Chapter 7 – The RSA Cryptosystem

Dr. Safi Ibrahim

 Content of this Chapter
• The RSA Cryptosystem
• Implementation aspects
• Finding Large Primes
• Attacks and Countermeasures
• Lessons Learned

2/34 Chapter 7 of Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl

 Content of this Chapter
• The RSA Cryptosystem
• Implementation aspects
• Finding Large Primes
• Attacks and Countermeasures
• Lessons Learned

3/34 Chapter 7 of Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl

 The RSA Cryptosystem
• Martin Hellman and Whitfield Diffie published their landmark public-
key paper in 1976
• Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman proposed the
asymmetric RSA cryptosystem in1977
• Until now, RSA is the most widely use asymmetric cryptosystem
although elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) becomes increasingly
popular
• RSA is mainly used for two applications
• Transport of (i.e., symmetric) keys
• Digital signatures

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 Encryption and Decryption
• RSA operations are done over the integer ring Zn (i.e., arithmetic
modulo n), where n = p * q, with p, q being large primes
• Encryption and decryption are simply exponentiations in the ring
Definition
Given the public key (n,e) = kpub and the private key d = kpr we write
y = ekpub(x) ≡ xe mod n
x = dkpr(y) ≡ yd mod n
where x, y ε Zn.
We call ekpub() the
• encryptionx,and
In practice y, n and d are very long integer numbers (≥ 1024 bits)
dkpr() the
• Thedecryption
security of the scheme relies on the fact that it is hard to derive the
operation.
„private exponent“ d given the public-key (n, e)

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 Key Generation
• Like all asymmetric schemes, RSA has set-up phase during which the
private and public keys are computed
Algorithm: RSA Key Generation
Output: public key: kpub = (n, e) and private key kpr = d
1. Choose two large primes p, q
2. Compute n = p * q
3. Compute Φ(n) = (p-1) * (q-1)
4. Select the public exponent e ε {1, 2, …, Φ(n)-1} such that
gcd(e, Φ(n) ) = 1
5. Compute the private key d such that d * e ≡ 1 mod Φ(n)
6. RETURN kpub = (n, e), kpr = d

Remarks:
• Choosing two large, distinct primes p, q (in Step 1) is non-
trivial
• gcd(e, Φ(n)) = 1 ensures that e has an inverse and, thus, that there is
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key7 dof Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl
always a privateChapter
 Example: RSA with small numbers
ALICE BOB
Message x = 4 1. Choose p = 3 and q = 11
[Link] n = p * q = 33 3.
Φ(n) = (3-1) * (11-1) =
20
4. Choose e = 3
Kpub = (33,3)
5. d ≡ e-1 ≡7 mod 20
y = xe ≡ 43 ≡ 31 mod 33
y = 31

yd = 317 ≡ 4 = x mod
33
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 Content of this Chapter
• The RSA Cryptosystem
• Implementation aspects
• Finding Large Primes
• Attacks and Countermeasures
• Lessons Learned

8/34 Chapter 7 of Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl

 Implementation aspects
• The RSA cryptosystem uses only one arithmetic operation (modular
exponentiation) which makes it conceptually a simple asymmetric scheme
• Even though conceptually simple, due to the use of very long
numbers, RSA is orders of magnitude slower than symmetric
schemes, e.g., DES, AES
• When implementing RSA (esp. on a constrained device such as
smartcards or cell phones) close attention has to be paid to the correct
choice of arithmetic algorithms
• The square-and-multiply algorithm allows fast exponentiation, even with
very long numbers…

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 Square-and-Multiply
• Basic principle: Scan exponent bits from left to right and
square/multiply operand accordingly
Algorithm: Square-and-Multiply for xH mod n
Input: Exponent H, base element x,
Modulus n Output: y = xH mod n
1. Determine binary representation H = (ht, ht-1, ...,
h0)2
2. FOR i = t-1 TO 0
3. y = y2 mod n
4. IF hi = 1 THEN
5. y = y * x mod n
6. RETURN y

• Rule: Square in every iteration (Step 3) and multiply current result by x

if the exponent bit hi = 1 (Step 5)
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• Modulo reduction after each step keeps the operand y small
 Example: Square-and-Multiply
• Computes x26 without modulo reduction
• Binary representation of exponent: 26 =(1,1,0,1,0)2=(h4,h3,h2,h1,h0)2
Step Binary exponent Op Comment

1 x = x1 (1)2 Initial setting, h4 processed

1a (x1)2 = x2 (10)2 SQ Processing h3

1b x2 * x = x3 (11)2 MUL h3 = 1

2a (x3)2 = x6 (110)2 SQ Processing h2

2b - (110)2 - h0 = 0

3a (x6)2 = x12 (1100)2 SQ Processing h1

3b x12 * x = x13 (1101)2 MUL h1=1

4a (x13)2 = x26 (11010)2 SQ Processing h0

4b - (11010)2 - h0 = 0

• Observe how the exponent evolves into x26 = x11010

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Example – Square & Multiplication Algorithm
 Complexity of Square-and-Multiply Alg.
• The square-and-multiply algorithm has a logarithmic complexity, i.e., its
run time is proportional to the bit length (rather than the absolute value) of
the exponent
• Given an exponent with t+1 bits
H = (ht,ht-1, ..., h0)2
with ht = 1, we need the following operations
• # Squarings =t
• Average # multiplications = 0.5 t
• Total complexity: #SQ + #MUL = 1.5 t
• Exponents are often randomly chosen, so 1.5 t is a good estimate for
the average number of operations
• Note that each squaring and each multiplication is an operation with very
long numbers, e.g., 2048 bit integers.
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 Speed-Up Techniques
• Modular exponentiation is computationally intensive
• Even with the square-and-multiply algorithm, RSA can be quite slow on
constrained devices such as smart cards
• Some important tricks:
• Short public exponent e
• Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT)
• Exponentiation with pre-computation (not covered here)

14 /34 Chapter 7 of Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl

 Fast encryption with small public exponent
• Choosing a small public exponent e does not weaken the security of RSA
• A small public exponent improves the speed of the RSA encryption
significantly

Public Key e as binary string #SQ + #MUL

21+1 = 3 (11)2 1+1=2

24+1 = 17 (1 0001)2 4+1=5

216 + 1 (1 0000 0000 0000 0001)2 16 + 1 = 17

• This is a commonly used trick (e.g., SSL/TLS, etc.) and makes RSA the
fastest asymmetric scheme with regard to encryption!

15 /34 Chapter 7 of Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl

 Fast decryption with CRT
• Choosing a small private key d results in security weaknesses!
• In fact, d must have at least 0.3t bits, where t is the bit
length of the modulus n
• However, the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) can be used to
(somewhat) accelerate exponentiation with the private key d
• Based on the CRT we can replace the computation of
xd mod Φ(n) mod n

by two computations
xd mod (p-1) mod p
and xd mod (q-1) mod q
where q and p are „small“ compared to n

16 /34 Chapter 7 of Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl

 Basic principle of CRT-based exponentiation
Problem
Domain x xd mod n

xp Xpd mod (p-1) mod p

CRT Domain
xq Xqd mod (q-1) mod q

• CRT involves three distinct steps

(1) Transformation of operand into the CRT domain
(2) Modular exponentiation in the CRT domain
(3) Inverse transformation into the problem domain
• These steps are equivalent to one modular exponentiation in the
problem domain
17 /34 Chapter 7 of Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl
 CRT: Step 1 – Transformation
• Transformation into the CRT domain requires the knowledge of p
and q
• p and q are only known to the owner of the private key, hence CRT
cannot be applied to speed up encryption
• The transformation computes (xp, xq) which is the representation of x
in the CRT domain. They can be found easily by computing
xp ≡ x mod p and xq ≡ x mod q

18 /34 Chapter 7 of Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl

 CRT: Step 2 – Exponentiation
• Given dp and dq such that
dp ≡ d mod (p-1) and dq ≡ d mod (q-1)
one exponentiation in the problem domain
requires two exponentiations in the CRT domain
yp ≡ xp mod
d
p and yq ≡d xq mod q
p q

• In practice, p and q are chosen to have half the bit length of

n, i.e.,
|p| ≈ |q| ≈ |n|/2

19 /34 Chapter 7 of Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl

 CRT: Step 3 – Inverse Transformation
• Inverse transformation requires modular inversion twice, which is
computationally expensive
cp ≡ q-1 mod p and cq ≡ p-1 mod q
• Inverse transformation assembles yp, yq to the final result y mod n in the
problem domain
X ≡ [ q * cp ] * xp + [ p * cq ] * yq mod n
• The primes p and q typically change infrequently, therefore the cost of
inversion can be neglected because the two expresssions
[ q * cp ] and [ p * cq ]
can be precomputed and stored

20 /34 Chapter 7 of Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl

 Complexity of CRT
• We ignore the transformation and inverse transformation steps since their
costs can be neglected under reasonable assumptions
• Assuming that n has t+1 bits, both p and q are about t/2 bits long
• The complexity is determined by the two exponentiations in the CRT
domain. The operands are only t/2 bits long. For the exponentiations we
use the square-and-multiply algorithm:
• # squarings (one exp.): #SQ = 0.5 t
• # aver. multiplications (one exp.): #MUL = 0.25t
• Total complexity: 2 * (#MUL + #SQ) = 1.5t
• This looks the same as regular exponentations, but since the operands
have half the bit length compared to regular exponent., each operation
(i.e., multipl. and squaring) is 4 times faster!
• Hence CRT is 4 times faster than straightforward exponentiation
21 /34 Chapter 7 of Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl
 Content of this Chapter
• The RSA Cryptosystem
• Implementation aspects
• Finding Large Primes
• Attacks and Countermeasures
• Lessons Learned

24 /34 Chapter 7 of Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl

 Finding Large Primes
• Generating keys for RSA requires finding two large primes p and q
such that n = p * q is sufficiently large
• The size of p and q is typically half the size of the desired size of n
• To find primes, random integers are generated and tested for
primality:

p' „p‘ is prime“

RNG candidate Primality Test OR
prime „p‘ is
composite“

• The random number generator (RNG) should be non-predictable

otherwise an attacker could guess the factorization of n

25 /34 Chapter 7 of Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl

 Primality Tests
• Factoring p and q to test for primality is typically not feasible
• However, we are not interested in the factorization, we only want to
know whether p and q are composite
• Typical primality tests are probabilistic, i.e., they are not 100%
accurate but their output is correct with very high probability
• A probabilistic test has two outputs:
• „p‘ is composite“ – always true
• „p‘ is a prime“ – only true with a certain probability
• Among the well-known primality tests are the following
• Fermat Primality-Test
• Miller-Rabin Primality-Test

26 /34 Chapter 7 of Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl

 Fermat Primality-Test
• Basic idea: Fermat‘s Little Theorem holds for all primes, i.e., if a
number p‘ is found for which ap‘-1 ≡ 1 mod p‘, it is not a prime

Algorithm: Fermat Primality-Test

Input: Prime candidate p‘, security parameter s
Output: „p‘ is composite“ or „p‘ is likely a prime“
1. FOR i = 1 TO s
2. choose random a ε {2,3, ..., p‘-2}
3. IF ap‘-1 ≡ 1 mod p’ THEN
4. RETURN „p‘ is composite“
5. RETURN „p‘ is likely a prime“

27 /34 Chapter 7 of Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl

 Content of this Chapter
• The RSA Cryptosystem
• Implementation aspects
• Finding Large Primes
• Attacks and Countermeasures
• Lessons Learned

28 /34 Chapter 7 of Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl

 Attacks and Countermeasures 1/3
• There are two distinct types of attacks on cryptosystems
• Analytical attacks try to break the mathematical structure of the
underlying problem of RSA
• Implementation attacks try to attack a real-world
implementation by exploiting inherent weaknesses in the way
RSA is realized in software or hardware

29 /34 Chapter 7 of Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl

 Attacks and Countermeasures 2/3
RSA is typically exposed to these analytical attack vectors
• Mathematical attacks
• The best known attack is factoring of n in order to obtain Φ(n)
• Can be prevented using a sufficiently large modulus n
• The current factoring record is 664 bits. Thus, it is recommended that
n should have a bit length between 1024 and 3072 bits
• Protocol attacks
• Exploit the malleability of RSA, i.e., the property that a ciphertext can
be transformed into another ciphertext which decrypts to a related
plaintext – without knowing the private key
• Can be prevented by proper padding

30 /34 Chapter 7 of Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl

 Attacks and Countermeasures 3/3
• Implementation attacks can be one of the following
• Side-channel analysis
• Exploit physical leakage of RSA implementation (e.g.,
power consumption, EM emanation, etc.)
• Fault-injection attacks
• Inducing faults in the device while CRT is executed can
lead to a complete leakage of the private key

More on all attacks can be found in Section 7.8 of Understanding Cryptography

31 /34 Chapter 7 of Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl

 Attacks and Countermeasures 2/2
• RSA is typically exposed to these analytical attack vectors (cont’d)
• Protocol attacks
• Exploit the malleability of RSA
• Can be prevented by proper padding
• Implementation attacks can be one of the following
• Side-channel analysis
• Exploit physical leakage of RSA implementation (e.g.,
power consumption, EM emanation, etc.)
• Fault-injection attacks
• Inducing faults in the device while CRT is executed can
lead to a complete leakage of the private key

32 /34 Chapter 7 of Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl

 Content of this Chapter
• The RSA Cryptosystem
• Implementation aspects
• Finding Large Primes
• Attacks and Countermeasures
• Lessons Learned

33 /34 Chapter 7 of Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl

 Lessons Learned
• RSA is the most widely used public-key cryptosystem
• RSA is mainly used for key transport and digital signatures
• The public key e can be a short integer, the private key d needs to have
the full length of the modulus n
• RSA relies on the fact that it is hard to factorize n
• Currently 1024-bit cannot be factored, but progress in factorization
could bring this into reach within 10-15 years. Hence, RSA with a 2048
or 3076 bit modulus should be used for long-term security
• A naïve implementation of RSA allows several attacks, and in
practice RSA should be used together with padding

34 /34 Chapter 7 of Understanding Cryptography by Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl