The Shift of Japanese Foreign Policy

– A Tilted Middle Way

Quansheng Zhao

American University

Abstract: This paper focuses on Japan’s foreign policy in an attempt to sort out the mainstream
ways of thought and develop a new concept – the “tilted middle way” – approach and then apply
it to the analyses of Sino-Japanese relations.

This paper focuses on Japan’s foreign policy in an attempt to sort out the mainstream

ways of thought and develop a new concept – the “tilted middle way” – approach and then apply

it to the analyses of Sino-Japanese relations.

A Tilted Middle Way

In the early twenty-first century, Japan’s ruling and opposition parties formed a broad

consensus, completing the third major policy choice regarding the country’s foreign policy

direction. The fundamental difference between this choice and the first two choices was that,

rather than breaking completely with old forms of policy, the incorporation of a middle way

became viewed as the best option for Japan’s foreign policy.

In May 2005, Abe Shinzo conducted a luncheon lecture in Washington DC as a warm-up

before he became Prime Minister of Japan the next year. At that time, Japan appeared to be

strengthening its relations with the United States, while experiencing worsening relations with

China and South Korea. During the luncheon, Abe was asked whether these recent developments

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meant that Japan’s foreign policy was still under the influence of a datsu-a nyu-o, or “leave Asia,

enter Europe,” type of policy.1 He answered that Japan’s relations with the United States and its

relationships with Asian neighbors such as China and South Korea were complementary to each

other rather than mutually exclusive. Abe’s ideas reflected a new trend in the policy of Japan

which attempts to avoid both extremes and instead pursues a path closer to the middle. In

essence this could be viewed as a “follow the middle way” strategy. One month after Abe took

office, the New York Times also commented that he was taking a “middle way” diplomatic

approach ( Norimitsu 2006). Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo, who succeeded Abe in

autumn of 2007, was also a politician who implemented a policy based on the middle way. Of

Fukuda’s successors, Aso Taro and Hatoyama Yukio, one was of a more conservative nature

than the previous two leaders, and the other was more “liberal.” However, it was difficult for

either Aso or Hatoyama to diverge far from this middle-way approach.

Conceptual Basis

A major change took place in Japan in September 2009 when the Democratic Party of

Japan (DPJ) gained a landslide victory in Japan’s general election, ending the Liberal

Democratic Party’s (LDP) ruling position which began in 1955 (with a short break in 1993), until

they came back into power in 2012 under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. When the DPJ change of

guard under Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio, many wondered what impact this change would

have on Japan’s foreign relations, until the LDP’s return to power. With Prime Minister Shinzo

Abe’s October 22nd 2017 election victory, the LDP’s primacy is secured, for the foreseeable

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future. In order to better understand the direction of development in Japanese foreign policy, it is

necessary to examine Japan’s political mainstream way of thinking.

Since Japan developed as a democratic and pluralistic society after World War II,

expressions of different views and tendencies within the country are natural. However, simply

making a list of different views will not allow one to grasp the true meaning behind Japan’s

foreign policy. Therefore, it is necessary to emphasize mainstream thinking, which refers to the

dominant preferences within Japan’s political, economic, academic and bureaucratic systems.

This consensus is reflected in the relative views of the majority, and this relative majority is

constantly changing. When analyzing a country’s foreign policy, it is important not to neglect the

basic concepts of international relations theory.

Realism emphasizes the strength and fundamental interests of a country (Waltz 2001). 2 In

terms of this view, leaders pay most attention to how they can maintain the country’s security,

prosperity and political power on the international stage. Based on this school of thought, so-

called high politics and low politics are placed in a certain order in a country’s foreign policy. In

realism, the formulation of political, diplomatic and military posture is often placed higher than

other factors, such as economic and cultural considerations. In this sense, growth and weakening

of military and political power among nations, as well as relative changes in the priorities given

to national interests, have a significant impact on the country’s foreign-policy making. In other

words, realism is based on a consideration of the country’s national strength and fundamental

interests. Other factors, such as ideological ones, are placed in a secondary position.

Liberalism, in particular as a result of the recent rise in the field of study devoted to

globalization, tends to focus attention on interdependence between nations. Special emphasis is

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placed upon the strengthening of cooperation and compromise among major powers as a result of

increased economic interdependence of nations through enhanced trade (Keohane and Nye

1977). From this point of view, international organizations on the world stage, as well as a series

of international institutions aimed at building communities on the regional level, have a profound

impact upon inter-state relations and in shaping individual countries’ foreign policies.

At the same time, the increasingly popular constructivist theory also provides valuable

insight when studying foreign policy issues. As the youngest of the main theories, constructivism

views changes in foreign policy by focusing on a country’s policy makers’ perceptions of

international situations and regional and world development patterns (Wendt 1999). Policy

makers’ knowledge, position and feelings about their own country and the history of the region

are seen to play an important role in the formulation of foreign policy. From the overview of

these schools of thought, it can be seen that liberalist and constructivist emphasize factors other

than the strength and interests of countries. Without a doubt, there are many schools of thought

in international relations and foreign policy analysis which offer theories that can be used to

analyze the trend of Japan’s foreign policy.

Those discussed above are only a few of the major ones. Other derivatives have been

developed by a number of schools. Examples are power transition theory, interest group theory,

and the domestic-international linkage approach, all of which provide very useful theoretical

frameworks. In addition, many scholars have recently started trying to analyze international

relations theory from the perspective of the Asia-Pacific region (Haggard 2004, 1-38).3 This

paper will to some extent utilize some applications of these theories in order to analyze the

mainstream thinking of Japanese foreign policy.

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Historical review

In the course of its evolution, modern Japanese foreign policy encountered three

crossroads at which a significant choice concerning the direction of policy was necessary. The

first crossroad occurred in the mid-nineteenth century. When China’s Qing government was

invaded by the British-led Western imperialist powers, Japan, as a longtime student of China,

paid close attention to what John King Fairbank called “the clash of the Eastern and Western

civilizations” and the fall of the Qing Empire. When China was defeated in the Opium War and

signed The Treaty of Nanking in 1842, and then suffered humiliation and further loss of

sovereign rights from the ensuing invasion of other imperialist countries (such as France,

Germany and Russia) with territorial and monetary claims, Japan’s rulers, upper classes and

intellectuals watched intently. These events left Japan’s elite with many questions. How could

Japan learn from China’s defeat and fall? In which direction should its foreign policy head?

Should it continue to adhere to its closed-door and xenophobic policies or thoroughly reform

itself and start down a different path?

The events surrounding China, and Japan’s ensuing questions formed the background of

the 1868 Meiji Restoration in Japan. This reformation led to a major transformation in domestic

and foreign affairs. The Meiji Restoration led to Japan’s rapid realization of industrialization; its

substantial increase in national strength, and to its rapidly emerging international status. At the

end of the nineteenth and in the beginning of the twentieth century, Japan defeated the two great

powers in the region. It first overpowered the Qing Empire in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5

and it then defeated the Russian Empire in the 1904–5 Russo-Japanese War. These victories

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caused Japan’s reputation to grow from that of a small isolated island in the East China Sea into

the “Empire of Imperialist Japan.” Japan’s political environment, economy and society also

experienced major changes during this period. The nation changed its style and moved from

being a predominantly closed feudal and agrarian-based country into being an industrialization-

oriented economic and military power. These sudden changes inflated the ego of Japan’s rulers,

and encouraged them to accept a “law of the jungle”-type of logic emphasized by Western

colonialists.

Thus, beginning in the first half of the twentieth century, Japan began a gradual

movement towards militarism. Japan’s militaristic behavior included colonization of the Korean

Peninsula, invasion of northeast China and establishment of the Manchukuo. It also took part in

the Germany-Italy-Japan axis, leading to the start of World War II. It invaded Southeast Asia and

attacked Pearl Harbor. Japan pursued these actions with the goal of extending the territory of the

“Empire of Imperialist Japan” to the largest ever in its history (Chang 1997).4 The dazzling

victories, however, were soon followed by painful defeat. In China, Korea, and other Asian

countries, Japan was struck by the region’s anti-war campaign. The United States counter-

attacked the Pacific Islands and bombed the Japanese mainland, destroying Hiroshima and

Nagasaki with atomic bombs. The Soviet Red Army marched into northeast China and defeated

the Japanese Kwantung Army as well. The combination of these defeats dealt Japan a

devastating blow and eventually forced it to surrender and accept US occupation in August 1945.

At the end of World War II, a defeated Japan was faced with a second decisive choice in its

modern history. In which direction should Japan’s foreign and domestic policy head now? How

would Japan be able to redevelop from the ruins of war and return to the international

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community? How should Japan handle its relations with Asian neighbors, particularly China?

These questions pointed to key issues for which Japan needed urgent solutions. Under the

leadership of the US occupation authorities, Japan adopted its second constitution in 1947,

moving down a road peaceful development (Dower 1999). As early as the 1950s, Japan began to

enter a period of rapid economic development and became the leader of Asia’s economic takeoff.

Subsequently, the Japanese economy then overtook those of several European powers

and it became the world’s second-largest economy, drawing near that of the United States.

Japan’s relations with China during this period were heavily influenced, if not determined, by the

United States and subsequent developments of the Cold War. China’s rise began with its rapid

economic growth in the early 1980s, leading to new international concern regarding the

country’s growth. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s, as

well as the strengthening of globalization and regionalism, left Japan with an additional series of

challenges. From this period until the beginning of this century, Japan also experienced a “lost

decade,” which was made even worse by the plight caused by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. In

addition, a nuclear crisis with North Korea also added to these factors, increasing Japan’s

sensitivity towards foreign affairs. This series of developments in major domestic and

international political and economic issues encouraged a new wave of nationalistic sentiment

within the Japanese government and among its public. Politically conservative trends deepened

further (Matthews 2003, 158-72). Japanese politicians and political leaders also went through an

unprecedented social and political change represented by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro

(Calder 2005 46-9). All of this brought Japan’s foreign policy to a new crossroads, (Hook 2005)

and prompted Japan’s decision makers, politicians and intellectuals at the beginning of this

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century to start a policy debate on how best to attend to the nation’s concerns and interests within

the new global environment (Kawashima 2003).

Based on the above discussion, it can be concluded that Japan’s foreign policy

experienced three major crossroads during the 100-plus years of challenges and choices that

arose in its most recent history. Each one of these policy choices was not only extremely

influential in Japan’s own development, but also had significant impacts in Asia and the world.

The policy options also were all closely linked with a mainstream type of thinking heavily

influenced by realism and idealism. At the time of the first two crossroads, Japan was under

tremendous pressure both at home and abroad, and its decisions led to major turning points in

history. For example, during the Meiji Restoration, Japan chose to move away from Asia and

draw closer to Europe. That is to say, the Japanese decided to distance themselves from the

“backwardness and poverty of East Asia”, by following strategies of datsu-a nyu-o, or “leave

Asia, enter Europe” and fukoku kyohei, meaning “rich country, strong military” in order to catch

up with European and American powers. Japan shifted once again however, after World War II

when, under the occupation of the United States, it moved from a militarist, authoritarian regime

to a democratic, peace-oriented government.

Policy Debates and the Tilted Middle Way

In Japan, while there are certainly groups who take extreme stances on foreign policy,

they are far from being in the majority. The majority of elite politicians tend to prefer avoiding

extremes and instead opt for the middle ground. Even so, different politicians at different times

can have different preferences. For this reason, understanding this tendency is the key factor for

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unraveling the current direction of Japan’s foreign policy. This is what is emphasized in this

article as the tilted middle way. Below is an issue- by-issue analysis regarding this type of policy

framework.

Middle Way Number I: Datsu-a nyu-o vs. Aji wa hitotsu

During most of Japan’s 2000-year history, its position towards the East Asian region has

been clear. However, this came into question in the mid-nineteenth century as Japan’s society

faced new challenges. The Japanese intellectual leader Fukuzawa Yukichi, who established Keio

University in Japan, suggested a new policy of datsu-a nyu-o (leave Asia, enter Europe)

(Fukuzawa 2002). Fukuzawa believed that Japan should leave China, which was still considered

to be in a backwards state, along with other Asian societies, and follow the example of European

powers in order to become a modernized nation. He argued Japan should carry out a series of

political and economic reforms and accelerate its modernization. In addition, he called for Japan

to form an alliance with the advanced Western countries.

Another Japanese thinker, Okakura Tenshin, although strongly influenced by Western

culture like Fukuzawa, put forward a set of rather different ideas and slogans. In his book

Oriental Awakening, he recommended that Japan adopt the idea Ajia wa hitotsu, meaning “Asia

is one.” Although Okakura emphasized Japan’s leadership role, he sharply criticized the invasion

of the East by Western powers and stressed the importance of standing up against such intrusion

by creating a social solidarity in East Asia (Okakura 1940). The huge differences between

Okakura’s idea of “Asia is one” and the concept of an East Asian community in contrast to

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Fukuzawa’s push for greater Westernization represents the dichotomy of ideas among Japanese

intellectuals at the time concerning Japan’s position in the international community. As a result

of Japan’s rapidly changing domestic and international situation, including the series of

humiliating defeats of the Qing Empire, Fukuzawa’s school of thought gradually became the

dominant voice in both the academic and the political world. As the notion of needing to separate

from Asia and join Europe became stronger, the trend of respecting and loving Chinese culture

was replaced by a mentality of disgust towards Japan’s Asian neighbors. In this sense, the

Japanese government’s actions began to represent thinking that “since the Western powers were

able to invade and colonize developing countries, especially in Asia, why shouldn’t Japan do the

same?” This mentality led directly to a series of acts of aggression including the Japanese

colonization of the Korean peninsula, its occupation of China and invasion of several Southeast

Asian countries.

This line of thought went along well with Japan’s expansion policy and did not end until

the nation’s defeat in World War II. As mentioned earlier, Japan’s defeat in 1945 led to its

second major foreign policy choice in contemporary history. During the seven years of US

occupation, Japan was unable to conduct independent policy choices. Instead, it could only

accept the leadership of the United States, taking part in the US-led Western camp. The

surrounding international environment also confirmed Japan’s position of having a foreign

policy closer to that of the West than to that of the East. The San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952

and the Japan–US Security Treaty which followed, made Japan a firm member of the Western

alliance during the Cold War (Cha 1999). A high degree of Westernization (that is,

Americanization) in Japanese society since the end of World War II became a main theme of

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development. In the years after World War II, the rapid development and economic recovery of

Asia brought about the miracles of the “four little dragons,”(South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore

and Taiwan) and also forced Japan to recognize the importance of Asia. This awareness has been

strengthened by the rapid economic development of China since the early 1980s, as well as the

start of a post-Cold War East Asian Economic Community. One example is that of ASEAN +3,

in which China, Japan and South Korea participate together with ASEAN in regional affairs. The

Japanese Prime Minister, Abe Shinzo, declared more than once that Japan’s previous policy of

datsu-a nyu-o was no longer a policy option Japan should follow, indicating that Japan is not

only a member of the advanced Western world, but also a part of the East Asian community.

However, in reality, Japanese policy makers – especially when forced to make major

policy choices – still tend to lean toward the direction of Europe and the US. For example,

during the second half of Prime Minister Koizumi’s term, when he was asked to respond to the

deterioration of Japan–China and Japan–South Korea relations, he replied “as long as good

relations with the United States are maintained, relations with China and South Korea will

naturally improve.” Koizumi’s mentality of relying heavily on alliances with Europe and

America, instead of focusing on alliances with East Asia was revealed clearly here. Of course,

there were voices in Japanese society during this time urging for better relations with China,

Korea and other Asian countries. Concern was particularly strong in the business community,

which was worried about the economy in Asia and Japan’s weakened economic status and urged

Japan’s leaders to “return to Asia.” This is one of the reasons why Abe, after being elected Prime

Minister of Japan, made his first foreign visit to China and South Korea in early October 2006.

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Fukuda’s series of policies to strengthen cooperation between Japan and China and Japan and

South Korea also provides further evidence of this shift.

Japan’s Prime Minister Hatoyama, 2009-2010, went even further by advocating that

instead of datsu-a nyu-o, Japan should move toward Aji wa hitotsu, meaning moving away from

Europe and returning to Asia.5 Right before his official inauguration, Hatoyama published an op-

ed in The New York Times entitled “A New Path for Japan” discussing Japan’s national goals and

strategy. He stated, “of course, the Japan–U.S. security pact will continue to be the cornerstone

of Japanese diplomatic policy.” Then he emphasized, “but at the same time we must not forget

our identity as a nation located in Asia.” (Yukio 2009) One can tell that the prime minister might

have been tilted toward Asia but could not move away from Japan’s alliance with the United

States.

This middle-way approach in which the Japan–US alliance remains the base axis, while

emphasis is placed on good relations with Asian countries, is likely to continue as the most

dominant theme of Japanese foreign policy for the foreseeable future.

Middle Way Number II: Peace vs. Armaments

The direction of Japan’s path of national development was the subject of several major

policy debates during the Meiji Restoration. The consensus reached by the Japanese leadership

and intellectuals was to follow a policy of fukoku kyohei, or “rich country, strong military.” In

other words, it was believed that in order to realize its goal of reaching political power equal to

that of Western countries, Japan needed to industrialize and become a military power. In this

sense, both economic and military development were viewed as equally important. From the

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latter half of the nineteenth century until World War II, military development was the base of

Japan’s diplomatic priorities.

However, following its crushing defeat in World War II, and under the leadership of the

United States, both the ruling and opposition parties in Japan decided to learn from their

mistakes and adopted a new constitution in 1947 based on peace. Article IX of the constitution,

known as the “Peace Clause,” formally renounces any military engagement except in self-

defense. This clause has laid the foundation for Japan’s peace and development for more than

half a century. Immediately after the occupation, the US signed a security treaty with Japan in

which it pledged to provide a nuclear umbrella of protection. Thus, in spite of facing security

threats from the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, Japan was able to dedicate its energy

toward developing its economy rather than its military, with its military budget hovering around

only one percent of its GDP. This later became known as a “free-ride” strategy for economic

development. This agreement also laid down the guidelines for Japan’s foreign policy, which set

economic development as the country’s top priority (Heginbotham and Samuels 1998, 171-203).

As Japan’s national strength grew, questions began to be raised as to whether the country

should also start enhancing its military status or whether it should focus on becoming a military

power (Rongzhong 2004,24-38). The concept of an “ordinary country” suggested by veteran

Japanese Politician Ozawa Ichiro was a representation of this trend (Inuguchi and Bacon 2006,

1-21). The push for this concept came after the US initiated the first Iraq War. Japan provided

enormous economic support for the effort. However, after the war, Japan’s name was left out of

a letter of thanks published by the Kuwaiti government in the New York Times. Kuwait only

expressed gratitude in the letter towards a dozen countries that actually sent troops to the

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country. This was considered a failure of Japan’s “checkbook diplomacy.” A new trend of

thought appeared which argued for the need to revise Article IX of the constitution. Many

scholars and politicians began to intensify their efforts to obtain public support for the

manufacturing of national armaments, leading to the transformation of Japan’s Defense Agency

into the Ministry of Defense. In addition, the subsequent popularity of the “China threat theory”

as well as the North Korean nuclear crisis helped promote further support for the movement

towards rearmament.

Of course, it should also be noted that the social forces in Japan which adhere to the ideal

of peaceful development of society and oppose any build-up of military equipment or

strengthening of military power have also had a powerful influence. Japan’s ruling and

opposition parties have a large number of politicians and scholars who oppose amending the

constitution, particularly Article XI. In their view, Japan’s post-World War II strategy of

prioritizing economic development and avoiding military power has been successful. Japan’s

peace constitution is unique in the world and has made a significant contribution towards the

maintenance of world peace; therefore, Japan should not start back down the road towards

militarism. In the heated debate about whether Japan should adhere to its strategy of peaceful

development or switch towards a “normalization” of its status in the world by rearming,

international public opinion has also been divided.

Mainstream politicians in the United States hope that Japan can become a responsible

“normal” country, and make its contribution towards international security and world affairs

(Rozman 2002, 72-91). In their view, Japan’s post-war development created a solid foundation

for a path of peace, making it impossible for Japan to initiate aggression again or pose a security

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threat to other countries (Green 2006).6 On this issue, China, the two Koreas and a few Southeast

Asian countries which were invaded by Japan, hold an opposing stance. They believe Japan

should adhere strictly to its constitutional restrictions, especially Article IX. They feel Japan

should stick to its road of peaceful development and reflect and examine its past crimes of

aggression in order to avoid re-taking the old road to militarism. In this sense, Japan is not only

facing its own dilemma, but also dealing with the two different opinions – that of the United

States and that of Asia. In such an environment, Japan’s choice of a middle way is unavoidable.

However, for each specific policy, such as the issue of amending the constitution, different

political leaders have had different policy preferences.

Middle Way Number III: Economic Power vs. Political Power

The first guiding principle for Japanese foreign policy after World War II was the so-

called “Yoshida Doctrine.” At that time, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru put forward economic

development as the nation’s top policy priority. As mentioned previously, Japan revised its

principle of fukoku kyohei, which had been stressed since the Meiji Restoration. Rich Country

was now the primary objective, while the issue of strong military emphasized dependence on the

United States’ nuclear umbrella. In other words, as long as the Japan–US security treaty

guaranteed Japan’s national security, Japan would not need to provide substantial financial

resources towards security. Instead, it only needed to maintain a small but strong self-defense

force.7 Over the years, Japan has managed to keep its military expenditure at around one percent

of its GDP while still being able to satisfy its need for national defense. The nationwide efforts to

develop the economy helped Japan quickly surpass Great Britain, France, Germany and other

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European great powers, and become the second-largest economic entity in the world by the

1970s until 2010. Japan’s economic position as a major power was also strengthened by its

active economic involvement overseas. Japan’s substantial investment and acquisition of assets

in the United States, coupled with the trade frictions between the two countries, caused the world

to recognize Japan’s strength, thereby effectively improving Japan’s status as a great power. In

the 1980s, Japan became the largest provider of official development assistance (ODA) to

developing countries.

Japan held this leading position until its economy took a downturn in the late 1990s and

was once again surpassed by the US. However, even though Japan experienced a “lost decade”

of economic downturn, Japan had the second-largest economy in the world, until 2010. Its

machinery, automobile manufacturing and electronic high-tech sectors all maintained a leading

position in the world (Vogel 2006).8 While Japan’s economic achievements have been huge, its

political influence in the world did not corresponded with its level of monetary growth. Japan has

faced the dilemma – similar to the peace vs. rearming dilemma mentioned in the previous

sections – of how to raise its political status to a level that matches its economic status

(Hongfang 2004, 24-7). Many Japanese politicians have been dissatisfied with Japan’s status as a

so-called “economic giant” but “political dwarf.” In order to change this, Japan has strengthened

its activities in regional affairs, focusing especially on the start-up and development of an East

Asian community, and increased regional economic integration by injecting enormous financial

resources and energy to spur growth (Katzenstein and Shiraishi 2004).

China’s surpassing Japan’s economy in 2010 has further complicated the issue. So, what

are Japan’s next foreign policy steps? So far, Japanese citizens have difficulty accepting the truth

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that Japan is no longer the world's second largest economy. This has strengthened feelings of

insecurity in the domestic populace and indirectly increased support for improving Japan’s

defense system (especially during Abe's term). When analyzing the direction of recent Japanese

diplomacies, it's not hard to see how Abe's administration handles Japan's multilateral relations

with its neighbors.

Furthermore, Japan’s reluctance to adequately handle the historical problems it still has

with other countries has made it difficult for the country to develop a more assertive and

influential role in the Asia Pacific region. During the Koizumi administration, Sino-Japanese and

Korea–Japan relations worsened because of Koizumi’s successive visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.

The decision makers in Tokyo learned that simply emphasizing economic relations or providing

financial assistance was not necessarily going to strengthen the nation’s political position or

improve diplomatic relations. One example of such misjudgment involves Japan’s use of official

development assistance (ODA) to China, which it started in 1979. Over a twenty-some-year

period, China accepted multi-billions of dollars of economic assistance, including long-term,

low-interest loans, grant assistance, and technical assistance (Hilpert Haak 2002, p121-396).9

However, upon entering the twenty-first century, Japan began reducing and freezing aid to China

for many reasons (such as the opaqueness of the Chinese military), before finally ending its

assistance to China altogether in 2008, when China hosted the Olympic Games. So, while

Japan’s overall aid to China played a valuable role in China’s modernization and development,

Japan’s sudden cessation of the ODA severely weakened its effect on bilateral political relations.

(Tsukasa p439-61). These were all lessons worth learning by the Japanese government.

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 Another way for Japan to achieve its goal of building up its political power is through

existing international organizations. One of the best examples in this regard is Japan’s use of the

United Nations as the base axis of its foreign policy for carrying out a series of activities. Japan

has also advocated a restructuring of the United Nations Security Council by petitioning to join

the US, Russia, Britain, France and China as a permanent member (Kitaoka 2005 3-10). In 2005,

Japan, Germany, Brazil and India formed an alliance and launched a full campaign to become

permanent members of the UN Security Council. However, Japan was unsuccessful in gathering

support from some major powers as well as from its Asian neighbors (Drifte 1999).

In the foreseeable future, however, Japan will not abandon its attempt to obtain a

permanent seat in the UN Security Council. It will continue to try to get the support of the big

powers as well as that of Asian, African and Latin American countries (Feng 2008, 22-3).

However, whether Japan will become a permanent member in the near future is still uncertain. In

fact, despite the push by domestic mainstream politicians and other elites of the Japanese

government to attain political power, there are also voices insisting that Japan should instead

focus more maintaining its status as a middle power (Yoshinide 2008, 36-41). Some believe that

it would be more beneficial for Japan to continue prioritizing the “economy first” policy, which

was established after World War II and to focus on economic development and democratic issues

with the goal of creating a more peaceful and healthy country, rather than competing for a

leading role among political and military powers, This view has become the base on which

public support for a middle-way approach to foreign policy has been established.

Middle Way Number IV: The Leader or The Follower vs. The Partner

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 In response to a reporter’s question regarding Japan’s future direction in foreign policy,

Harvard political scientist Samuel P. Huntington stated, “I think at this stage, Japan will still

follow the United States, but eventually shift towards China.” He explained his reasoning by

noting that historically, the Japanese have always allied with the world’s number-one power: first

with the United Kingdom; then with Germany, and finally with the United States. Therefore,

Huntington believes that if China becomes a leading power in East Asia, Japan will work to form

a strong alliance with China. Rather than attempt to make assertions as to whether or not

Huntington’s prediction is correct, it is more beneficial to instead note the psychological factor

present in Japanese foreign policy. That is to say, Japan has long had a mentality of befriending

the powerful and despising the weak. In this sense, Japan is accustomed to being either a type of

big-power follower, or a leader of the neighboring countries, and is not accustomed to dealing

with other countries equally. These aspects are quite obvious in terms of Japan’s relations with

China. For a couple of thousand years, Japan regarded Chinese culture as its mother culture and

always looked up to it for advice on how best to deal with not only domestic issues but also

international affairs. However, after China was invaded and divided by Western powers and

became weaker (even being regarded as the “sick man of East Asia,”) Japan’s attitude towards

China shifted from looking up to looking down on China. It no longer wanted to associate with

the Chinese, and instead emphasized a policy of datsu-a nyu-o. Such changes in the relative level

of strength between Japan and China have had, and continue to have, a profound impact on

Japanese people’s mentality even now (Chubanshe 2005). Japan is rather proficient in dealing

with the two kinds of relationship, namely “weak vs. strong” and “strong vs. weak.”

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 However, with the rise of China in East Asia, a new structure of “strong vs. strong” has

emerged, which troubles Japan tremendously. Clearly, Tokyo needs to change its mentality in

order to better adjust to the transformation of international relations and to adjust psychologically

to prepare for the rise of China and the consequential changes in the international order. There is

no lack of a pragmatic tradition in both China and Japan. As Wang Gungwu suggested, “The

pragmatic lessons of history run through Chinese and Japanese history: ‘the victor is king, the

defeated is but a bandit.’” (Gungwu 2004, 107) Such a psychological change can lead to

unprecedented adaptation and development of more partnership relations in Japanese foreign

policy. This idea of a middle way therefore offers a vision for Japan’s strategic partnership with

China, in which both countries can concentrate on mutually beneficial relations.

Middle Way Number V: Traditional Politics vs. Open Public Policy

Any country’s foreign policy is deeply influenced by its domestic politics and the impact

of its traditional foreign policy. Japanese Policymaking, a book published in 1993, (Zhao 1993)

emphasizes the importance of traditional Japanese foreign policy, offering an analysis of

Japanese politics through an informal mechanism. Based on this analytical framework, while the

effect of formal mechanisms such as government departments, politicians and the ruling parties

play an important role in the formation of Japanese foreign policy, policy formation is also

greatly influenced by traditional politics. These policy-making mechanisms, including tsukiai

(social networks) on the societal level; kuromaku (informal institutions and politicians) on the

institutional level; and nemawashi (behind-the-scene consensus building) on the individual level,

are collectively referred to as non-formal mechanisms. The frequently heard ryotei seiji

20
(restaurant politics) and “secret envoy diplomacy” in Japanese political life are concrete

manifestations of such decision-making styles (Blaker, Giarra and Vogel 2002). These informal

mechanisms in Japanese foreign policy played an important role during the 1970s in Japan’s

diplomacy toward China.

The increased development of globalization since then has seen Japan undergo noticeable

political changes. Japan’s public and politicians now put more emphasis on such factors as

democratic values. The transparency of the decision-making process in respect of Japan’s

diplomatic policy has increased substantially and public debate has become more prevalent. The

power of the public to influence policy making has also obviously increased (Krauss 2000). Both

Japan’s ruling and opposition parties have changed their style to a more open and transparent one

in order to adapt together with the changes occurring in Japanese society (Schwartz and Pharr

2004). The reforms stemming from major policies Koizumi instituted during his five-year period

in office are good examples of such a change. The open debate of public policies, including that

of foreign policy, in addition to an increased use of formal mechanisms, is likely to weaken the

effects of “secret envoys” and “restaurant politics.” Japan’s foreign policy will also be more

influenced by the context of domestic public opinion, with the government using the public

opinion card more often. Although such changes in Japanese politics are expected, it is important

to note that, as a political entity, the traditional political culture of Japan will not disappear

overnight, and its indomitable vitality should not be underestimated (Benidict 1946). 10 Bearing

this background in mind, it becomes easier to foresee that – because the formulation and

implementation of foreign policy have a certain degree of confidentiality, and because of Japan’s

21
mastery of “secret foreign policy” – a middle way of alternating between traditional informal

mechanisms and transparent foreign policy will prevail.

The above exposition of different routes or options for Japan’s foreign policy reflect the

influence of both post-Cold War changes in the international arena, and of changes in Japan’s

domestic politics due to the increasing influence of public opinion. Although this transformation

has not been as “revolutionary” as the previous two crossroads, it highlights a fundamental shift

that is occurring. In other words, this formation of mainstream thinking in Japan’s foreign policy

may be called the “silent revolution.” It should also be noted that the different choices referred to

here are not always contradictory. For example, it is possible to become an economic power at

the same time as becoming a military and political power. The purpose here is to emphasize the

sequence or order of priority given to each of the policy options within Japan’s foreign policy.

Understanding this alignment answers the so-called “question of inclination.”

This middle-way approach is by no means a compromised position, but a balancing

option between two extremes. It should also be emphasized that the old style of going to

extremes in Japanese foreign policy has not totally vanished due to the appearance of this middle

way. Instead, it may re-emerge from time to time and have an impact on specific policy makers.

For these reasons, this new policy direction is better called a “tilted middle way.” The dichotomy

between Koizumi’s insistence on visiting Yasukuni Shrine and Fukuda’s willingness to forgo

such visits in exchange for better Japan–China relations are specific examples of different

inclinations in this middle-way approach. Koizumi’s assertion that the “improving relationship

with the US will automatically improve Japan’s relations with China and Korea” is a reflection

of the tendency toward datsu-a nyu-o; while Fukuda’s advocacy of “review[ing] the old while

22
innovating the new” when he visited China and expressed his respect of Confucianism reflects an

Ajia wa hitotsu tendency. Another important point is that this tilted middle-way approach in

Japanese foreign policy has been nurtured over a long period of time. Its formation is a gradual

process brought about through deliberation and debating. Although it began in the last century

with the emergence of the post-Cold War era, it did not form into its present state until this

century under the influence of Koizumi, Abe and Fukuda. Therefore, it is very important to

understand this tilted middle way when studying Japanese foreign policy.

Policy Debates in Japan in the Background of Power Politics

The arguments concerning Japanese foreign policy reflects changes in Japan's domestic

politics, as well as the competitions among great powers. The mainstream Japanese foreign

policies are moderate, but yet have some subtle intentions. From such policies we can see not

only the conflicts between realism and idealism, but also how the country's foreign policies have

changed over time. For example, we ask this question when we are looking at current China-

Japan relations: Is the China-Japan relationship simply a bilateral relationship, or an essential

part in the global competition among great powers? The China-Japan relationship basically

depends on Beijing and Tokyo; any other factors are hardly referred and considered.

Outside of the U.S., Japan is the second most important external factor concerning the

Taiwan issue. Furthermore, Japan and Taiwan are deeply related to each other for historical

reasons. However, in the Japan-China-Taiwan triangle, China is a far more important character

to Japan compared to Taiwan. Even though maintaining the disunity of the mainland and Taiwan

is in Japan's interest, Japan will not go straightforward and encourage going in such a direction.

23
Japan has given support to Taiwan’s independence movement, but when dealing with detailed

problems, for example, trading negotiations, Japan does not have to compromise with Taiwan

(Smith 2015).

Here, we can refer to the Japan-Taiwan Fishery Agreement, which was signed in 2013.

Japan and Taiwan had been negotiating for a long time without making any progress, because

Japan knew that the mainland would not be happy if it compromised with Taiwan, and this was

the reason why Japan held such a strong and tough attitude towards economic issues like fishery

with Taiwan.

In 2012, the dispute over the South China Sea became even more intense because of

Tokyo's "nationalizing" the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. China and Taiwan united and fought

against Japan together on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands issue, which was probably a situation that

Japan wanted to see the least. People still remember how Japanese Coast Guard's ships

confronted China’s ocean surveillance ships, and the next day, they got into a water cannon fight

with ships from Taiwan Coast Guard Administration. 11 If Japan didn't try to control such a

situation, the mainland and Taiwan would soon be officially standing against it on the islands

issue. This was also an issue when Abe Shinzo returned to office. Under his leadership, the

Japan-Taiwan Fishery Agreement was transformed from an economic issue to a strategic

problem. Abe's administration made it clear that Japan should try its best to achieve this

agreement even if they had to make a concession to Taiwan. 12 So, the agreement was

immediately signed in 2013. In other words, Abe signed this agreement to get Japan out of the

trap of the Diaoyu Islands situation.

24
 From Japan's perspective, signing the Japan-Taiwan Fishery Agreement was like killing

two birds with one stone. One the one hand, it pacified the Taiwanese population. On the other

hand, which was even more important, it broke the brief unity that mainland and Taiwan created

during the island dispute. As a result, both Japan and Taiwan were winners, while China failed to

unite with Taiwan over the defense of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Yongjiang 2015, 297-306). 13

During the 2013 Conference on Taiwan in Beijing, a Chinese scholar acutely criticized Taiwan's

behavior of signing the fishery agreement, describing it as stabbing China in the back. He also

questioned why Ma Yingjiu's administration would consider betraying China. From the Chinese

perspective, the criticism was understandable. However, we will have to learn from Japan's

strategic thinking on its diplomacies. In other words, it made a small sacrifice (to Taiwan) to gain

big benefit (broke mainland and Taiwan's unity on the island dispute). Japan's solution on this

diplomatic issue is worth considering. In fact, this strategic thinking was also reflected when

Japan changed its' attitude on the "comfort women" issue and signed an agreement with Korea

(Qian 2015). The agreement could never be reached without the strategic thinking of Japan,

Korea and the US (Eliperin 2016).

It's easy to understand the old saying: "no permanent enemies, no permanent friends"

when we look at the China-Japan relationship as part of the development of the Asia-Pacific

region, especially with the competition amongst great powers (including the China-Japan-US

trilateral relationship). From Japan's third debate on foreign policy back in the 90s to the change

of the ruling party in 2009, the country's public opinions had "drifted" several times. We could

see the rise of a new opinion such as "drifting away from the US and retaining our diplomatic

independence." From the independent foreign policy advocated by Hatoyama Yukio to the

25
massive protests against Abe's amendment intention in 2015 and the recent disagreements on

issues like the Okinawa military base problem, a lot of different voices have been rising in Japan.

China should be aware of how deep and wide Japan's domestic debates are and use the

different intentions that appeared in those debates to achieve its own purpose. This method

should also be considered when looking at the US-Japan relationship. For example, China should

highlight the voices in the US criticizing the various times Japan has sanitized its WWII history

in its textbooks. Of course, we should not overestimate Japan's centrifugal force to America and

ignore the rise of the right wing in Japan, as well as the possible negative effects of the changing

global political climate. In other words, China should be prepared for a long-term depressed

relation with Japan.

The tilted middle way direction of Japanese foreign policy can be understood as a

collision between realism and idealism, as well as an evolution of Japan’s foreign policy.

Recalling Japanese foreign policy since World War II, it is clear that policy towards the US, with

the Japan–US security treaty as a cornerstone, remains the top priority while foreign policy

toward China can be regarded as coming second. Japan’s foreign policy has experienced

significant changes from the Cold War to the creation of friendlier Sino-Japanese diplomatic

relations marked by the 1972 rapprochement. Since the mid-1990s, calls have begun to be made

for an end to the “1972 system” and start of a “normal relationship” (Wan 2002). With the

collapse of the former Soviet Union, both China and Japan carried out a full range of adjustments

towards each other through their foreign policies, which could be called “Power Politics” (Yahua

2006, 14-28).14 These diplomatic games reveal a greater focus on real interests than on

26
ideological factors. Thus, consideration of national interest takes precedence when adjusting

policy in order to deal with domestic and international situations.

This was obvious during Koizumi’s administration. From 2001 until 2006 when Koizumi

stepped down, Sino-Japanese relations shifted from relative stability to a phase characterized by

low-level hostility. Scholars of course have different interpretations regarding the emergence of

such a shift. Some scholars believe structural changes in the international environment caused

the shift, while others argue that the main reason for such change was a surge in rightist and

nationalist sentiment in Japan. Yet another interpretation holds that the rise of China triggered a

sense of imbalance on the Japanese side. Each of these perceptions have some logic to their

argument, the point is that both China and Japan have made mistakes in their policy towards

each other.

(a) Japan’s Misjudgment in the Koizumi Era

One of the features of Game-theory Diplomacy is, adjusting the old foreign policies

according to the changing situations (both domestic and international), while the adjustments

have to be based on national interests. The goal of such adjustments is emphasizing more

interests and reducing the effects of idealism. This feature was really conspicuous during

Koizumi Junichiro's term. From the mid-90s to Sept 2006, the China-Japan relationship

experienced a "relatively friendly to relatively hostile" transformation.

Due to the lack of strategic thinking, Japanese diplomacy failed to manage the tendency

of its “tilted way” foreign policy. This can be proved by comparing Japan with the United States

regarding diplomatic policies on China. The Chinese scholar, Liu Weidong, summed up the

27
following six different points: (1) At the strategic level, Japan tends to fight, while the United

States tends to guide; (2) Regarding security issues, Japan has both prevention and provocation,

while the United States emphasizes cooperation and prevention; (3) Regarding trade issues,

Japan pays more attention to economic opportunities, but lacks stability of its targets and

meaning. In contrast, although the decisions of US are often influenced by political factors, the

connotation of its targets is stable; (4) Regarding Taiwan, the strategic importance of Taiwan is

rising in Japan’s diplomacy, while such importance is gradually decreasing for the United States;

(5) Regarding the Japan-US alliance, Japan uses it to contain China, while the United States

attempts to use it to contain China and control Japan; (6) On the ideological level, the attitude of

Japan and the US toward China are out of sync; when one rises and the other falls (Liu 2006).

Secondly, due to the lack of large-scale and long-term strategic thinking, Prime Minister

Junichiro Koizumi and his think tanks underestimated China’s determination on the Yasukuni

Shrine issue, and the importance of China’s role in international affairs. Nevertheless, Japan’s

refusal to listen to the criticisms of other countries on an internal matter was understandable, but

its choice regarding the issue of Yasukuni Shrine put Japan in the position of having to be a

loser. Japan's position on this issue was even criticized by its allies. For example, Hyde, the

chairman of the International Relations Committee of the Federal House, had written to Japan's

ambassador to the United States, in which he strongly criticized Koizumi visiting the Yasukuni

Shrine.15 This criticism was not only from US politicians, but also from the United States

mainstream media (NYT 2006)16 and even experts who had good relationships with Japan

criticized Japan on this issue (Glosserman 2005, 8).

28
 For United States foreign policy, the truth is obvious: you may act against China, but you

can never reverse the verdict on the issue of World War II. Although in recent years the United
17
States has lifted its restrictions on Japan’s constitutional issues, (Ford 2015) there is always a

clear criticism from United States on the historical issues of Japan. For example, in September

2015 the Congressional Research Institute issued a lengthy report entitled “Japan- U.S. relations

problems faced by the Congress," in which it describes the criticism from the United States on

the issue of comfort women and Japan's Yasukuni Shrine (Chanleu-Aversy et al. 2015, 7-8).

From the diplomatic perspectives, the approaches taken by Prime Minister Koizumi in

this context were particularly unwise. When Japan disregarded China’s views and continued the

successive visits to Yasukuni Shrine, the relationship between Japan and China weakened.

China shifted its attitude from vague into clear opposition regarding Japan’s desire to become a

permanent member of the UN Security Council, which served as a good example to illustrate that

Japan was not handling the Yasukuni Shrine well (Jianyong 2005).

Thirdly, there was a vicious circle between the Koizumi cabinet’s diplomatic policies

toward China and its domestic conservative tendency; the interaction of which also largely

limited the flexibility of Japan's diplomacy. In other words, the upsurge of nationalism in Japan,

made even more leaders adhere to the "do not listen to Beijing’s commands" and ignored

whether the problem itself was right or wrong. The Yasukuni Shrine issue mentioned above was

one such example. In turn, the leaders’ insistence also promoted the Japanese media’s criticism

towards China, resulting in the sentiment of "Boredom China" continuing to spread and

exacerbated the confrontation between the people from the two countries (China Today 2005). 18

Under such circumstances, it was also difficult for Japanese experts who had a deep
29
understanding of Japan-China relations to stand up and point out the errors to be corrected in

Japan’s diplomatic directions. Tensions were so high, that some politicians, officials, scholars

and entrepreneurs who did not agree with the government's policy towards China were afraid to

speak out on the issue, because they feared personal attacks and for their safety. This fear

silenced a large number of people with dissident voices. This made it more difficult for Japan to

push its diplomatic policy on China towards a more moderate path. This vicious interaction of

course limited the possibilities Koizumi government had to carry out a pragmatic and flexible

diplomacy on the issue of China.

(b) China's Misjudgment in the Koizumi era

Similar to Japan’s problem, China’s diplomacy during the Koizumi period is also worth

considering. Firstly, regarding strategic priority issues, China has always followed its tradition

placing its diplomacy with Japan in the global environment. In the Maoist period, Japan was

considered to be part of the "Second World" between the United States, the Soviet Union and the

“Third World,” which included China. Japan was considered a power that was able to collaborate

within the triangular pattern of US, Soviet Union and China around Nixon's visit to China in

1972. During the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations marked by Tanaka's visit to China in

1972, although Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai had criticized Japan’s wrong historical view, China

did not consider this a problem when it considered its global strategy consideration. After 1978

when China entered a new era with Deng Xiaoping's reformation and more open policies,

China's diplomacy was subject to its strategic goal of modernization, and its diplomatic policies

to Japan were also paramount considerations (Li 2005). 19 Chinese leaders criticized Japan’s

30
wrongdoing on historical issues, including the textbook issue and Japanese leaders visits to the

Yasukuni Shrine (for example, the incumbent, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone), but they did

not interfere with their own fight of uniting with Japan to help promote the modernization of

China's strategic objectives (Zhao 2003). However, during the period when Koizumi was

incumbent, China's foreign policy toward Japan seemed to reach an impasse and the bilateral

relations became lopsided, which in turn compromised China’s core interests in other aspects

(for example, on the possibility of raising a Japanese version of the "Taiwan Relations law ")

were compromised. That is, although China then held a remarkable strategy of “fight without

breaking up,” regarding relations with Japan, it confined itself to the matter as they were and

rarely put it in the Asia-Pacific global level, and therefore, China failed to widely make friends

among Japanese governments and diplomatic channels were relatively limited.

First, when making foreign policy, the country should be clear about its political

influence. And, the country should apply its method of solving internal affairs and foreign affairs

separately other than interchangeably. Secondly, even when the two countries are at war, the

communication channels of the highest level should still be smooth. The United States and the

Soviet Union still maintained the highest-level of communication even during the Cold War.

When dealing with complex international issues, one should make the best of the contradictions

and mistakes on the other side, especially for the conflict between China and Japan (including

the history issue and the Diaoyu Islands dispute), which was not a simple question on the

technical level, but required more negotiation at the political strategic level (Pollmann 2015).

Therefore, China's foreign policy during the Koizumi government does need further reflection

(Zhao 2005).20 One successful example of political manipulation was the transformation of U.S.-

31
Japan relations. The U.S. transformed the deterioration of U.S-Japan relations, which was the

result of "caveating Japan" in the 1980s, into the improved US-Japan relations under the

guidance of US-Japan alliance policy in the latter 1980s (Zhao 2015). 21 Ironically, the

improvement of Japan-US relations happened simultaneously with the deterioration of China-

Japan relations, which proved that different diplomatic strategies do indeed play a pivotal role in

the transformation of a country's external relationships.

Thirdly, regarding the issue of Japanese mainstream thinking, during diplomacy with a

specific foreign country, we should not only learn about the history of this country but should

also grasp the current developments of this country accurately, which is especially important in

Japanese diplomacy. As described above, since the Meiji Restoration, Japan, under the policy of

"people from Asia to Europe" and "Enriching," gradually embarked on an expansive course of

foreign militarism, which brought great suffering to the people of Asia, especially China and the

Korean Peninsula. However, we should also see that since end of World War II, Japan insisted

on a national policy of prioritizing economic development. Besides, its "peace constitution" also

played a role in reducing the possibility of Japan's foreign expansion. Inside Japan there is also a

complex and arduous struggle on how to recognize the history issue in the past. Japan's actions in

strengthening its military force does require caution, but such action is different in essence with

the militarism Japan exhibited before. Therefore, we need to do further research and emphasize a

multi-angle study on such issues in Japan (Zhao 2015). 22 Moreover, we should be clear about the

mainstream thinking in Japanese diplomacy. In other words, we should pay special attention to

Japan’s tendency to drift away from and come back to its middle way diplomacy discussed here,

and its influence on friendly diplomatic relations between China and Japan. At the same time,

32
relevant government departments should guide domestic nationalist sentiment to the positive

development of China-Japan relations, in an insightful manner. To achieve this purpose,

Japanese diplomatic work and other diplomatic work should absorb Chinese experts on Japanese

issues as much as possible, such as the famous Japanese expert Liao Chengzhi. In essence, the

importance of experts in Japan not only provides a more realistic perception of Japan, but it also

provides useful network in the diplomatic conciliation. A good example is in the memoir of

Yang Zhenya, the former Chinese ambassador to Japan, mentioned that he used his personal

friendship, developed in his youth, with the Japanese Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita to

successfully prevent the Lee Teng-hui's under-planning visit to Japan (Yang 2006). China should

also pay more attention to building relations with the new generation of Japanese politicians and

should see their potential impact on determining which direction Japan is headed in their middle

way diplomacy (Wu 2002).

In particular, both the people and the government in China and Japan have carried out a

profound reflection and rethinking on important China-Japan relations, which is of great

importance to the Asia-Pacific region. After Koizumi stepped down in 2006, the leaders of the

two countries met and repeatedly expressed their determination to improve bilateral relations. Of

course, the problem of their foreign policy mentioned above cannot be solved overnight and is

also one of the many issues that influence the China-Japan relationship. Although the summits

between China and Japan were restored after the Koizumi government, there are still many other

problems between China and Japan. For example, the different attitudes between China and

Japan around the Diaoyu Islands territorial disputes, historical cognitive problems (such as

textbooks, Yasukuni Shrine), Japanese constitutional amendment, sending troops abroad and so

33
on. China's determination to safeguard national sovereignty on the Diaoyu Islands, of course, is

unshakable, but China should also pay special attention to some specific issues related to the

overall situation on the operational level, such as how to maintain channels of communication

with Japanese and US governments and defense departments, and how to avoid accidental

political fallout or military conflict. These problems are yet to be properly addressed individually

by leaders in the future.

Future Directions of Japanese Foreign Policy

The third political debate starting from the 1990s didn't happen in a quiet manner, and it

was as vigorous as the former two at the surface. However, the consensus of the "tendentious

middle way" had far-reaching significance in Japanese diplomacy. A tilted middle way in

Japanese foreign policy was formed under a framework incorporating ideas of both realism and

idealism with various other theories also continuing to add influence. This framework is a

product of long debate and deliberation among Japanese society and political circles. The debate

began in the end of the twentieth century and the framework started to take shape at the

beginning of the twenty-first century under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Prime Ministers

Koizumi, Abe, Fukuda, and Aso and will continue for the foreseeable future with Abe’s victory

on October 22nd. Based on an analysis of this consensus and paying particular attention to the

types of policy enacted by Abe and Fukuda and confirmed by Aso and Hatoyama, a few different

preferences in terms of the inclination or tilt within the Japanese middle-way approach to foreign

policy become apparent.

34
 First, Japan’s foreign policy will continue its post-war tradition of putting US-Japan

relations first. It is clear that Japanese leaders not only want to stress this alliance in order to

ensure Japan’s security, but also intend to place more emphasis on common values such as

democracy, which also coincides with trends developing through globalization. At the same

time, Japanese foreign policy will continue to express efforts to achieve the “fully independent

sovereign state goals” as former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro stressed (Hiroshi 2005, 10-

17), placing more emphasis on national interests and independence (Green 2001). The two

leading elements – security and common values related to the Japan–US alliance – will become

the pillars behind Japan’s tilt, causing it to maintain its present strategic policy, with US–Japan

alliance as the cornerstone, for the foreseeable future (Faiola 2006, A12).

During Abe’s government under the Obama administration, Japan's diplomacy exhibited

two different features: firstly, Japan improved Japan-China and Japan-Korean relations in order

to promote the construction of the East Asia Community. Secondly, Japan strengthened the

Japan-U.S alliance by adhering to "active pacifism" so as to help the Obama administration in

the pursuit of the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy. Such strategy served to help Japan's

strategic transformation, promoted Japan's efforts in becoming a permanent member in UNSC,

and interference in the East China Sea and South China Sea issue (Zhang 2015).

President Donald Trump’s election makes US policy uncertain. It raises many questions

about what form the US-Japan alliance will take. Politicians are wondering to what degree

President Trump will continue President Obama's pivot towards Asia. Japan is so concerned

about Trump's presidency, Prime Minister Abe had an emergency meeting with President

Trump. President Trump has already made decisions that that have been issues of concern for

35
Japan. The fact that Trump withdrew from TPP was a huge disappointment. With Trump's

presidency, Japan is reconsidering its foreign policy. Will Japan continue to rely solely on the

US or will Japan diversify its policy to not just rely on the US, but to also improve relations with

China?

Second, Japan will carefully handle relations with China. Although Tokyo is still

concerned about the possible existence of threats similar to that of the “China threat theory,” it

will focus more on strategic power transition in a macroscopic direction, showing more caution

regarding issues such as Taiwan, which are central to China’s interests. This is also related to

Japan’s own realistic interest, in that actions that may cause a worsening of relations from

“politically cold and economically hot” (Beijing Review 2006, 19) to “politically cold and

economically cool,” will harm the country’s fundamental interests (Hisake 2006, 12-20). In order

to avoid having to choose between Beijing and Washington, Tokyo will further strengthen its

position calling for the development of a framework incorporating China, the US and Japan

together. Needless to say, the China-Japan relationship is one of the key factors for China to

improve relations between the surrounding countries and to keep the regional stability in the

Asia-Pacific region. The China-Japan relationship is an ineluctable issue for China requiring

innovative thinking from the strategic point of view. From the perspective of Japanese

diplomacy, China should carefully study the development of political force and political thoughts

in Japanese society so as to keep track of the diplomatic policy debate inside Japan and take

advantage of the positive factors in China-Japan relations. In other words, China should find the

common interests with Japan, from a strategic view in the political game in Asia-Pacific. After

36
all, China and Japan have a longer history of peaceful coexistence, in which the two learned from

each other, than the hostility that started after the Sino-Japanese War.

We can also learn from China's experience in China-Korean diplomacy, both of which

would be valuable lessons in developing diplomatic relations with Japan (both of course are not

the same). For example, by taking advantage of Japan and the South Korean summit, and FTA

talks as a breakthrough, China can promote the realization of an East Asian Community. Again,

the concern about the North Korean nuclear issue is also a common ground between China and

Japan. Since China and South Korea established diplomatic relations in 1992, China took about

20 years to successfully contribute to the Korea's relative neutrality in the great power game.

With the further development of power transition in Asia-Pacific international relations, could

China also make it a long term (20 years or more) strategy goal to go from a more contentious

relationship with Japan to a more “neutralized” one? If it is difficult in the short term, China at

least should work together with the policy makers and politicians inside Japan in order to slow or

even prevent the further deterioration of China-Japanese relations, and further avoid conflict

between the two nations. In the development of China-US relations, China should actively

promote Japanese diplomacy, and thereby gradually change the unequal status of China-Japan-

US trilateral relations.

Third, Japan will be more actively involved in the East Asia community’s economic

development. It will also emphasize greater economic cooperation among groups such as the

ASEAN-plus-three framework, and work to create a stronger strategy for value-driven regional

integration by attempting to better integrate Australia, New Zealand and India into regional

affairs.

37
Such moves will allow Japan to both share in the regional leadership position with China, and

also balance China’s ever-growing influence (Hiatt 2006, A21).

Fourth, Japanese political circles will continue to promote modifications to the country’s

peace constitution in order to further improve Japan’s political and military power status. Japan

will also continue its efforts to raise its status within international institutions, including the

United Nations Security Council, making efforts towards both the US and China in order to win

support. Although Japan’s role in the North Korean nuclear problem is not the most important

one, Japan will adopt a more positive attitude and position during the six-party talks in order to

solve this problem (Zhao 2006, 95-111). Japan will continue to be vigilant for a potential united

front between China, North Korea, South Korea and Russia on the peninsula issue, as well as

working on preventing solving the deterioration of Japan’s relations with South Korea over

territorial disputes (Quia Bao 2005, A15).

Fifth, Japanese foreign policy will incorporate goals to strengthen Japan’s “soft power” to

better help it attain its strategic goals. As the world’s second or third largest economy, Japan has

the strength to carry out a more “soft power”-oriented approach to foreign policy. Such a policy

will not only rely on Japan’s economic diplomacy represented primarily through its use of ODA,

but also incorporate an expanded use of its cultural diplomacy. Regarding Japanese culture, by

emphasizing the exchange of young people, Japan continued to increase its output of Japanese

values and culture, which served to strengthen its "soft power" diplomacy (Hagstrom 2014, 129-

37).23 One such example of this policy is a program initiated in 2006 to support short visits and

home-stays for Chinese secondary-school students to Japan. China–Japan youth exchanges were

started as early as during Koizumi’s administration, pointing toward the goal of using people- to-

38
people diplomacy building through cultural exchanges as a tool for creating better foreign

relations and improving Japan’s international image abroad. Prime Minister Abe’s wife

emphasized this point when visiting a middle school in Beijing (Feng 2006, 62-3). Thus, the use

of cultural diplomacy in Japan’s “soft-power” approach is likely to play a greater role in the

future (Kondo 2006, 36-7).

As mentioned earlier, special attention needs to be given to the question of the tilt within

the middle-way direction. Although this approach has become the preferred route of Japanese

foreign policy, its inclination is heavily influenced by leaders (and their factions), particular

policy areas, as well as pressing domestic and international political situations. These essential

factors will be the basis of analysis and future research of Japan’s mainstream thinking and its

possible changes. According to its consensus forming in the long debate, Japan balanced its

diplomacy with other countries, or, in other words, Japan continued its international policy

following the "tendentious" middle way. Although such tendentiousness varied in different

periods, with different international environments and different internal political leadership,

generally, Japan's international policy returned to the "middle way," which was the most

beneficial to Japan’s national interests.

39
Notes

40
1
This question was asked by the author of this paper. Details related to Abe’s luncheon speech can be
found at: Shinzo Abe, “Miles to go: My vision for Japan’s future,” available online at
[Link]
2
For an explanation on this school’s main theoretical writings, see Kenneth Waltz, 2001 Theory of
International Politics (Readings MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). For a good example concerning its use
in foreign policy study, see John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York:
W.W. Norton).
3
For examples of efforts made in this direction see John G. Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (eds),
International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003);
and Stephen Haggard, “The Balance of Power, Globalization, and Democracy: International Relations
Theory in Northeast Asia,” Journal of East Asian Studies, 4 (2004): 1–38.
4
For information regarding the Japanese invasion of China, especially the Nanjing Massacre, see
Joshua Fogel (ed.), The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography (Berkeley CA: University of
California Press, 2000), and also Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World
War II (New York: Basic, 1997).
5
Ding Guo, “Riben biantianhou hequ hecong [Where is Japan Heading After the Regime Change?]”
Youzhou Zhoukan (13 September 2009): 11.
6
Michael Green, “Understanding Japan’s Relations in Northeast Asia,” testimony for the hearing on
“Japan’s Tense Relations with Her Neighbors: Back to the Future,” House Committee on International
Relations, 14 September 2006.
7
Nevertheless, Japan’s National Defense Force is still ranked among the top in the world.
8
See the following: Steven Vogel, Japan Remodeled: How Government and Industry are Reforming
Japanese Capitalism (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); Richard Colignon and Chikako
Usui, Amakudari: The Hidden Fabric of Japan’s Economy (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press,
2003); Bai Gao, Japan’s Economic Dilemma: The Institutional Origins of Prosperity and Stagnation
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
9
See Jin Xide, The Japanese Government’s Development Assistance (Beijing: Social Sciences
Academic Press, 2000): Juichi Inada, ‘Japan’s ODA: Its impact on China’s industrialization and Sino-
Japanese relations’, in Hans Gunther Hilpert and Rene Haak (eds), Japan and China: Cooperation,
Competition, and Conflict (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 121–396.
10
For an excellent interpretation of Japanese political culture see Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum
and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (New York: New American Library, 1946). Chinese
scholars writing in this area include Li Zhaozhong, Ambiguous Japanese (Beijing: Jincheng
Chubanshe, 2005).
11
On Sept 25th 2012, Taiwan's fishing boats entered waters around Diaoyu Islands. When the boats
reached within 16 to 18 nautical miles of the islands, over 20 Japan Coast Guard ships started following
them. When the Taiwanese got as close as 3 nautical miles to the islands, the Japanese Coast Guard
started shooting water cannon at them. Taiwan's patrol vessels, which were led by ship "De Xing," shot
back with water cannons. The patrol vessels then stood facing Japan Coast Guard along with the
fishing boats.
12
On Sept 8th 2012, Japan Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko suggested negotiating about fishery
resumed. On Oct 5th, through Interchange Association Japan (IAJ), Foreign Minister Genba Koichiro
indicated that Japan was willing to change the intensifying Japan-Taiwan relationship regarding Diaoyu
Islands, and resumed fishery negotiation as soon as possible.
13
According to the agreement that was reached in this treaty, Japan indicated that the area South of 27
degrees north, the so called ¨Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone, ¨ as ¨condominium sea.¨ Taiwan's
fishing boats will be allowed to fish there. Taiwanese fishermen were able to fish in a sea territory that
was twice as big as Taiwan itself, and this added 4530 km2 to Taiwan's fishing area. If mainland China
still recognized the temporary sea territory according to the current China-Japan fishery agreement,
fishermen from mainland China will in fact be excluded from Diaoyu Islands waters. Japan used the
treaty to gain the right for fishing and the ¨condominium¨ with Taiwan, and softened Taiwan's position
on the Diaoyu Islands issue. Japan tried to change the key of the dispute and concentrated all their
efforts to confront mainland China. This fact caused the breakdown of the current China-Japan fishery
agreement and it was a departure of the one-China principle. Refer to Liu Yongjiang, ¨China-Japan
Fishery Agreement's Impact on Diaoyu Islands Dispute,¨ Study on Japanese Foreign Policies and
China-Japan Relations, ed. Zhao Quansheng (Taipei: Wu-Nan Book Inc., 2015), 297-306

For analyses on diplomatic games between Japan and China, See Ma Yahua, “Lun zhongri qiutu
14

kunjing de cunzai ji taoyi [On the Prisoner’s Dilemma between China and Japan and How to Exit],”
Riben Xuekan (Japanese Studies), 2 (2006), p14–28.

Media Coverage of Criticism to Japan, referring to “Yasukuni Visit Denounced by Chairman of U. S.

15

House Committee on International Relations," accessed December 28, 2015, http: 1/news.
[Link]/[Link]? SubiD 二 news&MsglD 二 96139&c_lang=big5.

For example, The U.S New York Times public editorial criticized editorials on Japanese Foreign
16

Minister Taro Aso erroneous statements about historical issues refer to：Editorial, "Japan's Offensive
Foreign Minister," The New York Times (February 13,2006).
17
Matt Ford, "Japan Curtails Its Pacifist Stance," The Atlantic, last modified September 19, 2015,
[Link] 一 pacifism 一 article 一 nine/4063 18/.
18
China and Japan has conducted many surveys about public opinion regarding China-Japan
relations. For example, for a survey result during the governance of Koizumi refer to: "Chinese
Respondents Rational toward Sino-Japan Relations," China Today 54, no.11 (November 2005): 8.
Japanese survey result refers to: Forum of Foreign Affairs, no. 196 (2004): 58-61.
19
For reflections on strategic considerations between China and Japan then, please refer to: Enmin Li,
The Political Interaction behind Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China, (Tokyo:
Ochanomizu Shobo, 2005). Other relevant policy debate toward Japan in China at the time of the,
please refer to Peter Cries, "China's 'New Thinking' on Japan," The China Quarterly, (December
2005): 831-50.

The author put forward some views on China’s foreign policy toward Japan on the conference held in
20

March 2005, Beijing, China. For reports at the time of the debate, please refer to" US-Japan joint deal
with China - Returned Scholars On Sino-US -Japanese relations,” Global Times, March 25, 2005.
21
Referring to Quan Sheng Zhao, “Pushing Hands Role of Strategy Team in US Foreign Policy during
Transition,” International Security Study 4, (2013).

There are some attempt from the author. Referring to Quansheng Zhao, Japanese Foreign Study-the
22

Perspective of Researchers of China and Aboard (Taibei: Wunan Press, 2015).

23
Comparative analysis on China and Japan diplomacy regarding soft power, referring to Linus
Hagstrom, "The Sino-Japanese Battle for Soft Power: Pitfalls and Promises," Global Affairs 1, no. 2:
129-37.