Head of the Revolutionary Council.

After the 1953 Iranian coup état Pahlavi aligned Iran with the Western Bloc and cultivated a
close relationship with the United States to consolidate his power as an authoritarian ruler.
Relying heavily on American support amidst the Cold War, he remained the Shah of Iran for 26
years after the coup, effectively keeping the country from swaying towards the influence of the
aimed at modernizing Iranian society, in what is known as the White Revolution. In light of his
continued vocal opposition after being arrested twice, Khomeini was exiled from Iran in 1964.
However, as major ideological tensions persisted between Pahlavi and Khomeini, anti-
government demonstrations began in October 1977, eventually developing into a campaign of
civil resistance that included elements of secularism and Islamism. In August 1978, the deaths of
between 377 and 470 people in the Cinema Rex fire - claimed by the opposition as having been
orchestrated by Pahlavi's SAVAK – came to serve as a catalyst for a popular revolutionary
movement across all of Iran, and large-scale strikes and demonstrations paralyzed the entire
country for the remainder of that year.
On 16 January 1979, Pahlavi left the country and went into exile as the last Iranian monarch,
leaving behind his duties to Iran's Regency Council and Shapour Bakhtiar, the opposition-based
Iranian prime minister. On 1 February 1979, Khomeini returned to Iran, following an invitation
by the government; several thousand Iranians gathered to greet him as he landed in the capital
city of Tehran. By 11 february1979, the monarchy was officially brought down and Khomeini
assumed leadership over Iran while guerrillas and rebel troops overwhelmed Pahlavi loyalists in
armed combat. Following the March 1979 Islamic Republic Referendum, in which 98% of
Iranian voters approved country's shift to an Islamic republic, the new government began efforts
to draft the present-day Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Khomeini emerged as the
Supreme Leader of Iran in December 1979.
The success of Iranian Revolution was met with surprise around the world, and was considered
by many to be unusual in nature: it lacked many of the customary causes of revolutionary
sentiment (e.g., defeat in war, a financial crisis, peasant rebellion, or disgruntled military);
occurred in a country that was experiencing relative prosperity; produced profound change at
great speed; was massively popular; resulted in the massive exile that characterizes a large
portion of today’s Iranian diaspora; and replaced a pro-Western secular and authoritarian
monarchy with an anti-Western Islamist theocracy that was based on concept of Velayat-e Fqih
(or Guardianship of the Islamic jurist), straddling between authoritarianism and totalitarianism.
In addition to these, the Iranian Revolution sought the spread of Shia Islam across the Middle
East through the ideological tenets of Khomeinism- particularly as a means of uprooting the
region's status quo, which favored Sunni Islam. After the consolidation of Khomeinist factions,
Iran began to back Shia militancy across the region in an attempt to combat Sunni influence and
establish Iranian dominance within the Arab world, ultimately aiming to achieve an Iranian-led
Shia political order.
The shah’s regime was seen as an oppressive, brutal, corrupt, and lavish regime by some of the
society's classes at that [Link] also suffered from some basic functional failures that brought
economic bottlenecks, shortages, and inflation. The shah was perceived by many as beholden to-
if not a puppet of-a non-Muslim Western powers(i.e., the united states)whose culture was
affecting that of Iran at the same time, support for the shah may have waned among Western
politicians and media-especially under the administration of U.S president Jimmy Carter-as a
result of the shah support for OPEC petroleum price increases earlier in the decade. When
president Carter enacted a human-rights policy which said that countries guilty of human-rights
violations would be deprived of American arms or aid, this helped give some Iranians the
courage to post open letters and petitions in the hope that the repression by the government might
subside.
The revelation that substituted the monarchy of Muhammad raza shah Pahlavi with Islam and
Khomeini is credited in the part of the spread of Shia version of the Islamic revival. It resisted
westernization and saw ayatollah Khomeini as following in the footsteps of the Shia Imam
Husayn ibn Ali, with the shah playing the rule of Husayn’s foe, the hated tyrant Yazid I. Other
factors include the underestimation of Khomeini's Islamist movement by both the shah reign-
who considered them a minor threat compared to the Marxists and Islamic socialists-and by
secularist opponents of the government- who thought the Khomeinists could be sidelined.
TOBACCO PROTEST (1891)
At the end of 19th century, the Shia clergy (ulama) head a significant influence on Iranian
society. The clergy first showed itself to be a powerful political force in opposition to the
monarchy with the 1891 Tobacco Protest. On 20 march 1890, the long-standing Iranian monarch
Nasir al-din shah granted a concession to British Major G. F. Talbot for a full monopoly. Over
the production, sale, and export of tobacco for 50years. At the time, the Persian tobacco industry
employed over 200,000 people, so the concession represented a major blow to Persian farmers
and bazaaris whose livelihoods where largely dependent on the lucrative tobacco business. The
boycotts and protest against it were wide spread and extensive as result of Mirza Hassan
Sherazi’s fatwa (judicial decree). within 2 years, Nasir al-Din shah found himself powerless to
stop the popular movement and cancelled the concession.
The Tobacco protest was the first significant Iranian resistance against the Shah and foreign
interests, reveling the power of people and the ulama influence among them.
Persian Constitutional Revolution
(1905-1911)
The growing dissatisfaction continued until the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911. The
Revolution led to the establishment of a parliament, the National Consultative Assembly. (also
known as the Majlis), and approval of the first constitution. Although the constitutional
revolution was successful in weakening in the autocracy of the Qajar regime, it failed to provide
a powerful alternative government. Therefore, in the decades following the establishment of the
new parliament, a number of critical events took place. Many of these events can be viewed as a
continuation of the struggle between the constitutionalists and the Shah of Persia, many of whom
were backed by foreign powers against the parliament.
Reza Shah (1921-1935)
Insecurity and chaos created after the constitutional Revolution led to rise of General Reza Khan,
the commander of elite Persian Cossack Brigade who seized power of coup d'état in February
1921. He established a constitutional monarchy, deposing the last Qajar Shah, Ahmed Shah, in
1925 and being designated monarch by the national Assembly, to be known thenceforth as Reza
Shah founder of the Pahlavi dynasty.
There were widespread social, economic, and political reforms introduced during his reign, a
number of which led to public discontent that would provide the circumstances for the Iranian
Revolution. Particularly controversial was the replacement of Islamic laws with Western ones
and the forbidding of traditional Islamic clothing, separation of the sexes and veiling of women's
faces with the niqab. Police forcibly removed and tore chadors off women who resisted his ban
on the public hijab. In 1935, dozens were killed and hundreds injured in the Goharshad Mosque
rebellion. On the other hand, during the early rise of Reza Shah, Abdul-Karim Ha'eri Yazdi
founded the Qom Seminary. However, he would avoid entering into political issues, as did other
religious leaders who followed him. Hence, no widespread anti-government attempts were
organized by clergy during the rule of Reza Shah. However, the future Ayatollah Khomeini was
a student of Sheikh Abdul Karim Ha'eri.
Mosaddegh and The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (1951–1952)
From 1901 on, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in
1931), a British oil company, enjoyed a monopoly on sale and production of Iranian oil. It was
the most profitable British business in the world.[57] Most Iranians lived in poverty while the
wealth generated from Iranian oil played a decisive role in maintaining Britain at the top of the
world. In 1951, Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh pledged to throw the company
out of Iran, reclaim the petroleum reserves and free Iran from foreign power.
In 1952, Mosaddegh nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and became a national hero.
The British, however, were outraged and accused him of stealing. The British unsuccessfully
sought punishment from the World Court and the United Nations, sent warships to the Persian
Gulf, and finally imposed a crushing embargo. Mosaddegh was unmoved by Britain's campaign
against him. One European newspaper, the Frankfurter Neue Presse, reported that Mosaddegh
"would rather be fried in Persian oil than make the slightest concession to the British." The
British considered an armed invasion, but UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill decided on a
coup after being refused American military support by U.S. President Harry S, Truman, who
sympathized with nationalist movements like Mosaddegh's and had nothing but contempt for
old-style imperialists like those who ran the Anglo Iranian Oil Company. Mosaddegh, however,
learned of Churchill's plans and ordered the British embassy to be closed in October 1952,
forcing all British diplomats and agents to leave the country. Although the British were initially
turned down in their request for American support by President Truman, the election of Dwight
D. Eisenhower as U.S. president in November 1952 changed the American stance toward the
conflict. On 20 January 1953, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother, C.I.A.
Director Allen Dulles, told their British counterparts that they were ready to move against
Mosaddegh. In their eyes, any country not decisively allied with the United States was a
potential enemy. Iran had immense oil wealth, a long border with the Soviet Union, and a
nationalist prime minister. The prospect of a fall into communism and a "second China" (after
Mao Zedong won the Chinese Civil War) terrified the Dulles brothers. Operation Ajax was born,
in which the only democratic government Iran ever had was deposed.
Iranian coup d'état (1953)
In 1941, an invasion of allied British and Soviet troops deposed Reza Shah, who was considered
friendly to Nazi Germany, and installed his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as Shah. In 1953,
following the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry by the democratically elected prime
minister Mohammad Mossadegh, American and British forces instituted a highly effective
embargo of Iranian oil, and covertly destabilized the legislature and helped return control to their
ally, Pahlavi. The American "Operation Ajax" orchestrated by the CIA, was aided by the British
MI6 in organizing a military coup d'état to oust Mossadegh. The Shah fled to Italy when the
initial coup attempts on August 15 failed but returned after a successful second attempt on
August 19. Pahlavi maintained a close relationship with the U.S. government, as both regimes
shared opposition to the expansion of the Soviet Union, Iran's powerful northern neighbor. Like
his father, the Shah's government was known for its autocracy, its focus on modernization and
Westernization, and for its disregard for religious and democratic measures in Iran's constitution.
Leftist and Islamist groups attacked his government (often from outside Iran as they were
suppressed within) for violating the Iranian constitution, political corruption, and the political
oppression, torture, and killings, by the SAVAK secret police.
White Revolution (1963-1978)

Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi

The White Revolution was a far-reaching series of reforms in Iran launched in 1963 by Shah
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and lasted until 1978. Mohammad Reza Shah's reform program was
built especially to weaken those classes that supported the traditional system. It consisted of
several elements including land reform; sales of some state-owned factories to finance the land
reform; the enfranchisement of women; nationalization of forests and pastures; formation of a
literacy corps; and the institution of profit-sharing schemes for workers in industry.
The Shah advertised the White Revolution as a step towards westernization, and it was a way for
him to legitimize the Pahlavi dynasty. Part of the reason for launching the White Revolution was
that the Shah hoped to get rid of the influence of landlords and to create a new base of support
among the peasants and working class. Thus, the White Revolution in Iran was an attempt to
introduce reform from above and preserve traditional power patterns. Through land reform, the
essence of the White Revolution, the Shah hoped to ally himself with the peasantry in the
countryside, and hoped to sever their ties with the aristocracy in the city.
What the Shah did not expect, however, was that the White Revolution led to new social tensions
that helped create many of the problems the Shah had been trying to avoid. The Shah's reforms
more than quadrupled the combined size of the two classes that had posed the most challenges to
his monarchy in the past-the intelligentsia and the urban working class. Their resentment towards
the Shah also grew as they were now stripped of organizations that had represented them in the
past, such as political parties, professional associations, trade unions, and independent
newspapers. The land reform, instead of allying the peasants with the government, produced
large numbers of independent farmers and landless laborers who became loose political cannons,
with no feeling of loyalty to the Shah. Many of the masses felt resentment towards the
increasingly corrupt government; their loyalty to the clergy, who were seen as more concerned
with the fate of the populace, remained consistent or increased. As Ervand Abrahamian pointed
out: "The White Revolution had been designed to preempt a Red Revolution. Instead, it paved
the way for an Islamic Revolution. The White Revolution's economic "trickle-down" strategy
also did not work as intended. In theory, oil money funneled to the elite was supposed to be used
to create jobs and factories, eventually distributing the money, but instead the wealth tended to
get stuck at the top and concentrated in the hands of the very few.
Western culture was a plague or an intoxication to be eliminated; Ali Shariati's vision of Islam as
the one true liberator of the Third World from oppressive colonialism, neo-colonialism, and
capitalism; and Morteza Motahari's popularized retellings of the Shia faith all spread and gained
listeners, readers and supporters.
Most importantly, Khomeini preached that revolt, and especially martyrdom, against injustice
and tyranny was part of Shia Islam, and that Muslims should reject the influence of both liberal
capitalism and communism, ideas that inspired the revolutionary slogan "Neither East, nor West
– Islamic Republic!”
Away from public view, Khomeini developed the ideology of Vilayat-e faqih (guardianship of
the jurist) as government, that Muslims-in fact everyone-required "guardianship," in the form of
rule or supervision by the leading Islamic jurist or jurists. Such rule was ultimately "more
necessary even than prayer and fasting" in Islam, as it would protect Islam from deviation from
traditional sharia law and in so doing eliminate poverty, injustice, and the "plundering" of
Muslim land by foreign non-believers.
This idea of rule by Islamic jurists was spread through his book Islamic Government, mosque
sermons, and smuggled cassette speeches by Khomeini among his opposition network of
students (talabeh), ex-students (able clerics such as Morteza Motahari, Mohammad Beheshti,
Mohammad-Javad Bahonar, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and Mohammad Mofatteh), and
traditional businessmen (bazaari) inside Iran.
Communist groups-primarily the Tudeh Party of Iran and the Fedigan guerrillas had been
weakened considerably by government repression. Despite this, the guerrillas did help play an
important part in the final February 1979 overthrow delivering "the regime its coup de grace."
[82] The most powerful guerrilla group-the People's Mujahedin was leftist Islamist and opposed
the influence of the clergy as reactionary. Some important clergy did not follow Khomeini's lead.
Popular ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani supported the left, while perhaps the most senior and
influential ayatollah in Iran—Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari—first remained aloof from
politics and then came out in support of a democratic revolution.
Khomeini worked to unite this opposition behind him (except for the unwanted 'atheistic
Marxists'), focusing on the socio-economic problems of the Shah's government (corruption and
unequal income and development), while avoiding specifics among the public that might divide
the factions particularly his plan for clerical rule, which he believed most Iranians had become
prejudiced against as a result of propaganda campaign by Western imperialists.
In the post-Shah era, some revolutionaries who clashed with his theocracy and were suppressed
by his movement complained of deception, but in the meantime anti-Shah unity was maintained.
1970-1977
Several events in the 1970s set the stage for the 1979 revolution. The 1971 2500-year celebration
of the Persian Empire at Persepolis, organized by the government, was attacked for its
extravagance. "As the foreigners reveled on drink forbidden by Islam, Iranians were not only
excluded from the festivities, some were starving." Five years later, the Shah angered pious
Iranian Muslims by changing the first year of the Iranian solar calendar from the Islamic Hijri to
the ascension to the throne by Cyrus the Shah's family was the foremost beneficiary of the
income generated by oil, and the line between state earnings and family earnings blurred. By
1976, the Shah had accumulated upward of $1 billion from oil revenue; his family – including 63
princes and princesses had accumulated between $5 and $20 billion; and the family foundation
controlled approximately $3 billion. By mid-1977 economic austerity measures to fight inflation
disproportionately affected the thousands of poor and unskilled male migrants settling in the
cities working in the construction industry. Culturally and religiously conservative, many went
on to form the core of the revolution's demonstrators and "martyrs". All Iranians were required to
join and pay dues to a new political party, the Ḥezb-e Rastakhiz party—all other parties were
banned. That party's attempt to fight inflation with populist "anti-profiteering" campaigns—
fining and jailing merchants for high prices – angered and politicized merchants while fueling
black markets.
In 1977 the Shah responded to the "polite reminder" of the importance of political rights by the
new American president, Jimmy Carter, by granting amnesty to some prisoners and allowing the
Red Cross to visit prisons. Through 1977, liberal opposition formed organizations and issued
open letters denouncing the government. Against this background a first crucial manifestation of
public expression of social discontent and political protest the regime took place in October
1977, when the German Iranian Cultural Association in Tehran hosted a series of literature
reading sessions, organized by the newly revived Iranian Writers Association and the German
Goethe-Institute.
The chain of events began with the death of Mostafa Khomeini, chief aide and eldest son of
Ruhollah Khomeini. He mysteriously died at midnight on 23 October 1977 in Najaf, Iraq.
SAVAK and the Iraqi government declared heart attack as the cause of death, though many
believed his death was attributed to SAVAK. Khomeini remained silent after the incident, while
in Iran with the spread of the news came a wave of protest and mourning ceremonies in several
cities. The mourning of Mostafa was given a political cast by Khomeini's political credentials,
their enduring opposition to the monarchy and their exile.
The developments initiated by seminaries closing on 7 January 1978 were followed by the bazaar
and seminary closing, and students rallied towards the homes of the religious leaders on the next
day. On 9 January 1978, seminary students and other people demonstrated in the city, which
was cracked down by the Shah's security forces who shot live ammunition to disperse the crowd
when the peaceful demonstration turned violent. Between 5–300 of the demonstrators was
reportedly killed in the protest. 9 January 1978 (19 Dey) is regarded as a bloody day in Qom.
Consolidation of the Opposition
(February-March)
According to Shia customs, memorial services (Chehalem) are held 40 days after a person's
death. Encouraged by Khomeini (who declared that the blood of martyrs must water the "tree of
Islam"), radicals pressured the mosques and moderate clergy to commemorate the deaths of the
students and used the occasion to generate protests. The informal network of mosques and
bazaars, which for years had been used to carry out religious events, increasingly became where
protests were larger, and Tehran, where they were smaller protesting every 40 days. This
amounted to a small minority of the more than 15 million adults in Iran.
Against the wishes of Khomeini, Shariatmadari called for 17 June mourning protests to be
carried out as a one-day stay. Although tensions remained in the milieu, the Shah's policy
appeared to have worked, leading Amu Zegar to declare that "the crisis is over." A CIA analysis
in August concluded that Iran "is not in a revolutionary or even a pre-revolutionary situation."
Renewed Protests (August-September)
Appointment of Jafar Sharif-Emami as prime minister (11 August)
By August, the protests had "kick…into high gear, " and the number of demonstrators
mushroomed to hundreds of thousands. To dampen inflation, the Amu Zegar administration cut
spending and reduced business. However, the cutbacks led to a sharp rise in layoffs particularly
among young, unskilled, male workers living in the working-class districts.
The protesters demanded that Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi step down from power and that
Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini be returned from exile. The protests grew incredibly fast,
reaching between six million and nine million in strength in the first week. About 5% of the
population had taken to the streets in the Muharram protests. Both beginning and ending in the
month of Muharram, the protests succeeded, and the Shah stepped down from power later that
month.
After the success of what would become known as a revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini returned to
Iran as its religious and political leader for life. Khomeini had been an opposition leader to Shah
for many years, rising to prominence after the death of his mentor, renowned scholar Yazdi
Ha'iri, in the 1930s. Even in his years in exile, Khomeini remained relevant in Iran. Supporting
the protests from beyond Iran's borders, he proclaimed that "freedom and liberation from the
bonds of imperialism" was imminent.
Tasu'a and Ashura marches (10-11 December)

Tehran Ashura demonstration, 11 December 1978

As the days of Atsu's and Ashura (10 and 11 December) approached, to prevent a deadly
showdown, the Shah began to draw back. In negotiations with Ayatollah Shariatmadari, the
Shah ordered the release of 120 political prisoners and Karim Sanjabi, and on 8 December
revoked the ban on street demonstrations. Permits were issued for the marchers, and
troops were removed from the procession path. In turn, Shariatmadari pledged to make
sure that there would be no violence during the demonstrations.
On 10 and 11 December 1978, the days of Atsu's and Ashura, between 6 and 9 million anti-
Shah demonstrators marched throughout Iran. According to one historian, "even
discounting exaggeration, these figures may represent the largest protest event in history."
The marches were led by Ayatollah Taleghani and National Front leader Karim Sanjabi, thus
symbolizing the "unity" of the secular and religious opposition. The mullahs and bazaaris
effectively policed the gathering, and protesters who attempted to initiate violence were
restrained.
More than 10% of the country marched in anti-Shah demonstrations on the two days,
possibly a higher percentage than any previous revolution. It is rare for a revolution to
involve as much as 1 percent of a country's population; the French, Russian, and
Romanian revolutions may have passed the 1 percent mark.

The Shah is Gone — headline of Iranian newspaper

Ettela'at, 16 January 1979,

when the last monarch of Iran left the country

Revolution (Late 1978-1979)

Much of Iranian society was in euphoria about the coming revolution. Secular and leftist
politicians piled onto the movement hoping to gain power in the aftermath, ignoring the fact that
Khomeini was the very antithesis to all the positions they supported. While it was increasingly
clear to more secular Iranians that Khomeini was not a liberal, he was widely perceived as a
figurehead, and that power would eventually be handed to the secular groups.

Demoralization of the army (December, 1978)

 Demoralization of the army (December 1978)

A protester gave a rose to an Army Officer.

The military leadership was increasingly paralyzed by indecision, and rank-and-file soldiers were
demoralized, having been forced to confront demonstrators while prohibited from using their
own weapons (and being condemned by the Shah if they did). Increasingly, Khomeini called on
the soldiers of the armed forces to defect to the opposition. Revolutionaries gave flowers and
civilian clothes to deserters, while threatening retribution to those who stayed.
On 11 December, a dozen officers were shot dead by their own troops at Tehran's Lavizan
barracks. Fearing further mutinies, many soldiers were returned to their barracks.