0% found this document useful (0 votes)
7 views14 pages

Introduction X

The 2007-2008 economic crisis was primarily caused by a surge in sub-prime mortgage defaults, leading to the collapse of financial institutions and significant market panic. Securitization practices, particularly involving collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps, exacerbated the crisis by obscuring the quality of financial products and increasing systemic risk. Effective crisis management requires a structured approach that includes signal detection, prevention, damage containment, recovery, and learning from past events to enhance organizational resilience.

Uploaded by

anangroy13
Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
0% found this document useful (0 votes)
7 views14 pages

Introduction X

The 2007-2008 economic crisis was primarily caused by a surge in sub-prime mortgage defaults, leading to the collapse of financial institutions and significant market panic. Securitization practices, particularly involving collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps, exacerbated the crisis by obscuring the quality of financial products and increasing systemic risk. Effective crisis management requires a structured approach that includes signal detection, prevention, damage containment, recovery, and learning from past events to enhance organizational resilience.

Uploaded by

anangroy13
Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

Causes of the 2007-2008 Economic Crisis

The economic crisis of 2007-2008 had the most far-reaching financial repercussions
for the U.S. economy since the Great Depression (Helleiner 2011). The significant
increase in sub-prime mortgage defaults caused the bursting of a housing bubble.
As a result of the growth in the number of defaults, the stability of financial institutions
exposed to those mortgages was compromised. Following the collapse of several
hedge funds in June 2007, panic broke out in numerous highly-liquid markets
(Helleiner 2011). The US government-chartered institutions, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mae, were placed in a federal conservatorship program due to the significant
losses experienced by them (Helleiner 2011). Moreover, authorities also had to prop
up investment bank Bear Stearns in March 2008 (Helleiner 2011). The collapse of
Lehman Brothers was an explicit signal that a market meltdown might ensue.

Securitization significantly contributed to the depth of the crisis (Lewis, 2015). This
has to do with collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and mortgage-backed
securities (MBSs) issued by the U.S. institutions being purchased by foreign banks
and hedge funds. Moreover, trading of credit risk was not ‘restricted to mortgages but
also included other asset-backed securities’ (Helleiner 2011, p. 70) such as car loans
and credit cards, among others. Furthermore, credit risks that were sold and traded
worldwide with the help of CDOs and MBSs were hedged via the credit default swap
(CDS) and other derivatives (Helleiner 2011). The instrument was created in order to
provide holders of bonds with insurance against defaults. However, a significant
number of CDSs buyers were not holders of underlying bonds: their aim was to
speculate on defaults of certain bonds.

Therefore, an enormous market for CDS contracts emerged. Its size exceeded $60
trillion at the beginning of the crisis (Helleiner 2011). The explosive growth of new
types of securitization led to the increased confidence among market players
because of the prevalent notion that new instruments were able to promote the
stability of the financial system by distributing risks. However, mortgage lenders who
were able to quickly sell mortgages started to ‘overlook prudential concerns’
(Helleiner 2011, p. 70) in order to generate more fees from selling increasingly larger
volumes of loans. MBSs and CDOs were bundled in such a way that it was difficult to
determine their exact quality. Therefore, the rise in defaults led to dramatic
consequences showing the lack of resilience of highly regulated individual financial
institutions and other commercial actors. The diffusion of new financial instruments
contributed to the intensification of panic over the inability to determine ‘which
institutions actually held these products and what their levels of exposure were’
(Helleiner 2011, p. 69).

The mortgage securitization was associated with the risks associated with over-
relying on credit rating agencies, the ever-increasing significance of lightly-regulated
firms, the opacity of OTC derivatives, the perils of crisis amplification across
numerous markets and countries, and the concentration of risk in huge and
interrelated companies (Helleiner 2011). It could be argued that these practices still
exist today even though liquidity requirements have been changed, and capital ratios
have been increased (Taylor & Baily 2014).

Tools for Forecasting Events and


Predicting Crises
Role-Playing
Role-playing is a qualitative method of predicting events and forecasting crises in the
business environment. This tool uses subjects who adopt the viewpoints of different
groups in order to simulate interactions aimed at evoking reactions from decision-
makers. Role-playing is used to test the alternative outcomes of a particular
intervention (Armstrong, 1999). This tool is relevant for dealing with crises because
unlike the method of the intention, which only helps to determine what actions can be
taken by allowing subjects to adopt the perspective of decision-makers, role-playing
helps participants to act out different scenarios. The advantage of this method is that
it allows subjects to use their skills and knowledge during realistic interactions.
However, group dynamics can negatively impact the process of role-playing.
Evidence suggests that role-playing can be successfully used in the fields of the
military, law, and business (Armstrong 2011).

Even though role-playing is more expensive than Delphi, which relies on


independent expert opinions, it is more accurate. Moreover, situations that were
brought about by the 2007-2008 crisis do not lend themselves to experimentation.
Another argument for the use of role-playing for environmental forecasting has to do
with the fact that the crisis was caused by unique factors such as defaulting
mortgages and mispricing of the unregulated CDS market (Murphy n.d.). Therefore,
analogies would not work as a method for predicting the outcome of interventions by
relying on cases where similar interventions have been used. Role-playing, on the
other hand, could have helped to predict the behaviour of actors such as
government, financial institutions, local banks, credit rating agencies, renters,
mortgage holders, and mortgage brokers among others.

Mispricing of CDSs was caused by the actions of mortgage bankers who were
incentivized ‘by loan origination commissions to just maximize the volume of issued
mortgages because they were owned by other investors’ (Murphy n.d., p. 69).
Moreover, statistical scoring procedures were provided with false or misleading
inputs. Incentivized by the desire to sell more mortgages, lenders intentionally limited
criteria for credit analysis based on the history of default rates (Murphy n.d.).
Therefore, prior to the explosion in defaults, they were caught in the vicious cycle of
borrowing that guaranteed them large profits. Role-playing could have been used to
assess the actions of numerous players before the crisis. The behaviour of national
government, local banks, financial institutions, credit rating agencies, borrowers, and
economic advisors could have been modelled in order to predict the decisions of
each party. Taking into consideration that decisions are difficult to predict, interaction
stimulated by role-playing could have helped to forecast that lenders of original loans
would have had inadequate incentives encouraging the creation of subprime
mortgages. Moreover, the instrument could have helped to predict that heavy
investment into various debt contracts by numerous financial institution will
eventually result in their financial insolvency (Murphy n.d.).

Econometric Models
Econometric models involve analysis of information on causal relationships for
making predictions (Johnson et al. 2013). This method is associated with the use of
well-established theories, identifying key variables as well as specifying both forms
and directions of relationships; therefore, it is useful for forecasting events that
triggered the crisis of 2007-2008 (Hendry & Nielsen 2012). Whereas the
extrapolations method presupposes that current trends will continue, econometric
models only consider the constancy of the current relationships; therefore, they are
more precise. Moreover, econometric models allow comparison of alternative
approaches with one another in a relatively objective manner. Dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models and the New Area-Wide Model (NAWM) provide
a fairly adequate interpretation of international factors contributing to the
development of the crisis. These macro models can ‘help test the internal
consistency of a particular economic theory with the data’ (European CentralBank
n.d., p. 9) thereby creating important clues for the interpretation of business cycle
dynamics.

It should be noted that the financial crisis has revealed some weaknesses in both
DSGE and traditional models, leading some experts to criticize their forecasting
value (European CentralBank n.d.). Mainstream macroeconomic models have
complex procedures, have a lack of data on casual variables and are expensive
(Armstrong 1999). Moreover, ‘unrealistic assumptions, lack of attention to financial
frictions, and the role of the banking sector and to non-linear dynamics or
interrelationships’ (European CentralBank n.d., p. 9) are some of the major
disadvantages of this forecasting method. However, unlike extrapolation method that
did not prove to be particularly accurate in the wake of the economic crisis because
of its reliance on the past relationships between the causal factors, macroeconomic
models are a fairly useful forecasting instrument that could be used to interpret
economic developments in real-time.

How Organisations Can Survive a Crisis


Forecasting tools should be used in the initial stages of crisis management models.
The crisis arc is a model for crisis management proposed by Hilburg (Crisis
Management Model n.d.). To successfully handle a crisis, a manager has to
recognize that every prevention and management strategy for coping with the
uncertainties of the external environment consists of the following elements: crisis
avoidance, crisis mitigation, and crisis recovery. Effective crises management
strategy requires the careful evaluation of all vulnerabilities of an organization as a
potential catalyst of a crisis (Crisis Management Model n.d.).

According to James, a typical crisis consists of the following phases: signal


detection, preparation and prevention, damage containment, recovery and learning
(cited in Wooten & James 2011). The first phase requires the detection of the early
signals of a crisis. The second phase involves actions aimed at the aversion of a
crisis. The third phase prevents a crisis from spreading to other departments of an
organisation. The recovery phase entails the development of plans for renewing
business operations. The final phase is associated with reflection and learning from
a crisis (Wooten & James 2011). The first two phases of the model can be
considered a part of a proactive approach to the process of crisis management;
therefore, it is best suited to a crisis.

According to the crisis management model proposed by Gonzalez-Herrero and Pratt


in 1996, there are three stages to crisis management: diagnosis of the crisis,
planning, and adjusting to the changes (Crisis Management Model n.d.). The model
presupposes regular monitoring of early indicators of a crisis through observation of
employee performance and maximum levels of transparency. Therefore, it operates
within the framework of structural functions systems theory by facilitating the proper
flow of information across all hierarchies of an organization.

Five Phases of Crisis


Signal Detection
Signal detection is a phase in crisis management associated with analysing available
information that is available at the moment of decision making. According to a recent
study by the Institute of Crisis Management, only 30% of crises that occurred during
the last decade were sudden, whereas ‘the remaining 70 percent were characterized
as “smoldering”’ (Penuel, Statler & Hagen, 2013, p. 629). Therefore, signal detection
is a phase in a crisis cycle that has to be recognised in a timely fashion.

Prevention and Preparedness


The second phase of James’ crisis management model is prevention and
preparedness. This phase is associated with ‘systematic planning to prepare the
organization to deal with a crisis, explicating critical personnel, resources, and
actions to be allocated during the crisis situation’ (Penuel, Statler & Hagen, 2013, p.
630). According to an article that explores the management of the 2007-2008 crisis,
coordination issues between different financial institutions of Europe were conducted
through a combination of ad hoc and existing instruments (Pisani-Ferry & Sapir
2011). Therefore, the managers of those institutions were not focused on all modes
of preparation and coping measures during the second phase of crisis management.
Arguably, this phase can be divided into two different sets of activities, as in the
PPRR model, in order to better prepare for a crisis before it presents itself.

Damage Containment
The damage containment phase involves mitigation of a crisis, aimed at preventing it
from further escalation, resulting in severe damage to an organisation. Systematic
‘interventions in the source of a crisis’ (Penuel, Statler & Hagen, 2013, p. 630) are an
essential element of this phase that helps to minimise the impact of a crisis and
prevent it from spiralling out of control. Proper contingency planning, which should be
a part of the previous phase of crisis management and should include
communications strategy, can help to protect an organisation’s reputation, assets,
and infrastructure when a crisis is unfolding (Penuel, Statler & Hagen, 2013).

Recovery
The fourth phase of crisis management involves ‘fixing the damage caused by the
crisis’ (Penuel, Statler & Hagen, 2013, p. 630). During this stage, organisations
ensure their business continuity and resume their linkages with all groups of
stakeholders. Just like the previous phase, recovery is highly dependent on
contingency planning and preparedness. A properly constructed communications
strategy is also essential to an organisation’s survival during the recovery of critical
structures and procedures.

Learning
The final stage of James’ model is associated with ‘the development of crisis
management-specific organizational learning’ (Penuel, Statler & Hagen, 2013, p.
632) that should include experience gained during the dissemination of a crisis both
within an organization and for its constituents. The obtained knowledge can help to
modify the practices and policies of an organization in order to make it more resilient
to future shocks.

Leadership Lessons for Senior


Management
Successful leaders should be able to correctly identify stages in a crisis life cycle and
apply a complex set of skills, abilities, and competencies for planning, responding to
and learning from ‘crisis events while under public scrutiny’ (Wooten & James 2011,
p. 2). The conceptual model by James could significantly enhance the capacity of
leaders to ‘lead an organization through the various crisis phases and into a
successful recovery’ (Wooten & James 2011, p. 2). Examining a crisis with the help
of James’ framework helps to develop ‘a structure for framing the process by filtering
knowledge and by providing a roadmap for decision making’ (Wooten & James
2011, p. 4).

The shock caused by the crisis had a spill-over effect that fundamentally changed
the correlations between international stock markets. The economy was not
responsible for the crisis but rather a chain of poor managerial decisions, such as the
‘take-over of Merryll Lynch and allowing the failure of Lehman Brothers’ (Hausman &
Johnston 2014, p. 2720). Therefore, the senior management of both financial and
political institutions of the country have to carefully consider the underlying factors
that led to the crash of the markets in order to derive important lessons from its
consequences.

Interdependence among global markets is one of the reasons why mistakes


originating in the US credit and housing markets produced such devastating effects
on the global economy. In order not to repeat similar mistakes in the future, it is
necessary not only to create ‘better oversight of financial institutions and tightening
mortgage markets’ (Hausman & Johnston 2014, p. 2720) but also to introduce
changes to formal governance structures and composition of their teams. An
important leadership lesson that can be taken away from the crisis of 2007-2008 is
that every crisis is a deviant event that requires people who are able to act in
nonconventional ways, recognise the unknowable and move beyond their initial
emotional reactions.
Nobody would deny that revising organizational structures and implementing
changes are some of the greatest challenges that leaders can face. These actions
are associated with a tremendous amount of strategic planning and assessment that
could help inadequately reacting to the important idiosyncrasies of a problem and to
choose the right direction to take. Nonetheless, effective leaders have to find
structures and processes that mobilise members of their organization and challenge
thinking while retaining productive power-resistance relations. It should be noted that
productive dissent can engender communicative practices that play ‘a facilitative
role, resulting in organizational change based on transformation of knowledge’
(Thomas, Sargent, & Hardy 2011, p. 25).

Effective leaders should possess the perspective, mentality, confidence, and


authority necessary for implementing radical structural changes. Moreover, they
have to espouse certain attitudes so that they can engage in implementation
activities as well as have in-depth knowledge of the tasks that should be
accomplished. The most important implementation activities for introducing changes
to organizational structures and process are communicating, mobilizing and
evaluating (Battilana et al., 2010). Leaders who are willing to call for radical changes
have to emphasise both the task-oriented and the person-oriented behaviours that
are necessary for the comprehensive implementation of more effective
organizational designs (Battilana et al., 2010). Person-oriented leaders have to
realise that post-crisis change projects require building coalitions that can support
the process of redesigning organisations. Therefore, they have to consider careful
approaches to all groups of stakeholders in order to overcome growing concern over
the impact or restructuring of organizational settings.
Lack of innovation made a significant contribution to the severity of the financial crisis
of 2007-2008. Even though this did not directly contribute to the financial meltdown,
numerous think tanks and government agencies agree that it was ‘a significant
symptom of a more generalized problem resulting in this crisis’ (Hausman &
Johnston 2014, p. 2722). Effective leaders have to consider how to stimulate
innovations that can significantly contribute to a strong economy, thereby preventing
similar negative developments in the future.

Another important lesson that senior managers should take away from the crisis is
that it is essential to utilize both quantitative and qualitative forecasting methods
during the process of seeking signals. It will help them to better understand the
specific risks of an approaching crisis as well as eliminate some of the unrealistic
assumptions created by macroeconomic models.

Conclusion
The economic crisis of 2007-2008 had the most far-reaching financial repercussions
for the U.S. economy since the Great Depression. It was caused by numerous
factors ranging from defaulting mortgages to mispricing of CDSs. Taking into
consideration the fact that the crisis put an at-risk financial system of the country, it is
necessary to consider important leadership lessons of the situation in order to avoid
similar events in the future.

Organization leaders can guide their organizations through a financial crisis by


utilizing quantitative and qualitative forecasting tools such as role-playing, Delphi,
analogies, extrapolation, rule-based forecasting, and economic models, among
others. Taking into consideration that situations that were brought about by the 2007-
2008 crisis do not lend themselves to experimentation, role-playing can be effectively
used to test alternative outcomes of a particular intervention or an event. Economic
models is a quantitative method of forecasting that can help organization leaders to
use well-establish theories in order to identify key variables and relationships
between them.

Effective leaders should also make use of the crisis management models such as
the crisis arc proposed by Hilburg, James’ model, and Gonzalez-Herrero model,
among others. Organization managers have to find structures and processes that
mobilise members of their organizations and challenge thinking while retaining
productive power-resistance relations. Moreover, they should possess the
perspective, mentality, confidence, and authority necessary for implementing radical
structural changes in order to avoid similar crises in the future.

Reference List
Armstrong, J 1999, ‘Forecasting for environmental decision making’, in V Dale and M
English, eds., Tools to aid environmental decision making, Springer-Verlag, New
York, pp. 192-225.

Armstrong, J 2011, Principles of forecasting: a handbook for researchers and


practitioners, Kluwer Academic, Boston.

Battilana, J, Gilmartin, M, Sengul, M, Pache, A & Alexander, J 2010, ‘Leadership


competencies for implementing planned organizational change’, The Leadership
Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 422-438.

Cheung, W, Fung, S, & Tsai S, 2010, ‘Global capital market interdependence and
spillover effect of credit risk: evidence from the 2007–2009 global financial
crisis’, Applied Financial Economics, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 85-103.
Crisis Management Model n.d., Web.

European Central Bank n.d., Some lessons from the financial crisis for the economic
analysis, Web.

Hausman, A & Johnston, W 2014, ‘The role of innovation in driving the economy:
Lessons from the global financial crisis’, Journal of Business Research, vol. 67, no.
1, pp. 2720-2726.

Helleiner, E 2011, Understanding the 2007–2008 global financial crisis: lessons for
scholars of international political economy. Annual Review of Political
Science, 14(1), 67-87.

Hendry D & Nielsen, B 2012, Econometric modeling: a likelihood approach,


Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Johnson, G, Whittington, R, Scholes, K, Angwin, D & Regner, P 2013, Exploring


strategy: text & cases, 10th edn, Pearson, Harlow.

Lewis, M 2015, The big short: inside the doomsday machine, W. W. Norton &
Company, New York.

Murphy, A. n.d., Financial crisis of 2008, Web.

Penuel, K, Statler, M & Hagen, R (eds.) 2013, Encyclopedia of crisis management,


vol. 1, SAGE, Los Angeles, CA.

Pisani-Ferry, J & Sapir, A 2011, ‘Banking crisis management in the EU: an early
assessment’, Economic Policy, vol. 25, no. 62, pp. 341-373.
Taylor, J & Baily, M 2014, Across the great divide, Hoover Institution Press,
California.

Thomas, R, Sargent, L & Hardy, C 2011, ‘Managing Organizational Change:


Negotiating Meaning and Power-Resistance Relations’, Organization Science, vol.
22, no. 1, pp. 22-41.

Wooten, L & James, E 2011, ‘Linking crisis management and leadership


competencies: the role of human resource development’, Advances in Developing
Human Resources, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 352-379.

You might also like