Chapter 14
Entity Authentication
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14.1
Chapter 14
Objectives
To distinguish between message authentication and
entity authentication
To define witnesses used for identification
To discuss some methods of entity authentication
using a password
To introduce some challenge-response protocols for
entity authentication
To introduce some zero-knowledge protocols for
entity authentication
To define biometrics and distinguish between
physiological and behavioral techniques
14.2
14-1 INTRODUCTION
Entity authentication is a technique designed to let one
party prove the identity of another party. An entity can
be a person, a process, a client, or a server. The entity
whose identity needs to be proved is called the
claimant; the party that tries to prove the identity of
the claimant is called the verifier.
Topics discussed in this section:
14.1.1 Data-Origin Versus Entity Authentication
14.1.2 Verification Categories
14.1.3 Entity Authentication and Key Management
14.3
14.1.1 Data-Origin Versus Entity Authentication
There are two differences between message
authentication (data-origin authentication), discussed in
Chapter 13, and entity authentication, discussed in this
chapter.
1) Message authentication might not happen in real
time; entity authentication does.
2) Message authentication simply authenticates one
message; the process needs to be repeated for each
new message. Entity authentication authenticates the
claimant for the entire duration of a session.
14.4
14.1.2 Verification Categories
Something known
Something possessed
Something inherent
14.5
14.1.3 Entity Authentication and Key
Management
This chapter discusses entity authentication. The next
chapter discusses key management.
14.6
14-2 PASSWORDS
The simplest and oldest method of entity
authentication is the password-based authentication,
where the password is something that the claimant
knows.
Topics discussed in this section:
14.2.1 Fixed Password
14.2.2 One-Time Password
14.7
14.2.1 Fixed Password
First Approach Figure 14.1 User ID and password file
Attacks on the first approach
Eavesdropping
Stealing a password
Accessing a password file
guessing
14.8
14.2.1 Continued
Second Approach Figure 14.2 Hashing the password
Dictionary attack
Create a list of password, calculate the hash value,
and search the second-column entries to find a
match.
14.9
14.2.1 Continued
Third Approach Figure 14.3 Salting the password
When the password is created, a random string, called the
salt, is concatenated to the password. The salted password is
then hashed.
The Unix OS uses a variation of this method.
14.10
14.2.1 Continued
Fourth Approach
• In the fourth approach, two identification techniques
are combined.
• A good example of this type of authentication is the use
of an ATM card (something possessed) with a PIN
(personal identification number) (something known).
14.11
14.2.2 One-Time Password
A one-time password is a password that is used only
once.
In the first approach, the user and the system agree
upon a list of passwords.
In the second approach, the user and the system agree
to sequentially update the password.
In the third approach, the user and the system create a
sequentially updated password using a hash function.
14.12
14.2.2 Continued
Figure 14.4 the third approach -- Lamport one-time password
Alice and Bob agree upon an
original password P0 and a counter n.
The system stores the identity of
Alice, the value of n and the hash.
14.13
14-3 CHALLENGE-RESPONSE
In password authentication, the claimant proves her
identity by demonstrating that she knows a secret, the
password. However, because the claimant reveals this
secret, it is susceptible to interception by the adversary.
In challenge-response authentication, the claimant
proves that she knows a secret without sending it.
Topics discussed in this section:
14.3.1 Using a Symmetric-Key Cipher
14.3.2 Using Keyed-Hash Functions
14.3.3 Using an Asymmetric-Key Cipher
14.3.4 Using Digital Signature
14.14
14-3 Continue
Note
In challenge-response authentication, the claimant
proves that she knows a secret without sending it to
the verifier.
Note
The challenge is a time-varying value sent by the
verifier; the response is the result
of a function applied on the challenge.
14.15
14.3.1 Using a Symmetric-Key Cipher
First Approach Figure 14.5 Nonce challenge
1. ID of claimant
2. The challenge: RB is the nonce randomly chosen by the Bob to
challenge Alice
3. Alice encrypts the nonce using the shared secret key known only
to Alice and Bob. Bob decrypts the message. If the nonce
14.16 obtained from decryption is the same as the one sent by Bob.
14.3.1 Continued
Figure 14.6 Timestamp challenge
Second Approach
The challenge message is the current time sent
from the verifier to the claimant.
The claimant encrypt Alice ID and time with
Alice-Bob secret key.
14.17
14.3.1 Continued
Third Approach. Figure 14.7 Bidirectional authentication
1. Alice ID
2. The challenge from Bob to Alice RB
3. Alice respond and send her challenge RA
4. Bob’s response. RA and RB are switched to prevent a replay attack.
14.18
14.3.2 Using Keyed-Hash Functions
Instead of using encryption/decryption for entity
authentication, we can also use a keyed-hash function
(MAC). Figure 14.8 Keyed-hash function
1. The challenge message is the current time sent from the
verifier to the claimant.
2. The timestamp is sent both as plaintext and as text scrambled
by the keyed-hash function.
3. Bob compares his calculation with what he received.
14.19
14.3.3 Using an Asymmetric-Key Cipher
First Approach
Figure 14.9 Unidirectional, asymmetric-key authentication
Ownership of claimant’s private key
14.20
14.3.3 Continued
Second Approach
Figure 14.10 Bidirectional, asymmetric-key
14.21
14.3.4 Using Digital Signature
Figure 14.11 Digital signature, unidirectional
First Approach
Ownership of claimant’s private key
14.22
14.3.4 Continued
Second Approach
Figure 14.12 Digital signature, bidirectional authentication
14.23
14-4 ZERO-KNOWLEDGE
In zero-knowledge authentication, the claimant does
not reveal anything that might endanger the
confidentiality of the secret. The claimant proves to the
verifier that she knows a secret, without revealing it.
The interactions are so designed that they cannot lead
to revealing or guessing the secret.
Topics discussed in this section:
14.4.1 Fiat-Shamir Protocol
14.4.2 Feige-Fiat-Shamir Protocol
14.4.3 Guillou-Quisquater Protocol
14.24
14.4.1 Fiat-Shamir Protocol
Figure 14.13 Fiat-Shamir protocol
y 2 is from private key and challenge
xv c is from public key of Alice
y 2 (rs c ) 2 r 2 s 2 c r 2 ( s 2 ) c xv c
14.25
14.4.1 Continued
Cave Example Figure 14.14 Cave example
The door can only be
opened with a magic word.
Alice claims that she knows
the word and that she can
open the door. Bob and
Alice are at pint 1. Alice
enters eh case and reaches
the point 2.
1. Alice chooses to go either right or left. After Alice disappears, Bob comes to
point 2 and asks Alice to come up from either the right or left.
2. if Alice knows the magic word, she will come up from the right direction. If
she does not know the word, she comes up from the right direction with ½
probability.
3. The game will be repeated many times.
14.26
14.4.2 Feige-Fiat-Shamir Protocol
Figure 14.15 Feige-Fiat-Shamir protocol
c c c c c c c c ck
y 2 v1 1 v2 2 vk k r 2 ( s1 1 ) 2 ( s2 2 ) 2 ( sk k ) 2 v1 1 v2 2 vk
2 c 2 c 2 c
x( s1 ) c1 (v1 1 )( s2 ) c2 (v2 2 ) ( sk ) ck (vk k )
2 2 2
x( s1 v1 ) c1 ( s2 v2 ) c2 ( sk vk ) ck
x(1) c1 (1) c2 (1) ck x
14.27
14.4.3 Guillou-Quisquater Protocol
Figure 14.16 Guillou-Quisquater protocol
y e v c (r s c ) e v c r e s ce v c
r e ( s e v) c x 1c x
14.28
14-5 BIOMETRICS
Biometrics is the measurement of physiological or
behavioral features that identify a person
(authentication by something inherent). Biometrics
measures features that cannot be guessed, stolen, or
shared.
Topics discussed in this section:
14.5.1 Components
14.5.2 Enrollment
14.5.3 Authentication
14.5.4 Techniques
14.5.5 Accuracy
14.5.6 Applications
14.29
14.5.1 Components
Several components are needed for biometrics, including
capturing devices, processors, and storage devices..
14.30
14.5.2 Enrollment
Before using any biometric techniques for authentication,
the corresponding feature of each person in the
community should be available in the database. This is
referred to as enrollment.
14.31
14.5.3 Authentication
Verification
Identification
14.32
14.5.4 Techniques
Figure 14.17 Techniques
14.33