Institute for Defense Analyses

Report Part Title: Defining, Describing, and Measuring Democracy

Report Title: Democracy Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990 to 2014
Report Author(s): Stephanie M. Burchard
Institute for Defense Analyses (2014)

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Introduction
The widespread adoption of multiparty elections in sub‐Saharan Africa in the 1990s was greeted
with much enthusiasm by the international community. Many heralded this trend as the
beginning of some great democratic experiment in Africa. This optimism was based in part on
the belief that repeatedly holding multiparty elections would, over time, lead to improvements
in democratic governance, specifically in terms of the protections of civil liberties and freedoms.
Even though virtually every country in Africa has now held repeated multiparty elections over
the past two decades, democratic development is progressing at an uneven pace across the
continent. In some countries there seems to be a deepening commitment to democratic norms
and practices, but in others, this commitment, both by elites and the public, has proven shallow.
Countries such as Ghana, Senegal, and Zambia have seen several peaceful transitions between
political parties as a result of close and contentious elections. Countries such as Mali, Niger, and
Burkina Faso have experienced sudden coups d’état of unpopular but constitutionally elected
governments. Furthermore, in many cases elections do not seem to produce substantive
change. Countries such as Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, and Angola routinely hold elections, but the
opposition has no realistic chance of dislodging the incumbent party from power, and civil
liberties in all three countries have either stagnated or regressed.
This paper identifies potential factors that may account for the range of democratic outcomes
found in sub‐Saharan Africa by (1) examining the different definitions of democracy, (2)
determining the most common metrics that are used to assess democratic quality, and (3)
identifying the factors or processes that led to the proliferation of multiparty systems in Africa.
This project concludes with suggestions on how to better assess the process of democratization
in sub‐Saharan Africa and potential avenues for future research.

Defining, Describing, and Measuring Democracy

Background
For several reasons, democracy is touted as a preferred method of governance, especially
compared with its authoritarian alternatives. Democracy is believed to be more conducive to
economic and social development.1 It is believed to be a more stable system of government in
the long run compared with dictatorships, single‐party systems, and the like, which are prone to
civil strife and coups d’état.2 From a foreign policy perspective, democracies are much less likely
to engage in significant external conflict or war with each other, making the proliferation of
democracy a likely precondition for global peace.3
The U.S. Government has a long history of including democracy promotion as a fundamental
tenet of its foreign policy. Beginning after World War II, the United States played an active role

1 Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic and Political Development,” American
Political Science Review 53 (1959), no. 1: 69–105; Ross E. Burkart and Michael S. Lewis‐Black, “Comparative
Democracy: the Economic Development Thesis,” American Political Science Review 88(1995), 4: 903–910; Adam
Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development:
Political Institutions and Well‐Being in the World, 1950 to 1999 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
2 Yi Feng, “Democracy, Political Stability and Economic Growth,” British Journal of Political Science 27(1997), 3:
391–418; Przeworski, et al., Democracy and Development.
3 John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” International Security 19 (1994), 2: 87–125; Paul
R. Hensel, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl, “The Democratic Peace and Rivalries,” Journal of Politics 62(2000), 4:
1173–88.

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in encouraging integration and liberalization in Western Europe.4 During the Cold War, the
United States sought out allies in its ideological stalemate with the USSR, which sometimes put
its foreign policy at odds with its stated goal of pursing democracy across the world. But in the
1980s under the Reagan administration, the United States began to actively support
democratization programs in Latin America. Since the 1990s, the United States has established
numerous programs to help support the growth of democracy in Africa. Presidents George Bush,
Sr., Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush all actively promoted democratic reform in Africa as an
essential part of their foreign policy strategies.5 The first pillar of the Obama Administration’s
2012 “US Strategy toward Sub‐Saharan Africa” is explicitly focused on strengthening democratic
institutions in support of deepening democracy on the continent.6
Because promoting democracy can be shown to be such an essential part of US foreign policy, it
is important to be absolutely clear about what is meant by the concept of democracy.
Researchers and academics have been debating the definition of democracy for decades, and
yet there is still little consensus on a precise definition.7 Some use democracy as a catchall
phrase to describe anything from the holding of elections to the broad protection of human
rights, each of which addresses a part of what democracy could look like.
At its essence, democracy is rule by the people. It is a system of decision‐making and
governance that is territorially bound to a specific group of people who have assented to rule.
Primary alternatives to democracy include (1) anarchy, in which there is no overarching
authority that makes decisions on behalf of a group; (2) autocracy, in which a single person or
entity makes decisions on behalf of a group; and (3) oligarchy, in which a small group of people
makes decisions on behalf of a group. Anarchy, autocracy, and oligarchy do not require the
members of the group (the governed) to assent to rule, whereas democracy requires it. Another
key distinction between these various forms of governance is the number of individuals involved
in the decision‐making process. In theory, the range is from none (anarchy) to all (pure
democracy). Monarchy is a specific subtype of autocracy in which leadership succession is
hereditarily based. Theocracy is another subtype of autocracy in which leadership is based on
religious strictures. The selection criterion for political leadership under an oligarchy is
established by some formal criteria such as race, ethnicity, or economic class. Anocracy is the
category that describes countries that combine characteristics of both autocracy and
democracy.
Although democracy may seem like a simple concept, because there are actually several
different ways in which democracy can be organized, it is a concept that lends itself to different
levels of definitional specificity. In small groups or societies, democracy can be exercised
through town meetings or other types of inclusive forums in which everyone is allowed to
participate in the decisions that are made on behalf of the group. This type of democracy is

4 Mark P. Lagon, “Promoting Democracy: the Whys and Hows for the United States and the International
Community,” Expert Brief, Council on Foreign Relations, 2011, [Link]
democracy‐whys‐hows‐united‐states‐international‐community/p24090, accessed December 2014.
5 Adewale Banjo, “U.S. Development Diplomacy in Africa: from Bill Clinton to George W. Bush,” African Journal of
Political Science and International Relations 4(2010), 4: 140–49.
6 “US Strategy toward Sub‐Saharan Africa,” The White House, 2012,
[Link] accessed December 2014.
7 J. D. May, “Defining Democracy: a Bid for Coherence and Consensus,” Political Studies, 1978; P. C. Schmitter and
T. L. Karl, “What Democracy Is…and Is Not,” Journal of Democracy, Summer 1991; P. R. Newberg and T.
Carothers, 1996. “Aiding—and Defining Democracy,” World Policy Journal, 1996; G. L. Munck, “What is
Democracy? A Reconceptualization of the Quality of Democracy,” Democratization, 2014.

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referred to as direct democracy. The size and complexity of most modern societies, however,
makes direct democracy virtually impossible to implement. An alternative to direct democracy is
indirect democracy in which a smaller group of representatives is empowered with the authority
to make decisions on behalf of the group at large. It is understood that these representatives
are agents that speak on behalf of the known preferences of the larger group and make
decisions with these preferences in mind.
There are myriad methods of selecting political representatives. Democracy requires a method
of leadership selection in which virtually all citizens are able to participate and to exercise some
form of control over said leaders. In contrast, autocracies generally rely on a very narrow subset
of individuals to select leaders or, in the case of monarchies and theocracies, political leadership
is preordained. The most common method of leadership selection in a democracy is some form
of an election. An election can be as simple as a show of hands or as complicated as an
electronic secret ballot. Elections can be conducted using various formulas that translate the
preferences of the electorate into its representatives. Constituencies are drawn, either
randomly or deliberately, and given a specific number of seats that represent that specific
constituency.
Electoralism has now become the norm, meaning that most every country in the world holds
some form of election as a means of selecting some contingent of its political leadership.
Whereas prior to the 1990, elections were held intermittently in most African countries, now
elections are almost universally adopted. Elections, although an essential component of
democracy, are not the exclusive domain of democratic governments. Elections can be held by
non‐democracies. For example, in Swaziland—Africa’s last hereditary monarchy and absolutely
not a democracy—the executive position is handed down from generation to generation based
on lineage. Elections are held to fill some legislative positions, but there are many barriers to
entry and organization. Political parties are not allowed to form and the executive, King Mswati
III, retains final decision‐making authority.
Translating citizen preferences and votes into elected seats adds another level of complexity to
the definition of democracy. Plurality rules award elected seats to the highest vote‐getter.
Zambia and Malawi use plurality rules in their presidential elections. Majoritarian rules require
that eventual victors receive at the least 50 percent of the vote plus one. Kenya, Nigeria, and
Liberia use majoritarian rules for their presidential elections. Proportional representation
apportions seats based on the percentage of votes that parties or politicians receive. South
Africa and Benin adopted proportional representation for their legislative electoral systems.
Mixed systems combine aspects of plurality, majoritarian, and proportional representation.
Senegal and Lesotho both use mixed‐member electoral systems. Countries may also use
separate rules for executive and legislative elections. For example, Zimbabwe uses majoritarian
electoral rules for its executive elections and simple plurality rules for legislative elections.
Once representatives are elected, they are organized into different governing components.
Essential functions of a government include making laws, executing and enforcing laws, and
adjudicating when disputes over rules arise. Most modern configurations of democracies
include three primary branches with distributed responsibility for these functions. A legislature
makes rules for the group. An executive ensures these rules are followed. A judiciary resolves
disputes regarding these rules. Parliamentary systems fuse legislative and executive
responsibilities and make them simultaneously accountable to each other. Botswana and South
Africa are examples of parliamentary systems. Presidential systems, on the other hand, create
separate mandates for executive and legislative responsibilities. Sierra Leone and Niger have

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presidential systems. Semi‐presidentialism, also referred to as hybrid regimes, combines aspects
of presidentialism and parliamentarism. The Democratic Republic of Congo and Madagascar
both employ semi‐presidentialism. Any of these three types of systems can be democratic but
they do not have to be.
Political parties may form before or after elections. Political parties are formal organizations that
facilitate elections through such activities as mobilizing voters, coordinating local and national
campaigns, and providing ideological branding on behalf of the candidates as a collective.
Political parties also play a significant role in organizing a common policy agenda and passing
legislation once members have obtained office. Party systems refer to the number of active
political parties routinely participating in elections. The number of political parties varies among
different democratic systems and has a close, but not perfect, relationship to the types of
electoral rules in use. Two‐party systems tend to form in conjunction with plurality or
majoritarian electoral rules. Multiparty systems tend to form in conjunction with the varieties of
proportional representation. There is no fixed number of political parties necessary to consider
a country democratic.
In some countries, elections may be held but partisan organization and competition are highly
restricted. Uganda during the 1990s held no‐party elections. Several countries in Africa during
the 1970s and 1980s, including Kenya, Tanzania, and Ghana, organized single‐party elections in
which only one party was legally allowed to nominate candidates for office. In the 1970s,
Senegal briefly adopted a mandatory three‐party system with strict ideological roles assigned to
each political party. From a normative perspective, there are ongoing debates regarding the
democratic quality of these forced‐party systems as they impose formal restrictions on
organization and electoral participation.
Although not an exhaustive examination of the different ways of organizing democratic
governments, this review should make clear that there are myriad ways to configure democracy.
Because of the ways these different political institutions can be combined, identifying
democracy and differentiating it from other regime types can become complicated. This is
especially true due to the overlap in political institutions and terminology between democratic
and nondemocratic regimes. Presidents as well as nominally functional legislatures are found in
democracies and nondemocracies alike. Elections are held in both democratic and autocratic
systems. In addition, because some countries may be motivated to overemphasize the presence
or quality of democracy for a domestic audience, an international audience, or both, relying on
self‐reported designations can prove unreliable. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, also
known as North Korea, is an example of a nondemocratic country that has adopted the language
of democracy for rhetorical reasons.
Criteria for Assessing Democracies
So based on what criteria can democracies be identified and assessed? Some researchers utilize
a minimal definition of democracy in their analyses. Such a definition focuses on whether a
country has adopted only the most essential of democratic institutions: elections. The only
caveat to this definition is that elections must be considered “open” in that most citizens are
free to contest elections as an aspirant and most are free to participate as a voter. This
procedural definition focuses only on the inclusivity of political institutions and the freeness of
citizens to participate in leadership selection. This approach to identifying democracy does not
account for the quality and conduct of elections and is silent on many other key aspects of
democratic rule. Further, this approach does not factor in individual civil liberties such as the
right to organize and assemble, freedom of speech, or freedom of the press. It stands to reason

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that these types of guarantees serve to buttress the ability of citizens to effectively and actively
participate in elections. The inclusion of such criteria creates a substantive definition of
democracy, one in which the establishment of democratic institutions is not sufficient; the
institutions must also work as designed. When analyzing data on democratic designations, it is
imperative to be aware of which definition is being used.
Table 1 describes several different measures of democracy commonly used in research, each
with its own merits and drawbacks. Some measures use the procedural definition of democracy
(Polity IV, Przeworski et al.) whereas some measures incorporate substantive aspects of
democracy (Freedom House, Boix et al.) Some measures capture worldwide data from as far
back as the 1800s (Polity IV, Boix et al., Przeworski et al.) whereas some confine their data
collection to more recent times or regions (Freedom House, Mo Ibrahim Index). Some measures
are binary, merely indicating either the presence or absence of democracy (Boix et al.,
Przeworski et al.). Some measures assign cumulative scores based on various defined criteria
(Mo Ibrahim ranges from 0 to 100; Freedom House ranges from 1 to 7; Polity IV ranges from –10
to 10). Measures such as these present themselves as ordinal‐level data such that we can
measure and use to compare different countries or different time periods; however, there is
debate about the appropriateness of using data in such a way.8

Table 1: Sampling of Common Measures of Democracy

Definition Countries Years
Measure Used Included Covered Operationalization
Boix et al.* Substantive Global 1800–2007 1 = democracy,
0 = autocracy
Freedom Substantive Global 1974 to Ranges from 1 to 7;
House present 1 = free, 7 = not free
Ibrahim Index Substantive Africa 2000 to Ranges from 100 to
of African present 0; 100 = best
Governance performing, 0 =
worst performing
Polity IV Procedural Global 1800 to Ranges from 10 to
present –10; 10 = pure
democracy, –10 =
pure autocracy
Przeworski et Procedural Global 1950 to 1 = democracy, 0 =
al. 1990 autocracy
* Charles Boix, Michael Miller, and Sebastian Rosato, “A Complete Data Set of Political Regimes, 1800–2007,”
Comparative Political Studies 46(2013), 12: 1523–54.

Hogstrom (2013) evaluates two of the most frequently used measures of democracy, Freedom
House and Polity IV.9 Both are global time‐series datasets, making them popular in quantitative
analysis of democracy trends and patterns. Data for Polity IV is collected from 1800 to present

8 See Gerardo L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative
Indices,” Comparative Political Studies 35(2002), 5: 5–34 for a more detailed debate.
9 John Hogstrom, “Does the Choice of Democracy Measure Matter? Comparisons between the Two Leading
Democracy Indices, Freedom House and Polity IV,” Government and Opposition 48(2013), 2: 201–21.

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day for all countries in the world. Freedom House data has been collected since 1974. Polity IV
measures come from the presence of specific procedures for electoral contestation: the
competitiveness of political participation, constraints on executive power, and the openness of
executive recruitment. Freedom House measures are based on country expert surveys of
protections for both civil liberties and political rights. Hogstrom finds that the two measures are
correlated (but not perfectly so) and that the differences between the two measures can have a
significant effect on research findings. The substantive measure of democracy, Freedom House,
sets a much as higher standard for consideration of democracy than does Polity IV, which
measures the procedural definition of democracy. Hogstrom concludes that the measure of
democracy that is used has a direct impact on the nature of research findings, with different
measures sometimes producing conflicting results. Thus, in any analysis it is necessary to be
explicit about the definition and how it is used and how democracy is measured.
For the purpose of this report, I examine both the minimalist (procedural) and maximalist
(substantive) measures of democracy. Comparing trends in procedural democracy and
substantive democracy presents a picture of progress and retreat across sub‐Saharan Africa.
Based on data from Polity IV, in 1991 there were approximately 7 democracies in Africa; by 2012
there were 16, more than double the number 20 years before (See Table 2). The increase in the
number of democracies was accompanied by an associated decrease in autocracies, from 16 in
1990 to 3 in 2012.10 According to the data, the vast majority of countries in Africa, however,
were characterized as anocracies, or hybrid regimes that occupy the space between democracy
and autocracy. The number of anocracies increased as well, from 17 in 1991 to 24 in 2012. From
this measure, it would seem that democracy has spread rapidly across sub‐Saharan Africa and
that this improvement has come at the cost of autocratic rule. The most significant gains appear
to have taken place between 2000 and 2012, where many countries transitioned from anocracy
to democracy.
To be sure, the increase in procedural democratic practices across the continent is impressive.
But again, this measure does not capture democratic quality or substantive gains in democracy
in Africa. It only reflects the number of countries that have transitioned to multiparty elections
with minimal formal restrictions on participation. This definition may be inappropriate given the
patterns and nature of electoral competition in Africa. Electoral fraud is a common occurrence
and more than 50 percent of elections in Africa can be characterized by harassment,
intimidation, or some other form of electoral malfeasance.11 In many cases, the government is
directly responsible for sponsoring violence against potential voters, through attempts to
mobilize supporters and disenfranchise the opposition.12 Problematic elections have been held
repeatedly in Nigeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, in which
thousands have lost their lives due to violence before and after the elections. In other countries,
elections may be superficially peaceful, but significant fraud and vote rigging are believed to
have taken place.13

10 “Sub‐Saharan Africa: Regimes by Type, 1946‐2012,” Systemic Peace,

[Link] accessed December 2014.
11 Scott Straus and Charlie Taylor, “Democratization and Electoral Violence in Sub‐Saharan Africa, 1990–2008,” in
Voting in Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub‐Saharan Africa, ed. Dorina Bekoe (Washington, DC: United States
Institute of Peace Press, 2012), 15–38
12 Ibid.
13 Paul Collier and Pedro C. Vicente, “Violence, Bribery, and Fraud: The Political Economy of Elections in Sub‐
Saharan Africa,” Public Choice 153(2012), 1‐2: 117–47.

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 Table 2: Polity Scores, Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990 to 2012
1990 2000 2012
Democracy 17.5% 19.5% 37.2%
Anocracy 42.5% 70.7% 55.8%
Autocracy 40% 9.7% 6.9%

Freedom House scores are an example of a substantive measure of democracy. They are
calculated based on subjective assessments in several areas related to the protection of political
rights and civil liberties. The score reflects expert survey responses regarding a country’s
electoral process; political pluralism and participation; functioning of government; freedom of
expression, association, and organization; rule of law; and individual rights. Based on these
scores, Freedom House, a nonprofit organization, assesses the overall level of freedom of a
country and rates it as Free, Partly Free, or Not Free. Table 3 displays the distribution of
countries in Africa based on these criteria. The most significant gains in political freedoms and
civil liberties in Africa took place from 1990 to 2000, where the percentage of “Free” countries
more than doubled and the percentage of “Not Free” countries was virtually halved. From 2000
to 2014, however, it seems as though democracy stagnated and may have even declined a bit as
the percentage of countries ranked “Not Free” increased from 33 percent in 2000 to 41 percent
in 2014.

Table 3: Freedom House Scores, Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990 to 2014

1990 2000 2014
Free 8% 19% 20%
Partly Free 32% 48% 39%
Not Free 60% 33% 41%

Another measure that attempts to capture substantive democratic gains in Africa is the Ibrahim
Index of African Governance. Since 2000, the Mo Ibrahim foundation has been releasing yearly
reports broadly assessing governance trends across the continent. Fortuitously, this is the time
period in which the two previous measures of democracy seem to disagree the most, allowing
us to further probe the reason for the divergence.
The Mo Ibrahim Foundation collects data on over 100 different measures and then combines
the scores on these measures into 4 indicators of governance: safety and rule of law; human
development; sustainable economic opportunity; and participation and human rights. The index
assigns scores that range from 0 (worst) to 100 (best). All four indicators are then combined into
a single measure representing a country’s governance score. In 2000, the continental average
was 46.6. For 2012, the continental average was 51.6; for 2013, the continental average was
51.5. According to their 2014 report, there was no difference in the overall governance measure
from the previous year. Among the various components, however, there were some changes.
The biggest gains were in human development (+10.2), and there was a slight decline in safety
and rule of law (–1.1). There is also a wide gulf between the top and bottom. Table 4 shows the
rankings and scores for the top‐10, middle‐10, and bottom‐10 performing countries for 2014.

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 Table 4: 2014 IIAG Overall Scores
Top 10 Middle 10 Bottom 10
Mauritius (81.7) Mali (49.5) Libya (42.1)
Cape Verde (76.6) Niger (49.4) Angola (40.9)
Botswana (76.2) Comoros (49.3) Equatorial Guinea (38.4)
South Africa (73.3) Liberia (49.3) Zimbabwe (38.0)
Seychelles (73.2) Ethiopia (48.5) DRC (34.1)
Namibia (70.3) Madagascar (48.2) Guinea‐Bissau (33.2)
Ghana (68.2) Cameroon (47.6) Chad (32.3)
Tunisia (66.0) Djibouti (46.8) Eritrea (29.8)
Senegal (64.3) Togo (46.4) Central Africa Republic (24.8)
Lesotho (62.3) Nigeria (45.8) Somalia (8.6)

The top‐10 countries are the most stable, and they have been routinely ranked relatively highly
since 2000. The bottom 10, on the other hand, have seen significant volatility. Southern African
countries perform the best, and Central African countries are many of the worst performing
countries on the continent. The top‐five improvers since 2000 are Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda,
Angola, and Togo. In four of these countries, a significant war or conflict ended in the 2000s. The
average improvement score was 4.8 points. The five countries that have seen the largest
decreases in terms of governance since 2000 are Madagascar, Central African Republic, Eritrea,
Libya, and Mauritania. Four of these countries have experienced at least one coup d’etat since
2000. The patterns of improvement and decline since 2000 reflect the devastating effects of
conflict and instability. In addition, according to the disaggregated data, the biggest gains across
the continent have been in human development (specifically health outcomes); more modest
gains have occurred in safety and rule of law. The largest areas of stagnation and retreat have
been in the areas of political participation and human rights protection.
It seems that the number of democracies across sub‐Saharan Africa has significantly increased
since 1991, with major gains taking place in the 2000s. This perspective, however, provides an
incomplete picture of the growth and development of democracy. According to substantive
measures, democracy spread across Africa in the 1990s but has stagnated since 2000. In some
ways, this makes sense. Adopting democratic procedures—namely elections—is much easier
and less threatening to political elites than genuinely liberalizing the political sphere.
Furthermore, elections are but one of the many structural features necessary for a country to be
considered fully democratic. Citizens must have access to information about government policy,
legislation, and deliberative processes to adequately evaluate performance. They must also be
able to use other democratic means of contacting elected officials and making their preferences
known. Ensuring that there are protections in place for individual civil liberties, and that these
protections are respected, helps to strengthen democracy.

Democratic Transitioning in Africa, 1990s

This finding—that the number of procedural democracies in Africa has dramatically increased
since the 1990s while substantive democracy is either stagnating or declining—is in tension with
much of the research that has found a democratizing effect of elections in Africa. In 1990s and

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