Introduction & basic principles

Meaning of interpretation
Interpretation means it is an explanation,
expotison, translation, meaning,
• It means if any controversies/inconvenience
are arises in the statute or in enacted laws or
in provisions or any difficulties are there in the
words of the statute, through interpretation
interpreter remove the such difficulties and
controversies from the statute it is called
interpretation.
 Basic principles
• Basic Principles of interpretations are
• 1) Intention of the legislature
• 2) Statute must be read as a whole in its context
• 3) Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat
• 4) Plain or Ordinary meaning
• 5) Rule of Literal Construction
• 6) Strict Construction
• 7) Harmonious construction
• 8) Beneficent Construction
• 9) Mischief Rule
 Intention of the legislature
• What is called intention of the legislature
• when interpreter should consider the
intention of legislature
• why interpreter should consider the intention
of legislature
• It is necessary to consider the intention of
legislature at the time of interpretation.
 Vishnu prathap sugar works pvt ltd
v/s
chief inspector of stamp, UP (AIR1986 SC 74)

• In this case SC held that A statute is an

established rule, formal regulation or
ordinance, enacted by the legislature and A
statute is an announcement of the legislature.
 RMD Chamarbaugwala v/s UOI (AIR 1957 SC
628)
• SC held that the conventional way of
interpreting or construing a statute is to know
the intention of the maker of the statute. It
has to be construed in the manner similar to
“the intent of them who make it”.
• According to Salmond, the duty of the
judicature is to discover and to act upon the
true intention of the legislature. It means at
the time of interpretation interpreter should
consider the sententia legis which means
intention of legislature.
 United states v/s F.W. Keitel

• In this case U.S. court held that when more

than one interpretation can be made of a
statutory provision, the court has to be very
careful in choosing that interpretation which
represents the true intention of the legislature
and which can also be referred to as the legal
meaning of the statutory provision.
• The intention of legislature can be said to have
two aspects.
• Meaning
• Purpose and object
• Meaning: first aspect is that of ‘meaning’ which tells
what the words mean
• Purpose and object: second aspect includes
concept (parikalpane) of purpose and object which
means the purpose and object of enacting the statute.
 Kanailal Sur v/s Paramanidhi Sadhukhan, AIR
1957 S.C.907
• In this case justice Gajendragdkar said that “
the first and primary rule of construction is
that the intention of the legislature must be
found in the words used by the legislature
itself.
• Even when the words gives plain meaning,
then it is not necessary to interpret because
the words itself gives the plain/ordinary
meaning then why judges themselves are busy
to interpret.
 Reserve Bank of India v/s Pearless general
Finance and investment co 1987 SC 424
• In this case SC held that the interpretation
must depend on the context(sandarbha) and
the text (patya). These are the basis of
interpretation. Neither can be ignored. Both
are important.
Poppatlal shah v/s State of madras AIR 1953 SC
274
• In this case judge Mukarjee said that each
word , phrase (helike) or sentence (vakya) is to
be construed in the light of the general
purpose of the act itself.
 Statute must be read as a whole in its
context
• Whenever the question arises as to the meaning
of a certain provision in a statute, it is proper and
legitimate to read that provision in its
context(sandarbha).
• What was the previous state of the law, study of
other statute in pari materia (on the same
matter), what is the general scope of the statute
and what is the mischief which it wanted to
remedy, all these questions are to be considered
here.
 Canada Sugar Refining Co v/s R.(1898)

• In this case justice Lord Davey said that “Every

clause of a statute should be construed with
reference to the context and other clauses of
the Act, So as, as far as possible, to make a
consistent enactment of the statute or series
of statutes relating to the subject matter.
 Re,Bidie case 1948

• In this case lord Greene M.R. said that “ To

ascertain the meaning of a clause in a statute
the courts must look at the whole statute, at
what precedes(follows) and at what succeeds
and not merely at the clause itself and the
method of construing statutes that I prefer, is
to read the statute as a whole. He said when
we read the whole statute then only we can
find out the true meaning of that word.
Charles Robert Leader v/s Georage F. Diffey
(1888)
• In this case Lord Halsbury said that “ when
there is inaccuracy and inconsistency in the
statute, interpreter should read the whole
statute. It is now firmly established as a rule
that the intention of the legislature must be
found by reading the statute as a whole.
 Jennings v/s Kelly (1939)

• The court held that the principle that the

statute must be read as a whole is equally
applicable to different parts of the same
section.
 Attar Singh v/s Inder Kumar AIR 1967 SC
773
• Facts of the case the Punjab Rent Restriction Act 1949 provided by
• Section 13(a)(ii) that a landlord could obtain possession in the case
of rented land if
• (a) he requires it for his own use
• (b)he is not occupying in the urban area for the purpose of his
business any other such rented land. And
• He has not vacated such rented land without sufficient cause after
the commencement of the act in the urban area concerned.
• The high court of Punjab held that the words for his own use
permitted the landlord to claim eviction for his own use, what ever
may be the nature of use. But supreme court reversed the high
court decision and held that for his own use means should consider
the other clause.
Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat
• Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat is a legal maxim,
used in India.
• It means It is better for a thing to have effect than to
be made void.
• it is better to validate a thing than to invalidate it. A
statute is supposed to be an true source of the
legislative will and the function of a court is to
interpret it “according to the intent of them that
made it.”
• This maxim means that it may rather become operative
than null, to unhold the constitutionality of statutes
whenever it can rationality be done.
• On this principle only a statute or any enacting provision
therein must be so construed so as to make it effective
and operative.
• It is an application of this principle that courts while
pronouncing upon the constitutionality of a statute start
with a presumption in favour of constitutionality and
prefer a construction which keeps the statute within
competence of the legislature.
Manchester ship canal Co v/s Manchester
Race course co. 1904
• In this case the judge Farewell said “unless the
words were so absolutely senseless that I
could do nothing at all with them, I should be
bound to find some meaning and not declare
them void for uncertainty.
 Fawcett properties v. Buckingham country
council (1960)
• Lord denning said when a statute has some
meaning even though it is obscure (Gondala)
or several meanings, even though it is little to
choose between them, the courts have to say
what meaning the statute is to be bear, rather
than reject it as a nullity.
 Murray v/s IRC 1918

• Lord Dundien observed that it is our duty to make

what we can of statutes, knowing that they are
meant to be operative and not inept(null) and
nothing short of impossibility should in my judgment
allow a judge to declare a statute unworkable.
 Nokes v/s Doncaster Amalgamated
Collieries(1940)
• Judge Simon L.C. if the choice is between two
interpretations, the narrower of which would
fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the
legislation we should avoid a construction
which would reduce the legislation to
ineffectiveness and should rather accept the
bolder construction, based on the view that
parliament would legislate only for the
purpose of bringing about an effective result.
 Tinsukia Electric supply co Ltd v/s State of
Assam. AIR 1990 SC 123
• In this case SC held that a statute or enacting
provision therein must be so construed as to
make it effective and operative on the
principle expressed in the maxim. If a statute
is absolutely vague and its language is wholly
intractable(charchisabaudada) and absolutely
meaningless, the statute could be declared
void for vagueness.
 Plain or Ordinary meaning

• When the language of a statute is plain, words

are clear and unambiguous and give only one
meaning, then effect should be given to that
plain meaning only and one should not go in
for the construction of the statute.
State of Uttar Pradesh v/s vijay Anand Maharaj,
AIR 1963,SC 946
• “ in this case SC has held that when the
language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous and admits of only one meaning
no question of construction of a statute arises,
for the act speaks for itself”.
 Nelson Motis v/s Union of India AIR 1992 SC
1981.
• SC held that when the words of a statute are
clear, plain or unambiguous, they are
reasonably susceptible to only one meaning,
the courts are bound to give effect to that
meaning irrespective of consequences.
 Sussex peerage case,

• The rule was stated by Tindal in this case. He

said if the words of the statute are in
themselves precise(exact) and unambiguous,
then no more can be necessary than to
expound those words in their natural and
ordinary sense. The words themselves do
alone in such cases best declare the intent of
the law giver.
Kanailala Sur v/s Paramanidhi Sadhu Khan,
Air 1957 SC 907
• In this case judge Gajendragadkar said if the
words used are capable of one construction
only then it would not be open to the courts
to adopt any other hypothetical construction
on the ground that such construction is more
consistent with the alleged object and policy
of the Act.
 Pakala Narayanaswamy v/s Emperor, AIR
1957 SC 907
• In this case lord ATKIN said “ when the
meaning of the words is plain, it is not the
duty of the courts to busy themselves with
supposed intentions. It, therefore, appears
inadmissible to consider the merits and
demerits of applying the plain meaning
whether in the interests of the prosecution or
accused.
 CIT, Agriculture, v/s Keshab Chandra
Mandal,AIR 1950 SC 265
• Facts of this case: The Bengal Agriculture Income
Tax Act required that a return of income shall be
verified and the declaration shall be signed in the
case of an individual himself, therefore, a return of
income signed by an illiterate person by the pen of
his son was not a valid return of income. In this
regard S.R. DAS JUDGE observed that hardship or
inconvenience cannot alter the meaning of the
language employed by the legislature if such
meaning is clear on the face of the statute.
 H.H. Sri Rama Verma v/s CIT 1991.

• In this case court held that when language of

the provision is plain and clear court cannot
enlarge the scope of the provision by
interpretative process.
 Delhi Transport corpn v/s D.T.C Mazdoor
Congress,1991.
• While interpreting a statute the plain meaning
of words must first be ascertained and in case
there is any doubt, the object and preamble of
the statute can also be seen.
 Rule of Literal Construction (Aksharshaha
Arthakalpaneya niyama)
• The rule of literal construction is considered to
be the first principle of interpretation.
• According to this rule, the words of an
enactment are to be given their ordinary and
natural meaning and if such meaning is clear
and unambiguous, effect should be given to a
provision of a statute whatever may be the
consequences.
• The literal rule of
statutory interpretation should be the
first rule applied by judges. Under the literal
rule, the words of the statute are given their
natural or ordinary meaning and applied
without the judge seeking to put a shine on
the words or seek to make sense of the
statute.
• Literal rule is a rule used to interpreting
statutes. In literal rule, the words in a statute
are given its plain, ordinary, and literal
meaning. While applying the literal rule, the
law is read word by word and without
diverting from its true meaning.
• this rule can be easily understood under the
four headings.
• 1. Natural and Grammatical meaning
• 2. Explanation
• 3. exact meaning, preferred to Loose meaning
• 4. Technical words in Technical sense.
• 1. Natural and Grammatical meaning:
the words of a statute are first understood in
their natural, ordinary or popular sense and
phrase and sentences are construed according
to their meaning, unless that leads to some
meaninglessness or unless there is something
in the context, or in the object of the statute
to suggest the contrary.
 Corpn. Of the City Victoria v/s Bishop of
Vancouver of Island AIR 1921 PC 240
• In this case lord Atkinson said “ in the
construction of statutes, their words must be
interpreted in their ordinary grammatical
sense unless there be something in the
context, or in the object of the statute in
which they occur or in the circumstances in
which they are used, to show that they were
used in a special sense different from their
ordinary meaning.
 Municipal Board v/s State Transport
Authority, Rajasthan AIR 1965 SC 458
• The regional transport authority had changed the
location of a bus stand. If any one wanted to move
an application against this order, he could do so
within 30 days from the date of order to the Regional
Transport Authority under section 64-A of the motor
vehicles Act 1939. But in this case the application
was moved after expiry of the period. The argument
was made by the applicant that an application could
be moved with in 30 days from the knowledge of the
order passed by the regional transport authority.
 Ramavathar v/s assistant sales tax officer
AIR 1961, SC1325
• The question before the court was whether the sale of betel
leaves was subject to sales tax. The contention given by the
applicant was that betel leaves being vegetables were not
subject to sales tax. the appellant relied on the dictionary
meaning of vegetable which says that a vegetable is that
pertaining to, comprised or consisting of or derived or
obtained from plants or their parts. The supreme court
rejected the contention and held that betel leaves could not be
given the dictionary, technical or botanical meaning when the
ordinary and natural meaning is clear and unambiguous. When
we used the word every day its not necessary to interpret.
Therefore the sale of betel leaves was liable to sales tax.
• 2. Explanation: when it is said that words are to be
understood first in their natural, ordinary or popular
sense, it is meant that the words must be recognized
that natural, ordinary or popular meaning which they
have in relation to the subject matter with reference
to which and the context in which they have been
used in the statute. In the statement of the rule “ the
epithets (describes) natural, ordinary, literal,
grammatical and popular are employed almost
interchangeable to convey the same idea.
 Forest Range Officer v/s Khushboo Enterprise
AIR 1994 SC120
• The question was whether sandal wood oil is wood oil as used in the
definition of forest produce in section 2(f)of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961
which defines Forest produce to include timber, charcoal, wood oil
whether found in or brought from a forest . Sandal wood is produced at a
factory level by mechanized process utilizing the hard wood and roots of
sandal wood trees removed from forest as a raw material. It was argued
before SC that wood oil is a natural produce of the forest derived as on
exudation from living trees in the forest belonging to the family of diptero
carpucoe trees and it will not include sandal wood oil which is a bye-
product from sandal wood by industrial process. But this argument was
rejected by the supreme court and it was pointed out that the object of
the Act was to conserve forest wealth and there was no indication in the
act to exclude what ordinary and in common parlance spoken of as wood
oil. Therefore, it was held that the sandal wood oil was within the
definition of forest produce.
• 3. Exact meaning preferred to loose
meaning: the third important point regarding the
rule of literal construction is that exact meaning is
preferred to loose meaning in act of parliament.
• in Prithipal Singh v/s union of India ( AIR 1982
SC 1413) SC was held that there is a presumption
that the words are used in an Act of Parliament
correctly and exactly and not loosely and inexactly.
• 4. Technical words in Technical sense: the
fourth important point regarding the rule of literal
construction is that technical words are understood
in the technical sense only.
• Few relevant points regarding this are following.
• 1. Special meaning in trade, business etc.-
• 2. Legal sense of words
• 1. Special meaning in trade, business etc.- regarding this in
Union of india v/s garware nylons Ltd AIR
1996 SC 3509. Supreme court was held that as a
necessary consequences of the principle that words are
understood in their ordinary or natural meaning in relation
to the subject-matter in legislation relating a particular
trade, business, profession art or science, words having a
special meaning in that context are understood in that
sense, such a special meaning is called the technical
meaning in order to distinguish it from the more common
meaning that the word may have.
• 2. Legal sense of words: By legal sense of
words we mean that when words acquire a
technical meaning because of their use by the
legislature in a particular sense or because of
their authoritative construction by superior
courts, they are understood in that sense
When used in a similar context in subsequent
legislation
 Strict Construction
• Strict construction must be applied to criminal
statutes, penal statutes and Taxing statutes.
This means all these Statutes may not be
enlarged by implication or intent beyond the
fair meaning of the language used or the
meaning that is reasonably justified by its
terms.
• Strict Construction is the opposite of liberal
construction, which permits a term to be
reasonably and fairly evaluated so as to
implement the object and purpose of the
document.
• Strict Construction happens when ambiguous
language is given its exact and technical meaning,
and no other equitable considerations or
reasonable implications are made.
• A judge may make a construction only if the
language is ambiguous or unclear. If the language
is plain and clear, a judge must apply the plain
meaning of the language and cannot consider
other evidence that would change the meaning.
• Taxing statutes are strictly construed. Tax and
fee are impositions made by a state for raising
revenue. A tax is imposed for public purpose
for raising general revenue of the state
whereas a fee is imposed for rendering
services and bears a board co-relationship
with the services rendered. A taxing statute
means any act making compulsory imposition
whether of tax or fee.
Harshad Mehta v/s Custodian AIR 1998 SC
2291
• In this case SC held that there are three stages
in the imposition of a Tax. They are
• 1. Declaration of liability in respect of persons
or Property.
• 2. Calculation of tax that qualifies the sum
which the person liable has to pay.
• 3. Methods od recovery if the person taxed
does not voluntarily pay.
 Beneficent Construction

• Statutes is enacted by the legislature for

benefit for the public or class of people.
Where the statute is not convey the object or
intention of legislature, then it is the duty of
interpreter should interpret infavour the
public.
 Mahadeo Lal v/s Admn. General of
[Link], AIR 1960 SC 936
• SC held that if in a legislation, the general
object of which is to benefit a particular class
of persons, any provision is ambiguous so that
it is capable of two meanings, one of which
would preserve the benefit and another
would take it away, the meanings which
preserves it should be adopted.
 Aslam Babalal Desai v/s State of
Maharashtra (1992) 4 SC 272

• In this case judge Ramaswamy said “ the

purpose of interpretation is to sustain the law.
The court must interpret the words or
language of the statute to promote public
good and to interdict (prohibition) misuse of
power”.
 Manohar Lal v/s State of Punjab AIR 1961
SC 418
• In this case section 7 of the Punjab trade employees
act 1949 directing that the shops and establishments
which come under the purview of this act shall remain
closed one day in a week was held not to violative of
Art 19(1)(g) of the constitution as it was a reasonable
restriction on the fundamental right because it was
necessary for ensuring health and efficiency of
workers. Even when business is being conducted by
the owner and his family members, the provisions
would apply to them also in the same manner and for
the same reason.
Dahiben v/s Vasanji Kevalbhai AIR 1995 SC
1215.
• Bombay Tenancy and Agriculture lands Act,
1948 as amended by Bombay tenancy Act
1952. it was held to be a legislation beneficial
to tenants. Therefore, it was to be given liberal
interpretation. That’s why it was held that the
amendments would apply to suits which were
pending when the amendment had come into
force.
 Harmonious construction
• The basis of the harmonious construction is
that the legislature never intends to contradict
itself by providing two repugnant provisions in
the same statute. The rule of harmonious
construction says that when two or more
provisions in such a manner, if possible, as to
give effect to both by harmonizing them with
each other.
 Keshava Chandra joshi v/s UOI

• SC held that Harmonious construction should

be applied to statutory rules and courts should
avoid absurd or unintended results.
 Sultana Begum v/s Prem chand Jain
1997(1) SC 373
• In this case SC held that following 5 principles were
considered
• 1. it is the duty of the courts to avoid a head-on- clash
between two sections of the act and to interpret the
provisions which appears to be in conflict with each
other in such a manner as to harmonise them.
• [Link] provisions of one section of a statute cannot be
used to defeat the other provisions unless the court,
inspite of its efforts, finds it impossible to effect
reconciliation between them
• 3. it has to be borne in mind by all the courts all the
time that when there are two conflicting provisions
in an act, they should be interpreted that , if
possible, effect should be given to both.
• 4. the courts have also to keep in mind that an
interpretation which reduces one of the provisions
to a dead letter or useless lumber(timber) is not
harmonious construction.
• 5. To harmonise is not to destroy any statutory
provision or to render it otiose(useless).
 Mischief Rule
• It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly
established in England as far back as 1854 when
Haydon's case. In this case was decided that for the
sure and true interpretation of all statutes four things
are to be considered. They are
• 1. what was the law before the making of the Act.
• 2. what was the mischief or defect for which the law
did not provide.
• 3. what is the remedy that Act has provided.
• 4. what is the reason of the remedy.
• Mischief rule directs that the courts must
adopt that construction which shall supress
the mischief and advance the remedy.
 Parayan Kandiyal Eravath Kanapravan
Kalliani Amma v/s K devi(1996)4 SC76

• In this case SC held that Mischief Rule is

applicable there where languages is capable of
more than one meaning.
 Purposive construction
• A purposive construction promoting the
object of the enactment. It is the duty of the
courts to accept a construction which
promotes the object of the legislation and also
prevents the ambiguity.
 Explain the Basic Principles of
Interpretation
• 1. introduction.
• 2. Meaning of interpretation
• 3. intention of legislature.
• 4. statute must be read as whole in its context
• 5. ut res Magis Valeat quam Pereat
• 6. plain or ordinary meaning
• 7. Rule of literal construction
• 8. Strict Construction
• 9. Beneficent construction
• 10. Harmonious construction
• 11. Mischief Rule
• 12 purposive construction