Team R-Respondent Memorial
Team R-Respondent Memorial
HARISH MEMORIAL, GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2024
TEAM CODE: R
(THE APPLICANT)
VS.
(THE RESPONDENT)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Summary Of Arguments............................................................................................................. 12
RESPONSIBILITY AND THEY CAN EVADE LIABILITY FOR THE ACTS OF EAGLE
EYE ...................................................................................................................................... 14
1. Republic of Aventara did not violate the principle of State Responsibility under
International Law............................................................................................................... 14
2. Republic of Aventara can evade liability for the acts of Eagle Eye .............................. 15
2.1 EagleEye acted autonomously and its actions were unforeseen and not directly
commanded. ................................................................................................................... 16
2.2 Inarguendo, the Republic of Aventara is responsible for the acts of the EagleEye and
they were acts of self defense, countermeasure or arising out of necessity....................... 17
1. xDAO DOES NOT MEETS THE CRITERIA LAID DOWN FOR STATEHOOD ........... 19
2.3 xDAO’s smart contracts do not form a government under traditional definitions . 22
2.4 xDAO’s engagement with other DAO’s for mutual benefit cannot be considered
“making relations”......................................................................................................... 23
EAGLEEYE. ........................................................................................................................ 25
2. Actions taken by EagleEye were a response to an imminent and severe threat posed by
the criminal use of Bitnero on Crimson Road ..................................................................... 26
5. There is lack of direct causation between the cyber-counter actions and the financial
losses ................................................................................................................................. 30
Prayer ....................................................................................................................................... 32
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASE LAWS
Armed Activities On The Territory Of The Congo, (Congo, The Democratic Republic Of
The V Uganda), Judgment, Merits, Icj Gl No 116, (2005) Icj Rep 168,(Dec 19).
Corfu Channel (U.K. V. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 43 (Apr. 9) (Separate Opinion Of Judge
Alvarez)
Judgment No 13, (1928) Pcij Series A No 17, Icgj 255 (Pcij 1928), 13th September 1928.
States Of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1986 (June 27), At 97-98
ARTICLES
Political Dimension Of Injustice.” Political Theory, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2002, Pp. 410–40. Jstor
Feuer, Lewis S. “The Economic Factor In History.” Science & Society, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1940,
Ilias Plakokefalos, “Causation In The Law Of State Responsibility And The Problem Of
(May 2015)
Jakobi, Anja P. “Global Networks Against Crime: Using The Financial Action Task Force
American Journal Of International Law, Vol. 35, No. 4, 1941, Pp. 605–17. Jstor,
(Dec. 1, 2015)
Responsibility For The Torts Of An Independent Contractor.” ,39 The Yale Law Journal,
Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism And The Concept Of “Armed Attack” In Article 51 Of The
U.N. Charter, 43
Sklaroff, Jeremy M., "Smart Contracts And The Cost Of Inflexibility" (2018). Prize
Doi: 10.3389/Fclim.2021.737929.
Usha R. Rodrigues, Law And The Blockchain, 104 Iowa L. Rev. 679, 707 (2019).
INTERNATIONAL REPORTS
Rep. Of The Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., April 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, At 80,
U.N. Doc
UN Charter
BOOKS
ONLINE SOURCES
Https://[Link]/Sales-Territory-Management/
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Republic of Aventara (“Aventara”) and the State of Zimblia (Zimblia) respectfully submit
the present dispute to the International Court of Justice, pursuant to article 40, paragraph 1 of the
Statute of the Court. The Parties agree to accept as final and binding the Judgment of this Court
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Background
The Republic of Zimblia, located in Central America has historically been facing ongoing political
and economic turmoil. This also led to a civil war between the Military Government, supported by
the Republic of Aventara, and various leftist rebel factions. xDAO is a global NGO based in the
Autonomous Organization.
The Republic of Aventara operates as a Unitary One-party Socialist system under the leadership
of the AAA. Aventara consistently scores low in global evaluations conducted, relating to
Democracy and related issues, religion, and ethnic groups. While the Aventaran Constitution
proclaims to protect fundamental rights, these claims often fall short in reality, providing limited
Unfolding of Events
In 2021, the President of Zimblia proposed the introduction of the Bitnero cryptocurrency as a
legal currency, which is a decentralized privacy-enhanced digital currency. Operating on the open-
any central governing body or overarching surveillance. The Bitnero Law was enacted by
Zimblia’s Legislative Assembly (“ZLA”) in June 2021 and Bitnero became a legal tender in
The Republic of Aventara has built and deployed EagleEye, an AI to detect, investigate, and
neutralize threats to national security. On 13th August, 2023, EagleEye detected that the operators
of Crimson Road, an online darknet market, were using Bitnero. EagleEye algorithms predicted
that there was a high probability that Bitnero was being misused by criminal entities for money
laundering and financing of terrorism at a global level. EagleEye launched a series of sophisticated
cyber-attacks and brought down the EtherX network and permanently corrupted all Bitnero data.
This attack also led to the de-anonymization of xDAO members’ data, identities & transactions of
Bitnero users.
Dispute
A week after the attack, the Government of Zimblia in an official social media post claimed that
Aventara had launched the sophisticated cyber-attack as a retaliation for the shutdown of Aventara
Mining Corporation's operations and reducing the reliance on the Aventara Dollar by making
Bitnero, a legal tender. The post claimed that Aventara must reimburse Zimblia for the losses they
incurred on the basis state responsibility, due diligence duty and prohibit the use of force. Two
days later, Aventara's Government issued an official social media post claiming that they were not
liable for the losses that Zamblia incurred, as acts of the AI were independent and autonomous and
they could take the shield of necessity, self-defense and countermeasures. Further, xDAO also
claims that it must be considered as a sovereign state on the grounds of Evolution of Statehood,
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
RESPONSIBILITY AND CAN THEY EVADE LIABILITY FOR THE ACTS OF EAGLE
EYE?
INTERNATIONAL LAW?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Responsibility and they can evade liability for the Acts of EagleEye
It is humbly submitted that the Republic of Aventara did not violate the principle of State
Responsibility under the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001. The
cyber attack launched does not fall within the ambit of an “internationally wrongful act” and does
not entail attribution to the State and breach of an obligation that applies to the State. Further,
Aventara can evade liability as they were independent actions of the AI. Inarugendo, even if the
Republic of Aventara claims liability, the exceptions of countermeasure, necessity and self-defense
Law
The assertion that entities such as xDAO could evolve into non-territorial states in the digital era
poses challenges to traditional international law. Historically, statehood, firmly tied to territorial
control, has played a crucial role in stabilizing global governance. Deviating from this principle
may disrupt established norms and introduce uncertainties. The Montevideo Convention of 1933
did not foresee the complexities arising from decentralized digital entities, making it challenging
to define territory without a physical presence, especially with reliance on blockchain technology.
Moreover, giving priority to economic influence as a criterion for statehood might enable resource-
rich entities to assert a state-like status, potentially undermining the distinctive nature of
Zamblia for the financial losses incurred due to the devaluation of bitnero
It is humbly submitted that the Republic of Aventara is not obligated to reimburse the Republic of
Zamblia for the financial losses incurred due to the devaluation of Bitnero as a result of the
counteraction by EagleEye and the grounds for it are fivefold : [3.1] EagleEye acted autonomously
and independently, [3.2] actions taken by EagleEye were a response to an imminent and severe
threat posed by the criminal use of Bitnero on Crimson Road, [3.3]There was no use of force and
breach of Sovereignty, [3.4] EagleEye's actions were to prevent criminal activities, [3.5] There is
lack of direct causation between the cyber-counter actions and the financial losses.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
EAGLE EYE
The Republic of Aventara did not violate the principle of State Responsibility under the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001 (herein referred to as “RSIWA”)
The cyber attack launched does not fall within the ambit of “internationally wrongful act” and does
not entail attribution to the State and breach of an obligation that is applicable to the State. Further,
Aventara can evade liability as they were independent actions of the AI. Inarugendo, even if the
Republic of Aventara claims liability, the exceptions of countermeasure, necessity and self defense
can be invoked as they were acts attributable to the State. he Republic of Aventara is not
responsible for the acts of the EagleEyet and can evade liability by claiming non-attribution and
EagleEye is not formally affiliated with the Republic of Aventara’s government. Prima facie, the
acts of a private individual are not attributable to the state under international law. 1Authorization
1
Commentary to Draft Articles at 103.
requires acts to be done under the instruction, direction or control of the state. 2 A high degree of
association between the state and a private action is required to engage state responsibility. 3 In
certain circumstances, a state may take countermeasures against a state that would be unlawful
were they not in response to a prior violation by that State4. There was no breach of any obligation
on behalf of the State of Aventara nor was there any act attributable to the State. The acts carried
out by the AI were not acts by organs of State, directed or controlled by a State or entities
2. Republic of Aventara can evade liability for the acts of Eagle Eye
The actions of the AI, EagleEye are autonomous actions as they were not conduct of organs of
controlled by the State. Liability for non-state actions would attach to the state only if the non-
state actor is either a formal or de facto agent of the state5. The exceptions to state liability of
wrongful acts can be invoked, inarguendo, the Republic of Aventara is responsible for the acts of
the EagleEye and they were acts of self defense, countermeasure or arising out of necessity. States
may become responsible at customary international law for acts ex post facto. 6 Article 11 of the
2
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), [Link].E.1, [Link]
[hereinafter Draft ARSIWA].
3
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits,
Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1986 (June 27), at 97-98
4
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, at 55-56 (Sept. 1997); Nauililaa (Port. v. Ger.), 2 R.I.A.A.
1011, at 1025-26 (1928); Air Serv. Agreement (Fr. v. U.S.), 18 R.I.A.A. 416, at 443-46 (Mar. 1979); Draft Articles
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 26.
5
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., April 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, at 80, U.N. Doc A/56/10, U.N.
GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001).
6
Draft RSIWA; United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. 3; Lighthouses Arbitration (1956)
R.I.A.A., xii, 155.
International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility (Draft Articles) recognizes
that acts of private persons shall be attributed to the state "to the extent that the State acknowledges
2.1 EagleEye acted autonomously and its actions were unforeseen and not directly
commanded.
In Prosecutor v. Tadic, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)
adopted an “overall control” test. the ICTY found that the control would have to go “beyond “the
mere financing and equipping of such forces and involv[e] also participation in the planning and
supervision of military operations 7. Furthermore, the actions of private non-state actors are not
attributable to the state8. Here the actions by EagleEye, which is a private entity, cannot be
attributed to the state as it was an independent action. Under the Nicaragua standard, as mentioned
above, a state cannot be held responsible for the actions of a non-state actor merely because it had
general control over their operations. Even though Aventarra deployed the AI, the very act of the
cyber attack which led to the subsequent deanonymization of the users cannot be attributed to the
State. The courts have in various cases, have held that a State can only be held responsible under
circumstances where it was proved that the State nhad “effective control of the military or
paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed 9.” Therefore,
7
See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 43 (Apr. 9) (separate opinion of Judge Alvarez); Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 202 (June 27) (quoting Corfu
Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 35); TALLINN MANUAL, (manuscript r. 5, para. 2); cf. Stephen Allen, Harboring or
Protecting? Militarized Refugees, State Responsibility, and the Evolution of Self-Defense, 25 PRAXIS: FLETCHER
J. HUM. SECURITY 5, 9–10 (2010).
8
See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., April 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, at 80, U.N. Doc A/56/10,
U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) (“Thus the general rule is that the only conduct attributed to the State
at the international level is that of its organs of government, or of others who have acted under the direction, instigation
or control of those organs, i.e. as agents of the State.”).
9
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 115.
in the present case merely because the AI was built by the Republic Aventara any and every act of
2.2 Inarguendo, the Republic of Aventara is responsible for the acts of the EagleEye and they
were acts of self defense, countermeasure or arising out of necessity.
The principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity as rights of a state do not exist in a vacuum,
but are balanced against the right of self-defense under international law 10. The criminal use of
Bitnero posed an immediate threat not just to Aventara but to the entire world and hence
EagleEye’s actions were a form of self-defense. Under Art 21 of the RSIWA, the wrongfulness of
an act of a State is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful measure of self defense taken in
conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. self-defence constitutes an exceptional right
which, when successfully invoked, does not constitute ‘even potentially’ a breach of the obligation
not to use force in international relations. It is an established principle that states will maintain the
right to exercise self-defense in the cyber domain, as in the domains of air, land, and sea 11. cyber
domain will not be any different from the other domains in which states have always maintained
As established by the UN, determined to be necessary for their security, states may use force in
the cyber context as they would in other domains. In arguing that non-state actors are indeed
covered by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, it accepts that an attack by a nonstate actor may
10
DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 52 (3d ed. 2010) (“It used to be that States
were the only recognized subjects of international law, the only ‘real’ players on the international scene.”); see also
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 119 (2nd Cir. 2010) (describing how, after the Nuremburg Trials,
states were no longer the sole focus of international law), cert. granted, 132 [Link]. 472 (2011); cf. U.N. Charter art. 3
(opening membership to states, not individuals or organizations).
11
In 2011, the U.S. government officially stated its position on a State’s right of self-defense in the cyber domain,
noting that, “[c]onsistent with the United Nations Charter, states have an inherent right to self-defense that may be
triggered by certain aggressive acts in cyberspace.” See WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
CYBERSPACE 10 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 INTERNATIONAL CYBERSPACE STRATEGY].
constitute an “armed attack” regardless of whether a state is directly involved in any aspect of the
attack12 In support of this position, is the plain language of Article 51, which does not limit the
armed attack being committed by a state13. Therefor just because it is an “armed attack” does not
necessarily become attributable to the State. Transactions were exclusively handled using Bitnero,
ensuring further anonymity. EagleEye algorithms predicted that there was a high probability that
Bitnero was being misused by criminal entities for money laundering and financing of terrorism
at a global level. EagleEye launched a series of sophisticated cyber-attacks and brought down the
EtherX network and permanently corrupted all Bitnero data. This was done as a way of due
diligence and counter measures against the widespread misuse of the bitnero as the legal tender in
the black market. While the Draft Articles recognize only non-forcible measures, 14 the ICJ in
to acts involving the use of force. 15 Thus, even if EagleEye’s action is deemed a "use of force," it
12
See JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
296 (2010) (“[I]nternational practice seems to have evolved both to allow self-defence against armed attacks by non-
state forces, and to loosen the required link between such forces and a state in which armed defence measures are
taken.”); DINSTEIN, supra note 182, at 224–30; Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95
AM. J. INT’L. L. 839, 840 (2001); Raphaël Van Steenberghe, Self-Defence in Response to Attacks by Non-State
Actors in the Light of Recent State Practice: A Step Forward?, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.183, 184 (2010) (concluding
that recent State practice suggests that attacks committed by non-State actors constitute armed attack sunder Article
51).
13
Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43
HARV. INT’L L.J. 41, 50 (2002).
14
Supra Note 2.
15
Supra Note at 109-110.
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
It is contended that the assertion that entities like xDAO can evolve into non-territorial states in
the digital era poses challenges within traditional international law frameworks. The historical
foundation of statehood, deeply rooted in territorial control, has provided stability in global
governance. Departing from this principle may disrupt established norms and introduce
uncertainty into international relations. The Montevideo Convention of 1933 may not have
envisioned the complexities arising from decentralised digital entities. Challenges arise in defining
a clear and recognized territory due to the absence of a physical presence and reliance on
prompt entities with substantial resources to assert a state-like status, potentially undermining the
STATEHOOD
Unlike traditional states, xDAO exclusively operates in the digital realm and lacks a physical
presence in any specific geographic location. The conventional concept of statehood is usually
linked to a tangible territory with defined borders, a feature that is absent in xDAO owing to its
16
Marcella Atzori, "Blockchain Technology and Decentralised Governance: Is the State Still Necessary?" University
College of London - Center for Blockchain Technologies (Dec. 1, 2015), (last revised June 13, 2016).
The European Union's supranational structure, while presenting an alternative model, emphasises
the ongoing relevance of territorial governance. The EU's influence over member states
effective governance. This perspective challenges the notion of states transcending traditional
territorial constraints.17
entities like xDAO, introduces uncertainties into the international system. Real-world instances
reveal the intricate connections between territorial clarity and diplomatic relations, trade
agreements, and mutual defence pacts. Departing from this clarity raises legitimate concerns about
the enforcement of laws, citizen protection, and the preservation of national interests within a
In practical terms, the importance of territorial governance is enforcing laws and safeguarding
sovereignty, citizenship, and the preservation of national identity. In a world where geopolitical
realities continue to be shaped by physical spaces, there is the pragmatic necessity of maintaining
Amidst the ongoing discourse surrounding the potential recognition of decentralised autonomous
organisations (DAOs) such as xDAO as states, it is crucial to assert that these entities do not align
17
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR COMMUNICATION (EUROPEAN COMMISSION), THE EUROPEAN
UNION - WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT DOES," (2022).
18
Marta Piekarska, The State of DAO Security (11 November 2022).
19
LITFIN, KAREN T. “SOVEREIGNTY IN WORLD ECOPOLITICS.” Mershon International Studies Review, vol.
41, no. 2, 1997, pp. 167–204. JSTOR, [Link] Accessed 12 Dec. 2023.
with the traditional criteria defining statehood. Despite the evolving landscape, there is a pressing
need to adhere to the conventional model of statehood, firmly anchored in territorial boundaries. 20
As the international system grapples with digital transformations, upholding the traditional
statehood model proves essential for addressing issues related to sovereignty, citizenship, and law
domain, do not possess a physical presence within a specific geographic location. Despite their
interactions with blockchain platforms, these engagements fall short of the territorial control
typically associated with traditional states. Consequently, DAOs fail to fulfil the criteria for
cryptocurrency communities like Bitcoin and Ethereum. However, the fluid and diverse nature of
these communities raises questions about the stability and recognition of xDAO's claimed
location and can be global. Members can join or leave the DAO at any time, making the population
20
Aaron Wright, The Rise of Decentralised Autonomous Organisations: Opportunities and Challenges, Stanford
Journal of Blockchain Law & Policy, 30 June 2021.
21
Usha R. Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain, 104 Iowa L. Rev. 679, 707 (2019).
The analogy between xDAO's defined territory on the Ethereum blockchain and the broader
acceptance of blockchain technology in various sectors may not confer recognized and sovereign
territorial legitimacy. Traditional states typically have well-defined geographic boundaries, and
the widespread use of blockchain in specific industries doesn't necessarily equate to territorial
An effective territory typically refers to a geographical area where an entity has clear-cut
boundaries and exercises control12. It involves managing operations based on attributes such as
geographic location, industry, product or service needs, or account size2. A blockchain, like the
one used by xDAO, is a digital ledger and does not have a physical presence. It cannot be defined
Blockchains are globally accessible and do not have boundaries that can be managed or controlled
in the traditional sense. Anyone with internet access and the necessary resources can interact with
the blockchain.
2.3 xDAO’s smart contracts do not form a government under traditional definitions
While xDAO's decentralised governance challenges traditional centralised structures, concerns
arise regarding accountability and responsiveness. The automated nature of smart contracts and
algorithms, while innovative, may lack the nuanced decision-making and adaptability found in
22
Georgios Dimitropoulos, The Law of Blockchain, 95 Wash. L. Rev. 1117 (2020). Available at:
[Link]
23
"Sales Territory Management: The Ultimate Guide," Fit Small Business, [Link]
territory-management/.
24
SKLAROFF, JEREMY M., "SMART CONTRACTS AND THE COST OF INFLEXIBILITY" (2018). Prize
Winning Papers. 9. [Link]
generally a state. It normally consists of legislature, executive, and judiciary. It is a means by which
organisational policies are enforced, as well as a mechanism for determining policy1. Smart
contracts, like those used by xDAO, are self-executing contracts with the terms of the agreement
directly written into code. They do not have the ability to enforce laws or determine policies in the
way a traditional government can. Smart contracts operate based on pre-set rules and lack the
2.4 xDAO’s engagement with other DAO’s for mutual benefit cannot be considered “making
relations”
xDAO's claim to engage in international affairs through its program, protocol, and token prompts
questions about the nature and recognition of these engagements. While certain blockchain
projects may collaborate internationally, the acknowledgment and acceptance of digital entities
participating in diplomacy, trade, and humanitarian efforts equivalent to traditional states remain
In conclusion, xDAO fails to make a convincing case for statehood, as it lacks parallels from real-
life examples that challenge traditional concepts of territorial recognition. Despite the growing
influence of digital entities on global dynamics, the lack of recognition for entities like xDAO in
international affairs underscores the persistent traditional norms of governance and collaboration.
CONSIDERED A STATE
25
DAO Smart Guide, Moralis, Available at [Link] (6 Jan 2022).
While the xDAO may assert significant economic influence, positioning itself on the international
stage, it'simperative to stress that economic strength alone should not be the exclusive determinant
for state recognition. Entities like the World Economic Forum, historically influential due to
economic clout, do not inherently possess the comprehensive attributes essential for statehood. 26
States recognized for economic prowess typically adhere to established frameworks covering
governance, diplomacy, and compliance with international law. Their responsibilities encompass
more than economic contributions, extending to citizen protection, law enforcement, and the
Moreover, state recognition involves nuanced geopolitical considerations, historical contexts, and
adherence to international norms. While economic strength can amplify global influence, its
effectiveness is intertwined with factors such as political stability, territorial control, and
diplomatic engagements. Traditional states, deeply rooted in the international system, grapple with
While acknowledging the xDAO's potential to instigate positive societal change through economic
demands a holistic scrutiny, encompassing political, legal, and social dimensions. Therefore, while
26
Feuer, Lewis S. “The Economic Factor in History.” Science & Society, vol. 4, no. 2, 1940, pp. 168–92. JSTOR,
[Link] Accessed 12 Dec. 2023.
27
Kelsen, Hans. “Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations.” The American Journal of International
Law, vol. 35, no. 4, 1941, pp. 605–17. JSTOR, [Link] Accessed 12 Dec. 2023.
28
Feldman, Leonard C. “Redistribution, Recognition, and the State: The Irreducibly Political Dimension of Injustice.”
Political Theory, vol. 30, no. 3, 2002, pp. 410–40. JSTOR, [Link] Accessed 12 Dec.
2023.
economic strength can contribute, it should not overshadow the broader criteria traditionally
EAGLEEYE.
It is humbly submitted that the Republic of Aventara is not obligated to reimburse the Republic of
Zamblia for the financial losses incurred due to the devaluation of Bitnero as a result of the
counteraction by EagleEye and the grounds for it are fivefold : [3.1] EagleEye acted autonomously
and independently, [3.2] actions taken by EagleEye were a response to an imminent and severe
threat posed by the criminal use of Bitnero on Crimson Road, [3.3]There was no use of force and
breach of Sovereignty, [3.4] EagleEye's actions were to prevent criminal activities, [3.5] There is
lack of direct causation between the cyber-counter actions and the financial losses.
The fundamental tenet of the "independent contractor defense" is that a state may not be held
responsible for, if an organization is truly functioning independently and not under the direction
or control of the state.29 The honourable Court held that in order for attribution to take place, the
state has to effectively control the non-state actor's actions and emphasized on the idea that
attribution may not always be satisfied by providing a non-state actor with support or assistance.
29
“Responsibility for the Torts of an Independent Contractor.” ,39 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL, 6,(1930), pp. 861–
73. JSTOR, [Link]
States can only be held accountable if they control independent entities' actions or if they direct or
EagleEye acted autonomously and independently, without direct instructions from the Aventaran
it is an act of independent entity that impartially detected potential threats and neutralized them
.Therefore it’s humbly submitted that in the instant case, Aventara had no effective control over
EagleEye's actions as it functioned without supervision and its conduct were unforeseen and not
directly commanded by Aventara. Hence it can not be held obligated to reimburse the Republic of
The principle of self-defense provides for the states to use force in response to an armed attack32.
Although physical attacks are the focus of the traditional understanding, responses to cyber threats
are also included in the modern interpretation. A state may use force in self-defense against a cyber
30
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, (Congo, the Democratic Republic of the v Uganda), Judgment,
Merits, ICJ GL No 116, (2005) ICJ Rep 168,(Dec 19).
31
Compromis, ¶19.
32
Supra Note 3.
33
Schmitt, M. N. (2017) in Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations. 2nd edn.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Rule 7.
It is contended that the severity of the threat emerging from the criminal use of Bitnero on Crimson
Road was significant. It is underlined that the possible repercussions of inaction may have caused
substantial harm to the nation's economy and international security. The existence of illicit
activities, such as the drug trade, the possession of weapons, and identity theft, shows a clear and
Crimson Road to spread quickly, posing an immediate threat that required immediate action.
Postponing action may have worsened the situation and jeopardized both international and national
security.
Furthermore, it is submitted that there is clear causality between the Bitnero cyberattack and the
possible harm to national and international security, as Bitnero's use for illicit purposes directly
fueled the perceived threat and supported the need for prompt, focused action. The illegal use of
Bitnero not only breached Aventara's digital space but also had wider ramifications for worldwide
security and the potential economic harm and security risks associated with the activities on
Crimson Road, facilitated by Bitnero, provide a clear basis for Aventara's actions in self-defense.
And lastly, the exceptional nature of the threat posed by Crimson Road justifies the presumptive
Henceforth, It is humbly submitted that the actions taken by EagleEye were a response to an
imminent and severe threat posed by the criminal use of Bitnero on Crimson Road and the de-
anonymization and detection of potential money laundering and terrorism financing was an
34
Compromis, ¶23.
absolute necessity for national security. 35 Since they were taken in self-defense and as lawful
countermeasures under international law 36, Aventara cannot be held obligated to reimburse.
It is respectfully submitted that the actions taken by EagleEye, which resulted in the devaluation
of Bitnero and the subsequent economic impact on Zimblia, did not amount to the use of force
within the meaning of Article 2(4)37 of the Charter of the United Nations. EagleEye's actions were
not a direct use of force against Zimblia, but rather a targeted response to a specific cyber threat
posed by Crimson Road. This nuanced distinction is consistent with the Tallinn Manual on the
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, which recognises the need for a substantial use of
It is further submitted that the cyber-attacks, while having an economic impact, did not rise to the
threshold of an armed attack, and thus the principle of non-intervention remains unviolated, as the
devaluation of Bitnero was an unintended consequence of neutralising the imminent threat posed
responsibility for unforeseen consequences 39. The Chorzów Factory case 40emphasises that states
35
Compromis, ¶ 25.
36
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83, Annex
(Dec. 12, 2001); [hereinafter RSIWA 2001].
37
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
38
Schmitt, M. N. (2017) in Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations. 2nd edn.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Rule 14.
39
Suckling J, Hoolohan C, Soutar I and Druckman A (2021), “Unintended Consequences: Unknowable and
Uavoidable, or Knowable and Unforgivable? “Front. Clim. 3:737929. doi: 10.3389/fclim.2021.737929.
40
Factory At Chorzów, Germany v Poland, Judgment, Claim for Indemnity, Merits, Judgment No 13, (1928) PCIJ
Series A No 17, ICGJ 255 (PCIJ 1928), 13th September 1928.
are responsible for injuries caused by their actions only if those injuries were the direct and
foreseeable result.
In addition, Aventara invokes the inherent right of self-defence recognised in Article 51 of the UN
Charter41. The Caroline Affair 42 and the principles of customary international law derived from it
establish that a State may act in self-defence against an imminent threat, provided that the response
is necessary and proportionate, and EagleEye's actions are consistent with these principles as they
were undertaken to counter an imminent and serious threat to its national security. Aventara's
action in deploying EagleEye underscores its adherence to international norms and efforts to
Thus, Aventara's position is rooted in the prohibition of the use of force, the doctrine of unintended
consequences, and the inherent sovereign right of Republic of Aventara to self-defend against
cyber threats. Aventara's actions were consistent with international norms and aimed at
neutralising a clear and imminent cyber threat, thereby protecting its sovereignty in the digital
It is contended that EagleEye's prime motivation was the prevention of criminal activity,
particularly money laundering and terrorist financing. This approach is consistent with the broader
41
U.N. Charter art. 51.
42
Jennings, R. Y. “The Caroline and McLeod Cases.” ,32 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 1 (1938), pp. 82–99. JSTOR, [Link]
43
2225 U.N.T.S. 209: Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001 ETS No. 185.
the global consensus to combat financial crime, it is submitted that EagleEye's actions are
consistent with the collective effort to maintain the integrity of the international financial system.
Reference to international instruments such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards
supports the argument that states have a shared responsibility to prevent and combat money
laundering and terrorist financing 44, justifying EagleEye's [Link] Aventara cannot be
5. There is lack of direct causation between the cyber-counter actions and the
financial losses
This argument is based on legal principles that emphasize the need for a direct causal link between
the allegedly wrongful act and the alleged loss. 45 even if EagleEye's actions contributed to the
devaluation of Bitnero, there is no direct causal link between the cyber-attacks and the financial
Market dynamics and various other factors may have influenced Bitnero's devaluation
independently of the cyber attacks. A ZCC survey in March 2023 showed that only 14% of local
traders had made at least one Bitnero transaction, and that Zimblia had purchased a large amount
of Bitnero to hold as a reserve. 46These facts clearly indicate that it is unlikely that EagleEye's
Jakobi, Anja P. “Global Networks against Crime: Using the Financial Action Task Force as a Model?” ,70
44
The Trail Smelter Arbitration case47 establishes that liability must be established through a clear
chain of causation, and Aventara contends that the financial losses suffered by Zimblia cannot be
attributed solely to the cyber counter-measures, but are subject to multiple market forces. It is
therefore respectfully submitted that Aventara is not liable to pay any compensation.
Therefore it is humbly submitted before the honourable court that with respect to all the above
contentions, the Republic of Aventara is not obligated to reimburse the Republic of Zamblia for
47
Arbitral Trib., 3 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941).
PRAYER
Wherefore in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is humbly
prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to hold, adjudge and declare that;
1. The Republic of Aventara has not violated the principle of state responsibility and they can
3. The Republic of Aventara is not obligated to reimburse the Republic of Zamblia for the
financial losses incurred due to the devaluation of Bitnero as a result of the cyber-attack by
EagleEye.
and pass any other order it may deem fit in the interest of justice, equity, and good conscience.