Critical Systems Validation

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 1

Objectives

To explain how system reliability can be measured and how reliability growth models can be used for reliability prediction To describe safety arguments and how these are used To discuss the problems of safety assurance To introduce safety cases and how these are used in safety validation

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 2

Topics covered

Reliability validation Safety assurance Security assessment Safety and dependability cases

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 3

Validation of critical systems

The verification and validation costs for critical systems involves additional validation processes and analysis than for non-critical systems:
The costs and consequences of failure are high so it is cheaper to find and remove faults than to pay for system failure; You may have to make a formal case to customers or to a regulator that the system meets its dependability requirements. This dependability case may require specific V & V activities to be carried out.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 4

Validation costs

Because of the additional activities involved, the validation costs for critical systems are usually significantly higher than for noncritical systems. Normally, V & V costs take up more than 50% of the total system development costs.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 5

Reliability validation

Reliability validation involves exercising the program to assess whether or not it has reached the required level of reliability. This cannot normally be included as part of a normal defect testing process because data for defect testing is (usually) atypical of actual usage data. Reliability measurement therefore requires a specially designed data set that replicates the pattern of inputs to be processed by the system.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 6

The reliability measurement process

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 7

Reliability validation activities

Establish the operational profile for the system. Construct test data reflecting the operational profile. Test the system and observe the number of failures and the times of these failures. Compute the reliability after a statistically significant number of failures have been observed.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 8

Statistical testing

Testing software for reliability rather than fault detection. Measuring the number of errors allows the reliability of the software to be predicted. Note that, for statistical reasons, more errors than are allowed for in the reliability specification must be induced. An acceptable level of reliability should be specified and the software tested and amended until that level of reliability is reached.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 9

Reliability measurement problems

Operational profile uncertainty

The operational profile may not be an accurate reflection of the real use of the system. Costs can be very high if the test data for the system cannot be generated automatically. You need a statistically significant number of failures to compute the reliability but highly reliable systems will rarely fail.

High costs of test data generation

Statistical uncertainty

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 10

Operational profiles

An operational profile is a set of test data whose frequency matches the actual frequency of these inputs from normal usage of the system. A close match with actual usage is necessary otherwise the measured reliability will not be reflected in the actual usage of the system. It can be generated from real data collected from an existing system or (more often) depends on assumptions made about the pattern of usage of a system.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 11

An operational profile
Nu mber o f inp uts

.. . Inp ut clas ses

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 12

Operational profile generation

Should be generated automatically whenever possible. Automatic profile generation is difficult for interactive systems. May be straightforward for normal inputs but it is difficult to predict unlikely inputs and to create test data for them.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 13

Reliability prediction

A reliability growth model is a mathematical model of the system reliability change as it is tested and faults are removed. It is used as a means of reliability prediction by extrapolating from current data
Simplifies test planning and customer negotiations. You can predict when testing will be completed and demonstrate to customers whether or not the reliability growth will ever be achieved.

Prediction depends on the use of statistical testing to measure the reliability of a system version.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 14

Equal-step reliability growth

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 15

Observed reliability growth

The equal-step growth model is simple but it does not normally reflect reality. Reliability does not necessarily increase with change as the change can introduce new faults. The rate of reliability growth tends to slow down with time as frequently occurring faults are discovered and removed from the software. A random-growth model where reliability changes fluctuate may be a more accurate reflection of real changes to reliability.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 16

Random-step reliability growth

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 17

Growth model selection

Many different reliability growth models have been proposed. There is no universally applicable growth model. Reliability should be measured and observed data should be fitted to several models. The best-fit model can then be used for reliability prediction.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 18

Reliability prediction

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 19

Safety assurance

Safety assurance and reliability measurement are quite different:

Within the limits of measurement error, you know whether or not a required level of reliability has been achieved; However, quantitative measurement of safety is impossible. Safety assurance is concerned with establishing a confidence level in the system.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 20

Safety confidence

Confidence in the safety of a system can vary from very low to very high. Confidence is developed through:
Past experience with the company developing the software; The use of dependable processes and process activities geared to safety; Extensive V & V including both static and dynamic validation techniques.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 21

Safety reviews

Review for correct intended function. Review for maintainable, understandable structure. Review to verify algorithm and data structure design against specification. Review to check code consistency with algorithm and data structure design. Review adequacy of system testing.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 22

Review guidance

Make software as simple as possible. Use simple techniques for software development avoiding error-prone constructs such as pointers and recursion. Use information hiding to localise the effect of any data corruption. Make appropriate use of fault-tolerant techniques but do not be seduced into thinking that fault-tolerant software is necessarily safe.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 23

Safety arguments

Safety arguments are intended to show that the system cannot reach in unsafe state. These are weaker than correctness arguments which must show that the system code conforms to its specification. They are generally based on proof by contradiction
Assume that an unsafe state can be reached; Show that this is contradicted by the program code.

A graphical model of the safety argument may be developed.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 24

Construction of a safety argument

Establish the safe exit conditions for a component or a program. Starting from the END of the code, work backwards until you have identified all paths that lead to the exit of the code. Assume that the exit condition is false. Show that, for each path leading to the exit that the assignments made in that path contradict the assumption of an unsafe exit from the component.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 25

Insulin delivery code

currentDose = computeInsu lin () ; // Safety check - adjust currentDose if necessary // if statement 1 if (previousD ose == 0) { if (currentDose > 16) currentDose = 16 ; } else if (currentDose > (previousD ose * 2) ) currentDose = previousDose * 2 ; // if statement 2 if ( currentDose < minimumDose ) currentDose = 0 ; else if ( currentDose > maxDose ) currentDose = maxDose ; administerInsulin (currentDose) ;

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 26

Safety argument model

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 27

Program paths

Neither branch of if-statement 2 is executed

Can only happen if CurrentDose is >= minimumDose and <= maxDose. currentDose = 0. currentDose = maxDose.

then branch of if-statement 2 is executed

else branch of if-statement 2 is executed

In all cases, the post conditions contradict the unsafe condition that the dose administered is greater than maxDose.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 28

Process assurance

Process assurance involves defining a dependable process and ensuring that this process is followed during the system development. As discussed in Chapter 20, the use of a safe process is a mechanism for reducing the chances that errors are introduced into a system.
Accidents are rare events so testing may not find all problems; Safety requirements are sometimes shall not requirements so cannot be demonstrated through testing.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 29

Safety related process activities

Creation of a hazard logging and monitoring system. Appointment of project safety engineers. Extensive use of safety reviews. Creation of a safety certification system. Detailed configuration management (see Chapter 29).

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 30

Hazard analysis

Hazard analysis involves identifying hazards and their root causes. There should be clear traceability from identified hazards through their analysis to the actions taken during the process to ensure that these hazards have been covered. A hazard log may be used to track hazards throughout the process.
Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24 Slide 31

Ian Sommerville 2004

Hazard log entry

Hazard Log. Page 4: Printed 20.02.2003 System: Insulin Pump System File: InsulinPump/Safety/HazardLog Safety Engineer: James Brown Log version: 1/3 Identified Hazard Insulin overdose delivered to patient Identified by Jane Williams Criticality class 1 Identified risk High Fault tree identified YES Date 24.01.99 Location Hazard Log, Page 5 Fault tree creators Jane Williams and Bill Smith Fault tree checked YES Date 28.01.99 Checker James Brown System safety design require ments 1. 2. 3. The system shall include self-testing software that will test the sensor system, the clock and the insulin delivery system. The self-checking software shall be executed once per minute In the event of the self-checking software discovering a fault in any of the system components, an audible warning shall be issued and the pump display should indicate the name of the component where the fault has been discovered. T he delivery of insulin should be suspended. The system shall incorporate an override system that allows the system user to modify the computed dose of insulin that is to be delivered by the system. The amount of override should be limited to be no greater than a pre-set value that is set when the system is configured by medical staff.

4.

5.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 32

Run-time safety checking

During program execution, safety checks can be incorporated as assertions to check that the program is executing within a safe operating envelope. Assertions can be included as comments (or using an assert statement in some languages). Code can be generated automatically to check these assertions.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 33

Insulin administration with assertions

static void administerInsulin ( ) throws SafetyException { int maxIncrements = [Link] / 8 ; int increments = [Link] / 8 ; // assert currentDose <= InsulinPump .maxDose if ([Link] > [Link]) throw new SafetyException ([Link]); else for (int i=1; i<= increments; i++) { generateSignal () ; if (i > maxIncrements) throw new SafetyException ( [Link]); } // for loop } //administerInsulin

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 34

Security assessment

Security assessment has something in common with safety assessment. It is intended to demonstrate that the system cannot enter some state (an unsafe or an insecure state) rather than to demonstrate that the system can do something. However, there are differences
Safety problems are accidental; security problems are deliberate; Security problems are more generic - many systems suffer from the same problems; Safety problems are mostly related to the application domain

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 35

Security validation

Experience-based validation
The system is reviewed and analysed against the types of attack that are known to the validation team. Various security tools such as password checkers are used to analyse the system in operation. A team is established whose goal is to breach the security of the system by simulating attacks on the system. The system is verified against a formal security specification.

Tool-based validation

Tiger teams

Formal verification

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 36

Security checklist
1. Do all files that are created in the application have appropriate access permissions? The wrong access permissions may lead to these files being accessed by unauthorised users. 2. Does the system automatically terminate user sessions after a period of inactivity? Sessions that are left active may allow unauthorised access through an unattended computer. 3. If the system is written in a programming language without array bound checking, are there situations where buffer overflow may be exploited? Buffer overflow may allow attackers to send code strings to the system and then execute them. 4. If passwords are set, does the system check that password are strong Strong passwords consist of mixed letters, numbers and . punctuation and are not normal dictionary entries. They are more difficult to break than simple passwords.
Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24 Slide 37

Safety and dependability cases

Safety and dependability cases are structured documents that set out detailed arguments and evidence that a required level of safety or dependability has been achieved. They are normally required by regulators before a system can be certified for operational use.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 38

The system safety case

It is now normal practice for a formal safety case to be required for all safety-critical computer-based systems e.g. railway signalling, air traffic control, etc. A safety case is:
A documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a system is adequately safe for a given application in a given environment.

Arguments in a safety or dependability case can be based on formal proof, design rationale, safety proofs, etc. Process factors may also be included.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 39

Components of a safety case

Component System description Safety requirements Hazard and risk analysis Design analysis Verification and validation Review reports T eam competences Process QA Change management processes Associated cases safety Description An overview of the system and a description of its critical components. The safety requirements abstracted from the system requirements specification. Documents describing the hazards and risks that have been identified and the measures taken to reduce risk. A set of structured arguments that justify why the design is safe. A description of the V & V procedures used and, where appropriate, the test plans for the system. Results of system V &V. Records of all design and safety reviews. Evidence of the competence of all of the team involved in safetyrelated systems development and validation. Records of the quality assurance processes carried out during system development. Records of all changes proposed, actions taken and, wh ere appropriate, justification of the safety of these changes. References to other safety cases that may impact on this safety case.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 40

Argument structure

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 41

Insulin pump argument

Claim: Evidence: Evidence: Evidence: Argument:

The maximum single dose computed by the insulin pump will not exceed maxDose. Safety argument for insulin pump as shown in Figure 24.7 T est data sets for insulin pump Static analysis report for insulin pump software The safety argument presented shows that the maximum dose of insulin that can be computed is equal to maxDose. In 400 tests, the value of Dose was correctly computed and never exceeded maxDose. The static analysis of the control software revealed no anomalies. Overall, it is reasonable to assume that the claim is justified.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 42

Claim hierarchy
The insulin pump will not deliver a singl doseofinsulin e that is unsafe

Thema ximum single dose computed by the pump software will not exceed maxDose

maxDose is set up correctly when the pump is configured

maxDose is a saf e dose f the user of or the insulin pump

In normal operation, the maximum dose computed will not exceed maxDose

Ifthesofwa f , t re ails the m aximum d ose computed will not exceed maxDose

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 43

Key points

Reliability measurement relies on exercising the system using an operational profile - a simulated input set which matches the actual usage of the system. Reliability growth modelling is concerned with modelling how the reliability of a software system improves as it is tested and faults are removed. Safety arguments or proofs are a way of demonstrating that a hazardous condition can never occur.

Ian Sommerville 2004

Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24

Slide 44

Key points

It is important to have a dependable process for safety-critical systems development. The process should include hazard identification and monitoring activities. Security validation may involve experiencebased analysis, tool-based analysis or the use of tiger teams to attack the system. Safety cases collect together the evidence that a system is safe.
Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 24 Slide 45

Ian Sommerville 2004