Promissory

Estoppel and Module 6

Legitimate
Expectations
 • Private Law Concept – “When one person has, by his
declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or
permitted another person to believe such a thing to
be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor
his representative shall be allowed, in any suit or
proceeding between himself and such person or his
representative, to deny the truth of that thing.” 
quasi contractual relationship.
• Why is it relevant in administrative law? – State
makes a promise and goes back on it, I can enforce

What is the state’s promise.

• Basis of this doctrine – lies in equity and fairness 

Promissory increases credibility of the government  no statute

 developed judicially.

Estoppel?
• Increased credibility and check on the government.
• Possible downside to this doctrine:
a) Cannot prevent the application of a statutory rule.
b) The executive cannot clog its discretion – fetters
to discretion is invalid.
c) Estopped cannot be allowed to hinder the
formation of the governmental policy even if a
citizen is a victim of change of policy.
d) Applying estoppel against the government maybe
against public interest.
• Should election promises count as well?
 • General Position – generally speaking, the
doctrine of promissory estoppel is
inapplicable against the government and its
agencies  artificially fetters their
discretion.
• Federal Crop Insurance Corp vs. Merril:
A local agent of a government corporation
Promissory advised the insured farmer that a particular
crop was insurable. On the recommendation
Estoppel of the agency, the Corp accepted the
application of the insured for crop insurance.
in the US Neither the farmer or the agency knew at the
the time that the Corp had made a regulation
precluding insurance of the crop. Later, the
crop was destroyed, and the Plaintiff
attempted to claim insurance. The Corp
refused to pay relying on the regulation
made by it. Supreme Court declined to give
effect to the promise made by the
government because it would run contrary to
the law  PE was in-applicable.
 • Moser vs. US: Administration made a promise to
Moser but later refused to be bound by it, on the
ground that it was unauthorized by the statute or
regulation. The Court disagreed, concluding that
estoppel should be invoked wherein an erroneous
advice was in the form of a crucial mis-statement in
an official decision. Administrative regularity must
yield to the basic notions of fairness. “to say to
these appellants, ‘the joke is on, you shouldn’t
have trusted us’, is hardly worthy of our great

Promissory government.”
• Although, over the years some progress has been

Estoppel made in judicial thinking towards acceptance of the

idea that estoppel may apply against the government
in some situations, by and large the position of those

in the US who rely on the governmental advice remain

vulnerable and not much protection is available to
them in case the advice turns out to be incorrect,
mistaken or wrong.
• One suggestion made out of this dilemma is that
Congress enact a general statute protection people
who rely on administrative advice in good faith. Such
law may provide that no sanction shall be imposed for
an act done in good faith by any person replying upon
an agency advice obtained in writing even though
such advice is later found to be invalid by the agency
– define the contours of promissory estoppel.
 • In Britain, the general rule if that the
doctrine of PE is not ordinarily available
against the government and that the
government is not bound by any
representatives or assurances which may
have been made on its behalf if to act on
the same involves a breach of statute.
• The rationale of the rule of no-estoppel
Promissory against the Administration is that the law is
prescribed by the legislature and not by the
Estoppel official concerned and so he has no right to
modify the provisions of the statute. If the
in the UK Administration is held bound by its advice or
assurance that is contrary to the law, it
would amount to changing statutory
provisions by the executive which only the
legislature could do in a democracy. If the
doctrine of estoppel were to apply, it would
amount to giving de-facto validity to ultra-
vires administrative acts. Estoppel cannot
be used to give public authority powers
which it does not possesses  would lead
to wide scale corruption.
 • Howell v. Falmouth Boat Construction Co. Ltd - In
this case, a statute provided that a certain operation
could not be undertaken legally without a licence being
obtained from the appropriate government department.
An official of the concerned department gave an
assurance to an individual that no such licence would be
necessary in his particular circumstances. The assurance
given was against the statute. Refusing to apply estoppel
in this fact-situation, the House of Lords held that the
assurance could not have the effect of overriding the
statute or of legalising the particular operation in the
Promissory absence of a licence.
• Southend-On-Sea Corporation vs. Hodgson
Estoppel (Wickford) Ltd. –A office of the planning authority told
a firm that if they bought certain property, they would

in the UK not need the planning permission to use it as a builder’s

yard since it was already being used for that purpose so
that the purchaser would have the benefit of the
‘existing use right’. This in fact was wrong information.
The builder relying on this assurance bought this land
and started using it, but the planning authority
subsequently refused permission. The court relied that
the Planning authority was not estopped from rely on the
true facts and could enforce its refusal of permission. The
Court held that just as estoppel could not affect the
performance of a statutory duty, so it could not hinder
the exercise of a statutory discretion  discretion cannot
be fettered.
 • Position somewhat changes with – Lever Finance vs.
Westminster Corp – After the Plaintiffs had obtained
planning permission for building fourteen houses, the
plaintiffs’ architect revised the site plan by altering the
building line so that one of the houses would be built
according to a different plan to the one for which
permission was taken. The architect sent revised plans to
the planning officer and enquired of him whether further
planning permission was needed.

Promissory • Relying on his memory as he had misplaced the file, the

planning officer concerned assured the architect that the

Estoppel
variation was not material, and no further permission was
necessary. Later, the planning authority required the
developers to demolish the offending house and rebuild it
in the UK according to the the original plan or seek fresh permission
for the change. The court ruled that the planning authority
was estopped from claiming that the planning permission
as necessary because of the assurances given by the
officer to the contrary effect. The authority was held bound
by the officers’ assurances. “If an officer acting within
the scope of his ostensible authority, makes a
representation on which another acts, then a public
authority may be bound by it, just as much as a
private person would be.”
• However, this line of cases remain the exception.
 • The Government of UP, in Oct 1968, gave
an assurance through a statement
published in the newspaper, that new
industrial units in the State would be
exempt from sales tax for a period of three
years to enable them to find firm footing in
Motilal the development stage. The Government
did so with a view to promote
Padampat industrialization in the State.

Sugar Mills vs. • The State Government also gave a

categorical assurance specifically to the
State of U.P. effect that if they set up a vanaspati
factory in the State, its product would be
exempt from sales tax for three years.
Relying on this assurance, the petitioner
established a mill in the State. Later, the
Government retracted its assurance and
sought to impose sales tax on the
petitioner.
 • The Government had a categorical
representation, knowing or intending that
it would be acted upon by the appellant
and since they did act upon the
representation and altered their position,
the factual basis for setting up the
doctrine of promissory estoppel was
present, and the government was bound
to make good the representation made by
it.
Holding • Promissory Estoppel could not be invoked
to compel the govt to do any act
prohibited by law. But the doctrine could
be invoked in the instant case as the
relevant statute contained a provision
enabling the State Government to grant
exemptions from sales tax through a
notification to such goods, as were
manufactured in a new unit. The
Government could, therefore, issue a
notification under this statutory provision
to honour its promise.
 • The Government argued that the Petitioners’
factory was profitable concern and thus no
prejudice was caused to them by acting on its
assurances and setting up the factory. But the
Court rejected this argument by saying that the
profit made by the factory was not a relevant
factor. The Court ruled that it was not necessary
“to attract the applicability of promissory
estoppel that the promisee acting in
reliance on the promise, should suffer any
Holding detriment.” What was material in the situation
was “altering of the position” by the
petitioners acting in reliance on the promise and
not any “prejudice” caused to them.
• “The detriment in such a case is not some
prejudice suffered by the promisee by
acting on the promise, but the prejudice
which would be caused to the promisee, if
the promisor were allowed to go back on
the promise. “
• Lowers the threshold of application of
promissory estoppel.
Holding
• The true principle of promissory estoppel, therefore seems to be that where one
party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal
promise which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to
arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other
party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party,
the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to
go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the
dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so
irrespective whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not.
• It is elementary that in a Republic governed by the rule of law, no one, howsoever
high or low, is above the law. Everyone is subject to the law as fully and completely
as any other and the Government is no exception. It is indeed the pride of
constitutional democracy and rule of law that the Government stands on the same
footing as a private individual so far as the obligation of the law is concerned: the
former is equally bound as the latter. It is indeed difficult to see on what principle can
a Government, committed to the rule of law, claim immunity from the doctrine of
promissory estoppel. Can the Government say that it is under no obligation to act in
a manner that is fair and just or that it is not bound by considerations of "honesty
and good faith"?
 • Being an equitable doctrine, “it must
yield when equity so requires.”
• The Court would not also enforce the
promise if public interest suffers in
fulfilling the promise made by the
government.
• Merely a claim of change of policy would
Exceptions not be sufficient to exonerate the
government from the liability. The
to PE Government has to show what precisely
is the changed policy and also its reason
and justification for the change so that
the court can judge for itself which way
the public interest lies and what equity
of the case demands.
• The doctrine cannot also be applied in
the teeth of an obligation or liability
imposed by law.
 differences between the two.
• Under this doctrine, a person may have
reasonable or legitimate expectations of
What is being treated in a certain way by an
administrative authority even though he has
Legitimate no right in law to receive the benefit. In such a
situation if a decision is taken by an administrative
Expectation? authority adversely affecting their interests, they
may have justifiable grievances in light of the fact of
continuous receipt of the benefit, LE to receive the
benefit or privilege which he has enjoyed all
throughout. Such expectations may either arise
from the express promise or from consistent
practice which the applicant may reasonably expect
to continue. Eg. Oxygen supply in steel and
petroleum industries  corresponding right in
private law  easement rights (right enjoyed by
virtue of practice).
• The expectation should be legitimate, that is
reasonable, logical and valid. Any expectation which
is based on sporadic or casual or random acts or
which is unreasonable, illegal or illogical cannot be a
legitimate expectation. Not being a right, it is
not enforceable as such. It is a concept
 • Gotten this right/benefit through
repeated practice for a long period
How do of time.
• Not a constitutional or statutory
you right.
identify • He will continue to receive the
benefit, due to the historical
LE? practice  as long as the benefit is
legitimate  court can uphold it.
• Sources  consistent practice or
express promise (what is this
called?).
 • The doctrine of LE based on established practice ,
can be invoked only by someone who has
dealings or transactions or negotiations
(legal) with an authority , on which such
established practice has a bearing, or by
someone who has recognized legal

What is relationship with the authority. A total stranger

unconnected with the authority or a person who
has no previous dealings with the authority and
Legitimate who has not entered into any transaction or
negotiations with the authority, usually cannot

Expectatio
invoke the doctrine of legitimate expectations. Eg.
Mineral industry.

n?
• Types of LE:
1. Procedural LE – give us a hearing before a
decision adverse to you is taken.
2. Substantive LE – based on merit. If the
Administration by representation has created a
LE in some person, then it will be unfair on the
part of the Administration to whittle down or
take away such legitimate expectations.
 • Historical Practice vs. Express
Promise
• Expectation  three sources 
a. Law – statutory right
What is b. Promise – Promissory Estoppel
c. Long standing practice - LE 
LE? legitimate, reasonable, logical and
valid
• Courts have constantly used these
terms interchangeably.
 • For PE to arise after a representation
or promise has been made by a public
authority, it is necessary that the
promisee or representee relying on the
promise or the representation should have
changed his position. There is no such
Difference condition in the case of LE.
• LE may arise not only out of promise or a
between representation, either generally
specifically to the concerned party, but
or

PE and LE also out of past practice followed by

the concerned authority.
• Every fact situation giving rise to PE also
created LE in the representee that the
administration will fulfill the
representation. But the reverse is not
always true.
• At times they are used interchangeably by
the courts but that is incorrect.
 • Because of the overall resistance, the concept
PE against the government has not made
much headway in Britain. The courts do not
support this concept on the ground that a
public authority ought not to fetter its
discretion.
• CCSU Case (Council of Civil Service Unions v
Minister for the Civil Service:
1. What a person has been permitted by the
Position in concerned authority to enjoy and which he
can legitimately expect to be permitted to

the UK
continue to enjoy until “there has been
communicated to him some rationale
grounds for withdrawing it on which he has
been given an opportunity to comment.”
2. He has received assurances from the
concerned authority that the benefit will not
be withdrawn without giving him an
opportunity of advancing reasons for
contending that it should not be withdrawn.
3. It may also extend to a benefit in the future
which has not yet been enjoyed but has
been promised.
 Schmidt vs. Secretary of Home
Affairs:
An alien was given the permit to
enter Britain for a certain period. He
was refused permission to stay in
Position in Britain beyond the stipulated period
the UK of the permit. The court ruled that he
had the legitimate expectation to
stay in Britain for the permit period
but had no legitimate expectation to
stay in Britain thereafter.
 Coughlan
• The court may decide that the public
authority is only required to bear in mind its
previous policy or other representation ,
giving it the weight, it thinks rights, but no
more before deciding whether to change
course.
• The court may decide that the promise or

Position in practice has induced a legitimate expectation

of being consulted before the particular
decision is taken.
the UK • The court may consider that the lawful
promise or practice has induced a legitimate
expectation of a benefit which is substantive.
It is for the court to decide in a proper case
whether to frustrate the expectation, is so
unfair that to take a new and different course
will amount to an abuse of power, “here once
the legitimacy of the expectation is
established, the court will have the task of
weighing the requirements of fairness against
any overriding interest relied upon for the
change of policy.” – Substantive
Position in
• The Government announced a policy of allotting land
to cooperative housing societies based on seniority
of registration (first come first serve). Later after

India – several societies registered, the Govt sought to

change this policy  registration will be based on the
number of members in the housing society 
Navjyoti adversely affected many housing societies 
approached court  past practice, we have a

Co- legitimate expectation.

• Court – The principle of allotment of land had always

operative
been on the basis on registration and not the date of
approval of the list of members, by practice even if
there is no statutory requirements.
Housing • In the aforesaid facts, the ground housing societies
were entitled to ‘legitimate expectation’ of following

Society vs. consistent past practice in the matter of allotment,

even though they may not have any legal right in
private law to receive such treatment. The existence
Union of of LE may have a number of different consequences
and one of such consequences is that the authority

India. ought not to act to defeat the LE without some

overriding reason of public policy to justify doing so.
In case of LE if the authority proposes to
defeat the persons LE it should afford him an
opportunity to make representations in the
matter – what is this?
 • It may be indicated here that the doctrine of
LE imposes in essence a duty on the public
Navjyoti authority to act fairly by taking into
consideration the relevant factors relating to

Co-
such ‘LE’. Within the conspectus of fair
dealing in case of LE, the reasonable
opportunity to make representations by
operative parties likely to be affected by any change of
consistent past policy comes in. We have not
Housing been shown any compelling reasons taken
into consideration by the CG to make a

Society vs. departure from the existing policy of

allotment with reference to seniority in
Registration by introducing a new guidelines.
Union of • We therefore feel that in the facts of the case
it was only desirable that before introducing
India. or implementing any change in the
guidelines for allotment, an opportunity to
make representations against the proposed
change in the guidelines should have been
given to the registered Group Housing
Societies, if necessary by way of public
notice.
 • The claim stemmed from a
government tender notification for a
project aimed at establishing digital
wireless telecommunication
facilities in an identified set of
Punjab villages in UP.
Communicatio • The original notification was
ns Ltd. Vs. UOI abandoned in favour of a
(1999) notification for setting up these
facilities across the country more
broadly, instead of targeting the
identified set of villages. The
claimant argued that it had a
substantive legitimate expectation
for the original tender to be
processed.
 • The principle of LE is still at the stage of evolution.
• For LE to arise, the decision of the administrative
authority must affect the person by depriving him
of some benefit or advantage which either;
a. He had in the past been permitted by the decision
maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately
expect to continue to do until there has been
communicated to him some rational ground for
withdrawing it on which he has been given an
opportunity to comment.
Holding b. He has received assurances from the decision-
maker that they will not be withdrawn without
giving him first an opportunity of advancing
reasons for contending that they should not be
withdrawn.
• The procedural part of it relates to a representation
that a hearing or other appropriate procedure will
be afforded before the decision is made. The
substantive part of the principle is that if a
representation is made that a benefit of a
substantive nature will be granted or if the person
is already in receipt of the benefit that it will be
continued and not be substantially varied, then the
same could be enforced  substantive LE.
 • Cited English cases where LE has been recognized.
Even so, it has been held under English law that the
decision maker’s freedom to change the policy in
public interest, cannot be fettered by the application
of the principle of SLE.
• The doctrine of LE in a substantive sense has been
accepted as part of our law and that the decision
makers can normally be compelled to give effect to
his representation in regard to the expectation based
on previous practice or past conduct unless some

Holding overriding public interest comes in the way.

• What is the lens the court must use?
The more important aspect in our opinion, is whether
the decision maker can sustain the change in policy by
resort to the Wednesbury principle of reasonableness
or whether the court can go into the question of
whether the decision makers has properly balanced
legitimate expectation as against the need for change ?
In the latter case the Court would obviously be able to
go into the proportionality of the change in the policy.
Court says change in policy can defeat a
substantive legitimate expectation if it can be
justified on Wednesbury Reasonableness  Art
14.
 • In sum, this means that the
judgment whether public interest
overrides substantial legitimate
expectation of individuals will be
for the decision maker who has
made the change in the policy
and the Courts will intervene in
that decision only if they are
Holding satisfied that the decision
violated the Wednesbury
Principle.
• In this case the court found no
violation of the Wednesbury
Principle of reasonableness ,
hence the change in policy was
found to not violate SLE
Doctrine.
 MRF Ltd. is a company incorporated under the
Companies Act, 1956, with its registered office in
Chennai. The company operates an industrial unit
M. R. F. Ltd., at Vadavathoor near Kottayam in Kerala, where it
manufactures automotive tyres, tubes, compound
rubber, tread rubber, and other rubber products.
Kottayam Ltd. The Government of Kerala had introduced various
incentives to promote industrial growth in the
state by granting exemptions, concessions, and
Assistant reductions in sales tax, electricity duty, and
electricity tariff to new and existing
industries. MRF had established its industrial unit
Commissioner in Kerala based on these promised incentives,
particularly tax exemptions. However, these
Sales Tax exemptions were later withdrawn by the
government.
• MRF filed a writ petition challenging the
(2006) 8 SCC withdrawal of the tax exemptions. The Single
Judge of the Kerala High Court dismissed the
petition. The Division Bench of the High Court
702 affirmed the Single Judge's decision. Subsequently,
MRF appealed to the Supreme Court.
 The primary issue was whether the
doctrine of promissory estoppel
applied against the government's
M. R. F. Ltd., decision to withdraw the previously
promised tax exemptions to MRF Ltd.
Kottayam Ltd. Legal Principles Involved
[Link] of Promissory Estoppel: This
Assistant principle prevents a party from acting
in a way that is inconsistent with an
understanding they have previously
Commissioner established with another party, where
the other party has relied on that
understanding to their detriment.
Sales Tax
[Link] Expectation: The principle
that a public authority should not
(2006) 8 SCC frustrate the legitimate expectations
of those who have relied on promises
702 or practices established by the
authority.
 The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and ruled in favor
of MRF Ltd. The Court held that:
[Link] virtue of the order granting exemption pursuant to
M. R. F. Ltd., the first notification, MRF Ltd. had acquired the right to
avail of tax exemption.
[Link] government had "clearly held out a promise to
Kottayam Ltd. these new industries which had admittedly got
established in the region, acting on such promise, the
same in equity would bind the government".

Assistant [Link] had made substantial investments based on the

Kerala government's promise of exemption. This
established a case for promissory estoppel against the
government.
Commissioner [Link] Court upheld the plea of promissory estoppel,
noting that MRF had effected huge investments based
on the promised exemptions, which were later
Sales Tax withdrawn.
This judgment is significant as it reaffirmed the application
of the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the
(2006) 8 SCC government in tax matters. It established that when
industries make substantial investments based on
promised government incentives, those promises can be
702 legally enforced, particularly when the government fails to
demonstrate an overriding public interest in withdrawing
such incentives
 M. R. F. Ltd., Kottayam Ltd. Assistant
Commissioner Sales Tax (2006) 8 SCC 702
“A person may have a 'legitimate expectation' of being treated in a certain way by an administrative
authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation
may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied
representation, or from consistent past practice. The doctrine of legitimate expectation has an
important place in the developing law of judicial review. It is, however, not necessary to explore the
doctrine in this case, it is enough merely to note that a legitimate expectation can provide a sufficient
interest to enable one who cannot point to the existence of a substantive right to obtain the leave of
the court to apply for judicial review. It is generally agreed that 'legitimate expectation' gives the
applicant sufficient locus standi for judicial review and that the doctrine of legitimate expectation to be
confined mostly to right of a fair hearing before a decision which results in negativing a promise or
withdrawing an undertaking is taken. The doctrine does not give scope to claim relief straightway from
the administrative authorities as no crystallized right as such is involved. The protection of such
legitimate expectation does not require the fulfillment of the expectation where an overriding public
interest requires otherwise. In other words, where a person's legitimate expectation is not fulfilled by
taking a particular decision then the decision maker should justify the denial of such expectation by
showing some overriding public interest”
 • SLE in India – Emperor’s New Clothes.
• Despite the SC having in theory accepted
SLE on multiple occasions  it remains an
illusory doctrine and therefore fictitious.
• The SC has held that SLE arise when a
representation is made to a person that a
benefit of a substantive nature will be
Chintan granted or – if the person is already
Chandrachud – enjoying the benefit – will be continued
without any significant variation. This
The fictious representation can manifest itself in
doctrine of SLE in different ways – including through an
express policy, a promise made to a
India. claimant or class of claimants, or
established practice giving rise to the
expectation that it will continue to be
followed. The claimant bears the burden
of producing evidence of policy, practice,
promise. The doctrine of SLE has been
subsumed within the ‘non-arbitrariness’
branch of the right to equality under Art.
14 of the Const.
 • Hindustan Development Corporation Case  Bid
Rigging Case  govt would ask railway tenders
from 3 players only. The 3 companies began
indulging in bid-rigging  ensure all 3 will get
tenders and will cause price inflation. Govt
realized this and invited bids from external
players  one of the 3 corporations went to court
Chintan  LE violated in lieu of past practices.
Chandrachud – • Court held: ‘mere anticipation’ does not give rise
The fictious to SLE. Only legal rights and rights deriving
from law leads to SLE. What is the problem
doctrine of SLE in here?
India. • SC has often highlighted the dangers of SLE.
Court has also said that “there are stronger
reasons as to why the LE should not be
substantively protected than the reasons as to
why it should be protected.”
• These observations shed light on the SC’s
reluctance to accept substantial protection of LE
as an independent basis for JR.
 • SC has also rejected SLE in
employment matters.
Contractual/Temporary employees
cannot rely on this doctrine to claim
Chintan that they have a LE to be regularized 
Chandrachud – worried about the volume of litigation.
The fictious • Court has accepted that SLE are a
doctrine of SLE in “weak” ground for JR. They have also
India. created many exceptions to the rule
and have laid out high thresholds (eg.
Conduct continuing over 14 years was
not found sufficient to lead rise to LE).
• Exceptions to SLE – Public interest and
Good Faith. Too easy?
 • Standard of review – Wednesbury test
and not proportionality.
• Out of 34 cases 1992-2012 – SLE
doctrine was not enforced in single
Chintan case. It did not influence the courts
outcome even in cases wherein it was
Chandrachud – cited.
The fictious
• Why not just do away with it? – wants
doctrine of SLE in to look progressive, has given weight
India. on early UK jurisprudence that didn’t
give much weight to this concept.
• Remarkably difficult to find any case in
which SLE has been successfully
vindicated by the SC – hence
fictitious.
 • `Promises are meant to be broken' is well known in
the social context. However, law has evolved the
doctrines of legitimate expectation and promissory
estoppel to ensure that promises made by the
Government, its officials and other authorities are
not broken and are, in fact, judicially enforceable,
subject to certain conditions.

2021 • The present petition has been filed by the Petitioners

to seek enforcement of the promise made by the
Update - Chief Minister of Delhi on 29th March, 2020.
• The CM gave a press conference on 29th March
Najma v 2020, in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, in
which he requested all landlords to postpone the
GNCTD demand/collection of rent from those tenants who
are poor and poverty stricken.
• In the backdrop of instances of landlords forcing
tenants to make payments of their rent, while
requesting landlords to talk to their tenants and
postpone the collection of rents, it is alleged that the
CM, in the press conference, had made a clear
promise that if any tenant is unable to pay the rent
due to poverty, the Government would pay his/her
rent on their behalf
 • According to the Petitioners, a solemn
assurance was given that the
Government would take care of the
2021 tenants.
Update - • When such a promise/assurance is
given by the Government, citizens
Najma v are entitled to seek enforcement of
GNCTD – such promises on the basis of the
doctrine of legitimate expectation.
Petitione • The conduct of the Government
rs cannot be contrary to the promise
made by the CM, in view of the
doctrine of promissory estoppel.
 • The difference between legitimate expectation
and promissory estoppel is also urged to the
effect that in the present case, it is not merely
the doctrine of legitimate expectation that is
applicable, but also the doctrine of promissory
2021 estoppel, inasmuch as, based on the statement
of the CM, the Petitioners have altered their
Update - position and have continued to live in Delhi,
instead of migrating to their hometowns.
Najma v • A procedural legitimate expectation would
mean that there has to be a proper notice and
GNCTD – consolidation in the decision-making process. A
substantive legitimate expectation would also
Holding include change in existing policies, and the
effect that it may have on those governed by
the unchanged policies.
• The promise, assurance or representation
made has to be judged from the reasonable
understanding of a common individual, and not
as per the authority making the representation.
 • The factum of the speech dated 29th March
2020, having been given by the CM, in the
present case is admitted and not in dispute. The
text of the speech is also not in dispute - It is an
appeal to landlords not to collect rent from
tenants for two to three months, if they are
2021 unable to pay the rent due to poverty.
• The address by the CM in the press conference
Update - has three dimensions. The first dimension is an
appeal to the landlords. Second is a promise to
Najma v landlords that it would pay on behalf of the
tenants, if they are unable to due to lack of
GNCTD – means and poverty, and thirdly, it has a warning
to landlords to not coerce the tenants.
Holding • Whether the said statements given by the
CM in this address are enforceable by
applying either the doctrine of legitimate
expectation or promissory estoppel, the
factual backdrop and the context in which
the above address was made, needs to be
taken note of.
 • A perusal of all these news reports preceding the
announcement made by the CM, would reveal that
the city of Delhi witnessed a massive human issue,
in which labourers, blue-collar workers, construction
workers, etc., who were employed in various
construction projects, commercial establishments,
2021 factories, godowns, weekly markets, etc., had all
started leaving Delhi. A large number of such
Update - people also lost their employment due to the
shutting down of these establishments.
Najma v • Various facilities, schemes and ex-gratia payments
were announced by Governmental authorities, both
GNCTD – at the Centre and the State level, during this period.
These included provision of free food, shelter and
Holding transportation, ex-gratia payments, etc. It is in this
context that the promise was made by the CM that
there would be reimbursement to the landlords, if
the tenants do not pay the rent. The speech, which
was under the premise that COVID-19 may be over
within two- three months, shows that the words used
were assurance or promise and reimbursement for
the landlords, on behalf of the tenants.
 • The principles governing the doctrines of legitimate
expectation and promissory estoppel are well settled.
Both these doctrines primarily recognize the role of
the State or the Governmental authority's vis-a-vis the
public. They are a reflection of the legal recognition
being accorded to the trust that citizens repose on

2021
promises/assurances/representations which are made
by Constitutional functionaries and governmental
authorities, especially in times of distress.
Update - • The said two doctrines are not absolute in nature.
There are various conditions that need to be satisfied

Najma v for legal enforcement of rights claimed under these

doctrines. There are also well recognized exceptions,
which can be relied upon for not enforcing such
GNCTD – promises/assurances/representations. The question as
to whether a promise/assurance/representation results

Holding in a legally enforceable right and if so, what would be

the relief that a Court can grant, depends upon the
factual circumstances of each case and the context in
which the said promises/assurance or representations
have been made by the Governmental authorities.
• The judicial enforceability of the assurance and promise made
by a Constitutional functionary, such as the CM, needs to be
considered by the Court both in letter and in spirit, in the
context of COVID Migrant Crisis.
 • The assurance given or the promise made in the
present case was obviously with a view to stop or
curb the migration of people from Delhi, to the
extent possible.
• The actual effect of the promise or the assurance is
beyond the scope of the present writ petition,
2021 inasmuch as there is no clarity as to whether the
assurance resulted in tenants staying back.
Update - However, this Court cannot be dismissive of
the fact that the Petitioners, who are before
Najma v the Court, claim to have acted on the promise
or the assurance made by the CM.

GNCTD – • It would not be unreasonable to presume that

some tenants and landlords may have altered their
Holding positions based upon the assurance given by the
CM.
• In the said case, the court, importantly recognised
that even when a public authority decided to renege
from its promise/ assurance/ representation, the
least that would be expected, before reneging on
the promise, is due consideration by the
government and adequate, legally valid
reasons to not abide by the same.
 • The first category of cases are where
there is a clear governmental policy,
which is sought to be changed, and the
legitimate expectation of those who
were covered under the previously
2021 existing policy is in question.
• The second category of cases are those
Update - where the initial assurance/promise given
Najma v by a State functionary or a Governmental
authority was, thereafter, translated into
GNCTD – a specific policy, which again was
enforced by the Courts.
Holding • The third category of cases are those
cases where an oral assurance/promise
which was made was not implemented by
a conscious policy decision, that was
taken in public interest due to adequate
reasons that were shown
 • Where a clear and unequivocal oral assurance and
promise is made by the CM of the GNCTD but there
is no policy whatsoever, placed before the Court.
The salient facts and features of the present case
are:
(1) Exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19
2021 pandemic.

Update - (2) Extreme distress being faced by migrant labourers

and blue-collar workers and employees.

Najma v (3) A clear promise/assurance made by the CM.

(4) No positive policy to implement the said
GNCTD – promise/assurance given by the GNCTD.
(5) No contrary policy implemented by the
Holding government, placed before the Court.
(6) No decision taken to not implement the said
promise/assurance that was given by the CM.
(7) The exception of public interest having not been
invoked for the non-implementation of the
promise/assurance.
 government, heads of State and those
holding responsible positions are expected
to make responsible assurances/promises
to their citizens, especially in times of crisis
and distress. On behalf of the citizens, there
would obviously be a reasonable
2021 expectation, that an assurance or promise
made by a senior Constitutional functionary,
Update - not less than the CM himself, would be give
effect to.
Najma v • It cannot be reasonably said that no tenant
GNCTD – or landlord would have believed the CM 
Test of Reasonableness.
Holding • If the GNCTD had actually come out with a
policy either deciding to not implement the
said promise or assurance on grounds
which are legally sustainable, obviously the
Courts cannot interfere. However, even
applying the basic Wednesbury
principles, the decision making, after
 commitment made, it is not the positive decision
making which is arbitrary, but the lack of decision
making or indecision, which this Court holds to
be contrary to law.
• Once the CM had made a solemn assurance, there
was a duty cast on the GNCTD to take a stand as to

2021
whether to enforce the said promise or not, and if so
on what grounds or on the basis of what reasons.

Update - • In the context of upholding Fundamental Rights,

the principles of legitimate expectation have to

Najma v be accorded a higher pedestal and the burden on

the authority concerned not to honour the same, is
even higher.
GNCTD – • It cannot be held that there was no expectation or

Holding anticipation by the citizens that the CM's promise

would be given effect to. The doctrine of promissory
estoppel also being an equitable doctrine, equity
requires this Court to hold the GNCTD responsible
for the said indecision or lack of action, on the
promise/assurance given by the CM.
• however, it is not clear as to why the GNCTD chose
to completely disregard the promise or assurance
given by its CM and not effectuate the same.
 authorities also ought to follow the rule of reason.
There has to be a reason as to why the Government has
simply chosen to disregard or failed to implement the
promise/assurance given by the CM.
• The said assurance is not a political promise, as
is sought to be canvassed before this Court. It
was also not made as a part of an election rally.

2021
It is a statement made by the CM of the GNCTD.
There is a reasonable expectation on behalf of
the citizens that the CM knows the background,
Update - in which such a promise is being made, the
number of people who would be affected by the
Najma v same as also the financial implications of such a
promise/assurance, in the context in which it was

GNCTD – made. The statement was not made by a

Government functionary at a lower level in the
hierarchy, who could be devoid of such
Holding knowledge.
• The said promise was to act as a balm on the wounds of
landlords and tenants, who were severely affected as a
class of citizens in Delhi.
• The CM and the Council of Ministers are to aid and
advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions,
and an assurance given by the CM, in a press
conference, i.e., a public platform, even without
 arbitrariness due to the doctrine of
legitimate expectation being applicable.
Thus, it cannot be said that merely because of
the fact that the conduct of the business of the
Government has to be in the name of the
Governor, the CM can be shorn of all the
2021 responsibilities.
• "The significance of the doctrine of promissory
Update - estoppel is great in the Administrative Law of
today. In India, the question whether the
Najma v doctrine of promissory estoppel applies against
the Administration in a specific fact-situation
GNCTD – arises quite frequently. The reason is that with
the vesting of large discretionary powers with
Holding the Administration, it has become increasingly
common for it to make advance
pronouncements regarding the manner in which
it would exercise its discretion, or interpret the
law, before an occasion to do so in a particular
case actually arises. It may also give opinion or
render advice to a particular individual as to
how it proposed to exercise its power in a
 • The GNCTD would, having regard to the
statement made by the CM on 29th March,
2020, to landlords and tenants, take a
decision as to the implementation of the
same within a period of 6 weeks.
2021 • The said decision would be taken, bearing
Update - in mind the larger interest of the persons to
whom the benefits were intended to be
Najma v extended in the said statement, as also any
overriding public interest concerns.
GNCTD – • Upon the said decision being taken, the
Direction GNCTD would frame a clear policy in this
regard.
s • Upon the said decision being taken, if a
Scheme or Policy is announced, the
Petitioners' case be considered under the
said Scheme/Policy as per the procedure
prescribed therein, if any. Remedies against
any decision taken are left open.