Reservations, Efficiency, and the Making of Indian Constitution

The notion that reservation is contrary to efficiency and merit has been invoked consistently.
Even the Supreme Court of India seems to have agreed withthis proposition in some
judgments, as it held that Article 16(4), which provides for reservation in services, would be
limited by Article 335, which mentions the term “efficiency of administration” in the
Constitution. This paper explores the Constituent Assembly Debates to show that the
Constitution framers did not subject reservations to the test of efficiency or merit. In addition,
“efficiency of administration” mentioned under Article 335 cannot be treated as an
exclusionary construct, as it was done in pre-independence era.

In the past seven decades of constitutional jurisprudence on reservations, the Supreme Court
of India has consistently referred to the notions of “efficiency” and “merit,” while
­adjudicating the validity of various reservation policies. The Court has held in several
judgments (Indra Sawhney and Others v Union of India and Others 1993; M Nagaraj and
Others v Union of India and Others 2006) that the reservation policies made under Article
16(4)1 of the Constitution would be limited by Article 335,2 which provides for “maintenance
of efficiency of administration,” while considering the claims of the Scheduled Castes (SCs)
and the Scheduled Tribes (STs) in the making of appointments to public services and posts.
This was done while the Constitution does not define the term “efficiency of administration.”
This gap in interpretation was filled by a two-judge bench in the B K Pavitra (II) v Union of
India (2019), as it held that “efficiency of adminis­tration in the affairs of the union or of a
state must be defined in an inclusive sense, where diverse segments of society find
representation as a true aspiration of governance by and for the people.”
In this paper, I have analysed the Constituent Assembly Debates to argue that contrary to
what the larger benches of the Supreme Court assumed, the framers of the Constitution did
not envisage that Article 16 would be limited by or subjected to Article 335. Furthermore,
using B R Ambedkar’s writings, I have critiqued the notion of “efficiency of administration,”
which has often been employed to cast aspersions on the concept of reservation. The phrase
“efficiency of administration” was used as an exclusionary construct in the colonial and
precolonial eras. This exclusionary understanding, I have ­argued, was rejected during the
framing of the Constitution, and that thus the term “efficiency” cannot be used against the
idea of reservations to exclude certain communities from ­public services.
Origins of Articles 16(4) and 335
During the framing of India’s Constitution, the Constituent ­Assembly, through a resolution on
24 January 1947, had appoin­ted an Advisory Committee to assist the assembly by drawing
upon a “list of fundamental rights, clauses for protecting minorities, and a scheme for the
administration of Tribal and Excluded Areas.” The Advisory Committee, consisting of the
members of the assembly, divided its work between different subcommittees (Austin 1999:
77–78). When the subcommittee on fundamental rights prepared a clause on the right to
“equality of opportunity,” the subcommittee of ­minorities recommended the addition of a
proviso to this initial clause, to enable the government to reserve a certain proportion of posts
in public services for the “minorities.” This was suggested to meet the claims of minorities to
special representation in the services (Shiva Rao 1968: 192–93). A red­rafted version of the
clause, which then came before the Advisory Committee on 22 April 1947, provided for the
state to make “provision for reservations in favour of classes not adequ­ately represented in
the public services” (Shiva Rao 1968: 194).
Ambedkar, who was then a part of the Advisory Committee, supported this clause. He,
however, suggested deleting the words “not adequately represented,” and that the clause be
rephrased to provide reservations “in public services in favour of classes as may be
prescribed by the State” (Shiva Rao 1968: 194). He argued that if the words “not adequately
represented” were retained, any reservation made by the state “would be open to challenge in
the court of law on the ground that the classes in whose favour reservation was made
happened to be in fact already adequately represented” (Shiva Rao 1968: 194). Ambedkar
was thus opposed to this issue being open to​
“judicial interpretation.” He later accepted the phrase “classes which in the opinion of the
state are not adequately represented,” as suggested by K M Munshi, who was also in the
Advisory Committee.
The clause (numbered 5) was included in the Interim Report on Fundamental Rights, which
was tabled by Sardar Vallabh­bhai Patel (as Chairman of the Advisory Committee) before the
Constituent Assembly on 29 April 1947. The clause, listed in the “justiciable fundamental
rights” section of the Interim Report, was discussed, and adopted by the assembly on 30 April
1947. It was later reassigned as Article 10(3) of the draft Constitution prepared by the
Ambedkar-led Drafting Committee with one modification: instead of the words “in favour of
any particular class of citizens,” the words “in favour of any backward class of citizens” were
inserted (Shiva Rao 1968: 194).
A slightly different recommendation for maintaining proper representation of “minorities” in
services was made in a separate report. On 27 August 1947, Sardar Patel placed before the
­assembly the subcommittee report on minority rights, which covered the claims made by
several minority groups: Anglo–Indians, Parsees, Plains' tribesmen in Assam, Indian
Christians, Sikhs, Muslims, and SCs. Clause 9 of the report provided that both, in the central
and provincial services, “the claims of all the minorities shall be kept in view in making
­appointments to these services consistently with the consideration of efficiency of
administration” (CAI 1947). It was noted in the report that an “appropriate provision shall be
embodied in the Constitution or a schedule thereto to this effect” (CAI 1947).
It was from here that the term “efficiency of administration” was brought in the text of the
draft Constitution. It, however, was not defined. The report recorded that the said
recommendation was made in response to a proposal submitted to the subcommittee on
minorities, which sought “a constitutional guarantee of representation in the public services
of the mino­rity communities in proportion to their population” (CAI 1947). While “such a
guarantee” was unheard of in “any other ­constitution,” the report recommended that there
should be “exhortation to the Central and Provincial Governments to keep in view the claims
of all the minorities” in making app­ointments to public services “consistently with the
efficiency of administration” (CAI 1947). In making this recommendation, Patel stated that
there is “unanimity between us and the​
communities whose interests are affected” (CAI 1947).
Though “some administrative posts of a higher level” would have to be “filled by
competition, that is, by competitive examination and competitive tests,” Patel noted that
“some concessions” have been made “in the matter of certain communities which require a
little help” (CAI 1947). At this point, V I Muni­swami Pillai, an SC member in the assembly,
remarked that the majority communities must remove from their minds that “those who were
chosen from these communities for high ­offices will not be efficient” (CAI 1947). He wished
that “the claims of the SCs will not be forgotten” by the majority communities. Jaipal Singh,
a tribal leader from erstwhile Bihar, regretted that the “most deserving group of Adibasis
[tribals] has been completely left out of the picture” of reservation in services at that moment
(CAI 1947).3 The said clause was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 28 August 1947
and was subsequently renumbered as draft Article 296.
As it is clear, draft Articles 10(3) and 296 were discussed and adopted separately by the
Constituent Assembly. Article 10(3) was included in the chapter on justiciable fundamental
rights and did not contain the term “efficiency of administration.” Article 296, adopted on a
later date, did not refer to Article 10(3) at all. Moreover, Article 10(3) explicitly provided for
reservation in services for backward classes, while Article 296 made only an assurance that
the claims of minorities would be taken into consideration. It did not explicitly guarantee
reservation for minorities in the services. It appears that the draughtsperson of the
Constitution had kept the scope of draft Article 10(3) on a higher pedestal in comparison to
Article 296. In ­later days in the assembly, there were several deliberations on the relation
between draft Articles 10(3) and 296.
Draft Articles 10(3) and 296
The draft Article 10(3) then came up for consideration before the Constituent Assembly on
30 November 1948. Few members suggested amendments for the deletion of Clause (3).
­Lokanath Misra, a Brahmin from Odisha, argued that the clause puts “a premium on
backwardness and inefficiency,” and also because it was “not a fundamental right of any
citizen to claim a portion of state employment, which ought to go by merit alone” (CAI
1948). Damodar Swarup Seth, a Vaishya from United Provinces, felt that reservation in
services meant the “very negation of efficiency and good government.” The said amendments
and assertions were rejected by the Constituent Assembly.
Some members from the SC community expressed their app­rehension regarding the scope of
the word “backward” in draft Article 10(3), and sought an addition of the term “SCs” after
“backward classes.” One such member, P Kakkan from Madras, expressed disappointment
that the SC candidates “hitherto did not get proper appointments in government services,”
and did not get justice “even in the matter of promotions” (CAI 1948). Muniswami Pillai
argued that “their case must be treated with generosity.” H J Khandekar, an SC member from
the Congress party, endorsed the reservation provision in Article 10(3), as he narrated that the
SC candidates “are not selected for the posts” because of the biases of the recruitment
panellists.
Responding to their fears, K M Munshi (now a member of the Drafting Committee) said that
the SCs would always be inc­luded within the broader “backward class” category for the
purpose of reservation. He made a reference to both draft Articles 10(3) and 296 to assure
that the “House, as constituted at present or hereafter, will [never] make a distinction or
discriminate against the SCs” (CAI 1948). A representation in the state services under draft
Article 10(3), Munshi pointed, is necessary for them, “for it is realised that state services give
a status and an opportunity to serve the country, and this opportunity should be extended to
every community, even among the backward people” (CAI 1948).
However, Munshi did not explain the relation or difference between draft Articles 10(3) and
296. Other members made ­remarks which are relevant to understanding the scope of draft
Article 296, and whether it has a relation with draft Article 10(3). Jaspat Roy Kapoor argued
that the efficiency of the services could be improved if the persons seeking​
employment in the provinces had adequate knowledge of the provincial language, and were
aware of the local conditions. Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru enquired about “the relationship”
between draft Articles 10(3) and 296. According to Kunzru, the minority communities would
get the benefit of reservations only if they were found to be “backward,” as draft Article
10(3) used the word “backward classes,” which was different from the term “minorities” used
in Article 296. As if in response to Kunzru, one member Aziz Ahmad Khan proposed the
omission of the word “backward” from Article 10(3), so that the said article became
consonant with Article 296.
Another member, Mohamed Ismail Sahib, pointed out that since draft Article 296 did not
speak of reservation in services for the minorities, the language in the fundamental rights
chapter should be amended to ensure that “when [Article 10(3)] speaks of reservation, it
means also minority communities,” including Muslims and Christians (CAI 1948). Sardar
­Hukam Singh, a Sikh leader from erstwhile East Punjab, said that the “fate of the minorities”
would be “certainly left in the lurch,” as draft Article 10 does not indicate whether it “would
override Article 296 or article 296 is independent of it” (CAI 1948). He added that if the
conflict between draft Articles 10 and 296 is not reconciled, then the safeguards provided to
minorities under Article 296 would “become illusory.”
In response to all the queries, Ambedkar clarified the difference in the scope of Articles 10(3)
and 296. He explained that the purpose of draft Article 10(3) is to provide “reservations in
favour of certain communities which have not so far had a ‘proper look-in,’ so to say, into the
administration” (CAI 1948). The claims of minorities for reservation, Ambedkar said, were
provided a “special reference” in Article 296, so that the ­constitutional scheme does not omit
the “minorities from consideration.” Article 10(3) was then passed in its tabled version and
was not made subject to Article 296. As a result, the case for representation of SCs and
backward classes was to be specifically addressed under Article 10(3), while Article 296
made a reference for the consideration of the claims of minorities for reservations. Both the
draft articles had different purposes.
The emphasis on the representation of SCs and STs emerged once again in the assembly
during the framing of provisions related to the Public Service Commission. On 23 August
1949, Ambedkar moved a proposal in the form of draft Article 286, defining the scope of the
functions of the commission. While Clause 3a of Article 286 provided that the Union Public
Service Commission or the State Public Service Commission shall be consulted on all matters
relating to methods of recruitment to civil services and for civil posts, Clause 4 disallowed
any such mandatory consultation regarding “the manner in which app­ointments and posts are
to be reserved in favour of any backward class citizens in the Union or a State” (CAI 1949a).
S Nagappa, an SC member from Madras, highlighted the miseries faced by SC candidates
during interviews. Ambedkar noted that the “real method of protection” provided to SCs,
STs, and backward classes, as it was adopted, is to permit the legislature to fix a certain quota
to be filled by these classes.
Dispute over the Language
After the partition of India, the Sardar Patel-led Advisory Committee, as it claimed,
concluded on the consent of the religious minority groups, particularly Muslims and Sikhs,
that they would not be considered for the purpose of reservations. After this development, the
Drafting Committee changed the language of draft Article 296, thereby substituting the word
“minorities” with “SCs and STs.” However, in the Constituent Assembly on 26 August 1949,
Naziruddin Ahmad, on behalf on a minority community, asserted that he had only agreed to
giving up the “question of representation of minorities in the legislature” (CAI 1949b).
In agreement, Sardar Hukam Singh stated the minorities did not agree that “all safeguards
will go or that the minorities are not to be treated as minorities” (CAI 1949b). He pointed that
though the original version of draft Article 296 was neither a fundamental right, nor even a
directive principle, its presence in the draft Constitution was a sort of “only comfort of
minorities,” that “in some respects their interests will be cared for” (CAI 1949b). He added
that “if that is also taken away [then] it will be a violation of a gentlemen's agreement.” What
is clear from this speech is that members of minority groups considered the original draft
Article 296 as a form of agreement or a directive, which was never a justiciable right.
Since the changed language of Article 296 created a controversy in the assembly, Ambedkar
formally moved a proposal on 14 October 1949 to substitute the term “minorities” with “SCs
and the Sts.” It is here that one member, Brajeshwar Prasad, moved an amendment to
substitute Ambedkar’s version with a new language which provided that “the maintenance of
efficiency of administration shall be the only consideration” in relation to “appointment to
services and posts in connection with the affairs of the union or of a state” (CAI 1949c).
Prasad’s argument was that only “a handful of people, constituting the cream of the Harijan
society” clamoured for reservation. His amendment and contention on efficiency were
rejected by the assembly.
Another member, Guptanath Singh, moved an amendment which sought to add the words
“and such other castes who are educationally and socially backward” in the draft Article 296.
This amendment, Singh argued, would protect the claims of “agricultural and pastoral
classes,” who were not explicitly covered under the proposed draft article. The said
amendment was also not approved. However, H V Kamath tried to dispel Guptanath Singh’s
“misapprehension” by explaining that the claims of all backward classes are covered under
draft Article 10(3), which “is not a [mere] directive principle of state policy,” but a
fundamental right. Kamath expressed that “if there is no representation for [backward
classes] in the services they can take the government to task on that account” (CAI 1949c).
That right, according to him, “would be an adequate safeguard for them so far as their share
in the services is ­concerned,” irrespective of draft Article 296, which did not ­include the word
“backward” (CAI 1949c).
The assembly eventually adopted Ambedkar’s version of draft Article 296, which used the
words “SCs and STs.” With this, draft Article 296 became a directive or agreement (as it was
already perceived by the members) with the future governments that the claims of SCs and
STs would be taken into consideration for appointments in services. This directive seemed
independent of the mandatory right of representation prescribed by draft Article 10(3), as
demonstrated by Kamath. Furthermore, by rejecting Prasad’s amendment, the Constituent
Assembly did not allow the notion of efficiency to have an overriding effect on the claims of
SCs and STs. Later, draft ­Article 10(3) was numbered as 16(4), draft Article 286 as 320, and
draft Article 296 as 335.
The Broad Scope of Article 16(4)
The Drafting Committee had made an amendment in Clause 4 of Article 320. It added the
words “the members of the SCs or STs or” to the effect that it would not be required to
consult the Public Service Commission reg­arding the manner in which ­appointments and
posts are to be “reserved in favour of the members of the SCs or STs or any backward class
of citizens in the union or states” (CAI 1949d).
When this amended Article 320 came for consideration ­before the Constituent Assembly
during a reading of the draft Constitution on 14 November 1949, Pandit Thakur Das
Bhargava, a Brahmin Congress member from erstwhile East Punjab, moved a proposal for
deletion of the newly added words “the members of the SCs or Sts or” (CAI 1949d).
Bhargava ­argued that Article 16(4) provided for reservations for only “backward class of
citizens” and would, hence not be applicable to the SCs and STs. For them, the only
safeguard, according to Bhargava, is prescribed under Article 335, which only provides for
taking their claims into consideration, and hence they do not have a right of reservation in
their favour. Bhargava’s contention was that the Drafting Committee was trying to do
“smuggling” of the reservation for the SCs and STs by the “back door” of the amended draft
Article 320(4).
He went on to argue that the amended draft Article 320(4) “takes away the effect of Article
335,” which imposes a “positive command” that the claims of the SCs and STs “must be
considered consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administration” (CAI 1949d).
With regard to Article 16(4), Bhargava stated that the “reservation of posts has not been
decided.” He added that if the state did not reserve any posts, then Article 16(4) would
“neither benefit the backward classes nor any other class,” and therefore the Constituent
Assembly was not justified “in having in this clause (4) [of Article 320] a contingency for
which reservation could be made” (CAI 1949d). Bhargava was only in favour of a strict
operation of Article 335, which need not necessarily “be implemented by reservation.”
Bhargava’s contentions were contrary to what was already accepted in the Constituent
Assembly. As Munshi had clarified earlier (on 30 November 1948), the SCs and STs were to
be always treated as a special category within the broader “backward class” category for the
purpose of reservation. Pillai spoke against Bhargava’s amendment, arguing that if it is
accepted, “it will mean that the SCs or Tribes will not count for reservation in the services”
(CAI 1949d). P S Deshmukh​
demanded that in similarity to Article 320(4), the word “backward classes” be added to
Article 335. Khandekar argued that amendments, such as by Bhargava, “are being moved at
this stage to bury down the [SCs].” R K Sidhwa, a Parsi from erstwhile Central Provinces,
opposed Bhargava’s amendment and supported the Drafting Committee, stating that “what
[wrongs have] been done during the past 150 years” must be undone as soon as possible.
Mahavir Tyagi, a Brahmin member from United Provinces, stated that the “communal virus”
in Article 335 was unnecessarily being introduced in another Article 320(4). According to
Tyagi, it was a perception in the assembly that Article 335 was “only a directive article,”
which “directs the policy of future governments,” and thus questioned why a provision
related to reservation was introduced in another article. Responding to Tyagi, Jaipal Singh
strongly objected to the accusations against “the Drafting Committee and the SCs and the Sts
and any other backward classes of aligning ourselves as a communal group” (CAI 1949d). He
stated that if reservations are to be provided for the most backward groups, it must be done
“without any mental reservations.” He closed his speech with a simple message to the
Constituent Assembly: “be generous and mean it.” Supporting the amendment proposed by
Ambedkar, K Santhanam (a Brahmin member from Madras) stated that Article 320(4) was
just “purely consequential to Article 335.” He said that reservations should be made “purely
at the discretion and judgment of either the central or local government” and can be done
under Article 335.
Kunzru gave the clearest explanation on the scope and relation between Articles 320(4), 335
and 16(4). He stated that under Article 16(4), it is not necessary for the central government or
the state government to consult the Public Service Commissions with regard to the
reservation of posts for any or all of the backward classes. The article would apply to the SCs
and STs. Kunzru stated that the term “SC and the STs” has been “specifically mentioned in
several places” in the Constitution to place emphasis on their rights, as “they are believed to
be more backward than the classes called backward according to the official terminology of
the Provincial Governments” (CAI 1949d).
Thus, Article 335 “is of limited application” than Article 16, and that even if there was no
Clause 4 present in Article 320, Clause 3 of Article 320 would be subject “to the provisions
of clause (4) of Article 16 which embodies a fundamental right” (CAI 1949d). According to
Kunzru, an inference may be drawn from Article 335 that “the State has the power to reserve
posts for the SCs and the Backward Tribes,” but it is in Article 16(4) that a power is provided
to the state in clear and “express terms” to make reservations in appointments or posts in
favour of any backward class of citizens. Article 320(4) “is in accord with or that it is
consequential to the power given to the state by Article 16” (CAI 1949d). Kunzru’s
explanation implies that both Articles 320 and 335 would be subject to Article 16(4).
Taking all these concerns and propositions into consideration, the Drafting Committee moved
a revised amendment to the debated version of Article 320(4). The new version of the
amendment provided: “Nothing in clause (3) shall require a Public Service Commission to be
consulted as respects the manner in which any provision referred to in clause (4) of Article 16
may be made or as respects the manner in which effect may be given to the provisions of
Article 335” (CAI 1949e). This amendment came up for consideration before the assembly
on 15 November 1949, where T T Krishnamachari (a member of the Drafting Committee)
made a reference to it. The amendment was adopted by the assembly on 16 November 1949
in the final draft of the Constitution.
The discussion in the Constituent Assembly shows that it was only Article 16(4) which
mandated and empowered the state to make reservations for backward classes of citizens,
including the SCs and STs. Article 320 was consequential to Article 16(4). Article 335, as
pointed out consistently by members—particularly by those opposed to reservation—was
­being treated as a mere directive. The Constituent Assembly never made Article 16(4) subject
to Article 335 or 320, rather accepted it as a stand-alone and overriding provision, as can be
understood by Kunzru’s analysis in the assembly. Reservation, as provided under Article
16(4), was thus not subjected to notion of efficiency mentioned in Article 335.
Debunking the Myth of Efficiency

While the members of the Constituent Assembly congratulated Ambedkar and the Drafting
Committee on the completion of the final draft of the Constitution, Dharanidhar Basu Matari,
a member from Assam, highlighted the plight of the tribals and their expectations from the
Constitution (23 November 1949). He remarked that the “advanced communities will have to
make special efforts, particular sacrifices if the backward classes are to come up” (CAI
1949f). He added that the tribals, who had been neglected and exploited in the past and would
continue to be suppressed, “unless there is special arrangement made for their advancement.”
This can be done, Matari said, only when tribals are recruited: “to all branches of service,
from the lowest to the highest”; “not only in the provinces but also at the centre;” and “not
only should there be a minimum quota fixed for their appointments, but their promotion must
equally be seen to, so that they do not stick where they begin” (CAI 1949f).
“For this to happen,” Matari further added, “the advanced classes must make a sacrifice” and
“recede.” Matari discarded the arguments about “efficiency of administration” as “just
dodges to perpetuate class or territorial interests.” He stated that the so-called upper castes
were benefited in the “jobs, the contacts and the privileges” during the British regime, and
that these “sections that have captured the services will see to it that their superiority is never
threatened or endangered” (CAI 1949f). He, however, hoped that the rights of the tribals
would be protected under the new constitutional regime. Matari was not the first one to
bulldoze the argument of “efficiency of administration.” Ambedkar had been already doing
that for a couple of decades.
The notion of “efficiency of administration” was an exclusionary construct in the colonial
and precolonial eras. It was used by the British to exclude Indians from becoming a part of
the administration. After continuous demands, the case for “Indianisation of services”
(BAWS, Vol 2, p 393) was accepted by the Royal Commission on Public Services in India,
also known as the Islington Commission, in 1915. The proportion between the Indians and
the Europeans in the different services was then given effect to (BAWS, Vol 2, p 393). The
upper castes, who got the benefit of the opening of the services and became part of the British
administration, thereafter, used this colonial notion of “efficiency of administration” against
the inclusion of the lower castes within the services. In his submissions before the Simon
Commission4 in 1928, Ambedkar noted:
It is notorious that the public services of the country in so far as they are open to Indians have
become by reason of various circumstances a close preserve for the Brahmins and allied
castes. The non-Brahmins, the depressed classes and the Mohamedans are virtually excluded
from them. (BAWS, Vol 2, p 394)

Ambedkar further noted that “the Brahmins and the allied castes” opposed the inclusion of
the backward classes within the services on the ground “that the interests of the State require
that efficiency should be the only consideration in the matters of appointment to public
offices.” They relied upon “educational merit” and “competitive examinations” as the “only
test which can be taken to guarantee efficiency” (BAWS, Vol 2, p 394). Ambedkar rejected
this argument, stating unequivocally:
The system of competitive examination relied upon may result in fairness to all castes and
creeds under a given set of circumstances. But those circumstances presuppose that the
educational system of the State is sufficiently democratic and is such that facilities for
education are sufficiently widespread and sufficiently used to permit all classes from which
good public servants are likely to be forthcoming to complete. Otherwise even with the
system of open competition large classes are sure to be left out in the cold. This basic
condition is conspicuous by its absence in India, so that to invite backward classes to rely
upon the results of competitive examination as a means of entry into the public services is to
practise a delusion upon them and very rightly the backward classes have refused to be
deceived by it. (BAWS, Vol 2, p 395)

Questioning Bias, Privilege and Merit

Ambedkar destroyed this myth of efficiency with several arguments. Before the Simon
Commission, he presented a case of “administrative utility” and a “moral case” for the
backward classes to have a “favoured treatment” for their inclusion in the public services.
Ambedkar gave examples from the past of how so-called upper-caste officers acted “to the
aggrandisement of their community and to the detriment of the general public” (BAWS, Vol
2, p 396). For this reason, Ambedkar argued:
[The] disadvantages arising from the class bias of the officers belonging to Brahmin and
allied castes has outweighed all the advantages attending upon their efficiency and that on the
total they have done more harm than good.
The remedy, he thus suggested, was “a proper admixture of the different communities in the
public service”, which will supply “a most valuable corrective to the evils of class bias”
(BAWS, Vol 2, p 396). Ambedkar then argued that the case of exclusion of backward classes
from the administrative services was morally wrong and evil in the same way as exclusion of
Indians from public services. He posed several questions to the opponents of inclusion of
backward classes within public services:
Now what one would like to ask those who deny the justice of the case of the backward
classes for entry into the public service is whether it is not open to the backward classes to
allege against the Brahmins and allied castes all that was alleged by the late Mr Gokhale5 on
behalf of Indian people against the foreign agency? ... Can [the backward classes] not
complain that as a result of their exclusion they are obliged to live all the days of their lives in
an atmosphere of inferiority, and that the tallest of them has to bend in order that the
exigencies of the existing system may be satisfied? Can they not assert that the upward
impulses which every school-boy of the Brahmanical community feels that he may one day
be a Sinha, a Sastri, a Ranade or a Paranjpye, and which may draw forth from him the best
efforts of which he is capable is denied to them? ... Can they not lament that the moral
elevation which every self-governing people feel cannot be felt by them and that their
administrative talents must gradually disappear owing to sheer disgust till at last their lot as
hewers of wood and drawers of water in their own country is stereotyped? (BAWS, Vol 2, pp
397–98)

The answers to all these questions, Ambedkar said, are in the “affirmative.” What Ambedkar
explained through the above questions was a system of exclusion against backward classes,
which was in existence even before the British regime began in India. The colonial construct
of “efficiency” was a ­repackaging of the social traditions of stereotypes, prejudices, and
subsequent ostracism.
Ambedkar also reminded the so-called upper castes that they had received their privileges
and social advancement not because of any merit (BAWS, Vol 9, p 477).6 They “acquired
their political power not by force of intellect—for intellect is nobody’s monopoly—but by
sheer communalism” (BAWS, Vol 9, p 477), a kind of absolute reservation since the
existence of ancient society. Ambedkar stated that Manusmriti, the ancient sociolegal code,
had provided that the important administrative, military, and ministerial posts “were all
reserved for the Brahmins” (BAWS, Vol 9, p 477). Apart from that, laws were enacted
because of which “education was made the monopoly and privilege of Brahmins,” while it
was criminalised for the lower castes “to acquire learning,” and included “cruel and inh­uman
punishment such as cutting the tongue of the criminal and filling his ear with hot molten
lead” (BAWS, Vol 9, p 478). While these reservations for Brahmins did not exist during
British rule, Ambedkar pointed out that “the advantages derived from their continuance over
several centuries have remained” (BAWS, Vol 9, p 478).
In his view, the argument of “efficiency” was a method of the upper castes to protect their
own interests and structural advantages. Ambedkar stated that instead of making any sacrifice
of their interests for an inclusive India, the upper castes made a “cry of ‘nationalism in
danger’” and “efficiency” against reservations (BAWS, Vol 9, pp 472, 478). The upper castes
left “no occasion to deprecate and to ridicule reservations” (BAWS, Vol 9, p 472). Ambedkar
made a sharp critique of this tendency by stating that:
The governing classes [upper castes] are bent on giving the reservations a bad name in order
to be able to hang those who are insisting upon them (BAWS, Vol 9, 482) … If the governing
class in India stands on the principle of efficiency and efficiency alone it is because it is
actuated by the selfish motive of monopolising the instrumentalities of government (BAWS,
Vol 9, 481) … Efficiency combined with selfish class interests instead of producing good
government is far more likely to become a mere ­engine of suppression of the servile classes.
(BAWS, Vol 9, p 480)
Ambedkar reiterated these points during the deliberations on the Constitution. He had written
a letter to Jawaharlal Nehru, charging that “the administration was unsympathetic to SCs
because it was manned wholly by caste Hindu officers … who practiced tyranny and
oppression” on the SCs (Austin 1999: 25). The best way to remedy this situation, Ambedkar
argued, was for the SCs to “become members of the various governments in India and
thereby to ensure that [SCs] also ­became members of the civil services” (Austin 1999: 25).
The notion of “efficiency,” as it was invoked by the upper castes, was contrary to the
representation of backward classes in ­services and the legislature.
Efficient Administration versus Good Governance

Ambedkar had consistently distinguished the colonial construct of “efficiency of

administration” with that of “good admi­nistration.” He asserted that a good administration or
government is one which is truly representative. In one of the articles, he had noted:
[The] view that good government was better than efficient government … must also be made
applicable to the field of administration. It was through administration that the State came
directly in ­contact with the masses. No administration could do any good unless it was
sympathetic … As against this the Brahmins have been taking their stand on efficiency pure
and simple. They know that this is the only card they can play successfully by reason of their
advanced position in education. But they forget that if efficiency was the only criterion then
in all probability there would be very little chance for them to monopolise state service in the
way and to the extent they have done. For if efficiency was made the only criterion there
would be nothing wrong in employing Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans and Turks instead
of the Brahmins of India. (BAWS, Vol 12, pp 723–24)

Ambedkar elaborated on this point by asserting that the ­“Indianisation” of public services
was also based on the noti­ons of representation and inclusiveness, and not on exclusionary
notion of “efficiency.” Therefore, a good government would require the inclusion of
backward classes, and that it must not be opposed. He argued:
The case for Indianisation, it must be remembered, did not rest upon efficient administration.
It rested upon considerations of good administration. It was not challenged that the ­Indian
was inferior to the European in the qualities that go into the make-up of an efficient
administrator. It was not ­denied that the European bureaucracy had improved their roads,
constructed canals on more scientific principles, effected transportation by rail, carried their
letters by penny post, flashed their messages by lightning, improved their currency, regulated
their weights and measures, corrected their notions of geography, astronomy and medicine,
and stopped their int­ernal quarrels. Nothing can be a greater testimony to the fact that the
European bureaucracy constituted the most efficient government possible. All the same the
European bureaucracy, efficient though it was, was condemned as it was found to be wanting
in those qualities which make for human administration. It is therefore somewhat strange that
those who clamoured for Indianisation should oppose the stream flowing in the direction of
the backward classes, forgetting that the case for Indianisation also includes the case for the
Backward Classes. (BAWS, Vol 2, p 398); (emphasis added)

Ambedkar further noted that “the question of entry into the public service is … a question of
life and death” for the SCs, as they did not have openings for a career in trade and industry
because of untouchability and biases against them (BAWS, Vol 10, p 416). Since “it is only in
government service that they can find a career” (BAWS, Vol 10, p 416), this created,
Ambedkar argued, a “natural idealism of the backward communities” and “aspirations” to
contribute to the governance (BAWS, Vol 2, pp 349–50). In his view, the reservation for the
backward communities “makes available for the national service such powerful social forces,
in the absence of which any Parliamentary government may be deemed to be poorer”
(BAWS, Vol 2, pp 349–50). Thus, for Ambedkar, giving due representation would have
enha­nced efficiency. In other words, his conception of “good government” meant that
efficiency would be measured by the test of representation and inclusion of underrepresented
social groups.
Ambedkar strongly asserted his arguments even at the Round Table Conferences in London
in 1930–31, where he stated that a government which did not have representatives from
under-represented communities, would not be a “responsible government” (Bhaskar 2020:
11). The admixture of all castes and creeds with “minimum efficiency” would make any
­administration to be a good administration (BAWS, Vol 12, p 724). “Minimum efficiency”
may be measured by certain ­basic tests, and not as an abstract criterion (BAWS, Vol 9, p 48).
Moreover, he argued that reservations, by providing representation to backward classes,
would act as a system of countercheck to protect the political democracy from being
subverted by particular privileged groups (BAWS, Vol 9, p 171). According to Ambedkar,
reservations “are only another name for what the Americans call checks and balances which
every constitution must have, if democracy is not to be overwhelmed by the enemies of
democracy” (BAWS, Vol 9, p 482).
It is for these reasons that Ambedkar made a consistent case before the British government
that the moral wrong of excluding lower castes from public offices and services must be
corrected through reservations. He continuously argued for the provisions of representation in
the public services and legislatures to be included in the future constitution. During the
framing of the Constitution, Ambedkar even walked away from the proceedings of the
Constituent Assembly, when Sardar Patel had taken a decision to do away with political
reservations for SCs and STs from the Constitution (Vundru 2017: 138). Eventually,
Ambedkar’s stand on the inclusion of reservation was accepted by the Constituent Assembly.
Conclusions
As narrated in this paper, the arguments of “efficiency” and “merit” were used against
reservations even during the framing of the Constitution. The Constituent Assembly
consciously rejected these arguments. Furthermore, there was a contentious debate among the
members on the scope of Article 16(4), which provided for reservation in services, and
Article 335, which mentioned the term “efficiency” while referring to rights of SCs and STs.
Some members had enquired whether Article 335 is independent of Article 16. The
Constituent Assembly Debates show that Article 16(4) has a broader view and would not be
restricted by any other constitutional provision. On the other hand, Article 335 was perceived
as a mere directive to the future governments. It was clarified that references to the rights and
claims of SCs and STs were mentioned in more than one article to emphasise on the
importance of their rights. SCs and STs are a special category within the definition of
“backward classes” under Article 16(4). It is in Article 16(4) that the power is provided to the
state in clear terms to make reservations for any backward class of citizens.
At the same time, it can be inferred that Article 16(4) is not a mere directive, as it was
enshrined in the chapter on fundamental rights. This made Kamath express that if
representation is not provided to backward classes, then the state can be held accountable in a
court of law. There was also a view in the Constituent Assembly expressed in favour of
reservations in promotions. As stated by Matari, overcoming backwardness of certain
communities, such as tribals, requires that reservations in services should be extended to
reservation in promotions as well, so that individuals from these communities do not stick to
where they begin.
Furthermore, in the final stages of the drafting of the Cons­titution, Matari had called the
argument of “efficiency” as a method “to perpetuate” class interests. Ambedkar had been
writing for several decades that the term “efficiency of administration” was a colonial and
precolonial construct, which was used as an exclusionary criterion and as an attempt by the
­upper castes to maintain their structural advantages and privileges. His writings clearly
suggest that in a post-independence era, the notion of “efficiency of administration” cannot
be used against reservations. Instead, “efficiency of administration” would be measured or
enhanced by ensuring due representation.
Article 16(4) thus cannot be understood in the context of any exclusionary notion of
“efficiency of administration.” In that sense, it cannot be used as a ground to cast aspersions
on reservations, which are provided for under Articles 15 and 16. When the term “efficiency
of administration” is used in Article 335, it refers to “representation” and “minimum
efficiency,” as Ambedkar argued. The 82nd amendment7 to the Constitution, which provided
for a minimum criterion for recruitment in the matters of promotions, reflects this
understanding. Furthermore, Ambedkar’s understanding has been solidified by few empirical
studies, which show that reservation in services does not dilute efficiency in any way
(Deshpande and Weisskopf 2014; Bhavnani and Lee 2020). Economists have, in fact,
suggested that reservation or “affirmative action in hiring might improve economic
performance—particularly in high-level jobs” (Deshpande and Weisskopf 2014: 177).
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court confused this basic understanding on reservations and
erroneously considered Article 335 to be a limitation to Article 16(4) in several judgments.
The B K Pavitra (II) judgment offers a fresh look in this regard. Both, the Constituent
Assembly Debates and Ambedkar’s writings, demonstrate that Article 16(4) would have a
broader and independent standing in the Constitution. The concern of Ambedkar that the
provision of reservation under Article 16(4) might become a subject of unjust scrutiny
through “judicial ­interpretation” has come true.