0% found this document useful (0 votes)
9 views121 pages

Water and CO2 Fire Extinguishers Guide

Uploaded by

anjalibino30
Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PPTX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
0% found this document useful (0 votes)
9 views121 pages

Water and CO2 Fire Extinguishers Guide

Uploaded by

anjalibino30
Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PPTX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

MODULE 5

Water Based Fire Extinguisher

• Water is the primary liquid used in these extinguishers, although sometimes other additives are also included.
• A drawback for pure water fire extinguishers is that it is not suitable for use in freezing conditions since the
water inside will freeze and render the extinguisher unusable. Certain types of water fire extinguishers contain
antifreeze which will allow the extinguisher to be used in freezing conditions.
• Water type fire extinguishers can also sometimes contain wetting agents which are designed to help increase
its effectiveness against fire.
• These extinguishers are intended primarily for use on Class A fires.
• Water mist extinguishers are a type of water fire extinguisher that uses distilled water and discharges it as a
fine spray instead of a solid stream. Water mist extinguishers are used where contaminants in unregulated
water sources can cause excessive damage to personnel or equipment.
• Typical applications include operating rooms, museums, and book collections.
Carbon Dioxide type
Fire Extinguisher
• The principal advantage of Carbon Dioxide (CO 2) fire extinguishers is that the agent does not leave a residue
after use.
• This can be a significant factor where protection is needed for delicate and costly electronic equipment.
• Other typical applications are food preparation areas, laboratories, and printing or duplicating areas.
• Carbon dioxide extinguishers are listed for use on Class B and Class C fires.
• This type of fire extinguisher is not recommended for outdoor use where windy conditions prevail or for
indoor use in locations that are subject to strong air currents, because the agent can rapidly dissipate and
prevent extinguishment.
• The concentration needed for fire extinguishment reduces the amount of oxygen in the vicinity of the fire and
should be used with caution when discharged in confined spaces.
DOW Fire & Explosion
Index

Summary

 Originated due to poor loss (accident)


record in 1966
 One of the first “chemical plant”
hazard analysis systems
 Unique Features
– Maximum Probable Property
Damage
– Maximum Probable Days Outage
 Continues to be upgraded in use and
application
 Fill out like a “Tax Form”
DOW Fire & Explosion
Index

F & EI
 Uses material factors that relate to
reactivity and flammability
 Identifies equipment that can present a
flammable or explosive hazard
 Suggests approaches to control a hazard
 Useful in determining plant layout and
separation between vessels
 Requires engineering judgement
 Is not a perfect tool
 Is a useful tool
DOW Fire & Explosion
Index

The expected damage


QUANTIFY
of potential fire &
explosion incidents
in realistic terms

Equipment that would


IDENTIFY likely contribute to
the creation or
escalation of an
incident

COMMUNICAT The fire & explosion


E potential to design
teams and plant
personnel
DOW Fire & Explosion
Index
 Material Factor
– Measure of Reactivity and
Flammability
 General Process Hazards
– Play a primary role in
determining the
magnitude of a loss
incident
 Special Process Hazards
– Contribute to the
probability of a loss
incident
 Fire & Explosion Index
– A measure of the relative
hazard and relates to an
exposure radius
DOW Fire & Explosion
Index
LOSS CONTROL CREDITS

Are features that have


proved beneficial in
preventing serious
incidents and reducing
the magnitude of a
particular incident

* Process Control
* Material Isolation
* Fire Protection
DOW Fire & Explosion
Index

Actual Maximum Probable


Property Damage
Represents the property damage
that could result from an incident
of reasonable magnitude with
adequate functioning of
protective equipment

Maximum Probable Days


Outage
Time required to rebuild the
plant to its original capacity

Business Interruption
The lost profit to the company due
to an incident
DOW Fire & Explosion Index

Items Required to Develop an F & EI


1. Accurate Plot Plan for an existing plant
2. Preliminary Plot Plan for a new plant
3. Process Flow Sheet
4. F & EI Hazard classification guide
5. F & EI form
DOW Fire & Explosion
Index
IDENTIFY PERTINENT PROCESS
UNIT

(An item of equipment that could impact the


process from a safety & loss prevention
standpoint)

* Chemical Energy Potential


(Material Factor)
* Quantity of hazardous materials
in the process unit
* Capital density
* Process pressure and
temperature
* Past history of problems

Not all unit operation need to be analyzed.


DOW Fire & Explosion
Index
MATERIAL FACTOR

* Measure of the
flammability (NF) and
reactivity (NR) of a
material

* Material factor adjusted


for process conditions
- Flash Point
- Boiling Point
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
CONTRIBUTING HAZARD
FACTORS

Evaluate the process unit to


eliminate over estimating
penalties

* General Process
Hazards (F1)

* Special Process Hazards


(F2)
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
GENERAL PROCESS
HAZARDS
F1

Penalties for:

Exothermic/Endothermic
Material Handling & Transfer
Enclosed processes
Access
Drainage and spill control

F & EI workbook has various penalties


DOW Fire & Explosion Index

SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS


F2
Penalties for:
Toxic materials (0.2 x NH)
Sub-atmospheric pressure
(P<500mHg, 0.5)
Dust explosions
Operating in flammable range
Low temperature operation
Corrosion & Erosion
Leakage
Rotating equipment

F & EI workbook has various penalties


DOW Fire & Explosion Index
SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS
F2
Pressure Penalty
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS
F2
Quantity of
Flammable/Unstable
material

Separate figures for process, storage and


solids
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS
F2
Use of fired equipment

Curve A-1 Release above flash point or


combustible dust
Curve A-2 Released above boiling point
DOW Fire & Explosion Index

UNIT HAZARD FACTOR (F3)

F3 = F1 X F2

F & EI = Material Factor X


F3
DOW Fire & Explosion
Index

F & EI USED TO DETERMINE

An area having a potential for impact from a flammable or over


pressure event
DOW Fire & Explosion Index

Degree of
F & EI Hazard

1 - 60 Light

61 - 96 Moderate

97 - 127 Intermediate

128* - 158 Heavy

159+ Severe

* Trigger for more detailed


PHA
DOW Fire & Explosion
Index
Area of Exposure

Exposure radius from empirical


relationship

Determined from spills of flammable materials 3


in. deep as well as potential vapor air
mixtures
DOW Fire & Explosion
Index
Volume of Exposure

Calculate volume as a cylinder


with height equal to radius

Determine replacement value


of equipment in the area
(volume)
DOW Fire & Explosion
Index
Damage Factor

Determine damage factor from


empirical relationship of Unit
Hazard (F3) and Material
Factor (MF)
DOW Fire & Explosion
Index

BASE MAXIMUM PROBABLE


PROPERTY DAMAGE

Base Maximum Probable


Property Damage (Base
MPPD)

Value of the area of exposure

Damage Factor
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
LOSS CONTROL CREDIT
FACTORS

F & EI workbook has various credits


DOW Fire & Explosion
Index
ACTUAL MAXIMUM
PROBABLE PROPERTY
DAMAGE

Actual Maximum Probable


Property Damage (Actual
MPPD)

Base MPPD

Credit Factor
DOW Fire & Explosion
Index
MAXIMUM PROBABLE DAYS
OUTAGE (MPDO)
Maximum Probable Days
Outage (MPDO) determined
empirically from actual MPPD
DOW Fire & Explosion
Index
BUSINESS INTERRUPTION

Business Interruption (BI)

Maximum Probable Days


Outage (MPDO)

{Lost Profit before tax/day


+
Fixed Cost/day}
DOW Fire & Explosion
Index
RISK ANALYSIS
DOW Fire & Explosion
Index
WHAT CAN I DO TO LOWER
THE RISK?

* Reduce the Hazards (most


impact)

* Add Loss Control Features (Least


impact)

* Increase spacing (plant layout)

It is more effective to reduce the


hazards early in the project than
to add loss control features late in
the project

The system makes us quantify the


risk and suggests ways to reduce
DOW Fire & Explosion
Index

The DOW F & EI system


challenges you to
determine how much
risk you are willing to
accept.
What Is Preliminary Hazard Analysis

 Preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) is usually the first attempt in the system safety
process to identify and categorize hazards or potential hazards associated with the
operation of a proposed system, process, or procedure; it is used in the early stages of
system design.
 It is a semi-quantitative analysis that is performed to identify all potential hazards and
accidental events that may lead to an accident, rank the identified accidental events
according to their severity and identify required hazard controls and follow-up actions.
 Preliminary hazard analysis that can be used under different names, such as Rapid Risk
Ranking and Hazard Identification (HAZID).
Characteristics Of PHA

• It relies on brainstorming and expert judgment to assess the significance of hazards and
assign a ranking to each situation.
• It is typically performed by one or two people who are knowledgeable about the type of
activity in question.
• It is applicable to any activity or system
• It can be used as a high-level analysis early in the life of a process.
• It is used to generates qualitative descriptions of the hazards related to a process.
Provides a qualitative ranking of the hazardous situations; this ranking can be used to
prioritize recommendations for reducing or eliminating hazards in subsequent phases of
the life cycle.
• Quality of the evaluation depends on the quality and availability of documentation, the
training of the review team leader with respect to the various analysis techniques
employed, and the experience of the review teams.
Advantages And Disadvantages Of PHA
 Advantages
• Helps ensure that the system is safe
• Modifications are less expensive and easier to implement in
the earlier stages of design
• Decreases design time by reducing the number of surprises
 Disadvantages
• Hazards must be foreseen by the analysts
• The effects of interactions between hazards are not easily
recognized
Steps To Carrying Out Preliminary Hazard
Analysis (PHA)

1. PHA prerequisites: This involves, establishing a PHA team, description of

the system to be analysed, and collection of risk information from previous

system.

2. Hazard identification: This is where all hazards and possible accidental

events must be identified. All part of the system should be considered at

this stage. All findings should be recorded.

 Note: No hazards are too insignificant to be recorded.


3. Consequence and frequency estimation: To determine the risk level, we have to
estimate the frequency and the severity of each accidental event. At this stage, the
consequence and frequency of every hazard is considered.
4. Risk ranking and follow-up actions: Risk is established as a combination of a given
event/consequence and a severity of the same event/consequence. This will enable a
ranking of the
events/consequences in a risk matrix. This ranking level will determine the follow up
actions necessary for the risk.
Hazard & Operability Analysis (HAZOP)
 Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) is a structured and
systematic technique for system examination and risk
management.
 In particular, HAZOP is often used as a technique for identifying
potential hazards in a system and identifying operability
problems likely to lead to nonconforming products.
 HAZOP is based on a theory that assumes risk events are
caused by deviations from design or operating intentions.
 Identification of such deviations is facilitated by using sets of
“guide words” as a systematic list of deviation perspectives.
 This approach is a unique feature of the HAZOP methodology
that helps stimulate the imagination of team members when
HAZOP Methodology

 The HAZOP
analysis process
is executed in
four phases as
illustrated below:
Definition Phase

 The Definition Phase typically begins with preliminary


identification of risk assessment team members.
 HAZOP is intended to be a cross-functional team effort, and
relies on specialists (SMEs) from various disciplines with
appropriate skills and experience who display intuition and good
judgment.
 SMEs should be carefully chosen to include those with a broad
and current knowledge of system deviations.
 HAZOP should always be carried out in a climate of positive
thinking and frank discussion.
 During the Definition Phase, the risk assessment team must
identify the assessment scope carefully in order to focus effort.
 This includes defining study boundaries and key interfaces as
Preparation Phase

 The Preparation Phase typically includes the following activities:


Identifying and locating supporting data and information
 Identification of the audience and users of the study outputs
 Project management preparations (ex: scheduling meetings,
transcribing proceedings, etc.)
 Consensus on template format for recording study outputs
 Consensus on HAZOP guide words to be used during the study
 Risk assessment teams are responsible for identifying the guide
words that will best suit the scope and problem statement for
their analysis. Some common HAZOP guide words include:
Examination Phase

 The Examination Phase begins with identification of all elements

(parts or steps) of the system or process to be examined. For

example:

 Physical systems may be broken down into smaller parts as

necessary

 Processes may be broken down into discrete steps or phases


 The HAZOP guide words are then applied to each of the
elements.
 In this fashion a thorough search for deviations is carried out in
a systematic manner.
 It must be noted that not all combinations of guide words and
elements are expected to yield sensible or credible deviation
possibilities.
 As a general rule, all reasonable use and misuse conditions
which are expected by the user should be identified and
subsequently challenged to determine if they are “credible” and
whether they should be assessed any further.
 There is no need to explicitly document the instances when
Documentation & Follow-up Phase
 The documentation of HAZOP analyses is often facilitated by
utilizing a template recording form as detailed in IEC Standard
61882.
 Risk assessment teams may modify the template as necessary
based on factors such as:
 Regulatory requirements
 Need for more explicit risk rating or prioritization (ex: rating
deviation probabilities, severities, and/or detection)
 Company documentation policies
 Needs for traceability or audit readiness
 Other factors
Risk Review

 On a long-term basis, operational feedback should confirm that


the assessment and control steps are adequately addressing the
risk question.
 It is also important to note that new risks may arise from risk
control practices.
 Sometimes risks that were not originally identified or may have
been filtered out during the initial risk assessment can become
aggravating factors due to the implementation of risk control
Risk Communication

 HAZOP is a powerful communication tool.

 The output of the tool should always be presented at a level of

detail appropriate for the various stakeholders.

 This is important not just for presenting results, but also for

obtaining early buy-in on the approach.


das
 asd
das
 asd
Controlling Chemical Hazards
 Controlling exposures to chemical hazards and toxic substances is the fundamental method
of protecting workers.
 A hierarchy of controls is used as a means of determining how to implement feasible and
effective controls.
 Engineering and work practice controls must be the primary means used to reduce
employee exposure to toxic chemicals, as far as feasible, and that respiratory protection is
required to be used when engineering or work practice controls are infeasible or while they
are being implemented.
 Where possible, elimination or substitution is the most desirable followed by engineering
controls.
 Administrative or work practice controls may be appropriate in some cases where
engineering controls cannot be implemented or when different procedures are needed after
implementation of the new engineering controls.

Hazardous Properties of Chemicals
Sometimes they can explode and cause burns, vomiting, drowsiness, etc

You might also like