Fundamentals of IoT in

Enterprise
1. Energy industry – smart meters at home , wired or wireless
2. Retail industry – trying to find its place in it for improving leverage
new sensors, marketing capabilities and working on customer
satisfaction
Enterprise system is considered
as system of system
Architect of enterprise includes in design
Edge device
Gateways
Apps.
Transport
Cloud services
Diverse protocols
Data analysis Capabilities
Defining the IoT
-> The ITU's member-approved definition defines the IoT as "A global
infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services
by interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on existing and
evolving, interoperable information and communication technologies.“
-> The IEEE's small environment description of the IoT is "An IoT is a
network that connects uniquely identifiable "things" to the Internet.
The "things" have sensing/actuation and potential programmability
capabilities. Through the exploitation of the unique identification and
sensing, information about the "thing" can be collected and the state of
the "thing" can be changed from anywhere, anytime, by anything."
Cyber security versus IoT security and cyber
physical systems
• Cybersecurity, generally does not address the physical and security
aspects of the hardware device or the physical world interactions it can
have.
• the IoT has very real analog and physical elements. IoT devices are
physical things, many of which are safety-related. Therefore, the
compromise of such devices may lead to physical harm of persons and
property, even death.
• The subject of IoT security, is not the application of a single, static set of
meta-security rules as they apply to networked devices and hosts. It
requires a unique application for each system and system-of-systems in
which IoT devices participate.
An IoT device is almost anything possessing the following properties:
• Ability to communicate either directly on, or indirectly over the
Internet
• Manipulates or monitors something physical (in the device or the
device's medium or environment), that is, the thing itself, or a direct
connection to a thing
The security of the IoT device is then a function of the device's use the
physical process or state impacted by or controlled by the device, and
the sensitivity of the systems to which the device connects.
CPS- Cyber Physical system in IoT
• Safety: The system must not harm the world
• Security: The world must not harm the system
Characteristics of IoT
• Dynamic Self adapting- Surveillance camera, change captured by it.
• Self-configuring- set up network, fetch latest software upgrade
• Interoperable communication protocol
• Unique Identity
The things in the IoT
• Device: A piece of equipment with the mandatory capabilities of
communication and the optional capabilities of sensing, actuation, data
capture, data storage, and data processing
• Thing: An object of the physical world (physical things) or the
information world (virtual things), which is capable of being identified
and integrated into communication networks
The IoT device lifecycle
• IoT device implementation
• Original Equipment Manufacturer (or just "manufacturer") (OEM): OEMs
will typically procure off-the-shelf hardware and firmware and tailor a
device with unique physical characteristics, enclosure, and/or applications. They
package and distribute the products to end operators.
• Board Support Package (BSP) vendors: This vendor provides to the
OEM customized or off-the-shelf firmware, APIs, and drivers between the
hardware and operating systems.
• Original Design Manufacturers (ODM): ODMs will typically provide custom
operating systems and OS APIs to OEMs. They may also include hardware sub-
assemblies that OEMs make use of.
IoT service implementation
• This phase refers to the service organizations who support IoT
deployments through enterprise APIs, gateways, and other
architectural commodities. Organizations supporting this phase
include the following:
• Cloud service provider (CSP): These organizations typically provide,
at a minimum, infrastructure as a service.
• OEMs: In some cases, IoT device manufacturers (for example,
Samsung) operate and manage their own infrastructure
IoT device and service deployment
Hardware
• There are a number of IoT development boards that have become
popular for prototyping and provide various levels of functionality.
Examples of these boards come from Arduino, Beagle Board, Pinoccio,
Rasberry Pi, and CubieBoard, among others. These development
boards include microcontrollers (MCUs), which serve as the brains of
the device, provide memory, and a number of both digital and analog
General Purpose Input/Output (GPIO) pins.
• Leading developers of MCUs include ARM, Intel, Broadcom, Atmel,
Texas Instruments (TI), Freescale, and Microchip Technology. MCUs
are integrated circuits (IC) that contain a processor, Read Only
Memory (ROM), and Random Access Memory (RAM).
Operating systems
• Many Industries utilize real time operating system (RTOS) for process
and memory management as well as utility services supporting
messaging and other communications.
• The selection of each RTOS is based on needed performance, security
and functional requirements of the product.
• Some organizations may require more elaborate operating systems
with additional security features such as separation kernels, high
assurance process isolation, information flow control, and/or tightly
integrated cryptographic security architectures.
IoT communications
• In many situations, the end-to-end connectivity between a fielded IoT
device and web service may be provided by a series of field and cloud
gateways, each aggregating larger quantities of data from sprawled-
out devices. Dell, Intel, and other companies have recently introduced
IoT gateways to the market.
• Within an IoT device and its host network, a wide array of protocols
may be used to enable message transfer and communication. The
selection of the appropriate stack of messaging and communication
protocols is dependent upon the use cases and security requirements
of any specific system;
IoT communications stack
• Consider the example of the smart home for illustrative purposes.
As you wake in the morning, your wearable autonomously
transmits the wake-up signal over the Wi-Fi network to subscribing
devices. The smart television turns on to your favorite news
channel, the window blinds automatically rise, the coffee maker
kicks off, the shower starts and your car sets a timer to warm up
before you leave your home. All of these interactions are enabled
through device-to-device communications and illustrate the
immense potential of applying the IoT to business enterprises.
Messaging protocols

• At the top of the IoT communication stack live the protocols that
support the exchange of formatted message data between two
endpoints, typically clients and servers, or client-to-client.
• There are many gateway options, some as simple as a mobile device
(smart phone) co-located with the IoT end point and communicating
over an RF protocol such as Bluetooth-LE, ZigBee, or Wi-Fi. Gateways
such as this are sometimes called edge gateways.
• Others may be more centrally located in data centers to support any
number of dedicated or proprietary gateway IoT protocols, such as
message queuing telemetry transport (MQTT) or representational state
transfer (REST) communications.
Message queuing telemetry transport
(MQTT)
• At the top of the IoT communication stack live the protocols that
support the exchange of formatted message data between two
endpoints, typically clients and servers, or client-to-client. Protocols
such as the MQTT, the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), the
Data Distribution Service (DDS), the Advanced Message Queuing
Protocol (AMQP), and the Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP) run on top of lower-layer communication protocols
and provide the ability for both clients and servers to efficiently agree
upon data to exchange.
MQTT
MQTT-SN
• MQTT is a publish/subscribe model whereby clients subscribe to
topics and maintain an always-on TCP connection to a broker server.
As new messages are sent to the broker, they include the topic with
the message, allowing the broker to determine which clients should
receive the message. Messages are pushed to the clients through the
always-on connection. Like TV subscribing the channel. Messages are
pushed to the clients through the always-on connection.
• For Sensor Networks (MQTT-SN) is well suited for use with battery-
operated devices possessing limited processing and storage
resources. It allows sensors and actuators to make use of the
publish/subscribe model on top of ZigBee and similar RF protocol
specifications.
CoAP - Constrained Application Protocol
• CoAP is another IoT messaging protocol, UDP-based, and intended for
use in resource-constrained Internet devices such as WSN nodes. It
consists of a set of messages that map easily to HTTP: GET, POST, PUT,
and DELETE.
• CoAP device implementations communicate to web servers using
specific Uniform Resource Indicators (URIs) to process commands.
Examples of CoAP-enabled implementations include smart light
switches in which the switch sends a PUT command to change the
behavior (state, color) of each light in the system.
XMPP - Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol
• XMPP is based on Extensible Markup Language (XML) and is an open
technology for real-time communications.
• Upon confirmation of a friend request, the two IoT devices are able to
communicate with each other regardless of their domains. There also
exist parent-child device relationships. Parent nodes within XMPP-IoT
offer a degree of security in that they can provide policies dictating
whom a particular child node can trust (and hence become friends
with). Communication between IoT devices cannot proceed without a
confirmed friend request between them.
• IT evolved from the jabber instant messaging
Data Distribution Service (DDS),
DDS
• DDS is a data bus used for integrating intelligent machines. Like MQTT,
it also uses a publish/subscribe model for readers to subscribe to
topics of interest.
• DDS allows communications to happen in an anonymous and
automated fashion,since no relationship between endpoints is
required. Additionally, Quality of Service (QoS) mechanisms are built
into the protocol.
• DDS is designed primarily for device-to-device communication and is
used in deployment scenarios involving wind farms, medical imaging
systems, and asset-tracking systems.
Advanced Message Queuing Protocol (AMQP),
• AMQP was designed to provide a queuing system in support of server-
to-server communications. Applied to the IoT, it allows for both
publish/subscribe and point-to-point based communications. AMQP
IoT endpoints listen for messages on each queue.
• AMQP has been deployed in numerous sectors, such as
transportation in which vehicle telemetry devices provide data to
analytics systems for near-real-time processing.
Gateways
• A gateway is a network node used in telecommunications that
connects two networks with different transmission protocols
together.
Transport protocols
• The Internet was designed to operate reliably using the Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP), which facilitates the acknowledgement of TCP
segments transmitted across a network. TCP is the protocol of choice
for today's web-based communications as the underlying, reliable
transport.
• TCP is frequently unsuitable for use in constrained network
environments suffering from high latency or limited bandwidth.
• The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) provides a useful alternative,
however. UDP provides a lightweight transport mechanism for
connectionless communications (unlike session-based TCP).
Network protocols
• IPv4 and IPv6 both play a role at various points within many IoT
systems. Tailored protocol stacks such as IPv6 over Low Power Wireless
Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN) support the use of IPv6 within
network-constrained environments common to many IoT devices.
• 6LoWPan supports wireless Internet connectivity at lower data rates to
accommodate highly constrained device form factors.
• 6LoWPAN builds upon the 802.15.4 -Low Rate Wireless Personal Area
Networks (LRWPAN) specification to create an adaptation layer that
supports IPv6. The adaptation layer provides features that include IPv6
with UDP header compression and support for fragmentation, allowing
constrained sensors, for example, to be used in building automation
and security.
Data link and physical protocols
• IEEE 802.15.4, plays a significant role as the foundation for other
protocols—providing the Physical (PHY) and Medium Access Control
(MAC) layers for protocols such as ZigBee, 6LoWPAN, WirelessHART,
and even thread.
• IEEE 802.15.4- it is designed to operate using either point-to-point or
star topologies and is ideal for use in low-power or low-speed
environments.
• The PHY layer is responsible for managing RF network access, while
the MAC layer is responsible for managing transmission and receipt of
frames onto the data link.
ZWave
• Another protocol that operates at this layer of the stack is ZWave.
ZWave supports the transmission of three frame types on a network –
unicast, multicast, and broadcast. Unicast communications (that is,
direct) are acknowledged by the receiver; however, neither multicast
nor broadcast transmissions are acknowledged.
• ZWave networks consist of controllers and slaves.
• It includes - Bluetooth/Bluetooth Smart (also known as Bluetooth Low
Energy or BLE) is an evolution of Bluetooth designed for enhanced
battery life. Bluetooth Smart achieves its power saving capability by
defaulting to sleep mode and only waking when needed.
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN IoT ARCHITECTURE
• A critical requirement of IoT is that the devices must be
interconnected, which makes it be able to perform specific tasks, such
as sensing, communicating, information processing, etc.
• The system architecture must provide operational guarantees for the
IoT, which bridges the gap between the physical devices and the
virtual worlds.
• In designing the framework of IoT, following factors should be taken
into consideration: (1) technical factors, such as sensing techniques,
communication methods, network technologies, etc.; (2) security
protection, such as information confidentiality, transmission security,
privacy protection, etc.; (3) business issues, such as business models,
business processes, etc.
SoA(Service-Oriented Architecture) for IoT
• Sensing layer is integrated with end components of IoT to sense and
acquire the information of devices;
• Network layer is the infrastructure to support wireless or wired
connections among things;
• Service layer is to provide and manage services required by users or
applications;
• Application interfaces layer consists of interaction methods with
users or applications.
Sensing Layer and IoT End-Nodes
In determining the sensing layer of an IoT, the main concerns are:
• Cost, size, resource, and energy consumption. The things might be equipped
with sensing devices such as RFID tags, sensors, actuator, etc., which should be
designed to minimize required resources as well as cost.
• Deployment. The IoT end-nodes (such as RFID reader, tags, sensors, etc.) can be
deployed one-time, or in incremental or random ways depending on application
requirements.
• Heterogeneity. A variety of things or hybrid networks make the IoT very
heterogeneous.
• Communication. The IoT end-nodes should be designed in such a way that it is
able to communicate with each other.
• Networks. The IoT involves hybrid networks, such as Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSNs), WMNs, and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems.
In this layer, the security concerns can be classified into two main
categories:
• The security requirements at IoT end-node: physically security
protection, access control, authentication, nonrepudiation,
confidentiality, integrity, availability, and privacy.
• The security requirements in sensing layer: confidentiality, data
source authentication, device authentication, integrity, availability,
and timeless.
Network Layer
In the networking layer, the following issues should be addressed:
• Network management technologies including the management for
fixed, wireless, mobile networks,
• Network energy efficiency,
• Requirements of QoS (quality of service),
• Technologies for mining and searching,
• Information confidentiality,
• Security and privacy.
The security requirements in network layer involve:

• Overall security requirements, including confidentiality, integrity, privacy

protection, authentication, group authentication, keys protection,
availability, etc.
• Privacy leakage: Since some IoT devices physically located in untrusted
places, which cause potential risks for attackers to physically find the
privacy information such as user identification, etc.
• Communication security: It involves the integrity and confidentiality of
signaling in IoT communications.
• Over connected: The over connected IoT may run risk of losing control of
the user. Two security concerns may be caused:
(1) DoS Denial of service attack, the bandwidth required by signaling
authentication can cause network congestion and further cause DoS;
(2) Keys security, for the over connected network, the keys operations could
cause heavy network resources consumption.
• MITM attack: Man in the middle attack The attacker makes
independent connections with the victims and relays messages
between them, making them believe that they are talking directly to
each other over a private connection, when in fact the attacker
controls the entire conversation.
• Fake network message: Attackers could create fake signaling to
isolate/misoperate the devices from the IoT.
Service Layer
The service layer provides IoT a cost-effective platform where the
hardware and software platforms could be reused.
• The core set of services in this layer might include following
components: event processing service, integration services, analytics
services, UI services, and security and management services.
The activities in service layer
• Service discovery. It finds infrastructure that can provide the required
service and information in an effective way.
• Service composition. It enables the combination and interaction
among the connected things. Discovery exploits the relationships of
things to find the desired service, and service composition schedules
or recreates more suitable services to obtain the most reliable ones.
• Trustworthiness management. It aims to understand the trusted
devices and information provided by other services.
• Service APIs. It provides the interactions between services required
by users.
Application Interface Layer
• For the application maintenance, following security requirements will
be involved:
• Remote safe configuration, software downloading and updating,
security patches, administrator authentication, unified security
platform, etc. For the security requirements on communications
between layers
• Integrity and confidentiality for transmission between layers, cross-
layer authentication and authorization, sensitive information
isolation, etc.
Cross-Layer Threats
• Information in the IoT architecture might be shared among all of the
four layers to achieve full interoperability between services and
devices. It brings a number of security challenges such as trust
guarantee, privacy of the users, and their date, secure data sharing
among layers, etc.
Security Threats
• Sensitive information leakage at border- The sensitive information
might be not protected at the border of layers
• Identity spoofing -The identities in different layers have different
priorities
• Sensitive information spreads between layers
Primer on attacks and countermeasures
• Common IoT attack types
• • Wired and wireless scanning and mapping attacks
• • Protocol attacks
• • Eavesdropping attacks (loss of confidentiality)
• • Cryptographic algorithm and key management attacks
• • Spoofing and masquerading (authentication attacks)
• • Operating system and application integrity attacks
• • Denial of service and jamming
• • Physical security attacks (for example, tampering, interface exposures)
• • Access control attacks (privilege escalation)
The classic pillars of information assurance
• It is nearly impossible to discuss practical aspects of threat, vulnerability,
and risk without identifying the essential components of information
assurance (IA), an important subdomain of IoT security. they are as follows:
• • Confidentiality: Keeping sensitive information secret and protected from
disclosure
• • Integrity: Ensuring that information is not modified, accidentally or
purposefully, without being detected
• • Authentication: Ensuring that the source of data is from a known identity
or endpoint (generally follows identification)
• • Non-repudiation: Ensuring that an individual or system cannot later deny
having performed an action
• • Availability: Ensuring that information is available when needed
Attack trees
• Building an attack tree
• Corrupting its navigation database: A navigation database maps named
locations to positions in space (latitude, longitude, and typically, altitude above
mean sea level). In practice, there are many potential ways to compromise a
navigation database, for example, either directly on the aircraft, its ground
control station, or even in the navigation and mapping supply chain (this is true
of manned aviation as well, as commercial airliners' flight computers have
extensive navigation databases).
• Spoofing GPS: In this case, the attacker could choose to perform an active RF-
based GPS attack in which they generate and transmit false GPS timing
data that the drone interprets as a false location. In response, the drone (if
under autonomous flight) navigates unknowingly, based on its falsely perceived
location, and follows a path maliciously designed by the attacker. (Note, we
assume there is no machine vision or other passive navigation system in use.)
• Spoofing the ground control station (GCS): In this option, the attacker can find
a way to spoof the drone's legitimate operator and attempt to send malicious
routing commands
Expand the Corrupt Navigation Database goal node:
Geographic Information System (GIS)
• Two of the nodes, Exploit Transitive Trust and Compro DB server,
each have subtrees.
• The third node, modify GIS tables, does not and is therefore called a
leaf node.
• Leaf nodes represent the actual attack vector entry points into the
model, that is, the attacker's activities,
• whereas its parents (AND OR nodes) represent either specific
device states, system states, or goals that the attacker may achieve
through their activities.
The SecurITree tool goes much further than just creating tree diagrams.
Its dialogs assist you in modeling each attack goal by establishing
indicators such as the following:
• Capabilities of the attacker, such as technical ability, noticeability,
cost of the attack, and so on
• Behaviors and probabilities • Impact of the attack to the victim (note
that by the time the subtree impacts aggregate up to the root node,
the final impact can be enormous)
• Benefits to the attacker (of given impacts) are motivating impacts for
the attack
• Detriments to the attacker are demotivators for the attack
Expanding the Exploit Transitive Trust
Fault tree and attack tree differences
The principal difference between an attack tree and a fault tree lies in
how one enters and traverses each:

• Fault trees are not based on intelligently planned attacks in which

multiple leaves of the tree are entered at will at the discretion of an
intelligent entity
• Fault trees are traversed based on stochastic processes (failure/fault
rates) from each leaf through the dependent, intermediate nodes
• Each fault tree leaf is completely independent (faults occur randomly
AND independently of each other) of all other leaves of the tree
Today's IoT attacks
• Wireless reconnaissance and mapping

• Security protocol attacks

• Physical security attacks

• Application security attacks

Wireless reconnaissance and mapping

• The majority of IoT devices on the market utilize wireless

communication protocols such as ZigBee, ZWave, Bluetooth-LE,
WiFi802.11, and others.
• Just as network scanning using tools such as Nmap is commonly
utilized by hackers to gather intelligence about hosts, subnets, ports,
and protocols in networks, similar paradigms are being used against
IoT devices—things that may open your garage door, lock your front
door, turn lights on and off, and so on. Wireless reconnaissance will
often precede full-scale device attacks
Security protocol attacks

• Many security protocols can sustain attacks against vulnerabilities

introduced either in the protocol design (specification),
implementation and even configuration stages (in which different,
viable protocol options are set).
• As an example, researchers found while testing a ZigBee-based
consumer IoT implementation that the protocol was designed for easy
setup and usage but lacked configuration possibilities for security and
performed vulnerable device pairing procedures.
• These procedures allow external parties to sniff the exchanged
network key during the ZigBee pairing transaction and gain control of
the ZigBee device.
Physical security attacks

• Physical security is a topic frequently overlooked by IoT vendors that

are only familiar with designing equipment, appliances, and other
tools historically not subject to exploitation.
• Physical security attacks include those in which the attacker(s)
physically penetrate the enclosure of a host, embedded device, or
other type of IoT computing platform to gain access to its processor,
memory devices, and other sensitive components.
• Once accessed over an exposed interface (for example, JTAG), the
attacker can readily access memory, sensitive key material, passwords,
configuration data, and a variety of other sensitive parameters.
Application security attacks
• IoT devices and connections can be exploited through attacks against
application endpoints. Application endpoints include web servers as well
as mobile device applications (for example, iPhone, Android) that have a
role in controlling the device.
• Application code running on the device itself can also be directly
targeted.
• Application fuzzing can find ways of compromising the application host
and taking control of its processes. In addition, reverse engineering and
other notable attacks can uncover sad but still common implementation
vulnerabilities such as hardcoded keys, passwords, and other strings in the
application binary. These parameters can be useful in various exploits.
Thank you…