Competing or Complementary?

the Interplay between Customary and Formal Justice Systems in

Peacebuilding and Human Rights Protection in East Hararghe, Ethiopia

Abubeker Aman Hussien

College of Social Sciences and Humanities; Haramaya University, Ethiopia.
Phone number: 0943901654
Email: saanooaman6654@[Link] OR amanabubeker2010@[Link]
Abstract

This study examines the dual justice systems in East Haraghe Zone of Oromia regional state,
focusing on the interplay between customary and legal courts in conflict resolution and the
protection of human rights. It highlights how dual justice systems coexist, interact, function
together, their legitimacy and effectiveness in conflict resolution and human rights protection. A
qualitative approach was employed with a case study research design. Relevant data were
collected from both secondary and primary sources, and Legal documents, customary laws, and
court records were analyzed. Specific case studies were assessed and selected based on their
relevance to human rights issues and the type of conflict addressed. Semi-structured interviews,
FGD, case studies, and document analysis were employed. Thematic analysis was employed to
analyze the data. The findings indicate that, the interplay between customary and legal courts in
the study area is complex and multifaceted. While both systems play crucial roles in conflict
resolution and peacebuilding, significant challenges remain in human rights protection The
study identified the complementary and problematic aspects between customary and legal courts
in conflict mitigation, peacebuilding and human rights protection in the study area. Due to the
contradiction and tensions between the two systems human rights violations, double jeopardy
and overturned initial decisions were apparent. Legal ambiguity perceived in the study area,
particularly the overlap between customary and legal courts resulted ambiguity regarding which
legal framework to follow and leaving individuals uncertain about their rights. Ultimately, this
study argues that, bridging the gap between customary and legal courts could enhance the
legitimacy and effectiveness of both systems. The study concludes with recommendations for
enhancing collaboration between customary and legal systems to promote holistic peacebuilding
and human rights protection.

Keywords: Interplay, Peacebuilding, Human rights protection, Dual Justice Systems

1|Page
Introduction

Ethiopia is characterized by a pluralistic justice system in which formal legal institutions and
customary justice mechanisms coexist and interact (Tamene, 2012; Getachew, 2019). This dual
justice arrangement reflects the country’s diverse socio-cultural landscape and long history of
indigenous governance systems (Lahunou, 2016.; Yimer, 2020). On the one hand, the formal
justice system is grounded in codified national laws and administered by state institutions such as
courts, police, and prosecutors (Getachew, 2019). On the other hand, the customary justice
system is embedded in local traditions, norms, and values transmitted across generations and
administered by elders, religious leaders, and community councils (Zehr ,1985; Yimer, 2020).
While formal courts emphasize legal procedures, punishment, and the enforcement of state law,
customary courts primarily prioritize reconciliation, restorative justice, and the restoration of
social harmony (Yimer, 2020).

In the study area, customary justice systems continue to play a central role in resolving disputes,
particularly in rural communities where access to formal courts is limited (Getachew, 2019;
Tamene, 2012). Local conflicts related to land, marriage, inheritance, family relations, and minor
criminal offenses are commonly addressed through customary mechanisms that are culturally
legitimate, accessible, and trusted by the community (Yimer, 2020; Lahunou, 2016). In contrast,
formal legal courts are generally responsible for handling serious criminal and civil cases,
including homicide, major theft, and offenses governed explicitly by national legislation
(Getachew, 2019; Tamene, 2012). Despite this functional division, in practice, the boundaries
between customary and formal justice systems are often blurred, resulting in both cooperation
and competition between the two (Yimer, 2020; Zehr ,1985).

A growing body of scholarly work has examined the role of customary dispute resolution
mechanisms (CDR) in Ethiopia. Notably, Pankhurst and Getachew Assefa (2008), in Grass-roots
Justice in Ethiopia: Understanding Customary Dispute Resolution, provide a comprehensive
analysis of CDR practices across different regions and ethnic groups and explore their
relationship with the formal legal system. However, they also acknowledge that for centuries
customary justice operated informally, without formal legal recognition. Similarly, Endalew
Lijalem (2016) examines Ethiopian customary dispute resolution mechanisms as forms of

2|Page
restorative justice, emphasizing their focus on repairing harm and restoring relationships. Despite
their alignment with restorative justice principles, these mechanisms remain largely
institutionalized within Ethiopia’s formal criminal justice framework.

Although numerous studies have explored customary law and conflict resolution in Ethiopia,
most focus on the positive and complementary aspects of customary systems, with limited
attention to the competitive, contradictory, and problematic dimensions of their interaction with
formal courts (Getachew, 2019; Yimer, 2020). This gap is particularly evident in the East
Haraghe Zone, where complex social relations, diverse communities, and recurrent conflicts
demand a nuanced understanding of how dual justice systems operate in practice. As earlier
scholars have recommended, further empirical research is needed to critically examine the
interface between customary dispute resolution mechanisms and the formal legal structure
(Pankhurst & Assefa, 2008; Gebre et al., 2011).

While previous studies have provided valuable insights into the historical, sociocultural, and
legal foundations of customary dispute resolution in Ethiopia, they have largely overlooked the
interplay between customary and formal courts in relation to peacebuilding and human rights
protection, particularly in East Haraghe. Existing research tends to offer broad national or
regional overviews rather than in-depth, localized empirical analysis (Getachew, 2019; Yimer,
2020; Tamene, 2012; Pankhurst & Assefa, 2008; Gebre et al., 2011). This limitation is especially
significant given the persistent conflicts and plural legal practices within the Oromia National
Regional State.

Recently, the Oromia National Regional State has given increased attention to customary conflict
resolution mechanisms through the establishment of Mana Murtii Aadaa Oromoo, an
institutionalized form of indigenous justice intended to operate at district and kebele levels.
Despite this policy emphasis and institutional expansion, no empirical study has systematically
examined the interaction between Mana Murtii Aadaa Oromoo or customary court and formal
legal courts, particularly in terms of conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and human rights
protection.

3|Page
Studies on Oromo indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms such as those by Dejene (2001),
Desalegn and Seleshi (2007), and Tamene (2012) have examined blood compensation (gumaa),
elders’ councils, and reconciliation practices among the Borana and other Oromo clans. While
these studies provide rich ethnographic and cultural insights, they do not address the roles,
interactions, and tensions between customary and formal justice systems within a contemporary
legal pluralist framework. Consequently, the question of whether these systems operate as
competing or complementary mechanisms in promoting peace and protecting human rights
remains insufficiently explored. The study answered the following research questions:

 What seems like the interaction between customary and legal courts in conflict resolution
and human rights protection?
 How customary and legal courts contribute to conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and human
rights protection in the study area?
 What are the challenges and opportunities associated with the dual justice system in East
Haraghe?
 How the dual justice system can be strengthened for effective conflict resolution,
peacebuilding and human rights protection?

Research Methods

Research approaches/methods are plans and the procedures for research that span the steps from
broad assumptions to detailed methods of data collection, analysis, and interpretation
(Abutabenjeh and Jaradat, 2018). Accordingly, this study adopts a qualitative approach to
provide a comprehensive understanding of the dual justice systems. The study utilized both
primary and secondary data sources. For the study, relevant primary data was collected through
key informant interview and FGD. Secondary data was collected through extensive reading and
analysis of different written materials such as legal documents, court records, books, journals,
articles, thesis, and dissertations, to cross check and corroborate the information that the
researcher obtained from informants.

Ideally one wants to study is the entire population. However, it is unfeasible to do this and
therefore one must settle for a sample (Kothari, 2004). In this study, the researcher used
purposive sampling techniques. Because, the method is very important to find people who are

4|Page
willing to provide validation by virtue of knowledge or experience (Hancock et al., 2009). In this
study, respondents were selected purposively based on their willingness, age (elders),
knowledge, experience and involvement in conflict resolution through customary and legal
courts in the study area.

For this study, the pertinent data collected through interview, Focus Group Discussion and
Document Analysis. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants, including
conflict parties, judges from both legal and customary courts and community leaders. Focus
group discussions were also organized with local residents and conflict parties to understand
their perceptions and experiences with both systems. Moreover, legal documents, court records,
and case studies were reviewed to analyze the procedures and outcomes of both systems. In this
study, a detailed case study of a specific conflict within the study area was used to illustrate the
dynamics between customary and legal courts and how each system responded to the conflict.
The collected data was analyzed thematically in a coherent manner.

Results and Discussion

Legal Pluralism and the Establishment, Structure, and Functions of Customary Courts

In the study area, customary courts (Mana Murtii Aadaa) were established in 2014 in line with the
Oromia Region Customary Courts Proclamation No. 240/2021. This resulted legal pluralism and dual
justice system in Haramaya district. The newly established customary court has two structures namely -
first instance customary court (Mana murtii Aadaa Jalqabaa) and appellate customary court (Mana
murtii Aadaa oldabrafataa). The First Instance Customary Court, found in each kebele, and the
Appellate Customary Court, found at the district level. Informants state that, the chairperson of
the customary court, the elders of the customary court, the customary court secretary, and
Hadhaa siinqee are the major organs of both the first instance and appellate customary courts.

As for the key informants, the election of organs (elders) of both the first instance and appellate
customary courts are led by the coordination of a committee established by district’s Legal
Court. The elders of customary court elected by the people of the district based on age (between
40 and 70 years old); familiarity with and respect for the customary law; social acceptance,
competence and experience in rendering traditional justices; language potential (influent in
Afaan Oromoo) willingness to serve as a customary court elder and political impartiality.
5|Page
Informants stated that, the term of office of the elders of customary court is the same with the
year of service of Abba Gadaa or eight years. However, an elder of customary court against
whom complaint is made due to capacity and ethical limitations will be removed from duty even
before the lapse of their term of office. In Africa, traditional conflict resolution is based on
values, norms, cultures and beliefs as practiced by the members of the community. The methods,
processes and regulations are deeply rooted in the customs and traditions of peoples of Africa
(Choudree, 1999). Similarly, the approaches, procedures and principles of the study area’s
customary court (Mana murtii Aadaa) is extremely embedded in philosophies and values of
Gadaa system.

In the study area, the customary court plays an important role in resolving conflicts at the
community level. Conflict cases are first brought to the First Instance Customary Court by the
victims or the affected parties. This court has jurisdiction over a wide range of cases, particularly
civil and family disputes, such as disagreements related to marriage, inheritance, property, and
other social matters. Informants state that the disputing parties must consent for the Customary
Court to have jurisdiction over them. Conflict case occurred among individuals or group taken to
first instance customary court. Elders of the court listen to both sides, examine the facts of the
case, and apply customary laws and values to reach a decision aimed at restoring harmony and
social relationships. Many disputes are resolved at this level through dialogue and mutual
understanding.

However, disputes that are not resolved at first instance customary court may go to the district’s
appellant customary court. According to informants, any aggrieved party who is not satisfied
with the outcome at any of the first instance customary court may appeal the cases to district’s
appellant customary court. Then after, the elders of appellant customary court will see and
examined the case-based evidences.

Practices and Effectiveness of Conflict Resolution in Customary Courts

Informants highlighted that a key aspect of customary courts is the role of selected elders, who
advocate for values such as peace, tolerance, and mutual understanding. At the conclusion of

6|Page
reconciliation sessions, these elders emphasize the importance of restoring broken relationships
and preventing further conflicts within the community.

Data from focus group discussions reveal that these elders play a significant role in advising the
community on minimizing local disputes. To reduce conflicts, customary courts may order
defendants to fulfill penalties, including compensating the plaintiff for economic damages
through a process known as hirpha. This approach not only addresses individual grievances but
also engages the community in conflict prevention. Hirpha involves the wrongdoer seeking
support from clan or community members, either in cash or kind, to cover the costs imposed by
the court. This process often includes the individual explaining their wrongdoing and the
penalties to the community, thereby fostering accountability and encouraging collective
responsibility in preventing future conflicts. To sum up, the involvement of customary court
elders is crucial for promoting peace and reconciliation, while practices like hirpha enhance
community engagement in conflict resolution.

Customary courts exhibit several strengths in conflict resolution, particularly in their approach to
identifying the genuine sources of conflict and ensuring transparency. Informants noted that the
primary goals of these courts are to eliminate the root causes of disputes, resolve issues honestly,
and consider the perspectives of everyone involved in the process. When faced with complex
matters requiring deeper investigation, customary court elders actively seek input from
community members to uncover the underlying causes of conflict. Understanding these causes is
essential for prevention; they can be categorized into realistic causes, often linked to material
scarcity, and non-realistic causes, typically stemming from emotional expressions like anger
(Jeong, 2008). Jemila (2014) further highlights that customary courts play a crucial role in
identifying both proximate and permissive causes of conflict, as well as facilitating post-conflict
reconstruction and comprehensive healing.

Data from focus group discussions and interviews indicate that customary court elders encourage
the presence and active participation of the victim, the offender, their families, and other
community members in the resolution process. Elders allow conflict parties the freedom to share
their narratives and express their feelings, promoting a thorough exploration of the situation.
This open dialogue is aimed at uncovering the whole truth behind the wrongdoing, ensuring that

7|Page
all aspects of the conflict are addressed. To sum up, the strengths of customary courts in conflict
resolution lie in their focus on root causes, community involvement, and the promotion of
transparent and honest dialogue among all parties.

In customary courts, oath-taking is a common practice used in conflict resolution, applicable in

both initial and appellate proceedings. During this process, the plaintiff may take an oath to
affirm the truth of their claim, while the defendant is similarly expected to swear an oath to prove
their innocence. A failure to respond to an oath is generally interpreted as an admission of guilt.
Oath-taking serves as an extrajudicial method that assists customary court elders in identifying
weaknesses in the conflict. In the study area, elders employ various cultural objects such as
knives, dry wood, stones, and other materials during the oath-taking process, which adds a
traditional element to the proceedings (see figure 1). Generally, oath-taking in customary courts
is a significant aspect of conflict resolution, facilitating truth verification and helping elders
assess the integrity of the parties involved.

Cooperation and Contestation between Customary Courts and Formal Legal Systems

The interplay between customary courts and legal courts in conflict resolution and peacebuilding
within the study area is complex and multifaceted. Both systems fundamentally aim to settle
conflicts and prevent crime, leading to both cooperation and challenges in their interactions. One
cooperative aspect is the election of elders for the First Instance and Appellate Customary
Courts. Informants indicate that the elections of customary elders are coordinated by a committee
established by the legal court. This collaboration helps ensure that customary courts are staffed
with respected and knowledgeable elders. Another area of interaction involves the transfer of
cases and the notification of decisions between the customary and legal courts. Informants report
that cases are often transferred in various contexts, such as when disputing parties invite
customary court elders to intervene, or when elders persuade disputants to move their case from
the formal legal court to the customary court. Another area of cooperation between customary
courts and formal legal courts is the enforcement of judgments issued by the elders of the
customary court. Informants indicated that the customary court employs traditional structures,
such as ‘Foollee,’ ‘Jaallaba,’ ‘Jalkaawaa,’ and ‘Makkala,’ to implement its judgments when a
defendant fails to comply. However, if it becomes difficult to enforce the judgment through these

8|Page
customary structures without violating the defendant's human rights, the customary court will
send a copy of the judgment to the legal court for enforcement. Regarding the implementation of
customary court judgments by the legal court, the president of the legal court stated:

The customary court and the legal court collaborate in several ways. For instance,
employees of the legal court oversee and manage the entire election process of
customary court elders. Additionally, the formal legal court supports and collaborates
with the customary court in executing its decisions. In cases where defendants reject the
decisions made by the customary court, the legal courts may accept and implement these
decisions, provided that the judgments do not violate the human rights of the defendant.

Informants argued that neither institution can succeed without the other. The formal legal system
relies on its own mechanisms, such as police and military forces, to maintain order. In contrast,
the customary court draws on its experience and traditional authority to foster harmonious
relationships among the community and strengthen social cohesion.

In spite of the various areas of cooperation between customary courts and formal legal systems,
significant challenges and competition persist. These challenges include mutual undermining,
confusion and disputes over jurisdiction, double jeopardy, a lack of mutual trust, and the failure
of both systems to effectively resolve certain disputes. Participants in focus group discussions
(FGDs) highlighted that, while there are numerous areas of collaboration, the two systems often
undermine each other. Formal legal courts may hinder the activities of customary courts by
disregarding the decisions made by customary court elders under the pretext of upholding human
rights.

There have been numerous reports of disputants appealing to state courts after having been found
guilty by the decisions of customary court elders. Informants stated that, this was especially the
case with disputants who supposedly did not have the truth on their side and hoped to win a case
through corruption. This dynamic not only erodes the authority of customary courts but also
contributes to a pervasive sense of distrust between the two systems, ultimately undermining the
goal of providing justice to all parties involved.

Case Study: 1 land Dispute

9|Page
 A land dispute arose between two farmers in the Haramaya rural village of East
Haraghe Zone. The case was initially brought before a customary court, where local
elders carefully deliberated and issued a judgment grounded in the community's customs
and traditions. However, one of the farmers, dissatisfied with the outcome, decided to
appeal to a formal court. This farmer argued that the decision of the customary court
violated his human rights, referencing specific provisions of the Ethiopian Constitution
and international human rights law. Subsequently, the legal court in Haramaya district
examined the appeal. The farmer contended that the customary court's ruling was unfair
and discriminatory, asserting that he had not received a fair hearing in the initial
proceedings. In light of these arguments, the formal court, influenced by the human
rights claims, ultimately overturned the decision made by the customary court and issued
a new ruling.

The aforementioned case study, highlights the tension between customary court and formal legal
systems, particularly in the context of human rights. As we can understand from the above case
study, the overturned initial decision of the customary court undermines the authority of the
customary court and erodes the trust of the community in its ability to resolve disputes
effectively. As clearly stated in the above case study, sometimes dissatisfied party's use of human
rights arguments to challenge the customary court's decision and particularly the formal court's
intervention can erode the legitimacy of customary courts and undermine their ability to resolve
disputes peacefully. To sum up, the aforementioned case study illustrates the complex interplay
between customary and formal legal courts in the study area. While both systems have their
strengths and weaknesses, it is essential to find ways to harmonize them and ensure that justice is
served in all cases.

Confusion and dispute over jurisdiction are another problematic area among customary and legal
court in the study area. There exist cases that neither the formal nor the customary legal system
wish to deal with, as they are considered as trivial. Informants stated that, plaintiffs have
complained to the court that the police and public prosecutors do not accept cases that they
consider unimportant, such as verbal insult, personal quarrels, minor assault, petty theft and petty
damage to property. Instead of taking the plaintiffs’ statements, they usually send them back to

10 | P a g e
the community to have the case resolved by first instance customary court. The customary elders,
however, are also sometimes unwilling to deal with such minor cases.

Disputes between spouses provide another kind of cases that both systems do not like to deal
with. When, for example, women reported that they were insulted or harassed by their husbands
or close relatives without being able to provide strong evidence, the offices of prosecution and
women’s affairs sometimes send them to the customary elders, whom they consider better suited
to settle private disputes. Customary elders, however, are sometimes reluctant to deal with
marital and domestic disputes.

Another confusion is caused by the fact that aspects of the civil law fall into the sphere of
personal and family law. The 1995 FDRE Constitution and the 2001 Constitution of Oromia
have allowed customary courts to deal with personal and family matters, with the consent of the
parties in dispute. They left particulars to be determined by law, but this issue has so far not been
addressed by the concerned bodies. Thus, there is some uncertainty and confusion on the side of
elders to clearly identify matters that fall within their jurisdiction.

In the study area, In the case of serious crimes (homicide and bodily injury), double jeopardy can
be observed even though Art. 23 of the 1995 Ethiopian Constitution and the 2001 Revised
Constitution of Oromia state that no one will be subjected to double jeopardy for the same
offense if found guilty. At the same time, the Ethiopian law gives an exclusive jurisdiction over
such criminal cases to the formal law. One of the interviewed customary elders had this to say:

A man killed his neighbor in a rural area of Kersa district of Haraghe zone in 2016.
Their initial disagreement originated from a boundary issue concerning agricultural
land. The customary court settled the dispute by paying the victims' families a blood
price. Following the customary elders' resolution of the dispute, the legal court reopened
the case by the name of human rights and punished the defendant to 12 years in
imprisonment.

Absences of boundary between legal and customary court is another problematic area.
Informants indicated that there is no clear distinction between the formal legal system and
customary courts in their operations. This lack of boundaries has resulted in unnecessary
interventions by legal courts into customary court matters under the pretext of human rights

11 | P a g e
protection. Consequently, conflict parties sometimes face double jeopardy due to this overlap.
Article 23 of the 1995 Ethiopian Constitution and the 2001 Revised Constitution of Oromia state
that no one shall be subjected to double jeopardy for the same offense if found guilty. However,
in the study area, many disputants have experienced double jeopardy in the name of human
rights protection. Informants noted that the complex interplay between customary and formal
legal courts often leads to overlapping jurisdictions, resulting in confusion and potential
injustice.

Case Study 2: The Land Dispute in rural village

A family in Kombolach district had traditionally owned a piece of land for generations.
However, a dispute arose with a neighboring family who claimed ownership based on a
recent government land allocation. The families initially sought resolution through the
local customary court and brought their conflict case to Adu Bate first install customary
court. After hearing the case, based on local customs and traditions customary elders
reached on decision and the land was allocated to the original owners. Dissatisfied with
the customary court's decision, the neighboring family filed a case in the Kombolach
district formal court system. The formal court, unaware of the previous customary
resolution, proceeded to hear the case and issued a conflicting decision.
As illustrated in the case studies above, overlapping jurisdictions lead to confusion, delays, and
unnecessary legal costs. This situation not only creates uncertainty but also hinders the resolution
of disputes, resulting in inconsistencies in the application of justice and undermining the
effectiveness of both systems. In summary, these case studies highlight the significant challenges
posed by the overlap between customary and formal legal systems in the study area. To address
this issue, it is essential to clarify the roles and responsibilities of each system, establish effective
communication channels between them, and promote a more integrated approach to justice
delivery.

The unclear mandate of customary courts poses significant challenges in their relationship with
legal courts. Informants noted that there are no clear and limited directives governing the
operations of customary courts. This ambiguity has led to various problems between the two
systems. Due to the lack of a well-defined policy and mandate, elders in customary courts
sometimes attempt to resolve all types of conflicts, including serious criminal cases such as

12 | P a g e
homicide and physical injury. Informants also mentioned that, because both customary and legal
courts coexist, disputants may shift their cases from one court to the other if they are dissatisfied
with a judgment. This practice can undermine the legitimacy and credibility of both systems,
adding unnecessary time, expense, and complexity to legal proceedings.

The other problems created due to lack of clear policy directions is that, customary courts cannot
resolve any conflict without the consent of both conflict parties. For instance, if the defendant
has no interest to settle his case by customary courts they couldn’t operate. One of the
interviewed customary elders had this to say: Nuti Abbootin mana murtii Aadaa akka namaa
milaa tokkooti. Literally meaning, we the elders of customary courts are just like a man with one
leg. Informants said that, customary court cannot resolve conflict if one of the conflict parts has
no interest to solve his conflict case through customary court. To sum up, lack of capacity
building training, absences of clear boundary between legal and customary court, lack of clear
policy directions are affecting the functionality of both customary and legal courts in the study
area.

Conclusion

The dual justice systems in the study area reflect a complex relationship between customary and
formal legal courts, marked by both cooperation and tension. While the two systems collaborate
through case transfers, joint dispute resolution, and crime prevention, they also face challenges
such as mutual undermining and unclear jurisdiction, particularly in personal, family, and minor
criminal matters. The study finds that customary courts play a crucial role in local conflict
resolution through reconciliation and community participation. However, overlapping
jurisdictions, lack of clear legal boundaries, and human rights–based interventions by formal
courts often result in double jeopardy, weakened authority of customary courts, and reduced
public trust. To address these challenges, the study emphasizes the need for clear legal
frameworks, defined jurisdictions, and better harmonization between the two systems to
strengthen justice delivery, peacebuilding, and human rights protection.

Recommendations

Based on the results, the following recommendations were made and forwarded;

13 | P a g e
 Clearly define the jurisdiction and responsibilities of customary and formal courts to
avoid overlap and confusion.
Establish clear boundaries on the types of cases handled by each system, especially
serious crimes.
Provide regular capacity-building training for customary court elders on human rights,
conflict resolution, and legal principles.
Allocate adequate resources to strengthen the operational capacity of customary courts.
Formalize cooperation and communication mechanisms between customary and formal
legal systems.
Develop clear and transparent case-transfer procedures between the two systems.
Implement legal reforms to align customary practices with national and international
human rights standards.
References
Ajayi, A. T., & Buhari, L. O. (2014). Methods of conflict resolution in African traditional
society. African research review, 8(2), 138-157.
Assefa, A. (2001). Indigenous mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflict: The
experience of the Oromos in Ethiopia. In Workshop on Conflict in the Horn: Prevention
and Resolution organized by the Ethiopia Chapter of OSSREA.
Bahta, G. T. (2017). Popular dispute resolution mechanisms in Ethiopia: trends, opportunities,
challenges and prospects. African Journal of International and Comparative Law, 25(2),
234-255.
Boege, V. (2006). Traditional approaches to conflict transformation: potentials and limits.
Berghof research center for constructive conflict management. Retrieved from
[Link]
Creswell, J. W. (2003). Research design: quantitative, qualitative and mixed approaches (2nd
ed.). London: Sage publications.
Emanuel, M. and Ndimbwa, T. (2013). Traditional mechanisms of resolving conflicts over land
resource: a case of Gorowa community in Northern Tanzania. International Journal of
Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, (3)11, 214-224.
Etefa, T. (2012). Integration and peace in East Africa: a history of the Oromo Nation. Springer.
Getachew, M. (2019). The role of customary justice in Ethiopia: Challenges and opportunities.
African Journal of Legal Studies, 5(3), 269–290.
Henkeman, S. R. (2012). Restorative justice as a tool for peacebuilding: South African study
(Doctoral dissertation).

14 | P a g e
Jemila, A. (2014). Women and Indigenous conflict resolution institutions in Oromia. Experience
from siiqqee of the Wayyuu Shanan of Arsi Oromo: In Adami Tulluu Gidduu Kombolcha
District of Oromia regional state. (Unpublished master’s thesis). Addis Ababa University,
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Jeong, W. (2008) Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis, SAGE Publications Ltd,
London, California, New Delhi & Singapore, 2008
Kothari, C.R. (2004). Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques (2nded.).New Delhi:
International Publishers, Ltd.
Lahunou, A. (2016). Role of state weakness in customary conflict resolution: Case of Kenya and
Tanzania.
Lijalem, E. (2016). Ethiopian customary dispute resolution mechanisms: Forms of restorative
justice. African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 16(1), 63-84
Macfarlane, J. (2011). Working towards restorative justice in Ethiopia: Integrating traditional
conflict resolution systems with the formal legal system. Cardozo Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 12(2), 327-364.
Mellese, M. (2008). The Role of Elders in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Walayta People of
Southern Ethiopia. Addis Ababa; Master Printing Press
Pankhurst, A and Getachew. (2008). Grass-roots justice in Ethiopia: The contribution of
customary dispute resolution. Addis Ababa, Centre francais d’études ethiopiennes.
Yimer, B. (2020). Restorative justice practices in Ethiopia’s customary legal systems. Bergen
Journal of Comparative and Local Criminal Justice, 2(1), 45–63.
Yonas, T. (2012). An assessment of indigenous conflict resolution mechanism of Mezard in rural
Alamata woreda, Tigray National Regional State, Ethiopia. (Unpublished master’s
thesis). Mekele University, Ethiopia.

15 | P a g e