G.R. No.

L-24693 July 31, 1967 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and

void for being unreasonable and violative of due
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per
OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second
MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees, class motels; that the provision in the same section
vs. which would require the owner, manager, keeper or
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or
respondent-appellant. lodging house to refrain from entertaining or
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee. accepting any guest or customer or letting any room
or other quarter to any person or persons without his
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to
respondent-appellant. public view at all times and in his presence, wherein
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for the surname, given name and middle name, the date of
intervenor-appellee. birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the
nationality, the length of stay and the number of
FERNANDO, J.: companions in the room, if any, with the name,
relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his
of the lower court in an action for prohibition is passport number, if any, coupled with a certification
whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is that a person signing such form has personally filled it
violative of the due process clause. The lower court up and affixed his signature in the presence of such
held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more representative, with such registration forms and
specifically set forth, such judgment must be reversed, records kept and bound together, it also being
there being a failure of the requisite showing to provided that the premises and facilities of such
sustain an attack against its validity. hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for
inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. Police, or their duly authorized representatives is
4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, unconstitutional and void again on due process
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or
Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and
and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the
general manager of the second petitioner" against the right to privacy and the guaranty against
respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged
in his capacity as such "charged with the general ordinance classifying motels into two classes and
power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of requiring the maintenance of certain minimum
Manila and to give the necessary orders for the facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in
faithful execution and enforcement of such each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry
ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner similarly offends against the due process clause for
non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a
and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) conclusion which applies to the portion of the
members "operating hotels and motels, characterized ordinance requiring second class motels to have a
as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the
and city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18
and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 person years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels,
and representing an investment of more than P3 lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless
million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13, accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and
1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or
enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, duly authorized representative of such establishments
1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice
was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process
(par. 3). guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as
After which the alleged grievances against the the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged
ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause
assertion of its being beyond the powers of the the automatic cancellation of the license of the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the
insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that business and loss of its investments, there is once
in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any again a transgression of the due process clause.
other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in
injunction and for a final judgment declaring the its 4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex
above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The B);
lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to 5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor
refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from Herminio Astorga was submitted with the proposed
and after July 8, 1963. ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal
Board, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an
admission of the personal circumstances regarding the 6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual
respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are income of P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the
licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners)
City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited operating in the City of Manila.1äwphï1.ñët
Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether
on statutory or constitutional grounds. After setting Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on
forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the
and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable presumption of the validity of the challenged
relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of
immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police conformity to the Constitution resting on the party
power and that only the guests or customers not who assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but
before the court could complain of the alleged likewise applicable American authorities. Such a
invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty memorandum likewise refuted point by point the
against self incrimination, with the assertion that the arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity.
issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the
contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in
dissolution and the dismissal of the petition. detail what was set forth in the petition, with citations
of what they considered to be applicable American
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, authorities and praying for a judgment declaring the
there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated challenged ordinance "null and void and
September 28, 1964, which reads: unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of
preliminary injunction issued.
1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc. are After referring to the motels and hotels, which are
duly organized and existing under the laws of the members of the petitioners association, and referring
Philippines, both with offices in the City of Manila, to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the
while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and party, the lower court observed: "The only remaining
general manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the issue here being purely a question of law, the parties,
intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio with the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda
City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued; and thereafter, to submit the case for decision of the
Court." It does appear obvious then that without any
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed
incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of the City upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds
of Manila charged with the general power and duty to of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is
enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection
the necessary orders for the faithful execution and on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila
enforcement of such ordinances; to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that
"the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null
the business of operating hotels and motels in Malate and void." It made permanent the preliminary
and Ermita districts in Manila; injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his
agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the in question." Hence this appeal.
City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which
was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed.
Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a
Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City fundamental character ought to have admonished the
Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of
669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be
Manila besides inserting therein three new sections. allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto
This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the been the accepted standards of constitutional
adjudication, in both procedural and substantive would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to
aspects. destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be
deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision competence to promote public health, public morals,
is the absence of any evidence to offset the public safety and the genera welfare.6 Negatively put,
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged police power is "that inherent and plenary power in
statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt
by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.7
of validity x x x . The action of the elected
representatives of the people cannot be lightly set There is no question but that the challenged ordinance
aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices
things, be familiar with the necessities of their hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the
particular municipality and with all the facts and Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the
circumstances which surround the subject and stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in
necessitate action. The local legislative body, by the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in
enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that Manila traceable in great part to the existence of
the regulations are essential to the well being of the motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for
people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become
aside legislative action when there is not a clear the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.”The
invasion of personal or property rights under the guise challenged ordinance then proposes to check the
of police regulation.2 clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these
establishments by requiring these transients and guests
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose,
presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by
rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance introducing several other amendatory provisions
is void on its face which is not the case here. The calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the
principle has been nowhere better expressed than in registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the
the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford increase in the licensed fees was intended to
Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the American Supreme discourage "establishments of the kind from operating
Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to
summed up the matter thus: The statute here increase "the income of the city government." It
questioned deals with a subject clearly within the would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far
scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it from sustaining any attack against the validity of the
void on the ground that the specific method of ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence
deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably
underlying questions of fact may condition the stamped with the seal of its approval, ordinances
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer
resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the as a vagrant;8 provide a license tax for and regulating
absence of some factual foundation of record for the maintenance or operation of public dance halls;9
overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and
being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding monte;12 prohibiting playing of panguingui on days
the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of other than Sundays or legal holidays;13 prohibiting
facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the the operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting
judgment against the ordinance set aside. any person from keeping, conducting or maintaining
an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its smoked or otherwise used,15 all of which are intended
face the ordinance is fatally defective as being to protect public morals.
repugnant to the due process clause of the
Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with On the legislative organs of the government, whether
the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the
This particular manifestation of a police power police power, which, it cannot be too often
measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to
morals is immune from such imputation of nullity promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety
resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by and general welfare of the people. In view of the
anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to requirements of due process, equal protection and
unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the
which has been properly characterized as the most exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,4 the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to
extending as it does "to all the great public needs."5 It judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power
may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged
unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a vagueness.
violation of any other applicable constitutional
guaranty may call for correction by the courts. Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual
license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost for hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over
shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the 200% for the latter, first-class motels being required to
question of due process.16 There is no controlling and pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels,
precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law however, as
standard to which the governmental action should far back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be
conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or classified into those imposed for regulating
property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation
is the standard of due process which must exist both or restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises
as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the and for revenue purposes only.22 As was explained
challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2)
that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity Licenses for non-useful occupations are also
sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the incidental to the police power and the right to exact a
supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of fee may be implied from the power to license and
justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the
unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process municipal corporations are allowed a much wider
requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and
must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in aside from applying the well-known legal principle
sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable,
official action marred by lack of reasonableness. oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general
Correctly it has been identified as freedom from rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The
arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of
of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful
justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor
branch "in the light of reason drawn from in the determination of the amount of this kind of
considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of
traditions of legal and political thought."18 It is not a privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been
narrow or "technical conception with fixed content upheld, especially in of licenses for the sale of liquors.
unrelated to time, place and circumstances,"19 In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been
decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close declared unreasonable.23
and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of
our society."20 Questions of due process are not to be Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v.
treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier
phrases.21 announced by the American Supreme Court that
taxation may be made to implement the state's police
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to
ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the
lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and
proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide
authority. It would seem that what should be deemed range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax
unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication so levied is for public purposes, just and uniform.25
of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an
admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. To As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide
be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing
Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one
provided it with the enactment of the challenged case that "much discretion is given to municipal
ordinance. A strong case must be found in the records, corporations in determining the amount," here the
and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted here license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if
to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of it were viewed purely as a police power measure.26
nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close
requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of with this pertinent citation from another decision of
deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of significance: "It is urged on behalf of the
Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the
out such features as the increased fees for motels and ordinance could deprive them of their lawful
hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to occupation and means of livelihood because they can
not rent stalls in the public markets. But it appears that
plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail
storage meat, the sale of which outside the city over authority because then society will fall into
markets under certain conditions is permitted x x x . anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail
And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the over liberty because then the individual will fall into
community may be deprived of their present business slavery. The citizen should achieve the required
or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent balance of liberty and authority in his mind through
the exercise of the police power. As was said in a education and personal discipline, so that there may
case, persons licensed to pursue occupations which be established the resultant equilibrium, which means
may in the public need and interest be affected by the peace and order and happiness for all.29
exercise of the police power embark in these
occupations subject to the disadvantages which may It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court
result from the legal exercise of that power."27 nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation of
freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, "retains its virtuality as a living principle. The policy
insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the
for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized assumption by the government of the right of
representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, intervention even in contractual relations affected with
tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room public interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is
or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind
with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be or the person, the standard for the validity of
charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a governmental acts is much more rigorous and
limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the
the command of due process. It is neither most rights of property, the permissible scope of
unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended regulatory measure is wider.32 How justify then the
to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate allegation of a denial of due process?
use to which such premises could be, and, according
to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How could Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on
it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a another due process ground by invoking the principles
correspondence between the undeniable existence of of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a
an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at recital in the petition itself that what seems to be the
correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the
that every regulation of conduct amounts to provisions are too detailed and specific rather than
curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however, point to the
Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought requirement that a guest should give the name,
which runs through all these different conceptions of relationship, age and sex of the companion or
liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the
understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty necessity for determining whether the companion or
regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by companions referred to are those arriving with the
law for the good of the individual and for the greater customer or guest at the time of the registry or
good of the peace and order of society and the general entering the room With him at about the same time or
well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a
Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to
of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is
restraint by general law for the common good x x x dependent upon the discretion of its owners or
The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the operators; another proviso which from their standpoint
interest of the public health, or of the public order and would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of
safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof
police power."28 means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may
be asked, do these allegations suffice to render the
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or
"Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From
enactment of said law, and the state in order to Connally v. General Construction Co.33 to Adderley
promote the general welfare may interfere with v. Florida,34 the principle has been consistently
personal liberty, with property, and with business and upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such a
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring
to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to the doing of an act that men of common intelligence
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
the state x x x To this fundamental aim of our its application. Is this the situation before us? A
Government the rights of the individual are citation from Justice Holmes would prove
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about
not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but Pursuant thereto, a writ of execution was issued
there is no canon against using common sense in against Pan Asian but could be enforced only against
construing laws as saying what they obviously its cash bond of P10,000.00, the company having
mean."35 ceased to operate. Urtesuela then filed a complaint
with the Insurance Commission against Stronghold on
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, the basis of the aforementioned surety bond and
with all due allowance for the arguments pressed with prayed for the value thereof plus attorney's fees and
such vigor and determination, the attack against the litigation costs.
validity of the challenged ordinance cannot be
considered a success. Far from it. Respect for Under the bond, the petitioner and Pan Asian
constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so undertook —
uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a
reversal of the appealed decision. To answer for all liabilities which the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration may
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is adjudge/impose against the Principal in connection
reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. with the recruitment of Filipino seamen.
With costs.
It is understood that notice to the Principal is notice to
G.R. No. 88050 January 30, 1992 the surety. (Exh. "I-2").

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., WHEREAS, the liability of the surety under this Bond
petitioner, shall in no case exceed the sum of PESOS: FIFTY
vs. THOUSAND ONLY (P50,000.00) Philippine
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ADRIANO Currency.
URTESUELA, respondents.
After hearing, the Insurance Commission held that the
T.J. Sumawang & Associates for petitioner. complaint should be reformed because the provisions
in the surety bond were not stipulations pour autrui to
Linsangan Law Office for private respondent. entitle Urtesuela to bring the suit himself. It held that
the proper party was the POEA. 1 This ruling was
CRUZ, J.: reversed on appeal by the respondent court in its
decision dated April 20, 1989. 2 It was there declared
The petitioner invokes due process to escape liability that, as the actual beneficiary of the surety bond,
on a surety bond executed for the protection of a Urtesuela was competent to sue Stronghold, which as
Filipino seaman. It is a familiar argument that will be surety was solidarily liable with Pan Asian for the
denied, in light of the following findings. judgment rendered against the latter by the POEA.

Acting on behalf of its foreign principal, Qatar The petitioner asks for reversal of the Court of
National Fishing Co., Pan Asian Logistics and Appeals. It submits that the decision of the POEA is
Trading, a domestic recruiting and placement agency, not binding upon it because it was not impleaded in
hired Adriano Urtesuela as captain of the vessel M/V the complaint; it was not notified thereof nor did it
Oryx for the stipulated period of twelve months. The participate in the hearing; and it was not specifically
required surety bond, in the amount of P50,000.00, directed to pay the damages awarded to the
was submitted by Pan Asian and Stronghold Insurance complainant.
Co., Inc., the herein petitioner, to answer for the
liabilities of the employer. Urtesuela assumed his In support of its posture, the petitioner cites abundant
duties on April 18, 1982, but three months later his jurisprudence, particularly Aguasin v. Velasquez, 3
services were terminated and he was repatriated to where the Court held:
Manila. He thereupon filed a complaint against Pan
Asian and his former employer with the Philippine If the surety is to be bound by his undertaking, it is
Overseas Employment Administration for breach of essential according to Section 10 of Rule 62 in
contract and damages. connection with Section 20 of Rule 59 of the Rules of
Court that the damages be awarded upon application
In due time, the POEA rendered a decision in his and after proper hearing and included in the judgment.
favor for the amount of P6,374.94, representing his As a corollary to these requirements, due notice to the
salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract and plaintiff and his surety setting forth the facts showing
the cash value of his unused vacation leave, plus his right to damages and the amount thereof under the
attorney's fees and costs, which the respondents were bond is indispensable. This has to be so if the surety is
required to pay. The judgment eventually became final not to be condemned or made to pay without due
and executory, not having been appealed on time. process of law. It is to be kept in mind that the surety
in this case was not a party to the action and had no stipulation, the petitioner should be deemed as having
notice of or intervention in the trial. It seems received no notice at all of the complaint and therefore
elementary that before being condemned to pay, it was deprived of the opportunity to defend itself.
the elementary right of the surety to be heard and to
be informed that the party seeking indemnity would The Court cannot agree. The argument assumes that
hold it liable and was going to prove the grounds and the right to a hearing is absolute and may not be
extent of its liability. This case is different from those waived in any case under the due process clause. This
in which the surety, by law and/or by the terms of his is not correct. As a matter of fact, the right to be heard
contract, has promised to abide by the judgment is as often waived as it is invoked, and validly as long
against the principal and renounced the right to be as the party is given an opportunity to be heard on his
sued or cited. behalf.4

The Court has gone over the decision and finds that The circumstance that the chance to be heard is not
the petitioner is "hoist by its own petard." For as the availed of does not disparage that opportunity and
quoted excerpt itself says, the case is "different from deprive the person of the right to due process. This
those in which the surety, by law and/or by the terms Court has consistently held in cases too numerous to
of his contract, has promised to abide by the judgment mention that due process is not violated where a
against the principal and renounced the right to be person is not heard because he has chosen, for
sued or cited." whatever reason, not to be heard. It should be obvious
that if he opts to be silent where he has a right to
In the surety bond, the petitioner unequivocally bound speak, he cannot later be heard to complain that he
itself: was unduly silenced.

To answer for all liabilities which the Philippine Neither is public policy offended on the wicked
Overseas Employment Administration may ground of fraud and collusion imagined by the
adjudge/impose against the Principal in connection petitioner. For one thing, the speculation contravenes
with the recruitment of Filipino seamen. without proof the presumption of good faith and
unreasonably imputes dishonest motives to the
Strictly interpreted, this would mean that the principal and the obligee. For another, it disregards the
petitioner agreed to answer for whatever decision fiduciary relationship between the principal and the
might be rendered against the principal, whether or surety, which is the legal and also practical reason
not the surety was impleaded in the complaint and had why the latter is willing to answer for the liabilities of
the opportunity to defend itself. There is nothing in the former.
the stipulation calling for a direct judgment against the
surety as a co-defendant in an action against the In a familiar parallel, notice to the lawyer is
principal. On the contrary, the petitioner agreed "to considered notice to the client he represents even if
answer for all liabilities" that "might be adjudged or the latter is not actually notified. It has not been
imposed by the POEA against the Principal." suspected that this arrangement might result in a
confabulation between the counsel and the other party
But even if this interpretation were rejected, to the client's prejudice.
considering the well-known maxim that "the surety is
a favorite of the law," the petitioner would still have to At any rate, it is too late now for the petitioner to
explain its other agreement that "notice to the challenge the stipulation. If it believed then that it was
Principal is notice to the surety." This was in fact onerous and illegal, what it should have done was
another special stipulation typewritten on the printed object when its inclusion as a condition in the surety
form of the surety bond prepared by the petitioner. bond was required by the POEA. Even if the POEA
Under this commitment, the petitioner is deemed, by had insisted on the condition, as now claimed, there
the implied notice, to have been given an opportunity was still nothing to prevent the petitioner from
to participate in the litigation and to present its side, if refusing altogether to issue the surety bond. The
it so chose, to avoid liability. If it did not decide to petitioner did neither of these. The fact is that,
intervene as a co-defendant (and perhaps also as whether or not the petitioner objected, it in the end
cross-claimant against Pan Asian), it cannot be heard filed the surety bond with the suggested condition.
now to complain that it was denied due process. The consequence of its submission is that it cannot
now argue that it is not bound by that condition
The petitioner contends, however, that the said because it was coerced into accepting it.
stipulation is unconstitutional and contrary to public
policy, because it is "a virtual waiver" of the right to This Court has always been receptive to complaints
be heard and "opens wide the door for fraud and against the denial of the right to be heard, which is the
collusion between the principal and the bond obligee" very foundation of a free society. This right is
to the prejudice of the surety. Hence, disregarding the especially necessary in the court of justice, where
cases are decided after the parties shall have been
given an opportunity to present their respective THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
positions, for evaluation by the impartial judge. plaintiff-appellee,
Nevertheless, a party is not compelled to speak if it vs.
chooses to be silent. If it avails itself of the right to be ROBERTO GUNGON, y SANTIAGO and
heard, well and good; but if not, that is also its right. VENANCIO ROXAS y ARGUELLES, accused.
In the latter situation, however, it cannot later ROBERTO GUNGON y SANTIAGO,
complain that, because it was not heard, it was accused-appellant.
deprived of due process.
PER CURIAM:
Worthy of consideration also is the private
respondent's contention that he sought to enforce the For a direct automatic review by this Court,
petitioner's liability not in NSB Case No. 3810-82 as conformably with Article 47 of the Revised Penal
decided by the POEA, but in another forum. What he Code, as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No.
did was file an independent action for that purpose 7659, is the decision, dated 15 February 1995, of the
with the Insurance Commission on the basis of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch
surety bond which bound the petitioner to answer for 96, convicting accused-appellant Roberto Gungon Y
whatever liabilities might be adjudged against Qatar Santiago of the crimes of kidnapping and serious
National Fishing Co. by the POEA. In the proceedings illegal detention with frustrated murder, of carnapping
before the Commission, the petitioner was given full and of robbery in three separate Informations filed
opportunity (which it took) to present its side, in its against him and two other persons.1 The informations
answer with counterclaim to the complaint, in its averred —
testimony at the hearings, in its motion to dismiss the
complaint, and in its 10-page memorandum. There is In Criminal Case No. 94-54285 for Kidnapping and
absolutely no question that in that proceeding, the Serious illegal Detention with Frustrated Murder —
petitioner was actually and even extensively heard.
That on or about January 12, 1994 in Quezon City,
The surety bond required of recruitment agencies 5 is Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
intended for the protection of our citizens who are Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
engaged for overseas employment by foreign conspiring together, confederating and mutually
companies. The purpose is to insure that if the rights helping one another, did then and there by means of
of these overseas workers are violated by their force, violence against and intimidation of person and
employers, recourse would still be available to them at gunpoint, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
against the local companies that recruited them for the kidnap, carry away and detain AGNES
foreign principal. The foreign principal is outside the GUIRINDOLA, a female, thereby depriving her of
jurisdiction of our courts and would probably have no her liberty, and thereafter bring her to an uninhabited
properties in this country against which an adverse place in Barangay Bagong Pook, San Jose, Batangas
judgment can be enforced. This difficulty is corrected and then and there, with intent to kill and with
by the bond, which can be proceeded against to satisfy treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of
that judgment. superior strength, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
shoot her in the face with a hand gun, thus performing
Given this purpose, and guided by the benign policy all the acts of execution which would produce the
of social justice, we reject the technicalities raised by crime of MURDER as a consequence, but which,
the petitioner against its established legal and even nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
moral liability to the private respondent. These independent of the will of the accused, that is, the able
technicalities do not impair the rudiments of due and timely medical assistance given to the said Agnes
process or the requirements of the law and must be Guirindola which prevented her death, resulting to her
rejected in deference to the constitutional imperative utmost grief, sorrow, sufferings and sleepless night,
of justice for the worker. compensable in actual, moral and exemplary damages
in such amounts as may be awarded to them under the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the provisions of the Civil Code of the
challenged decision of the Court of Appeals Philippines.ℒαwρhi৷
AFFIRMED in toto. The respondent court is directed
to ENFORCE payment to the private respondent in CONTRARY TO LAW.2
full, and with all possible dispatch of the amount In Criminal Case No. 94-54286 for Carnapping —
awarded to him by the POEA in its decision dated
May 13, 1983. It is so ordered. That on or about January 12, 1994, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
G.R. No. 119574 March 19, 1998 conspiring together, confederating and mutually
helping one another, with intent to gain and by means Roxas, what traffic violation she had committed.
of force, violence against and intimidation of person Roxas replied that she had wrongly traversed a
and at gunpoint, did then and there, willfully, one-way street where, barely two days ago, a little girl
unlawfully and feloniously, take and carry away one had figured in an accident. Agnes surrendered her
Nissan Sentra Model 1993 with Plate No. TKR-837, driver's license. Roxas, giving her what appeared to be
then driven by Agnes Guirindola but owned by her a ticket, remarked, "Miss, kunwari pirmahan mo ito,"5
mother, Elvira G. Guirindola to the damage and but seeing that it was not the usual traffic ticket, she
prejudice of said Agnes Guirindola and Elvira G. merely put a check sign and returned it. Roxas told
Guirindola in such amount as may be awarded to them her to open the door. He came on board the car and
under the Civil Code of the Philippines. directed Agnes to proceed to the next intersection
where Roxas motioned her to turn left. After
CONTRARY TO LAW.3 executing a left turn, she stopped and handed over to
— and — him a fifty peso (P50.00) bill which he accepted. He
In Criminal Case No. 94-54287 (amended) for then returned her license.
Robbery —
Agnes asked Roxas where she could drop him off;
That on or about January 12, 1994 in Quezon City, instead, he suddenly pointed a gun at her and switched
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this off the engine, saying "Miss kailangan ko lang ito,"6 a
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, referring to the car. Agnes started to cry. She pleaded
conspiring together, confederating and mutually with Roxas to let her go and not harm her. Instead,
helping one another, with intent to gain and by means Roxas unlocked the rear door to let another man in.
of force, violence against and intimidation of person The man, identified in open court as accused-appellant
and at gunpoint, did then and there willfully, Roberto Gungon, immediately reclined her seat and
unlawfully and feloniously, while on board the motor pulled her over to the back seat by her arms while
vehicle of AGNES GUIRINDOLA, a 1993 Nissan Roxas promptly slid into the driver's seat. She was
Sentra with Plate No. TKR-837, and in the course of told that they were taking her to Philcoa but, after
its trip, divested and robbed said Agnes Guirindola of glancing at his beeper, Gungon, told Roxas, "Boss,
the following cash, check and personal belongings, to negative Philcoa"7 Roxas nodded. After a while,
wit: Gungon spoke to Roxas, "Boss, dalhin na natin siya sa
dati at doon na natin i-s,"8 to which Roxas again
Cash P1,000.00 simply nodded his head without a word.
Check 3,000.00
Pieces of jewelry valued at 34,000.00 Agnes, now really scared, took out a rosary from her
bag and prayed. Momentarily, Roxas pulled over and
and in the course of the execution thereof, shoot and alighted from the vehicle while Gungon held Agnes
fatally wounded Agnes Guirindola with a handgun, and poked a gun at her. When Roxas returned, he had
which is clearly unnecessary in the commission of the with him a bottle of softdrink and skyflakes which he
crime, to the damage and prejudice of said Agnes offered to Agnes. Agnes refused to drink after seeing
Guirindola in such amount as may be awarded to her some tablets floating inside the bottle. Gungon tried to
under the provisions of the Civil Code of the persuade Agnes to take the drink, advising her, "Sige
Philippines. na, makakatulong ito sa iyo."9 The car stopped a
second time to load gas at a gasoline station. Escape
CONTRARY TO LAW.4 was nil; Gungon made sure of that. The car thereafter
proceeded southwards and on to the South
The trial court gave a full account of the evidence Superhighway.
submitted by the prosecution that led to the
indictments. Roxas took time out from the wheel at a deserted area
to allow him and Gungon to relieve themselves one
It was about 3:30 in the afternoon of 12 January 1994. after the other. Back on the road, Roxas told Gungon
Agnes Guirindola, a 20 year old De La Salle to have Agnes partake of the softdrink but she
University student, was driving a red Nissan Sentra continued to resist. Agnes took out her wallet to get a
car with Plate No. TKR-837 along Panay Avenue, prayer leaflet. Gungon saw a picture and asked Agnes
Quezon City, on her way to a bookstore and, who it was in the photograph. She replied that it was
thereafter, to fetch her mother, Mrs. Elvira Guirindola, her sister. Gungon then also took out some pictures
from work when a man, passing himself off as a from his wallet to show to her, identifying one
traffic enforcement officer and wearing a "PNP" photograph as that of his niece and two others as those
reflectorized vest, flagged her down and motioned her of his girlfriend and of Roxas and his girlfriend and
to execute a U-turn towards him. She complied. child. Once again, Gungon insisted that she take the
Lowering the right front window of her car, she asked drink. Fearing his menacing look and the gun pointed
the man, whose name she later learned to be Venancio at her, she took a sip from the bottle. She was, still
later, also forced to swallow two tablets which Roxas spelled the beginning of her tormentors' undoing, for
gave to Gungon. She took the tablets but had them her ordeal was immediately brought to the attention of
under her tongue. the NBI which moved and investigated without delay
and hesitation. Cartographic sketches drawn from the
When asked what she wanted to eat, she said she recollections of the victim later started the procedure
would prefer a McDonald's sandwich. The car stopped to identify the unknown perpetrators. The alacrity,
at a bakery shop, where she noticed the address on the coordination, and ingenuity of NBI agents Regner
signboard reading, "Sto. Tomas Batangas". Roxas Feneza and Miralles led to the success of the
went out and returned with a "taisan" cake which he procedure.
handed over to Agnes but she just held it. Time
passed, and somehow she lost consciousness. It was Feneza recounted that on January 17, 1994 he met at
about 9:30 p.m. when she found herself lying at the the NBI offices in Manila with Miralles, who was
back seat with her legs on the lap of Gungon. She earlier assigned to the case of Agnes, because Miralles
noticed that her pieces of jewelry, bracelets, earrings, had left word that he wanted to consult with Feneza. It
ring, necklace and a wristwatch, as well as cash, were seems that Feneza was the agent handling the Virginia
missing and that her pair of shoes had been removed. Samaniego Villena case, another kidnapping case
She was told that the items were just being meanwhile where the modus operandi had striking similarities
kept for her. The pair of shoes, however, were with the kidnapping of Agnes. In their meeting,
returned to her. By this time, a third man was already Miralles showed and lent to Feneza the cartographic
seated in front of the car with Roxas. sketches in the Agnes kidnapping. Feneza referred to
his Villena files and discovered a distinct similarity of
When it was her turn to relieve herself, Roxas stopped a cartographic sketch to some of the Villena suspects
the car at a deserted area. Gungon escorted her to a with pictures in his files. With Miralles' permission,
place not far away from the car. Just as she was Feneza met with and talked to Agnes at the V. Luna
getting up, after relieving herself, she saw a "white Medical Center, and showed her about 3 or 4 pictures
spark" to her right and she fell. She was shot. Feeling from his files.
weak and unable to get up, she was still able to glance
at Roxas walking back to the car. Then she passed out. As Feneza testified: "When I gave the pictures to her,
she looked at them and she positively identified one in
When she came to, Roxas, Gungon, and the third man, the pictures to be one of her abductors, she nearly
as well as the car, were nowhere in sight. She fainted at that time." Agnes had thereby positively
managed to get up and slowly walked down the road identified Roberto Gungon, whom Feneza had already
until she reached a small house. Inside were two kids met in October or November, 1992 in connection with
and a teenager, who, apparently shocked by her the Villena case. He reported this breakthrough to his
appearance, hurriedly left. She was bleeding profusely superiors, who immediately authorized the search for
from the neck and face. She looked around the house Gungon.
but not finding anyone, she went to the sala to lie
down. People soon arrived on a vehicle. She again lost Gungon could not be arrested sooner. Based on
consciousness and regained it only at the Batangas information given to the NBI, he and his live-in
Regional Hospital.10 The hospital, which was partner had left Manila by car on a Wednesday, passed
ill-equipped to give full medical treatment, advised through Catbalogan, Samar, and were bound for
her to transfer to a Manila hospital. The medical Davao. According to Feneza, an informant provided
certificate described the gunshot wound: the information about Davao being the final
destination; he testified: "Before he left, he left his
Gunshot wound, POE, Zygomatic area (R), POX pocket bell to somebody whom he was able to talk to.
Sub-mandibular area (L); Fx, Zygomatic arch & At the same time, they were calling a person and they
condylar area, (R)Sec to GSW; Submandibular Gland told this person that they were in Legaspi about to
involvement with sinus tract.11 board a ferry boat going to Davao." The information
turned out to be a reliable. On cross-examination,
Recounting the circumstances that paved the way for Feneza disclosed how the NBI discovered the
the ultimate arrest of Gungon, the trial court narrated: informant. It seems that Manila Prosecutor Alice
Vidal had been approached by a certain Mrs. Atencio,
. The crimes charged herein could have easily supposedly Gungon's mother-in-law, to confide
remained unsolved because the victim did not know Gungon's whereabouts and to seek help; Prosecutor
any of her tormentors. That she was abandoned in a Vidal, in turn, notified the Makati Police Department,
dark and far away place strange to her, having been which happened to be collaborating with the NBI on
saved from the claws of sure death only by her the case. The Makati Police Department relayed the
abductor's false belief of having already done her in developments to NBI, which sent agents to meet with
with a single gunshot, would have made the escape of Mrs. Atencio in the office of Prosecutor Vidal, and it
the criminals irreversible. Fate had it that her survival was there where Mrs. Atencio disclosed the
destination of Gungon and his partner. The pocketbell allow her to relieve herself. Gungon later learned from
beeper was subsequently delivered by Mrs. Atencio to an investigator that the place was somewhere in
Feneza in Cubao, under are a receipt. Batangas City. Roxas accompanied Agnes. Gungon
was left alone in the car. After about 3 to 5 minutes,
Feneza and fellow agent Arnold Lazaro new to Davao he heard a gunshot and felt that something untoward
on the following Friday, still in January, but Gungon had happened. He lowered the car window to look,
and his partner could arrive there only on Saturday. and he saw someone, whom he presumed to be Roxas,
On Sunday evening, the agents located and arrested coming towards his direction, holding a gun. Agnes
him and detained him at their Regional Office in was not with him. Out of apprehension, he alighted
Davao. They flew him back to Manila on the first from the car, ran away, and hid in the nearby trees
available flight on Monday. At the lineup held on until Roxas finally drove away. He took a bus back to
February 1, 1994 at NBI offices in Manila, Agnes Manila, reaching home at about 10:30 that evening.13
picked Gungon out and positively identified him as
one of her kidnappers. In its decision, promulgated on 15 February 1995, the
RTC, Hon. Lucas P. Bersamin presiding, concluded:
After the lineup identification, the NBI checked the
contents of the blue bag that Gungon had brought WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding
along from Davao and found therein, among others, a the accused ROBERTO GUNGON y SANTIAGO
Nissan key chain with a key; a picture of a woman; guilty beyond reasonable doubt:
another picture of a man (Venancio Roxas), woman,
and child; and a rosary. These articles were turned 1. In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54285, for kidnapping
over to the NBI evidence custodian and were later and serious illegal detention with frustrated murder,
presented in court. Feneza and Lazaro prepared their and sentencing him to death;
joint affidavit and other papers before transmitting the
matter to the Department of Justice. Feneza readily 2. In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54286, for carnapping,
identified and pointed to Gungon in open court during and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
trial.12 of imprisonment from eighteen (18) years, as
minimum, to twenty five (25) years, as maximum;
The defense version varies materially from that given and,
by the prosecution.
3. In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54287, for robbery, and
Roberto Gungon, an employee of the Metropolitan sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
Manila Authority, testified that between 3:30 and 4:00 four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
o'clock in the afternoon of 12 January 1994, he had eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
just come from a friend's house and was waiting for a
taxicab along Panay Avenue, Quezon City, when a car The accused shall be credited with the entire period of
stopped in front of him. It was Venancio Roxas, an his preventive imprisonment in accordance with Art.
acquaintance he once met at a New Year's party, who 29, Revised Penal Code, provided he is qualified
asked him where he was going. Gungon replied that therefor pursuant to said legal provision.
he was waiting for a taxicab to get him to Cubao.
Roxas, who was with a lady companion, opened the The accused Gungon is further ordered to pay to
door of the car and said, "Halika na, at idadaan ka na Agnes Guirindola, as offended party, moral damages
namin." He boarded and sat at the rear. Roxas drove in the amount of P1,000,000.00, actual damages of
towards Cubao. Gungon alighted at the foot of the P36,161.83, representing her hospitalization and
underpass in Cubao, only to again board the car when surgical expenses, and P35,000.00, representing the
Roxas invited him to go with them to Batangas. value of the lost personal valuables and cash, with
interest on all the sums at the legal rate from the filing
Roxas proceeded to the South Superhighway with of the informations herein until full payment; and
Agnes in the front right seat. On the way, Agnes P500,000.00 as exemplary damages; to Mrs. Elvira
reminded Roxas that her mother was waiting for her. Guirindola, as owner of the Nissan Sentra car
Gungon then butted in and remarked that his wife was involved in the carnapping case, the sum of
also waiting for him. Agnes took out her wallet and P248,757.90, plus interest at the legal rate from the
showed Gungon her ID, her picture, and her sister's filing of the information until full payment; and
picture, and in turn, he, too, drew out his wallet from double costs of suit.
his pocket and showed Agnes his wife's picture. The
car stopped at a bakery in Sto. Tomas, Batangas, These cases shall be archived as far as they concerned
where Agnes and Roxas alighted to buy a piece of Venancio Roxas y Arguelles.14
cake and some softdrinks. Tired, after a long drive,
Gungon and Agnes had both fallen asleep. She awoke
after some time and requested that the car stop to
In the instant appeal, Gungon has continued to assert xxx xxx xxx
his innocence, assigning the following errors allegedly
committed by the trial court: Gungon failed the test of credibility by relying on an
implausible defense and on mere denials. To decide
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN issues of credibility, the testimonies of witnesses are
RULING THAT APPELLANT GUNGON AND tested for their plausibility or probability, i.e., whether
ROXAS CONSPIRED TO COMMIT THE CRIMES they were contrary to the natural course of things, or
SUBJECT OF THE INSTANT APPEAL. to common observation, experience, and common
sense, or contrary to natural laws, or exhibit incredible
II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN coincidences. "Evidence, to be believed, must not only
CONVICTING APPELLANT GUNGON OF THE proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but if
COMPLEX CRIME OF KIDNAPPING AND must be credible in itself — such as the common
SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION WITH experience and observation of mankind can approve
FRUSTRATED MURDER. as probable under the circumstances. We have no test
of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity
III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN to our knowledge, observation, and experience.
CONVICTING APPELLANT GUNGON OF THE Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the
CRIME OF ROBBERY. miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance.16

IV. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN The defense, verily, anchors itself on the bare denial
CONVICTING APPELLANT GUNGON OF THE of appellant of the specific acts imputed by the
CRIME OF VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. prosecution against him. Certainly, this negative
6539 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE assertion cannot prevail over the unimpeached
ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT.15 testimony of the victim describing in sufficient detail
the active participation of appellant in the commission
Appellant's challenges, in essence, would revolve on of the crimes charged. In the face of the clear and
the issue, once again, of credibility of witnesses. In positive declaration of the victim herself, the defense
monotone, this Court has constantly ruled that in the of denial hardly assumes probative value and sinks
determination of the veracity of testimony, the down the drain even further with the absence of any
assessment by the trial court is accorded the highest evidence of a sinister or nefarious motive on the part
degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal of the complainant to impute a crime so grave a wrong
unless, of course, it is seen to have acted arbitrarily or as that made out in the Information.
with evident partiality. Contrary to appellant's
contention, however, it is the Court's view that the The argument that the finding of conspiracy between
trial court has taken due care in evaluating the appellant and Venancio Roxas to commit the crimes
testimonies given at the witness stand. This much charged has been based by the trial court merely on
would easily be apparent from the following excerpts inferences, conjectures and presumptions is bereft of
of the appealed decision. merit. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
Upon thorough consideration of the evidence, the felony and decide to commit it.17 The proof of the
Court finds the testimony and version of Agnes to be agreement need not rest on direct evidence;18 the
the truth of what transpired on January 12, 1994 and agreement itself may be inferred from the conduct of
that there was no credible fact or circumstance the parties disclosing a common understanding among
presented in the entire course of the trial, including them relative to the commission of the offense.19
her cross-examination by the Defense, by which the Jurisprudential account tells us consistently that the
neutral, objective, and uninvolved mind could conduct of the accused before, during, and after the
reasonably doubt her sincerity and trustworthiness. commission of the crime may be considered to show
The complainant and the accused were subjected to an extant conspiracy.20
the closest personal observation during their stints as
witnesses. There were contrasts in their demeanors: on The trial court, exhibiting keen perception on the
the one hand, the victim was firm, sincere, and whole bulk of evidence before it, has come up with a
collected when she narrated even the most painful number of observations not only to prove conspiracy
parts of her ordeal, easily impressing the Court by her but likewise to establish appellant's own part therein.
straightforward manner and strong recall of the
details; while, on the other hand, although Gungon 1. Gungon's presence on Panay Avenue and his
tried very much to appear cool and composed, he meeting with Roxas were not purely coincidental and
could not deceive the Court by hiding behind the by chance but intentional and prearranged. Roxas was
veneer of his feigned expressions and concealing what representing himself to Agnes as a traffic officer by
happened by a clever facade of denials. his wearing of the PNP reflectorized vest while
Gungon was employed by the MMA, which had a
direct connection with the functions assumed by had seen Roxas returning with a firearm at hand but
Roxas. Roxas and Gungon were associated with each without Agnes. Yet, he never reported the incidents to
other far longer than the latter has admitted. anyone else, most of all to the authorities, despite his
allegations that he thereafter continued to report to
2. Gungon's insistence that Roxas was only a casual work at MMA. The civic-minded and dedicated public
acquaintance is rejected as devoid of truth because it servant that he alleged himself to be notwithstanding,
is inconsistent with and contrary to the established he did not impress the Court that he was truly guiltless
facts and circumstances. The records already showed because of his unexplained failure to report to the
that Gungon knew several personal circumstances authorities.
about Roxas, including the fact that Roxas was
formerly employed at MMA and that Roxas was On the matter of the Davao land trip being taken on
unemployed when the incident took place, but was the January 28, 1994, the Court must have to consider it
president of a homeowners' association in as positively indicative of flight. It should first be
Commonwealth Avenue. Moreover, Gungon's conduct mentioned, as a premise for this conclusion, that
in relation to Roxas during the entire duration of the Gungon inextricably contradicted himself on this
trip from Panay Avenue to Batangas City, be it judged point, since, in his direct testimony, he cited the calls
from Agnes' point of view or from Gungon's own, made by somebody about two or three days before to
exhibited a deeper and closer familiarity and the office of Ms. Atencio asking her to meet a person
association than Gungon would admit. He called near the Makati Police Department about an alleged
Roxas "boss," an appellation of familiarity, if not also estafa case in relation to a roofing transaction as
subordination. He never protested his being invited to justification for the trip, implying that it was sudden
the unplanned Batangas trip. He never asked who and unplanned; whereas, in the cross-examination, he
Agnes was, nor where Roxas and Agnes had come stated that he and his wife had planned the Davao trip
from for vacation purposes even before New Year's Day,
1994. Aside from negatively reflecting on Gungon's
In any case, even assuming that Gungon, indeed, just testimonial integrity, such self-contradiction, not being
happened to be on Panay Avenue that afternoon, a merely minor or inconsequential development in the
implying thereby that he had no prior understanding Defense's presentation, exposed the Davao trip to be
with Roxas to meet thereat and also indicating thereby for what it was — the flight of a guilty man.21
that their acquaintance was merely casual, the Court is
still puzzled: (a) why Roxas on his part, should have It would defy logic and common sense to conclude
stopped for him; should have offered to convey him to that the above circumstances and events implicating
wherever he was going, and should even invite him to appellant to the crime were all purely coincidental.
go on the unplanned trip to distant Batangas without
notice to the latter's family, unless they were more Nor did the trial court err in convicting appellant of
familiar and closer; and (b) why Gungon, on his part, the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
should have agreed to go to Batangas unless he was in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code defines the
on the plans of Roxas. The unbelievable unnaturalness felony thus:
of Gungon's disavowal of his connection with Roxas
rendered his testimony suspect and implausible. Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. —
xxx xxx xxx Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
4. Another inconsistency was detected between another, or in any other manner deprive him of his
Gungon's allegations, on one hand, that he concealed liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
himself in the nearby trees from the returning Roxas death;
after the shooting of Agnes and allowed Roxas to
leave in the Nissan car without him, so that he 1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted
returned to Manila by bus, and, on the other hand, that more than three days.
the Nissan keychain and the key of the bar lock were
recovered from his blue bag. If he was to be believed, 2. If it shall have been committed simulating public
how did he come into the subsequent possession of authority.
the keychain and the key unless he and Roxas had met
after the shooting? 3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been
xxx xxx xxx inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if
6. On account of his admitted presence during the trip, threats to kill him shall have been made.
although protesting his innocence, the Court has also
carefully analyzed Gungon's conduct following the 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a
criminal incidents and found such conduct indicative minor, except when the accused is any of the parents,
of guilt rather than innocence. Despite his insistence female or a public officer.
to the contrary, he knew that at least one serious crime
had been perpetrated because he had heard a shot and
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or A. He reclined the seat and he took my arm and pulled
detention was committed for the purpose of extorting me to the back seat.
ransom from the victim or any other person, even if
none of the circumstances abovementioned were Q. While that second guy who entered the car reclined
present in the commission of the offense. your seat, and pulled your arm towards the back seat,
what was Roxas doing?
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of
the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or A. He was sitting at the passenger seat and when I was
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be at the back seat already, he took the driver's seat.
imposed. (As amended by Sec. 8, Republic Act No.
7659). (Emphasis ours.) Q. This second guy who boarded the car and pulled
you towards the back seat, is he inside the courtroom?
The crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
consists not only in placing a person in an enclosure A. Yes, sir.
but also in detaining that person or depriving him in
any manner of his liberty.22 Q. Will you please point to him?
xxx xxx xxx
Actual restraint of the victim's liberty was evident in Court
the instant case from the moment Agnes was taken at
gunpoint from Panay Avenue to a remote place in (Witness tapping a person in the first row) Will the
Batangas. The victim testified, thus: person tapped please rise? Do you wish to give your
name?
Q. What did he do with the P50.00 bill?
A. Yes, your honor.
A. He received it.
Court
Q. After receiving the P50.00 bill, what did he do
next? What is your name?

A. He gave my license back. A. Roberto Santiago Gungon, your honor.

xxx xxx xxx
Q. After getting back your license, what happened? State Pros. Agcaoili

A. He immediately poked a gun at me. You said that after you refused to drink the bottle of
softdrink being offered by Roxas, Roxas handed the
xxxx xxx xxx bottle over to Gungon?
Q. After Venancio Roxas pointed a gun at you, what
happened next? A. Yes, sir.

A. He switched off the engine and then told me, Q. After Gungon took the bottle, what happened next?
"Miss, kailangan ko lang ito."
A. He forced me to drink it, sabi niya, sige na,
Q. After that, what happened? makakatulong ito sa iyo.

A. I was so terrified, I cried and then pleaded to him You said that after you refused to drink the bottle of
to let me go, to take anything but not to harm me. softdrink being offered by Roxas, Roxas handed the
bottle over to Gungon?
Q. Did he heed your plea?
A. Yes, sir.
A. No, sir.
Q. After Gungon took the bottle, what happened next?
Q. What happened next?
A. He forced me to drink it, sabi niya, sige na,
A. After some minutes, he opened the back door of makakatulong ito sa iyo.
the car and then someone entered, another guy entered xxx xxx xxx
the car. State Pros. Agcaoili
xxx xxx xxx
Q. After that second guy entered the car, what And what was your reaction to that remark of
happened? Gungon?
A. Of course, I still refused to drink. victim has sustained the gunshot wound while still
trying to get up after relieving herself.
Q. And when you refused, what happened next?
The idea of killing the victim was likewise
A. He was still holding the bottle, and then he premeditated; Agnes testified:
continued to drive and then stopped to a nearby gas
station. State Pros. Agcaoili

Q. What did you do at the gas station if you did After this second guy who pulled you to the back seat
anything? whom you just identified as accused Roberto Gungon
pulled you towards the back seat, what happened
A. He gassed up. next?

Q. After gassing up, what else happened? A. I asked them where they are taking me.

A. During that time, I was trying to escape but I Q. What was their reply if any?
cannot escape since Gungon was holding me and from
time to time poking a gun at A. They said they are taking me to Philcoa.
me.23
Q. After telling you that they are taking you to
Q. Going back to your earlier testimony, madam Philcoa, what else happened?
witness, you testified earlier that along the way, Mr.
Roxas alighted from the car and bought Sprite and A. Gungon got his beeper and then he read it, then
skyflakes, how about you and Mr. Gungon when Mr. told Roxas, boss, negative Philcoa.
Roxas alighted from the car?
xxx xxx xxx Q. And what was the reaction of Roxas?
Q. What was Mr. Gungon doing while Mr. Roxas was
buying softdrinks a and skyflakes? A. He just nodded.
xxx xxx xxx
A. Gungon and I were still inside the car and he was Q. And what else happened?
holding me and from time to time poking a gun at me.
xxx xxx xxx A. After that, Gungon said, "Boss, dalhin na natin siya
Q. You also testified earlier that along the way Roxas sa dati at doon na natin i-S".
stopped somewhere at the South Expressway and took
a leak, what was Mr. Gungon doing while Mr. Roxas Q. And how did Roxas react to that remark of
was taking a leak? Gungon?

A. The same thing when Roxas left the car. A. The same, he just nodded.27

Q. What about when it was Mr. Gungon's turn to take The perpetration of the premeditated killing, albeit
a leak, what was Mr. Roxas doing? frustrated, was hatched from the moment the accused
and his co-conspirator took the victim in Quezon City
A. Roxas held me and he was holding the door and until she was ultimately "executed" in Batangas to
checking if it was locked and poking a gun at me.24 insure impunity to the perpetrators by eliminating the
only witness.
The evidence would likewise show, ineluctably, the
commission of frustrated murder. Not rebutted was the Murder is punishable under Article 248 of the Revised
medical finding that the gunshot wound sustained by Penal Code by reclusion perpetua to death if
the victim would have resulted in the death of the committed with the attendant circumstances, among
victim had it not been for the proper medical attention other circumstances, of treachery and evident
given to her.25 premeditation.28 When the crime is "frustrated," a
"penalty lower by one degree" or, in this case, prision
The trial court has, too, properly appreciated the mayor to reclusion temporal is imposed.
attendance of treachery in the commission of the
offense. Treachery exists when the offender employs The crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
means, methods, or forms in the execution of the has been correctly complexed by the trial court with
crime which tend directly and specialty to insure its frustrated murder. A complex crime is committed
execution, without risk to himself arising from the when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
defense which the offended party might take.26 It grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
bears stressing that the unsuspecting and defenseless means for committing the other.29
In a complex crime, the penalty for the most serious 1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
maximum period.30 Since the kidnapping and serious more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
illegal detention is the more serious crime, the proper pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceed the
penalty under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, should be period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one
applied in its maximum period. year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the
total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not
The Court finds merit, however, in appellant's third exceed twenty years.
assigned error.
The Information in Criminal Case No. Q-94-54287
Appellant would have it that the trial court erred in contains sufficient allegations, adequately proven by
convicting him of robbery considering that the taking the prosecution during the trial, to warrant a
of the victim's jewelry and cash were perpetrated conviction of appellant for the crime of theft. Section
while the latter was asleep. The victim herself testified 4, Rule 120, of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure
that shortly after the car had proceeded from Sto. provides on this score; thus:
Tomas, Batangas, she lost consciousness and regained
it only at about 9:30 that evening. She then found Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between
herself lying at the back seat minus her personal allegation and proof. — When there is variance
belongings with a total value of P38,000.00.31 between the offense charged in the complaint or
information, and that proved or established by the
Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code defines robbery evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or
to be one committed by any "person who, with intent necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused
to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to shall be convicted of the offense proved included in
another, by means of violence against or intimidation that which is charged, or of the offense charged
of any person, or using force upon anything. . . ." included in that which is proved.
Robbery may thus be committed two ways: (a) with
violence against, or intimidation of persons32 and (b) Since the value of the personal property taken from
by the use of force upon things.33 To be then liable the victim amounted to P38,000.00 the penalty
for robbery with violence against or intimidation of imposable is the maximum period of the penalty
persons, the following elements must concur: prescribed by Article 309 which is the maximum of
prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods
1) that there be personal property belonging to plus one year for the additional ten thousand pesos in
another; excess of P22,000.00. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty for this particular offense
2) that there is unlawful taking of that property; of theft that may thus be imposed is anywhere from
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
3) that the taking must be with intent to gain; and. prision correccional minimum period to six (6) years
of prision correccional maximum period, as minimum,
4) that there is violence against or intimidation of any to anywhere from eight (8) years, eight (8) months
person or use of force upon things. and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor
medium period, plus one (1) year for the additional
It would appear that the taking of the victim's jewelry P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 value of the
and cash came only by way of an afterthought on the property taken, or eleven (11) years of prision mayor
part of appellant. The taking was not attended by maximum period, as maximum.
violence or intimidation upon the person of Agnes.
The absence, however, of violence or intimidation did Lastly, appellant contends that he should not have
not exculpate appellant from liability for the crime of been convicted of violation of Republic Act No. 6539,
theft, punishable by Article 308, in relation to Article otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act, because
309, of the Revised Penal Code; viz: the taking of the subject motor vehicle was
perpetrated solely by Roxas, and at the time he
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. — Theft is (Gungon) boarded the subject vehicle. Roxas had
committed by any person who, with intent to gain but already acquired effective possession of the subject
without violence against, or intimidation of persons vehicle. This argument would have been
nor force upon things, shall take personal property of consequential had there been no finding of conspiracy
another without the latter's consent. between appellant and Venancio Roxas. In conspiracy,
to once again stress it, the act of one conspirator is the
Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall act of the other co-conspirators and, therefore, it is of
be punished by: no moment that an accused has not taken part in the
actual commission of every act constituting the Memorandum Circular No. 52, dated August 15,
crime,34 each of the conspirators being held in the 1980, of the Bureau of Land Transportation.
same degree of liability as the others.
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc.
WHEREFORE, the Court sustains the appealed (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of
decision of the trial court, dated 15 February 1995, taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of
except for appellant's conviction for the crime of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the
ROBBERY in Criminal Case No. Q-94-54287 which City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon
is hereby MODIFIED to one of THEFT of which accessible to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace
offense appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao
doubt and sentenced to a prison term of from two (2) are two of the members of TOMMI, each being an
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision operator and grantee of such certificate of public
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8) convenience.
months and one (1) day of prision mayor plus one (1)
year for the additional P10,000.00 in excess of On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of
P20,000.00 value of the property taken or a total of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular
nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as No. 77-42 which reads:
maximum. The decision of the court a quo with
respect to Criminal Case No. Q-94-54285 and SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of
Criminal Case No. Q-94-54286 is AFFIRMED. In Old and Dilapidated Taxis
Criminal Case No. Q-94-54285, four members of the
Court, although maintaining their adherence to the WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to
separate opinions expressed in People vs. Echegaray insure that only safe and comfortable units are used as
(G.R. No. 117472, 07 February 1997) that Republic public conveyances;
Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty, is unconstitutional nevertheless, bow to the WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in
ruling of the Court, by a majority vote that the law is Metro-Manila, has, time and again, complained
constitutional and that the death penalty should against, and condemned, the continued operation of
accordingly be imposed. old and dilapidated taxis;

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may
7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, be assured of comfort, convenience, and safety, a
upon finality of this decision, let the records of this program of phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis
case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the should be adopted;
President for possible exercise of the pardoning
power. WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the
Board of Transportation, the latter believes that in six
SO ORDERED. years of operation, a taxi operator has not only
covered the cost of his taxis, but has made reasonable
profit for his investments;
G.R. No. L-59234 September 30, 1982
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, Board hereby declares that no car beyond six years
INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE shall be operated as taxi, and in implementation of the
TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, petitioners, same hereby promulgates the following rules and
vs. regulations:
THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND 1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971
TRANSPORTATION, respondents. and earlier are ordered withdrawn from public service
and thereafter may no longer be registered and
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: operated as taxis. In the registration of cards for 1978,
only taxis of Model 1972 and later shall be accepted
This Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and for registration and allowed for operation;
mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order" filed by the Taxicab 2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972
Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao are ordered withdrawn from public service and
and Ace Transportation, seeks to declare the nullity of thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42, dated October 10, taxis. In the registration of cars for 1979, only taxis of
1977, of the Board of Transportation, and Model 1973 and later shall be accepted for registration
and allowed for operation; and every year thereafter, nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to
there shall be a six-year lifetime of taxi, to wit: allow the registration and operation in 1981 and
subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as
1980 — Model 1974 those of earlier models which were phased-out,
1981 — Model 1975, etc. provided that, at the time of registration, they are
roadworthy and fit for operation.
All taxis of earlier models than those provided above
are hereby ordered withdrawn from public service as On February 16, 1981, petitioners filed before the
of the last day of registration of each particular year BOT a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion", praying
and their respective plates shall be surrendered for an early hearing of their petition. The case was
directly to the Board of Transportation for subsequent heard on February 20, 1981. Petitioners presented
turnover to the Land Transportation Commission. testimonial and documentary evidence, offered the
same, and manifested that they would submit
For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum additional documentary proofs. Said proofs were
Circular, the rules herein shall immediately be submitted on March 27, 1981 attached to petitioners'
effective in Metro-Manila. Its implementation outside pleading entitled, "Manifestation, Presentation of
Metro- Manila shall be carried out only after the Additional Evidence and Submission of the Case for
project has been implemented in Metro-Manila and Resolution."3
only after the date has been determined by the Board.1
On November 28, 1981, petitioners filed before the
Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent same Board a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion to
Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) Resolve or Decide Main Petition" praying that the
issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August case be resolved or decided not later than December
15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV 10, 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of
Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the whatever remedy they may have under the law for the
National Capitol Region, to implement said Circular, protection of their interests before their 1975 model
and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to cabs are phased-out on January 1, 1982.
be allowed and accepted for registration as public Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made
conveyances. To quote said Circular: personal follow-ups of the case, but was later
informed that the records of the case could not be
"Pursuant to BOT Memo-Circular No. 77-42, taxi located.
units with year models over six (6) years old are now
banned from operating as public utilities in Metro On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was
Manila. As such the units involved should be instituted wherein the following queries were posed
considered as automatically dropped as public utilities for consideration by this Court:
and, therefore, do not require any further dropping
order from the BOT. "A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned
memorandum circulars in accord with the manner
"Henceforth, taxi units within the National Capitol required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby
Region having year models over 6 years old shall be safeguarding the petitioners' constitutional right to
refused registration. The following schedule of procedural due process?
phase-out is herewith prescribed for the guidance of
all concerned: B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply
with the procedural requirements imposed by
"Year Model​ Automatic Phase-Out Year Presidential Decree No. 101, would the
​ 1980 implementation and enforcement of the assailed
1974​ 1981 memorandum circulars violate the petitioners'
1975​ 1982 constitutional rights to.
1976​ 1983
1977​ (1) Equal protection of the law;
etc.​ etc.
Strict compliance here is desired.2 (2) Substantive due process; and

In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable
phase-out in registration year 1978; those of model classification and standard?
1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and
those of model 1974, in 1981. On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:

On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of
the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to Transportation the power
 process.ℒαwρhi৷ As held in Central Bank vs. Hon.
"4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, Cloribel and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307 (1972):
regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be
furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by "Pevious notice and hearing as elements of due
operators of public utility motor vehicles. process, are constitutionally required for the
protection of life or vested property rights, as well as
Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in
guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise of consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding,
its powers: generally dependent upon a past act or event which
has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential
"Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. — In the exercise of the to the validity of general rules or regulations
powers granted in the preceding section, the Board promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or
shag proceed promptly along the method of legislative persons or enterprises, unless the law provides
inquiry. otherwise. (Emphasis supplied)

Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Petitioners further take the position that fixing the
Board, in its discretion, may require the cooperation ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and oppressive
and assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the because the roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon
Philippine Constabulary, particularly the Highway their kind of maintenance and the use to which they
Patrol Group, the support agencies within the are subjected, and, therefore, their actual physical
Department of Public Works, Transportation and condition should be taken into consideration at the
Communications, or any other government office or time of registration. As public contend, however, it is
agency that may be able to furnish useful information impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and
or data in the formulation of the Board of any policy, recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can
plan or program in the implementation of this Decree. open the door to the adoption of multiple standards,
possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A
The Board may also can conferences, require the reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an
submission of position papers or other documents, vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The
information, or data by operators or other persons that span of six years supplies that reasonable standard.
may be affected by the implementation of this Decree, The product of experience shows that by that time
or employ any other suitable means of inquiry. taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and
a fair return on investment obtained. They are also
In support of their submission that they were denied generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and
procedural due process, petitioners contend that they comfortable service to the public specially considering
were not caged upon to submit their position papers, that they are in continuous operation practically 24
nor were they ever summoned to attend any hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift.
conference prior to the issuance of the questioned With that standard of reasonableness and absence of
BOT Circular. arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been
met.
It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however,
that the leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide On Equal Protection of the Law:
range of choice in gathering necessary information or
data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question
It is not mandatory that it should first call a violates their right to equal protection of the law
conference or require the submission of position because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila
papers or other documents from operators or persons only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry.
who may be affected, this being only one of the At the outset it should be pointed out that
options open to the Board, which is given wide implementation outside Metro Manila is also
discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. To
claim, therefore, that they were deprived of procedural repeat the pertinent portion:
due process. Neither can they state with certainty that
public respondents had not availed of other sources of "For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum
inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. Circular, the rules herein shall immediately be
operators of public conveyances are not the only effective in Metro Manila. Its implementation outside
primary sources of the data and information that may Metro Manila shall be carried out only after the
be desired by the BOT. project has been implemented in Metro Manila and
only after the date has been determined by the Board.4
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance
of the Circulars is neither violative of procedural due In fact, it is the understanding of the Court that
implementation of the Circulars in Cebu City is
already being effected, with the BOT in the process of JUMARANG Y MULINGBAYAN,
conducting studies regarding the operation of taxicabs ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
in other cities.
DECISION
The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially
in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared LOPEZ, J., J.:
to those of other places, are subjected to heavier
traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of This Court resolves an appeal from the Decision1
common knowledge. Considering that traffic dated January 16, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial in CA-G.R. CR HC-No. 08654, which affirmed with
distinction exists so that infringement of the equal modification the Judgment2 dated August 30, 2016
protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed. rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City,
Branch 60 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. Ir-9174. The
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the RTC earlier found accused-appellant Ronilo Jumarang
challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration y Mulingbayan (Jumarang) guilty beyond reasonable
is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the doubt of violation of Section 16 (Cultivation or
dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, Culture of Plants Classified as Dangerous Drugs or
in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe are Sources Thereof), Article II of Republic Act
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the
order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and
welfare of society.5 It may also regulate property The Facts
rights.6 In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare On April 27, 2010, an Information was filed against
may justify the exercise of governmental authority to Jumarang, the accusatory portion of which reads:
regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded".7 That on [the] 11th day of April 2010 at about 11:15
In so far as the non-application of the assailed o'clock [sic] in the morning at Barangay Santiago,
Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, Bato, Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the
it need only be recalled that the equal protection jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
clause does not imply that the same treatment be accused, without any legal purpose or authority, did
accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly,
Identically or similarly situated. It permits of PLANT, CULTIVATE OR CULTURE THREE (3)
classification of the object or subject of the law POTS OF FULLY GROWN MARIJUANA PLANTS
provided classification is reasonable or based on WITH FRUITING TOPS, CLASSIFIED AS
substantial distinction, which make for real DANGEROUS DRUGS, ON TOP OF THE ROOF
differences, and that it must apply equally to each OF HIS HOUSE MADE OF CONCRETE SLAB,
member of the class.8 What is required under the MIXED WITH OTHER ORNAMENTAL PLANTS,
equal protection clause is the uniform operation by NOW HAVING THE FOLLOWING MARKINGS
legal means so that all persons under Identical or AND HEIGHTS: EXHB. A JPB 4-11-10=116 CM;
similar circumstance would be accorded the same EXHB B JPB 4-11-10=189 CM & EXHB C JPB
treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities 4-11-10=109 CM regardless of quantity, to the great
imposed.9 The challenged Circulars satisfy the damage and prejudice of public interest and of that of
foregoing criteria. the Republic of the Philippines.

Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned ACTS CONTRARY TO LA W.3
Circulars do not suffer from any constitutional
infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the Jumarang was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the
infringement of constitutional right must be clear, charge against him.4 Thereafter, trial on the merits
categorical and undeniable.10 ensued.

WHEREFORE, the Writs prayed for are denied and The prosecution witnesses testified5 that on April 11,
this Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs. 2010, around 10:30 in the morning, Police Officer
(PO) 2 Manuel Tanay6 (PO2 Tanay) received a tip
SO ORDERED. that someone "in the De Lima residence" located in
Santiago, Bato, Camarines Sur was keeping marijuana
[ G.R. No. 250306. August 10, 2022 ] plants. The information was relayed to the then Chief
of Police of Bato, Camarines Sur Police Inspector
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Salvador Banaria (P/Insp. Banaria), who, in turn,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RONILO
directed PO2 Tanay and PO2 Jeric Buena7 (PO2 was the one caught handling the plant, he was arrested
Buena) to conduct surveillance.8 by the police officers.

PO2 Tanay and PO2 Buena immediately went to the After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered the
area and positioned themselves around 10 meters Judgment15 dated August 30, 2016 finding Jumarang
outside a house, which was located inside a guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section
compound. From where they were standing, they 16, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and sentencing him to
could see a man, later on identified as Jumarang,9 suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
tending to some plants at the roof of the house. Not fine of P500,000.00.
long after, the man, holding a three-foot tall potted
plant with "five finger leaves," started descending the Jumarang appealed the Judgment dated August 30,
roof. 2016 to the CA. However, the same was denied by the
CA in its Decision16 dated January 16, 2018, which
Suspecting that Jumarang was bringing the plant affirmed with modification the trial court's Judgment.
inside his house, the two police officers called out to The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
him and rushed inside the compound. They instructed
Jumarang to put the plant down so they could closely WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
examine it. Jumarang complied while asserting that it appeal of accused-appellant is DENIED and the RTC's
was a medicinal plant. They also asked Jumarang if Decision dated August 30, 2016 is hereby
they could go inside the house. Jumarang relented and AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the
allowed PO2 Tanay and PO2 Buena inside the penalty imposed is life imprisonment with payment of
house.10 fine of five hundred thousand Pesos ([P]500,000.00).

When PO2 Tanay and PO2 Buena went up the roof, SO ORDERED.17
they found two other pots of what they identified as
marijuana plants. They also brought these down. At Hence, the instant appeal.
this point, onlookers were already starting to gather,
including the owner of the compound, so PO2 Tanay Issues
and PO2 Buena decided to bring Jumarang and the
plants to the police station.11 I. Whether the marijuana plants seized from
accused-appellant is admissible in evidence to prove
Once there, PO2 Tanay looked for a barangay official, his guilt for the crime of violation of Section 16,
a member of the media, and a prosecutor. He was able Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
to secure the attendance of Acting Punong Barangay
Adam Billiones, media practitioner Glenda Bearis, II. Whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt
and Prosecutor Antonio Ramos, Jr. as witnesses.12 of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt for the
PO2 Buena also prepared the inventory receipts, and crime of violation of Section 16, Article II of R.A. No.
photographs were taken of the plants which were 9165.
turned over to PO2 Rico Dancalan. The next day, the
plants were brought to Camp Simeon Ola for Our Ruling
scientific examination. The tests conducted by Police
Senior Inspector Wilfredo I. Pabustan, Jr., a forensic Pertinent to the resolution of this case is the
chemist, confirmed that these were marijuana determination of whether the three pots of marijuana
plants.13 plants seized from accused-appellant are admissible in
evidence. Accused-appellant contends that the
For his part, Jumarang vehemently denied the charges marijuana plants were seized from him through an
against him.14 He testified that at the time of the invalid warrantless search. He asserts that there being
incident, he was visiting his in-laws from Batangas no valid warrantless arrest, the subsequent warrantless
where he resides. He stated that on that day, April 11, search effected on him was likewise unlawful.
2010, his mother-in-law requested him to clean their
rooftop. However, when he saw three pots of The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand,
marijuana plants among the other plants, he decided to maintains that the marijuana plants seized from
report the matter to the police. However, as he was accused-appellant were products of a valid search
handling the plants to bring to the police, two of them incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest and valid
passed by him. When they saw him with the plant, consented search.
they approached and told him that he was planting
marijuana. They then asked him if they could check Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
the rooftop and he accompanied them, along with his mandates that search and seizure must be carried out
parents-in-law, his wife, and some neighbors. There, through or on the strength of a judicial warrant
they saw two more marijuana plants. As Jumarang predicated upon the existence of probable cause,
absent which, such search and seizure becomes In warrantless arrest made pursuant to Section 5(a),
"unreasonable" within the meaning of the said two elements must concur: (1) the person to be
constitutional provision.18 arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, actually committing, or is
To protect the people from unreasonable searches and attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act
seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 is done in the presence or within the view of the
Constitution provides that evidence obtained from arresting officer.23
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any In an arrest made in flagrante delicto, it is required
proceeding.19 In other words, evidence obtained and that the apprehending officer must have been spurred
confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable by probable cause to arrest a person caught. Probable
search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded cause refers to "such facts and circumstances which
for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.20 would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent [person]
to believe that an offense has been committed by the
However, there are instances when a warrantless person sought to be arrested."24
search is valid. The following are recognized
instances of permissible warrantless searches: (1) a As explained in People v. Racho,25 a lawful arrest
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) must precede or at least must be substantially
search of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a contemporaneous to the search made by a police
moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless searches; officer provided there is probable cause to arrest the
(5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent offender, thus:
and emergency circumstances.21
Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to
The CA ruled that accused-appellant was arrested in a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search;
flagrante delicto because he was holding a pot planted generally, the process cannot be reversed.
with marijuana when the police officers saw him. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous
with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have
After a careful review of the evidence on record, the probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the
Court finds that the warrantless arrest was unlawful. search. Thus, given the factual milieu of the case, we
Consequently, the search effected on have to determine whether the police officers had
accused-appellant was also unlawful. probable cause to arrest appellant. Although probable
cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
a search can be made; the process cannot be themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that
reversed.22 Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
Court, a warrantless arrest may be made under the he is charged.26
following circumstances:
The Court finds that accused-appellant's arrest could
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under
peace officer or a private person may, without a Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court.
warrant, arrest a person:
In this case, PO2 Tanay testified that they received a
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested tip from a confidential informant that marijuana plants
has committed, is actually committing, or is could be found in the De Lima residence located in
attempting to commit an offense; Santiago, Bato, Camarines Sur. To verify the tip, the
police officers proceeded to the De Lima residence
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he and conducted a surveillance where they observed the
has probable cause to believe based on personal house from the roadside. According to PO2 Tanay,
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to they were positioned at a distance of ten meters from
be arrested has committed it; and the house when they saw a man going downstairs
holding a potted plant. According to PO2 Tanay, since
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who their confidential informant already told them that the
has escaped from a penal establishment or place person had some marijuana plants, they already
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily assumed that the potted plant was marijuana. Thus,
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped they called the man and instructed him to come down
while being transferred from one confinement to from the stairs and they asked him about the plant he
another. (Emphasis supplied) was carrying.27
Based on the foregoing, in effecting the warrantless testimony reveals that before the arrest was made, he
arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip that only saw that Dominguez was holding a small plastic
they received from the confidential informant. It is sachet. He was unable to describe what said plastic
settled that reliable information alone is insufficient to sachet contained, if any. He only mentioned that the
support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from plastic contained "pinaghihinalaang shabu" after he
the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has had already arrested Dominguez and subsequently
just been committed, was being committed, or is about confiscated said plastic sachet[.]
to be committed.28 xxxx
The present case is similar to People v. Villareal,
As stated above, when the police officers saw where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the
accused-appellant, he was simply going downstairs accused was unconstitutional, as simply holding
while holding a potted plant. Accused-appellant was, something in one's hands cannot in any way be
at this moment, not committing a crime and it was not considered as a criminal act:
even shown that he was about to do so or that he had
just done so. What he was doing was descending from On the basis of the foregoing testimony, the Court
the stairs, and there was no outward indication that finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even with
called for his arrest. his presumably perfect vision, would be able to
identify with reasonable accuracy, from a distance of
Also, the fact that accused-appellant was holding a about 8 to 10 meters while simultaneously driving a
pot, which the police suspected to be a marijuana motorcycle, a negligible and minuscule amount of
plant is not a justification to effect the warrantless powdery substance (0.03 gram) inside the plastic
arrest. The Court has held that a reasonable suspicion sachet allegedly held by appellant. That he had
is not synonymous with the personal knowledge previously effected numerous arrests, all involving
required under Section 5(a) to effect a valid shabu, is insufficient to create a conclusion that what
warrantless arrest.29 The facts of the case clearly he purportedly saw in appellant's hands was indeed
indicate that PO2 Tanay merely assumed that the plant shabu.
he saw in the pot being carried by accused-appellant
was marijuana based on the information relayed to Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor
them by their confidential informant. PO2 Tanay even a lawful arrest, no other overt act could be properly
admitted that said information was the sole basis in attributed to appellant as to rouse suspicion in the
arriving at his conclusion. Clearly, PO2 Tanay had no mind of PO3 de Leon that he (appellant) had just
personal knowledge as to the type of plant that committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
accused-appellant was holding, to produce probable crime, for the acts per se of walking along the street
cause to believe that the plant was indeed a marijuana and examining something in one's hands cannot in any
plant. way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if
appellant had been exhibiting unusual or strange acts,
Moreover, PO2 Tanay testified that they were or at the very least appeared suspicious, the same
positioned at a distance of 10 meters from the house would not have been sufficient in order for PO3 de
when they saw accused-appellant going downstairs Leon to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under
holding a plant in a pot. At such a distance, the police paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.
officers would not be able to discern as to the type of xxxx
plant that accused-appellant was holding. They cannot The prosecution failed to establish the conditions set
be said to be equipped with personal knowledge in the forth in Section 5 (a), Rule 11362 of the Rules of
commission of a crime. In Dominguez v. People,30 Court that: (a) the person to be arrested must execute
the search made by a police officer on the accused, an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
whom he had seen from a meter away holding a actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
plastic sachet, was acquitted of the charge of illegal crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or
possession of dangerous drugs, with this Court within the view of the arresting officer. As already
discussing as follows: discussed, standing on the street and holding a plastic
sachet in one's hands cannot in any way be considered
The circumstances as stated above do not give rise to as criminal acts. Verily, it is not enough that the
a reasonable suspicion that Dominguez was in arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe that
possession of shabu. From a meter away, even with the accused had just committed a crime; a crime must,
perfect vision, SPO1 Parchaso would not have been in fact, have been committed first, which does not
able to identify with reasonable accuracy the contents obtain in this case.31 (Emphasis in the original,
of the plastic sachet. Dominguez' acts of standing on citations omitted)
the street and holding a plastic sachet in his hands, are
not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of Applying the principle herein, the police officers, who
criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to were at a distance of 10 meters away from
justify a warrantless arrest. In fact, SPO1 Parchaso's accused-appellant, cannot be said to have properly
determined the nature of the plant that he was holding search the entire premises of the house, specifically
was a marijuana plant. As it turned out, he was merely going to the rooftop of the house.
descending the stairs while holding a plant. Without
any circumstance presented by the prosecution, it is Accordingly, there being no valid warrantless search
doubtful how the police officers were able to under a search incidental to a lawful arrest and a valid
recognize that the plant accused-appellant was consented search, the marijuana plants seized from
carrying was a marijuana plant. It bears noting that accused-appellant are rendered inadmissible in
before resorting to a search incidental to a lawful evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the
arrest, the existence of a crime must first be poisonous tree. As the seized marijuana plants are the
established. There being none, the search made on very corpus delicti of the crime charged,
accused-appellant cannot be considered as a valid accused-appellant must be acquitted and exonerated
warrantless search. from criminal liability.

It bears emphasizing that the failure of WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The
accused-appellant to timely object to the illegality of Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 16,
his arrest does not preclude him from questioning the 2018 in CA-G.R. CR HC-No. 08654 is hereby
admissibility of the evidence seized. "The REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant
inadmissibility of the evidence is not affected when an Ronilo Jumarang y Mulingbayan is ACQUITTED in
accused fails to question the court's jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. Ir-9174 for violation of Section 16
their person in a timely manner. Jurisdiction over the (Cultivation or Culture of Plants Classified as
person of an accused and the constitutional Dangerous Drugs or are Sources Thereof), Article II
inadmissibility of evidence are separate and mutually of Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as the
exclusive consequences of an illegal arrest."32 "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," and
is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from
Neither can this Court consider the search conducted detention unless he is being lawfully held for another
on the rooftop where they discovered two more pots cause.
of marijuana plant as a valid consented search.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the
According to PO2 Tanay, they asked Director General of the Bureau of Corrections,
accused-appellant if they can go inside the house and Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The
the latter allowed them to enter the house. Upon Director is directed to report to this Court the action
entering the house, they proceeded to the rooftop taken within five (5) days from receipt of this
where they discovered two more pots of marijuana Decision. Copies shall also be furnished to the Police
plant. General of the Philippine National Police and the
Director General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
This Court has held that the consent to a warrantless Agency for their information.
search and seizure must be "unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given, and unattended by duress or Let an entry of judgment be issued.
coercion.33 Mere passive conformity to the
warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence SO ORDERED.”
which does not amount to consent and that the
presence of a coercive environment negates the claim G.R. No. 89103 July 14, 1995
that [accused-appellant] therein consented to the
warrantless search."34 LEON TAMBASEN, petitioner,
vs.
Here, an inquiry into the environment in which the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 2ND ASSISTANT
consent was given shows that at that time, PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR GLORIA
accused-appellant was in the company of two police LASTIMOSA MARCOS and HON. CICERO U.
officers.1a⍵⍴h!1 Thus, it can be said that QUERUBIN in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
accused-appellant act of allowing the police officers to Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch
enter the house was a mere passive conformity due the 44, Bacolod City, respondents.
presence of a coercive and intimidating environment.
It should be noted also that PO2 Tanay only asked if QUIASON, J.:
they could enter the house. However, there was no
consent given to allow them to search the premises of This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under
the house, like going to the rooftop where they Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the
discovered two more pots of marijuana plant. Thus, Order dated July 20, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court
assuming there is consent, accused-appellant (RTC), Branch 44, Bacolod City in Civil Case No.
consented only for them to enter the house but not to 5331, which nullified the order earlier issued by the
Municipal Trial Circuit Court (MTCC) of the City of
Bacolod. The MTCC Order directed the return to Torres, the station commander of the Bacolod City
petitioner of the amount of P14,000.00 which had Police, said that the amount of P14,000.00 had been
been seized by the police. earmarked for the payment of the allowance of the
Armed City Partisan (ACP) and other "known NPA
I personalities" operating in the City of Bacolod.
On August 31, 1988, P/Sgt. Flumar Natuel applied for
the issuance of a search warrant from the MTCC, On December 23, 1988, the MTCC issued an order
alleging that he received information that petitioner directing Lt. Col. Torres to return the money seized to
had in his possession at his house at the North Capitol petitioner. The court opined that in the implementation
Road, Bacolod City, "M-16 Armalite Rifles (Mags & of the search warrant, any seizure should be limited to
Ammos), Hand Grenades, .45 Cal. Pistols (Mags & the specific items covered thereby. It said that the
Ammos), Dynamite Sticks and Subversive money could not be considered as "subversive
Documents," which articles were "used or intended to documents"; it was neither stolen nor the effects of
be used" for illegal purposes (Rollo, p. 14). On the gambling.
same day, the application was granted by the MTCC
with the issuance of Search Warrant No. 365, which Three months later, the Solicitor General filed before
allowed the seizure of the items specified in the the RTC, Branch 44, Bacolod City a petition for
application (Rollo, p. 15). certiorari seeking the annulment of the order of the
MTCC (Civil Case No. 5331). The petition alleged
At around 6:30 P.M. of September 9, 1988, a police that assuming that the seizure of the money had been
team searched the house of petitioner and seized the invalid, petitioner was not entitled to its return citing
following articles: the rulings in Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279 (1987)
and Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986). In
(1) Two (2) envelopes containing cash in the total those cases, the Court held that pending the
amount of P14,000.00 (one envelope P10,000.00 and determination of the legality of the seizure of the
another P4,000.00); articles, they should remain in custodia legis. The
petition also averred that a criminal complaint for
(2) one (1) AR 280 handset w/antenae (sic) "any of the crimes against public order as provided
SN-00485; under Chapter I, Title III of the Revised Penal Code"
had been filed with the City Fiscal (BC I.S. No.
(3) one (1) YAESU FM Transceiver FT 23R 88-1239) and therefore, should the money be found as
w/Antenae (sic); having been earmarked for subversive activities, it
should be confiscated pursuant to Article 45 of the
(4) one (1) ALINCO ELH 230D Base; Revised Penal Code.

(5) one (1) DC Regulator Supply 150 V. 13.8 V 12 On July 20, 1989, RTC, Branch 44 issued an order
AMP — 128 VAC; granting the petition for certiorari and directing the
clerk of court to return to the MTCC the money
(6) one (1) brown Academy Notebook & Assorted pending the resolution of the preliminary investigation
papers; and being conducted by the city prosecutor on the criminal
complaint. In said order, the RTC held:
(7) Four (4) handsets battery pack (Rollo, p. 16).
The Court observed that private respondent Leon
On September 19, 1988, the MTCC, acting on Tambasen never questioned the validity of the search
petitioner's urgent motion for the return of the seized warrant issued by respondent Judge Demosthenes L.
articles, issued an order directing Sgt. Natuel to make Magallanes. A perusal of private respondent's "Motion
a return of the search warrant. The following day, Sgt. to Declare Search and Seizure Illegal and to Return
Natuel submitted a report to the court. Not Seized Properties" dated October 7, 1988 shows that
considering the report as a "return in contemplation of respondent Tambasen questions not the validity of the
law," petitioner filed another motion praying that Sgt. search warrant issued by respondent Judge
Natuel be required to submit a complete and verified Demosthenes Magallanes, but rather, the execution or
inventory of the seized articles. Thereafter, Sgt. Natuel implementation of the said warrant principally on the
manifested that although he was the applicant for the ground that the articles seized are not allegedly
issuance of the search warrant, he was not present mentioned in the search warrant. However, the
when it was served. question thus raised involves matters determinative of
the admissibility in evidence and the legality of the
On October 7, 1988, petitioner filed before the MTCC articles seized. These matters, it is submitted, go
a motion praying that the search and seizure be beyond the immediate and limited jurisdiction of the
declared illegal and that the seized articles be returned respondent Judge to inquire into the validity of the
to him. In his answer to the motion, Lt. Col. Nicolas search warrant he issued. These issues which relate
exclusively or principally with the intrinsic and returnees, the police filed a complaint for subversion
substantive merits of the case or cases which are being against petitioner with the Office of the City
prepared against respondent Tambasen, and insofar as Prosecutor. The following day, the City Prosecutor
Tambasen is concerned involve matters of defense filed an information for violation of the
which should be properly raised at the criminal action Anti-Subversion Law against petitioner with RTC,
or actions that may be filed against respondent Leon Branch 42, Bacolod City (Criminal Case No. 8517).
Tambasen (see DOH v. Sy Chi Siong Co., Inc. et. al., An order for the arrest of petitioner was issued on
G.R. No. 85289, Feb. 20, 1989). They cannot be March 2, 1990.
addressed to the respondent Judge because the
respondent Judge has no jurisdiction over the said On March 6, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to quash
issue. It is clear therefore that respondent Judge has the information in Criminal Case No. 8517.
transcended the boundaries of his limited jurisdiction
and had in effect encroached upon the jurisdiction of On March 15, 1990, RTC, Branch 42 granted
the appropriate trial court or courts that will try the petitioner's motion to quash and recalled the warrant
criminal case or cases against respondent Leon of arrest. The court also directed the City Prosecutor
Tambasen, in issuing the assailed order dated to resolve BC-I.S. Case No. 88-1239.
December 23, 1988. Ostensibly, the assailed order, if
not corrected, will unduly deprive the prosecution of On March 20, 1990, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
its right to present the evidence in question and, Gloria Lastimosa Marcos manifested before RTC,
consequently, will improperly oust the trial court, Branch 42 that petitioner had been "dropped" from
which will try the criminal case or cases against BC-I.S. No. 88-1239. However, the City Prosecutor
private respondent Leon Tambasen of its original and had, by then, filed a motion for the reconsideration of
exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the admissibility and said Resolution of March 15, 1990. The motion was
legality of the said evidence. This order of respondent denied.
court is tantamount to a denial of due process. It may
be considered as a grave abuse of discretion Under this factual matrix, this Court is confronted
reviewable by certiorari (Esparagoza v. Tan, 94 Phil. with the question of whether RTC, Branch 44 gravely
749) (Rollo, pp. abused its discretion in directing that the money
47-48). seized from petitioner's house, specifically the amount
of P14,000.00, be retained and kept in custodia legis.
Consequently, petitioner filed the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition praying for the issuance of a On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3,
temporary restraining order commanding the city Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
prosecutor to cease and desist from continuing with prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more
the preliminary investigation in BC I.S. No. 88-1239 than one specific offense. The caption of Search
and the RTC from taking any step with respect to Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two special
Civil Case No. 5331. He also prayed that Search laws: P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms,
Warrant No. 365 and the seizure of his personal ammunition and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the
effects be declared illegal and that the Order of July Anti-Subversion Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was
20, 1989 be reversed and annulled. therefore a "scatter-shot warrant" and totally null and
void (People v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 101
Petitioner contended that the search warrant covered [1992]).
three offenses: "(1) illegal possession of armalite rifle
and .45 cal. pistol; (2) illegal possession of hand Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in
grenade and dynamite sticks; and (3) illegal the search warrant, the police acted beyond the
possession of subversive documents" (Rollo, pp. 3-4) parameters of their authority under the search warrant.
in violation of Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Revised Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires
Rules of Court. He assailed the legality of the seizure that a search warrant should particularly describe the
of the articles which were not mentioned in the search things to be seized. "The evident purpose and intent of
warrant. Moreover, since a complaint against him was the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to
filed only after his house had been searched, petitioner those, and only those, particularly described in the
claimed that the police were "on a fishing expedition.” search warrant — to leave the officers of the law with
no discretion regarding what articles they should
During the pendency of the instant petition, a series of seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and
events related to the questioned search and seizure seizures may not be made and that abuses may not be
transpired. At around 10:30 P.M. of March 1, 1990, committed" (Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, 547
petitioner, who was then on board a passenger vehicle, [1985]); Bache & Co. [Phil.] Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA
was arrested by intelligence operatives in Barangay 823 [1971]; Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886
Mandalagan, Bacolod City and forthwith detained. On [1920]). The same constitutional provision is also
the strength of sworn statements of two rebel aimed at preventing violations of security in person
and property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of SO ORDERED.
the home, and giving remedy against such usurpations
when attempted (People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547
[1992] citing Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646 [ G.R. No. 247348. November 16, 2021 ]
[1946]).
CHRISTIAN CADAJAS Y CABIAS, PETITIONER,
Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
the search warrant, had been illegally seized from RESPONDENT.
petitioner. The fact that the members of the police
team were doing their task of pursuing subversives is DECISION
not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The
presumption juris tantum of regularity in the LOPEZ, J., J.:
performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail
against the constitutionally protected rights of an Before this Court is a Petition for Review on
individual (People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759 [1994]; Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, 176 [1925]). Although Court assailing the Decision2 dated September 17,
public welfare is the foundation of the power to search 2018 and Resolution3 dated May 9, 2019 rendered by
and seize, such power must be exercised and the law the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 40298,
enforced without transgressing the constitutional which affirmed with modification the August 7, 2017
rights of the citizens (People v. Damaso, supra, citing Joint Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of
Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235 [1937]). Valenzuela City, Branch 270 (RTC) in Criminal Case
As the Court aptly puts it in Bagalihog v. Fernandez, Nos. 215-V-17 and 216-V-17, finding Christian
198 SCRA 614 (1991), "[z]eal in the pursuit of Cadajas y Cabias (petitioner) guilty of violating
criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10175, in
that the Constitution itself abhors." relation to Sections 4(a), 3(b) and (c)(5) of R.A. No.
9775.
For the retention of the money seized by the police
officers, approval of the court which issued the search The Antecedents
warrant is necessary (People v. Gesmundo, 219 SCRA
743 [1993]). In like manner, only the court which Petitioner, who was then 24 years old, met the victim,
issued the search warrant may order their release AAA,5 who was only 14 years old, in the canteen
(Temple v. Dela Cruz, 60 SCRA 295 [1974]; where he works. Their relationship started when the
Pagkalinawan v. Gomez, 21 SCRA 1275 [1967]). younger sibling of AAA told petitioner that AAA had
a crush on him. Petitioner tried to evade AAA, but the
Section 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution latter started to stalk him. Later, AAA sent petitioner a
provides that evidence obtained in violation of the request in his Facebook Messenger, which he
right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall accepted. The petitioner and AAA would then
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. exchange messages on Facebook Messenger and after
some time, petitioner courted AAA for two weeks,
The information in Criminal Case No. 8517, with until they became sweethearts on April 2, 2016.6
petitioner as the sole accused, was ordered quashed by
the trial court and the prosecution's motion for the Sometime in June 2016, BBB, the mother of AAA,
reconsideration of the quashal order had been denied. learned of their relationship.7 She discovered the
Even in BC I.S. Case No. 88-1239, which was being relationship because AAA would borrow her
investigated by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor cellphone to access the latter's Facebook account.8
Marcos, petitioner was dropped as a respondent. Her mother was thus able to read their messages
Hence, there appears to be no criminal prosecution whenever AAA would forget to log out her account.
which can justify the retention of the seized articles in BBB disapproved of their relationship because AAA
custodia legis. was still too young.9 However, petitioner and AAA
ignored her admonishment.
A subsequent legal development added another reason
for the return to him of all the seized articles: R.A. Sometime in October 2016, BBB was disheartened
No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Law, was repealed by when she read that petitioner was sexually luring her
R.A. No. 7636 and, therefore, the crimes defined in daughter to meet with him in a motel. She confronted
the repealed law no longer exist. petitioner and told him to stay away because AAA
was still a minor.10
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the
People of the Philippines is ORDERED to RETURN At around 5:30 in the morning of November 18, 2016,
the money seized to petitioner. BBB was shocked when she read the conversation
between petitioner and AAA. She found that
petitioner was coaxing her daughter to send him That on or about November 16, 2016 in Valenzuela
photos of the latter's breast and vagina. AAA relented City and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
and sent petitioner the photos he was asking. When Court, the accused, the above-named accused, acting
AAA learned that her mother read their conversation, with lewd design, did, then and there, willfully,
she rushed to a computer shop to delete her messages. unlawfully and feloniously coerced, induced [AAA],
BBB, however, was able to force her to open (DOB: February 10, 2002) (POB: Valenzuela City),
petitioner's Facebook messenger account to get a copy 14 years old, to send him pictures of her vagina and
of their conversation.11 breasts, through Facebook Messenger using a mobile
phone.
On the part of the petitioner, he admitted sending
AAA the messages "oo ready ako sa ganyan" and CONTRARY TO LAW.15
"sige hubad." He, however, denied having sent AAA,
photos of his private part. On November 17, 2016, Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to both charges
AAA asked petitioner to delete their messages from during arraignment.16
his account. He even told her "bakit kasi hindi ka pa
nagtitino, hayan tuloy nakita ng mama mo." On the After trial, the RTC acquitted petitioner of the charge
same day, petitioner broke up with AAA because her for violation of Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, but
mother did not like him.12 found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No. 10175 in
Petitioner later learned from his co-workers that two relation to Sections 4(a), 3(b) and (c)(5) of R.A. No.
(2) criminal cases were filed against him.13 He was 9775. As such, petitioner was sentenced to reclusion
charged for violation of Section 10(a) of R.A. No. temporal and to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00.17
7610 and for child pornography as defined and
penalized under Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No. 10175 in According to the RTC, petitioner was aware that AAA
relation to Sections 4(a), 3(b) and (c)(5) of R.A. No. was still a minor when he obstinately prodded the
9775. The two (2) informations that were filed against latter to send him photos of her private parts. This is
petitioner on December 27, 2016, read as follows: an explicit sexual activity, a lascivious conduct, which
the minor victim, AAA, could not have done were it
Criminal Case No. 215-V-17 not for the persistent inducement of the petitioner.18
Moreover, petitioner's violation of R.A. No. 9775 is a
The undersigned Associate Prosecutor Attorney II malum prohibitum.19 As such, his claim that he was
accuses CHRISTIAN CADAJAS of "Violation of in a relationship with AAA finds no relevance.
Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610" committed as
follows: On the other hand, the RTC dismissed the charge
against petitioner for violation of Section 10(a) of
That on or about November 16, 2016 in Valenzuela R.A. No. 7610 holding that AAA is a city lass who
City and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable was no longer innocent of the ways of the world. She
Court, the above-named accused, acting with lewd herself attested that she was not affected by what
design, and abuse of minority, did, then and there, happened. As such, the RTC ruled that the protective
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously coerced. [AAA] mantle of R.A. No. 7610 is wanting.20 Thus, the RTC
(DOB: February 10, 2002) (POB: Valenzuela City), disposed the case as follows:
14 years old, a minor, to send pictures of her breasts
and vagina through Facebook Messenger, which WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing,
circumstances debased, degraded and demeaned the judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human
being, thereby endangering her youth, normal growth In Criminal Case No. 215-V-17, finding accused
and development. CHRISTIAN CADAJAS y CABIAS NOT GUILTY
and is hereby acquitted. The prosecution failed to
CONTRARY TO LAW.14 prove beyond cavil of doubt all the elements of the
offense as charged.
Criminal Case No. 216-V-17
In Criminal Case No. 216-V-17, finding accused
The undersigned Associate Prosecution Attorney II CHRISTIAN CADAJAS y CABIAS GUILTY of
accuses CHRISTIAN CADAJAS of Child violation of Sections 4(a) and 3(b) and (c)(5) of RA
Pornography Under Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No. 10175 9775 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
(Cybercrime Prevention of 2012, in Relation to of reclusion temporal and to pay a FINE of One
Sections 4(a) and 3(b) and (c)(5) of R.A. No. 9775", Million Pesos.
committed as follows:
SO ORDERED.21
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment. The 10175 in relation to Sections 4(a), 3(b) and (c)(5) of
CA held that the minority of AAA was both R.A. No. 9775 despite the failure of the prosecution to
established and was even admitted by the petitioner.22 prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, petitioner's conversation with AAA
showed that he induced her to send him photos of her Our Ruling
private parts.23 These facts clearly evince that
petitioner committed child pornography as defined Upon a careful review of the records of this case, the
and penalized under Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No. Court finds the petition to be without merit.
10175, in relation to Sections 4(a), 3(b) and (c)(5) of
R.A. No. 9775. The CA did not give credence to the On petitioner's right to privacy
sweetheart defense that was raised by petitioner as the
violation committed by petitioner was a malum One of the arguments raised by petitioner before this
prohibitum.24 As regards the penalty, the CA Court concerns the admissibility of the evidence
modified the same and sentenced petitioner to suffer presented by the prosecution, which was taken from
the penalty of imprisonment for 14 years, eight his Facebook messenger account. He claims that the
months and one day, as minimum, to 18 years and photos presented in evidence during the trial of the
three months, as maximum. The fine imposed was case were taken from his Facebook messenger
retained as it was within the range prescribed by account. According to him, this amounted to a
law.25 Thus, the CA disposed as follows: violation of his right to privacy, and therefore, any
evidence obtained in violation thereof amounts to a
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is fruit of the poisonous tree.
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Joint
Decision dated August 7, 2017 issued by the Regional We disagree.
Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch270 in Criminal
Case No. 216-V-17 finding Christian Cadajas y Cabias The right to privacy is defined as "the right to be free
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from
4(a) and 3(b) and (c)(5) of Republic Act 9775 is intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that appellant to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary
is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 14 years, 8 sensibilities." It is the right of an individual "to be free
months and 1 day, as minimum, to 18 years and 3 from unwarranted publicity, or to live without
months, as maximum. unwarranted interference by the public in matters in
which the public is not necessarily concerned."
SO ORDERED.26 Simply put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let
alone."29 In his Separate Concurring Opinion,
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen
the CA denied in its Resolution27 dated May 9, 2019. expounded on the concept of privacy, as it has
developed throughout the digital age, thus:
Undeterred, petitioner filed the instant Petition28
before this Court. Chief Justice Puno sparked judicial interest in the
right to privacy. In his speech that I cited in my
Issues separate opinion in Versoza v. People,30 he discussed
the three strands of privacy in American
I. Whether the CA gravely erred in not finding that Jurisprudence, namely, locational or situational
the evidence presented by the prosecution are privacy, informational privacy, and decisional privacy.
inadmissible for violating petitioner's right to privacy.
Locational privacy, also known as situational privacy,
II. Whether the CA gravely erred in convicting pertains to privacy that is felt in a physical space. It
petitioner of violation of Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No. may be violated through an act of trespass or through
10175 in relation to Sections 4(a), 3(b) and (c)(5) of an unlawful search. Meanwhile, informational privacy
R.A. No. 9775 despite the fact that the alleged act refers to one's right to control "the processing—i.e.,
complained of does not constitute an offense acquisition, disclosure and use—of personal
penalized under the said statute. information."

III. Whether the CA gravely erred in the interpretation Decisional privacy, regarded as the most controversial
of the unlawful and punishable acts under Section among the three, refers to one's right "to make certain
4(c)(2) of R.A. No. 10175 in relation to Sections 4(a), kinds of fundamental choices with respect to their
3(b) and (c)(5) of R.A. No. 9775. personal and reproductive autonomy."31

IV. Whether the CA gravely erred in convicting This speech has been influential in several of our
petitioner of violation of Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No. jurisprudence.32 To this day, we are still refining our
concept of privacy, particularly the right to
informational privacy.33 Parallel to the unprecedented escalation of the use of
the Internet and its various technologies is also an
As early as Morfe v. Mutuc,34 we have recognized the escalation in what has been termed as cybercrimes.36
increasing importance of the protection of the right to
privacy in the digital age. Such right is of particular Privacy scholars explain that the right to informational
importance given the nature of the internet and our privacy, to a certain extent, requires "limitation on
inescapable dependence on it despite the possible inspection, observation, and knowledge by others."37
disruption that it can bring. In my separate opinion in Thus, it has the following aspects: (1) to keep
Disini v. Secretary of Justice,35 I explained: inalienable information to themselves; (2) to prevent
first disclosure; and (3) to prevent further
The internet or cyberspace is a complex phenomenon. dissemination in case the information has already
It has pervasive effects and are, by now, ubiquitous in been disclosed. More recently, the European Union
many communities. Its possibilities for reordering has paved the way for the fourth aspect —the right to
human relationships are limited only by the state of its be forgotten, or the right to prevent the storage of
constantly evolving technologies and the designs of data.
various user interfaces. The internet contains exciting
potentials as well as pernicious dangers. As regards the first component of the right to
informational privacy, a person has the right not to be
The essential framework for governance of the parts exposed on the internet in matters involving one's
of cyberspace that have reasonable connections with private life, such as acts having no relation to public
our territory and our people should find definite interest or concern. Closely related to the first
references in our Constitution. However, effective component is the right to prevent first disclosure,
governance of cyberspace requires cooperation and allowing individuals to regulate the extent, time, and
harmonization with other approaches in other manner of disclosure, if at all, of their information. In
jurisdictions. Certainly, its scope and continuous case the data have been illegally disclosed, a person
evolution require that we calibrate our constitutional does not lose protection since they have the right to
doctrines carefully: in concrete steps and with full and prevent their further dissemination. In some cases, one
deeper understanding of incidents that involve various has the right to prevent the storage of their data, which
parts of this phenomenon. The internet is neither just gives one the right to be forgotten. Privacy scholars
one relationship nor is it a single technology. It is an describe this right as "forced omission," or the process
interrelationship of many technologies and cultures. of making the information difficult to find on the
internet.38
While the Internet has engendered innovation and
growth, it has also engendered new types of Under the 1987 Constitution, the right to privacy is
disruption. A noted expert employs an "evolutionary expressly recognized under Article III, Sec. 3 thereof,
metaphor" as he asserts: which reads:

[Generative technologies] encourage mutations, SECTION 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
branchings away from the status quo — some that are correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
curious dead ends, others that spread like wildfire. order of the court, or when public safety or order
They invite disruption —along with the good things requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
and bad things that can come with such disruption.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
Addressing the implications of disruption, he adds: preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Disruption benefits some while others lose, and the
power of the generative Internet, available to anyone While the above provision highlights the importance
with a modicum of knowledge and a broadband of the right to privacy and its consequent effect on the
connection, can be turned to network-destroying ends rules on admissibility of evidence, one must not lose
... [T]he Internet's very generativity — combined with sight of the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended to
that of the PCs attached —sows the seeds for a protect private individuals against government
"digital Pearl Harbor." intrusions. Hence, its provisions are not applicable
between and amongst private individuals. As
The Internet is an infrastructure that allows for a explained in People v. Marti:39
"network of networks." It is also a means for several
purposes. As with all other "means enhancing That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is
capabilities of human interaction," it can be used to not meant to be invoked against acts of private
facilitate benefits as well as nefarious ends. The individuals finds support in the deliberations of the
Internet can be a means for criminal activity. Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties
guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must Here, the pieces of evidence presented by the
always be subject to protection. But protection against prosecution were properly authenticated when AAA
whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship identified them in open court. As further pointed out
speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda during the
he himself posed, as follows: deliberations of this case, the DPA allows the
processing of data and sensitive personal information
First, the general reflections. The protection of where it relates to the determination of criminal
fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional liability of a data subject,43 such as a violation of
democracy. Protection against whom? Protection R.A. No. 10175 in relation to R.A. No. 9775 and
against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the when necessary for the protection of lawful rights and
relationship between the individual and the state. Its interests of persons in court proceedings,44 as in this
concern is not the relation between individuals, case where the communications and photos sought to
between a private individual and other individuals. be excluded were submitted in evidence to establish
What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some AAA's legal claims before the prosecutor's office and
forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to the courts.
any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of
Commissioner Bernas, Record of the Constitutional Be that as it may, the act of AAA cannot be said to
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis have violated petitioner's right to privacy. The test in
supplied)40 ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to
privacy has been explained in the case of Spouses
While the case of Zulueta v. Court of Appeals41 Hing v. Choachuy, Sr.45 as follows:
(Zulueta) may appear to carve out an exception to the
abovementioned rule by recognizing the rule on In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right
inadmissibility of evidence between spouses when one to privacy, courts use the "reasonable expectation of
obtains evidence in violation of his/her spouse's right privacy" test. This test determines whether a person
to privacy, such a pronouncement is a mere obiter has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether
dictum that cannot be considered as a binding the expectation has been violated. In Ople v. Torres,
precedent. This is because the petition brought to the we enunciated that "the reasonableness of a person's
Court in Zulueta simply asked for the return of the expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1)
documents seized by the wife and thus, pertained to whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited
the ownership of the documents therein. Moreover, an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is
documents were declared inadmissible because of the one that society recognizes as reasonable." Customs,
injunction order issued by the trial court and not on community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit
account of Art. III, Sec. 3 of the Constitution. At any or extend an individual's "reasonable expectation of
rate, violation of the right to privacy between privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a person's
individuals is properly governed by the provisions of expectation of privacy must be determined on a
the Civil Code, the Data Privacy Act (DPA),42 and case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual
other pertinent laws, while its admissibility shall be circumstances surrounding the case.46
governed by the rules on relevance, materiality,
authentication of documents, and the exclusionary Here, petitioner's expectation of privacy emanates
rules under the Rules on Evidence. from the fact that his Facebook Messenger account is
password protected, such that no one can access the
In this case, the photographs and conversations in the same except himself. Petitioner never asserted that his
Facebook Messenger account that were obtained and Facebook Messenger account was hacked or the
used as evidence against petitioner, which he photos were taken from his account through
considers as fruit of the poisonous tree, were not unauthorized means. Rather, the photos were obtained
obtained through the efforts of the police officers or from his account because AAA, to whom he gave his
any agent of the State. Rather, these were obtained by password, had access to it. Considering that he
a private individual. Indeed, the rule governing the voluntarily gave his password to AAA, he, in effect,
admissibility of an evidence under Article III of the has authorized AAA to access the same. He did not
Constitution must affect only those pieces of evidence even take steps to exclude AAA from gaining access
obtained by the State through its agents. It is these to his account. Having been given authority to access
individuals who can flex government muscles and use his Facebook Messenger account, petitioner's
government resources for a possible abuse. However, reasonable expectation of privacy, in so far as AAA is
where private individuals are involved, for which their concerned, had been limited. Thus, there is no
relationship is governed by the New Civil Code, the violation of privacy to speak of.
admissibility of an evidence cannot be determined by
the provisions of the Bill of Rights. While the messages and photos were taken from the
Facebook Messenger of petitioner because AAA was
forced by BBB to do so, such does not deviate from
the fact that petitioner allowed another person to (2) Child Pornography. — The unlawful or prohibited
access his account. When he gave his Facebook acts defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775
Messenger password to AAA, he made its contents or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009,
available to AAA, and the latter would then have the committed through a computer system: Provided, That
latitude to show to other persons what she could the penalty to be imposed shall be (1) one degree
access, whether she be forced to do so or not. The higher than that provided for in Republic Act No.
availability of accessing these photos limited the 9775.
scope of his right to privacy, especially that these xxxx
became essential in pursuing AAA's claims to protect Section 4. Unlawful or Prohibited Acts. - It shall be
her rights. unlawful for any person:

In any case, it bears pointing out that petitioner failed (a) To hire, employ, use, persuade, induce or coerce a
to raise his objection to the admissibility of the photos child to perform in the creation or production of any
during the proceedings in the RTC. Basic is the rule form of child pornography
that in order to exclude evidence, the objection to
admissibility of evidence must be made at the proper Section 3. Definition of Terms. - x x x
time, and the grounds therefore be specified.
Objection to evidence must be made at the time it is (b) "Child pornography" refers to any representation,
formally offered. In case of documentary evidence, whether visual, audio, or written combination thereof,
offer is made after all the witnesses of the party by electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or
making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose any other means, of child engaged or involved in real
for which the evidence is being offered. It is only at or simulated explicit sexual activities.
this time, and not at any other, that objection to the
documentary evidence may be made. When a party (c) "Explicit Sexual Activity" includes actual or
failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at simulated - x x x
the time they were offered in evidence, such objection
shall be considered as waived. This is true even if by (5) lascivious exhibition of the genitals, buttocks,
its nature the evidence is inadmissible and would have breasts, pubic area and/or anus.51
surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the xxxx
proper time.47 From the foregoing, one can be convicted for
committing child pornography upon proof of the
As a complimentary principle, it is well-settled that no following: (1) victim is a child; (2) victim was
question will be entertained on appeal unless it has induced or coerced to perform in the creation or
been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, production of any form of child pornography; and (3)
theories, issues and arguments not brought to the child pornography was performed through visual,
attention of the lower court, administrative agency or audio or written combination thereof by electronic,
quasi-judicial body, need not be considered by a mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other
reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first means. This Court finds that the prosecution was able
time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness to prove these facts by proof beyond reasonable
and due process impel this rule. Any issue raised for doubt.
the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel.48
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 9775 defines a child to be as
By failing to timely raise his objection to the follows:
admissibility of the photos, petitioner is deemed to
have already waived the same. Thus, the photos taken (a) "Child" refers to a person below eighteen (18)
from his Facebook Messenger account are admissible years of age or over, but is unable to fully take care of
in evidence. himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or
On petitioner's liability mental disability or condition.

Petitioner was charged for violating Section 4(c)(2) of For the purpose of this Act, a child shall also refer to:
R.A. No. 1017549 in relation to Sections 4(a) and 3(b)
and (c)(5) of R.A. No. 9775,50 which reads as (1) a person regardless of age who is presented,
follows: depicted or portrayed as a child as defined herein; and
xxxx
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following (2) computer-generated, digitally or manually crafted
acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable images or graphics of a person who is represented or
under this Act: x x x who is made to appear to be a child as defined herein.

(c) Content-related Offenses: x x x

The members of the Technical Working Group for the K: Nakahubad na hahaha
Pre-Bicameral Conference Committee on the
Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 6440 and C: Tangalin (sic) uh (sic) panti (sic) muh (sic) haha
Senate Bill No. 2317 (Anti-Child Pornography Act of
2009) explained the intent in defining "child" under K: Baliw hubad na lahat
the statute as follows:
C: Picturan uh (sic) pasa muh (sic) xkin (sic) bi
MS. GIRONELLA. Sir, in addition to that, I would
just like to quote what Senator Defensor-Santiago said K: Lah gagi bi wag
on the floor because she fully agreed with the
expanded definition as seen in the House version, Ayoko
numbers (1) and (2). She said that she fully agrees to
the extended definition of the term "child" so that C: Uh ayaw muh (sic) pala sa mga treep (sic) KO (sic)
adult website that display explicit images of ei (sic)
legal-aged models in pigtails with the balloon or xxx
lollipop while surrounded by stuff animals could be C: Tayo lang naman makakakita ie (sic)
prosecuted under the measure. While the law seeks to
protect children, the extended definition punishes the K: Hahahaha baka pagkalat mo
depravity of the viewer. So, what we are after here
talaga is the perpetrator. We don't care what age the Dede lang
child or the person is. What we're trying to penalize,
what we're trying to prohibit is the pedophile from C: Ako din bi PSA (sic) mna (sic)
gravitating towards that kind of material.
HahAt (sic) bi
Yes, Mr. Del Prado.
K: Magpasa ka din hahaha
MR. DEL PRADO. We support that view. That's why
it is specific here a person regardless of age. It is the Lah (sic) bat lahat
representation that is deemed reprehensible and I xxx
think the public policy expression here is really to C: Hahaha hnde (sic) aman (sic) bi
prohibit promoting the child as a sexual object and,
therefore, it covers both the adult and children being Lahat bi gusto ko
subject of sexually explicit activity.52
Uo nga nkKaumay (sic) bi nslibugan (sic) ako
Here, it was uncontroverted that AAA was only 14
years old at the time of the incident. This was K: Gagi ayoko nga yung pepe
established from the copy of her Certificate of Live xxx
Birth53 that was presented in evidence. Moreover, C: Buka muh (sic) nga kunti (sic) bi kunti (sic) lang
petitioner was aware of this fact. It was undisputed tutok muh (sic)
that BBB confronted petitioner and told him to stay
away because her daughter was still a minor. Hah (sic)

It is likewise clear from the records of this case that K: Ayoko na.
petitioner induced AAA to send him photos of her
private parts through Facebook Messenger. This is Haha Christian haha OK nay an
evident from their conversation, which the CA quoted
as follows: C: She (sic) nah (sic) gsto (sic) KO (sic) mkita (sic)
bi54
AAA (K): Hahaha gusto ko siya pagtripan e di mo xxx
kasi ako pinagtritripan (sic) e. It is evident from the above-quoted conversation that
petitioner induced AAA to engage in the lascivious
Cadajas (C): Gsto (sic) muh (sic) pagtrepan (sic) kita exhibition of her breasts and vagina through Facebook
ngayon Messenger. Notably, it was petitioner who was the one
giving specific orders to AAA. He even asked AAA to
K: Oo send to him nude photos of her and for the latter to
further spread her legs near the camera, so that
Ready ako sa ganyan petitioner can see her vagina. In her testimony, AAA
further explained that it was because of the continuous
C: Sge (sic) hubad prodding of petitioner, that forced her to send her nude
photos to the latter, thus:
 probable that AAA was merely bluffing to maintain
Q: What about those pictures? Can you tell us about petitioner's interest. In her testimony, AAA explained
those pictures that you are referring to? that she was not even serious when she sent some of
her messages, thus:
A: Because he instructed me to send a picture to him
of my breast and vagina, so I send him pictures, Sir. Q: In fact, there is in this statement that you even type
these words kuya nalilibugan ako hahaha is it true
Q: Okay, you send pictures of your breast and you that? Did you type this?
[sic] vagina. What did you use in order to send him
those pictures? A: Yes Sir, I typed that but that is not true, it is just a
trip lang sa kanya.
A: Cell phone, Sir.
Q: In that trip, in line with it is a four (4) smiley
Q: How did the accused convince you to do that? crying while laughing, smiley with tears meaning you
are laughing?
A: He said magsend daw po ako ng picture.
Court:
Q: Was there a promise?
You are just joking ganun ba?
A: None, Sir.
Witness:
Q: Just the accused merely telling you or commanding
you to produce or take pictures of your private parts? Yes, your Honor.56

A: Yes, Sir. Likewise, when AAA said "Nakahubad na," the same
cannot be said to be voluntary on her part as it was
Q: Why did you allow yourself to do that? preceded by an order from petitioner to take her
clothes off. Thus, it was clear from the wordings of
A: Napilitan lang po akong magsend ng ganun. the messages that petitioner induced AAA to send him
xx x xx x xxx photos of her private parts. Without petitioner's
Q: Paanong napilitan kung hindi ka pinuwersa or inducement, she would not have been compelled to
hindi ka tinakot? Paano mo nasabing napilitan lang? actually undress and send petitioner, photos of her
Alam mong mali iyon at hindi naman pinapayagan na private parts.
ganun, bakit mo sinend parin kung hindi ka naman
niya pinilit o tinakot? Ano talaga ang nagtulak sayong Thus, contrary to petitioner's contention, his act of
magsend ng ganun? Ano ba ang pumasok sa isip mo, inducing AAA to send photos of her breasts and
pumasok sa katawan mo nung ginawa mo iyon? Just vagina constitutes child pornography and explicit
be candid. sexual activity under Sections 4(a), 3(b) and (c)(5) of
R.A. No. 9775. While there was no showing that
A: Hindi ko po alam. petitioner intended to sell AAA's photos to other
people, this did not exonerate him from liability under
Q: Hindi mo alam kasi? the said provision. During the Pre-Bicameral
Conference Committee meeting that led to the
A: Naaano lang po ako sa sinabi niya, sa message po enactment of R.A. No. 9775 the members of the
niya sakin na puro please magsend kana sige na puro Technical Working Group made a distinction between
ganun po. the act of merely possessing child pornography
materials from the act of making a profit out of it, to
Q: Sa pagkukumbinsi niya? Panay ang please? wit:

A: Hindi po niya ako tinigilan nun e. MR. DESCALLAR. Madam Chair, I think x x x kasi
doon sa House version amy (sic) distinction between
Q: Hindi siya tumitigil? producer, distributor x x x

A: Hindi po.55 (MS. THELMA M. RETUBA TOOK OVER)

Further, while the conversation in the Facebook MR. DESCALLAR. (Continuing) x x x distributor
Messenger appears to show that AAA was already and user, client. So, pag ni-level natin siya on the
undressed while she was conversing with petitioner, it same level, the producer, distributor can say "I'm just
should be pointed out that they were merely a client. I just possess with no intention to sell." So, I
exchanging messages on a mobile application. It is think, we should differentiate mere possession and
with the other x x x with the intention to distribute or Senate version with the following amendments: "To
benefit, profit from pornography. possess or knowingly access, download, purchase x x
x or purchase with reasonable knowledge, any form of
COMMITTEE SECRETARY MANALIGOD. Madam child pornography with or without the intent to
Chair, may I just explain because this was a specific publish, sell, distribute and broadcast;"
amendment of Senator Santiago. In the deliberations
on the floor she stated that on Section 4(d), Senator MR. DESCALLAR. I think we delete "or without".
Santiago noted that the possession of child So, it will be "with the intent to publish" and you
pornography was not qualified by the adverb provide another provision for possession as, like for
"knowingly". She explained that knowledge of child example in letter (f) of the House version which is
pornography does not attach to possession but only to mere possession. Letter (d) of the House is for
access. Therefore, she believed that mere possession possession, downloading, or distribution." So,
of child pornography is punishable and not subject to separate x x x ano siya, separate siya, 'yung intent to
the defense that the possessor was not aware of the publish or to distribute.
materials in his or her possession.
MS. GIRONELLA. Sir, can you please word the
MR. DESCALLAR. Papaano 'yun? Saan? provision you're proposing.

MR. GIRONELLA. Earlier Madam Chair, I think COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA. Okay.
there was a proposal to include the word "knowingly" May we recognize Atty. Del Prado first.
before the word "possess". So, it would be "to
knowingly possess" or "knowingly access". Chair MR. DEL PRADO. Na-discuss din po naming ito
Madrigal supports the position of Senator doon sa x x x first, we support x x x including the
Defensor-Santiago that knowing possession of a word "knowingly" before "possess". Iyong
pornographic material cannot be made a defense by discussions po ditto, halimbawa po may nagpadala sa
the perpetrator. So, for us, the fact that he or she inyo ng e-mail with an attachment of child
possesses a child pornography material is subject to pornography na kung hindi natsi-check ng e­mail, it's
the penalties of this law. been there for several months, hindi pa rin po 'yun
dapat "knowing possession". So, pero kapag binuksan
And on the second point, on the point raised by Mr. mo 'yan na x x x na-access mon a, alam mo na and
Descallar, I think we also should separate a provision then you keep it, so 'yun po 'yung sinasabi na
from the possessor's point of view as opposed to that "knowing possession".
producer's point of view. So, we cannot include
reproduce. And then doon naman po sa point of "with intent to
sell, distribute," ang concern po ng law enforcement
MR. DESCALLAR. With or without the intent to agents you are x x x we are adding another x x x the
publish. burden again of proving this intent kasi 'yung sinasabi
nila we can x x x some jurisdictions, some countries
MS. GIRONELLA. For the possessor. do provide for the x x x parang sa drugs po iyong how
many kilobytes. Pero sinasabi rin po naming, mahirap
MR. DESCALLAR. Yes. Oo. Kasi in the House din pong mag term kasi po pagka ano 'yung personal
version, letter (f)... and ano 'yung with intent to distribute. So, we really x
x x it's either you possess and we punish that or you
MR. MARALIT. Ihiwalay na lang natin. distribute and we punish that. Kasi kung hindi naman
natin ma-prove 'yung kanyang distribution, then
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA. Letter mayroon pa tayong fallback doon sa possession. So,
(f). ganoon na lang x x x 'yun po ang irerekomenda natin
para hindi po additional burden 'yung to establish the
MR. DESCALAR. x x x In the house version, "to intent.
knowingly possess, download, purchase, blah blah x x
x "so, it's mere possession, separate x x x distinct from COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA. I think
producing, distributing, selling or profiting from child the reason why separate the two (2) to distinguish
pornography. possession with the intent to sell and mere possession
for personal use, mas grave ang penalty, 'no. Mas
MS. GIRONELLA. So, Sir, I think, what we can do... mabigat ang penalty for x x x pag may intent pa to
sell. Pero kung hindi natin ma­prove 'yung intent to
MR. MARALIT. Yeah, mere possession. sell, pasok pa rin siya sa possession.

MS. GIRONELLA. x x x it would be x x x so, let's Now, we can just x x x alisin na lang natin 'yung
adopt x x x the proposal is to adopt section (d) of the "personal use", 'no, pero we retain the "intent to sell,
'no. Kasi if you prove "intent to sell," mas mabigat mere possession. So, we don't need to prove that the
ang penalty. person who knowingly possess pornographic material
x x x a child pornographic material. And then
MR. MARALIT. Tama. secondly, I think we did away with the intention to sell
because that would be a very hard fact to prove that
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA. If you the person had intent to sell it, unless nagkaroon ng
fail to prove "intent to sell," mas lighter kasi hindi mo outright act of selling it.
naman dini-distribute, eh.
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA. No, not
MR. DEL PRADO. I agree po doon sa graduation ng really. Because if you, by circumstantial evidence, if
penalties. Ang sinasabi lang po natin if we include you reproduce so many copies and you reproduce or
that phrase "with intent to sell" kailangan po nating send or distribute to so many e-mails, 'no, e­ mail
i-prove 'yun. Whereas, kung nag-sell talaga siya, it's addresses, the intent is there already. It's already the
an objective culpable act that we can punish. act of distributing.

MS. GIRONELLA. Madam Chair, point of MR. MARALIT. What our colleague here is saying
clarification. What are we talking about? Are we that in case there are many copies x x x
talking about section "b" of the Senate version, section
(b) of the House version, section (f) of the House (MS. AGNES LUCIA V. TIBAY TOOK OVER)
version? Parang naghalu-halo na, eh, kasi earlier we're
talking about possession, 'di ba, tapos we went to MR. MARALIT (Continuing) x x x are many copies
production and then distribution. made, then it could give rise to a presumption, maybe
a prima facie presumption that he has intent to sell,
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA. Oo. distribute. Yeah, we will have to put the presumption
there because iyon nga, iyong intent medyo mahirap
MS. GIRONELLA. So, baka better nga talaga i-prove, although it could be x x x although the
paghiwalayin natin 'yung "act of possession" which is possession of so many could give rise to a prima facie
punishable and then "act of production, distribution presumption of intent to sell. In which case, if not
with the intent to sell" as a separate ano rin, 'di ba? controverted, then the intent to sell will be
conclusively presumed, parang ganoon, siguro if you
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA. But we were to put that there.
already provide "to sell, offer, advertise" and "to
produce, direct," 'di ba? We already provide for the COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA. Kasi para
unlawful acts, eh. It's different, eh. You produce, sa akin, pagka may intent ka to distribute, to sell it,
direct or to sell, it's different. Here, you possess, economic na ang reason mo, tapos at the expense of
meaning, you are not the original owner. other people, mas dapat mas malaki ang penalty niya.

MS. GIRONELLA. So, 'yung section (b) ng House MR. MARALIT. I agree.
version we're no longer considering it kasi I think
that's the only provision with the phrase "with the COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA. Bahala
intent of selling or distributing.” na kasi, anyway naman kung hindi naman ma-prove
iyong intent, punishable pa rin, hindi ba? Punishable
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA. That's pa rin siya.
why we are saying na x x x because you do not have
provision on "knowingly possess" for personal use. MR. MARALIT. Yes, yes, mere possession. So the
Here in our version, we have. So, diniferentiate suggestion is siguro to differentiate the two. I think a
naming 'yung "with intent to sell" and "without intent clear differentiation of the two as well as iyong sa
to sell." So, 'yun siguro doon tayo nagkaiba. access, huwag natin isama ito, in my view, kasi
mag-iiba ang x x x
In the Senate version, "possession, 'no, whatever x x x
with or without intent to publish it" magkasama na COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA. Kasi
lang together. In the House version, magkaiba because parang unfair doon sa mere possession, wala siyang
the intention is to penalize, to provide for stiffer intent to sell. Kasi unfair iyong penalty kung pareho.
penalties for those who possess with the intent to If we lump it together in one provision, it will be
distribute it as against those who possess without unfair.
intent x x x and to reproduce this but for his personal
use. MR. MARALIT. I agree.

MS. GIRONELLA. In the Senate version po kasi,

Madam Chair, for clarification, we intend to punish
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA. Because said to have limited its application only to those who
the other one has earned a lot or tiyak na mayroon are engaged in the business of child pornography.
siyang network para pagbigyan at kikita siya.
It also bears emphasis that petitioner obtained the
MR. MARALIT. Yeah like Hayden Kho child pornographic materials by inducing AAA to
send him photos of the latter's private parts. He did
MR. DESCALLAR. I suggest that we adopt the not come into possession of these photos because it
House version na letter (d) and letter (f) with was sent by another person. Rather, he came into
amendments, deleting the term "for personal use" in possession of AAA's photos because of inducing
letter (f) so parang we distinguish distribution and AAA to exhibit her private parts to him. As the
with the intent to sell and for mere possession, inducement to send photos of AAA's private parts was
deleting "for personal use", so mere possession is committed with the use of a mobile phone through
punishable. Facebook Messenger, petitioner's act also falls within
the purview of Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No. 10175,
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA. And in which penalizes child pornography through the use of
the case of letter (d) of the House version, knowledge a computer system. A mobile phone is considered as a
of possession is not a requirement, basta ma-prove mo computer system under Section 3(g)60 of R.A. No.
iyong intent to possess, download, with the intent. So 10175.
there are two elements here - to possess or download
or purchase or reproduce and then with intent. Kasi On another matter, petitioner's heavy reliance on the
pagka wala siyang x x x so knowledge is immaterial sweetheart theory is misplaced. Invoking this defense
ditto. Hindi kailangan ng knowledge kasi kapag would depend on the circumstances of each case.
mapu-prove mo iyong intent. Ngayon kung hindi mo Jurisprudence explained that the said theory applies in
ma-prove iyong intent, pasok naman siya sa "to felonies that were committed against or without the
knowingly possess". consent of the victim. This theory operates on the
premise that the violation committed was consensual.
MR. MARALIT. Iyong suggestion ng colleague Hence, the party invoking this theory bears the burden
naming is, sabi niya, no proof of intent is necessary if of proving that said party and the victim were lovers
we will provide here that there would rise a and that the latter consented to the commission of the
presumption of intent to sell, distribute, in case there act.61
are a number of copies, puwede natin i-craft na lang
siguro maya-maya. Ngayon na. we will x x x In the recent case of Bangayan v. People,62 the
sweetheart theory was given serious consideration
MR. DESCALLAR. I move to adopt the House because the accused and the alleged victim were able
version, letter (d) and letter (f) with some amendments to show that the alleged rape incident that happened
removing or deleting the term "for personal use" in between them was consensual, and a product of love.
letter (f). As noted by the court in that case, the accused and the
alleged victim had two children and had lived together
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA. Of even after the filing of the rape charges.
course, with modifications siguro.
As compared with the instant case, there was
MR. MARALIT. Yeah, we will craft the provisions. insufficiency of evidence to prove the application of
Can we suspend the session.57 the sweetheart theory. Lovers, when they are
passionate with their feelings, engage in physical
It can be gleaned from the lengthy discussion of the contact, as manifestations of their love towards one
members of the Technical Working Group that the another. As they express their feelings towards one
authors of this statute intended to penalize even the another, they express themselves and not just lust over
mere possession, for personal use or enjoyment, of the photos of private parts of their partners. While
child pornography. The law, as enacted, considers there may be instances of expressions of love in a
possession with intent to sell, distribute, or publish58 virtual space, the same would usually be predicated by
to be distinct and separate from mere possession.59 If endearing words and not just advances of lust, as in
proven, a stiffer penalty would be imposed on those this case.
who were found to have intended to distribute or
profit from child pornography. Thus, the foregoing Here, AAA was led to believe that she was in a
shows the intention of the legislature to include as relationship with petitioner. It was undisputed that it
much violation for acts committed that would further was AAA who relentlessly pursued the petitioner.
spread the proliferation of pornography in the country, Still, it can be gleaned from the facts that petitioner,
including possession thereof. Necessarily, as those who must be basking in her attention, took advantage
who merely possess child pornographic materials are of her innocence and vulnerability. The fact that AAA
also punished by law, then R.A. No. 9775 could not be had three previous boyfriends should not even be
taken against her for it is the rule under Section reaches the age of 12 years old. From this age, the law
54(a)(1), Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court that may admit voluntariness on the part of the child.
"the character of the offended party may be proved if
it tends to establish in any degree the probability or Nevertheless, voluntariness or informed sexual
improbability of the offense charged." It has been held consent of a child must be determined cautiously.
in rape case, that this argument may be raised only to Cases involving younger victims must be resolved
show that there was consent in a rape case. This does through more stringent criteria. Several factors, such
not apply when the woman's consent is immaterial as the age of the child, [their] psychological state,
such as in statutory rape or rape with violence or intellectual capability, relationship with the accused,
intimidation.63 It must be added that consent would their age difference, and other signs of coercion or
also be immaterial if the victim was persuaded, manipulation must be taken into account in order to
coerced or induced to do a particular act, as in this protect the child.
case. In his Separate Concurring Opinion, Justice xxxx
Leonen made reference to his Dissenting Opinion in It is for the same reason that we cannot allow the
Bangayan v. People,64 ultimately concluding that the sweetheart defense in child pornography. The
sweetheart defense should not be allowed in cases sweetheart defense is a common, distasteful, and
involving child pornography, thus: much abused in acts of lasciviousness and rape,
xxxx aiming to establish that fact that the sexual act was
[S]exual intercourse is a complex act which is not consensual. Under the pretense of a romantic
only physical or sensual. Beyond that, it comes with relationship, it is not unimaginable that a child will be
the complexity of intimacy, relationship, and easily induced or coerced to engage in explicit sexual
reproductive consequences. acts. Engaging in such a relationship does not remove
the special protection of a child. This is especially true
Sexual intimacy may be primarily done for in the digital age and space, where a child's interaction
procreation or solely for pleasure. How sexuality and with others easily evades supervision. Had AAA not
intimacy is expressed, what constitutes sex, and with been careless in logging out from her mother's device,
whom to be intimate with is a person's choice. the latter would not have found out about their
relationship.65
Therefore, consent to sex does not only cover the
physical act. Sex does not only involve the body, but it It should be pointed out that AAA was only 14 years
necessarily involves the mind as well. It embraces the old at the time of the incident while petitioner was 24
moral and psychological dispositions of the persons years old. Such huge age disparity placed petitioner in
engaged in the act, along with the socio-cultural a stronger position over AAA, which enabled him to
expectation and baggage that comes with the act. For wield his will on the latter.66 Judicial notice must also
instance, there are observed differences in sexual be taken of the fact that minors, especially those who
expectations and behaviors among different genders, are between the ages of 12 and 18 years, are curious
and more so, among individuals. The wide range of about their sexuality. They are that stage in their lives
sexual desire and behavior are not only shaped by when they are dealing with their raging hormones.
biology, but by culture and prevailing norms as well. Nonetheless, this should not be taken to mean that
Full and genuine consent to sex, therefore, is they are now capable of giving rational consent to
"preceded by a number of conditions which must exist engage in any sexual activity. In a society where birth
in order for act of consent to be performed." control and sex education are taboo subjects, these
sexually curious teenagers are left to their own
Part and parcel of a valid consent is the ability to have devices. Unfortunately, the only source of information
the intellectual resources and capacity to make a available to them are those from the internet or from
choice that reflects [their] judgments and values. For their friends, who are also not knowledgeable on the
someone to give sexual consent, [they] must have subject. For this reason, minors have been
reached a certain level of maturity. acknowledged to be vulnerable to the cajolery and
deception of adults, such as in this case.67
This observation becomes more apparent in
determining the validity of sexual consent given by Unless and until these minors are given proper
adults compared to children. Sexual consent is not a guidance and/or taught about sex and its
switch, but a spectrum. As a child grows into consequences, and until it be shown that their actions
adolescence, and later to adulthood, the measure of arise from their feelings of love towards their partner,
sexual consent shifts from capacity to voluntariness. they cannot be considered to be truly capable of
Under the law, sexual consent from a child is giving an educated and rational consent to engage in
immaterial, because [they are] deemed incapable of any form of sexual activity. Thus, to minimize the risk
giving an intelligent consent. However, this of harm to minors from the detrimental consequences
presumption is relaxed as the child matures. In our of their attempts at adult sexual behavior, the State, as
jurisdiction, the gradual scale begins when the child parens patriae, is under the obligation to intervene and
protect them from sexual predators like petitioner in distinction is important with reference to the intent
this case.68 This must be so if We are to be true to the with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the
constitutionally enshrined State policy to promote the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs;
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the
well-being of the youth.69 This is also in harmony law been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of
with the declared policy of the State in R.A. No. 9775, the offender is immaterial. When the doing of an act is
which provides: prohibited by law, it is considered injurious to public
welfare, and the doing of the prohibited act is the
x x x The State recognizes the vital role of the youth crime itself.
in nation building and shall promote and protect their
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, emotional, A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes
psychological and social well-being. Towards this are found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC), while all
end, the State shall: mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal
laws. In reality, however, there may be mala in se
(a) Guarantee the fundamental rights of every child crimes under special laws, such as plunder under R.A.
from all forms of neglect, cruelty and other conditions No. 7080, as amended.
prejudicial to his/her development;
Similarly, there may be mala prohibita crimes defined
(b) Protect every child from all forms of exploitation in the RPC, such as technical malversation.
and abuse including, but not limited to:
The better approach to distinguish between mala in se
(1) the use of a child in pornographic performances and mala prohibita crimes is the determination of the
and materials; and inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If
the punishable act or omission is immoral in itself,
(2) the inducement or coercion of a child to engage or then it is a crime mala in se; on the contrary, if it is not
be involved in pornography through whatever means; immoral in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its
x x x70 commission by reasons of public policy, then it is
mala prohibita. In the final analysis, whether or not a
Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a
Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
signatory is similarly emphatic that in all actions circumstances surrounding the violation of the
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or statute.72
private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, it is In the ratification speech on Anti-Child Pornography
the best interests of the child that shall be the primary Act of 2009, the principal author explained the need
consideration. for the promulgation of this law, to wit:

Article 1 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise This Bill is much awaited by all the sectors involved
known as, "The Child And Youth Welfare Code" is in the protection and promotion of the rights of
likewise clear and unequivocal that every effort children not only in the Philippines but also in the
should be exerted by the State to promote the welfare international community, and, I believe, by the
of children and enhance their opportunities for a children themselves whose voices resonate in the
useful and happy life. silence of their hearts and in the equanimity of their
spirits. Knowing how this bill could be of great
This Court, however, concurs with petitioner's consequence to the building of their self-worth and the
argument, and as pointed out by Associate Justice realization of their hope for a bright future, this
Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa in his Dissenting representation takes pride in sponsoring this noble
Opinion,71 that a violation of Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. piece of legislation in support of their call to stop the
No. 10175, in relation to Sections 4(a), 3(b) and (c)(5) menace of child pornography. Evidently, child
of R.A. No. 9775 falls under the class of offenses pornography is such a disgusting crime which
known as mala in se, where criminal intent must be operates with surprising efficiency, swiftness and
proven by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The dispatch as it rides along with technologically
difference between the concept of mala in se and advanced communication highways such as the
malum prohibitum were succinctly explained as internet.
follows:
What appalls us more is the fact that such meaningless
Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong violence against the honor and dignity of our children
in themselves called acts mala in se; and acts which knows no boundaries: political or geographical. Child
would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law pornography transcends national and international
forbids them, called acts mala prohibita. This boundaries even without actual physical movement of
children from one place of victimization to
[Link], while it could be done in the secrecy of COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA. Okay.
her room and abode, its evil resounds in every corner Although we also, we already passed several
of society.73 legislations defining crimes, new crimes, 'yung mga
bago pa na hlndi pa talaga legislated, walang specific
Even during the pre-bicameral conference committee law na x x x (interrupted)
hearing, the Technical Working Group had a lengthy
discussion on the title of the statute to emphasize the MR. MARALIT. Let's just have a compromise. Why
depravity of the acts being penalized, to wit: don't we say, "prohibiting and defining?" that would
be fine with us, if it's okay with you, "defining and
So, let's start with the title of the bill. So, we just put prohibiting and imposing penalties thereof."
in the remarks column that the Senate version was
adopted as the working draft. So, that's the first x x x COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA. We use
that's the first remarks, first remark. So, okay, let us go imposing or prescribing? We prescribe the penalties
to the title of the bill. So, which of the provision x x x for the crime.
which of the title would you think will aptly or will
cover, will cover the purpose, the intent of the bill? MR. MARALIT. "Prescribe." "Prescribe" is better.
So, I suggest that we adopt the House version because
there's still no crime defining child pornography and if COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA. So, for
we are not just prohibiting. When you say crime, it's record purposes, the title of the reconciled bill shall
really punishable. Unlike when you just prohibit, a be, "An Act Defining and Prohibiting the Crime" x x x
prohibition may only take x x x the penalty may not "Defining and Prohibiting Child Pornography,
be penalty at all but just a warning or form of fines. Prescribing Penalties Therefor and For Other
But when it says crime, it attaches criminal liability. It Purposes."
attaches punishment, fines and even other liabilities.
MR. MARALIT. Can we make "penalizing" rather
MS. GIRONELLA. Conferring with Atty. Maralit, than "prohibiting"?
'no, most of our special laws penalizing or defining a
crime is usually called penalizing or punishing the COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA. Okay,
specific act. You only use the term "defining" when it yeah. That's x x x I was about to suggest because
refers to specific rights that you're granting an penalizing is more ano x x x
individual. For example, Presidential Decree No. 133,
which is x x x I'm sorry, Presidential Decree 704 MR. MARALIT. Yes, more forceful.
which is a decree punishing illegal fishing. So, that's
the usual term that they used. That's why we adopted COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA. x x x
the word "prohibiting child pornography and imposing more forceful than in prohibiting.
penalties, thereof."
MR. MARALIT. Yeah. Thank you.
COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA. Although
kasi sa legislative... this is a legislative enactment COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA. Okay,
unlike those mentioned by our counterpart that those So, that the title of the reconciled bill shall be "An Act
provisions x x x those are executive issuances, Defining and Penalizing Child Pornography x x x
promulgations.
MR. MARALIT. The crime, the crime.
MR. MARALIT. Yes, but we have also examples of
statutes titled this way. "An Act Prohibiting the COMMITTEE SECRETARY GUEVARRA. x x x the
Demand of Deposits or Advanced Payments For the Crime of Child Pornography, Prescribing Penalties
Confinement or For Treatment of Patients in Hospitals Therefor and For Other Purposes. I repeat, "An Act
and Medical Clinics in Certain Cases." That is BP Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Child
Bilang 702 which is a statute. Usually, the word Pornography, Prescribing Penalties therefor and For
"defining" is used in defining rights like this statute, Other Purposes."
Republic Act No. 7438, "An Act Defining Certain
Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or Under MR. MARALIT. Okay.74
Custodial Investigation." So in our view, it's either
prohibiting or punishing, or penalizing, to make a From the foregoing, it is decisively clear that the
strong message to the violators, would be violators of crime of child pornography as defined and penalized
this law that Congress is serious with these violations under R.A. No. 9775 should be classified as a crime
of law. mala in se. As parens patriae, this act of grooming
minors for sexual abuse should not be tolerated. We
That is our positions. should not be complicit in reinforcing this belief upon
the minors that sex with children is acceptable and
thereby fuel a pedophile's fantasies prior to One degree higher than the penalty of reclusion
committing sexual abuse, which clearly happened in temporal is the indivisible penalty of reclusion
the instant case. Contrary to the appreciation of perpetua. Accordingly, the penalty imposed by the CA
evidence of the other members of this Court, the should be modified to reclusion perpetua as it is in
circumstances of this case showed the intent of accordance with the provisions and intent of R.A. No.
petitioner to abuse AAA and engage in acts of child 10175.
pornography by inducing the latter to exhibit her
private parts to him. Petitioner, being the one with Finally, the Court finds no compelling reason to
mental maturity, should have known that it was not modify the fine imposed by the courts a quo as it is
just legally, but inherently wrong for AAA, a minor, to within the allowable range imposed by law.
show her private parts, particularly, through a mobile
device. If indeed, petitioner loved AAA, he should WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
have protected her dignity, being a minor. However, as Consequently, The Decision dated September 27,
the exchanges of petitioner and AAA would show, it 2018 and Resolution dated May 9, 2019 both rendered
was through petitioner's prodding that led to AAA's by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 40298
act of exhibiting her private parts. Thus, this Court are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner
concurs with the findings of the courts a quo that the Christian Cadajas y Cabias is guilty beyond
prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable reasonable doubt of the crime of child pornography
doubt that petitioner induced or coerced the minor under Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No. 10175, in relation to
victim to perform in the creation of child pornography Sections 4(a) and 3(b) and (c)(5) of R.A. No. 9775.
and that the same was done through a computer He is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with all its
system. accessory penalties and to pay a fine in the amount of
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
All told, the courts a quo did not err in finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation SO ORDERED.
of Section 4(c)(2) of R.A. No. 10175, in relation to
Sections 4(a), 3(b) and (c)(5) of R.A. No. 9775.

As regards the proper penalty to be imposed, Sections

4 and 875 of R.A. No. 10175 both explicitly provide
that the proper penalty to be imposed for child
pornography committed through a computer system
should be one degree higher than that provided for in
R.A. No. 9775. Under Section 15(b)76 of R.A. No.
9775, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion temporal
in its maximum period and a fine of not less than
P1,000,000.00 but not more than P2,000,000.00. The
rationale for this rule was succinctly explained in the
case of Disini Jr. v. The Secretary of Justice,77 to wit:

It seems that the above merely expands the scope of

the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 200931 (ACPA) to
cover identical activities in cyberspace. In theory,
nothing prevents the government from invoking the
ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit child
pornography using a computer system. Actually,
ACPA's definition of child pornography already
embraces the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital,
optical, magnetic or any other means." Notably, no
one has questioned this ACPA provision.

Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one

degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace.
But no one can complain since the intensity or
duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and
there is rational basis for such higher penalty. The
potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular
piece of child pornography when uploaded in the
cyberspace is incalculable.78