Jodhamal Youth Conclave ‘22

Establishing morality in mayhem

BACKGROUNG GUIDE

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (LEGAL)

AGENDA: Deliberating upon a legal framework of
regulations apropos to military intervention
with special emphasis on Responsibility to
Protect.

CHAIRPERSON: KARMANYA WAHI

VICE CHAIRPERSON: ATIN WAZIR
RAPPORTEURS: SOHAM MAGAZINE, SANVI ARORA

On gloomy days and avaricious nights

When a country bleeds and people suffer the plight

Only a true leader can bring in a morning bright

 Table of Contents

1. Executive Board’s Surmise on the Agenda

2. About the Committee

3. Introduction to Agenda

4. Case of Iraq

5. Case of Kosovo

6. Case of Rwanda

7. Raid on Entebbe

8. India Bangladesh War

 Executive Board’s Surmise on the
Agenda

In modern and contemporary world, the definition of invasion

and intervention are empirically interchangeable, especially
in geopolitical conflicts and situation. While
etymologically, intervention means ‘the act or fact of
becoming involved intentionally in a difficult situation1’
and invasion means ‘an occasion when an army or country uses
force to enter and take control of another country2’;
virtually, both challenge the Westphalian Sovereignty of a
nation. Hence, in order to elucidate my arguments in this
essay, I will be using both terms interchangeably.

To begin with, I would like to say that on moral and ethical

grounds, it becomes the responsibility of every nation to
protect human beings from crime against humanity and
transgression of their basic human rights. Since 2005, the
United Nations has endorsed ‘Responsibility to Protect’ or
‘R2P’ which inherently make member sates’ fundamental duty
to protect human dignity and integrity, even at the cost of
military intervention.

Though, Article 2(4)3 of UN Charter delineates non-

intervention as its rudimentary meaning and makes invasion
or intervention illegal in any scenario; however, Article
514 of Chapter VII of United Nations Charter gives inherent
right to member states to act militarily in self-defence
against any aggression. Since this article is vaguely
defined, it gives member states a prerogative to launch a
military intervention at the prospects of aggression from
another member state.

Through this, United States and George Bush administration

were able justify their invasion of Iraq and toppling of
Saddam Hussein regime after the terror attacks of 9/11 on
the prospects of arbitrary and barbaric region of Hussein,
presence of WMDs or weapons of mass destruction and
purported links with terror groups like Al-Qaeda. In this
particular case, invasion was neither legitimate as it took
place without the approval of United Nations Security
Council nor was it morally justified as it caused mayhem in
Iraq and increased the death toll from 70,000 in Saddam’s
reign to 100,000 Iraqis and 4500 Americans in the aftermath.

While Iraq may have faced severe ramifications of

intervention, Rwanda, on the other hand, had to bear the
severe consequences of non-intervention of international
community in 1994 which resulted in a genocide of Tutsi
community5.

Even if we take the example of Kosovo armed conflict of

1999, we can observe that it was a battle for humanity and
not territory, bereft of any cupidity. The harrowing
campaign launched by Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević’s
forces against Kosovo Liberation Army who were seeking
autonomy and independence lead to thousands of deaths and
internal displacement of nearly 1.5 million people. The
campaign’s modus operandi was to kill or expel as many as
Kosovo Albanians as possible. It was “Serbrenica, all over
again.”

The conflict would have exacerbated had NATO (North Atlantic

Treaty Organization) not intervened with its air-strikes and
economic sanctions. Though this was done without the
approval of UN Security Council, yet, it was welcomed by the
international community including Secretary General Kofi
Annan. ‘This was morally legitimate.’

“We had to make clear that the rights of sovereign states to

non-interference in their internal affairs could not
override the rights of individuals to freedom from gross and
systematic abuses of their rights.”-Former Secretary General
of United Nations Kofi Annan

Through the examples of Rwanda and Kosovo, we have

established that invading another country on the pretext of
Responsibility to Protect is not only legitimate but also a
fundamental duty of member states. We have also observed
that it is important to discern the intentions of the member
states in their exercise of R2P as we can see in the case of
Iraq, acrimonious relations between George W. Bush
administration and Saddam Hussein may have been a salient
aspect of intervention.

Another example can be given of Muammar Gaddafi and Libya

which was theoretically and legally legitimate as it
occurred with the approval UN Security Council in 2013 and
passing of Resolution 1973 and with aim of ‘precluding
further attacks on civilians’. Michael Poznansky argues in
his book ‘In the Shadow of International Law’ that the claim
of the White House apropos to Gaddafi massacring people of
Benghazi was antithetical to the reality. The New York
Times reported that Gaddafi’s threats were aimed at rebel
groups and not at civilians, he in fact was willing to give
amnesty to all those who laid down their arms. The
international intervention in Iraq and Libya were contingent
upon their leaders’ acrimonious relationships with the west
and not on fostering fraternity in a fractured world.

This observation eventually led to many jocular and

facetious remarks such as “Oil is discovered in Antarctica.
The murderous regime of penguins is going to be overthrown,
says US Department of State.”

The above also explains the recalcitrance of the world

community in engaging in crisis over East Timor. After the
fall of Suharto, many regions of Indonesia long suppressed
and deprived of their cultural identity started seeking
autonomy. East Timor was one of them. In the referendum
held, 78.4% voted for autonomy and this led to a massive
violent conflict. Since US didn’t want to lose an important
ally (Indonesia), it had to be emphatically pacified into
pressurizing President B.J. Habibie to withdraw all
Indonesian forces from East Timor. The international
community’s reticence in engaging in Darfur is another
vindication of the above observation.

We can conclude from the above arguments that it is

legitimate for one country to intervene or invade another
country with the intention of establishing peace at the
hearth of chaos on the pretext of Responsibility to Protect.

“WE THE PEOPLE” in the United Nations Charter doesn’t

distinguish between nationalities and hence, member states
are given the responsibility of upholding Universal
Declaration of Human Rights universally without any
prejudice of nationalities.

Apart from R2P, other scenarios which allow countries to

intervene is ‘right to rescue’ wherein each member state has
a moral duty to protect and rescue its citizens envisaged in
a conflict-ridden state. This may partially invade the
sovereignty of the country but stands legitimate, both
legally and morally. One of the most prominent examples of
this is Raid on Entebbe in 1979 by Israel to rescue its
citizens kept as hostages in Uganda. Idi Amin had allegedly
supported the hijacking. During the Operation (Thunderbolt),
Israel destroyed nearly 11 MIG-21s of Ugandan Air Force
along with killing 45 soldiers of Ugandan Army. This
The third scenario, though has no legal framework or
legitimacy, is when distress caused by the internal matters
of a state effects its neighbouring state. For instance, the
involvement of India in the Bangladesh Liberation War may
well be justified as the influx of nearly 6 million
Bangladeshi immigrants into West Bengal was causing acute
distress to the Indian economy and infrastructure in 1971.
The obstination of West Pakistan in denying political
representation to East Pakistan sowed the seeds of
disparity. Moreover, General Tikka Khan’s aggressive and
violent policies in East Pakistan led to mayhem. Though
India’s involvement in training Mukti Bahini (the
Bangladeshi rebel group) and waging a war against Pakistan
in 1971 was a breach of Pakistan’s sovereignty; it was again
ethically and politically justified.

In peroration, one would assume that in the modern and

contemporary world, the international community would have
moral responsibility to intervene in conflicts to uphold the
human dignity; sometimes invading another nation may be the
only viable option but it should be done with the aim of
rebuilding and not reshaping the state or its people. This
act should be bereft of any avariciousness or greed.
Fostering fraternity in a fractured world should be a moral
navigator in international politics and the world should
stand in morality over rapacity and solidarity over
disparity. Through this, one would be able to justify the
legitimacy of invasion of a country.

Note: The above stated essay is an overview of the topic and

excerpts from the same should not be quoted in the
committee. The above stated paragraph does not delineate the
prespective of the conference.

The delegates are requested to be well-versed with the

background guide. However, excerpts from the background
guide cannot be presented as a viable proof in the
committee.

Happy Researching 😊

See you at the fall!!

At your disposal

Executive Board

ungalegal.jyc22@[Link]
 About The United Nations Legal

The General Assembly, which is constituted of

representatives from each UN Member State, is the principal
deliberative body on issues with regard to international
law. Many multilateral treaties are adopted by the General
Assembly and then made available for signature and
ratification. The Legal (Sixth) Committee aids the General
Assembly's work by giving substantive legal assistance. The
Sixth Committee is the major forum for the General Assembly
to examine legal issues. As one of the main committees of
the General Assembly, all United Nations Member States are
entitled to participation on the Sixth Committee.

The Committee discusses agendas like crimes against

humanity, international terrorism and internationally treaty
frame work and works to solve issues regarding the same with
respect to the power it holds.

The United Nations General Assembly has an express mandate

to promote the progressive development of public
international law as laid out in the Charter of the United
Nations. Specifically, Article 13 of the Charter states that
the General Assembly has the authority to "initiate studies
and make recommendations for the purpose of: (a) promoting
international co-operation in the political field and
encouraging the progressive development of international law
and its codification."

Subsequent practice has interpreted this provision as a

broad authorization to elaborate new treaties on the widest
range of issues, to adopt them, and to recommend them to
states for their subsequent signature, ratification or
accession. While international law-making negotiations take
place in a variety of specialized bodies of the United
Nations, depending on their actual subject-matter, those
negotiations related to general international law are
usually held at the Sixth Committee.

For this year’s conference, the Agenda of the Committee

shall be: Deliberating upon a legal framework of
regulations apropos to military interventions with special
emphasis on Responsibility to Protect.
The agenda will source a bright ray of debate that shall
help the delegates understand legal framework and the very
necessary involvement of the committee in matters such as
military interventions.

Introduction to Agenda

 R2P (Responsibility to Protect)

Each individual State has the responsibility to

protect its populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes,
including their incitement, through appropriate and
necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will
act in accordance with it. The international community
should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to
exercise this responsibility and support the United
Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

The international community, through the United

Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in
accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to
help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this
context, we are prepared to take collective action, in
a timely and decisive manner, through the Security
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including
Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation
with relevant regional organizations as appropriate,
should peaceful means be inadequate and national
authorities are manifestly failing to protect their
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing
and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the
General Assembly to continue consideration of the
responsibility to protect populations from genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the
principles of the Charter and international law. We
also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and
appropriate, to helping States build capacity to
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to
assisting those which are under stress before crises
and conflicts break out.
 R2P stipulates three pillars of responsibility:

PILLAR ONE: Every state has the Responsibility to

protect its populations from four mass atrocity crimes:
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and
ethnic cleansing.

PILLAR TWO: The wider international community has the

responsibility to encourage and assist individual
states in meeting that responsibility.

PILLAR THREE: If a state is manifestly failing to

protect its populations, the international community
must be prepared to take appropriate collective action,
in a timely and decisive manner and in accordance with
the UN Charter.

 Legal Framework

The rules, rights and obligations of companies,

governments, and citizens are set forth in a system of
legal documents called a legal framework. Documents in
the legal framework include a country’s constitution,
legislation, policy, regulations and contracts. Laws
and policy are supposed to have more authority than a
contract. However, contracts can also be written to
explicitly override the laws and regulations. Legal
documents that cover broad principles, like
constitutions, are generally more difficult to change.
More specific documents, like laws and contracts, can
often be more easily amended. Countries with detailed
laws and policies often have more stable and
predictable legal frameworks than those that leave more
aspects open for negotiation in individual contracts.

 Meaning of Military Intervention, military invasion and

Westphallian Democracy

International military intervention is the

movement of troops or forces of one country into the
territory or territorial waters of another country, or
military action by troops already stationed by one
country inside another, in the context of some
political issue or dispute. While an invasion is a
military offense in which large numbers of combatants
of one geopolitical entity aggressively
enter territory owned by another such entity, generally
with the objective of either: conquering; liberating or
re-establishing control or authority over a territory;
forcing the partition of a country; altering the
established government or gaining concessions from said
government; or a combination thereof. An invasion can
be the cause of a war, be a part of a larger strategy
to end a war, or it can constitute an entire war in
itself. Due to the large scale of the operations
associated with invasions, they are
usually strategic in planning and execution.

The basis of modern international relations was

established by the 1648 Westphalian Peace Treaties,
which mark the birth of nation states as the privileged
and primary actors, replacing the medieval system of
centralized religious authority with a decentralized
system of sovereign states as the sole legitimate form
of sovereign authority. The Westphalian state-centric
system was based on some new principles, including the
sovereignty, sovereign independence and equality of the
nation states, territorial integrity, the equal rights
and obligations of the states, non-intervention in
others’ domestic affairs, and the conduct of inter-
state diplomatic relations through embassies, among
many others. Power was at the center of this system to
regulate inter-state relations in the absence of any
higher systemic authority. As Michael Vaughan argues,
the Westphalian order was important for three reasons.
First, it secularized international politics and
anchored it on the Understanding the Distinguishing
Features of Post-Westphalian Diplomacy 177 tenets of
national interests. Second, it introduced the concept
of sovereignty and the privileged status of the states
without any higher authority standing above them,
unless the state voluntarily assents to such an
authority. Third, it accepted the states as sovereign
supreme authorities within their borders with
legitimate authority over all inhabitants living there,
and promoted a conception of international society
based on the legal equality of the states. Referring to
this difference between internal and external
sovereignty, domestic politics and foreign policy
emerged as two distinct and independent domains for the
nation states. Thus, the emergence of similar
contrasts, i.e. between national and international,
internal politics and foreign policy, world politics
and world economics, inside and outside, etc., has
become one of the characteristics of the Westphalian
system
 Iraq

The Iraq War was a protracted armed conflict in Iraq from

2003 to 2011 that began with the invasion of Iraq by the
United States–led coalition that overthrew the Iraqi
government of Saddam Hussein. The conflict continued for
much of the next decade as an insurgency emerged to oppose
the coalition forces and the post-invasion Iraqi government.
US troops were officially withdrawn in 2011. The United
States became re-involved in 2014 at the head of a new
coalition, and the insurgency and many dimensions of the
armed conflict continue today. The invasion occurred as part
of the George W. Bush administration’s War on terror
following the September 11 attacks.

In October 2002, Congress granted Bush the power to decide

whether to launch any military attack in Iraq. The Iraq War
began on 20 March 2003, when the US, joined by the United
Kingdom, Australia, and Poland, launched a "shock and awe"
bombing campaign. Iraqi forces were quickly overwhelmed as
coalition forces swept through the country. The invasion led
to the collapse of the Ba'athist government; Saddam Hussein
was captured during Operation Red Dawn in December of that
same year and executed three years later. The power vacuum
following Saddam's demise and mismanagement by the Coalition
Provisional Authority led to widespread civil war between
Shias and Sunnis, as well as a lengthy insurgency against
coalition forces. The United States responded with a build-
up of 170,000 troops in 2007. This build-up gave greater
control to Iraq's government and military, and was judged a
success by many. In 2008, President Bush agreed to a
withdrawal of all US combat troops from Iraq. The withdrawal
was completed under Barack Obama in December 2011

Kosovo
Twenty-two years ago, the first bombs fell on the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia during the night of March 24, 1999.
Over the next seventy-eight days, NATO aircraft flew over
10,000 strike sorties and dropped some 23,000 bombs. This
was a significant effort; by comparison, during the First
Gulf War, coalition forces flew almost 12,000 strategic
sorties over six weeks.

NATO hoped to stop a campaign of ethnic cleansing carried

out by Serbian military and paramilitary forces against
Albanian Kosovars. As NATO Secretary General Javier Solana
stated, Operation Allied Force sought “to halt the violence
and to stop further humanitarian catastrophe.” Over the
course of the crisis, approximately 950,000 Kosovars fled
into Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Almost 600,000
became displaced within Kosovo. In total, some 90 percent of
the Kosovar population fled their homes in the war.

Kosovo is a tantalizing case of success. Even today Kosovar

Albanians speak favorably of America and NATO. After NATO
forces reached Gjakova, Agim Byçi recalled that “then began
joy, merriment and bliss, life, freedom, and gratitude for
the European Union and especially for America.” Under
certain circumstances, and with enough commitment, military
intervention can work and save lives. But we need to look
beyond the assumption that our decisions and actions
determine success or failure, and instead make sure the
dynamics of the local conflict are conducive to an
intervention. Ultimately, not all problems can be solved
with military force. NATO envisioned Operation Allied Force
as a three-day bombing campaign to quickly cause Milošević
to acquiesce to NATO’s demands. NATO planners based the
campaign on Operation Deliberate Force, a two-week operation
in Bosnia that rapidly brought Serbian forces to the
negotiating table at Dayton. Allied Force was supposed to be
a similarly swift jolt of reality to bring Milošević to his
senses. The bombing campaign had a strong start, with
aircraft attacking from bases in Italy, Germany, the United
Kingdom, and the U.S. On the first day, NATO even shot down
three MiG-29s, Serbia’s most advanced fighter. But Milošević
did not give in. Soon NATO leaders agreed to allow
intensified bombing and approved a larger target list. By
May 1, NATO was flying about 200 combat sorties a day. They
bombed petroleum refineries, lines of communication, power
grids, dual-use communications structures, bridges, and
roads. But NATO forces were destroying targets faster than
they could be approved. By the end of the campaign, NATO had
the resources to conduct 1,000 combat sorties a day but
lacked sufficient targets.[22]

As the conflict dragged on and Serbian ethnic cleansing

continued, the strategic rationale behind Allied Force
crumbled. A coercive bombing campaign is ill-suited to
stopping ethnic cleansing. Rather than seeking complete
military victory, Robert Pape explains, “The key to success
in conventional coercion is...the ability to thwart the
target state’s military strategy for controlling the
objectives in dispute. To succeed the coercer must undermine
the target state’s confidence in its own military
strategy.”[23] In this case, Operation Allied Force aimed to
change Milošević’s strategic calculus by increasing the cost
of his ethnic cleansing campaign. Just two days into
Operation Allied Force, General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR), warned CNN, “It was always
understood from the outset that there was no way we were
going to stop these paramilitary forces who were going in
there and murdering civilians.”[24] Bombing campaigns—even
with the best precision weapons—are best at hitting hard
targets or large-scale units–like tank formations, heavy
artillery, or massed infantry. Small units armed with AK-47s
or just machetes are sufficient to carry out ethnic
cleansing. Those are hard to spot and bomb. Milošević
dispersed his troops into the general population, making it
impossible for NATO to bomb them without unacceptable
civilian casualties while still maintaining full operational
capacity.[25] Serbian forces also used urban areas and
Kosovo’s rugged terrain to their advantage.
View fullsize

The aftermath of a missile strike on the government-run studios of Radio Television

Serbia (RTS) in Belgrade. (Emil Vas/Reuters)

After 78 days of bombing, NATO and Serbia signed the

Military Technical Agreement on June 9. The agreement
ordered the cessation of hostilities by Yugoslav and Serb
forces, laid out the phased withdrawal of those forces from
Kosovo, and established NATO’s peacekeeping force, Kosovo
Force.[26] After confirming that “the full withdrawal of the
Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo has begun,” on June 10,
NATO Secretary General Javier Solana ordered a suspension of
NATO bombing operations.[27]

On June 12, NATO forces entered Kosovo and with them came
the first of the returning Kosovar refugees. By the end of
August, almost all of the refugees had returned to Kosovo.
NATO’s job was not done though

Rwandan Genocide

Code Cable, 11 January 1994.

To: Maurice Baril, DPKO, UN, New York.

From: Romeo Dallaire, Force Commander, UNAMIR,

Kigali, Rwanda.

Subject: Request for protection of informant.

Force Commander put in contact with informant by

very very important government politician. Informant is

a top level trainer in the cadre of interahamwe-armed

militia of MRND [the ruling Hutu political party]. He

informed us he was in charge of last Saturday’s

demonstrations . . . [There] they hoped to provoke the

RPF battalion [the unit of the rebel army stationed in

Kigali as part of the peace agreement] to engage

(being fired upon) the demonstrators and provoke a

civil war. Deputies were to be assassinated upon entry

or exit from Parliament. Belgian troops [the core

component of the peacekeeping force] were to be

provoked and if Belgian soldiers resorted to force a

number of them were to be killed and thus guarantee

Belgian withdrawal from Rwanda . . . Since the

UNAMIR mandate he [the informant] has been ordered

to register all Tutsi in Kigali. He suspects it is for their

extermination. Example he gave was that in 20

minutes his personnel could kill up to 1,000 Tutsis.

Informant states he disagrees with anti-Tutsi

extermination . . . Informant is prepared to provide

location of major weapons cache with at least 135

weapons . . . He was ready to go to the arms-cache

tonight . . . It is our intention to take action within the

next 36 hours . . . Recce of armed cache and detailed

planning of raid to go on late tomorrow. Possibility of a

trap not fully excluded . . . Peux Ce Que Veux. Allons-Y.

-KOFI ANAN,INTERVENTION

Starting April 6, 1994, and during 100 days, the Hutu

majority murdered 800,000 Tutsis, or 11 percent of the
population, and 84 percent of the Rwandan Tutsi. 1 The
atrocities begun the day President Habyarimana’s plane was
shot down. The next day, 10 Belgium UN Assistance Mission
for Rwanda (UNAMIR) peacekeepers were assassinated in order
to force a withdrawal. UNAMIR was sent to implement the
peace process in Rwanda. The main countries supporting the
2,500 UN force eventually pulled out, including the United
States. A new mission, UNAMIR II, was finally authorized by
the UN on May 17, 1994, but troops arrived as late as
August, or one month after the end of the genocide. The
Clinton administration agreed to send a small force in
Rwanda to deal with the humanitarian consequences of the
genocide. A minority of 34 percent of the American people
approved of a US intervention.

It is generally agreed that the international community

failed in its responsibility to intervene in the genocide in
Rwanda. (104) Kenneth Kaunda, the former President of
Zambia, has said "I do not know how we could have sunken to
that situation with the rest of the world watching and doing
nothing about it. I think it is unforgivable. I do not know
how we can ever explain that." According to some, the United
States, France, Belgium, Germany, and the United Nations in
particular deserve censure for standing by despite having
significant knowledge of what was occurring inside
[Link] facilitated this lack of response by Western
governments, who could have easily helped to try to stop the
genocide then occurring in Rwanda?

While the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment

of Genocide does not provide a specific mechanism for
intervention in situations of genocide, it has been argued
that there is nonetheless a duty to intervene. Article 8 of
the Convention states that "any Contracting Party may call
upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such
action under the Charter of the United Nations as they
consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of
acts of genocide." Thus, when genocide occurs, states party
to the Convention should take action to prevent and suppress
it.

The United Nations was perhaps best equipped to intervene in

Rwanda. Indeed, throughout 1993, recommendations were made
to the Security Council to send a peacekeeping force to the
country. Even U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
argued in favor of sending a peacekeeping force, as Rwanda
was seen to be on fragile ground during the negotiation, and
the immediate aftermath, of the Arusha Accords. On October
5, the U.N. Security Council (Security Council) passed
Resolution 872 in an attempt to help, but it was an
inadequate response to the deteriorating situation on the
ground in Rwanda.

Right to Rescue (Raid on Entebbe)

Operation Entebbe or Operation Thunderbolt was a counter-

terrorist hostage-rescue mission carried out by commandos of
the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) at Entebbe
Airport in Uganda on 4 July 1976.

A week earlier, on 27 June, an Air France Airbus A300 jet

airliner with 248 passengers had been hijacked by two
members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
– External Operations (PFLP-EO) under orders of Wadie
Haddad (who had earlier broken away from the PFLP of George
Habash), and two members of the German Revolutionary Cells.
The hijackers had the stated objective to free 40
Palestinian and affiliated militants imprisoned in Israel
and 13 prisoners in four other countries in exchange for the
hostages. The flight, which had originated in Tel Aviv with
the destination of Paris, was diverted after a stopover
in Athens via Benghazi to Entebbe, the main airport of
Uganda. The Ugandan government supported the hijackers, and
Dictator Idi Amin, who had been informed of the hijacking
from the beginning, personally welcomed them. After moving
all hostages from the aircraft to a disused airport
building, the hijackers separated all Israelis and several
non-Israeli Jews from the larger group and forced them into
a separate room. Over the following two days, 148 non-
Israeli hostages were released and flown out to
Paris. Ninety-four, mainly Israeli, passengers along with
the 12-member Air France crew, remained as hostages and were
threatened with death.

The IDF acted on information provided by the Israeli

intelligence agency Mossad. The hijackers threatened to kill
the hostages if their prisoner release demands were not met.
This threat led to the planning of the rescue operation.
These plans included preparation for armed resistance from
the Uganda Army.

The operation took place at night. Israeli transport planes

carried 100 commandos over 4,000 kilometers (2,500 mi) to
Uganda for the rescue operation. The operation, which took a
week of planning, lasted 90 minutes. Of the 106 remaining
hostages, 102 were rescued and three were killed. The other
hostage was in a hospital and was later killed. Five Israeli
commandos were wounded, and one, unit commander Lt.
Col. Yonatan Netanyahu, was killed. Netanyahu was the older
brother of Benjamin Netanyahu, who would later become Prime
Minister of Israel. All the hijackers and forty-five Ugandan
soldiers were killed, and eleven Soviet-built MiG-
17s and MiG-21s of Uganda's air force were
destroyed. Kenyan sources supported Israel, and in the
aftermath of the operation, Idi Amin issued orders to
retaliate and kill Kenyans present in Uganda. As a result,
245 Kenyans in Uganda were killed and 3,000 fled the
country.

Operation Entebbe, which had the military codename Operation

Thunderbolt, is sometimes referred to retroactively
as Operation Jonathan in memory of the unit's leader,
Yonatan Netanyahu.
 Indo-Pak War 1971 And Creation of Bangladesh

Prior to Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971, India had no

plans for large scale military action in East Pakistan.
Since the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the primary objective of
the Indian Army Eastern Command was the defense of the
Indian northern and eastern borders, defending the
"Shiliguri Corridor", and on combating insurgencies raging
in Mizoram, Nagaland, Manipur and the Naxalites in West
Bengal. Pakistani Eastern Command plan for the defense of
East Pakistan between 1967 and 1971. A generic
representation, some unit locations are not shown.

Since 1948 bulk of the Pakistani armed forces were stationed

in West Pakistan and the strategic role of the forces in
East Pakistan was to hold out until Pakistan defeated India
in the west. The Pakistan Army Eastern Command had planned
to defend Dhaka until the last by ultimately concentrating
their forces along the "Dhaka Bowl", the area surrounded by
the rivers Jamuna, Padma and Meghna

The main reason Maj. Gen. Rao Farman Ali and Lt. Gen.
Sahibzada Yaqub Khan had opposed military action against
Bengali civilians was the fear of an Indian attack, which
the Pakistan army was woefully unprepared to meet in March
1971. The 14th infantry division with its brigades posted at
Comilla (53rd), Dhaka (57th), Rangpur (23rd) and Jessore
(107th) was the only Pakistani unit in East Pakistan prior
to March 1971. The issue of direct military intervention was
discussed between the Indian military and political
leadership in April 1971. Although some Indian officers
expected early intervention, Indian army command decided
against immediate intervention, and concluded that a full
attack could only take place after 15 November at the
earliest and only after deliberate and extensive
preparations. Indian Army Eastern Command took over
responsibility for East Pakistan operations on 29 April and
on 15 May launched Operation Jackpot, a full-fledged
operation to arm, train, equip, supply and advice the Mukti
Bahinifighters engaged in guerrilla warfare against the
Pakistan armed forces.