Cryptography and Network Security Chapter 18
Fifth Edition by William Stallings Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown
Chapter 15 Electronic Mail Security
Despite the refusal of VADM Poindexter and LtCol North to appear, the Board's access to other sources of information filled much of this gap. The FBI provided documents taken from the files of the National Security Advisor and relevant NSC staff members, including messages from the PROF system between VADM Poindexter and LtCol North. The PROF messages were conversations by computer, written at the time events occurred and presumed by the writers to be protected from disclosure. In this sense, they provide a first-hand, contemporaneous account of events. The Tower Commission Report to President Reagan on the Iran-Contra Affair, 1987
Email Security
email
is one of the most widely used and regarded network services currently message contents are not secure
may be inspected either in transit or by suitably privileged users on destination system
Email Security Enhancements
confidentiality
protection from disclosure of sender of message
authentication
message
integrity
protection from modification
non-repudiation
of origin
protection from denial by sender
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
widely
used de facto secure email developed by Phil Zimmermann selected best available crypto algs to use integrated into a single program on Unix, PC, Macintosh and other systems originally free, now also have commercial versions available
PGP Operation Authentication
1.
2.
3. 4.
5.
sender creates message make SHA-1160-bit hash of message attached RSA signed hash to message receiver decrypts & recovers hash code receiver verifies received message hash
PGP Operation Confidentiality
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
sender forms 128-bit random session key encrypts message with session key attaches session key encrypted with RSA receiver decrypts & recovers session key session key is used to decrypt message
PGP Operation Confidentiality & Authentication
can
use both services on same message
create signature & attach to message encrypt both message & signature attach RSA/ElGamal encrypted session key
PGP Operation Compression
by
default PGP compresses message after signing but before encrypting
so can store uncompressed message & signature for later verification & because compression is non deterministic
uses
ZIP compression algorithm
PGP Operation Email Compatibility
when using PGP will have binary data to send (encrypted message etc) however email was designed only for text hence PGP must encode raw binary data into printable ASCII characters uses radix-64 algorithm
maps 3 bytes to 4 printable chars also appends a CRC
PGP also segments messages if too big
PGP Operation Summary
PGP Session Keys
need
a session key for each message
of varying sizes: 56-bit DES, 128-bit CAST or IDEA, 168-bit Triple-DES
generated
using ANSI X12.17 mode uses random inputs taken from previous uses and from keystroke timing of user
PGP Public & Private Keys
since many public/private keys may be in use, need to identify which is actually used to encrypt session key in a message
could send full public-key with every message but this is inefficient is least significant 64-bits of the key will very likely be unique
rather use a key identifier based on key
also use key ID in signatures
PGP Message Format
PGP Key Rings
each
PGP user has a pair of keyrings:
public-key ring contains all the public-keys of other PGP users known to this user, indexed by key ID private-key ring contains the public/private key pair(s) for this user, indexed by key ID & encrypted keyed from a hashed passphrase
security
of private keys thus depends on the pass-phrase security
PGP Key Rings
PGP Message Generation
PGP Message Reception
PGP Key Management
rather than relying on certificate authorities in PGP every user is own CA
can sign keys for users they know directly trust keys have signed can trust keys others have signed if have a chain of signatures to them
forms a web of trust
key ring includes trust indicators users can also revoke their keys
PGP Trust Model Example
S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions)
security
enhancement to MIME email
original Internet RFC822 email was text only MIME provided support for varying content types and multi-part messages with encoding of binary data to textual form S/MIME added security enhancements
have
S/MIME support in many mail agents
eg MS Outlook, Mozilla, Mac Mail etc
S/MIME Functions
enveloped
data
encrypted content and associated keys
signed
data data
encoded message + signed digest cleartext message + encoded signed digest
clear-signed
signed
& enveloped data
nesting of signed & encrypted entities
S/MIME Cryptographic Algorithms
digital
signatures: DSS & RSA hash functions: SHA-1 & MD5 session key encryption: ElGamal & RSA message encryption: AES, Triple-DES, RC2/40 and others MAC: HMAC with SHA-1 have process to decide which algs to use
S/MIME Messages
S/MIME
secures a MIME entity with a signature, encryption, or both forming a MIME wrapped PKCS object have a range of content-types:
enveloped data signed data clear-signed data registration request certificate only message
S/MIME Certificate Processing
S/MIME
uses X.509 v3 certificates managed using a hybrid of a strict X.509 CA hierarchy & PGPs web of trust each client has a list of trusted CAs certs and own public/private key pairs & certs certificates must be signed by trusted CAs
Certificate Authorities
several well-known CAs Verisign one of most widely used Verisign issues several types of Digital IDs increasing levels of checks & hence trust
have
Class 1 2 3 Identity Checks name/email check + enroll/addr check + ID documents Usage web browsing/email email, subs, s/w validate e-banking/service access
S/MIME Enhanced Security Services
3
proposed enhanced security services:
signed receipts security labels secure mailing lists
Domain Keys Identified Mail
a
specification for cryptographically signing email messages so signing domain claims responsibility recipients / agents can verify signature proposed Internet Standard RFC 4871 has been widely adopted
Internet Mail Architecture
Email Threats
see
RFC 4684- Analysis of Threats Motivating DomainKeys Identified Mail describes the problem space in terms of:
range: low end, spammers, fraudsters capabilities in terms of where submitted, signed, volume, routing naming etc outside located attackers
DKIM Strategy
transparent
to user
MSA sign MDA verify
for
pragmatic reasons
DCIM Functional Flow
Summary
have
considered:
secure email PGP S/MIME domain-keys identified email