A)​Sino-Indian Relations

India-China Relations: Problems and Prospects – Detailed Notes

1. Introduction: The Rise of China – A Global Dilemma

The paper begins by highlighting the unprecedented and rapid ascent of China in the international system. This rise has been both an economic and a military
phenomenon, and it presents a global puzzle: is China a threat or an opportunity?

●​ Global Uncertainty: While some analysts hope that China will act responsibly due to its increasing stakes in the global system, others see signs of
assertiveness and unilateralism that point toward a more disruptive future.​

●​ Strategic Dilemma: For countries like India, the US, Japan, and European powers, the challenge is to engage China to utilize the opportunities it
provides while simultaneously constraining it to manage the risks it poses.​

2. Economic Power and Global Integration

China’s economic prowess is undeniable:

●​ Economic Magnetism: With a vast consumer market and manufacturing power, China has become central to global trade and financial flows.​

●​ Concerns from the West: However, its mercantilist tactics (such as undervaluing currency, intellectual property rights violations, and dumping) have
raised suspicions in the West. Calls for rebalancing and stimulating Chinese domestic demand have become louder, especially during the global
financial crisis.​

●​ Financial Leverage: China’s vast foreign exchange reserves have enabled it to become a major player in sovereign debt markets, especially in the
troubled Eurozone, where its investments are actively sought.​

3. Military Modernization and Regional Anxiety

China’s military growth has kept pace with its economic rise:

●​ PLA’s Political Role: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is gaining influence in decision-making, leading to more aggressive behavior in maritime
and border disputes.​

●​ Maritime Assertiveness: China's expansive claims in the South China Sea and heightened activity on the Indian border show that the narrative of a
“peaceful rise” is being challenged by its actions.​

4. India’s Unique Dilemma: Geographical Contiguity and Strategic Exposure

India’s challenge is more acute than that of other countries for several reasons:

●​ Loss of the Tibetan Buffer: In 1950, China’s annexation of Tibet effectively erased the buffer zone between India and China, creating direct
geographical contiguity.​

●​ Underestimation of the Threat: India’s leadership failed to perceive the strategic implications of the annexation. The absence of a formal border in
the western sector (Ladakh) and China’s rejection of the McMahon Line in the east (Arunachal Pradesh) should have alerted India to potential conflict.​

●​ From Civilizational Harmony to Geopolitical Conflict: Historically, India and China had no territorial disputes and even influenced shared cultural
spaces like Southeast Asia (Indo-China). However, China’s military presence in Tibet turned it into a territorial adversary.​

5. The 1962 War: Origins, Blunders, and Legacy

●​ India’s Generosity Misplaced: India recognized the PRC early, supported its UN membership, and recognized Tibet as part of China—all goodwill
gestures. Yet China betrayed India by initiating the 1962 war.​

●​ The 1954 Agreement: A strategic mistake, the agreement gave de facto recognition to Chinese sovereignty over Tibet without securing India’s border
interests.​

●​ Aksai Chin Road and Escalation: China’s construction of the road through Aksai Chin, in disputed territory, led India to increase its presence in
remote areas, prompting the Chinese to retaliate militarily.​

●​ The Result: The 1962 war caused a deep psychological and political scar, the consequences of which continue to shape Indian foreign policy.​
6. Border Dispute: The Core of the Conflict

●​ 3000 km of Unsettled Border: The unresolved border dispute is the most significant source of distrust between India and China. It allows China to
maintain strategic pressure on India.​

●​ Shifting Chinese Positions: China’s approach to the border talks has been evasive. It continuously shifts its stance, prolonging the dispute to
maintain leverage.​

●​ Special Representatives (SRs) Mechanism: Initiated in 2003 for a political solution, the SRs have met 15 times without meaningful progress. China
now demands Indian concessions (such as Tawang) on political and religious grounds, broadening the dispute.​

●​ Strategic Hollowing of Dialogue: Instead of focusing on resolution, China uses dialogue to expand its agenda and link the border issue with broader
strategic matters.​

7. The Tawang Puzzle: Religious, Cultural, and Strategic Dimensions

●​ Historical Retreat and Current Claims: China withdrew from Tawang in 1962, effectively acknowledging the McMahon Line. Yet, decades later, it
demands Tawang citing Tibetan religious sentiment, even though the Dalai Lama acknowledges it as part of India.​

●​ Tibetan Sentiment as a Tool: China opposes the very institution of the Dalai Lama, yet invokes Tibetan religious connections to stake claims on
Indian territory. This is seen as hypocritical and cynical.​

●​ India’s Inaction on Tibet: Fearful of provoking China, India does not support the Dalai Lama’s struggle for autonomy, despite his moderate stance
and willingness to accept Chinese sovereignty in return for cultural and religious freedoms.​

8. Stabilization Without Settlement: A Risky Status Quo

●​ CBMs and Agreements: India and China signed Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in the 1990s to maintain peace. But these have frozen the
dispute rather than resolving it.​

●​ China’s Strategic Patience: While India wants peace and a final settlement, China prefers peace without settlement, buying time to consolidate
control over Tibet and reinforce its infrastructure.​

●​ Military and Infrastructural Edge: China enjoys superior terrain, logistics, and infrastructure on its side of the border (e.g., railway to Lhasa). This
gives it an upper hand in case of a conflict.​

●​ Economic and Psychological Costs for India: China’s incursions and provocations keep India off-balance, militarily and politically, while
undermining its development efforts.

9. China’s Strategic Use of Pakistan: A Longstanding Axis Against India

China’s strategic partnership with Pakistan is a cornerstone of its policy to contain India and limit its regional influence.

●​ Pakistan as a Proxy: China has used Pakistan to keep India "boxed in" within South Asia without confronting India directly. This allows China to
maintain an image of a "peacefully rising" power while indirectly stoking instability around India.​

●​ Nuclear Empowerment of Pakistan: China’s transfer of nuclear weapons technology and delivery systems to Pakistan fundamentally altered the
strategic balance in South Asia. It has allowed Pakistan to engage in provocative behavior without fear of conventional military retaliation by India.​

●​ Counterbalancing Indian Dominance: China’s objective is clear: prevent India from asserting itself even in its immediate neighborhood. A
nuclear-armed Pakistan ensures India is constantly looking over its shoulder.​

●​ Opposition to India-US Nuclear Deal: China opposed the 2008 India-US nuclear agreement, arguing it was discriminatory against Pakistan. Later,
China bypassed Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) rules to build additional nuclear reactors in Pakistan, suggesting a strategic motive behind its
"civilian" nuclear cooperation.​

10. The Gilgit-Baltistan and POK Dimension: Military-Economic Expansion

China has taken active interest in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), even as it disputes India’s sovereignty over Jammu &
Kashmir.

●​ Double Standards on Territorial Disputes: While issuing stapled visas to Indian citizens from J&K (questioning India’s sovereignty), China treats
POK and GB as uncontested Pakistani territories.​

●​ Infrastructure Projects and Strategic Presence:​

○​ China is building massive roads and hydropower projects in these regions.​

○​ India has raised concerns about reports of 3,000–4,000 Chinese (including PLA) personnel present in POK.​

●​ Sinkiang and Strategic Contiguity: China’s interests in POK are also driven by its need to:​

○​ Monitor and suppress Uighur separatists in Xinjiang.​

○​ Connect Gwadar port to Xinjiang for energy transport.​

○​ Ensure secure access to Afghanistan, linking up with Chinese stakes there.​

●​ Military Shielding of Investments: China will not invest billions in strategic regions without ensuring diplomatic and possibly military protection,
thus signalling potential military encirclement of India in J&K.​

11. Strategic Entrenchment in South Asia: Encircling India

China has expanded its footprint across South Asia, undermining India’s influence regionally:

●​ Afghanistan:​

○​ Investing in minerals and railway infrastructure.​

○​ Possibly engaging with the Taliban, via Pakistan, to secure its economic interests.​

●​ Nepal:​

○​ Leveraging the political rise of Maoists to demand parity with India in diplomatic arrangements.​

○​ Using anti-India rhetoric to influence Nepali public opinion.​

○​ Seeks to weaken India’s special position in Nepal.​

●​ Bangladesh:​

○​ Even pro-India government led by Sheikh Hasina maintains close ties with China.​

○​ China’s presence incentivizes Bangladesh to balance India.​

●​ Sri Lanka and Myanmar:​

○​ China provided arms during Sri Lanka’s war against LTTE.​

○​ Has gained long-term naval and commercial footholds in ports like Hambantota and Kyaukphyu.​

●​ “String of Pearls” Strategy:​

○​ Aimed at creating a network of ports and facilities encircling India in the Indian Ocean.​

○​ Commercial now, military potentially later.​

12. Strategic and Diplomatic Disconnect in India’s Approach

 ●​ Mismatch Between Government and Public Sentiment: India’s leadership maintains a restrained and cooperative tone, despite increasing public
scepticism about China.​

●​ Economic Dependency and Political Concessions:​

○​ India allows deepening economic ties (China as top trading partner), even as China undermines Indian interests in strategic areas.​

●​ Softness Misread as Weakness: India’s reluctance to confront China, driven by practical needs for peace, is misinterpreted in Beijing as lack of
resolve, encouraging China to remain uncompromising.​

●​ NSG and UNSC Bid Lessons:​

○​ China blocked India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group and has been non-committal on India’s permanent membership in the
UNSC.​

○​ India had to seek Chinese goodwill for international ambitions—a weaker diplomatic posture.​

13. Economic Engagement: Double-Edged Sword

India-China trade has grown rapidly, but the relationship is imbalanced and politically risky:

●​ Trade Volume vs Trade Deficit:​

○​ Bilateral trade reached $70 billion by 2011, with goals of $100 billion by 2015.​

○​ India suffers a $20 billion trade deficit, due to limited market access in China.​

●​ Strategic Economic Dialogue & CEO Forum:​

○​ Institutional mechanisms to promote economic cooperation.​

○​ But trade deficits and concerns over dumping of cheap Chinese products persist.​

●​ Telecom and Power Sectors:​

○​ Chinese companies dominate Indian supply chains but face security concerns, especially near borders and military zones.​

●​ China’s Protectionism:​

○​ China restricts Indian IT and pharmaceutical companies, compounding the imbalance.​

●​ Cautious Approach to FTA:​

○​ India is sceptical of a Free Trade Agreement, fearing further economic asymmetry.​

14. Geostrategic Challenges of Regional Integration

●​ China’s Integration Strategy:​

○​ Building infrastructure to integrate its border provinces with regional economies.​

○​ This increases Chinese influence in India’s neighborhood and creates economic magnetism for Indian border areas.​

●​ Impact on Indian Sovereignty:​

○​ Chinese presence in disputed regions (e.g., Arunachal, POK) undermines India’s standing.​

○​ India is unable to reciprocate with similar leverage.​

15. Multilateral Engagements: Cooperation With Caveats

 ●​ Multilateral Groupings:​

○​ India engages China through BRICS, RIC (Russia-India-China), and East Asia Summits.​

●​ BRICS Dynamics:​

○​ China remains the dominant player.​

○​ India’s efforts (e.g., pushing for UNSC seat) find no support due to Chinese opposition.​

●​ Issue-Based Cooperation:​

○​ WTO and Climate Change are arenas where India and China collaborate, given shared interests against Western pressure.​

●​ Regional Forums:​

○​ China has observer status in SAARC and participates in ARF and EAS, working with India diplomatically.​

●​ Military CBMs and Exercises:​

○​ Joint military drills are symbolic but do not reflect deeper trust.

16. Is China India’s Adversary?

While Indian officialdom avoids calling China an adversary, Ambassador Sibal argues that China is India's adversary in practical terms:

●​ Power Gap: Despite comparable civilizational depth and demographics, China has surged far ahead in economic, military, and infrastructural terms.​

●​ Authoritarian Advantage: China’s centralized political system enables swift and strategic execution, unlike India’s slower, democratic processes.​

●​ Military Disparity:​

○​ China’s indigenous defense capabilities and missile arsenal, especially ballistic and nuclear, far outpace India’s.​

○​ India’s Agni-V missile, tested in 2012, improved deterrence by reaching Chinese cities, but China remains significantly ahead.​

●​ Chinese Media Reaction: After Agni-V, Chinese state media downplayed Indian capabilities while warning India not to be arrogant—reflecting China’s
dismissive attitude.​

●​ India-US Alignment: Interestingly, the US response was calm and even supportive, seeing India's no-first-use and responsible posture as a
balancing factor against China.​

17. India's Emerging Strengths and China’s Long-Term Concerns

●​ India’s Growth Potential:​

○​ A strong domestic market, corporate dynamism, and knowledge sector (especially IT and pharmaceuticals) position India well for future
growth.​

○​ As Chinese labor costs rise, India becomes a more attractive investment destination.​

●​ Global Shift in Perception:​

○​ India is viewed more favorably by Western countries due to its democratic system and legal transparency.​

○​ By 2025, many analysts predict India will narrow the economic gap with China, increasing competition for global resources.​

●​ China’s Internal Strains:​

○​ Rising inequality between urban and rural areas and export dependence create long-term vulnerabilities for China.​

18. China’s Geo-Strategic Ambitions: The South China Sea and Beyond
 ●​ Authoritarianism Meets Expansionism:​

○​ China’s rigid political model supports a revisionist foreign policy, asserting dominance over territories like the South China Sea.​

○​ It claims large maritime areas based on historical narratives contested by several Southeast Asian nations.​

●​ Naval Build-Up:​

○​ China’s expanding blue-water navy and aircraft carrier ambitions reflect its desire to break out of maritime containment and challenge US
naval dominance.​

●​ Strategic Implications for India:​

○​ India’s ONGC exploration in Vietnamese waters drew Chinese objections, which India rebutted by asserting its rights under international
law.​

○​ At the East Asia Summit, India joined others in supporting freedom of navigation—a direct rebuke to China’s claims.​

●​ Hypocrisy on Sovereignty:​

○​ China opposes Indian activity in the South China Sea citing “disputed” status, yet ignores Indian objections in POK, revealing strategic
double standards.​

19. India’s Strategic Alignment and Hedging Strategy

●​ Act East Policy:​

○​ Encouraged by the US, India is shifting from “Look East” to “Act East,” building deeper ties with Vietnam, Japan, ASEAN, and beyond.​

●​ Balancing China:​

○​ India holds joint naval exercises with the US and Japan.​

○​ Entered trilateral strategic dialogue with the US and Japan.​

○​ Deepening ties with Vietnam and South Korea aim to form a web of regional cooperation to hedge against Chinese dominance.​

●​ Challenges with the US:​

○​ Despite improved ties, the US remains ambiguous on China's role in South Asia and tends to overlook China’s support for Pakistan’s
nuclear program.​

○​ India remains wary of US-China deals that might come at its expense.​

20. Final Observations: Strategic Patience, Realism, and Preparation

●​ China’s Peace Narrative:​

○​ Despite its rhetoric of peaceful rise, China is slowly cementing its power, and each year makes it harder to counter its
assertions—especially in disputed areas.​

●​ India’s Dual Strategy:​

○​ Engage China economically and diplomatically, but build strong defensive and strategic capabilities.​

○​ Develop partnerships with like-minded countries, without surrendering strategic autonomy.​

●​ Mindset Matters:​

○​ India and China differ not only in power but in mentality: India is less hierarchical, less strategic, and more tolerant, making it harder to play
the kind of long game China excels at.
B. INDIA AND BRICS
​
1. Introduction: The BRICS Idea and Its Relevance

The idea of BRICS emerged not from a political agreement or summit but from the financial sector. Specifically, the concept was born in 2001 when Goldman
Sachs economist Jim O’Neill coined the acronym BRIC, referring to Brazil, Russia, India, and China, in a paper that forecast the future of the world economy.
The report projected that these four emerging economies, despite their structural differences, were likely to become the dominant economic forces of the 21st
century.

What made this idea so powerful was its timing and plausibility. At the time, all four countries were undergoing significant transformations. China was
expanding rapidly after joining the World Trade Organization; Brazil was recovering from hyperinflation and embracing new macroeconomic frameworks; Russia
was reasserting itself following post-Soviet economic chaos; and India had begun its liberalisation journey in the early 1990s, gradually integrating into the global
economy.

By 2003, a follow-up report titled Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050 further detailed how these countries could, collectively, surpass many of the world’s
richest nations in GDP by the middle of the century. By 2050, it argued, only the United States and Japan among the then G6 would remain in the top six
economies in dollar terms.

The appeal of the BRIC narrative lay in its reversal of the global economic gaze — away from the traditional North and West toward the emerging South and
East. It positioned these developing economies not as followers of global trends but as shapers of them.

2. From Concept to Club: The Formalisation of BRICS

Although the BRIC concept began as a financial model, it gradually transformed into a diplomatic coalition. This was not an inevitable process. In fact,
Goldman Sachs had not anticipated that BRIC would evolve into an organised grouping. For the first few years after the term gained currency, there was little
movement toward institutionalisation.

That changed in the mid-2000s when the foreign ministers of the BRIC countries began meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly sessions. These
early meetings helped build mutual understanding and laid the groundwork for future cooperation.

The first official BRIC summit was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in 2009. By then, the global financial crisis had already shaken confidence in Western-led
institutions. The moment was ripe for emerging powers to claim a larger voice in global economic governance. The summit marked a turning point — the group
was no longer a financial idea but a political forum advocating for a more multipolar world order.

In 2010, South Africa was invited to join, transforming BRIC into BRICS. Although South Africa’s economy was considerably smaller than the other members', its
inclusion was symbolically and strategically significant. It allowed BRICS to claim representation across all inhabited continents and connected the grouping
to Africa, a continent with growing strategic importance in geopolitics and global markets.

Each year since then, BRICS has held annual summits in a rotating order among its members, addressing a range of global and regional challenges from
financial governance and sustainable development to climate change and trade.

3. Structure and Internal Evolution of BRICS

The formalisation of BRICS brought with it not only summit-level coordination but also a growing web of sectoral cooperation. Over time, BRICS has
established working groups and institutional linkages in fields such as agriculture, health, science and technology, trade, finance, and education.

By 2010, BRICS represented over 40% of the world’s population and almost 30% of the Earth’s land surface. Their share in global GDP, especially when
measured by purchasing power parity (PPP), had also grown substantially — rising from about 16% in 2000 to roughly 25% by 2010. In terms of nominal GDP
(i.e., at current exchange rates), the increase was also significant, although uneven across countries.

China’s rise was the most dramatic. Between 1990 and 2010, its GDP multiplied more than fourteen-fold. India saw nearly a five-fold increase; Brazil’s economy
grew more than four times in size; and South Africa’s more than tripled. Russia, too, recovered its economic footing and became a key player in energy and
security. This period also saw substantial increases in per capita income, although income inequality and poverty remained persistent challenges in several
countries.

These economic gains translated into greater geopolitical visibility. BRICS began to be seen not just as an economic story, but as a potential pole of power
capable of reshaping the international order — particularly in light of the West’s struggles after the 2008 financial crisis.
4. BRICS’ Economic Importance in the World System

The document provides a wealth of empirical data to show how the BRICS have become economically consequential. In GDP terms, the bloc’s combined share
of world output rose sharply between 1990 and 2010, especially when measured by PPP. For example, China alone accounted for 13.6% of world GDP in PPP
terms by 2010, up from just 3.9% in 1990. India’s share grew from 3.1% to 5.4%, and Brazil and Russia also saw steady gains.

The global trade footprint of BRICS also expanded. In 1990, BRICS accounted for only 3.6% of global trade. By 2010, this share had quadrupled to over 15%,
driven mainly by China’s dramatic surge, though other members also saw growth. India, for instance, increased its share of global trade from 0.5% to 1.8%.

BRICS countries also became more open to global commerce, as measured by trade openness (exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP). Forex
reserves increased dramatically — China’s reserves reached nearly 49% of GDP in 2010. These figures suggest that the BRICS were not only exporting and
importing more, but also accumulating financial buffers, which gave them greater resilience and autonomy in global markets.

5. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Economic Integration

An important aspect of the BRICS’ growing economic influence is their evolving role in foreign direct investment flows. Traditionally, developing countries were
recipients of investment. But by 2010, BRICS were both major destinations and increasingly active sources of FDI.

FDI inflows to BRICS rose from around $81 billion in 2000 to over $221 billion in 2010 — an annual growth rate of around 11%. Meanwhile, FDI outflows also
surged at a compound growth rate of 35%. China led in both inflows and outflows, reflecting its growing corporate presence worldwide.

This expansion marked a strategic shift: BRICS countries were no longer just “emerging markets” waiting for capital — they were now global investors
shaping industries and infrastructure far beyond their borders. Their share of total global FDI inflows stood at about 18% in 2010, a dramatic increase from just
under 6% in 2000.

This dual role — as both investment destinations and sources — strengthens the BRICS' claim to equal footing in the architecture of global economic
governance.

6. Labour Force Trends and Demographic Advantages

Another critical dimension of BRICS’ global role lies in demographics. As of 2012, BRICS countries together accounted for more than 44% of the world’s
population and over 45% of the economically active global labour force.

China led in absolute numbers and participation rates, but India stood out for its potential: with the youngest population among the five, India’s labour force is
expected to grow rapidly. Though only a small percentage of Indian workers were formally skilled in 2012 (about 2%), the sheer size of its workforce and its
integration into global services markets gives India long-term structural advantage, provided it can improve education and vocational training.

Meanwhile, developed economies are experiencing labour force declines. This demographic contrast could tilt global labour dynamics in BRICS’ favor in the
coming decades, especially if they invest in skill development and health systems.

7. Institutional Readiness: Business Environment and Competitiveness

Despite these promising trends, BRICS countries face serious institutional challenges, particularly regarding the ease of doing business. Rankings from the
World Bank in 2012 revealed that India (ranked 132), Brazil (126), and Russia (120) lag significantly behind South Africa (35) and China (91) in terms of
regulatory efficiency, infrastructure quality, and business friendliness.

Efforts are being made to improve this. Russia introduced reforms in electricity and legal procedures; India launched advisory platforms for overseas investors;
and Brazil reduced bureaucratic red tape. Still, progress is uneven and slow, especially given the scale of challenges — such as legal delays, complex tax
codes, and poor infrastructure — in countries like India and Brazil.

Without sustained improvements in the institutional environment, the BRICS risk squandering the economic momentum they have built over the last two
decades.

8. Food Security and Agricultural Cooperation

●​ Shared Challenges:
○​ Climate change impacts, water scarcity, rising input costs, and urbanisation threaten food security.​
 ○​ Emphasis on improving smallholder farming, innovation, and sustainability.​

●​ Action Plan 2012–2016:

○​ Coordinated by each member:​

■​ China: info systems​

■​ Brazil: access strategy​

■​ South Africa: climate adaptation​

■​ India: tech innovation​

■​ Russia: trade & investment​

●​ Role Models:
○​ Brazil’s Embrapa is a global leader in agricultural R&D—can anchor BRICS-wide agri-innovation.​

9. Research & Development, Cultural Exchange

●​ R&D Cooperation:
○​ Identified sectors: energy, nanotech, biotech, basic sciences, medicine.​

○​ Strategy: collaboration through think tanks and innovation networks.​

●​ Cultural and Tourism Exchange

○​ Still underdeveloped due to vast cultural, linguistic, and historical differences.​

○​ Calls for deeper people-to-people ties akin to the Indo-Soviet model of the 1970s.

10. The Core Strength of BRICS: Unity in Diversity​

Despite their vast differences — in political systems, cultures, stages of economic development, and even geographies — the BRICS countries share a few core
traits that allow them to act as a collective bloc with growing global influence.

Most importantly, each country is a regional powerhouse in its own right. China and India dominate Asia; Brazil leads in Latin America; Russia spans both
Europe and Asia with military and energy clout; and South Africa is Africa’s most advanced economy. Together, they account for nearly half of the world’s
population, 30% of global land mass, and over a quarter of world GDP (as of 2011).

This combination of demographic weight, geographic breadth, and increasing economic capacity gives BRICS a credible platform to demand changes in the
global governance system — particularly in financial, developmental, and trade institutions which have historically been dominated by the Global North.

Yet the BRICS’ greatest strength — their diversity — is also a source of challenge. Unlike blocs such as the G7, which are ideologically and structurally
homogeneous, BRICS is heterogenous and still lacks an internally cohesive identity. It is in the process of defining itself, and this formative stage is reflected in
its pragmatic but still fluid engagement with global affairs.

11. BRICS and the Shift Toward a Multipolar World

The global order that emerged after the Cold War was largely unipolar, dominated by the United States and supported by the Western-led institutional
architecture (IMF, World Bank, UN, WTO, etc.). But that dominance is now being eroded. The financial crisis of 2008–10 marked a turning point. Developed
economies stagnated while the BRICS led global economic recovery.

The concept of a “Third World” is becoming outdated. As World Bank president Robert Zoellick argued, we’re entering a multipolar world where old
North-South binaries are no longer valid. Emerging economies are not just catching up—they are actively redefining the rules of the global game.

BRICS countries have become both symbols and agents of this shift. Their demand for reforms in global governance institutions—like greater voting power in the
IMF and World Bank, or permanent UNSC membership for India, Brazil, and South Africa—reflect their dissatisfaction with existing structures that fail to
represent new realities.

Yet multipolarity here does not mean equality of power. While economic influence is becoming more diffuse, political and strategic power still rests
unequally. BRICS, through joint summits, policy statements, and institutional mechanisms, is attempting to recalibrate this imbalance by speaking in one
voice—despite internal divergence.
12. Institutionalisation and Expansion: The BRICS Framework

Although BRICS began as a loose acronym, over time it has grown into a more formalised group. The transition from concept to organisation was gradual,
starting with foreign ministers’ meetings in the mid-2000s and culminating in the first BRIC summit in 2009 in Russia.

Since then, the group has held annual summits, established working groups in areas like agriculture, science and technology, trade, and finance, and even
proposed joint institutions like the BRICS Development Bank. These steps mark the move from informal coordination to more structured multilateral
cooperation.

The inclusion of South Africa in 2010 was a strategic decision to globalise the bloc’s identity and enhance its legitimacy by including the African continent. It
was not just about economic weight, but also about symbolism, diplomacy, and outreach.

Expansion remains a question for the future. While there is interest from other emerging economies, the group has not yet established clear criteria for
membership. This raises both opportunity and risk: expansion could boost global influence but might also dilute internal cohesion and decision-making.

13. The Political Role of BRICS: Beyond Economics

While BRICS began as an economic grouping, it has steadily assumed political and strategic dimensions. One of the clearest examples is its joint stance on
global political issues, especially on matters related to sovereignty, intervention, and multilateral decision-making.

For instance, BRICS nations have frequently resisted Western interventionist policies, particularly in the Middle East, and have emphasized
non-interference, sovereignty, and multilateral diplomacy. These positions reflect a shared concern that global norms should not be determined solely by
Western powers.

In global fora like the UN, G20, WTO, and UNFCCC, BRICS countries coordinate their positions on climate change, global trade rules, and development
financing. Their emphasis is on a more balanced and equitable international order, one that reflects demographic and economic shifts of the 21st century.

However, this political unity has limits. For example, while all BRICS members are UN members, they differ on Security Council reform, with India, Brazil, and
South Africa seeking permanent seats, and China and Russia—current veto-holders—being more ambiguous.

14. The BRICS Development Bank and Alternative Architecture

One of the most ambitious institutional innovations proposed by BRICS is the New Development Bank (NDB), conceived to finance infrastructure and
sustainable development projects in BRICS and other developing countries. Its key aims are:

●​ To provide an alternative to Western-dominated institutions like the World Bank and IMF.​

●​ To fund projects without the political and structural conditionalities that often come with Western loans.​

●​ To strengthen South-South financial cooperation.​

Another motivation is to de-dollarize intra-BRICS trade. Agreements have been made to conduct transactions in local currencies, thereby reducing reliance on
the US dollar and insulating BRICS economies from global financial volatility.

This growing economic infrastructure — from development banks to local currency trade — suggests that BRICS is not only critiquing the existing system but
also creating alternatives.

15. Sectoral Cooperation: Research, Agriculture, Culture

a. Science and Technology:

R&D is a critical area for collaboration, especially in emerging technologies like nanotech, biotech, renewable energy, and health. BRICS aims to become not just
consumers of global innovation but producers of cutting-edge knowledge, working through shared research platforms and think tanks.

b. Agriculture and Food Security:

From the very first summit, BRICS identified agriculture and food security as a shared priority. They’ve launched a joint action plan (2012–16) with each country
leading a thematic focus: China on data systems, India on technology, Brazil on access strategy, etc.

The model of Embrapa (Brazil’s agri-tech agency) is seen as a potential template for broader collaboration.

c. Culture and Tourism:

Here, cooperation remains underdeveloped. Despite millennia-old civilisational exchanges (like India-China Buddhist ties), modern BRICS nations have limited
cultural interaction. Language barriers, different lifestyles, and minimal tourism links remain obstacles. The group recognizes this gap but concrete initiatives are
still lacking.

16. Conclusion: Can BRICS Shape the 21st Century?

The final question the report addresses is whether BRICS can become a guiding force in shaping global governance and world order. While they possess the
population, economic weight, and political will to do so, success depends on whether they can overcome internal contradictions.

Key challenges include:

●​ Vast asymmetries in economic power (especially China vs. others).​

●​ Conflicting political interests and trade competition.​

●​ Lack of institutional depth compared to Western alliances.​

Nonetheless, BRICS remains one of the most significant efforts by emerging economies to assert themselves collectively. If it continues to institutionalize
cooperation, deepen intra-group trade and investment, and align more closely on political issues, it may not only influence the international system — but also
reshape it from the ground up.

Indian Foreign Policy and BRICS

1. Introduction: The Shift in India’s Foreign Policy Post-1990s

India’s foreign policy has undergone significant changes since the 1990s, driven by the transformation of the global order, the disintegration of the USSR, and
the end of the Cold War. This period marked a drastic shift from a bipolar world dominated by the US and the USSR to a unipolar world led by the United
States, and eventually, to the rise of a multipolar world in the 21st century. India, during this period, recalibrated its foreign policy to adjust to these global shifts
and tackle both domestic economic challenges and external security issues.

In the post-Cold War era, India’s foreign policy had to evolve significantly. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the changing political dynamics encouraged
India to realign its relationships. It moved towards fostering stronger ties with the Western world, particularly the United States, while also establishing
relations with Israel—a shift from its earlier non-aligned stance.

Moreover, India recognized the growing significance of multilateralism in global governance. The rise of globalization and regional integration prompted India to
engage more actively in regional multilateral frameworks and align itself with emerging powers in order to leverage its position. This new era of cooperative
engagement marked a shift toward building partnerships based on mutual benefit and addressing shared global challenges, such as economic growth,
security, and environmental issues.

2. BRICS and the New World Order

The BRICS grouping—originally BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China)—came into prominence as a forum for emerging economies to collaborate and
influence the global order. BRICS represents an essential part of India’s foreign policy, particularly in the context of economic development and security.

BRICS was formed to challenge the dominance of Western powers and to promote a more equitable global system. As the world moved towards
multilateralism, India played an active role in establishing the BRICS forum alongside Brazil, Russia, and China. This grouping offers a platform for countries
with shared concerns—such as economic development, energy security, and climate change—to cooperate and shape the global agenda.

One of India’s primary interests in BRICS is to address issues related to food and energy security. These issues are critical to India, considering its large
population and the growing demands on its resources. Furthermore, combating terrorism has been another priority in India’s collaboration with BRICS, as
terrorism remains one of the most significant threats to India’s security.
Despite the cultural, geographic, and political differences among BRICS members, the grouping has managed to develop common ground through shared
interests. By focusing on development and security, BRICS has the potential to evolve into a major political force in the emerging world order.

3. India’s Engagement with BRICS: Goals and Objectives

India’s foreign policy in the 21st century has been marked by a shift towards multilateralism and economic diplomacy. As part of this shift, India has
positioned itself as an advocate for economic growth through cooperative international frameworks. BRICS serves as a platform where India can engage
with other emerging economies to achieve its strategic objectives.

The primary objectives of India’s foreign policy include:

●​ Economic Development: India seeks to foster economic growth, which has been a key driver of its foreign policy since the 1991 liberalization. By
engaging with BRICS, India aims to ensure sustainable development by harnessing the collective strengths of the group.​

●​ International Peace and Security: India’s foreign policy emphasizes global peace and stability. BRICS provides India with an opportunity to work on
security challenges, including terrorism, cyber threats, and regional instability.​

●​ Preservation of Sovereignty: The preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty is central to India’s foreign policy. By working within BRICS,
India can enhance its diplomatic leverage and strengthen its stance in global forums like the United Nations.​

India’s active participation in BRICS is a strategic move to address shared global challenges and promote peace while enhancing its own economic and
security priorities. Through BRICS, India gains a platform to not only express its economic aspirations but also to assert its role in shaping the future global
order.

4. BRICS as a Strategic Vehicle for India’s Foreign Policy

A. Economic Growth and Development

BRICS is perceived as a vital economic engine for the global economy. Despite global economic slowdowns, the BRICS economies have been among the
fastest-growing economies, with China and India leading the charge. This provides India with a platform to influence global economic reforms.

The first BRICS summit, held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in 2009, focused on global economic recovery and financial reforms. The summit set the tone for
subsequent engagements, emphasizing the need to improve the global financial system and increase BRICS’ role in it. Over the years, the BRICS nations
have aligned their interests around economic recovery, infrastructure development, and manufacturing sector growth.

In 2010, South Africa joined the BRICS group, further increasing its global influence and economic footprint. With its combined GDP of $16.6 trillion, BRICS
represents about a quarter of the global economy, and with 40% of the world’s population, it has significant economic leverage.

India, as a member, benefits from BRICS in several ways:

●​ Infrastructure Development: India’s own infrastructure development requires significant investment, and BRICS provides a platform for cooperation
in funding infrastructure projects, especially through the New Development Bank.​

●​ Diversifying Economic Relations: The group also helps India diversify its economic partnerships, reducing dependence on traditional Western
powers.​

5. BRICS' New Financial Architecture: The New Development Bank (NDB)

The New Development Bank (NDB), established by BRICS in 2014, represents a significant step towards reshaping the global financial system. The NDB is
designed to address the funding gap for infrastructure development in developing countries, a problem that has historically impeded growth in these regions.

The NDB operates with a multilateral structure, giving equal decision-making power to all its members, unlike the World Bank, which has been dominated
by Western powers. The bank’s focus on infrastructure, technology, and renewable energy projects reflects a long-term commitment to sustainable
development and economic modernization across the BRICS nations and beyond.

India, as a founding member of the NDB, benefits by gaining access to affordable financing for its own infrastructure projects and securing greater economic
autonomy in a system that has traditionally been shaped by institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
6. Financial Autonomy and Institutional Alternatives to the West

One of the most important objectives of BRICS has been the creation of financial alternatives to Western-dominated institutions. In addition to the New
Development Bank, BRICS established the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) in 2015. This mechanism provides financial protection against
short-term liquidity pressures — functioning as a backstop similar to the IMF’s role, but without its conditionalities.

CRA is particularly valuable in times of global currency volatility, offering BRICS members a safety net. India benefits from this as a developing country
vulnerable to capital flight and balance of payments imbalances in times of financial crisis.

Furthermore, China and Russia have initiated alternative international payment systems in response to what they see as Western financial coercion,
particularly the threat of sanctions. China developed the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) as an alternative to SWIFT, the Western-dominated
global banking messaging system. Discussions are underway among BRICS members to integrate a collective payments system, thereby enhancing
financial sovereignty and reducing reliance on the dollar-centric order.

7. BRICS and International Peace and Security

India sees BRICS not just as an economic grouping but as a strategic platform for ensuring peace and security. BRICS countries have emphasized working
within the UN framework to preserve international stability, and collectively they support adherence to international law, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
non-aggression.

Each member contributes uniquely to UN peacekeeping operations:

●​ India is the third-largest troop contributor to UN missions and also hosts a renowned UN Peacekeeping Training Centre.​

●​ Brazil has incorporated peacekeeping into its broader foreign policy and is the 13th largest troop contributor.​

●​ Russia contributes aircraft and logistics support, while China provides both personnel and significant financial assistance.​

●​ South Africa focuses its contributions in African operations.​

Together, BRICS forms a critical component of the global peacekeeping effort — a key arena where India both demonstrates leadership and finds diplomatic
alignment with its BRICS partners.

8. Maritime Security Cooperation

Maritime security has also become a shared concern for BRICS, especially due to threats like piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the growing importance of
maritime trade routes. Four of the five BRICS countries have been actively involved in anti-piracy operations, mostly through bilateral and multilateral
collaborations, although they have not operated under the formal BRICS banner.

India, Brazil, and South Africa have already begun trilateral maritime cooperation under the IBSA framework, conducting joint naval exercises aimed at
countering non-traditional maritime threats like smuggling, piracy, and terrorism. This growing cooperation could potentially be expanded under BRICS for
collective maritime security.

9. Transnational Threats: Human Trafficking, Migration, Terrorism, and Drugs

a. Human Trafficking and Migration

BRICS nations face various challenges related to human trafficking and irregular migration. These issues are not only humanitarian concerns but are also
linked to organized crime and terrorism. Countries like Russia and South Africa experience high levels of net immigration, while India and China are major
sources of emigration. The movement of people, both legal and illegal, presents security, economic, and social challenges that BRICS must address
collectively.

b. Terrorism and Organized Crime

Terrorism remains a central concern for India, which consistently ranks among the top ten countries most affected by terrorism. Russia faces threats from
Chechen insurgents, and China from Uighur extremists. While Brazil and South Africa are relatively safer from terrorism, all five countries recognize the
importance of a united front.
At the Goa Summit (2016), BRICS issued a declaration calling on all nations to prevent terrorist activities from their territories and emphasized the
urgency of adopting the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) at the UN — a longstanding proposal by India. The statement
included explicit recognition of terror financing, online radicalization, and organized crime as critical fronts in the global fight against terrorism.

India sees this as an opportunity to bring global attention to Pakistan’s state sponsorship of terrorism, though direct naming of countries is often diplomatically
avoided within BRICS to maintain unity.

c. Drug Trafficking

BRICS nations are also major nodes in the global drug trade — either as consumers, producers, or transit hubs. Brazil is the world’s second-largest
consumer of cocaine. Russia suffers from significant heroin use, while South Africa has seen a 600% increase in drug use over the past decade. India and
China also face growing drug-related issues. Recognizing the nexus between drugs and terrorism, BRICS has begun to coordinate more actively on
counter-narcotics policies.

10. Cybersecurity and the Digital Domain

Cybersecurity has emerged as a strategic priority for BRICS nations. All five members have developed or are strengthening Computer Emergency Response
Teams (CERTs) to handle cyber threats. Brazil and China are particularly advanced in using CERTs for threat monitoring and training.

The BRICS group is actively discussing the creation of joint mechanisms for international information security, countering cybercrime, and ensuring that
cyber governance does not become monopolized by Western powers. For India, this is critical, as it is simultaneously expanding its digital economy and
facing cyberattacks from hostile state and non-state actors.

11. Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: A Divided Front

The issue of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation presents a challenge within BRICS, due to differing positions:

●​ Russia and China are signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as nuclear powers.​

●​ India is not a signatory, as it views the NPT as discriminatory — legitimizing existing nuclear powers while preventing others from acquiring similar
capabilities.​

●​ Brazil and South Africa are signatories as non-nuclear states but maintain peaceful nuclear energy programs.​

Despite these differences, all BRICS countries participate in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and are committed to promoting peaceful nuclear
energy. India continues to advocate for equitable non-proliferation frameworks that respect national security interests.

12. Conclusion: Challenges and Opportunities for India in BRICS

BRICS, though often criticized for being diverse and fragmented, offers India an important strategic platform to pursue both economic and geopolitical goals.
The grouping represents nearly half the world’s population and holds massive potential in human capital, natural resources, and diplomatic clout.

India’s participation in BRICS allows it to:

●​ Shape an emerging multipolar world order.​

●​ Push for reform of global governance institutions (UN, IMF, World Bank).​

●​ Address issues like terrorism, energy security, and climate change on equal terms with powerful global actors.​

However, bilateral tensions, especially with China, continue to limit full cooperation. Disputes over Arunachal Pradesh, Aksai Chin, and the Indian Ocean
region, alongside competition for influence and ideological differences, present serious challenges.

Nonetheless, India sees BRICS not as a flawless alliance, but as a strategic necessity — a vehicle for economic growth, diplomatic visibility, and collective
resilience in a world undergoing profound transformation.

Role of BRICS in India’s Foreign Policy – Explanatory Notes

1. The Global Context: Decentralisation and the Rise of the Global South

The 21st century has seen a major shift in global power from a Western-centric world to a more multipolar and multilateral system. As this global order
evolves, power is moving increasingly toward Asia, and the voice of the Global South—a term that broadly refers to developing and emerging countries—is
becoming louder and more assertive. Within this new context, India is positioning itself as a crucial actor.

India’s foreign policy is now oriented toward advancing food and energy security, addressing climate change, accelerating digital transformation, and
enhancing economic resilience. These pressing concerns tie India closely to the Global South, whose collective future India increasingly seeks to shape. At the
same time, India maintains strategic ties with the West, reflecting its hybrid identity as both an emerging power and a democratic ally of liberal internationalism.

2. Strategic Autonomy and Multi-Alignment in India’s Global Strategy

India’s approach to foreign policy rests on a framework of strategic autonomy and multi-alignment. Strategic autonomy, rooted in India’s non-alignment
legacy, implies the ability to make independent decisions based on national interests without being bound to any one bloc. However, in today’s interconnected
world, this has evolved into what Ian Hall calls multi-alignment—a flexible approach that allows India to pursue relations with multiple power centres
simultaneously.

This pragmatic posture helps India:

●​ Manage its complex regional security environment.​

●​ Promote its values in a globally resonant way.​

●​ Stimulate its own economic development.​

●​ Expand its global influence without sacrificing independence.​

This strategy is reflected in India’s engagement with multilateral platforms such as BRICS, G20, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), alongside
bilateral strategic partnerships with countries like the US, Russia, Iran, and even China.

3. India’s Pragmatic Embrace of BRICS

BRICS—originally BRIC—was coined by a Goldman Sachs economist in 2003 as a market classification. Although India viewed its inclusion as international
recognition of its rising economic stature, it was cautious of the fact that the term was Western-imposed. When the grouping evolved into a political forum in
2009, India had mixed feelings.

India’s previous involvement in IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa)—a democratic South-South forum—had already embodied India’s goals of economic
cooperation and global governance reform. India initially opposed folding IBSA into BRICS, particularly due to China’s dominance in the new grouping.
Nonetheless, India ultimately recognized the strategic potential of BRICS: it enabled deeper ties with Russia, offered opportunities for coordination with China
on financial reform, and provided a collective platform to push for greater voice in global institutions like the IMF and World Bank.

4. The New Development Bank: A Tangible Achievement

The New Development Bank (NDB) is one of the most concrete outcomes of BRICS cooperation. Proposed by India and created in 2015, the bank finances
infrastructure and sustainable development projects in member and non-member developing countries. While all five BRICS countries contributed equally to its
$50 billion capital base, China dominates the emergency reserve fund, contributing 41%.

India has secured around $8.8 billion in NDB loans for 24 projects focusing on infrastructure and green development. During the Covid-19 pandemic, India
also accessed emergency support. However, criticisms have been raised about the NDB’s lack of transparency, continued use of dollar-denominated loans, and
the dominance of its founding members in decision-making.

Nevertheless, for India, the NDB is a significant step toward reducing dependence on Western financial institutions and enhancing its financial sovereignty.
5. India’s Evolving Role Within BRICS: Balancing China and the West

India views BRICS as a tool to diversify its diplomatic engagement, balance China’s influence, and counter Western dominance in Asia. However, this
positioning is not without tension. India continues to seek a place within BRICS that reflects its own size, status, and interests, particularly in the face of
China’s overwhelming economic and political influence within the group.

Under Manmohan Singh, India’s BRICS policy was marked by political pragmatism and support for multilateralism within limits. Under Narendra Modi,
multi-alignment has intensified and evolved into a structure of divided loyalties—with India actively pursuing ties with both the US and China/Russia
simultaneously.

BRICS thus provides India with a flexible strategic arena: one where it can operate independently from US-led blocs, yet without having to surrender its values
or priorities.

6. Expansion and the Challenges of Heterogeneity: India’s Concerns over BRICS+

BRICS has recently expanded to include UAE, Iran, Ethiopia, and Egypt, with Saudi Arabia invited but not yet confirmed. This reflects China and Russia’s
drive to make BRICS more representative of the developing world. However, India and Brazil opposed uncontrolled expansion, fearing dilution of the forum’s
purpose and an over-concentration of Chinese influence.

India insisted on restrictions for new members, such as a requirement that members not be under international sanctions—a condition that would exclude
countries like Iran. This demand reflects India’s concern that China could manipulate the enlargement to build an anti-Western bloc, which India does not
endorse.

The heterogeneity of BRICS+ now includes creditor nations like UAE and debt-ridden ones like Egypt. It includes major oil exporters and importers. This
diversity raises questions about whether BRICS can remain cohesive and functional.

7. The 2024 BRICS+ Summit: India’s Diplomatic Engagements

At the first BRICS+ Summit in Kazan, Russia (October 2024), India actively engaged in high-level diplomacy:

●​ With Russia, Modi discussed the Ukraine conflict and advocated a diplomatic solution.​

●​ With Iran, Modi explored increased trade through the Chabahar Port, a key asset for India’s access to Central Asia.​

●​ With Xi Jinping, a significant development occurred: the first bilateral meeting since the border tensions, where both sides agreed to resume talks and
patrol coordination.​

The summit also addressed modern security threats like cybercrime, terrorism, regional conflicts, and climate change mechanisms such as carbon trading.
India used this stage to reiterate its vision for a multipolar world and emphasize reform of the global system.

8. Conclusion: BRICS as a Strategic Space in India’s Foreign Policy

BRICS began as a symbol of economic transition to the Global South but has since become a major geopolitical forum. India has adopted a pragmatic,
interest-based approach toward the grouping, overcoming its initial hesitation. BRICS allows India to:

●​ Exercise multi-alignment without sacrificing autonomy.​

●​ Access development finance.​

●​ Build coalitions on global governance reform.​

●​ Engage with emerging partners across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.​

However, the challenges of internal diversity, China’s dominance, and conflicting visions among members remain real. BRICS+ offers India an expanded
stage to project power, but its effectiveness depends on cohesion, balance, and India’s ability to shape consensus.
Ultimately, for India, BRICS is not an ideological alliance but a platform of opportunity—one that serves its ambition to be a leading power of the Global
South and a key player in a restructured international order.

C INDIA AT THE UN

I. India’s Foundational Engagement with the UN

India's association with the UN began even before its independence. It was one of the original signatories of the Declaration by United Nations (1942) and
actively participated in the San Francisco Conference (1945) that established the UN. Independent India saw the UN as a critical mechanism to ensure
international peace, development, and cooperation.

India is a founding member of the UN, and its foreign policy has consistently upheld multilateralism and dialogue. The UN is seen as a vital platform to
address global issues like peacekeeping, poverty, climate change, terrorism, disarmament, human rights, health, cybersecurity, frontier technologies, and
institutional reforms.

II. Historical Contributions and Leadership at the UN

1. Anti-Colonialism and Anti-Apartheid

●​ India co-sponsored the 1960 Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries, highlighting its leadership in decolonization.​

●​ It chaired the Decolonization Committee (Committee of 24) and supported the independence of non-self-governing territories.​

●​ India was the first nation to raise apartheid in the UN (1946) and helped form the UN Sub-Committee against Apartheid.​

●​ It was among the earliest signatories to the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (1965).​

2. Leadership Roles by Indians

Notable Indian leaders at the UN:

●​ Arcot Ramasamy Mudaliar: First President of ECOSOC (1946)​

●​ Hansa Mehta: Rephrased the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to include “all human beings” instead of “all men.”​

●​ Lakshmi Menon and Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit (first woman President of UNGA in 1953) promoted universal human rights and gender equality.​

●​ Chandrika Prasad Srivastava, Judge Nagendra Singh, and Kamaljit Singh Garewal held top positions in global maritime, judicial, and
administrative bodies.​

Currently, seven Indians hold high-level posts (Under-Secretary General and Assistant Secretary General), including Atul Khare, Anita Bhatia, and Satya
Tripathi.

III. India’s Role in UN Committees

1. First Committee – Disarmament and International Security

●​ Advocates nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.​

●​ Supports Chemical Weapons Convention and opposes chemical weapons usage in any context.​

●​ Strongly promotes non-weaponization of outer space, and led resolutions on transparency and confidence-building in space activities.​
 ●​ India co-sponsored the resolution to prevent the arms race in outer space and supports legally binding agreements.​

●​ Advocates responsible use of science and technology in security, initiated a 1988 resolution on this topic.​

2. Second Committee – Economic and Financial

●​ Focuses on sustainable development, SDGs, poverty eradication, trade, and digital inclusion.​

●​ Presented Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs) in 2017 and 2020, showing integration of SDGs into national programs.​

●​ Supports multilateralism in trade (WTO) and institutional reforms (e.g., IMF).​

●​ Advocated for the Global Compact on Migration (migration as a choice, not compulsion).​

3. Third Committee – Social, Humanitarian & Cultural

●​ Advocates dialogue-based approaches to human rights instead of intrusive methods.​

●​ Partnered with UN Women, donating $8 million and hosting their field visit to India in 2017.​

●​ Promotes inclusive, cooperative frameworks for human rights, gender empowerment, and rights of marginalized groups.​

4. Fourth Committee – Special Political & Decolonization

●​ Reinforces its anti-colonial stance from history.​

●​ Participates in UN space law initiatives and hosts major space-tech conferences (e.g., APRSAF 2017, Remote Sensing 2017).​

●​ ISRO contributes through CSSTEAP (UN-affiliated center) in Dehradun, with over 1600 trainees from 50+ countries.​

5. Fifth Committee – Administrative & Budgetary

●​ India supports adequate funding of the UN to implement Agenda 2030 and emphasizes accountability.​

●​ India’s UN contributions are fully paid and increasing, with a 13% hike in 2019.​

●​ Raises concern over delayed peacekeeping reimbursements and the UN’s liquidity crisis, especially post-COVID.​

6. Sixth Committee – Legal

●​ India has ratified key treaties like UNCLOS, the Paris Agreement, and UN Customs Conventions.​

●​ Strongly supports marine biodiversity, geospatial norms, and the UNCITRAL legal frameworks.​

●​ Promotes arbitration and mediation in international commercial law.​

IV. India’s Contribution to UN Peacekeeping

India has the largest cumulative number of peacekeepers deployed—over 253,000 personnel in 49 missions.

●​ Played a vital role in Korean War mediation and Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos (Geneva Accords).​

●​ India was the first country to send an all-women peacekeeping unit (Liberia, 2007), significantly improving local security and women’s participation
in law enforcement.​
 ●​ Indian peacekeepers provide medical, veterinary, engineering, and humanitarian support (e.g., in South Sudan).​

●​ 173 Indian peacekeepers have died in service—the highest among all UN member states.​

●​ India contributed $1.6 million to “UNITE AWARE”, a situational awareness software to enhance peacekeeping effectiveness.​

V. 75th Anniversary of the UN (2020)

India used the platform to push for:

●​ “Reformed multilateralism” (PM Modi emphasized it in UNGA speech).​

●​ Participation in global efforts against COVID-19, including vaccine sharing.​

●​ Advocated for greater inclusivity and democratization of international institutions.​

VI. Representation in UN Bodies

India has been elected to numerous bodies including:

●​ International Court of Justice (ICJ) – Judge Dalveer Bhandari.​

●​ International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Human Rights Council, Commission on the Status of Women, etc.​

●​ Elected to 23 UN bodies as of 2020.​

VII. Noteworthy Achievements (2014–2020)

●​ Declaring 21 June as International Day of Yoga (177 co-sponsors, 2014).​

●​ Launch of India-UN Development Partnership Fund ($100M) and Commonwealth Window ($50M) for South-South cooperation.​

●​ India pushed through listing of Masood Azhar (May 2019) under UN sanctions after multiple attempts.​

●​ India's promotion of Hindi in UN communications and postal stamps on Gandhi, Yoga, and Diwali by UNPA.​

●​ Hosted cultural and peace-themed events, like UN Day Concert (2018) and Gandhi’s 150th birth anniversary celebration at the UN (2019).​

VIII. India's Priorities at 77th UNGA (2022–2023)

Key Focus Areas

1.​ Sustainable Development and Climate Action​

○​ Through programs like Poshan Abhiyan, Ujjwala Yojana, Smart Cities, Swachh Bharat.​

○​ Lifestyle for Environment (LiFE) movement launched to change climate-related behaviors.​

 ○​ Strong advocacy for climate finance, capacity building, and Net-Minus accountability for developed nations.​

2.​ South-South Cooperation​

○​ Scaling India-UN Fund and IBSA Fund to help LDCs and SIDS.​

3.​ Human Rights and Social Inclusion​

○​ Women-led development, digital education access, and clean energy access.​

○​ Constructive approach to human rights monitoring.​

○​ Highlighting India’s achievements on SDG targets and inclusive policies.​

4.​ Counter-Terrorism​

○​ Eight-point action plan including no glorification of terrorists, transparency in UN listings, support to FATF.​

○​ India chaired the Counter Terrorism Committee (2022) and hosted a major summit in Mumbai and New Delhi focused on tech-enabled
terrorism.​

5.​ UN Reforms​

○​ Strong push for Security Council reform and initiating text-based negotiations via the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) process.​

○​ India’s vision: N.O.R.M.S – New Orientation for a Reformed Multilateral System, guided by 5 S’s: Samman, Samvad, Sahyog, Shanti,
Samriddhi.​

6.​ Technology, Space, and Cybersecurity​

○​ India's emphasis on responsible use of outer space and cyber technologies.​

○​ Proposal of a Global Cyber Security Cooperation Portal.​

7.​ Peacekeeping Reform​

○​ Ensure sustainable mandates, improve host state capability, and accountability for crimes against peacekeepers.​

I. Overview and Objectives of the Paper

The paper investigates why India has had greater success achieving international cooperation on development issues (like climate change and the
2030 Agenda) than on security issues (like counterterrorism and UN Security Council reform) at the United Nations.

It blends international cooperation theory (ICT) and game theory to explore:

●​ What drives cooperation at the UN.​

●​ Why asymmetries of cost/benefit and the time horizon of engagement matter.​

●​ Why India’s multilateral strategies work better in some domains than others.​

The paper uses four case studies (two from development, two from security) to explore these questions.

II. Theoretical Frameworks Used

1. Definitions and Key Concepts
 ●​ Multilateralism (as per John G. Ruggie): Institutional cooperation based on generalised principles of conduct and not narrow interests.​

●​ International Cooperation Theory (ICT): Studies how states collaborate even in an anarchic international system.​

●​ Dilemmas of Common Interests: Situations where everyone benefits from cooperation, but end up not cooperating due to conflicting interests.​

2. Game Theoretic Applications

●​ Prisoner's Dilemma: Shows why rational actors may not cooperate even when it’s in their collective interest.​

●​ Cooperation is affected by:​

○​ Asymmetry of costs/benefits.​

○​ Time horizon (longer = more cooperation).​

3. Levels of Multilateral Engagement (Gradient Framework)

●​ Level One: India promotes cooperation but fails to build coalitions or shift debates.​

●​ Level Two: India joins or leads a coalition, but can’t shift the debate substantially.​

●​ Level Three: India leads a coalition, shifts the global agenda, and achieves real cooperation.​

III. Case Studies: India’s Engagement in International Development

A. Climate Change Negotiations (Copenhagen & Paris Agreements)

India’s Strategic Actions

●​ Played a leadership role in the BASIC coalition (Brazil, South Africa, India, China).​

●​ Advocated for climate justice, differentiated responsibilities, and capacity-building for developing countries.​

●​ Protected India’s right to development while acknowledging climate responsibility.​

Multilateral Performance

●​ Level 1: Advocated for multilateral climate policy at COP-15 and COP-21.​

●​ Level 2: Formed and led BASIC coalition with a unified position.​

●​ Level 3: BASIC shaped the final negotiations; India’s demands on differentiation and finance were included in final texts.​

Effectiveness

●​ India blocked overly ambitious emission cut targets not in line with its development needs.​

●​ India secured inclusion of “differentiation” between rich and poor countries.​

●​ International Solar Alliance (120 countries) was launched.​

●​ India was perceived as a constructive, powerful player.​

B. 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

India’s Strategic Actions

●​ Member of the Open Working Group (OWG).​

●​ Represented a coalition with Pakistan and Sri Lanka.​

●​ Key player in the G77 (134 developing nations).​

Policy Positions

●​ Advocated:​

○​ Clear indicators and national reviews for SDGs (absent in MDGs).​

○​ Technology Facilitation Mechanism for developing countries.​

○​ Peace and security to be seen through a development lens.​

Multilateral Performance

●​ Level 1: Active participation in OWG.​

●​ Level 2: Led G77; shaped common positions.​

●​ Level 3: Successfully integrated India’s proposals into final SDG framework.​

Effectiveness

●​ All of India’s demands were reflected:​

○​ Differentiated goals and responsibilities.​

○​ Technology and financial access for developing countries.​

○​ Avoidance of securitization of development.​

●​ PM Modi said India’s national goals “mirror” the SDGs.​

IV. Case Studies: India’s Engagement in International Security

A. Counterterrorism (CCIT - Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism)

India’s Strategic Actions

●​ Proposed CCIT in 1996: called for a universal definition of terrorism, legal extradition, ban on all terror groups.​

●​ Supported UN General Assembly’s Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.​

●​ Chaired UN Counter Terrorism Committee (2011).​

Challenges

●​ Deadlock over defining terrorism:​

 ○​ OIC (esp. Arab nations) want exceptions for “national liberation” (e.g., Palestine).​

○​ US wants to exclude actions by its military.​

●​ These conflicting demands created an impasse.​

Multilateral Performance

●​ Level 1: Consistently advocated CCIT, but unable to form a strong coalition.​

●​ No Level 2 or 3: Coalitions (like NAM, G77) didn’t support CCIT as a bloc.​

India’s Strategy Shift

●​ Pivoted to bilateral lobbying:​

○​ Met Arab League, GCC, China, US, etc.​

○​ Joint Working Groups on CT with many countries (France, Russia, Japan, etc.)​

Effectiveness

●​ Marginal success:​

○​ Some bilateral support.​

○​ Some counterterror protocols passed.​

●​ But CCIT remains unpassed.​

●​ Resistance from key blocs (US, OIC, GRULAC) continues.​

B. UN Security Council Reform

India’s Strategic Actions

●​ Demands expansion of both permanent and non-permanent seats.​

●​ G4 coalition (India, Brazil, Germany, Japan) for new permanent seats.​

●​ L.69 coalition (42 developing nations) pushing for equitable representation.​

Multilateral Performance

●​ Level 1: Committed to the OWG and Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) process since 1992.​

●​ Level 2: Formed and led both G4 and L.69 with consistent policy positions.​

●​ No Level 3: Coalitions failed to influence real reform outcomes.​

Key Setbacks

●​ 2005 World Summit: African Union withdrew support.​

●​ 2007: India dropped proposal after procedural impasse.​

●​ Coalitions couldn’t sway negotiations despite support from 130+ countries.​

India’s Strategy Shift

●​ Bilateral lobbying with P5:​

○​ US, China, Russia, France, UK.​

●​ Bilateral outreach to nations beyond G4 and L.69.​

Effectiveness

●​ Achieved minor symbolic wins:​

○​ IGN Framework Document accepted for future negotiations.​

●​ But:​

○​ No text-based negotiations yet.​

○​ P5 remain non-committal.​

○​ China demands India withdraw support for Japan.​

○​ No concrete progress since 1992.​

V. Key Findings and Implications

1. Development vs. Security: A Clear Divide

●​ India is far more successful in achieving cooperation on developmental issues than security issues.​

2. Causes of Cooperation Failure on Security Issues

●​ Asymmetric Distribution of Benefits/Costs:​

○​ Countries fear they pay more or lose status by cooperating with India.​

●​ Short Time Horizons:​

○​ India's call for immediate adoption (e.g., CCIT) discourages long-term buy-in.​

○​ Once decisions are final (e.g., UNSC reform), there's no chance to revise.​

3. Success Factors in Development Engagement

●​ Symmetric cost/benefit sharing: Shared gains across G77 or BASIC.​

●​ Longer time horizons: E.g., annual climate talks, 15-year SDG cycles.​

●​ Repeated interaction and incremental negotiations: Helps build trust and compromise.​

VI. Policy Recommendations for India

●​ Avoid pushing for immediate resolutions on complex, zero-sum issues.​
 ●​ Work to create symmetrical benefit-sharing in security cooperation.​

●​ Design engagement strategies that allow multiple rounds of discussion.​

●​ Rely more on inclusive coalitions and not just bilateral lobbying.​

●​ Build on game theory insights: avoid “single-play” frameworks where opposition is rational.

D. India Japan
I. Overview of the Japan-India Strategic Partnership
●​ Celebrating 20 years of strategic partnership, the Japan-India relationship has evolved into a central pillar of the Indo-Pacific’s
stability and cooperation.​

●​ Their ties are built on shared democratic values, mutual economic interests, and regional security concerns, especially
regarding China’s rise.​

●​ While Shinzo Abe is widely credited with elevating the relationship, earlier leaders like Hatoyama, Kan, and Noda played
foundational roles in deepening cooperation.​

II. Phases of the Strategic Partnership

1. Era of Strategic Reset (2009–2010) – Yukio Hatoyama

Key Themes:

●​ Initiated recalibration of Japan’s foreign policy post-global economic crisis.​

●​ Introduced the “East Asian Community” vision for regional integration.​

●​ Saw India as a natural fit due to its size, democracy, and growing influence.​

India-Focused Initiatives:

●​ Kickstarted Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) project.​

●​ JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) began investments in Indian infrastructure and manufacturing.​

Limitations:

●​ Defence cooperation was limited due to Japan’s cautious approach toward China.​
2. Era of Strategic Consolidation (2010–2012) – Naoto Kan & Yoshihiko Noda

Naoto Kan’s Contributions:

●​ Overcame domestic crises (earthquake, Fukushima) while strengthening India ties.​

●​ Introduced the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) to reduce trade barriers and target $25 billion in trade
by 2014.​

●​ Initiated civil nuclear cooperation discussions (eventually signed in 2017).​

●​ Increased naval cooperation via the Malabar exercises.​

Yoshihiko Noda’s Contributions:

●​ Enhanced defence and strategic convergence.​

●​ Strengthened the Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership.​

●​ Started technology transfer talks—significant shift in Japan’s post-WWII defence posture.​

●​ Promoted joint maritime exercises and intelligence sharing (2012).​

●​ Accelerated investment in India’s smart cities and urban infrastructure.​

3. Era of Strategic Elevation (2012–2020) – Shinzo Abe

Key Milestones:

●​ Championed the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision; India became central to this.​

●​ Institutionalised “2+2” foreign and defence ministerial dialogues.​

●​ Made Japan a permanent member of the Malabar exercises.​

Defence and Tech Cooperation:

●​ Signed deals on defence equipment and technology transfer.​

●​ Enhanced strategic trust and security alignment.​

Economic Ties:

●​ Invested heavily in infrastructure—$15 billion for Mumbai-Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail project (funded partly by JICA).​

Cultural and People-to-People Ties:

●​ Declared 2017 as Year of India-Japan Friendly Exchanges.​

●​ Expanded scholarships and academic exchanges.​

●​ Strengthened ties through support for Tokyo 2020 Olympics.​

Significance:
 ●​ Abe’s tenure marked the peak of India-Japan relations, shaping them into a comprehensive strategic partnership.​

4. Era of Pragmatic Continuity (2020–2024) – Yoshihide Suga & Fumio Kishida

Yoshihide Suga:

●​ Maintained Abe’s FOIP vision and commitment to the Quad (India, Japan, US, Australia).​

●​ Focused on supply chain resilience and pandemic support to India.​

Fumio Kishida:

●​ Prioritised cybersecurity, green energy, and tech cooperation.​

●​ Launched Japan-India Digital Partnership in 2023, focusing on:​

○​ AI​

○​ Supply chain tech​

●​ Pledged $42 billion investment in India, especially in semiconductors and rare earth alternatives.​

5. Era of Future Strategic Innovation – Shigeru Ishiba (2024–)

Anticipated Focus Areas:

●​ Stronger defence posture and multilateral engagement with India.​

●​ Acceleration of:​

○​ Joint technology development​

○​ Expanded military exercises​

○​ Intelligence-sharing mechanisms​

●​ Potential collaboration in space exploration and satellite technology.​

III. Key Strategic Themes Across Administrations

1.​ Economic Collaboration:​

○​ From DMIC to smart cities and supply chain diversification.​

○​ CEPA, infrastructure investment, and digital partnerships.​

2.​ Security and Defence Cooperation:​

○​ Malabar naval exercises, 2+2 dialogues, defence tech transfers.​

 ○​ Joint response to Chinese assertiveness in Indo-Pacific.​

3.​ Technology and Innovation:​

○​ Smart cities, high-speed rail, and digital tech alliances.​

○​ Increasing focus on green energy and AI.​

4.​ Multilateralism and Regional Stability:​

○​ Support for FOIP and Quad.​

○​ Engagement through joint statements and summits.​

5.​ Soft Power and Cultural Diplomacy:​

○​ Scholarships, friendly exchanges, and Olympic collaboration.​

○​ Promotion of people-to-people ties as a foundation for long-term trust.​

IV. Conclusion & Strategic Outlook

●​ Japan-India partnership has matured into a cornerstone of Indo-Pacific geopolitics.​

●​ Future collaboration likely to deepen in:​

○​ Defence​

○​ Technology​

○​ Space​

○​ Cybersecurity​

●​ The partnership continues to be anchored in:​

○​ Shared democratic values​

○​ Commitment to regional and global stability​

○​ Desire to balance China’s growing influence​

As global dynamics shift, India-Japan ties are poised to remain among the most critical bilateral relationships in Asia.

Here are comprehensive, in-depth notes on the article “Deepening of India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership” by Manoj Joshi
(Raisina Debates, March 23, 2023). These notes capture every aspect of the piece in a fully explained manner so you don’t need to revisit the
original article.

I. Context of the Article

 ●​ The article discusses the evolving strategic partnership between India and Japan, highlighted by PM Fumio Kishida’s 2023 visit
to New Delhi.​

●​ It captures the geopolitical shifts in the Indo-Pacific, rising concerns about China’s assertiveness, and Japan’s changing defence
posture.​

●​ The partnership is not just bilateral but part of a broader regional strategy involving the Quad and G7-G20 cooperation.​

II. Key Themes of PM Kishida’s 2023 Visit

1. G7-G20 Synergy

●​ Japan (G7 Chair) and India (G20 Chair) aligned their agendas on:​

○​ Global economic recovery​

○​ Geopolitical stability​

○​ Climate and energy cooperation​

2. Indo-Pacific Vision

●​ Kishida reaffirmed commitment to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).​

●​ India described as an “indispensable partner” in this vision.​

●​ FOIP echoes earlier speeches by Shinzo Abe in 2007 and 2016.​

○​ Abe’s line: Indian and Pacific Oceans as “seas of freedom and prosperity”.​

3. Outcomes of the Visit

●​ ¥300 billion (fourth tranche) funding for the Mumbai-Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail.​

●​ MoU on Japanese Language Education in India.​

●​ Discussions covered:​

○​ Economic & trade cooperation​

○​ Climate & energy​

○​ Defence and security​

○​ People-to-people ties​

○​ Skill development​

III. Japan’s Strategic Realignment Post-Ukraine War

1. Trigger Events
 ●​ Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggered a rethink in Japan's strategic doctrine.​

●​ Kishida's June 2022 statement: “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.”​

2. Defence and Security Policy Overhaul

●​ Lifted 1% GDP cap on defence spending → Targeting 2% by 2027.​

●​ Japan will surpass India to become the third-largest defence spender.​

●​ Revised three key defence documents in Dec 2022:​

○​ National Security Strategy (NSS)​

○​ National Defense Strategy (NDS)​

○​ Defense Buildup Program​

3. New Defence Domains Covered

●​ Cybersecurity​

●​ Space​

●​ Economic security​

●​ Maritime threats​

4. China-Taiwan Worries

●​ China not directly called a “threat”, but labelled:​

○​ “The greatest strategic challenge Japan has ever faced.”​

●​ Taiwan conflict seen as a potential flashpoint.​

IV. US-Japan Defence Alignment and Its Relevance

●​ January 2023: Kishida visits Washington to strengthen US-Japan ties.​

●​ Outcomes:​

○​ Cybersecurity cooperation​

○​ US-Japan “2+2” Dialogue​

○​ Upgraded US Marine presence in Okinawa to deter China.​

○​ US commits to protecting Japan’s space assets.​

○​ Defence R&D and supply chain security agreements signed.​

Key Joint Statement

 “Strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion, anywhere in the world.”

●​ Marks Japan’s more proactive global posture and aligns closely with Indian concerns.​

V. India-Japan Bilateral and Quad-Level Engagement

1. Strategic Cooperation

●​ India and Japan are key partners in the Quad (with US and Australia).​

●​ India is not a US military ally, unlike Japan and Australia, but shares common goals.​

●​ Goal: Stabilize the Indo-Pacific and contain China’s aggressive behavior.​

2. Military Engagement

●​ Reciprocal Provision of Supplies Agreement (RPSS) signed in 2021.​

●​ 2+2 Dialogue institutionalised in 2019.​

●​ Joint exercises:​

○​ Veer Guardian (2023): Indian Air Force fighter jets in Tokyo.​

○​ Malabar Naval Exercises with US and Australia.​

3. Challenges in Defence Ties

●​ Earlier projects like amphibious aircraft production and submarine tech acquisition failed.​

●​ However, regular maritime dialogues and joint drills indicate consistent strategic communication.​

VI. Economic and Developmental Cooperation

1. Investments and Infrastructure

●​ Kishida reaffirmed the ¥5 trillion (₹3.2 lakh crore) investment plan announced in 2022.​

●​ India is Japan’s largest recipient of ODA.​

●​ Major infrastructure initiatives funded by Japan:​

○​ Mumbai-Ahmedabad Bullet Train​

○​ Metro projects​

○​ Dedicated Freight Corridor​

●​ Focus on Northeast India: Roads, bridges, forest management, and capacity building.​
2. Industry and Supply Chains

●​ Japan is shifting high-tech industries away from China.​

●​ India is seen as a key alternative hub for resilient and secure supply chains.​

●​ Trilateral Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (India, Japan, Australia) is part of this effort.​

●​ 11 Japanese Industrial Townships are already operational in India.​

3. Trade Reality Check

●​ Despite strong political ties, trade is underwhelming.​

○​ Japan’s exports to India: 1.7%​

○​ Imports from India: 0.8%​

○​ Compared to China: 22–24% shares​

VII. Strategic Outlook: Geography & Alignment

India and Japan’s Roles in Indo-Pacific Strategy

●​ India focuses more on land-based threats; Japan on maritime power projection.​

●​ Their differing geographies complement each other in regional security efforts.​

Key Distinctions

●​ Japan and Australia: Formal US allies​

●​ India: Strategic autonomy, not a treaty ally​

●​ Despite this, Japan and India are “lynchpins” of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”​

VIII. Conclusion
●​ Japan’s changing global posture is opening new doors for deeper India-Japan defence and economic collaboration.​

●​ Their partnership is rooted in:​

○​ Shared values (democracy, rule of law)​

○​ Complementary capabilities​

○​ Common concern over China’s rising assertiveness​

India-Japan cooperation is no longer just symbolic—it is geopolitically strategic, economically significant, and poised to shape the future
of the Indo-Pacific.
Here are comprehensive explanatory notes on the article "India, Japan and the Evolving Global Order" by Harsh V. Pant (ORF & King’s
College London, Dec 22, 2023). These notes include all key arguments, strategic developments, and their implications — designed so you
don’t need to revisit the article.

I. The Strategic Convergence: India’s Act East Policy & Japan’s FOIP
●​ India’s Act East Policy (AEP) and Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP) are converging in both ambition and
action.​

●​ Both nations:​

○​ Support a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.​

○​ Seek to secure the maritime commons from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific.​

○​ Aim to balance China’s growing military and economic presence.​

Core Foreign Policy Vision

●​ Trilateral (e.g., India-Japan-Australia) and Quadrilateral (QUAD) frameworks are central to this Indo-Pacific strategy.​

●​ This partnership is described as “natural” due to shared values, democratic governance, cultural affinities, and geopolitical goals.​

II. Expanding Scope of India–Japan Cooperation

Beyond Cost-Benefit Calculations

●​ Their relationship transcends mere economic interests—it is vision-driven, aiming to:​

○​ Shape regional peace and security​

○​ Mitigate global threats, such as climate change​

○​ Build consensus, especially among Asian and Global South countries.​

Former PM Abe’s Role

●​ Referred to India and Japan as “natural allies”, reinforcing long-term strategic trust and alignment.​

III. Institutional Frameworks & Initiatives

Major Agreements & Platforms

 ●​ India-Japan Vision 2025: A blueprint for comprehensive bilateral cooperation.​

●​ Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA): Boosts economic and trade relations.​

●​ Civil Nuclear Deal: A landmark pact for peaceful nuclear energy cooperation.​

Defence Cooperation Mechanisms

●​ 2+2 Dialogue: Defence and foreign ministers meet regularly.​

●​ Annual Defence Ministerial Dialogue​

●​ Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA): For logistics and operational support during joint missions.​

Multilateral and Minilateral Engagement

India and Japan collaborate through various groupings:

●​ Quad (US, India, Japan, Australia)​

●​ Japan-Australia-India Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI)​

●​ Japan-America-India Trilateral (JAI)​

●​ Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)​

Geographic Outreach

●​ Japan invests in India’s Northeast and Andaman & Nicobar Islands—strategically vital locations in the Indo-Pacific.​

IV. Strategic Context: The Hiroshima G7 Summit (2023)

India’s Role at the Summit

●​ PM Modi was a special invitee, reflecting India’s rising global stature, especially as G20 Chair.​

Japan’s Strategic Messaging

●​ PM Kishida presented a new global posture for Japan, more willing to:​

○​ Assume leadership in global peace and security.​

○​ Shift away from a purely pacifist stance.​

○​ Engage deeply with Global South nations.​

V. Japan’s Security Policy Transformation

Key Catalysts

●​ Russia’s invasion of Ukraine​

●​ China’s rising assertiveness​

●​ These forced Japan to rethink its post-WWII military doctrine.​

Major Strategic Shifts

●​ National Security Strategy (NSS) (Dec 2022) labelled Japan’s environment as the most dangerous since WWII.​

●​ Committed to raising defence spending to 2% of GDP by 2027.​

●​ Focus areas:​

○​ Counterstrike capabilities​

○​ Space and cyber warfare​

○​ Missile defence​

○​ Mobility & lift operations​

Redefining Post-War Identity

●​ Shift from pacifist to active strategic participant.​

●​ Japan no longer fears being perceived as a threat; now sees power projection as necessary for security.​

VI. G7 Unity and the “China Factor”

Unified Message

●​ While not naming China directly, G7 leaders:​

○​ Condemned “economic coercion”.​

○​ Called for de-risking from Chinese supply chain dominance.​

Indo-Pacific Focus

●​ G7 committed to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.​

●​ India’s presence reinforced the need for partnerships with key regional players like India and Vietnam.​

VII. Japan & the Global South

 ●​ Kishida aims to rally Global South nations on key issues like Ukraine.​

●​ Modi echoed this with his call to:​

○​ “Amplify the voices and concerns of the Global South.”​

○​ Seek synergy between G7 and G20 agendas.​

VIII. Broader Global Relevance of India-Japan Ties

India’s Role

●​ India is central to any Indo-Pacific strategy.​

●​ Japan was the first to reimagine Asia’s strategic geography and assert that:​
​
​
“There is no Indo-Pacific without India.”​
​

Geostrategic Alignment

●​ Both countries recognize:​

○​ Shared values (democracy, rule of law).​

○​ Complementary capabilities (land vs maritime focus).​

○​ Mutual concern about Chinese aggression.​

IX. Conclusion: A Strategic Relationship for the Future

●​ The India-Japan partnership is becoming a vital axis in Indo-Pacific geopolitics.​

●​ It:​

○​ Reinforces a rules-based order.​

○​ Supports economic resilience and supply chain security.​

○​ Elevates multilateral diplomacy.​

○​ Provides leadership to the Global South.​

India and Japan, together, are positioned to shape the regional order amidst intensifying great power rivalry and help stabilize a rapidly
evolving Indo-Pacific.
Here are detailed, comprehensive notes on the article “India-Japan Strategic Cooperation: Impacting Indo-Pacific” by Debasis
Bhattacharya (Raisina Debates, Feb 27, 2020). These notes cover every dimension of the strategic, economic, and geopolitical discussions
from the article and are designed so you never need to refer to the original again.

I. Overview of India-Japan Strategic Ties

●​ India-Japan relations have evolved into a matured, multidimensional strategic partnership, driven by:​

○​ Geopolitical convergence​

○​ Shared democratic values​

○​ Regional and global strategic concerns​

●​ This cooperation is institutionalized under the “Special Strategic and Global Partnership” framework.​

●​ The upcoming 14th India-Japan Annual Summit (Modi-Abe) was expected to deepen:​

○​ Defence and maritime security cooperation​

○​ Economic and technological ties​

○​ Joint Indo-Pacific strategy​

II. Strategic Objectives and Frameworks

1. Indo-Pacific Maritime Focus

●​ The Indo-Pacific region—especially the maritime corridor—is central to India-Japan cooperation.​

●​ India and Japan are working to:​

○​ Ensure regional stability​

○​ Safeguard maritime trade routes​

○​ Counter unilateral and coercive actions (especially China’s)​

●​ There is a shared commitment to freedom of navigation, overflight, and unimpeded commerce.​

2. Vision and Agreements from Previous Summits

●​ The 13th Annual Summit (2018):​

○​ Produced a Vision Statement with an “unwavering commitment” to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.​

○​ Emphasized:​

■​ Maritime domain awareness (MDA)​

■​ Frequent naval exercises (Malabar)​

 ■​ Accelerated maritime security cooperation​

●​ The first 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting (Nov 2019) further institutionalized this partnership.​

III. Significance of the 14th Summit and Location

1. Guwahati as the Summit Venue

●​ Symbolic of:​

○​ India’s Act East Policy​

○​ Japan’s increasing interest in India’s Northeast​

○​ Creating a gateway for connectivity and strategic presence in the region​

●​ Reinforces:​

○​ Japan’s role in infrastructure projects (₹13,000 crore investment)​

○​ Strengthening of the India-Japan Act East Forum​

2. Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative

●​ Launched by India in November 2019.​

●​ Seeks to align with Japan’s FOIP, emphasizing:​

○​ Multilateral cooperation​

○​ Rules-based regional order​

○​ Inclusivity and openness​

IV. Economic and Technological Dimensions

●​ Japan remains a major investor in:​

○​ India’s manufacturing​

○​ Infrastructure development​

○​ Technology sharing initiatives​

●​ The cooperation complements India’s Make in India strategy.​

●​ The summit was set to boost Japanese FDI, especially in:​

○​ Smart cities​

○​ Transport infrastructure​
 ○​ High-speed rail and industrial corridors​

V. Strategic Significance of Northeast and Indian Ocean

●​ Northeast India and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are key to:​

○​ Countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)​

○​ Enhancing regional connectivity​

○​ Strengthening Indo-Pacific maritime capacity​

●​ Japan’s active involvement in these areas is a direct geopolitical signal.​

VI. Military and Naval Cooperation

●​ Focus of 14th summit: Deepening defence and intelligence cooperation.​

●​ Includes:​

○​ Joint production of defence hardware​

○​ Co-development of military technologies​

○​ Institutionalized joint military and naval exercises​

●​ Plans for regular trilateral and multilateral maritime exercises to:​

○​ Expand presence in the Indian Ocean​

○​ Counter threats in South China Sea​

VII. Counterbalancing China: A United Stance

●​ India and Japan oppose:​

○​ China’s unilateralism in the South China Sea.​

○​ Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, which India has formally rejected.​

●​ Both advocate:​

○​ Dispute resolution without use of force​

○​ A multipolar Indo-Pacific with no single dominant power​

VIII. Trilateral and Multilateral Strategic Partnerships

1. JAI (Japan-America-India) Trilateral

●​ Recognized for its potential to:​

○​ Secure Indo-Pacific trade routes​

○​ Institutionalize joint exercises across Army, Navy, and Air Force​

○​ Counter regional threats via Malabar exercises​

●​ 14th summit expected to:​

○​ Promote greater US involvement​

○​ Leverage Modi and Abe’s personal ties with President Trump to strengthen JAI.​

2. QUAD and Beyond

●​ India and Japan are also active in:​

○​ QUAD (with US and Australia)​

○​ ASEAN-focused maritime collaborations​

○​ A broader Indo-Pacific security architecture​

IX. Vision for a Multipolar Indo-Pacific

●​ The goal is a multipolar regional order, promoting:​

○​ Balance of power​

○​ Regional inclusivity​

○​ Non-coercive international behavior​

●​ India and Japan see themselves as anchor powers, driving this framework via:​

○​ Joint vision statements​

○​ Infrastructure and defence partnerships​

○​ Rules-based diplomacy​

X. Final Remarks and Outlook

●​ The 14th Summit (2020) marked a turning point in India-Japan relations:​

○​ More action-oriented agenda beyond symbolic diplomacy.​

 ○​ Strong focus on strategic deterrence, defence manufacturing, and regional security.​

●​ Long-standing Modi-Abe camaraderie acted as a catalyst for:​

○​ Greater synergy with the US.​

○​ Stronger coordination in trilateral and quad formats.​

●​ India and Japan are now key shapers of Indo-Pacific geopolitics—both economically and militarily.​

E. INDIA AND QUAD

Two Decades of the Quad: Diplomacy & Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific​

(Published by the Observer Research Foundation & East-West Center, 2024)

This part explains the Quad’s evolution from 2004–2024, its transformation into a strategic diplomatic mechanism, and the thematic overview
of its six major working groups.

India & the Quad: Two Decades of Strategic Evolution – Explanatory Notes (Part 1 of 2)

1.​ Introduction: Understanding the Quad in Indo-Pacific Geopolitics​

The “Quad,” or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, is a strategic partnership between four democratic nations — India, Australia, Japan, and
the United States. Originally born out of a joint humanitarian response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the Quad has since grown into a
formidable mechanism for promoting peace, stability, and shared prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.

From a loose coalition in the early 2000s, the Quad has transformed into a cohesive grouping with leader-level summits, regular diplomatic
meetings, and structured cooperation across key policy domains. The grouping today is an influential player in international affairs — not as a
military alliance, but as a values-based partnership dedicated to ensuring a free, open, inclusive, and rules-based Indo-Pacific.

2.​ The Origins and Resurgence of the Quad: From Humanitarianism to Strategy​

The Quad’s foundation lies in the 2004 tsunami crisis, when the four countries coordinated relief efforts. However, its transformation into a
political framework began in 2007, following Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s “Confluence of the Two Seas” speech in India, where he
conceptualized a vision for democratic cooperation across maritime Asia. Yet, the Quad quickly faded due to Australia's decision in 2008 to
withdraw over fears of antagonizing China.

It wasn't until 2017, in the backdrop of growing Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific, that the Quad was revived. This marked the
beginning of its strategic resurgence. The four countries began meeting again on the sidelines of ASEAN summits, eventually holding foreign
ministerial and then leader-level summits. By 2021, the Quad was institutionalized with six formal working groups.

3.​ India’s Place in the Quad: Strategic Vision and Regional Anchoring​

India plays a vital role in the Quad, not only as a geographic anchor of the Indian Ocean region but also as a civilizational democracy with
growing global influence. India’s approach to the Quad aligns with its strategic autonomy — New Delhi avoids formal alliances, but leverages
multilateral groupings to enhance regional stability and protect its maritime and economic interests.

The Quad enhances India’s role in regional geopolitics, enabling it to partner with other Indo-Pacific democracies to address common threats
like Chinese expansionism, climate change, and supply chain vulnerabilities. It also allows India to build strategic trust with the U.S. and its
allies, without compromising its policy of non-alignment.
 4.​ Structural Framework: How the Quad Operates​

Since 2017, the Quad has developed a structured format with:

●​ Senior Officials’ Meetings (regular diplomatic coordination)​

●​ Foreign Ministers’ Meetings (held annually since 2019)​

●​ Leader-Level Summits (five between 2021 and 2023)​

Each summit produces joint statements that articulate shared visions, principles, and cooperative agendas. The Quad has consciously moved
beyond defense, launching thematic working groups that address contemporary regional concerns.

5.​ The Quad’s Six Core Working Groups (Leader-Level)​

i. Quad Health Security Partnership​

This initiative emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic to facilitate vaccine manufacturing and distribution in the Indo-Pacific. India’s
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, combined with funding from Japan, logistical support from Australia, and U.S. vaccine technology,
formed the core of the vaccine diplomacy initiative. Though it faced delays, the partnership transitioned into a broader health security initiative,
including pandemic preparedness and health data systems.

ii. Climate Working Group​

Launched in March 2021, this group focuses on clean energy, climate adaptation, and resilience. One major program is Q-CHAMP, which
promotes low-carbon technologies, climate-smart agriculture, and renewable energy collaboration. India hosted key workshops under this
group and also partnered with the U.S. on clean hydrogen development.

iii. Critical and Emerging Technologies (CET)​

This group handles frontier technologies like AI, semiconductors, and cybersecurity. In 2023, it announced partnerships on Open RAN (for 5G
networks), semiconductor supply chain mapping, and tech investment forums. India benefits by building capacity in digital and frontier tech
sectors while promoting inclusive global standards.

iv. Space Cooperation​

India, a major space power, contributes Earth observation data and participates in joint satellite initiatives. The group also supports maritime
surveillance through the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness program. India signed the Artemis Accords in 2023, joining the U.S.,
Australia, and Japan in supporting responsible space exploration.

v. Infrastructure Coordination​
The Quad established this group to offer a transparent alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Projects include digital connectivity,
undersea cables, and development finance. India works with the Quad to reduce regional debt distress and promote sustainable infrastructure
investment.

vi. Senior Cyber Group​

Cybersecurity is central to national and economic security. Each Quad country leads on different aspects: India focuses on workforce
development, while others address supply chain security and critical infrastructure protection. The “Quad Cyber Challenge” promotes digital
literacy and safe online practices across Indo-Pacific nations.

6.​ Expanding the Quad Agenda: From Functional Cooperation to Strategic Synchronization​

Beyond its six formal working groups, the Quad has increasingly expanded its scope to include themes tied more directly to hard security and
regional power balancing. While the Quad remains explicitly non-military and is not a formal alliance, its agenda reflects shared concerns about
regional threats and global power dynamics — especially concerning China’s rising influence.

i. Maritime Security & Domain Awareness​

Maritime security has always been a central concern for Quad members. The Indo-Pacific region depends heavily on secure sea lanes for
trade and energy flow, and rising concerns over Chinese naval expansion, illegal fishing, and gray zone tactics have increased the urgency for
collaboration.
In response, the Quad launched the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) initiative. This program integrates satellite data and
national maritime sensors across multiple countries to improve real-time surveillance of the region. It aims to:

●​ Track illegal fishing vessels.​

●​ Detect unregistered naval movement.​

●​ Enhance transparency in waters stretching from Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean.​

India contributes significantly to this effort through its Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR), a data-sharing hub based in
Gurugram. The Quad supports these efforts through capacity-building for smaller island nations and real-time information sharing.

ii. Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement​

In 2023, the Quad launched its first dedicated counterterrorism working group. India co-leads this initiative, reflecting its long-standing efforts
to elevate terrorism as a global security priority. Key areas of work include:

●​ Curbing terror financing.​

●​ Strengthening border security practices.​

●​ Enhancing coordination on tracking transnational extremist networks.​

The group has also focused on resisting state-sponsored terrorism and building tools to counter violent extremism online — themes that align
closely with India’s security interests.

iii. Disaster Response and Humanitarian Assistance​

Building on its origins in tsunami relief, the Quad continues to prioritize humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR). Recent efforts
include coordinated responses to cyclones, earthquakes, and COVID-19 pandemic-related crises.

India has taken a leadership role here by offering its military logistics and humanitarian experience, especially through its Navy’s Humanitarian
Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations across the Indian Ocean region.

iv. Strategic Technologies and Norm-Setting​

The Quad has emerged as a platform for norm-setting in areas like artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, digital governance, and ethical tech
use. The CET working group pushes for inclusive, democratic, and transparent rules around the development and use of technologies — a
direct counter to authoritarian models.

India’s key priority in this space is ensuring “technological sovereignty” and avoiding digital dependence. The Quad helps India:

●​ Collaborate on open-source platforms.​

●​ Attract investment in domestic chip manufacturing.​

●​ Enhance cyber defense.​

7.​ Infrastructure Diplomacy: Competing with China’s BRI​

The Quad has increasingly used infrastructure diplomacy as a counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Unlike BRI projects, which
have been criticized for opaque financing and debt traps, the Quad emphasizes:

●​ Transparent project selection.​

●​ Sustainable financing.​

●​ Local job creation.​

●​ Respect for sovereignty.​

India participates in cross-border connectivity and infrastructure development projects under the Quad banner. This includes:

●​ Digital connectivity in South Asia.​

●​ Renewable energy grids in Southeast Asia.​

●​ Transportation corridors across the Indo-Pacific.​

Such initiatives help India bolster its regional influence while avoiding geopolitical overreach.

8.​ India’s Quad Diplomacy: Strategic Outcomes & Challenges​

India views the Quad through a uniquely strategic lens — it provides:

●​ A geopolitical counterbalance to China.​

●​ An economic engine for regional development.​

●​ A platform to build consensus with advanced democracies on critical issues like supply chains, AI, and global governance reform.​

At the same time, India remains cautious. It does not want the Quad to evolve into a military alliance like NATO — both to maintain its strategic
autonomy and to avoid provoking conflict. This is why India consistently emphasizes:

●​ ASEAN centrality.​

●​ Rule-based multilateralism.​

●​ Dialogue over confrontation.​

Nevertheless, India uses the Quad framework to enhance:

●​ Bilateral military exercises (like Malabar with the US and Japan).​

●​ Joint naval drills with Australia.​

●​ Tech partnerships (like semiconductor supply chain cooperation with Japan and the US).​

●​ Vaccine diplomacy and critical mineral security.​

9.​ Challenges and the Road Ahead​

Despite progress, the Quad faces structural and political challenges:

●​ China sees the Quad as a containment strategy and has responded aggressively.​

●​ Differences persist between members (e.g., India’s border clashes with China and complex ties with Russia).​

●​ Coordinating across different bureaucracies and political systems remains difficult.​

Still, the Quad’s strength lies in its adaptability and shared values. It has matured from a nascent grouping to a central pillar of Indo-Pacific
diplomacy. As security competition intensifies in the region, the Quad offers a model for multilateral, values-driven cooperation.

10.​ Conclusion: The Quad as a Pillar of India’s Global Strategy​

For India, the Quad is not merely a foreign policy accessory—it is now an integral part of its strategy to shape a multipolar, rules-based order in
the Indo-Pacific. By building issue-based coalitions, promoting collective resilience, and diversifying its strategic options, India uses the Quad
to:

●​ Assert leadership in the Indian Ocean region.​

●​ Foster economic and technological self-reliance.​

●​ Balance Chinese assertiveness without formal entanglements.​

●​ Deepen engagement with like-minded democracies on global challenges.​

In sum, the Quad is a key axis in India’s effort to shape the contours of the emerging global order — one that aligns democratic values with
pragmatic, flexible, and forward-looking diplomacy.

The Rise and Rise of the Quad: Setting an Agenda for India (ORF 2021)​
Comprehensive Explanatory Notes – Part 1 of 2

1.​ Introduction: The Quad as a Geopolitical Force in the Indo-Pacific​

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue — or the “Quad” — has become one of the most prominent frameworks in the 21st-century geopolitical
landscape. Comprising India, the United States, Japan, and Australia, the Quad began with modest origins but has since grown into a
multi-dimensional diplomatic and strategic forum. Far from being a traditional military alliance, the Quad is now a flexible, issue-based
partnership committed to shaping a free, open, inclusive, and rules-based Indo-Pacific order.

This transformation has not happened overnight. The Quad’s rise reflects deeper shifts in the global order — especially the declining
unipolarity of the post-Cold War era and the growing assertiveness of China in the Indo-Pacific. For India, the Quad represents not only a
strategic opportunity but also a challenge: how to harness this partnership to protect its interests while preserving its cherished principle of
strategic autonomy.

2.​ From Tsunami Response to Strategic Dialogue: The Quad’s Evolution​

The Quad’s journey began in the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, when the four countries came together in an ad hoc humanitarian
response. While the coordination was effective, it was not initially meant to be permanent. That changed in 2007, when Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe delivered his now-famous “Confluence of the Two Seas” speech before the Indian Parliament. In it, he proposed a new
strategic vision — one where democracies across the Indian and Pacific Oceans could cooperate to preserve a peaceful maritime order.

Inspired by Abe’s idea, the four countries initiated exploratory meetings, even holding a naval exercise together. But the initiative quickly
faltered: Australia, wary of provoking China, withdrew in 2008, effectively ending the experiment — at least temporarily.

Fast forward to 2017: amid growing concerns about China’s behavior — including the militarization of the South China Sea, coercive trade
practices, and expansionist rhetoric — the Quad was revived. This time, it had momentum. Between 2017 and 2021, the grouping evolved
from senior officials’ meetings to foreign ministers’ dialogues and, eventually, to leader-level summits. With this institutionalization came a
clearer agenda and more coordinated action across sectors like health, climate, technology, and security.

3.​ India’s Strategic Shift: From “Look East” to Indo-Pacific Leadership​

India’s foreign policy, especially since the 1990s, has evolved from a cautious, continental posture toward a more outward-looking,
maritime-centric strategy. This shift is reflected in the transition from the “Look East” policy to “Act East” and finally toward an integrated
Indo-Pacific vision. The Quad fits neatly into this trajectory.

India sees the Indo-Pacific not just as a geographic space but as a political and economic theatre — one in which its aspirations for
great-power status can be realized. Through the Quad, India gets a chance to:

●​ Align itself with other major democracies.​

 ●​ Promote regional security and economic cooperation.​

●​ Balance Chinese influence — especially in the Indian Ocean.​

Importantly, India views the Quad not as a military alliance but as a platform for flexible diplomacy and issue-based cooperation. This allows it
to maintain its doctrine of strategic autonomy while deepening engagement with powerful partners.

4.​ The March 2021 Virtual Quad Summit: A Turning Point​

The first-ever Quad leaders’ summit in March 2021 marked a milestone. Hosted virtually, it signaled the Quad’s maturation into a credible
diplomatic entity. The summit outcome — which included the establishment of three major working groups — demonstrated that the Quad was
no longer limited to defense and security. It had broadened its vision.

The three working groups were:

a) The Quad Vaccine Partnership​

The most immediate and high-profile initiative was a joint plan to deliver 1 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines across the Indo-Pacific by the
end of 2022. The burden of production was placed on India, leveraging its strength in pharmaceutical manufacturing. The U.S. and Japan
offered funding and technology, while Australia committed to logistics and last-mile delivery.

However, this plan was soon tested when India faced a devastating second wave of COVID-19 in mid-2021. Vaccine exports were halted,
leading to delays and skepticism about the Quad’s ability to deliver on its promises. China, seizing the opportunity, stepped in with its own
vaccine diplomacy in Southeast Asia.

Yet, India’s temporary setback did not undo the initiative. It instead highlighted both the potential and limitations of relying on one country —
however capable — to anchor regional public health efforts. It also reaffirmed the need for resilient supply chains and equitable vaccine
access.

b) Climate Change Collaboration​

The second working group focused on climate change. While the report does not provide granular detail here, the emphasis was on
innovation and coordinated mitigation strategies — a significant move considering that India, the U.S., and Australia have different domestic
political economies around climate action.

c) Critical and Emerging Technologies​

The third group focused on emerging tech — including 5G/6G telecommunications, semiconductors, AI, and data governance. India saw this
as a chance to reduce dependence on Chinese technologies like Huawei, while the U.S. and Japan aimed to create secure, democratic digital
ecosystems. This working group serves as an early step toward shaping global standards and building techno-democratic resilience.

5.​ India’s Core Agenda within the Quad​

India’s agenda within the Quad is defined by both ambition and caution. It seeks to position itself as an Indo-Pacific leader, but it also wants to
avoid over-committing to anti-China postures. The report outlines five key goals India pursues within the Quad:

1.​ Vaccine Leadership: India wants to be seen as a provider of public goods in the Global South, especially through initiatives like
COVAX and Quad-based delivery systems.​

2.​ Maritime Influence: India envisions a leading role in securing the Indian Ocean — its strategic backyard — through maritime domain
awareness, naval exercises, and regional partnerships.​

3.​ Technology Partnerships: India sees the Quad as an opportunity to leapfrog in areas like digital infrastructure, cybersecurity, and
semiconductor production.​

4.​ Balancing China: India uses the Quad to offset China’s influence, particularly after the 2020 Galwan Valley clash. Yet, it resists
reducing the Quad to a China-containment mechanism.​

5.​ Multipolarity & Autonomy: India wants the Quad to enhance multipolarity in Asia, not replace one hegemony with another. It seeks
influence without entrapment.
6.​ Naval Diplomacy and Maritime Security: India’s Strategic Sphere of Influence​
For India, maritime security is a central component of its Indo-Pacific strategy — and within the Quad, this is where it holds natural comparative
advantage. With the Indian Ocean forming the core of its maritime identity, India has actively used naval diplomacy to shape regional
outcomes.

India views the sea lanes from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Strait as strategic lifelines — critical not only for energy and trade, but also for
power projection. In this space, China’s increasing naval forays, including port development in Gwadar (Pakistan) and Hambantota (Sri Lanka),
are viewed with deep suspicion.

Within the Quad, India advocates for expanded:

●​ Naval exercises (e.g., the Malabar series, which now includes all four Quad members).​

●​ Maritime domain awareness and joint surveillance.​

●​ Capacity-building with smaller Indian Ocean states like Seychelles, Mauritius, and the Maldives.​

However, India is cautious about directly militarizing the Quad. While naval drills and interoperability are welcome, India stops short of
endorsing a formal security alliance — especially one that would replicate NATO’s framework in Asia. This restraint is shaped both by India’s
strategic culture and by the sensitivities of ASEAN states, who are wary of great-power blocs.

7.​ Countering the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): India’s Infrastructure Diplomacy​

A major concern for India — and one of the Quad’s unspoken drivers — is the need to provide an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI). The BRI has, in India’s view, extended Chinese influence through opaque loans, debt traps, and dual-use infrastructure projects. The
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which runs through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, is particularly provocative for India.

India has boycotted the BRI from the start, but it recognizes that criticism alone is not enough. Through the Quad, India supports cooperative
infrastructure initiatives that are:

●​ Transparent​

●​ Rule-based​

●​ Respectful of sovereignty​

Examples include:

●​ The Blue Dot Network (proposed by the U.S., Japan, and Australia), which aims to certify high-quality infrastructure projects.​

●​ Japan-India infrastructure development in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Africa.​

●​ Financing of undersea cables, clean energy grids, and regional connectivity corridors.​

Yet, India’s own capacity to offer large-scale financing is limited. It relies on partnership — particularly with Japan — to jointly execute regional
projects. The Quad thus becomes a vehicle to amplify India’s influence without overstretching its resources.

8.​ Internal Divergences: Tensions Within the Quad​

Despite their shared values, the Quad countries are not always perfectly aligned. The report identifies several underlying tensions:

●​ India–China Complexity: India is the only Quad member that shares a contested land border with China and has suffered deadly
military clashes in recent years (e.g., Galwan, 2020). This makes India both more exposed and more cautious. Unlike the U.S. or
Australia, India cannot afford an openly confrontational posture without risking escalation.​

●​ U.S. Strategic Focus: The United States often frames the Quad as part of its broader competition with China — a vision that may not
always match India’s emphasis on multipolarity and strategic autonomy.​
 ●​ Japan’s Domestic Constraints: Japan, while strategically aligned with India, has constitutional and public constraints on military
assertiveness. It relies more on economic diplomacy and technological leadership.​

●​ Australia’s China Dilemma: Canberra has fluctuated in its China policy — moving from deep economic integration to strategic
concern. Though now more aligned with the Quad, Australia’s position is shaped by its trade dependence on China.​

These divergences are not deal-breakers, but they do constrain the pace and depth of cooperation. India must navigate this carefully,
balancing ambition with realism.

9.​ India’s Reservations on Expanding the Quad​

The report also touches on debates around expanding the Quad — either by bringing in new members (e.g., South Korea, Vietnam, France) or
by institutionalizing it further. India has mixed feelings here.

On the one hand, a broader grouping might dilute the Quad’s coherence. India fears that too many members will:

●​ Create consensus fatigue​

●​ Slow decision-making​

●​ Water down the strategic intent​

On the other hand, issue-based coalitions (such as Quad+ arrangements on vaccines or tech) are more acceptable. India supports
“minilateralism” — small, purpose-driven groupings — over permanent enlargement.

The key, for India, is to preserve the Quad’s flexibility and avoid bureaucratization or ideological entrapment.

10.​ The Road Ahead: Setting an Agenda for India​

As the Quad evolves, the report recommends that India shape its engagement around the following priorities:

a) Health Security & Vaccine Diplomacy​

India should continue to be a global supplier of affordable vaccines and medical goods, especially in the Global South. But this must be
balanced with investment in domestic health capacity.

b) Digital Sovereignty​
India must use Quad platforms to build trusted tech ecosystems, push for global norms on data governance, and attract semiconductor
investment.

c) Blue Economy Leadership​

India should become a leader in maritime sustainability, marine resource governance, and ocean-based climate action — using the Indian
Ocean as a testbed for global initiatives.

d) Green Growth & Infrastructure​

India can leverage Quad-backed financing to transition toward a green economy, particularly through solar energy, smart mobility, and
sustainable urban development.

e) Capacity Building in the Indo-Pacific​

Through education, digital literacy, and military training programs, India can become a “net security provider” and partner of first choice for
small island and littoral states.

11.​ Conclusion: The Quad as a Strategic Lever, Not a Fixed Structure​

In summary, the Quad is not a military alliance or a formal treaty organization — and India prefers it that way. For India, the Quad is a dynamic,
evolving mechanism to:
 ●​ Shape the Indo-Pacific narrative​

●​ Expand diplomatic influence​

●​ Hedge against Chinese assertiveness​

●​ Build coalitions around shared interests​

It is also a test of India’s ability to lead from the front — not just through military strength, but through diplomacy, innovation, and development
partnerships.

India’s ultimate goal is to preserve regional multipolarity, safeguard sovereignty, and uphold a rules-based order — and the Quad remains one
of its most potent tools in this mission.​
F. INDIA-EU TIES
A New EU-India Strategic Agenda in 2025 – Comprehensive Explanatory Notes (Part 1 of 2)

Introduction: The Context Behind a Renewed EU-India Partnership

The EU-India Strategic Partnership entered a defining phase with the 2020 Roadmap to 2025. However, as this roadmap nears its expiry, there
is widespread acknowledgment—on both sides—that the time has come for a refreshed and more ambitious framework. The reasons are as
much about the shifting global order as they are about evolving domestic priorities.

The international context has changed dramatically since 2020. The world has witnessed not just the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war in
Ukraine, but also rising tensions in the Middle East and escalating rivalries between China and the West. These developments have pushed
countries to reassess their alliances and strategic dependencies.

India’s non-aligned posture—particularly its refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—initially caused friction with Europe. However,
over time, European leaders have come to accept India’s “strategic autonomy” as a geopolitical reality. Rather than alienate India, Europe now
seeks to deepen engagement in ways that reflect mutual pragmatism.

A renewed roadmap—what the author calls “EU-India 2.0”—is now essential to consolidate and expand upon the gains made since 2020. It is
likely to be a central agenda item when European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visits India after her reelection, accompanied
by the entire College of Commissioners—a symbolic gesture of Brussels' political will.

A Turning Point: From Rhetoric to Results

EU-India relations are often described as high on symbolism but low on substance. Yet recent years have brought noticeable shifts. Political
understanding has deepened; trade negotiations have resumed; and cooperation in critical technologies and connectivity has expanded.

Still, challenges remain. The gap between ambition and delivery persists. If the two partners are to fulfill their potential as “natural allies” in a
complex multipolar world, they must move beyond bureaucratic dialogue toward implementation and joint action. That requires trust, clarity,
and institutional coordination.

Cracking the Free Trade Agreement (FTA): Central to Everything

Perhaps the most consequential item on the bilateral agenda is the EU-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Negotiations began in 2007 but
were suspended in 2013 due to disagreements over market access, labor rights, sustainable development, and regulatory alignment. Talks
were revived in 2022, and by early 2025, nine rounds had been completed.

While some progress has been made—particularly in digital trade, services, and customs cooperation—serious hurdles remain. India is
concerned about the EU’s growing use of what it perceives as non-tariff barriers disguised as ethical standards. Chief among these is the EU
Deforestation-Free Products Regulation (EUDR), which affects Indian exports like rubber, coffee, and cocoa, valued at around US$1.3 billion.
India fears such norms could disproportionately hurt its agricultural sector and small producers.

Europe, on the other hand, views the FTA as a strategic necessity. In a world where the U.S. may retreat from global trade under a second
Trump presidency, and China is increasingly seen as a rival, the EU wants to lock in partnerships with large, like-minded economies. India, with
its scale, growth potential, and relative stability, fits this bill. Yet, Brussels is also bound by its internal legislative framework and public pressure
to uphold sustainability, labor, and human rights standards in all external trade agreements.
India has become more open to FTAs recently, concluding deals with Australia, the UAE, and the EFTA bloc (Switzerland, Norway, Iceland,
Liechtenstein). These include relatively liberal clauses on public procurement and services—areas the EU has long pushed for. Still, New Delhi
continues to prioritize domestic industrialization and retains caution toward opening sensitive sectors like dairy, automobiles, and data
governance.

Without an FTA, the EU-India strategic partnership risks being undermined. Trade and investment flows will remain below potential, and the
broader diplomatic relationship may lose momentum.

De-Risking from China: A Shared Economic Strategy

Another major pillar of EU-India convergence is the push to de-risk supply chains—especially from overdependence on China. This alignment
has grown stronger in the wake of COVID-19 disruptions, the semiconductor crisis, and mounting tensions between Beijing and the West.

The EU and India are increasingly focused on securing value chains in critical minerals, pharmaceuticals, electronics, and green technologies.
While China accounts for over 30% of global manufacturing, India contributes less than 3%. Yet, India’s large labor force, expanding domestic
market, and stable democracy make it an appealing alternative in the “China+1” diversification model.

Europe’s challenge lies in investment security. India unilaterally terminated many Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in 2016, following
disputes over arbitration. This has made European firms wary. While India now offers investment protection under domestic laws and is willing
to sign separate BITs, the EU insists on integrated investment chapters within FTAs. This disconnect must be addressed to unlock new capital
flows.

In critical sectors like semiconductors, both sides have taken concrete steps. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on semiconductors was
signed in 2023, building on India’s Production Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes and the EU’s Chips Act. There is potential for joint research,
talent mobility, and co-investment in chip fabrication and design.

Similarly, in clean technologies like electric vehicles, solar power, and hydrogen, India and the EU are aligned. Both are members of the
Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), and India has shown interest in using the India-Japan-Australia Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI)
as a template for triangular cooperation with Europe.

Reviving the Trade and Technology Council (TTC)

One of the most promising institutional mechanisms in the EU-India relationship—the Trade and Technology Council (TTC)—has
underperformed. Launched with much fanfare in 2022 and modeled after the EU-US TTC, the forum was intended to provide high-level
coordination on digital standards, emerging tech, and critical infrastructure.

However, the TTC has suffered from unclear objectives, overlapping mandates, and bureaucratic inertia. Unlike the India-US iCET (Initiative on
Critical and Emerging Technology), which has moved swiftly on semiconductors and defense tech, the EU-India TTC has produced few
tangible outcomes.

To revive the TTC’s relevance, both sides need to:

●​ Appoint empowered decision-makers rather than mid-level officials.​

●​ Define time-bound deliverables in key verticals: AI, cybersecurity, telecom infrastructure, and green tech.​

●​ Coordinate better with existing domestic frameworks like India’s Digital India and the EU’s Digital Decade.​

●​ Promote interoperability in platforms, privacy norms, and ethical tech governance.​

While data localization and privacy remain points of divergence—especially given India’s protectionist stance—there is scope for consensus in
areas like digital inclusion, online safety, and content moderation.

🟪 Security and Defense Cooperation: From Caution to Quiet Convergence

Historically, the EU has not been a central player in India’s security calculus, and India has relied more on bilateral strategic partnerships with
France, the U.S., Israel, and Russia for defense and intelligence cooperation. However, this is changing.

Since the launch of the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2021, there has been a deliberate effort by Brussels to step up security engagement with
India. While NATO remains distant from India’s interests, European countries—especially France, Germany, and the Netherlands—have
increased naval deployments and joint exercises in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific. For India, this enhances maritime stability and
offers diversification in security partners.

Concrete cooperation includes:

●​ Maritime domain awareness (MDA) in the Indian Ocean Region​

●​ Joint naval exercises and port visits​

●​ Dialogue on hybrid threats, cyber resilience, and counter-terrorism​

Cybersecurity is emerging as a new frontier. The EU is eager to share best practices and frameworks for critical infrastructure protection, while
India brings its own digital expertise and vulnerabilities to the table. Both sides are also interested in the application of international law in
cyberspace, digital sovereignty, and ethical AI.

Still, challenges remain. India’s large-scale reliance on Russian defense equipment—especially after the Ukraine invasion—limits the scope of
full-spectrum defense cooperation with Europe. However, the EU recognizes that India’s balancing act is a function of geography and legacy
dependencies, not ideological alignment.

🟪 Connectivity and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)

Connectivity has become one of the most exciting areas of EU-India cooperation. It is also one of the most geopolitical. In 2023, the
India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) was launched under the auspices of the G20 and supported by the EU, India, the U.S.,
Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. This initiative is meant to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and offer a transparent, sustainable
alternative.

The IMEC project involves:

●​ Rail and maritime corridors connecting India to the Arabian Peninsula, and from there to Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean​

●​ Associated energy and data corridors​

●​ Cross-border digital infrastructure​

India sees IMEC as a way to enhance its trade routes and emerge as a logistics hub in Eurasia. The EU, in turn, supports it through its Global
Gateway Initiative, aimed at mobilizing €300 billion in global infrastructure investments. France and Germany are playing a major role in
coordinating private capital and public policy.

For the EU, IMEC also fits into its diversification strategy—ensuring that connectivity does not become dependent on Chinese-financed ports,
cables, and digital networks. For India, the corridor strengthens its ties with the Middle East and offers greater economic linkages with Europe
without overreliance on China-dependent choke points like the Malacca Strait.

🟪 Green Diplomacy: Climate Action, Energy, and Carbon Markets

Climate and sustainability form a third pillar of the EU-India relationship. Both sides have made ambitious pledges: India has set a net-zero
target for 2070, and the EU for 2050. But cooperation is not only about targets—it’s about technologies, finance, and equitable transitions.

Some key areas of convergence include:

●​ Renewable energy cooperation (solar, wind, and green hydrogen)​

●​ Grid interconnection and battery storage​

●​ Circular economy practices and waste management​

 ●​ Sustainable agriculture and urban planning​

India has joined several EU-led initiatives like the International Solar Alliance and the Clean Energy Ministerial. At the bilateral level, both sides
are working on aligning their respective carbon pricing frameworks and exploring the interoperability of carbon markets.

However, the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)—which imposes a carbon tariff on imports like steel and aluminum—has
generated concern in India. New Delhi views it as a disguised protectionist measure that punishes developing countries. This has complicated
climate diplomacy, especially in trade talks.

Nonetheless, the bigger picture remains positive. India understands that it needs European finance, technology, and expertise to decarbonize
at scale. The EU sees India not just as a beneficiary but as a partner in shaping the global green transition.

🟪 Migration, Mobility, and People-to-People Ties

Human mobility is a quieter but increasingly important component of the relationship. India has a large diaspora in Europe, and skilled
migration is a key demand from both sides. Education and digital connectivity are also intertwined with migration policy.

There is growing momentum for:

●​ Bilateral migration and mobility partnerships (as India has already signed with Germany and France)​

●​ Easier visa regimes for students and tech professionals​

●​ Mutual recognition of degrees and certifications​

●​ Enhanced cooperation in higher education and research (e.g., Erasmus+, Horizon Europe)​

For India, access to European education and labor markets is part of its broader human capital strategy. For Europe, Indian students,
researchers, and STEM professionals help address demographic decline and skill shortages.

That said, immigration remains a politically sensitive issue in many EU states, especially after the refugee crises of the 2010s. Any long-term
mobility regime must balance domestic politics with strategic workforce planning.

🟪 Strategic Convergence in a Fragmented World

The broader logic for EU-India cooperation stems from shared geopolitical anxieties. The war in Ukraine has shifted Europe’s worldview.
China’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific, coupled with a more transactional United States (especially if Trump returns to the White House),
has made both Brussels and New Delhi seek new hedging strategies.

For the EU:

●​ India is a democratic counterweight to China.​

●​ It offers a vast market, a strategic location, and a values-compatible partner.​

●​ India’s role in forums like the G20 and BRICS makes it a bridge between the Global North and South.​

For India:

●​ Europe offers technology, investment, and global diplomatic support.​

●​ It is an alternative to both American volatility and Chinese coercion.​

●​ It can help amplify India’s voice on climate, WTO reform, and development finance.​
Both sides are exploring trilateral and multilateral formats as well—India-France-Australia in the Indo-Pacific; India-EU-Japan on infrastructure;
and coordination at the UN on multilateral reform.

🟪 Conclusion: Toward a “Strategic Plus” Partnership

The ORF brief concludes with a call for the EU and India to evolve their relationship from a “strategic partnership” to a “strategic plus”
framework—one that reflects not just high-level dialogue but deeper institutional alignment, market integration, and shared leadership in global
governance.

This requires:

●​ Resolving trade disputes and closing the FTA.​

●​ Reviving underperforming institutions like the TTC.​

●​ Mobilizing private capital through policy coordination.​

●​ Building public constituencies for the partnership in both Europe and India.​

A new roadmap—replacing the 2020-2025 version—should be grounded in realism, driven by results, and anchored in long-term strategic
thinking.

Ultimately, the EU-India relationship is not about ideology or convenience. It is about building resilience in an age of fragmentation and forging
interdependence among pluralistic, democratic, and forward-looking powers.

Renewing the EU-India Strategic Compact – Comprehensive Explanatory Notes

🟪 Introduction: Why a New Compact Is Necessary in 2025

The strategic partnership between India and the European Union (EU), while full of promise, has yet to achieve its potential. The 2020
“Roadmap to 2025” laid out a vision for deep cooperation between the two “unions of diversity,” rooted in shared values like democracy, the
rule of law, and multilateralism. Yet, despite that ambition, the relationship remains underwhelming. Much of the agenda from 2020 remains
incomplete, and new geopolitical challenges — such as the Ukraine war, tensions in the Middle East, an increasingly authoritarian China, and
Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency — add fresh urgency.

In this new global context, the EU-India partnership must not only fulfill the 2020 roadmap but go beyond it. This means addressing unfulfilled
commitments, tackling new security and economic risks, and overcoming persistent structural and political obstacles.

The authors identify six key areas where India and the EU must deepen cooperation. They also offer a set of critical “how-not-to’s” —
avoidable missteps that the EU should be especially cautious of when engaging with India and the wider Global South.

🟪 1. Advancing Strategic and Defense Cooperation

While the 2020 Roadmap included general commitments to foreign policy and security cooperation (e.g., counterterrorism, non-proliferation),
the authors argue that the new compact must take a far more ambitious approach: full-scale military cooperation.

Why this matters:

●​ India still heavily depends on Russian military imports. A stronger EU-India defense partnership could help New Delhi diversify its
military sources and reduce dependency on Moscow.​

●​ Such cooperation would help maintain regional power balance in the Indo-Pacific.​

●​ The EU has already shown willingness to work with Asian democracies like Japan. Similar engagement with India is overdue.​
What should this involve?

●​ Defense technology transfer​

●​ Joint production and co-development of systems​

●​ Long-term procurement agreements​

Importantly, this is not just about strategic convergence. There is a commercial opportunity too — India’s decline in Russian arms imports (from
76% in 2009–13 to 36% in the past five years) opens a US$100 billion market for European defense firms.

🟪 2. Climate Cooperation Must Balance Idealism with Realism

The EU positions itself as a climate leader, but some of its policies — especially the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) — are
viewed by India as coercive and counterproductive.

India’s objections:

●​ Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman called CBAM “unilateral” and “not going to facilitate the green transition.”​

●​ It imposes a de facto carbon tariff on imports from developing countries, seen as protectionist.​

The solution:

●​ Rather than pushing punitive climate regulations, the EU should offer generous climate finance, technology-sharing, and
public-private partnerships to help India decarbonize.​

●​ Aligning with India on this front can set a model for EU cooperation with the wider Global South.​

Both partners support sustainability, but progress requires striking a pragmatic balance between the EU’s normative ambitions and India’s
development priorities.

🟪 3. Concluding the EU-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA)

Despite renewed FTA talks since 2022 (after a decade-long freeze), negotiations have stalled again. Longstanding disagreements persist over
market access (especially in agriculture and manufacturing), labor standards, environmental clauses, and digital regulation.

Why an FTA matters now more than ever:

●​ Global trade multilateralism is under threat.​

●​ The U.S. has turned inward, and China is increasingly seen as a systemic rival.​

●​ India-EU trade is growing (€124 billion in goods in 2023), but India is only the EU’s 9th largest partner. In contrast, the EU’s
investment in China and Brazil dwarfs that in India.​

What’s at stake:

●​ A well-structured FTA could unlock supply chain diversification away from China, especially in sensitive sectors like semiconductors
and pharmaceuticals.​

●​ It could also set standards on digital sovereignty, data flows, and tech governance.​
However, both sides must recognize this FTA as more than just a trade deal — it is a strategic tool to ensure economic resilience in a volatile
world. Without it, the broader strategic partnership will remain fragile.

🟪 4. Reimagining Migration and Mobility

Migration is often reduced to India sending skilled labor and students to Europe. But this unidirectional framing no longer reflects 21st-century
realities.

The authors argue that the narrative must evolve:

●​ As India grows into a major economic power, it is becoming an attractive destination for Europeans — not just for work, but also for
family reunification and business.​

●​ Embracing reciprocity in migration (mobility in both directions) may help build public support in Europe for more open migration
frameworks — especially amid rising xenophobia and electoral volatility.​

In short, mobility needs to be seen as a strategic and balanced exchange, not a donor-recipient relationship.

🟪 5. Including Animal Welfare in Sustainability and Connectivity

This unusual but important recommendation expands the notion of “sustainable connectivity” to include animal welfare. As India and the EU
embark on major infrastructure and connectivity projects, they should ensure that these do not harm biodiversity or subject animals to
unnecessary cruelty (e.g., live exports).

Why it matters:

●​ Zoonotic diseases (like COVID-19) have highlighted the risks of industrialized animal exploitation.​

●​ India has strong cultural and ethical traditions around animal protection (e.g., LiFE — Lifestyle for Environment).​

●​ The EU has an active animal rights constituency and growing public support for reforms.​

By incorporating animal welfare into sustainability frameworks, India and the EU can become global leaders in “ethical connectivity” — shaping
a more humane model of development.

🟪 6. Reforming and Rebuilding Multilateralism

Both India and the EU are vocal supporters of multilateralism — but it’s time to move beyond platitudes and push for real reforms.

Key recommendations:

●​ Reform the UN Security Council (e.g., expand permanent membership to include India).​

●​ Consider revising WTO principles like Most Favoured Nation status to allow “deep integration” among like-minded states.​

●​ Engage in “minilateralism” where necessary — working with smaller coalitions to build consensus outside gridlocked institutions.​

India’s rise presents a rare opportunity to make multilateralism more inclusive. The EU should view India not just as a regional partner but as a
gateway to wider engagement with the Global South.

🟪 How Not to Work With India: Lessons for the EU

The brief concludes with three “how-not-to’s” — common mistakes the EU must avoid if it wants a deeper and more equal partnership with
India:

1.​ Don’t Dismiss the Global South Label​

European policymakers increasingly reject the term “Global South,” claiming it lacks coherence. But India proudly embraces this identity — as
seen in its Voice of the Global South summit and climate diplomacy. The EU must understand that India sees itself as a bridge between
developed and developing worlds. Respecting that identity is crucial.

2.​ Don’t Stereotype “Asian Values” as Illiberal​

India’s civilizational thought includes robust traditions of pluralism and rights — often more inclusive than many Western liberal models. The
EU should stop framing India as either “Western ally” or “Asian exception.” Instead, it must recognize India’s unique normative framework and
ideological depth.

3.​ Don’t Preach or Patronize​

European leaders often criticize India on human rights and domestic politics without proper context. For example, the European Parliament’s
2023 resolution on the Manipur violence was seen in India as one-sided. The EU must avoid hypocrisy and instead adopt a partnership
approach — especially given its own colonial legacies and strategic inconsistencies.

🟪 Conclusion: Toward a Truly Strategic and Symmetrical Partnership

India and the EU have built momentum in their strategic partnership, but much remains underutilized. With India poised to become the world’s
third-largest economy, the EU must engage New Delhi not as a peripheral partner but as a central actor in shaping global order.

This means:

●​ Investing in shared strategic capacities (defense, tech, climate)​

●​ Avoiding outdated hierarchies and assumptions​

●​ Building trust based on reciprocity and empathy​

By learning from past missteps and embracing genuine strategic convergence, India and the EU can not only do more together — they can
shape a more equitable, secure, and humane global future.

EU US Relations

The European Union and the United States – Comprehensive Explanatory Notes​
European External Action Service (EEAS) | October 4, 2023

Introduction: A Transatlantic Relationship Built on Shared Values and Trust

The strategic partnership between the European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.) is one of the most long-standing and robust alliances
in international politics. Rooted in shared values—such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and multilateralism—the EU-U.S.
relationship has evolved over the past six decades into a vital anchor of global peace and prosperity.

This partnership is strengthened by high levels of public trust and by extensive political, economic, and civil society engagement. As global
challenges continue to intensify—including climate change, digital disruption, and strategic competition—the EU and U.S. have continually
expanded their cooperation across multiple sectors. Both sides identify themselves as “natural partners” committed to shaping a rules-based
global order.
Shared Values, Peace, and Stability

At the heart of EU-U.S. cooperation lies a common commitment to defending democratic governance, the rule of law, and human rights
globally. Together, the EU and U.S. are the largest donors of development assistance and humanitarian aid in the world. They work to promote
peace, advance inclusive development, and support post-conflict reconstruction in fragile states.

Their cooperation on global security is increasingly broad and multifaceted. In Europe, the U.S. plays a central role in NATO, while the EU
leads regional defense initiatives through its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In Africa, both actors support peacekeeping,
anti-terrorism, and mediation efforts. In the Indo-Pacific, they engage in naval cooperation, capacity building, and strategic coordination to
ensure maritime stability and uphold international law.

Beyond regional efforts, the EU and U.S. also work together to address global security threats, including terrorism, cybercrime, and nuclear
proliferation. They jointly promote non-proliferation, cyber stability, and the regulation of emerging security technologies.

Deep Economic Ties: Trade, Investment, and Innovation

The EU-U.S. economic relationship is the largest and most integrated bilateral trade and investment relationship in the world. Collectively, the
EU and U.S. account for roughly one-third of global GDP (by purchasing power parity). They are each other’s top trading partners and primary
sources of foreign direct investment.

Transatlantic trade and investment support over 9.4 million jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. The size and depth of this economic corridor
underpin not only shared prosperity but also innovation, competitiveness, and industrial resilience.

To modernize their economic engagement, the EU and U.S. established the Trade and Technology Council (TTC). This platform enables
high-level dialogue and cooperation on key areas including:

●​ Semiconductor supply chains​

●​ Data governance and privacy frameworks​

●​ Artificial intelligence and digital ethics​

●​ Regulation of emerging technologies​

●​ Economic security and trade defense mechanisms​

The TTC plays a key role in aligning democratic responses to economic coercion, non-market behavior, and strategic
dependencies—especially in relation to authoritarian regimes.

The EU also operates instruments like Access2Markets and the Single Entry Point (SEP) to support European exporters and enforce trade
standards globally. These tools aim to increase market transparency and protect sustainability principles in international commerce.

Climate, Energy, and Connectivity: Leading the Global Green Transition

Climate diplomacy is a central pillar of EU-U.S. collaboration. Both partners are deeply invested in implementing the Paris Agreement and
pushing global decarbonization. Their joint efforts include:

●​ Promoting renewable energy deployment​

●​ Coordinating on climate finance​

●​ Enhancing energy security and clean energy infrastructure​

The EU-U.S. Energy Council serves as a key coordination mechanism for transatlantic energy policy. This platform covers areas such as:
 ●​ LNG diversification and strategic reserves​

●​ Grid resilience and smart power systems​

●​ Hydrogen, bioenergy, and critical minerals for clean tech​

In addition, both sides share a vision for “values-based connectivity.” They aim to build secure, sustainable, and inclusive infrastructure
globally, offering a credible alternative to state-led development models. This includes joint initiatives in:

●​ Digital and physical infrastructure​

●​ Science and technology research​

●​ Pandemic preparedness and public health systems​

●​ Academic exchange and knowledge mobility​

Through their global outreach, the EU and U.S. promote democratic standards, ethical innovation, and sustainability in both digital and physical
infrastructure.

Conclusion: A Foundation for Global Leadership

The transatlantic alliance between the European Union and the United States remains foundational to the liberal international order. Built on
decades of trust, mutual investment, and aligned values, it is now positioned to address the defining challenges of the 21st century.

Whether promoting democratic governance, managing the digital transition, driving climate action, or responding to geopolitical upheaval, the
EU and U.S. are united by a vision of multilateral cooperation and responsible leadership. At a time when authoritarianism and power politics
are resurging, the transatlantic relationship offers a model of principled power anchored in the rule of law, shared prosperity, and enduring
partnership.

G. INDIA US RELATIONS
Demystifying Indo–US Natural and Strategic Partnership​
Author: Baljit Singh Mann | Published in International Studies (JNU), 2023

Introduction: Evolving Yet Conflicted Strategic Convergence

The Indo–US relationship has undergone a long transformation—oscillating between estrangement, engagement, and a formalized strategic
partnership. The post-2000s era witnessed a major upward shift in the bilateral trajectory, starting with the 2005 Civil Nuclear Deal.
Agreements such as LEMOA, COMCASA, and BECA followed to institutionalize their defense cooperation. Yet despite these milestones, the
relationship has remained troubled by core divergences.

India’s strategic outlook remains firmly anchored in realism—especially strategic autonomy and a multi-polar world order—whereas the United
States continues to advance its interests through a uni-polar order. India perceives the partnership as one among many (within the broader
doctrine of multi-alignment), while Washington still seeks a hierarchical model of alliances, where it plays the dominant role. This creates
friction on critical issues like trade, co-production, technology transfer, and regional priorities.

The paper argues that while mainstream literature frames these tensions as “teething problems,” they are in fact structural and deep-rooted.
Theories of realism, neo-realism, and social constructivism are employed to explain these dynamics at global, Asian, and regional levels.

India’s Realist Posture and Early Strategic Deals

India's partnership with the U.S. is shaped by a pragmatic foreign policy rooted in realism. Although India invokes shared democratic values
(as social constructivism would highlight), it pursues national interests above all. The U.S.–India Joint Strategic Vision articulates mutual goals
in the Indo–Pacific and Indian Ocean Regions, yet India has consistently resisted any alliance structure that might compromise its autonomy.

Key defense agreements reflect this carefully balanced approach:

●​ The Civil Nuclear Deal (2005) laid the foundation.​

●​ The Defence Partnership Agreement (2015) formalized high-level military cooperation.​

●​ LEMOA (2016) brought India into logistics-sharing agreements previously exclusive to close U.S. allies.​

●​ COMCASA (2018) and BECA (2020) facilitated real-time military communication and geospatial intelligence sharing.​

Despite this cooperation, India has repeatedly pushed back on U.S. pressures—especially those that sought to curtail India's energy imports
from Iran or defense purchases from Russia. These moves reflect India's unwillingness to let a single partnership dictate its broader foreign
policy.

Strategic Partnerships vs. Strategic Dependence

India and the U.S. have often clashed over what strategic partnership means in practice. For the U.S., it implies arms sales, military
interoperability, and geopolitical alignment. For India, strategic partnership must include co-development, technology transfer, and space for
strategic autonomy. For example:

●​ India has pressed for joint production and defense manufacturing under “Make in India.”​

●​ The U.S., however, has been reluctant to transfer high-end technology or share intellectual property—insisting on retaining control
even when production is localized.​

●​ U.S. firms have resisted liability for defects in co-produced equipment, undermining trust.​

The result is a transactional relationship: while India is labelled a “Major Defense Partner,” its treatment falls short of equal status. U.S. arms
sales have expanded (e.g., C-17s, Apaches, P-8Is), but India still experiences the relationship more as buyer-seller than as true
co-developers.

Contrasting Worldviews: Unipolar vs. Multipolar Order

A deeper divergence lies in each country’s vision of global order:

●​ The United States seeks to preserve its leadership in a liberal, rules-based, and largely Western order.​

●​ India, however, rejects both unipolarity and bloc-based alignments. It prefers a multi-polar world where power is distributed, autonomy
is preserved, and no single power dominates.​

India’s membership in BRICS, SCO, and its engagement with both Western and non-Western partners reflects this orientation. Even while
partnering with the U.S. in the Quad, India participates in security platforms with China and Russia, maintaining flexible coalitions across issue
areas.

This desire for a multi-polar world also informs India’s reluctance to support Western sanctions on countries like Russia and Iran, and its
frequent pushback against U.S. pressure on these fronts.

Trade and Immigration: Points of Structural Friction

Trade and immigration are persistent areas of conflict:

●​ In 2019, the Trump administration ended India’s preferential access under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).​

●​ The U.S. filed disputes at the WTO over India’s farm subsidies and trade practices. India retaliated with tariffs on U.S. exports like
apples and almonds.​

●​ The U.S. resisted India’s demands for a permanent solution on public food stockholding—a key issue for food security.​

●​ In parallel, Trump’s anti-immigrant policies and H1-B visa restrictions alienated much of the Indian diaspora, even though they remain
a key people-to-people bridge.​

These trade frictions underscore the limits of shared values in the face of hardened national interests. India’s “Make in India” and the U.S.
“America First” agendas are both inward-looking, and frequently at odds.

The China Factor: Convergence and Constraints

China’s rise provides a major strategic rationale for Indo–U.S. cooperation. Both countries share concerns about Beijing’s assertiveness in the
Indo–Pacific. The U.S. seeks to counterbalance China’s regional influence through the Indo–Pacific Strategy, the Quad, and strengthened
alliances. India, too, has faced direct military threats from China, especially visible in the 2020 Galwan clashes along the Line of Actual Control
(LAC).

This convergence has deepened India–U.S. defence cooperation:

●​ India now participates in joint military exercises like Yudh Abhyas, Malabar, and Tiger Triumph.​

●​ The U.S. supports India’s role as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean.​

However, fundamental differences remain. India refuses to join any formal anti-China military alliance. Even after the border crisis, India
continues to engage China diplomatically through platforms like BRICS, SCO, and bilateral talks. India's “multi-alignment” strategy means it
hedges against both American and Chinese dominance, rather than aligning fully with one against the other.

Thus, while China provides tactical convergence, it does not translate into complete strategic alignment between India and the U.S.

Russia and Iran: Enduring Divergences

Russia and Iran are two other significant fault lines in Indo–U.S. relations.

For Russia:

●​ India maintains a historic defence relationship. Despite U.S. sanctions under CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act), India proceeded with purchasing the Russian S-400 missile defence system.​

●​ India continues to value Russia as a major supplier of affordable military technology and an important diplomatic partner, particularly
for its balancing role vis-à-vis China.​

For Iran:

●​ India historically relied on Iran for energy security and regional connectivity, particularly through the Chabahar Port project, which
provides access to Afghanistan and Central Asia bypassing Pakistan.​

●​ U.S. sanctions on Iran disrupted Indian energy imports and slowed down infrastructure cooperation.​

In both cases, India's decisions reflect its strategic autonomy. It prioritizes national interest over alliance solidarity, even if this creates friction
with Washington.
—

Regional Differences: Afghanistan and the Indo-Pacific

The chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 showcased another divergence in Indo–U.S. regional visions.

India, which had invested heavily in Afghan infrastructure, governance, and education, saw the withdrawal as abandoning Afghanistan to
instability. The return of the Taliban is seen by India as a security threat, particularly due to concerns about Pakistan-backed terrorism gaining
ground.

Moreover, while the U.S. increasingly focuses on the Pacific theatre and deterring China, India continues to prioritize continental challenges —
including securing its northern borders with China and stabilizing its western flank via Iran, Central Asia, and Afghanistan.

Even in the Indo–Pacific, where cooperation appears strongest, there are tensions:

●​ India emphasizes ASEAN centrality and strategic autonomy.​

●​ The U.S. pushes alliances and minilateral structures like AUKUS (Australia-UK-U.S. security pact), which India was not included in.​

India welcomed the Quad but views it as a flexible, non-military grouping focused on common interests (maritime security, climate, tech) rather
than as a military alliance directed against China.

AUKUS and the Quad: Complementary or Conflicting?

The creation of AUKUS in 2021 raised questions in India about the future of the Quad.

On the surface, the U.S. assured that AUKUS and the Quad were complementary — AUKUS dealt with security issues, while the Quad
addressed economic and technological cooperation. However, some Indian analysts view AUKUS as privileging Australia over India in U.S.
strategic calculations, especially with advanced capabilities like nuclear submarines.

India, mindful of historical sidelining in Western alliances, remains cautious. It continues to support the Quad but insists that it remain
non-militarized and inclusive — focused on delivering public goods like vaccine production, critical infrastructure, and resilient supply chains.

Theoretical Reflections: Realism, Neo-Realism, and Constructivism

The author draws on three major International Relations (IR) theories to explain the Indo–U.S. relationship:

●​ Classical Realism: Both countries are driven by the pursuit of national interest and power maximization. Trust is limited and alliances
are seen as temporary marriages of convenience.​

●​ Neo-Realism (Structural Realism): The anarchic structure of the international system forces states to act primarily in self-interest.
Balancing behaviour — whether against China or any other major threat — dominates strategic thinking.​

●​ Constructivism: Although shared democratic values and identities create a sense of partnership, material interests and structural
factors remain paramount. Values matter, but only insofar as they serve national interests.​

Thus, the Indo–U.S. strategic partnership is not based on ideological congruence alone. It is an outcome of pragmatic calculations, strategic
hedging, and mutual necessity — all moderated by deeper divergences in worldviews and priorities.

Conclusion: A Relationship of Convergence Without Full Alignment

The Indo–U.S. partnership is robust but remains carefully managed on both sides. It is a relationship of convergence without complete
alignment, partnership without alliance, and friendship without dependency.
India values the U.S. as a key strategic partner — particularly against the backdrop of a rising China — but will never subordinate its autonomy
to any external actor. The U.S., for its part, recognizes India's strategic weight but often struggles to adjust to India's non-aligned instincts and
transactional approach.

The future of Indo–U.S. ties will depend on both sides respecting each other’s red lines, managing divergences maturely, and building
cooperation based on shared interests rather than assumed ideological unity. In a complex and shifting global order, both countries are likely to
remain “natural partners”—but not natural allies in the traditional sense.

Engagement sans Commitment: A New Phase of US–India Relations​

Author: Shubhrajeet Konwer

Introduction: Strategic Engagement, but Conditional Alignment

The article opens by asking a provocative question: despite the high-profile 2023 Biden–Modi summit and deepening engagement, has there
truly been a fundamental shift in the US–India relationship? The author argues that while cooperation has undeniably grown in scope and
symbolism, deep-seated structural differences—especially over India’s insistence on strategic autonomy and the US’s normative
expectations—continue to constrain the depth of alignment.

The bilateral relationship, often branded as a “natural partnership” between two democracies, has grown more pragmatic and transactional.
This article contends that the real burden of deepening cooperation lies with Washington, which must understand and adapt to India’s unique
diplomatic posture, rather than expecting New Delhi to fall in line with US-led global norms.

India’s Strategic Priorities and America’s Changing Posture

India’s core foreign policy priorities revolve around two imperatives:

1.​ Achieving rapid and inclusive economic growth (aiming to become a $5 trillion economy).​

2.​ Safeguarding national security against threats along the Pakistan and China borders.​

Against this backdrop, India values its relationship with the US—but on its own terms. India sees the US as an important, but not exclusive,
partner in a broader multi-aligned foreign policy strategy.

From the US side, India is increasingly important in light of China’s assertiveness, the fallout from the Afghanistan withdrawal, and declining
American influence in the Global South. The US now treats India as an “exception” among developing countries—granting it strategic latitude,
avoiding criticism on sensitive domestic issues, and offering unprecedented technology transfers, including co-development of next-gen
defense platforms.

Trade, Technology, and the Indo-Pacific: New Foundations

India has overtaken China as the US’s largest trading partner. This commercial foundation is vital. The two countries aim to push bilateral trade
to $500 billion, focusing on “high-value industries” and technology partnerships. Initiatives like iCET (Initiative on Critical and Emerging
Technologies) reflect a shared desire to cooperate in semiconductors, AI, quantum computing, space, and climate technologies.

In defense, deals like the purchase of MQ-9B drones and co-production of jet engines underscore a shift from buyer–seller dynamics to
long-term industrial cooperation. Yet some US lawmakers remain skeptical: what is America getting in return?

On the Indo-Pacific, both countries are part of the Quad and IPEF, but their visions differ. For the US, the Indo-Pacific is primarily a geopolitical
and security space. For India, it is an economic arena. India remains cautious about pushing too far against China, given its long, disputed
border and history of violent clashes (e.g., Galwan 2020). The US, having no direct territorial disputes with China, can afford a more
confrontational posture.

Strategic Autonomy and the Multipolar Worldview

India’s commitment to “strategic autonomy” is the central lens through which it views the US relationship. Despite the rhetoric of shared
democratic values, India does not align with the West on many global issues—most notably the Ukraine war, where it refused to condemn
Russia or join sanctions.

External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has publicly championed “multi-alignment,” arguing that countries should pursue interest-based rather
than ideology-driven diplomacy. India continues to balance ties with Russia, China, and the US simultaneously.

This realism has paid dividends:

●​ India gained discounted oil from Russia without facing US sanctions.​

●​ India’s balancing role in multilateral platforms (e.g., SCO, BRICS, G20, Quad) is seen as enhancing its global leverage.​

●​ Domestic narratives of “Vishwaguru” (global teacher) and “Naya Bharat” (New India) have boosted Modi’s image as an independent
global statesman.​

Domestic Politics, Diaspora, and Public Opinion

The article highlights how both domestic politics and diaspora engagement shape the bilateral relationship:

●​ The Indian diaspora in the US (over 5 million strong) is politically influential and overwhelmingly supportive of Modi.​

●​ Modi’s image as a “global leader” plays well at home, especially in election seasons.​

●​ Biden’s refusal to criticize India on democracy and rights issues—despite public calls from figures like Barack Obama—shows the US
is prioritizing realpolitik over liberal idealism.​

However, public opinion in India remains skeptical of the West. Surveys show Indians view both the US and China as major
threats—underscoring deep-rooted distrust. The Indian government has capitalized on these sentiments by resisting foreign commentary on its
domestic politics and projecting confidence in global forums.

Structural Incongruities in the Strategic Partnership

Despite high-level engagements, growing defense ties, and diplomatic bonhomie, the Indo–US partnership remains riddled with structural
contradictions. At the core is a clash of strategic culture. India seeks transactional engagement based on equality and strategic autonomy. The
United States prefers strategic convergence rooted in shared values and hierarchical alliance structures.

The author notes that while there is elite consensus on the desirability of the partnership in both capitals, bureaucratic and political systems on
both sides often struggle to align. The US Congress, for instance, continues to frame foreign policy through the lens of democratic norms and
human rights, which causes tension with India's governance model. In India, institutional caution and historical mistrust of Western alliances
slow the pace of policy transformation.

Moreover, the US often expects alignment on global issues — such as sanctions, military cooperation, or climate commitments — while India
remains committed to an “issue-based coalition” model, where cooperation is limited to clearly defined interests.

The Emerging Indian Foreign Policy Doctrine: Ultra-Realism

The paper identifies the emergence of what it calls “ultra-realism” in Indian foreign policy. This is a doctrine that:

●​ Embraces multi-alignment as a permanent state rather than a transitional phase.​

●​ Rejects traditional liberal internationalism and instead prizes sovereignty, national interest, and self-reliance.​

●​ Pursues global recognition not through bloc politics but through calibrated engagement with all sides.​
This doctrine is now embedded in India’s foreign policy posture:

●​ It cooperates with the US in the Quad, iCET, and defense.​

●​ It remains in BRICS with China and Russia.​

●​ It balances its interests in the Middle East among the US, Iran, and Israel.​

●​ It keeps diplomatic autonomy even in times of crisis (e.g., neutrality in the Ukraine conflict).​

India increasingly resists any attempts to classify it as a member of the “liberal democratic alliance.” The notion of being “on the same side” as
the US is seen not as a default, but as a conditional, interest-driven arrangement.

The China Factor: Strategic Convergence, Tactical Divergence

China remains a powerful driver of US–India cooperation, but also reveals their limits. The US frames China as a revisionist power challenging
the liberal order. It expects its partners to confront Beijing diplomatically, militarily, and economically.

India, though concerned about Chinese aggression (especially post-Galwan), adopts a more cautious approach:

●​ It avoids direct economic decoupling from China.​

●​ It continues bilateral dialogue and multilateral cooperation with Beijing.​

●​ It does not support militarization of the Quad or Indo-Pacific containment strategies.​

In this context, the Quad serves India’s interests precisely because it is not a military alliance. It allows India to enhance regional stature and
secure public goods (vaccines, tech cooperation) without being tied to any anti-China doctrine.

The Russia Factor: Strategic Hedge and Legacy Partner

India’s deep historical ties with Russia remain a major friction point. India depends on Russian defense systems, especially as it diversifies
away from Western platforms that often come with restrictions or political strings.

During the Ukraine war, India took a principled neutral stance:

●​ It abstained from UN votes condemning Russia.​

●​ It continued oil imports and defense cooperation.​

●​ It argued for dialogue and diplomacy rather than punitive sanctions.​

This angered Washington but reflected India’s commitment to sovereignty and interest-based diplomacy. While the US chose to overlook this
divergence in the short term (thanks to the need for India’s partnership against China), the tension remains a long-term challenge.

Engagement Without Commitment: A New Strategic Template

The article introduces the idea of “engagement sans commitment” as the defining model of Indo–US relations in this new phase. It implies:

●​ Deep engagement across trade, defense, and technology.​

●​ High-level summits and symbolic gestures of trust.​

 ●​ Institutional platforms for long-term cooperation.​

But this engagement is not matched by formal alliance commitments or ideological alignment. India will not be a treaty ally. It will not join
Western-led interventions. And it will resist any encroachment on its domestic politics.

This model serves both sides — for now. The US gains a key partner in Asia without bearing the costs of alliance maintenance. India gains
access to markets, technology, and global legitimacy without compromising autonomy. But this arrangement is fragile: it depends on managing
expectations and recognizing limits.

Conclusion: A Realist Partnership for an Unstable World

The article concludes by arguing that the US–India partnership will continue to deepen, but it must be grounded in realism, not romanticism.
Both sides must abandon the myth of a “natural alliance” based on values and instead build a durable framework based on shared but limited
interests.

India will continue to act as a sovereign power in a multipolar world. The US must accommodate this worldview if it wants a reliable partner in
Asia. Rather than expecting alignment, Washington should invest in frameworks of mutual respect, reciprocity, and flexibility.

This vision of “engagement sans commitment” may not resemble the traditional alliances of the Cold War era — but in an increasingly
fragmented and unstable world, it may be the only way forward.