American Grand Strategy

Concepts, Theory, History and Futures

Presentation by Dr. Steven Metz

U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
April 1, 2008
 Concepts and Theory
Definitions, Levels, Dimensions, and Components
 Definition
■ Strategy is the integrated and coherent use of power resources to
attain desired objectives
– It is in contrast to an ad hoc or "muddling through" approach
– Can be formal or informal
■ Strategy has two dimensions
– The horizontal dimension integrates effort across organizations and
across the elements of power
– The vertical dimension plans for the mid- and long-term future
■ Strategy has two components
– Augmenting one's own strength
– Deterring, weakening, thwarting or defeating opponents
 Levels
■ Grand strategy: patterns of behavior involving the integrated use
of power resources in pursuit of national objectives
■ National security strategy: The component of grand strategy
dealing specifically with preventing, deterring, or defeating state
or non-state threats
■ Military strategy: the component of grand strategy dealing
specifically with preparing for, deterring, preventing, or
conducting armed conflict by shaping the security environment,
strengthening friends, or acting directly against with opponents
and enemies
■ Regional strategy or strategies
 Elements of Strategy

■ Ends: national objectives as defined by leaders and

elites, sometimes on their own, sometimes through
consensus building
■ Means: power resources—time, people, effort,
money
– military, political, economic, informational
■ Ways: methods, procedures, and techniques for
using means to promote or attain ends
 The "5-2-2" Approach to Grand Strategy
■ Grand strategy has five components
– Definition of an appropriate world role
– Identification of strategic objectives
– Characterization of opponents or threats (identification of, concept of
motivation, strengths, weaknesses, likely actions)
– Identification of preferred and acceptable methods (applications of the elements
of national power, e.g. containment)
– Identification of the appropriate level of mobilization
■ Grand strategy has two determinants (independent variables)
– The internal (perceptions and preferences as articulated and shaped by leaders;
state of the economy)
– The external (actions of opponents, partners, fence sitters)
■ Grand strategy has two additional shifting central characteristics: the
coherence of the strategy and its supporting consensus
 Effective Strategies
Strategies require constant refinement and adjustment
■ Opponents adjust and adapt
– Edward Luttwak's "paradoxical logic" of strategy—what appears best often is
not when facing an adapting opponent who seeks to deter, weaken, thwart, or
defeat us
■ Means/ends imbalances sometimes develop
– Three solutions
» Revise the ends
» Make the ways more effective
» Increase the means
■ The global security environment, the nature of the
threat, and the nature of armed conflict change
 Strategic Culture

Strategic culture is vital, but sometimes

overlooked or underestimated. It includes:
■ A nation's way of making and adjusting strategy
■ A nation's way of defining who affects strategy
■ A nation's level of acceptable risk
■ A nation's normative framework
A Strategic Approach to Statecraft

Successful nations tend to be those which

■ Think and act strategically
■ Constantly refine and adjust their strategy
– Formal or informal methods
– U.S. today has the most elaborate formal method of strategy
formulation ever seen
■ Develop methods to identify, educate, reward, and
empower strategic thinkers and leaders
 History

The American Approach to Grand Strategy

 Intermixed Traditions
■ Crusading spirit
– A nation defined by values--"beacon on the hill"
– Proselytizing policy--spread democracy and human rights
– Low tolerance for moral ambiguity
– Need to be on the side of "good" and to have partners
■ Isolationism
– Still powerful, particularly in the nation's heartland
– Did not apply to the Western Hemisphere
■ Economism
– Distance from threats and importance of trade led to tendency to define
interests in economic terms
■ Legalism
■ Realism--a European "import"
■ Reliance on technological solutions to problems
 The Reluctant Power

■ Even though the U.S. was the world's dominant

economic power by the early 20th century, it was a
reluctant political and military power
– Led the creation of the League of Nations, then rejected it
■ World War II was the death knell of isolationism
 In Search of a Strategy

■ Initial vision for the post-war

world was "collective security"
built on the United Nations
■ Immediate and extreme
demobilization
■ Emergence of the communist
challenge and the Cold War
■ A mission without a strategy
 The Coalescence of Containment

■ "Containment" coined by George Kennan

– Immediate and widespread acceptance of
concept
– Debate over how to implement it and its extent
■ Debates
– Was it purely political/economic or military?
– Where did it apply?
» Europe only? Everywhere?
– What were the acceptable means?
» Roll back? Support to insurgents? Covert action?
Alliances with friendly dictators? Political warfare?
 The Truman Strategy
■ "Pactomania"
■ Marshall Plan
■ Military technological superiority
– U.S. would not match the Soviets man for man
– Quality would substitute for quantity
■ Strategic nuclear superiority
■ National Security Act created a more effective and
coherent organization
■ Beginning of covert action
■ Internal security—focus on subversion
 The Eisenhower Strategy
■ NSC 68 and the militarization of containment
■ Fear of adverse effects of large defense budgets
■ Massive Retaliation and the ascendance of the airpower
■ Application of containment to new regions like Middle
East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America
■ Association with friendly dictators
■ Lukewarm acceptance of decolonization
■ Mobilization of national scientific and technological
resources
■ Increased emphasis on national air defense
 The Kennedy/Johnson Strategy

■ "People's war" as the prime threat, Third World as the

major battleground
– Significant economic and security assistance
■ Emergence of counterinsurgency; focus of SOF on this
role
■ Vietnam did severe damage to U.S. reputation as force
for democracy and human rights
■ Sustained superiority in aerospace and naval power
 The Nixon/Ford Strategy

■ "Vietnamization" and the abandonment of

counterinsurgency
■ The ascent of "realism" and an approach
utilizing a balance of power logic
– Detente and the "China Card"
■ The search for proxies
– Iran, Israel, Zaire, etc.
■ Emergence of the terrorist challenge
 The Carter Strategy
■ A "return to principles"—stress on human rights
– Downplaying the Soviet threat
– Attempt to pressure friendly dictators
■ Nadir of the U.S. military
■ A Soviet global offensive
– Southern Africa
– Latin America
– Augmentation of blue water navy
■ Narrowing aerospace superiority
 The Reagan Strategy

■ Return to a hard line approach to Soviets

– The enemy of my enemy is my friend
» Angola, Nicaragua, Afghanistan
■ Massive improvement of military
– Holistic quality: people, leadership and training in addition to technology
– Development of many major weapons systems and platforms
■ Spending the Soviets into submission
■ Great emphasis on missile defense
■ Emergence of "LIC" strategy, doctrine, and organization
 The Bush 41Strategy

■ A strategy of hegemony and global

community
– "Everybody wants to be my baby now"
■ Wave of global political and economic
reform
■ Breaking away from friendly dictators
■ Military downsizing (but in a rational way)
– The two MTW concept and the Base Force
■ Involvement in multinational peacekeeping
 The Clinton Strategy
■ A resurgence of idealism--spread of values,
promotion of democracy and market reforms
■ Global engagement
■ Coalition building against "rogue" states
■ Humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping
■ The revolution in military affairs
– Emphasis on creativity, nonlinearity, "out of the box" thinking
■ Growing focus on asymmetry
■ A stressed military
– Declining size, increasing OPTEMPO
 The Initial Bush 43 Strategy

■ Perception that military

transformation needs a jump start
■ Relooking global engagement,
humanitarian intervention, and
protracted peacekeeping
■ Renewed emphasis on missile
defense
■ Skepticism of partnership with
some former enemies, particularly
China
 Bush 43 Strategy Post 9/11
■ Objectives
– Change the dynamics that generate terrorism
– End support for terrorism
– Destroy terrorists with “global reach”
■ Methods
– Military action
– Law enforcement
– Improved intelligence
– Homeland security
» Pre 9/11 the core of homeland security was forward defense, with some
emphasis on air/missile defense and internal subversion
» Post 9/11 close defense and the focus on internal counterterrorism paramount
– Partnerships
» Fluid coalitions—friends defined by their relationship with the threat
» New partnerships—India, Central Asian states
» Transformed relationship with Russia and, to a lesser extent, China
Seeking a New Grand Strategy

Debates and Issues

 The Current Debate: Components

■Appropriate world role

» A spectrum:

Global Imperial Global Engineer Limited

» Global imperial world role: the United States seeks to determine, shape or
dominate security globally
» Global engineer world role: the United States seeks to shape security
globally primarily through partnerships and the use of international
organizations
» Limited world role: the United States determines, shapes or dominates
security in some regions but not others
 The Current Debate: Components

■ Strategic objectives
– Managing sources of threat and conflict versus ameliorating them
» Amelioration is preferably, but very expensive and risky
– Augmenting regional security structures
» Is this a good idea if it diminished the U.S. role?
– Democracy, good governance, or stability?
» In the long term, democracy is the only assurance of good governance and
social stability
» In the short term, democratization is usually destabilizing and often does
not generate good governance
» Is democracy exportable?
– Should the preservation of American hegemony be a strategic
objective?
 The Current Debate: Components

■ Preferred and acceptable methods

– Rollback versus containment
– Unilateral applications of military power (last resort?, if necessary to
maximize effectiveness and minimize risk?, never?)
» Role of nuclear weapons
– Nature of relationships with partners
– When and how "hard" (military) rather than "soft" power will be used
– Respect for sovereignty when attacking enemies
– Role of covert action
– Should U.S. corporations and media play a more overt role in grand
strategy?
 The Current Debate: Components

■ Opponents or threats (identification, concept of

motivation, strengths, weaknesses, likely actions)
– Should U.S. grand strategy remained focused on countering
or defeating terrorism?
» How much effort should be devoted to containing rogue states, preventing
proliferation, or managing the emergence of new global powers?
» How much effort should be devoted to non-military threats that affect
security (global organized crime, pandemic diseases, migration, the
adverse effects of globalization, etc.)?
– Should the opponents or threats be defined by their choice of
tactics?
– Is the root cause of terrorism the absence of political and
economic opportunity?
 The Current Debate: Components

■ Mobilization
– Are we a "nation at war"?
» If so, why have we not undertaken more extensive mobilization?
» Why has Congress not declared war?
– Should we mobilize?
– If so, what effect will this have on:
» Non-military sources of national strength like the academia and
educational system, the media, the science and technology
communities, industry
» American dependence on foreign technology, capital, manufactured
goods
» Methods of military recruitment (i.e. volunteer versus a draft military)
» Personal rights and legal protections
 The Current Debate: Determinants

■ Internal
– Growing "red/blue" schism within the American public
– Potential budgetary crisis
» Impending demand for increase in social spending as the population ages
» Trade and spending deficits could generate economic problems
– Potential fading of support for an active American world role
■ External
– Will other states attempt to contain or constrain the United States?
– Can traditional alliances be sustained?
– Will effective regional security systems emerge?
– What will America's opponents and enemies do?
 The Current Debate: Characteristics

■ Coherence
– Current grand strategy is only moderately coherent, but this is normal in
the period following a significant strategic shift
» The current era is analogous to the late 1940s when there was
agreement that containment was a good idea but disagreement over
how and where to apply it.
■ Supporting consensus
– Supporting consensus is fragile due to schisms in the American polity,
information saturation (which gives everyone a picture of an opinion
toward any application of national power), the way current strategy was
formulated (by fiat rather than consensus-building), and the lingering
isolationist instinct outside the East and West coast
Future Grand Strategies

Alternatives
 Alternative 1

The Lion Unbound

■ Additional major terrorist attacks in the U.S., possibly involving
WMD, focus American on GWOT and remove any restraints
■ Very aggressive global posture including preemption and
intervention in terrorism sponsoring states and regions
– Long term presence or occupation of central states or regions
■ Partners and friends are defined solely by their role in GWOT
■ Significant increase in national mobilization and constriction of
personal rights
– Development of a full national strategy to augment resources
■ Significant increase in defense budget and size of the military
 Alternative 2

The Lion Benign

■ Linear progression and success of existing strategy
– Political, economic, and social reform takes root in the current cauldrons of
terrorism; this undercuts the dynamic that generates terrorism
– National and regional security capabilities improve
■ The U.S. continues to play the dominant role in all regions, but this is
accepted by most regional states
■ Emerging powers like China remain stable and integrate into the global
community
■ Proliferation of WMD is controlled
■ Transformation preserves U.S. military superiority
■ Eventually, modest decline in U.S. defense budget, force size, level of
national mobilization, and constriction of personal rights
 Alternative 3

The Lion Beleaguered

■ Multiple internal wars and state failures, including some in major
regional powers, create cascading security dilemmas and
humanitarian disasters
– A long list of potentials: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Indonesia, Nigeria,
Egypt, Ukraine, Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela
■ U.S. military involved in large scale, protracted stabilization
operations, probably in concert with some partners
– Development of some method of strategic triage
– Emphasis on identifying and preventing internal war or state collapse
■ Controlling "loose nukes" becomes the highest strategic priority
 Alternative 4

The Lion Disengaged

■ Some combination of frustration with Iraq, the widespread
disintegration of regional security structures, domestic economic
problems, alienation from traditional allies, and lessened
dependence on Middle Eastern petroleum forces or allows the
United States to diminish its role in the security of some or most
regions
■ Major security role in the Western Hemisphere likely to continue
■ Greater focus on and shift of resources to homeland security
rather than force projection
■ Preservation of long range strike systems—nuclear and non-
nuclear—to deter opponents
 Implications for the Army
■ The greatest demands on the Army will come from grand strategies
that are active and which seek amelioration of the root causes of
conflict
– The highest demand on the Army would come if these conditions hold and the
world sees frequent internal conflict, collapse, and humanitarian disasters in
large regional states
■ The least demands on the Army would be within a strategy of partial
disengagement
– The Army's role would be support to homeland security and, possibly,
participation in multinational peacekeeping
■ Linear continuation of the current strategy is likely to create an
increased role for the Army (and, probably, a larger end strength) in
the mid-term, with a decline coming as the strategy succeeds
(probably 5-10 years)
Dr. Steven Metz
Strategic Studies Institute
U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5244
Voice phone 717 245-3822 Fax 717 245-3820
Email: [Link]@[Link]
Web: [Link] revised April 1, 2008