Introduction

The Idea of Justice by Amartya Sen presents the capabilities approach as a central part of his
framework for assessing societies and advancing justice. Most of the detailed exploration
happens in Part III of the book, under the heading “The Materials of Justice”, and it runs
through four crucial chapters: “Lives, Freedoms and Capabilities”, “Capabilities and
Resources”, “Happiness, Well-being and Capabilities”, and “Equality and Liberty.”
In Amartya Sen's work, the discussion of the capabilities approach to justice begins in
scattered places, then unfolds fully in the middle chapters. The first mention comes on page
25, tucked away in the acknowledgements, where Sen looks back on the conversations that
helped form his ideas. He thanks Diana Strassman, editor of a journal, for talks about the
links between feminist thinking and the capability approach, and notes how those exchanges
shaped the wider picture of justice built around freedoms and opportunities.1
Another brief reference appears on page 256, in a footnote that considers possible extensions
of the approach. Sen remarks that beyond the familiar uses of capability thinking, its reach
might stretch into less familiar areas, such as traditional ‘European values’ that all favour
freedom.2 The comment points to flexibility without exploring it further.
The main treatment begins properly on page 260, in a subsection called “the capability
approach”. Here Sen establishes it as a basic alternative for judging individual advantage in
theories of justice. He explains at some length:
Any substantive theory of ethics and political philosophy, particularly any theory of
justice, has... In contrast with the utility-based or resource-based lines of thinking,
individual advantage is judged in the capability approach by a person’s capability to
do things he or she has reason to value. A person’s advantage in terms of opportunities
is judged to be lower than that of another if she has less capability – less real
opportunity – to achieve things that she has reason to value. The focus here is on the
freedom that a person actually has to do this or be that – things that he or she may
value doing or being.3
This view, rooted in freedom, stands apart from measures based on utility or resources,
placing weight on opportunities that actually exist.
The Capabilities Approach in the Preface and Acknowledgements
Amartya Sen hints at the capabilities approach quietly but repeatedly in the preface, treating
it as essential to the comparative view of justice that centres on actual human lives rather than
abstract institutions. He highlights the limits of the Rawlsian idea of “justice as fairness”,
which focuses on just institutions and assumes people will comply, and calls instead for
attention to the lives people really lead.
The recent investigation of what has come to be called the ‘capability perspective’
fits directly into the understanding of justice in terms of human lives and the
freedoms that the persons can respectively exercise.4

1
Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 25.
2
Sen, Idea of Justice, 256.
3
Sen, Idea of Justice, 260.
4
Sen, Idea of Justice, 12.
The footnote opens gently into something deeper, a steady tug towards a view that will not
separate justice from the rough texture of lived experience. Sen calls to mind the sharp tang
of real possibility, the weight of freedoms seized or lost in ordinary struggles. The capability
perspective arrives not as fixed doctrine but as a way of seeing that attends to genuine
opportunities, building on earlier work shared with Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum roots the
approach more firmly in Aristotelian ideas of human flourishing. She offers a clear list of
central human capabilities regarded as minimum requirements for a life of dignity:
1. Life. ... 2. Bodily Health. ... 3. Bodily Integrity. ... 4. Senses, Imagination, and
Thought. ... 5. Emotions. ... 6. Practical Reason. ... 7. Affiliation. ... 8. Other
Species. ... 9. Play. ... 10. Control over One’s Environment.5
Yet this return to Aristotle also invites comparison with another modern recovery of
Aristotelian thought. Alasdair MacIntyre maintains that virtues, justice among them, can only
develop within shared practices and narrative traditions that supply a common purpose, not
within the detached individualism of liberal theories. He writes, “Lack of justice, lack of
truthfulness, lack of courage, lack of the relevant intellectual virtues – these corrupt
traditions.”6 The hint carries wide implications, explored more fully later, but already marks a
turn away from obsession with institutions towards lives made richer or poorer by what
people can truly do and be. The approach brings a human warmth to theory, creating urgency
about deprivations that institutions by themselves cannot fully address.
In the acknowledgements Sen acknowledges influences that formed the perspective, giving
particular weight to the contribution of Nussbaum.
A long-standing influence on my work on justice, particularly related to freedom and
capability, has come from Martha Nussbaum. Her work, combined with her strong
commitment to the development of the ‘capability perspective’, has deeply influenced
many of its recent advances.7
The gratitude comes across warmly, the sentences shifting rhythm to express appreciation for
shared intellectual paths. Nussbaum’s Aristotelian account of flourishing ties capacity to
human potential, extending the perspective into questions of gender, rights, and development.
Nussbaum underlines the political liberalism that supports a list of central capabilities, seeing
them as grounds for constitutional protection while still honouring pluralism. 8 MacIntyre,
drawing from the same Aristotelian source, cautions that such liberal pluralism often conceals
deeper fragmentation, where justice lacks the binding story of a common good. He observes:
“A society is composed of individuals, each with his or her own interest, who then
have to come together ... Individuals are thus primary and society secondary.”9
Sen also names scholars such as Sabina Alkire and Ingrid Robeyns, whose research broadens
its uses. The acknowledgements convey a lively network, the low murmur of cross-
disciplinary exchange that sharpens the approach without boxing it in. The capability

5
Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 78–80.
6
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 240.
7
Sen, Idea of Justice, 24–25.
8
Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 74–75.
9
MacIntyre, After Virtue, 268.
perspective feels cooperative, alive with continuing conversation, preparing the ground for its
central place without yet entering the detailed workings reserved for Part III.
The Capabilities Approach in the Introduction
Sen brings in capabilities early in the introduction as vital for judging social outcomes by the
freedoms people actually possess.
If social realizations are assessed in terms of capabilities that people actually have,
rather than in terms of their utilities or happiness... then some very significant
departures are brought about. ... Freedom to choose gives us the opportunity to decide
what we should do, but with that opportunity comes the responsibility for what we do
– to the extent that they are chosen actions. Since a capability is the power to do
something, the accountability that emanates from that ability – that power – is a part
of the capability perspective.10
The passage carries moral gravity; responsibility threaded quietly through the cloth of
freedom. Capabilities move past the brief pleasures of utility or the shifting light of subjective
happiness, insisting on answerability for acts within one’s reach. Sen sets this against
utilitarianism, suggesting the cold distance of pleasure-centred views. The perspective
touches both agency and duty, stirring awareness of obligations that arise from real power. It
catches freedom’s two-sided nature: chance and duty, the soft but firm call to act against
injustice when one has the means. This early placement anchors the comparative project in
human lives, the uneven pulse of choices opened or shut.
The Capabilities Approach in The Demands of Justice
Mentions remain few in Part I, which concentrates on reason, Rawls, institutions, choice, and
impartiality, yet capabilities appear in criticisms of resource-based measures.
Sen examines differences in how primary goods are converted.
The conversion of primary goods into the capability to do various things that a person
may value doing can vary enormously with differing inborn characteristics... as well
as disparate acquired features or the divergent effects of varying environmental
surroundings.11
The criticism unfolds steadily, the writing patient as it uncovers concealed inequalities.
Primary goods presume even conversion, yet disability or pregnancy requires more to reach
comparable capabilities. Rawls describes primary goods as:
…things that every rational man is presumed to want... rights, liberties, and
opportunities, and income and wealth.12
Sen calls up the quiet frustration of obstacles, the muffled effort against conditions that
diminish the worth of resources. Capabilities insist on noticing these differences, a
fundamental departure from Rawls while still valuing freedom highly. MacIntyre deepens the
contrast, contending that the resource-centred justice of Rawls, like Nozick’s entitlement
version, removes desert and any shared notion of the good, leaving modern arguments

10
Sen, Idea of Justice, 48.
11
Sen, Idea of Justice, 95.
12
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), 78.
incommensurable and grounded in emotivist breakdown rather than coherent tradition. He
states:
Neither of them make any reference to desert in their account of justice, nor could
they consistently do so. ... Rawls and Nozick articulate with great power a shared
view which envisages entry into social life as—at least ideally—a matter of free
choice by individuals concerned to further their own ends.13
The reference points ahead to the fuller treatment in Part III, stressing why justice must look
past mere means to genuine opportunities.
The Capabilities Approach in the Forms of Reasoning
References come and go quickly in Part II’s treatment of position, rationality, plurality, and
agency, yet one clear mention stands out in the discussion of transnational ethics.
Sen points to David Crocker’s book that brings agency and capability together.
The variety of channels through which people interact with each other across the
globe today, and their ethical and political significance, are illuminatingly discussed
by David Crocker, Ethics of Global Development: Agency, Capability and
Deliberative Democracy.14
The footnote reaches towards the place capability holds in ethics beyond borders, suggesting
duties that stretch across distances. It points to the way deliberative democracy can strengthen
capabilities, the easy movement of care between different identities. The reference ties
capability to agency, strengthening the sense of variety in reasoning without going into full
detail.
The Capabilities Approach in Public Reasoning and Democracy
The approach receives its widest use in Part IV, especially where it connects freedom of the
media, human rights, and global demands to capabilities.
When he examines how democracy actually works, Sen links freedom of the media to the
growth of capability.
Media freedom is critically important for our capability to do this [better the world].
The absence of a free media and the suppression of people’s ability to communicate
with each other have the effect of directly reducing the quality of human life.15
The claim carries a pressing weight, the sharp feeling of voices cut off draining colour from
daily existence. A free media supports capability for public reasoning, the spreading of ideas,
the defence of those overlooked, and the shaping of values. Sen calls to mind the lively pulse
of open talk, the quiet drift of ideas like gender fairness carried along by conversation.
In the chapters on human rights, capabilities give shape to the opportunity side of freedom.

13
MacIntyre, After Virtue, 267–269.
14
Sen, Idea of Justice, 171.
15
Sen, Idea of Justice, 365.
 For the opportunity aspect of freedom, the idea of ‘capability’ – the real opportunity
to achieve valuable functionings – would typically be a good way of formalizing
freedoms.16
Sen separates process from opportunity, adding careful layers to the understanding of
violations even when results seem acceptable. Capability grasps the real chances available,
working alongside proper procedure. The explanation develops steadily; the heavy sense of
freedoms lost through force or limit.
Later, when he brings in development ethics.
In his far-reaching contribution... David Crocker points out that because agency and
valuable capabilities are ‘the basis for human rights... a development ethic will also
examine how a globalized world is a help or a hindrance’.17
This calls up the moral strength of capability in duties that span the world, the wide view of
securing basic capabilities everywhere. Sen’s tone carries a calm reach, capability linking
rights, justice, and democracy in obligations that remain imperfect.
Equality and Liberty
Amartya Sen closes Part III of the book with this chapter, moving to the tangled connection
between two central values of justice. He looks at how theories of norms always call for
equality of something essential, even when they seem to conflict. The discussion threads
equality into the cloth of impartiality while protecting the capabilities approach from calls for
absolute equality of capability. Sen then considers the many sides of liberty, engaging closely
with Rawls, republican ideas, Hobbes, and his own past work on the impossibility of the
Paretian liberal. The chapter ends in thoughts on social choice and game forms, confirming
plurality as vital to justice.
Equality, Impartiality and Substance
Sen begins by observing the constant call for equality in different theories, connecting it to
impartiality.
Every normative theory of social justice that has received support and advocacy in
recent times seems to demand equality of something – something that is regarded as
particularly important in that theory. The theories can be entirely diverse (focusing on,
say, equal liberty or equal income or equal treatment of everyone’s rights or utilities),
and they may be in combat with each other, but they still have the common
characteristic of wanting equality of something (some feature of significance in the
respective approach).18
The remark opens with quiet depth, the gradual sense of discovery growing as Sen reviews
thinkers from Rawls to Nozick. Equality appears not as a choice but as a foundation, a guard
against random treatment. Even those who oppose distributive justice, such as Nozick with
his rights of liberty or Buchanan with equal legal rules, seek equality in their chosen area.
Utilitarianism also includes equal consideration of utilities. Sen develops this view broadly,
suggesting the gentle tug of fairness that runs through opposing positions. The demand shows
16
Sen, Idea of Justice, 400.
17
Sen, Idea of Justice, 410.
18
Sen, Idea of Justice, 291.
a deeper promise to impartiality, where principles must hold up under examination without
favour. One senses the burden of this agreement, the common human feeling that justice
means treating people as equals in some basic way. MacIntyre, though, sees in these modern
equalities a hidden break: competing ideas of justice stay incomparable without a shared
purpose or narrative tradition, turning argument into disguised struggle rather than reasoned
settlement. He argues:
Rawls’s priorities are incompatible with Nozick’s ... Rawls’s position is
incommensurable with Nozick’s ... there are rival conceptions of justice formed by
and informing the life of rival groups.19
It prepares the ground for the part capability plays, not as the only focus, but as an important
view among many.
Capability, Equality and Other Concerns
Sen argues against requiring equality of capability, despite its value, because of clashing
considerations.
If equality is important, and capability is indeed a central feature of human life (as I
have tried to argue earlier on in this book), would it not be right to presume that we
should demand equality of capability? I have to argue that the answer is, no. This is so
for several distinct reasons. ... First, capability is ... only one aspect of freedom,
related to substantive opportunities, and it cannot pay adequate attention to fairness
and equity involved in procedures that have relevance to The Idea of Justice.20
Sen explains with attention, the reasoning opening out like layers of a flower. Capability
shines in judging opportunities but misses fairness of process. An example brings the point
alive: women tend to live longer with equal care, so forcing equal longevity capability could
mean giving men more medical help, breaking fairness in matters of life and death. This calls
up a cold sense of wrong, the stark unfairness of bias hidden as correction. Sen carries the
criticism further: capability ignores deserved reward, as in pay for work, and permits
different weightings that produce partial rankings. Improvement for all matters as well as
distribution; raising every capability counts, not merely levelling them. The explanation stays
on these strains, the rough feel of actual clashes where single focus on equality fails.
Capability stays essential yet not dominant, giving way to demands of procedure and varied
values. This careful position brings human warmth to the theory, recognising the many sides
of justice without fixed rule.
Capability and Personal Liberties
Sen brings the capabilities approach into line with Rawls’s priority of liberty.
In departing from John Rawls’s focus on primary goods ... there is no hidden intention
of disputing Rawls’s reasoning on other issues. Those issues include the priority of
liberty ... Indeed ... there are good grounds for giving personal liberty some kind of a
real priority (though not necessarily in the extremist lexicographic form chosen by
Rawls).21

19
MacIntyre, After Virtue, 267–270.
20
Sen, Idea of Justice, 295–296.
21
Sen, Idea of Justice, 299.
Sen supports the leading place of liberty beyond simple advantage, touching concerns close
to the person that deserve respect. Rawls maintains that:
…the priority of liberty means that whenever the basic liberties can be effectively
established, a lesser liberty must sometimes be limited or denied.22
Sen questions Rawls’s strict order yet accepts broad precedence. Liberty needs guarding not
only as useful but as closely bound into lives. The argument grows thoughtfully, setting apart
from primary goods or capabilities in questions of distribution. Sen’s tone shows respectful
difference, the sentences shifting pace to mark agreement on the special standing of liberty
while refusing extremes. Small gains in liberty need not outweigh large losses elsewhere.
Public reasoning settles the exact weight, suggesting the open weave of discussion. This
joining strengthens capabilities, making sure liberty speaks amid the focus on opportunity.
MacIntyre, in contrast, sees such ordering as a sign of liberalism’s separation, where people
enter society as outsiders bargaining rights, lacking the community ties that alone support
true virtues. He notes:
A society is composed of individuals, each with his or her own interest, who then
have to come together ... Individuals are thus primary and society secondary.23
The Plural Features of Freedom
Sen looks at the many sides of freedom, beyond opportunity and process.
The terms ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’ are used in many different ways ... One distinction
in particular, between the opportunity aspect and the process aspect, was explored in
Chapter 11 ... The plurality of aspects of freedom can be approached and identified in
other ways as well.24
Freedom includes direct control, indirect results, and shared effort. Examples bring clear
pictures: a doctor deciding for an unconscious patient confirms effective power, shaped by
guessed wishes. Removing an epidemic shows group freedom. Sen examines success without
real power, like chance matching of state wishes. The discussion opens widely, warmth of
working together against the chill of mere luck. Variety resists narrowing, adding rather than
rival.
Capability, Dependence and Interference
Sen sets capability against republican and Hobbesian views.
In some theories of freedom ... liberty is defined not just in terms of what a person is
able to do ... but also includes the demand that others could not have eliminated that
ability ... even if that intervening power is not actually exercised.25
Three situations of a disabled person clarify: no aid leaves incapacity; public help or servants
allow movement. Capability treats enabled cases alike, republicanism marks independence.
Sen defends both as fitting together. Hobbes centres on actual interference. The examination
stays on fine points, the strength of independence against the practical scope of capability.

22
Rawls, Theory of Justice, 178.
23
MacIntyre, After Virtue, 268.
24
Sen, Idea of Justice, 301.
25
Sen, Idea of Justice, 305.
Social support deepens freedom greatly, a point republicanism might miss. Many aspects
enrich the view, suggesting the layered touch of freedom.
The Impossibility of the Paretian Liberal
Sen returns to his theorem, showing the clash between liberty and Pareto.
There is an allegedly pornographic book and two possible readers ... Prude ... would
suffer even more from its being read by ... Lewd ... Lewd ... would prefer even more
that Prude reads it.26
No option meets both minimal liberty and Pareto conditions. Possible ways out involve
tolerant preferences or rights that depend on context. Sen dismisses collusion as impractical
and contrary to liberal principles. The theorem continues to provoke debate, raising questions
about the absolute status of Pareto. The broad criticism highlights the strangeness of
meddlesome preferences, the cold discomfort of enforced intrusion.
Social Choice Versus Game Forms
Sen responds to Nozick’s emphasis on process.
Individual rights are co-possible; each person may exercise his rights as he chooses.
The exercise of these rights fixes some features of the world. Within the constraints ...
a choice may be made by a social choice mechanism.27
Game forms lay out strategies, and outcomes arise from collective play. Yet actions that
invade personal space need attention to results. The rights of a non-smoker require reasoning
backwards from actual consequences. Sen decides that both perspectives are required, with
outcomes shaping acceptable processes.
The conclusion reinforces variety in equality and liberty.
Both equality and liberty must be seen as having several dimensions within their
spacious contents. We have reason to avoid the adoption of some narrow and unifocal
view of equality or of liberty.28
This chapter brings together earlier threads with skill, accepting pluralism with thoughtful
poise and warm understanding.
Happiness, Well-being and Capabilities
Amartya Sen explores in depth the tangled relations between happiness, well-being, and the
capabilities approach in this key chapter of Part III of the book. He challenges the long hold
happiness has had in welfare economics while revealing its serious shortcomings as a full
measure of human advantage. Drawing on groundwork from earlier chapters, Sen sets the
appealing subjectivity of happiness against the stronger, freedom-centred view of capabilities.
The chapter moves through the strains between utilitarian traditions and the requirements of
justice, finally confirming why capabilities provide a better way to judge lives and make
normative decisions.
Happiness, Capability and Obligations
26
Sen, Idea of Justice, 310–311.
27
Sen, Idea of Justice, 315 (quoting Robert Nozick).
28
Sen, Idea of Justice, 317.
Sen starts the chapter by connecting capability to duties that come from real power, marking
a clear difference from happiness.
Freedom in general and agency freedom in particular are parts of an effective power
that a person has, and it would be a mistake to see capability, linked with these ideas
of freedom, only as a notion of human advantage: it is also a central concern in
understanding our obligations. This consideration yields a major contrast between
happiness and capability as basic informational ingredients in a theory of justice,
since happiness does not generate obligations in the way that capability inescapably
must do.29
The passage opens into a deep ethical understanding, building on Sen’s earlier reference to
the reasoning of Buddha in Sutta-Nipata. Capability carries the power to bring about change,
demanding responsibility when someone can lessen injustice. Happiness, on the other hand,
stays inward, without this outward moral demand. Sen suggests the calm insistence of
agency, the burden of possibility that touches conscience, reminding readers that justice asks
for more than private satisfaction. It requires action based on the reach of freedom. This
difference raises capability above simple advantage, placing it as vital for moral thought. One
senses the feel of duty here, the gentle pressure of what is possible, set against the softer,
more personal light of happiness.
The chapter skilfully breaks the exclusive claim of happiness, strengthening capabilities as
necessary for justice sensitive to the completeness of freedom and the depth of human
variety.
Capabilities and Resources
Amartya Sen pushes the argument forward in this chapter by looking at the weaknesses of
approaches to justice based on resources, especially the influential theory of primary goods
put forward by John Rawls. Building straight on the capabilities framework from the previous
chapter, Sen argues that concentrating on the sharing of resources misses the vital differences
in how people turn those resources into actual freedoms. The chapter examines closely the
notion that equality ought to be judged only by resources, showing why such a measure fails
to meet real human diversity and the calls of justice. Sen treats Rawls with respect yet firm
criticism, recognising the refinement of primary goods while proving their insufficiency as
the only basis for information in justice. MacIntyre carries this criticism further, presenting
the primary goods of Rawls as typical of a broken modernity where justice loses ties to desert
and shared purpose. He writes:
Neither [Rawls nor Nozick] make any reference to desert in their account of justice ...
Rawls (p. 310) allows that common sense views of justice connect it with desert, but
argues that we must reject this connection.30
Capability and Resources
Sen begins by making clear the difference between capabilities and resources, stressing that
the worth of resources comes from what they add to capabilities, not from mere ownership.

29
Sen, Idea of Justice, 271.
30
MacIntyre, After Virtue, 266–267.
 The capability approach to a person’s advantage is concerned with evaluating it in
terms of his or her actual ability to achieve various valuable functioning ... Resources,
such as income or wealth or primary goods, can be seen, to some extent, as inputs into
the achievement of capabilities, but the relationship is neither constant nor in any
sense automatic or obvious.31
This opening sets the direction for the whole chapter, marking a basic change of viewpoint.
Resources, whether money, goods, or the primary goods of Rawls, act as means rather than
ends. Their value comes from what they allow people to do and be. Yet the turning of
resources into capabilities differs widely because of personal, social, and environmental
conditions. Sen shows this with sharp examples: the same income provides more movement
for someone able-bodied than for a person with physical disability, who may need costly
equipment or changes. The explanation grows into a strong grasp of human difference.
Justice cannot ignore these variations; giving people equal resources can deepen inequality in
freedoms. Sen’s reasoning strikes with a direct feel, calling up the irritation of someone
trapped by conditions despite having the same set of goods as another who moves easily. By
putting capabilities first, the approach catches the lived depth of advantage, where the touch
of opportunity, the hint of possibility, forms a life much more than abstract possessions.
Rawls’s Focus on Primary Goods
Sen acknowledges the strength of Rawls’s theory while identifying its concentration on
resources, describing how primary goods act as the measure for justice in A Theory of
Justice.
Rawls’s ‘difference principle’ demands that we concentrate on making the worst-off
individuals in society as well off as possible, and the index in terms of which this
maximin exercise is carried out is a list of ‘primary goods’ – goods that any rational
person would want, no matter what else he or she wants. These include ‘rights,
liberties and opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect’. 32
Sen examines closely the grace of Rawls’s structure. Primary goods stand for all-purpose
means that people require whatever their particular aims, letting the theory stay neutral about
ideas of the good life. Rawls calls them:
things that every rational man is presumed to want... whatever a person’s rational plan
of life.33
The difference principle, with its attention to the least advantaged, carries a strong drive
towards equality. Yet Sen looks deeper, uncovering a quiet but important limit. The measure
of primary goods treats inputs the same way, supposing a broadly similar turning into well-
being or freedom. This supposition, useful in the original position of Rawls, passes over
actual differences. Sen’s wide criticism develops with thoughtful fairness, noting how
primary goods moved beyond welfarist options by avoiding subjective utilities. All the same,
the focus on resources risks wrongly spotting those truly worse off. Someone with greater
needs, perhaps from illness or disability, ends up poorer in capability even with equal or more
primary goods. The reasoning builds a persuasive case: justice needs care for results in
freedoms, not just the sharing of means, however refined the list of those means.
31
Sen, Idea of Justice, 253.
32
Sen, Idea of Justice, 255.
33
Rawls, Theory of Justice, 78.
The chapter bolsters the capabilities approach by laying bare the flaws of resource measures,
clearing the path for further looks at well-being and equality in later chapters. It serves as
proof of the method of Sen: critical yet building, grounded in the truths of varied lives.
Lives, Freedoms and Capabilities
Amartya Sen begins the third part of the book, devoted to the materials of justice, with this
chapter. He places the capabilities approach as a main framework for judging human
advantage in theories of justice. Instead of depending only on resources or happiness,
attention centres on the real freedoms people have to lead lives they value. The chapter lays
groundwork for later discussions on resources, well-being, and equality. Sen draws
differences with other views while making clear the main traits of capabilities. Nussbaum
names ten central capabilities, including bodily health, practical reason, and affiliation, as
thresholds of overlapping agreement for dignity, while sharing the stress of Sen on freedom
yet choosing more detail to shape policy. 34 The Aristotelian route of MacIntyre turns away
sharply, holding that virtues need rooted practices and traditions, not detached capabilities.
He states:
Necessary components of any practice with internal goods and standards of
excellence [are] the virtues of justice, courage and honesty. ... Without justice,
courage and truthfulness, practices could not resist the corrupting power of
institutions.35
The Capability Approach
Sen presents the capabilities approach as a means to assess individual advantage through the
capability of a person to do things he or she has reason to value.
Any substantive theory of ethics and political philosophy, particularly any theory of
justice, has to choose the nature of individual advantage in terms of which the
evaluations are made. In contrast with the utility-based or resource-based lines of
thinking, individual advantage is judged in the capability approach by a person’s
capability to do things he or she has reason to value. A person’s advantage in terms of
opportunities is judged to be lower than that of another if she has less capability to do
things she has reason to value.36
This passage grasps the core of the change Sen supports. Traditional theories often put first
either utility, as in happiness or desire satisfaction, or resources, such as income or primary
goods. Sen finds these lacking because they miss the real freedoms that let people turn inputs
into valued results. The capabilities approach focuses on opportunity freedom, the actual
possibilities available to individuals. It accepts that advantage is not only about what one has
or feels, but about what one can truly do and be.
Sen develops this by pointing out that capabilities come from a mix of functionings, the
different beings and doings a person reaches, such as being nourished, educated, or taking
part in community life. The approach calls for public reasoning to pick valued capabilities,
keeping it varied and suited to context. It escapes the limits of utility, which can be warped
by adaptation, or resources, which overlook factors of conversion like disability or social
34
Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 78–80.
35
MacIntyre, After Virtue, 208–212.
36
Sen, Idea of Justice, 231.
obstacles. In a world of difference, this concentration on freedoms offers a firmer ground for
comparative justice, allowing judgements of deprivation and advantage that connect with
human lives as they are actually lived.
Sen ends the chapter by confirming capabilities as central to judging lives and freedoms. This
framework moves justice forward by concentrating on real opportunities, differing from
narrower views while staying open to reasoning and pluralism. It prepares us to address
injustices that can be put right through a view tuned to the depth of human potential.
Conclusion
Reading Amartya Sen's The Idea of Justice, you feel the capabilities approach building
quietly, almost like a river finding its way. It starts with small hints scattered through the
preface and acknowledgements, then gathers real momentum in Part III and the chapters that
follow. Sen develops the idea with such patience, holding it up against the harder edges of
utilitarian thinking, resource-based theories, and the pursuit of perfect institutions, all while
keeping an open conversation going with people like Nussbaum and Rawls. The quiet
disagreements with MacIntyre, though, point to something deeper: Sen embraces the
messiness of plural views and open public reasoning, whereas MacIntyre fears we lose
something vital when there's no longer a shared story or common good to hold us together.
What stays with me longest is the warmth running through Sen's approach. Capabilities will
not let us shrink people down to mere possessors of goods or calculators of pleasure. Instead,
the focus falls on the actual texture of freedom, the way opportunity can feel sharp and
immediate when it's within reach or painfully absent in ordinary days. There's moral force in
that attention; it ties responsibility to agency and pushes us toward injustices we can actually
put right. The approach offers no tidy blueprint, no sealed system, just a way of comparing
lives that remains alert to difference, to context, to the uneven rhythm of what people might
become.
In the end, Sen's vision gives the whole pursuit of justice a kind of living breath. It turns our
gaze away from abstract perfection and toward the felt realities of existence. Societies come
into focus not only through the elegance of their institutions but through the substantive
freedoms people truly have, those small openings that shape dignity and the chance to
flourish. The whole thing feels like a generous, humane invitation to keep talking, a reminder
that justice will always be imperfect yet utterly necessary, anchored deep in the richness of
lives as they are actually lived.
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MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue. 3rd ed. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,
2007.
Nussbaum, Martha C. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1971.
Sen, Amartya. The Idea of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 2009.