JUDICIAL REVIEW OF

ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS:
PRINCIPLES
 4 categories/shapes
1. Legislative review (constitutionality of
laws/rules)
2. Judicial review (lower courts)
3. Constitutional review (constitutional
amendment)
4. Administrative action review
(constitutionality,
fairness-reasonableness-justness)
JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT
• Article 32, 136
• Does judiciary have the power to review the
decision?
• Can art. 32 be used only in case of violation of
Fundamental Rights? (Jhumman Singh v. CBI
1995)
• Can writ be issued against a pvt. Entity?
 What restricts judicial review?

Locus standi, laches, alternative remedy, res

judicata
 Locus standi against administrative
action
• Against whom a writ may lie?
• Who has the locus to challenge?
• Habeas corpus- anyone
• Quo warranto- any person can challenge an
appointment to public office
• Mandamus, certiorari- only person whose
rights have been infringed
• Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International
Airport Authority of India 1979
When petitioner has locus

a. Public significance, involvement of public

right, injury to public interest
b. Interest of his own
Fertiliser corporation Kamgar Union v.
UOI 1981
• Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer laid down several
revolutionary principles regarding locus
standi that fundamentally transformed access to
justice in India
• “locus standi must be liberalised to meet the
challenges of the times”
• ”all public-minded citizens or organisations with
serious concern for conservation of public
resources should have the right to invoke the
higher courts to correct misexercise of public
power so as to promote social justice”
• “public interest is promoted by a spacious construction of
locus standi" and advocated for ‘conceptual
latitudinarianism’ that permits taking liberties to invoke
higher courts where the remedy is shared by a considerable
number, particularly when they are weaker”
• When ‘a large body of persons with a common grievance
exists’, the traditional requirement of individual standing
should not be a barrier.
• participative justice is facilitated through Public Interest
Litigation
• procedural technicalities and hurdles should not be used to
prevent PIL being brought or succeeding
 Standing in the PIL
• Public duties standing (Municipal Council,
Ratlan v. Vardichand)
• Class standing (union members, prisoners,
• Public concern (PUCL v. UOI, SP Gupta v. UOI)
 Doctrine of Laches or unreasonable
delay
• Courts may refuse remedy when unreasonable
delay
• No fixed period for laches
• Courts look into explanation for delay in filing
petition
 Dr. Karan Singh v. State of Jammu &
Kashmir (1986)
• The Court rejected an application filed after 30
years, stating that there was "no right to
reopen the issue after 30 years without any
exceptional or reasonable grounds".
• Principle: Extraordinary delay without
reasonable explanation bars equitable relief
 The Three-Pronged Test

Halsbury's Laws of England provides the most widely

cited formulation for the doctrine of laches
1. Acquiescence on the Claimant's Part – when did
claimant become aware of violation
(a property owner knows that their neighbor has
built a structure encroaching on their land but
continues to accept rent or maintain cordial relations
without objection for years, this conduct may
constitute acquiescence)
2. Change of Position on the Defendant's Part
- whether the defendant has "altered his or her
position in reasonable reliance on the
claimant's acceptance of the status quo“

3. The Unconscionability Test

"put the other party in a position in which it
would not be reasonable to place him if the
remedy were afterwards to be asserted
Courts examine whether granting the remedy
would be unconscionable considering:
• The extent of delay and its impact on the
defendant
• The nature of the right being asserted
• The prejudice that would result to the
defendant
• Whether the defendant's legitimate
expectations would be frustrated
 Balancing Test
This involves balancing the claimant's right to
seek redress against the defendant's right to
security and finality. The court considers
whether it would be "unjust to give the claimant
a remedy" in the circumstances.
 Tilokchand Motichand & Ors. v. H.B.
Munshi & Anr. (AIR 1970 SC 898)
• Petitioners collected sales-tax refunds from customers
• Sales Tax Officer forfeited Rs. 26,563.50 under s.21(4)
Bombay Sales Tax Act (1953)
• Petitioners challenged forfeiture in Bombay High Court
(dismissed) and paid the sums under attachment in
1959–60 with protest
• After SC’s decision in Kantilal Babulal v. H.C. Patel (29
Sep 1967) struck down a similar provision, petitioners
filed under Art. 32 (Feb 1968) seeking refund under
s.72 Indian Contract Act (mistake/coercion)
• Petitioners filed Article 32 writ on 9 February
1968-over seven years after payment.
• Whether the Article 32 petition for refund
could be dismissed for laches given the long
delay between payment (1960) and filing
(1968).
• Petitioners: payments were made under coercion
and/or mistake of law; they discovered the
mistake after this Court’s Kantilal decision and
promptly filed; entitled to restitution
• Respondents / State: petitioners delayed
unreasonably (years passed, they litigated earlier
in High Court and did not appeal here), so Court
should apply laches/analogy to Limitation Act
and refuse writ; earlier High Court orders (and
petitioners’ conduct) estop or at least justify
denial
• No fixed limitation under Article 32, but “utmost
expedition” required.
• Delay must be assessed “on its own facts” and discretionary
relief may be refused if delay is avoidable and prejudicial.
• Majority held petition time-barred by analogy to Limitation
Act and due to petitioners’ failure to act promptly.
• Petitioners’ long delay, their prior High Court litigation and
payments under legal process meant their claim was barred
on grounds of laches/limitation and public policy
• Dissent emphasised fundamental-right remedy is not
subject to laches absent abuse, but majority view governs.
 ALTERNATIVE REMEDY
• refers to a statutory, administrative, or civil
procedure available to a litigant for redressal
of grievances before approaching
constitutional courts
• discretionary guideline, not a strict bar; High
Courts generally avoid entertaining writ
petitions if an equally efficacious statutory
remedy exists
• Rule of discretion, not compulsion
 AV Venkateswaran v. RS Wadhwani
1961
• The Supreme Court held that while the High Courts
have wide powers under Article 226, they generally
should not entertain writ petitions when specific,
effective alternative remedies are statutorily provided.
The Court clarified that the rule of alternative remedy
is a rule of discretion, not jurisdiction—exceptions
exist when:
• Fundamental rights are violated
• Principles of natural justice are breached
• The statutory remedy is not adequate or efficacious
• The order impugned is wholly without jurisdiction
 Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of
Trademarks (1998)
• Petitioner approached HC under Art. 226,
challenging an order passed by a statutory
authority without first availing the provided
appellate remedy under the relevant statute.
• Respondents contended that WP was not
maintainable due to the existence of a specific
statutory alternative remedy (appeal or
revision) which the petitioner did not exhaust.
 RATIO
• HC reiterated that existence of an alternative and equally
efficacious remedy is not an absolute bar to exercising writ
jurisdiction under Article 226
• The Court emphasized:
– The rule is one of discretion and self-restraint, not a rule of law.
– Exceptions include violation of fundamental rights, breach of principles
of natural justice, cases of orders wholly lacking jurisdiction, or
challenges to the constitutionality of statutory provisions.
– Writ petitions may be entertained when alternative remedies are
inadequate, inefficacious, or exceptional circumstances exist.
• The Court ultimately dismissed the writ on the ground that the
petitioner had not demonstrated that the alternative remedy was
inadequate or that any exception applied.
 Court may exercise jurisdiction when
alternative remedies available but
• Not adequate
• Lost for no fault of person
• Involves delay
• When Fundamental Rights are violated
• Rule of discretion, not compulsion
• PN Kumar v. MCD (1987, SC- approach HC
first)
 When courts can exercise jurisdiction
despite Alternative remedy
1. Writ seeks FR enforcement
2. Failure of principles of NJ
3. Where orders or proceedings wholly w/o
jurisdiction
4. Where vires of law is challenged
 RES JUDICATA
• Principle firmly grounded in practice of public law as
matter of public policy
• Also applies in enforcement of Fundamental Rights
Essential conditions for res judicata:
a) Same parties (or those in legal privity) in both cases.
b) Same issues, causes of action, and legal capacity.
c) Previous decision must be final, on merits, and by a
competent authority
• prevents multiplicity of proceedings, judicial
inefficiency, and ensures public interest by avoiding
inconsistent judgments
Daryo v. state of U.P. AIR 1961 SC 1457

• The background started in 1948, when the landlords (respondents) filed suits for
ejectment of the petitioners under the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939.
• The trial court (Assistant Collector) dismissed the landlords’ suits and held that the
petitioners were entitled to remain in possession of the land.
• On appeal, the Commissioner affirmed the trial court’s decision in favour of the
tenants.
• However, in second appeal, the Board of Revenue (29 March 1954) reversed the lower
courts’ decisions. The Board held that the petitioners were not entitled to continue as
tenants because of an amendment to the U.P. Tenancy Act and therefore decreed
ejectment against them.
• Aggrieved, the petitioners filed writ petitions under Article 226 before the Allahabad
High Court, challenging the decision of the Board of Revenue on constitutional grounds
— alleging violation of their fundamental rights (e.g., right to property and equality).
• Dismissed on 29 March 1955. After this dismissal, they did not file an appeal to the
Supreme Court under Article 136, even though that was available.
• Instead, in March 1956, they filed fresh writ petitions under Article 32 directly before
the Supreme Court, raising the same constitutional challenges against the ejectment
orders
 Issues

• Whether a Supreme Court petition under Art.

32 is barred by res judicata when the same
party earlier had a writ under Art. 226
dismissed by the High Court on the merits.
• When (if ever) dismissal under Art. 226 will
not bar a later Art. 32 petition (e.g., dismissals
for laches, alternative remedy, withdrawal or
summary dismissal without reasons).
 Arguments
• Petitioners: Art. 32 is itself a fundamental-right
remedy — the right to move the Supreme Court
cannot be curtailed by a “technical” res-judicata
rule; they still deserve a hearing here.
• Respondents / State: finality and public policy
require that a contested High Court decision on
the merits should bind the parties; allowing
repetition would subject the State to re-litigation
and undermine finality.
 ✅ Held – Rule of Res Judicata under Article 32 (Supreme Court,
Gajendragadkar J.)
The principle of res judicata, based on public policy and finality of litigation,
applies even to petitions under Article 32.

The Court laid down these practical rules:

• Writ decided on merits (bar applies):
– If a petition under Article 226 was heard and dismissed on the merits, that decision is
binding on the parties.
– A subsequent petition under Article 32 on the same facts and for the same relief will be
barred by res judicata,
– Unless the earlier judgment is set aside by proper constitutional procedure (e.g., appeal,
review).
• Writ dismissed not on merits (no bar):
– If the High Court dismissed the Article 226 petition not on merits, but for delay (laches) or
because there was an alternative efficacious remedy,
– Such dismissal does not bar a later petition under Article 32.
– However, any findings of fact recorded in the earlier judgment may still be relevant.
• Writ dismissed in limine or withdrawn (no bar):
– If the Article 226 petition was dismissed in limine (without a speaking order) or was
withdrawn,
– Such dismissal does not operate as res judicata,
– Because the reasons for dismissal are not available and the case was not decided on merits
 Extent of JR- can NOT sit in appeal
Only decision making process, not merits of
decision are reviewable unless-
• Decision/action vitiated by unfairness,
illegality, irrationality
• Such decision could not be taken with proper
application of mind

Court not to substitute its own opinion with that

of experts
 Tata Cellular v. UOI 1994
The Department of Telecommunications (DoT) invited tenders (1992) from
Indian companies to provide Cellular Mobile Telephone Services in four metros
— Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras.
• The process had two stages:
– Technical evaluation (shortlisting eligible bidders)
– Financial evaluation (final selection based on bids)
• From 30 initial bidders, 16 were shortlisted. Later, a Selection Committee
(Apex Committee) and the Telecom Commission made changes to the list,
altering criteria and rejecting some companies.
• The final selection reduced the list to 8 companies (two per city).
• Several unsuccessful bidders (including Tata Cellular, Hutchison Max, India
Telecomp) filed writ petitions in the Delhi High Court, alleging:
– Bias and conflict of interest (notably Mr. Nair, whose son worked for BPL)
– Use of hidden and undisclosed criteria
– Bypassing the Apex Committee
– Arbitrary selection and ignoring tender conditions
• The High Court partly allowed the petitions and directed reconsideration. After
reconsideration, Tata Cellular was removed from the list, leading it to
approach the Supreme Court.
 Landmark principles laid down
1. Scope of Judicial Review in Government
Contracts
• subject to judicial review to ensure they are
non-arbitrary, fair, and in conformity with
Article 14
• there are inherent limitations: the court
cannot act as an appellate authority or
substitute its own decision for that of the
executive
2. Principles Governing Judicial Review

Court summarised the grounds on which judicial

review is permissible:
• Illegality: Authority must correctly understand
and act within the law governing its powers.
• Irrationality (Wednesbury unreasonableness):
Decision must not be so outrageous or illogical
that no reasonable authority could have made it.
• Procedural Impropriety: Fair procedure must be
followed, including natural justice.
• Proportionality
3. Nature of Government Power in Tender
Matters
• The State is not like a private party - it must
act fairly, transparently, and without
favouritism.
• The right to choose the best tender is
inherent, but it cannot be exercised arbitrarily
or for collateral purposes.
• Article 14 requires that like cases be treated
alike and decisions must have a rational nexus
with the objective.
 4. Judicial Restraint

• Courts must practice self-restraint — they cannot

“take over” administrative functions or interfere
simply because they might have reached a different
conclusion.
• Look into deficiency of decision making process, not
decision
• Interference is justified only if the decision is:
– Arbitrary,
– Mala fide,
– Biased, or
– So unreasonable that no reasonable authority would have
made it.
 Allied principles of Judicial Review
1. Principle of Comity- avoid interference with each
other’s functions, all organs support function of
each other
2. Principle of Subsidiarity- decision-making and
administrative functions should be handled at
level where it can be undertaken more aptly
3. Principle of Contextuality
4. Principles of Proportionality (means check, end
check, proportion/balance check)
 JR of Administrative Policy decisions
• Contrary to statutory or constitutional
provisions
• Relative merit of policy
• BALCO Employees Union v. UOI 2002
• Bringing to notice important issues of concern
 Innovation in Judicial Review
• Curative Petition- Ruppa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok
Hurra 2002
• Continuous Mandamus- Prakash Singh v. UOI:-
SC clarified it could give binding directions
under Art. 32 r/w 142, mandamus issued in
case was continuous to infuse element of
fairness and responsibility
• Issuing ongoing orders to monitor and enforce
compliance over an extended period
 Doctrine of Finality of administrative
action
• Finality clause, private clause, exclusion clause,
conclusive clause
• The decision of the Authority shall be final
• Subject to the other provisions of this Act, every
order or decision of the Tribunal shall be final and
conclusive
• NOT an absolute bar to judicial review
• Courts do intervene for jurisdictional error, breach
of natural justice, mala fides/fraud, or where the
statute has been exceeded
Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation
• Fairness and predictability
• Courts protect persons who have been led to
expect a fair procedure or a promised benefit by
public authorities
• based on a promise, past practice, or an
established policy
• Legal doctrine that protects a person's reasonable
expectation, induced by a public authority’s
promise, practice or representation that a certain
procedure will be followed or a benefit will be
maintained
• Comes in handy when unable to justify
position on basis of law
• Provides a central space between “no claim”
and a “legal claim”, not a legal right but falls
between having no claim and having an
enforceable claim
• Invented from Article 14- abhors arbitrariness
• Test of ‘legitimacy’- Expectation must be
reasonable, based on consistent past conduct
or clear promise, not just anticipation or hope
Hindustan Development Corporation v.
UOI 1993
• Court clarified that the doctrine of legitimate
expectation, based on past practice, does not
create an enforceable right.
• Rather, it imposes a duty on the administrative
body to act fairly.
• Tender conditions reserved the Railways' right to
reject offers and split quantities, and the public
interest in preventing monopolistic control
outweighed any legitimate expectation.
 KB Tea Products v. Commercial Tax
Officer 2023
• appellant-manufacturer was engaged in
manufacturing blended tea and was exempted
from paying sales tax for two years under section
39 of the West Bengal Finance Act, 1994.
• This section prescribed an incentive to newly set
up small-scale industrial units in the form of a tax
holiday for sales of manufactured goods
• act was amended in 2001 and the words
“blending of tea” were removed from the
definition of “manufacture”
 ISSUE
• whether the doctrine of legitimate
expectation applied since the
appellant-manufacturer had set up industrial
units on the basis of the government-granted
tax holiday.
 SPLIT VERDICT
• Justice MR Shah dismissed • allowed appeal
appellant’s contention • Held that a legitimate expectation
• Held that nobody could claim was created in the appellant’s
exemption from sales tax as a mind and should be protected.
matter of right • Noting that appellant was granted
• Decision to grant exemption, or to a certificate of eligibility under
continue or withdraw exemption, section 39 of the 1994 act for a
fell within the domain of the state period of seven years,
government and was a policy originally-given benefits must be
decision. made applicable for the period
promised by the public authority.
• it was due to the tax exemption
that the appellant-manufacturer
set up the small-scale industrial
unit, and this created a legitimate
expectation
 Doctrine of Public Accountability
• public authorities act responsibly, transparently, and in
the public interest
• principle that public power is a trust that must be
exercised for the common good and not for private
gain or arbitrary purposes
• public officials and institutions are answerable to the
public for their actions, decisions, and use of authority
• operates both upward (towards legislative and
executive oversight) and downward (towards the
citizens through mechanisms like elections and RTI)
Doctrine of Proportionality