Module 9

Article 14
 Introduction
• The Constitution of India guarantees the Right to Equality through Articles 14
to 18.
• Equality is one of the magnificent corner-stones of Indian democracy.
• The doctrine of equality before law is a necessary corollary of Rule of Law
which pervades the Indian Constitution
• Article 14 outlaws discrimination in a general way and guarantees equality
before law to all persons. In view of a certain amount of indefiniteness
attached to the general principle of equality enunciated in Article 14,
separate provisions to cover specific discriminatory situations have been
made by subsequent Articles.
• Thus, Art. 15 prohibits discrimination against citizens on such specific
grounds as religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. Art. 16 guarantees to
the citizens of India equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.
Art. 17 abolishes untouchability, and Art. 18 abolishes titles, other than a
EQUALITY BEFORE LAW : ART. 14

• A negative concept
• It ensures that there is no special privilege in favour of any one,
that all are equally subject to the ordinary law of the land and
that no person, whatever be his rank or condition, is above the
law
• This is equivalent to the second corollary of the DICEAN concept
of the Rule of Law in Britain.
• This, however, is not an absolute rule and there are a number of
exceptions to it,e.g., foreign diplomats enjoy immunity from the
country’s judicial process; Art.361 extends immunity to the
President of India and the State Governors;24 public officers and
judges also enjoy some protection, and some special groups and
interests,like the trade unions, have been accorded special
privileges by law.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS : ART 14

• A positive right in content.

• It does not mean that identically the same law should apply to all
persons, or that every law must have a universal application within
the country irrespective of differences of circumstances.
• Equal Protection of the laws does not postulate equal treatment of
all persons without distinction. What it postulates is the application
of the same laws alike and without discrimination to all
persons similarly situated. It denotes equality of treatment in
equal circumstances.
• It implies that among equals the law should be equal and
equally administered, that the like should be treated alike
without distinction of race, religion, wealth, social status or political
influence
 Classification Test
• Article 14 forbids class legislation; it does not forbid
reasonable classification of persons, objects and
transactions by the Legislature for the purpose of achieving
specific ends. Classification to be reasonable should
fulfil the following two tests:
(1) It should not be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. It
should be based on an intelligible differentia, some real and
substantial distinction, which distinguishes persons or things
grouped together in the class from others left out of it.
(2) The differentia adopted as the basis of classification
must have a rational or reasonable nexus with the object
sought to be achieved by the statute in question
 State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar
• The case involved a Bengal law permitting setting up of special courts for the
‘speedier trial’ of such ‘offences’, or ‘classes of offences’ or ‘cases’, or ‘classes
of cases’, as the State Government might direct by a general or special order.
• These courts were to follow a procedure less advantageous to the accused in
defending himself than the procedure followed by the ordinary criminal
courts.
• The Act was held invalid as it made no reasonable classification, laid down “no
yardstick or measure for the grouping either of persons or of cases or of
offences” so as to distinguish them from others outside the purview of the Act.
• The government had the power to pick out a case of a person and hand it over
to the special tribunal while leaving the case of another person similarly
situated to be tried by the ordinary criminal courts. It gave ‘uncontrolled
authority’ to the executive ‘to discriminate’.
• The necessity of ‘speedier trial’ was held to be too vague, uncertain and
indefinite criterion to form the basis of a valid and reasonable classification.
 Kathi Raning Rawat v. Saurashtra

• A provision practically similar to the one involved in the Anwar Ali

case was held valid because the Court found that a policy was stated
in the preamble to the Act, and that the government was expected to
select such offences, classes of offences and classes of cases for trial
in special courts as were calculated to affect public safety,
maintenance of public order, etc.
• The main difference in the terms of the statutes, which resulted in
different judicial verdicts as to their validity, was that the preamble
to the Saurashtra Act was more elaborately worded than that to the
Bengal Act.
• While the term ‘speedier trial’ used in the Bengal Act to set up
special courts was held to be indefinite, the words ‘public safety, etc.’
in the preamble to the Saurashtra Act were held to be more definite
and as giving a guiding principle to control administrative discretion
 [Link] v. State of Tamilnadu AIR 1974 SC 555

• E.P. Royappa had challenged the validity of his transfer

from the post of Chief Secretary, first to the post of
Deputy Chairman, State Planning Commission and
thereafter as Officer on Special Duty as violative of his
Articles 14 and 16 rights.
• The petition rested on mala fide exercise of power by
the State with an inferior officer being appointed to the
position of Chief Secretary, overlooking the seniority of
petitioner Royappa therein.
• Now, what is the content and reach of this great equalising principle? It is a founding
faith, to use the words of Bose, J., “a way of life”, and it must not be subjected to a
narrow pedantic or lexicographic approach. We cannot countenance any attempt to
truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its
activist magnitude.
• Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be
“cribbed, cabined and confined” within traditional and doctrinaire limits.
• From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact
equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in
a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch.
• Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political
logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14, and if it affects any
matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Article 16. Articles 14 and 16
strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment.
• They require that State action must be based on valid relevant principles applicable
alike to all similarly situate and it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant
considerations because that would be denial of equality.
• Equality vis-à-vis arbitrariness was further polished
and fleshed out in the celebrated judgment of Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597 the
Supreme Court held that the trinity of three articles i.e.
Articles 14, 19 and 21 fertilise and cultivate each other
mutually. The Court correlated the principle of
reasonableness under Art 19 with non-arbitrariness
under Art 14 with substantive due procedure u/a Art
21
• In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi AIR 1981 SC
487
• The Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court (five
Judges) in no uncertain terms, held the concept of
reasonableness and non-arbitrariness to be applicable
even to executive actions.
• Bhagwati, J. held thus: “Wherever therefore there is
arbitrariness in State action whether it be of the
legislature or of the executive or of an “authority”
under Article 12, Article 14 immediately springs
into action and strikes down such State action. In
fact, the concept of reasonableness and non-
arbitrariness pervades the entire constitutional scheme
and is a golden thread which runs through the whole of
the fabric of the Constitution”
• Air India v. Nergesh Mirza, AIR 1981 SC 1829
• By virtue of section 3 of the Air Corporation Act, 1953 the Central
Government created two corporations known as Air
• India International and Indian Air Lines. A.I. Operating
international flights and the I.A.C. Operating domestic
flights within the country. Air Hostesses employed by Air India
were governed by Regulations 46 and 47 of Air India
Employees Service Regulations and the Air Hostesses employed
by l.A.C. were governed by the Indian Airlines Service, Regulation
No. 12.
• A.H. under A.I. was retired from service in the following
contingencies:
(a) On attaining the age of 35 years;
(b) On marriage if it took place within four years of the service; and
(c) On first pregnancy.
• Thus, from a detailed analysis and close examination of the eases of this Court
starting from 1952 till today, the following propositions emerge :-
• In considering the fundamental right of equality of Opportunity a technical,
pedantic or doctrinaire approach should not be made and the doctrine
should not be invoked even if different scales of pay, service terms, leave, etc.,
are introduced in different or dissimilar posts.
• Thus, where the class or categories of service are essentially different in
purport and spirit, Art. 14 can- not be attracted.
• Art. 14 forbids hostile discrimination but not reasonable classification. Thus,
where persons belonging to a particular class in view of their special
attributes, qualities, mode of recruitment and the like, are differently treated
in public interest to advance and boost members belonging to backward
classes, such a classification would not amount to discrimination having a
close nexus with the objects sought to be achieved so that in such cases Art.
14 will be completely out of the way.
• Art. 14 certainly applies where equals are treated differently without any
reasonable basis.
• The termination of the services of AHs on the ground of
pregnancy or marriage within four years is manifestly unreasonable
wholly arbitrary and violative of Art. 14
• This new dimension of Art. 14 transcends the
classificatory principle. Art. 14 is no longer to be
equated with the principle of classification. It is
primarily a guarantee against arbitrariness in state
action and the doctrine of classification has been
evolved only as a subsidiary rule for testing whether a
particular state action is arbitrary or not