GILBERT RYLE
LIFE
Ryle was born in Brighton, England, in 1900, and grew up in an
environment of learning. His father was a Brighton doctor, a
generalist who had interests in philosophy and astronomy, and
passed on to his children an impressive library. Ryle was educated
at Brighton College, and in 1919 he went up to Queen's
College at Oxford to study Classics but was quickly drawn to
Philosophy. He graduated with a "triple first": first-class honours in
classical honour moderations (1921), literae humaniores (1923),
and politics, philosophy, and economics (1924), and was appointed
as lecturer in philosophy at Christ Church, Oxford in 1925. A year
later, he became a Student (Fellow) and tutor at Christ Church,
where he remained until 1940.
In World War II he was commissioned in the Welsh Guards. A
capable linguist, he was recruited into intelligence work and by
the end of the war had been promoted to the rank of Major.
After the war he returned to Oxford and was elected Waynflete
Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy and Fellow of Magdalen
College, Oxford. He published his principal work, The Concept
of Mind in 1949. He was President of the Aristotelian Society
from 1945 to 1946, and editor of the philosophical
journal Mind from 1947 to 1971. Ryle died on 6 October 1976
at Whitby, North Yorkshire.
His brothers John Alfred (1889–1950) and George Bodley
(1902–1978), both educated at Brighton College as well,
also had eminent careers. John became Regius Professor
of Physic at the University of Cambridge 1935–45 and
physician to King George V. George, after serving as
Director of Forestry first for Wales and then England, was
Deputy-Director of the Forestry Commission 1963–65
and awarded the CBE.
WORKS
THE CONCEPT OF MIND
In The Concept of Mind, Ryle argues that dualism
involves category mistakes and philosophical nonsense.
Category mistakes and nonsense as philosophical topics
continued to inform Ryle's work. Students in his 1967-8
Oxford audience would be asked rhetorically what was
wrong with saying that there are three things in a field:
two cows and a pair of cows. They were also invited to
ponder whether the bung-hole of a beer barrel is part of
the barrel or not.
SUMMARY
In the chapter "Descartes' Myth," Ryle introduces
the term "the dogma of the Ghost in the machine"
to describe the philosophical concept of the mind
as an entity separate from the body. He argues, "I
hope to prove that it is entirely false, and false not
in detail but in principle. It is not merely an
assemblage of particular mistakes. It is one big
mistake and a mistake of a special kind. It is,
namely, a category mistake."