THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF ADVANCED LEGAL STUDIES

(A State University Est. by Act 27, 2005 of Kerala State Legislature)

Kalamassery, Kochi - 683503, Kerala

COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AND ADJUDICATION

HUMAN DIGNITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE: A

COMPARATIVE INQUIRY

SEMESTER 9

Submitted By:
Sanjna Padmam V (1701),
B.A. LL. B. (Hons.),
The National University of Advanced Legal Studies (NUALS)

Submitted To:
Dr. Nandita Narayan,
Course teacher – Comparative Constitutional Rights and Adjudication,
The National University of Advanced Legal Studies (NUALS)
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

In the accomplishment of completion of my project on ‘Human Dignity as a Constitutional

Value: A Comparative Inquiry’ I would like to convey my special gratitude to Prof. Nanditha
Narayan, our Professor for the Comparative Constitutional Rights and Adjudication subject.

Your valuable guidance and suggestions helped me in various phases of the completion of this
project. I will always be thankful to you in this regard.

I ensure that this project was finished by me with utmost attention and dedication.

- V. Sanjna Padmam
 INDEX

1. INTRODUCTION: HUMAN DIGNITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY

2. THEOROTICAL FRAMEWORK: FROM MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE
3. HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
4. HUMAN DIGNITY IN SOUTH AFRICA: TRANSFORMATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND EQUALITY
5. HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
6. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CROSS JURISDICTIONAL TRENDS
7. CRITICAL REFLECTIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
8. CONCLUSION
 HUMAN DIGNITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE: A COMPARATIVE INQUIRY

Abstract: This study undertakes a comparative analysis of human dignity as a constitutional

value in India, South Africa, and the European human rights framework. It examines the
philosophical foundations and judicial interpretations that have transformed dignity from a
moral ideal into a legal principle guiding constitutional adjudication. Through doctrinal and
comparative analysis, the research explores how dignity shapes rights to autonomy, privacy,
equality, and life. By contrasting India’s interpretive approach, South Africa’s transformative
constitutionalism, and Europe’s rights-based pluralism, the study argues that dignity functions
as a universal constitutional ethic anchoring modern jurisprudence and advancing
transformative justice across legal cultures.
INTRODUCTION: HUMAN DIGNITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY
Human dignity has become one of the most pervasive and unifying values in modern
constitutional thought. It stands at the intersection of moral philosophy and legal normativity,
embodying the idea that every individual possesses an intrinsic worth that the State must
respect and protect. While the vocabulary of dignity traces back to classical and theological
traditions, its constitutional articulation is a distinctly modern development, emerging in
response to the historical traumas of war, oppression, and systemic dehumanisation. The post–
World War II constitutional renaissance, epitomised by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (“UDHR”), placed dignity at the heart of human rights discourse, establishing it as both
a philosophical foundation and a juridical principle.1
The concept’s intellectual ancestry lies in Stoic philosophy and Christian theology,
which conceived of human beings as bearers of inherent worth by virtue of their rational and
moral capacities.2 However, it was Immanuel Kant who secularised and universalised the idea,
asserting that human beings must always be treated as ends in themselves and never merely as
means.3 Kant’s moral philosophy infused modern constitutionalism with a sense of individual
autonomy and equal moral status, providing the normative scaffolding for the later legal
conception of dignity. In the twentieth century, this notion evolved from ethical abstraction
into a constitutional guarantee, serving as the basis for the recognition of fundamental rights
and for the limitation of state power.4

1
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948).
2
See Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership 74–76 (2006).
3
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 36–42 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ.
4
Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights 3–5 (1990).
 In constitutional jurisprudence, dignity performs multiple roles: it is a foundational
value underpinning the legitimacy of rights, an interpretive principle guiding judicial
reasoning, and, in some systems, a directly enforceable right. Its inclusion and interpretation
vary across jurisdictions, reflecting differing historical trajectories and legal cultures. In South
Africa, the post-apartheid Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 explicitly
enshrines dignity as a supreme constitutional value and a justiciable right under Section 10,
framing it as central to the project of transformative constitutionalism.5 In India, dignity is not
textually articulated but has been read into fundamental rights by the judiciary, particularly
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.6 Cases such as Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,7
and K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India8 have expanded the notion of personal liberty to include
autonomy, privacy, and dignity as intrinsic constitutional guarantees. Similarly, the European
Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) has treated dignity as integral to the protection of life,
privacy, and freedom from degrading treatment under Articles 3 and 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.9
Thus, the idea of human dignity transcends textual formulations to embody the moral
core of constitutionalism itself. It functions as a bridge between law and ethics, ensuring that
the exercise of public power remains accountable to the inherent worth of every individual. In
doing so, it has become not merely a legal right, but a constitutional morality, the shared ethical
foundation upon which modern democratic orders rest.10
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: FROM MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE
Human dignity has become one of the most pervasive and unifying values in modern
constitutional thought. It stands at the intersection of moral philosophy and legal normativity,
embodying the idea that every individual possesses an intrinsic worth that the State must
respect and protect. While the vocabulary of dignity traces back to classical and theological
traditions, its constitutional articulation is a distinctly modern development, emerging in
response to the historical traumas of war, oppression, and systemic dehumanisation. The post-
World War II constitutional renaissance, epitomised by the Universal Declaration of Human

5
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, § 10.
6
Constitution of India, art. 21.
7
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 S.C.C. 248 (India).
8
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 S.C.C. 1 (India).
9
European Convention on Human Rights, arts. 3 & 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; Pretty v. United Kingdom,
2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 155.
10
See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 198–205 (1977); Aharon Barak, Human Dignity: The
Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right 16–20 (2015).
Rights (1948), placed dignity at the heart of human rights discourse, establishing it as both a
philosophical foundation and a juridical principle.11
The concept’s intellectual ancestry lies in Stoic philosophy and Christian theology,
which conceived of human beings as bearers of inherent worth by virtue of their rational and
moral capacities. However, it was Immanuel Kant who secularised and universalised the idea,
asserting that human beings must always be treated as ends in themselves and never merely as
means.12 Kant’s moral philosophy infused modern constitutionalism with a sense of individual
autonomy and equal moral status, providing the normative scaffolding for the later legal
conception of dignity. In the twentieth century, this notion evolved from ethical abstraction
into a constitutional guarantee, serving as the basis for the recognition of fundamental rights
and for the limitation of state power.13
In constitutional jurisprudence, dignity performs multiple roles: it is a foundational
value underpinning the legitimacy of rights, an interpretive principle guiding judicial
reasoning, and, in some systems, a directly enforceable right. Its inclusion and interpretation
vary across jurisdictions, reflecting differing historical trajectories and legal cultures. In South
Africa, the post-apartheid Constitution explicitly enshrines dignity as a supreme constitutional
value and a justiciable right under Section 10, framing it as central to the project of
transformative constitutionalism.14 In India, dignity is not textually articulated but has been
read into fundamental rights by the judiciary, particularly under Article 21 of the
Constitution.15 Cases such as Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India16 and K.S. Puttaswamy v.
Union of India17 have expanded the notion of personal liberty to include autonomy, privacy,
and dignity as intrinsic constitutional guarantees. Similarly, the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) has treated dignity as integral to the protection of life, privacy, and freedom
from degrading treatment under Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention.18
Thus, the idea of human dignity transcends textual formulations to embody the moral core
of constitutionalism itself. It functions as a bridge between law and ethics, ensuring that the

11
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
12
IMMANUEL KANT, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 37–38 (H.J. Paton trans., Harper & Row 1964)
(1785).
13
Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L.
655, 660–61 (2008).
14
S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 10.
15
INDIA CONST. art. 21.
16
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 (India).
17
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (India).
18
European Convention on Human Rights, arts. 3, 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; see also Pretty v. United
Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 155.
exercise of public power remains accountable to the inherent worth of every individual. In
doing so, it has become not merely a legal right, but a constitutional morality, the shared ethical
foundation upon which modern democratic orders rest.19
HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
The Indian constitutional imagination of human dignity has evolved through judicial
interpretation rather than textual articulation. The Constitution of India does not explicitly use
the term dignity in the fundamental rights chapter, yet the Supreme Court has consistently read
it into Article 21, the guarantee of life and personal liberty, transforming it into a central
normative and interpretive value.20 This judicial evolution has been gradual but profound,
tracing a journey from a narrow, procedural understanding of liberty to a substantive
conception encompassing autonomy, privacy, and the right to die with dignity.
The early jurisprudence of Article 21 was shaped by the A.K. Gopalan v. State of
Madras21 decision, where the Supreme Court adopted a positivist interpretation, confining the
meaning of “procedure established by law” to any procedure enacted by the legislature,
regardless of its fairness or reasonableness. Dignity had no role in this framework; liberty was
subordinate to legislative will. However, this interpretation was decisively overturned
in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,22 which marked a constitutional watershed. The Court
held that the procedure under Article 21 must be “right, just and fair” and could not be arbitrary
or oppressive.23 In doing so, it harmonised Articles 14, 19, and 21, creating what the Court
later described as the “golden triangle” of fundamental rights.24 The decision implicitly
recognised that the right to life was not a mere physical existence but a life of dignity, a
principle that became the cornerstone of subsequent rights jurisprudence.
Following Maneka Gandhi, the Court extended the reach of dignity across diverse areas
of life. In Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi,25 the Court
explicitly stated that “the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity.” This
interpretation enabled the judiciary to derive new rights, to livelihood, health, shelter, and

19
Upendra Baxi, Human Dignity, Constitutionalism, and the Politics of Interpretation, in Human Dignity:
Comparative and Conceptual Debates 136, 147 (Marcus Düwell et al. eds., 2014).
20
INDIA CONST. art. 21.
21
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 (India).
22
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 (India).
23
Id. ¶ 7.
24
Id. ¶ 56.
25
Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608 (India).
education, from the moral core of Article 21.26 The phrase “life with dignity” became both a
source and a standard of constitutional reasoning.
The dignity-based reasoning reached its most mature expression in Justice K.S.
Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India,27 where a nine-judge bench affirmed the constitutional
right to privacy. Drawing on comparative constitutional sources and philosophical reasoning,
the Court described dignity as the “core which unites the fundamental rights” and privacy as
an essential facet of human autonomy and self-determination.28 The judgment grounded dignity
in both individual autonomy and collective constitutional morality, thereby connecting it to
India’s democratic ethos.29 Importantly, Puttaswamy transformed dignity from a rhetorical
ideal into a doctrinal tool, aligning Indian constitutionalism with global dignity-based
jurisprudence.
The Court’s engagement with dignity has also extended to end-of-life decisions.
In Common Cause (A Regd. Society) v. Union of India,30 the Supreme Court recognised the
right to die with dignity as an intrinsic component of Article 21. Upholding the legality of
passive euthanasia and advance medical directives, the Court reasoned that the preservation of
dignity extends not only to living but also to dying.31 This judgment reaffirmed that autonomy,
choice, and control over one’s body and fate are integral to human dignity.
Thus, the Indian judiciary has elevated dignity from an implicit moral idea to an explicit
constitutional value, transforming Article 21 into a living repository of evolving rights.
From Maneka Gandhi to Puttaswamy and Common Cause, the Court has progressively
expanded the concept’s meaning, from liberty and fairness to autonomy, privacy, and self-
determination. Dignity has become both the telos and the measure of India’s constitutional
morality, bridging the gap between abstract ideals and lived justice.
HUMAN DIGNITY IN SOUTH AFRICA: TRANSFORMATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND EQUALITY
South Africa offers perhaps the most explicit and dynamic constitutional articulation of
human dignity in modern jurisprudence. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996 enshrines dignity both as a founding value and as a substantive right. Section 1(a) declares
that South Africa is founded on the values of “human dignity, the achievement of equality, and

26
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corp., (1985) 3 SCC 545 (India).
27
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (India).
28
Id. ¶ 298 (per Chandrachud, J.).
29
Id. ¶¶ 297–300.
30
Common Cause (A Regd. Soc’y) v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1 (India).
31
Id. ¶¶ 192–95.
the advancement of human rights and freedoms,” while Section 10 guarantees that “everyone
has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.”32 This dual
recognition, as both value and enforceable right, reflects South Africa’s commitment
to transformative constitutionalism, a project aimed at redressing the injustices of apartheid
and establishing a democratic order based on human worth, equality, and freedom.33
The landmark case of S v. Makwanyane34 represents the foundational exposition of
dignity within this transformative vision. In striking down the death penalty as unconstitutional,
the Constitutional Court invoked human dignity as the moral and normative core of the new
constitutional order. Chaskalson P, delivering the majority opinion, held that the “right to life
and the right to dignity are the most important of all human rights, and the source of all other
personal rights.”35 The Court reasoned that even the most reprehensible offender retains an
irreducible human worth that cannot be extinguished by state retribution.36 In doing
so, Makwanyane positioned dignity not merely as a right but as a guiding constitutional value
that shapes the interpretation and limitation of all rights.
Following Makwanyane, the Court continued to develop dignity as a key principle in
cases concerning social and economic rights, equality, and non-discrimination. In Khosa v.
Minister of Social Development,37 the Court extended social welfare benefits to permanent
residents, holding that excluding them violated dignity and equality. Mokgoro J observed that
the denial of access to social assistance undermined individuals’ self-worth and societal
inclusion.38 Similarly, in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of
Justice,39 the Court invalidated laws criminalising same-sex conduct, grounding its reasoning
in dignity, equality, and privacy. The judgment recognised that the State cannot impose moral
stigma that degrades the inherent worth of individuals based on identity or orientation.40
South African jurisprudence thus treats dignity as both a moral compass and a constitutional
tool, a principle that animates the substantive equality central to its post-apartheid order.
Dignity functions as a structural value, infusing rights adjudication with the imperative to

32
S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 1(a), 10.
33
Karl E. Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 146, 150–
52 (1998).
34
S v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.).
35
Id. ¶ 144 (Chaskalson P).
36
Id. ¶¶ 262–63 (Mokgoro J).
37
Khosa v. Minister of Soc. Dev., 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (S. Afr.).
38
Id. ¶¶ 74–76 (Mokgoro J).
39
Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Just., 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (S. Afr.).
40
Id. ¶¶ 26–29.
humanise law and remedy historical exclusion.41 In contrast to India’s interpretive approach or
Europe’s contextual one, South Africa’s constitutional framework embeds dignity at the very
foundation of its legal system, making it the axis around which the ideals of equality, freedom,
and justice revolve.
HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
Unlike the South African or Indian constitutions, the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) does not explicitly refer to “human dignity.” Nevertheless, the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR) has treated dignity as a foundational moral and interpretive
principle underlying the Convention’s guarantees, particularly under Articles 3 and 8.42 Article
3 prohibits torture and “inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” while Article 8
secures the right to respect for private and family life. The Court has interpreted both provisions
through the lens of human dignity, thereby constructing a jurisprudence that situates dignity at
the heart of personal integrity and autonomy.43
The case of Pretty v. United Kingdom44 is emblematic of this approach. Diane Pretty,
who suffered from a degenerative motor neuron disease, claimed that the prohibition of assisted
suicide violated her rights under Articles 2, 3, and 8 of the Convention. While the Court
declined to find a violation, it acknowledged that “the very essence of the Convention is respect
for human dignity and human freedom.”45 Although the claim for assisted dying was rejected,
the decision marked a crucial moment in the recognition of dignity as the interpretive core of
Convention rights, a principle connecting the right to life, bodily integrity, and self-
determination.46
A more robust affirmation of dignity appeared in Bouyid v. Belgium,47 where the Court
held that even a single slap by a police officer constituted degrading treatment under Article 3.
The Court reasoned that any act diminishing human dignity, even if minor in physical harm,
violates the spirit of the Convention.48 This case illustrated the Court’s insistence that dignity
is inviolable, regardless of context or severity, reinforcing its role as a threshold principle of
humane treatment.

41
See Stuart Woolman, Dignity, Community, and Democracy: Transformative Constitutionalism in South Africa,
20 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 105, 107–10 (2004).
42
European Convention on Human Rights, arts. 3, 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
43
Paolo G. Carozza, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights: A Reply, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L.
931, 933–34 (2008).
44
Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 155.
45
Id. ¶ 65.
46
See Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity 228–29 (2001).
47
Bouyid v. Belgium, App. No. 23380/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015).
48
Id. ¶¶ 81–83.
 The ECtHR’s dignity jurisprudence is therefore contextual rather than codified. It
evolves through case law, balancing individual autonomy and public order while upholding the
inherent worth of the person.49 Through its interpretation of Articles 3 and 8, the Court has
transformed dignity into a structural value, guiding the boundaries of permissible state
interference and shaping Europe’s conception of human rights as inherently relational and
respect-based.50 Though implicit in text, dignity operates as the moral nucleus of the European
human rights framework, bridging the ethical and legal dimensions of personhood within a
pluralist legal order.51
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL TRENDS
Across contemporary constitutional systems, human dignity has emerged as a
transnational value that transcends textual formulations and reflects shared moral commitments
within global constitutionalism. Although India, South Africa, and the European human rights
framework adopt distinct constitutional traditions, interpretive-expansive, transformative, and
pluralist respectively, their jurisprudence demonstrates significant convergence in treating
dignity as a normative foundation of rights and as a constraint on state power.52
A major point of convergence lies in the conceptualisation of dignity as intrinsic and
inalienable. The South African Constitution explicitly protects dignity as a self-standing right,
while Indian courts have derived it implicitly from Article 21, and the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) has read it into Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR.53 In all three systems,
dignity serves as the interpretive core of autonomy, privacy, equality, and humane treatment.54
This convergence suggests a cross-jurisdictional recognition of dignity as the moral essence of
human rights rather than a contingent cultural construct.
Yet, important divergences remain. South Africa’s transformative
constitutionalism positions dignity as both a moral and structural principle, a tool to redress
historical injustice and material inequality.55 Its constitutional design integrates dignity with

49
Eva Fikfak, Language and Persuasion: Human Dignity at the European Court of Human Rights, 20 HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (2020).
50
Id. at 10–12.
51
Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L.
655, 660–63 (2008).
52
Luigi Corrias, The Universal Value of Human Dignity: A Comparative Perspective, 13 GERMAN L.J. 1193,
1195–97 (2012).
53
INDIA CONST. art. 21; S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 10; European Convention on Human Rights, arts. 3, 8, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
54
Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L.
655, 660–63 (2008).
55
Karl E. Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 146, 150–
52 (1998).
equality, reflecting a communitarian vision that emphasises collective restoration. In contrast,
the Indian approach is predominantly interpretive-expansive, where dignity evolves through
judicial reasoning rather than textual articulation.56 Here, the Supreme Court has used dignity
to expand the scope of liberty, privacy, and autonomy but often without a clear doctrinal
boundary, leading to both innovation and indeterminacy.57 The European approach, by
contrast, is contextual and proportional, with the ECtHR balancing dignity against public
interest, moral order, and social pluralism.58
Judicial borrowing and cross-referencing further illustrate dignity’s transnational
character. Indian courts have frequently invoked comparative precedents, particularly from
South Africa and the ECtHR, to justify dignity-based reasoning. In K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v.
Union of India, the Supreme Court cited Makwanyane and Pretty to situate privacy and
autonomy within a global dignity framework.59 Similarly, South African courts have drawn
upon international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to ground dignity in universalist ethics.60
This circulation of ideas underscores the dialogic nature of modern constitutionalism, where
dignity functions as a bridge between legal systems, fostering interpretive coherence and
mutual reinforcement.
Nevertheless, the universalisation of dignity invites critical reflection. Scholars such as
McCrudden warn that dignity’s conceptual elasticity risks rendering it indeterminate, a value
invoked in support of contradictory claims, from life preservation to assisted dying.61 Others
argue that this openness is a strength, allowing dignity to mediate between competing moral
and legal principles.62 The comparative record suggests that dignity’s power lies in its
adaptability: it provides a common moral language that enables courts to humanise
constitutional interpretation while accommodating cultural diversity.
Thus, dignity has evolved into a transnational constitutional value, not through
uniformity, but through dialogue. It represents a shared ethical vocabulary that anchors
constitutional morality in the inherent worth of the individual, ensuring that the exercise of
state power remains accountable to the idea of human personhood. The comparative experience

56
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 (India).
57
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, ¶¶ 297–300 (India).
58
Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 155; Bouyid v. Belgium, App. No. 23380/09, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2015).
59
Puttaswamy, (2017) 10 SCC 1, ¶ 298.
60
S v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) ¶ 35 (S. Afr.).
61
McCrudden, supra note 3, at 679–82.
62
Luigi Ferrajoli, Constitutionalism and Human Dignity, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 121, 125–28 (2011).
of India, South Africa, and the ECHR demonstrates that while the expressions of dignity may
differ, its moral imperative, the recognition of human worth as the foundation of justice, is
universal.
CRITICAL REFLECTIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Despite its centrality in contemporary constitutional jurisprudence, the discourse of
human dignity has not escaped critique. Scholars have pointed out that the very universality
that makes dignity appealing also risks rendering it conceptually indeterminate. Jeremy
Waldron observes that dignity’s proliferation across legal systems has led to “semantic
inflation,” where it functions as an umbrella for competing moral and political ideals without
clear boundaries.63 The danger of such overuse is that it allows dignity to be invoked for
contradictory purposes, both to justify and to limit state intervention, diluting its normative
coherence.
This indeterminacy also produces what Christopher McCrudden terms the “pluralist
problem” of dignity.64 Because dignity draws from diverse philosophical and cultural sources,
its meaning inevitably shifts across jurisdictions and interpretive contexts. While this pluralism
can foster inclusivity and adaptability, it also risks transforming dignity into a rhetorical device
rather than a principled constitutional norm. Critics argue that when dignity is employed
without sufficient conceptual discipline, it enables judicial moralisation, allowing courts to
substitute subjective ethical judgment for democratic deliberation.65
Nevertheless, dignity’s flexibility may also be its greatest strength. Its capacity to
mediate between universal moral claims and local constitutional traditions has made it a vehicle
for cross-jurisdictional dialogue. Comparative constitutional scholarship has shown that
dignity functions as a “convergence point” in global rights adjudication, facilitating judicial
borrowing and normative harmonisation among courts in India, South Africa, Canada, and
Europe.66 This transnational migration reflects a shared aspiration to ground law in the
recognition of human worth, even as each jurisdiction adapts the concept to its socio-political
context.
The challenge moving forward lies in balancing universality with contextual sensitivity.
A “global constitutional ethic,” as suggested by Neuman and Rosenfeld, would require a
dialogic approach, one that treats dignity not as a fixed moral truth but as a dynamic interpretive

63
Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights 25–27 (Meir Dan-Cohen ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2012).
64
Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 Eur. J. Int’l L. 655,
679–81 (2008).
65
Ruth Macklin, Dignity Is a Useless Concept, 327 BMJ 1419, 1420 (2003).
66
David Feldman, Human Dignity as a Legal Value: Part II, 125 Law Q. Rev. 61, 72 (2009).
principle shaped by ongoing intercultural engagement.67 Courts must articulate dignity in ways
that preserve its normative integrity while remaining responsive to historical and cultural
difference. This entails developing more precise sub-concepts, such as autonomy, equality, and
community, that clarify dignity’s legal operation without diminishing its moral resonance.
In conclusion, human dignity remains both an indispensable and contested value in
constitutionalism. Its future will depend on whether jurists and scholars can transform it from
a diffuse moral aspiration into a disciplined constitutional ethic, one that affirms universal
human worth while respecting plural constitutional traditions.
CONCLUSION
The comparative inquiry into human dignity across India, South Africa, and the
European human rights framework reveals a shared constitutional commitment to grounding
state authority in the inherent worth of the individual. Despite differing textual formulations,
each jurisdiction converges on the understanding of dignity as both a foundational value and
an operative legal principle. In India, dignity has evolved through judicial interpretation under
Article 21, linking liberty, autonomy, and privacy.68 South Africa, in contrast,
constitutionalises dignity explicitly, using it as the cornerstone of transformative
constitutionalism and equality jurisprudence.69 The European Court of Human Rights embeds
dignity within the protection of life, privacy, and freedom from degrading treatment under
Articles 3 and 8.70
These trajectories demonstrate that dignity serves as a transnational moral language,
capable of bridging diverse legal cultures while maintaining a universal core. However, the
risk of conceptual vagueness persists, requiring continued theoretical refinement and judicial
discipline. The reaffirmed hypothesis of this study is that dignity, when properly
contextualised, offers a moral and constitutional compass for adjudication, anchoring human
rights in the recognition of shared humanity. Ultimately, dignity endures not merely as a legal
doctrine but as the ethical heart of constitutional democracy.

67
George C. Rosenfeld & Gerald L. Neuman, Human Dignity in Comparative Constitutional Perspective, in The
Migration of Constitutional Ideas 183–210 (Sujit Choudhry ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).
68
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (India).
69
S v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.).
70
Pretty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (2002).
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