ScotMUN 2025

ScotMUN 2025
7-9 March
Historical Security Council
(HSC)

Chairs: Ava Bradley and Avan Fata

Topics: The Invasion of Grenada (1983) and The
Question of Southern Rhodesia (1977)

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Table of Contents
Chair Introductions​ 3
Introduction to the Historical Security Council​ 4
Composition and Voting​ 5
Powers and Scope of Responsibilities​ 7
Topic One: The Invasion of Grenada (1983)​ 9
Topic Overview​ 9
Key Terms and Organisations​ 10
Timeline of Developments​ 11
Phase I: Background​ 11
Phase II: Escalating Tensions and Conflict​ 11
Phase III: U.S. Invasion​ 12
Part IV: What Really Happened​ 13
Situation Briefing​ 14
Relevant Stances and Bloc Positions​ 15
Relevant Documents​ 17
Questions to Address​ 18
Topic Two: The Question of Southern Rhodesia (1977)​ 19
Topic Overview​ 19
Key Terms and Organisations​ 20
Timeline of Developments​ 22
Phase I: The Colonial Era​ 22
Phase II: Towards Unilateral Independence​ 23
Phase III: Reactions and Non-Recognition​ 24
Situation Briefing​ 27
Possible Stances and Bloc Positions​ 31
Past Resolutions​ 36
Questions to Address​ 38
References:​ 39
Topic One​ 39
Topic Two​ 41

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Chair Introductions

Ava Bradley: Ava is studying Philosophy and English Literature at the University of
Edinburgh. Originally from California, she primarily has experience in the U.S.
MUN circuit, having started at age 11 and participated in conferences as both a
delegate and a chair. Outside of her time corralling delegates in committee, she
will be serving as ScotMUN’s Assistant Secretary-General. In her spare moments,
she enjoys satirical writing, costume design, and discussing the nuances of
Hamlet at great length.

Avan Fata: Avan is a Master’s student in the History of International Relations at

the London School of Economics and Political Science. His MUN experience began
in 2014 in the brutal sparring of the Southeast Asia circuit, before moving on to
much calmer diplomatic waters in the UK circuit. Having delegated in Security
Council committees for the better part of the past three years, he’s eager to be
chairing this edition of the Historical version at ScotMUN 2025. Although he
genuinely cites MUN as a hobby to anyone who asks, his other favourite pastimes
include reading history books, drinking copious amounts of tea, playing video
games, and endlessly pursuing the ideal optimisation of academic productivity.

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Introduction to the Historical Security Council

Left: The United Nations Security Council meets for the first time in 1946
Right: The Council votes to authorise Chapter VII actions on the Korean peninsula, 1950

On behalf of the ScotMUN Secretariat, we would like to extend a warm welcome to

all of you as representatives of your respective member States to the Historical
United Nations Security Council (HSC, hereinafter also referred to as “the
Council”).

Widely regarded as the executive organ of the United Nations as a whole, the
Council’s creation arguably predates the rest of the UN, with initial discussions
taking place as early as 1944 at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. The following
year, the Council took shape as the primary assembly of the new international
organisation tasked with the maintenance of international peace and security. In
the decades since then, the geopolitical turmoil and post-colonial tensions of the
Cold War have preoccupied the agenda of the Council, with the body itself
expanding from the initial 11 members to 15 in 1965. Although the pursuit of its
mission has been oftentimes frustrated by the presence of competing visions for
world order and the subsequent divisions in the policies of member States, the
Council has nonetheless remained a crucial factor in the outcome of regional crises
and questions of global importance.

At ScotMUN 2025, the Council has been convened to address a duo of Cold War
crises that threaten both the livelihoods and regional peace of two different regions.
The first topic, the 1983 Invasion of Grenada, revisits a unique instance of
unilateral Great Power action in the face of international opposition, and is a chance

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for delegates to redefine the traditional Cold War battle lines in the UN. The second
topic, the 1977 Situation in Southern Rhodesia, harkens back to the early days of
the Council when post-colonial struggles fused with ideological tensions to create
an uncertain geopolitical picture in the heart of the African continent. It is ultimately
up to the delegates which topic shall constitute the first item on the agenda, and
whether only one or both shall be discussed during the conference.

The Presidents have every faith that the Council will be able to shed off the
contemporary allegations of deadlock and Cold War rivalry for the greater good of
international peace and security. Of course, whilst the prerogatives of national
sovereignty and the right for every state to defend its own foreign policy interests
remain central to the modus operandi of the United Nations, we have every faith
that the delegates of the Council will work together to uphold the standard of
international collaboration and pacific resolution which it, alongside the United
Nations as a whole, stands for.

Composition and Voting

During the Cold War, the Council was reformed to reflect two interlocking realities
of the global situation: the increase in independent countries following the
post-colonial dissolution of European empires, and the subsequent rise of
humanity’s representation in the so-called ‘Third World’ and ‘Global South’.
Although the evolution of the Council merits its own exploration at the discretion of
interested representatives, for the sake of concision this section deals primarily with
detailing the Council’s current composition and the unique character of its mode of
operation.

In its current state, the Council operates as a body composed of 15 Member States.
Five seats of the Council are permanently reserved for its permanent members,
often collectively and colloquially referred to as the ‘P5’ States. These are the
People’s Republic of China, the Republic of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the
United States of America. Owing to these nations’ historical role in international
politics and the founding of the UN, they are the sole possessors of the veto power,
which grants them the ability to block the passing of any substantive
matters—resolutions and amendments—by casting a negative vote in committee.
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Beyond these Powers, the remaining 10 seats are held by non-permanent members
of the Council, democratically elected by the General Assembly to serve two-year
terms. Each year, five States relinquish their seats on the council, allowing the
Council to remain in constant operation whilst also ensuring an equitable
distribution of non-permanent members. To accommodate a range of nations and
account for the relevance of certain regional powers, the following Member States
will sit on the Council regardless of the topic under discussion.

●​ Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,

●​ Canada,
●​ Co-operative Republic of Guyana,
●​ Gabonese Republic,
●​ Jamaica,
●​ People’s Republic of Bangladesh,
●​ Portuguese Republic,
●​ Republic of Panama,
●​ Republic of South Africa,
●​ Republic of Zambia.

Regarding the voting procedure of the Council as per Article 27(3) of the United
Nations Charter, all substantial matters may pass provided there are nine
affirmative votes in addition to the concurring votes of the permanent members. It
should be noted that a veto in these instances explicitly refers to a negative vote,
and abstentions on the part of permanent members are therefore also counted as
concurrent. At the discretion of the Presidents and for the sake of ensuring the
continuous flow of debate, votes on procedural matters will only require a simple
majority of eight votes to pass.

Delegates should also be aware that, under the provisions of Articles 31 and 32 of
the Charter, the Council may invite Members of the UN who are not on the Council
to sit as observers in sessions where ‘the interests of that Member are specially
affected.’ As such, for ScotMUN 2025 two observer representatives have been
invited to sit on the Council: Grenada and Mozambique. Their representatives may
be accorded voting rights on substantive matters following the passing of a motion

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calling for such. This motion may be proposed by any member of the Council any
will require a supermajority of nine votes with no vetoes from the permanent
members.

Powers and Scope of Responsibilities

As the primary body of the United Nations responsible for the maintenance of
international peace and security, the Security Council is accorded much more
expansive and consequential powers than other assemblies. The most significant of
these stems from Article 25 of the Charter, which reads that: ‘The Members of the
United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council
in accordance with the present Charter’. In effect, this means that any and all
resolutions adopted by the Council are legally binding, and all Member States are
therefore obligated to ensure their national policies align with the decisions of the
Council in such cases. As such, debate in the Council often revolves around ensuring
that the provisions of the final resolution do not represent an egregious breach of
sovereign rights as exercised by all Members of the United Nations, and that
extensive consultations have been carried out with all relevant parties prior to
voting to ensure maximum compliance with minimum complications.

In addition, under Chapter VII of the Charter (Articles 39-51), the Council has at its
disposal a variety of methods to ensure that it can effectively carry out action with
respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.
These include, but are not limited to, the following:
●​ The complete or partial interruption of economic relations,
●​ The complete of partial interruption of any and all transport and
communication methods,
●​ The severance of diplomatic relations,
●​ The institution of blockade by land, air, and sea,
●​ The authorisation of military intervention by a state, coalition of states,
relevant regional organisation(s), or the Council itself.

Understandably, with such expansive powers comes equally expansive

responsibilities. Article 24(1) of the Charter summarises the primary duty of the
Council as the maintenance of international peace and security. The ambiguity
and flexibility of interpretation this term means that the Council itself can
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determine what topics are worthy of discussion as agenda items, as outlined in

Article 34 of the Charter:

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might
lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine
whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security.

Given these responsibilities and the magnitude of decisions laid before the Council,
it is unsurprising to note that for any serious action to gain the requisite nine votes
for approval, all representatives must be involved in the multilateral consultations
during UNSC sessions.

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Topic One: The Invasion of Grenada (1983)

Left: American soldiers and helicopters during the invasion of Grenada (October 1983)1
Right: Grenadian protestors rally in support of Maurice Bishop (October 1983)2

Topic Overview
On October 25th, 1983, the United States put into motion “Operation Urgent
Fury,” initiating its invasion of Grenada. Just days earlier, the island nation’s prime
minister, Maurice Bishop, had been overthrown and executed in a coup by his
primary political opponent within the New Jewel Movement party, Bernard
Coard, and his supporters. Motivated by the need to restore political stability,
ensure the safety of 650 U.S. medical students, and counter increasing communist
influence from Cuba and the Soviet Union, the U.S. took to Grenada’s shores with its
military.

The United States’ decision has been met with great international scepticism.
Grenada had only gained its independence from the United Kingdom a few years
prior in 1979, making respect for its sovereignty all the more presently crucial.
While some Caribbean nations are applauding the U.S. for its invasion and
subsequent prospects of stability, the overwhelming global response has been
condemnations of the U.S. and accusations that the country is breaching
international law.

1
Owen Rust, “How the Invasion of Grenada Exposed the Brutality of the US Military,” TheCollector, July 19, 2023,
[Link]
2
​Rust, “Exposed the Brutality.”
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Today, on October 28th, 1983, the Security Council convenes to assess the
justification of the U.S.’s invasion, determining if it is truly a breach of international
law or rather a necessary move given the violence perpetuated by Coard and the
new potentially illegitimate government. Together, member states will need to
decide how to next address the situation in Grenada, passing resolutions whilst not
contributing to rising Cold War tensions.

Key Terms and Organisations

CC: Central Committee — Governing body of the New Jewel Movement.

CPF: Caribbean Peace Force — Caribbean forces that invaded Grenada alongside
the U.S.

GULP: Grenada United Labour Party —Grenada’s first party, led by Eric Gairy. It
was overthrown in 1979.

NJM: New Jewel Movement — Socialist political party led by Maurice Bishop.
Succeeded the GULP.

NNP: New National Party —Political party elected to power after the U.S.’s invasion
of Grenada.

OECS: Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States — Regional organisation

consisting of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Montserrat.

PRG: People’s Revolutionary Government — Government established by the New

Jewel Movement.

PSA: Point Salines Airport — Airport constructed by Grenada, with heavy funding
from Cuba. Its true primary use—touristic or military—was a topic of contention.

RMC: Revolutionary Military Council — Governing body briefly in power after the
coup of Bishop’s government and his subsequent execution.
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Timeline of Developments

Phase I: Background
7 February 1974 Grenada gains total independence from the United
Kingdom.3 The Grenada United Labour Party
(GULP) wins the 1976 general election, making Eric
Gairy prime minister.4 His administration is
considered corrupt, becoming progressively more
authoritarian.

13 March 1979 The New Jewel Movement (NJM), headed by

Maurice Bishop, seizes Grenada in a coup.5 Bishop
creates the People's Revolutionary Government
(PRG), under which he strives to improve welfare
and education by following socialist (specifically,
Leninist) ideals.

1979 Bishop begins the construction of the Point Salines

(international) Airport, funded by Cuba. He claims
the airport’s goal will be to bring more tourism to
the island.6

Phase II: Escalating Tensions and Conflict

1981 U.S. attention is drawn to Grenada as the island
begins to become closer allies with Cuba. Grenada is
seen as the next potential hub for communism.

26 March 1983 U.S. President Reagan cites the construction of a

10,000-foot runway on Grenada as “Soviet-Cuban
militarisation.”7 He believes it will become a covert

3
Ronan Burtenshaw, “Forward Ever, Backward Never: Grenada’s Revolution at 40,” Tribune, August 4, 2019,
[Link]
4
Bhaskar Sunkara, “The US Invaded the Island of Grenada 40 Years Ago. The Legacy of Revolution Lives On,” The
Guardian, October 25, 2023,
[Link]
egacy-of-revolution-lives-on.
5
Burtenshaw, “Grenada’s Revolution.”
6
Dennis Laumann, “Grenada Marks 40 Years since the Assassination of Revolutionary Leader Maurice Bishop,”
People’s World, October 19, 2023,
[Link]
rice-bishop/.
7
Phil Gailey and Warren Weaver, “Briefing,” The New York Times, March 26, 1983,
[Link]
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military base for Cuba.

September 1983 Divisions within the NJM increase. As a compromise,

Maurice Bishop agrees to be joint leader of the
Central Committee alongside Bernard Coard, whilst
remaining the sole head of state.8

Early October 1983 Bishop goes on a diplomatic trip to Hungary,

Czechoslovakia, and Cuba. Upon his return, he
reverses his original agreement, maintaining full
leadership.9 Tensions escalate.

13 October 1983 Bishop is placed on house arrest by Coard and his

allies in the NJM. Part of the Grenadian military
joins Coard, turning on Bishop.

19 October 1983 Bishop is freed from his home by a crowd of

15,000-30,000. He briefly occupies Fort Rupert
before encountering soldiers who disperse the
crowds and kill Bishop and seven of his close allies.10
Hudson Austin forms the Revolutionary Military
Council (RMC) to rule the country. Paul Scoon
secretly requests U.S. military intervention.11

Phase III: U.S. Invasion

21 October 1983 The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States

(OECS) requests U.S. military intervention in
Grenada.12 The U.S. prepares for an invasion.

25 October 1983 The United States and Caribbean Peace Force

invade Grenada in “Operation Urgent Fury.” They
deploy 7,600 troops. Point Salines Airport and
Fort Rupert are captured, as well as key leaders.
Paul Scoon is rescued. There are several civilian
casualties. The U.S. claims to act in the interest of its
citizens first and foremost, wanting to ensure the

8
​Sunkara, “Legacy of Revolution.”
9
Laumann, “40 Years since the Assassination.”
10
Sunkara, “Legacy of Revolution.”
11
Wren Smith, “Legal Narratives of the Invasion of Grenada, 1983,” Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, October 22,
2024, [Link]
12
Smith, “Legal Narratives.”.
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safety of its 650 medical students studying on the

island. The calls for intervention are used to justify
the invasion.

26 October 1983 Fighting continues between U.S. and Cuban &

Grenadian military forces.

27 October 1983 A letter from Paul Scoon (dated October 24)

requesting U.S. military aid is released to defend the
U.S. 's intervention.13

28 October 1983 Our MUN HSC Committee convenes.

Part IV: What Really Happened

28 October 1983 The UN Security Council accepts to discuss a
resolution condemning the U.S. for its invasion and
requesting the removal of its troops. The U.S. vetoes
it.

2 November 1983 The UN General Assembly adopts Resolution 38/7,

citing that the U.S. has broken international law by
invading Grenada and calling for the nation to
withdraw its forces.14

December 1983 All U.S. forces are removed from Grenada.

3 December 1984 The New National Party (NNP) wins Grenada’s

general election.

13
Philip G Kukielski, “Secret Mission of Urgent Fury,” U.S. Naval Institute, October 1, 2021,
[Link]
14
“Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly at Its 38th Session,” UN General Assembly Resolutions Tables, 1983,
[Link]
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Situation Briefing

Left: Map of Grenada showing when and where U.S. troops arrived as the invasion unfolded15
Right: Map of Grenada outlining the U.S.’s invasion plan16

As of October 28, 1983, the United States is already three days into its invasion of
Grenada, otherwise known as “Operation Urgent Fury,” in response to the violent
coup against Maurice Bishop’s government. Thus far, it has achieved relative
success; thousands of troops (primarily from the U.S., though accompanied by a
few hundred from Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States nations) have entered
the country, securing key locations like the Point Salines airstrip (allowing for
more troops to be airlifted in) and St. George’s University School of Medicine,
where over 600 American medical students were studying.17 Additionally, Grenada’s
governor-general, Paul Scoon, has been rescued from house arrest.

While the U.S.'s goal of protecting American lives has been achieved, conflict
between the U.S. and opposing Cuban and Grenadian forces persist in the name of
creating a more stable, politically prosperous situation and retaliating against
what was seen as a growing communist threat.

15
Us Army PAO, Op Urgent Fury Invasion Map, February 2, 2012,
[Link]
16
United States Military Academy, “Invasion of Grenada by US and Caribbean Nations, 1983,” Wikimedia Commons,
[Link]
17
The Editors of the Encyclopædia Britannica, “U.S. Invasion of Grenada,” Encyclopædia Britannica, October 18, 2024,
[Link]
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So far, a few nations, such as the United Kingdom, have initially expressed
sentiments opposing the U.S.’s invasion, while others, like some members of the
OECS, have warmly welcomed it.18 It is now up to the Security Council, the only UN
body allowed to make legally binding resolutions and dispatch military and
peacekeeping forces to address the invasion and Grenada’s insecure situation and
to find a solution that key members will not object to.

Relevant Stances and Bloc Positions

United States, Jamaica, Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States

(Pro-U.S. Intervention)
The United States, with the support of a few Caribbean allies, believe that the
invasion of Grenada is justified. Not only was military intervention necessary to
protect Americans (those of the students residing in Grenada), but it is crucial to
preventing further violence from developing on the island. Given that Grenada is a
newly independent nation, ensuring that its government is stable, legitimate, and
relatively uncorrupt is important—invading Grenada is a necessary means.
Furthermore, the U.S.’s invasion is a response to numerous requests for intervention
from neighbouring states and political leaders within the country—therefore, the
U.S. has permission to conduct military operations in Grenada, exempting the
nation from truly breaching international law.

The United States also believes it had reason to respond to the growing communist
threat within Grenada, particularly in light of the Cuba-funded construction of the
Point Salines Airport. Were the airport to have been transformed into a military
base, it would have posed a serious security threat to the United States, given both
nations’ close proximity to each other. Therefore, the U.S. has a right to defend
itself.

United Kingdom and Canada (Pro-Diplomacy)

The United Kingdom and Canada both condemn the U.S.’s intervention in Grenada.
While they do not outright support Grenada’s new government, these nations

18
Mark Curtis, “The Only US Military Intervention Britain (Somewhat) Opposed,” Declassified Media Ltd, October 25,
2023, [Link]
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believe that instability in Grenada should not have been handled with foreign
military force. Instead, they push for a more diplomatic solution, emphasising the
use of organisations like the United Nations to peacefully resolve the conflict. The
U.K. and Canada believe that the U.S. breached international law, and that
Grenada’s sovereignty should be respected.

Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and Venezuela (Anti-U.S. Intervention)

The Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and Venezuela are strongly against the U.S.’s
invasion. It is a neo-imperialist act that completely breaches Grenada’s sovereignty
and should be put to an end as soon as possible. These nations argue that while the
United States might not agree with Grenada’s socialist views, these countries
believe that that gives the country no justification to interfere. Allowing the U.S. to
dispose of any governments that do not align with its ideals is a very dangerous
precedent, exemplifying the oppressive nature of the country. The citizens of a
nation have a right to self-determination, as per the UN Charter, so the U.S. should
not involve itself militarily or politically (in regard to future elections in Grenada).
The invasion has only served to escalate tensions between the U.S. and socialist
governments. Therefore, they believe that the U.S. should be condemned for its
actions.

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

Countries within the Non-Aligned Movement, such as Zambia, maintain relatively
neutral stances on the issue, not wanting to take a pro-U.S. or pro-socialist stance.
However, they still believe that a military invasion of this sort would likely
constitute a breach of sovereignty, and therefore should not be allowed to continue.
Furthermore, they express concern over the Grenadian civilians affected and killed
as a result of Cold War tensions in their nation.

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Relevant Documents

●​ On October 28th, 1983, the UN Security Council accepted a resolution

condemning the United States for its invasion of Grenada. The U.S. immediately
vetoed it.
[Link]

●​ On November 2nd, 1983, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution

38/7, condemning the armed invasion of Grenada as a breach of international law
and calling for respect for the nation’s sovereignty. It additionally requested that
foreign troops be removed immediately and fair and free elections be organised
within the country. The resolution as a whole passed, receiving 108 votes in favour
and 9 against.
[Link]

●​ On November 2nd,1983, before the adoption of Resolution 38/7, the

‘situation in Grenada” was debated in the 43rd plenary meeting.
[Link]

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Questions to Address
Delegates should keep in mind that this list of points is neither exhaustive nor a
required ‘checklist’ to go through when discussing the agenda topic. It is meant to
serve instead as a guide to potential sub-topics that may go on to form the
substance of clauses in a working paper and/or draft resolution. Likewise, the
Presidents of the Council wholeheartedly encourage explorations of points that
may not strictly fall under this list but nonetheless remain relevant and important to
holistically addressing the topic and progressing the cause of the Council.

●​ Can regional security supersede ●​ What kind of precedent may the

international law? How can the U.S.’s invasion set? How can this
authority and concerns of the be altered by how the council
Organization of Eastern responds?
Caribbean States be respected
whilst abiding by the UN Charter?

●​ Can a country’s sovereignty be ●​ What should the council do to

respected when unlawful or address civilian casualties and
violent political action is taken the current dangers that citizens
within it? are facing during this invasion?

●​ Was the U.S.’s invasion of ●​ How may the Cold War tensions
Grenada legitimate? If so, for that heavily contributed to this
which reasons? invasion be potentially
deescalated?

●​ How can the Security Council ●​ What role, if any, should the
approach this issue without council have in shaping
risking proposed resolutions Grenada’s political future? Does it
being vetoed? Can or should the have a responsibility to ensure
council condemn the U.S.’s the implementation of a stable
actions government, as well as free and
fair elections, or does
intervention infringe upon
Grenada’s sovereignty?

●​ Should neighbouring nations

have a larger role in resolving
Grenada’s political instability?

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Topic Two: The Question of Southern Rhodesia

(1977)​

A Continent in Crisis - Left: Ian Smith signing the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence
(UDI)
Right: A Rhodesian soldier interrogates villagers at gunpoint in 1977 during the Bush War

Topic Overview
Since 1965, the Republic of Rhodesia (hereinafter “Rhodesia” or “Southern
Rhodesia”) has existed as an unrecognised state in the interior of the African
continent, plaguing the region’s stability and security by engaging in armed
hostilities against national independence groups, referred to as the Bush War and
the Zimbabwean War of Independence. With its origins in the colonial period, the
conflict has ravaged the livelihoods of thousands in both the territory and
neighbouring UN Member States such as the People’s Republic of Mozambique
and Zambia.

Inextricably tied to the issue of resolving the ongoing conflict is the matter of
whether Rhodesia has a legal basis to exist as a sovereign state, given its complete
lack of formal international recognition since its Unilateral Declaration of
Independence (UDI) in 1965. The situation is complicated further by the existence
of militant rebel groups opposing the de facto government in the capital of
Salisbury, which is composed of a white minority not too dissimilar to the
apartheid regime in the Republic of South Africa. These groups are currently
waging guerrilla warfare on the Rhodesian regime, clamouring for greater political
and civil rights and the instigation of majority rule.

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On an international level, Southern Rhodesia has not been able to gain any formal
diplomatic recognition from UN Member States, although accusations continue
to emerge from regional actors as well as beyond the continent about informal
economic support in the form of illegal trade. More recently, Rhodesian authorities
have escalated their incursions into neighbouring Mozambique, marking a
significant development in the course of the Bush War. Responding to calls for
further international action (Annex I.), the Council has been convened on 30 June
1977 to discuss the situation once more.

Key Terms and Organisations

Central African Federation (CAF): Formally known as the Federation of Rhodesia

and Nyasaland, the CAF was a political entity formed by the federation of three
southern African British territories: Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and
Nyasaland. Existing only for a decade (1953-1963), the Federation was a crucial
catalyst for the pro-independence movements in all three territories, each of which
took their own trajectories following the CAF’s dissolution.

Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique,

FRELIMO): Formally founded in 1962, FRELIMO is the governing party in
Mozambique and the main nationalist movement which fought for independence
from Portugal during the Mozambican War of Independence (1964-1974). Since
taking power in Mozambique, the party has worked to isolate the Rhodesian regime
further, owing to the latter’s racial policies standing in stark contrast to the mass
self-determination which FRELIMO stands for.

Legislative Assembly of Rhodesia: The main legislative body of Southern

Rhodesia, the Legislative Assembly was modelled after the British House of
Commons, although as part of the minority rule practised in the territory a certain
number of seats in the chamber were reserved for Europeans, and from 1958
onwards a special voters’ roll was created for African citizens which further
institutionalised their marginalisation in the political system. Since 1965, the
Legislative Assembly has been dominated by the ruling Rhodesian Front party (see
below).

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Organisation of African Unity (OAU): Established in 1963, the OAU is the primary
intergovernmental organisation on the African continent, akin to ASEAN in
Southeast Asia and the Organisation of American States. Since the outbreak of the
conflict in Rhodesia, the OAU has supplied weapons and training to both ZAPU and
ZANU. As of the date of the Council meeting, two Member States and one Observer
are also Members of the OAU: Mozambique, Zambia, and Gabon.

Rhodesian Front (RF): Formed in 1962 during the struggle for Rhodesia’s future
outside of the CAF, the Rhodesian Front party is the governing authority in
Salisbury, and famously issued the 1965 UDI as part of its programme of preserving
white minority rule. The current party head is the incumbent Rhodesian Prime
Minister Ian Smith.

Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI): Adopted by the Cabinet of

Rhodesia on 11 November 1965, the UDI announced that the former self-governing
territory of Southern Rhodesia now considered itself a fully sovereign and
independent state. The refusal of any other nation to recognise the UDI as
legitimate and subsequently grant recognition to Rhodesia has formed one pillar of
the current situation.

Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU): Formed as a splinter group from ZAPU
in 1963, the ZANU party is one of the main political movements fighting against the
Rhodesian authorities, with the aim of ending white minority rule in the territory. Its
armed wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), has been
accused of carrying out terrorist attacks on farms and civilians, operating from
bases in Mozambique and Zambia.

Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU): Founded in 1961, the ZAPU began life
as a political party opposed to the RF’s conservative white minority rule policies,
and was banned less than a year later by the RF government. Its armed wing, the
Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), has been one of the main
belligerents in the Rhodesian Bush War, conducting operations from bases in
Botswana and Zambia.

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Timeline of Developments
Note: Delegates should keep in mind that the following timeline provides neither an
exhaustive historical background to the current situation, but is intended to serve
as a basic overview of the contextual details surrounding the topic. As such, the
period 1975-1977 is covered in greater depth in the following ‘Situation Briefing’
section, and both should be supplemented by further research.

Phase I: The Colonial Era

1890 - 1923 The land which would become Southern Rhodesia is
colonised and largely administered by the British South
Africa Company (BSAC) under the leadership of Cecil
Rhodes.

October 1922 In a referendum, the citizens of Southern Rhodesia vote in

favour of responsible government over incorporation
into the Union of South Africa, marking the colony’s
transition towards self-governing status within the British
Empire.

12 September 1923 Recognising the outcome of the referendum, the UK

formally annexes Southern Rhodesia.

1 October 1923 The first constitution for the newly-formed Colony of

Southern Rhodesia comes into force, giving it the right to
elect a 30-member legislature, premier, and cabinet. The
British Crown retains a formal veto over all legislature
and foreign relations.

1923 - 1953 Southern Rhodesia experiences significant economic

growth as a result of its mineral wealth and abundance of
resources, as well as the importation of a skilled—largely
European—workforce.

1 August 1953 Responding to postwar calls for African independence,

Britain creates the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, also known as the Central African
Federation (CAF). Its constituent parts are Southern
Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland.

1 January 1964 After significant political and economic trouble, the CAF is
dissolved, with the three former constituent parts taking

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their own paths in relation to the Empire.​

In the process of dissolution, much of the Federation’s

military and financial assets were allocated to Southern
Rhodesia, owing to its white minority rule.

6 July 1964 The former protectorate of Nyasaland gains independence

as the Republic of Malawi.

24 November 1964 Southern Rhodesia is granted independence and becomes

the Republic of Zambia.

9 December 1964 An Interpretation Bill declaring that Southern Rhodesia

could be referred to as simply ‘Rhodesia’ following
Zambia’s independence is passed for royal assent. It is
never granted this.

Phase II: Towards Unilateral Independence

22 - 26 October 1964 Seeking to gain the British Government’s approval for
independence, the Southern Rhodesian leadership calls
for an indaba (a tribal conference) to discuss the matter.
They unanimously agree to support the Government’s
push for independence.

27 October 1964 British Prime Minister Harold Wilson releases a statement

warning of severe diplomatic and economic consequences
if Southern Rhodesia pursues a UDI.

5 November 1964 An independence referendum is held in Rhodesia, with

almost 90% of the votes being cast in favour of
independence.

January - March 1965 Negotiations between the British Government and

Rhodesian representatives break down over the validity of
the referendum, causing rifts in their relations

May 1965 General elections are held in Rhodesia, with the

conservative Rhodesian Front (RF) party winning 50 of
the 65 seats in the Legislative Assembly, campaigning on a
promise of independence.

June 1965 Rhodesia is not invited to the Commonwealth Prime

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Ministers’ Conference again, marking yet another

diplomatic snub and solidifying the sense of alienation
from the wider international community.

September 1965 The Rhodesian mission in Lisbon is set up after

negotiations between ‘accredited representatives’ in
Salisbury and the Government of Portugal, marking a
significant potential step in foreign support for
independence.

30 October 1965 Before departing another round of unsuccessful talks in

Rhodesia, Harold Wilson proposes the creation of a Royal
Commission to investigate the twin questions of fair
representation and independence. The Legislative
Assembly rejects the Commission after it becomes clear
that it will likely support an anti-UDI stance.

11 November 1965 On Armistice Day, the Rhodesian Cabinet signs the

Unilateral Declaration of Independence, formally
marking the beginning of the former colony’s existence as
a de facto independent state.

Phase III: Reactions and Non-Recognition

11 November 1965 Hours after the UDI, the UN General Assembly (UNGA)
passes Resolution 2024 (XX) by 107-2—South Africa and
Portugal voting against and France abstaining. The
Resolution ‘condemns the unilateral declaration of
independence made by the racialist minority in Southern
Rhodesia.’

12 November 1965 The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 216,

denouncing the UDI as ‘racist’ and ‘illegal’, as well as
formally calling on all Member States to refuse any
recognition or assistance to the Rhodesian Government.

20 November 1965 Building off earlier discussions, the UNSC passes

Resolution 217, further condemning the UDI and calling
on all States to refrain from entertaining diplomatic or
economic relations with Rhodesia. Whilst not formally
enforced, sanctions are endorsed by the Council in
responding to the development.

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December 1965 Complying with calls from the UN to take action against
Rhodesia, the UK freezes Rhodesian reserves in Britain
and imposes total economic sanctions, including an oil
embargo.

1 March 1966 Responding to reports of Rhodesia defying the oil

embargo by utilising Portuguese Mozambican ports, the
Royal Navy—acting with UNSC approval—establishes the
Beira Patrol to intercept and divert tankers bound for the
port of Beira.

9 April 1966 The UNSC passes Resolution 221, endorsing the Beira
Patrol and empowering the Royal Navy to use force in
diverting tankers, albeit limiting the scope of applicability
to Beira-bound vessels.

28 April 1966 RSF personnel engage ZANLA militants near Sinoia,

marking the first major engagement of the Rhodesian
Bush War

2 December 1966 British PM Harold Wilson and Rhodesian Prime Minister

Ian Smith meet onboard HMS Tiger to discuss possible
solutions to the situation. These are ultimately
unsuccessful given the negotiating positions of both
parties.

19 December 1966 In a monumental development for both the UN and

Rhodesia, the UNSC passes Resolution 232, instituting
the first mandatory trade sanctions in its history. (See
‘Relevant Documents’ for further details).

August 1967 A large number of ZIPRA insurgents infiltrates Rhodesia

from Zambia, prompting the launch of Operation Nickel
by the Rhodesian military. Most of the militants are
captured or killed, with survivors withdrawing into
neighbouring Botswana.

29 May 1968 Revisiting the situation, the UNSC passes Resolution 253,
placing its most extensive list of restrictions and sanctions
on the state to date.

20 June 1969 A double referendum is held in Rhodesia, with voters

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asked to support or oppose a republican form of

government and a newly-proposed constitution
essentially nullifying the relationship with the Crown.
Both proposals were approved by the electorate.

2 March 1970 Rhodesia’s government declares the establishment of a

republic and the promulgation of a new constitution,
thereby severing its last links to the British Crown.

17 November 1971 The US Congress enacts the Byrd Amendment, permitting

the importation of chromite ore from Rhodesia despite the
UN sanctions in place.19

21 December 1972 A ZANLA raid on a commercial farm in northeastern

Rhodesia prompts greater cooperation between
Portuguese authorities in Mozambique and the RSF, with
cross-border raids and counter-raids becoming a common
occurrence in the Bush War.

25 June 1975 Following the Carnation Revolution in Portugal,

Mozambique becomes independent under FRELIMO
leadership, depriving Rhodesia of a key ally.

December 1975 The Beira Patrol concludes its operations, having

received reassurances from Mozambique that it will
cease any economic trade with Rhodesia.

Late 1976 Yielding to pressure from South Africa and the United
States, the Rhodesian government agrees to the principle
of black majority rule within two years.

30 June 197720 Responding to a letter from the Permanent

Representative of Mozambique (Annex I.), the Security
Council convenes to discuss the question of Southern
Rhodesia once again.

19
For coverage of the Permanent Members’ diplomacy towards the situation, see, e.g., Eddie Michel, The White House
and White Africa: Presidential Policy Toward Rhodesia During the UDI Era, 1965-1979 (New York, NY: Routledge, 2019);
Carl-Peter Watts, Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence: An International History (New York, NY: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2012); Michael F. Lofchie, ‘The British-Rhodesian Agreement and United States Policy,’ Africa Today 19, no.
1 (1972): 44-50.
20
For more coverage of the historical background surrounding the Situation in Rhodesia see, e.g., Richard W. Hull,
‘The Conflict in Rhodesia,’ Current History 71, no. 421 ( 1976): 149-152; Margery Perham, ‘The Rhodesian Crisis: The
Background,’ International Affairs 41, no. 1 (1966): 1-13..
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Situation Briefing

A Decade of UDI: The geopolitical situation in Southern Africa, 1965-1975. States highlighted orange
are those considered ‘hostile’ to Rhodesia, those in purple considered ‘friendly’, and those in grey
‘neutral’

In the 12 years following Rhodesia’s UDI, the situation in the region has deteriorated
considerably, with the Bush War drawing in multiple neighbouring UN Member
States and claiming deplorable numbers of innocent civilian lives. All parties have
been accused of carrying out deliberate attacks on non-combatants, with the
conflict being characterised by guerilla-style infiltrations and counter-raids along
with terror attacks on public infrastructure as well as government facilities.21 The
most notable instance of this was the Nyadzonya Raid (9 August 1976), in which
Rhodesian special forces infiltrated a camp deep in Mozambican territory and
subsequently killed over 1,000 individuals.

The Rhodesian authorities have defended this action by declaring that the camp
was being used by anti-Rhodesian guerillas as a training and recruitment ground,
whilst ZANLA and the Mozambican Government argue that it was a refugee camp
housing non-armed civilians fleeing the violence to the south.22 More recently, the
RSF launched Operation Aztec just a month prior to the present Security Council
meeting (30 May 1977), infiltrating 100 kilometers (60 miles) into Mozambican
territory in a pre-emptive strike on a ZANLA base at Mapai.23 This action has drawn

21
William B. Turner, ‘The Rhodesian Bush War/Zimbabwe War of Liberation: A Political-Military Analysis,’ Small Wars
Journal, originally published February 25, 2022. [Link]
bwe-war-liberation/.
22
Richard W. Hull, ‘The Conflict in Rhodesia,’ Current History 71, no. 421 (1976): 149-152, 185.
23
Carl-Peter, Watts. Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence: An International History, (New York, NY:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
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condemnation from the likes of UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim and the

Governments of three Permanent Council Members—the Soviet Union, the United
States, and the United Kingdom. Besides the human cost of such brutalities, they
demonstrate the sheer lengths which both sides are determined to go to in order to
achieve their respective objectives.

The escalation of hostilities has only further complicated the socio-political

dimensions of the Situation. The crux of the question revolves around the matter of
achieving a domestic and international settlement over the political existence
and internal configuration of Southern Rhodesia. This two-tier problem overlaps
significantly, as the state has been repeatedly deemed an ‘illegitimate’ one in
international fora due to its ‘racist’ policies and the dominance of white minority
rule.24 Despite modifying its constitution to become a republic in 1970, the state
remains highly divided along racial lines, with many socio-economic policies
providing greater privileges to the white minority, who have benefitted from the
conservative views of the ruling Rhodesian Front party. The quandary for the
international community therefore hinges on the question of how to persuade the
authorities in Salisbury to make concessions towards gradual majority rule, without
falling victim to the excesses of earlier nationalist movements on the continent. This
will be particularly difficult given the uncompromising dedication of both sides to
their respective causes.

Having let slip one chance after another of reaching an accommodation with
more moderate black leaders, Rhodesia’s whites seem to have made the
tragic choice of facing black nationalism over the barrel of a gun rather than
the conference table. The downhill road toward a race war in Rhodesia is
becoming increasingly slippery with blood.
- Rand Daily Mail editorial, May 1976.25

Another crucial matter for the Council to address is the issue of conflict spillover,
as neighbouring nations have been drawn into the Bush War as a result of political
allegiances and the hit-and-run nature of warfare being utilised. In particular,

24
Perham, ‘The Rhodesian Crisis’; Eddie Michel and Thula Simpson, ‘Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: The Diplomacy of
Isolation and Liberation under UDI,’ South African Historical Journal 71, no. 3 (2019): 363-364.
25
Hugh Pattenden, ‘British Public Opinion on the Rhodesian Issue, 1963-1980,’ The International History Review 44, no.
2 (2022): 335-356.
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Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana have lodged complaints with the UN over
Rhodesian raids and counter-insurgency patrols violating their sovereign territory,
whilst Rhodesia’s leaders maintain that these nations have actively escalated the
conflict by willingly supporting militant groups. Until the Carnation Revolution
and the subsequent decolonisation of the Portuguese Empire, Lisbon was also
accused of supplying Rhodesia with oil through its former holdings in Mozambique,
and it also hosts ‘accredited representatives’ from the state–albeit still
withholding full de jure recognition.26 The nation with the greatest ties to the
Rhodesian ‘side’ however, remains South Africa, despite its recent withdrawal of
armed personnel assisting the RSF and reduction of arms shipments.
Unsurprisingly, the two states’ alignment stems in part from their common racial
policies—Rhodesia’s minority rule is often regarded as highly similar to the South
African Apartheid regime.27 Beyond bilateral relations, the main regional
organisation—the OAU—has been largely hindered in its response by poor
multilateral frameworks and the precarious socio-economic position of many
Member States.28 Although it has expressed a desire to end the reign of the
‘supremacist’ regime in the state, it is also cognizant of the knock-on effect that any
punitive measures might have on neighbouring members, particularly Zambia.

Beyond the African continent, Cold War dynamics also factor significantly into the
overall Situation. The United Kingdom has been assigned as the ‘primary
administering power’ from the Council, owing to Rhodesia’s historical ties to its
colonial empire. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and China have been lending
material and vocal support to ZIPRA and ZANLA, respectively. Whilst both nations
have stopped short of sending armed troops to assist the nationalist groups in their
struggle, Moscow and Beijing are not aligned on which faction to back nor on how
to end the conflict. Like the other Permanent Members, the United States has
adopted a widely-followed policy of non-recognition, despite the presence of a
26
Christopher R. W. Dietrich, ‘“The Sustenance of Salisbury” in the era of Decolonization: The Portuguese Politics of
Neutrality and the Rhodesian Oil Embargo, 1965-7.’ The International History Review 35, no. 2 (2013): 235-255; Tinashe
Nyamunda, ‘In Defence of White Rule in Southern Africa: Portuguese–Rhodesian Economic Relations to 1974,’ South
African Historical Journal 71, no. 3 (2019): 394-422.
27
Alois S Mlambo, ‘“Honoured More in the Breach than in the Observance”: Economic Sanctions on Rhodesia and
International Response, 1965 to 1979,’ South African Historical Journal 71, no. 3 (2019): 371-393.
28
Osita C. Eze, ‘OAU Faces Rhodesia.’ The African Review: A Journal of African Politics, Development and International
Affairs 5, no. 1 (1975): 43-62; Teverayi Mugutu, ‘“A Necessary Evil?”: (Southern) Rhodesia’s Diplomatic and Economic
Relations with Zambia, 1963 to 1973,’ Journal of Southern Africa Studies 50, no. 2 (2024): 331-346.

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noticeable pro-Rhodesian lobby in the administration—largely stemming from

pro-segregation politicians and advocates.29 Thus at present, the Council faces a
difficult task navigating these Cold War intrigues, superimposed on an already
complex anti-colonial and nationalist struggle.

29
Eddie, The White House and White Africa; Michael F. Lofchie, ‘The British-Rhodesian Agreement and United States
Policy,’ Africa Today 19, no. 1 (1972): 44-50.
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Possible Stances and Bloc Positions

The following section is meant to serve primarily as a general guide towards

potential stances adopted by some Member States on the Council, rather than a
prescriptive set of instructions to be adhered to by the representatives of those
Members referred to. Delegates should of course keep their own Governments’
foreign policies in mind but the Presidents would like to urge that the spirit of
cooperation and compromise be the modus operandi of the Council in its
discussions. As such, exclusion from this section should not be taken as a sign of
irrelevance or any related interpretation; any and all Members of the Council can
and should play a role in progressing the question.​

As Rhodesia has been accorded no diplomatic recognition by any polity, a

representative from the state shall not be sitting in Council sessions. However, at
the request of the Council Members it may be in order for the Presidents to
receive communications from the authorities in Salisbury, though this is
ultimately the prerogative of the Rhodesian regime.

The United Kingdom

By far the Permanent Member with the greatest historical and present role in
Southern Rhodesia, the British Government has faced a difficult predicament in
responding to the UDI, owing to the fact that its role in decolonisation on the African
continent was instrumental in pushing Rhodesian leaders towards independence at
any cost.30 In recognition of its former colonial ties to the state, both the General
Assembly and Council have designated it the primary administering power of the
situation, and it was among the first Member States to place sanctions on Rhodesia
following the 1965 UDI.31 In addition, the UK was also entrusted with the most
extreme form of Chapter VII Actions when the Royal Navy’s Beira Patrol–put in
place in an attempt to prevent Rhodesian imports of oil from Portuguese-controlled
Mozambique–was authorised to use force in its efforts to deter trade with the state.

30
Carl P. Watts, ‘The United States, Britain, and the Problem of Rhodesian Independence, 1964–1965.’ Diplomatic
History 30, no. 3 (2006): 439-470.
31
Hugh Pattenden, ‘British Public Opinion on the Rhodesian Issue, 1963-1980,’ The International History Review 44, no.
2 (2022): 335-356.
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On the other hand, Britain has also been blamed and criticised for failing to take
more assertive and decisive action to neutralise the threat posed by Rhodesia’s
policies.32 According to such accusations, Britain’s colonial policies–particularly the
implementation of land re-allocations along racial lines and the imposition of white
minority rule–are to blame for the trajectory Rhodesia has taken. In the view of
several African nations and other Third World countries, the UK therefore has the
responsibility to intervene militarily in the region. Unsurprisingly, the
Government has ruled this policy of its options, and has vetoed seven Draft
Resolutions put before the Council between 1963 and 1973 on Southern Rhodesia
which would have required it to take such measures.33 It is therefore more likely that
the UK will seek an internationalist approach towards Rhodesia based on the
principles laid out in its bilateral talks with the state’s leaders, although how it will
navigate the responsibilities of primary administering power in relation to such
solutions will be an interesting task for the representative at the Council.

The United States and France

As the other Permanent Members of the ‘Western’ bloc, the US and France have
taken similar stances on Rhodesia’s claim to statehood. However, the two have
diverged with their British counterparts on the nuances in policy towards the
regime in Salisbury. The United States, through the 1971 Byrd Amendment,
resumed the importation of vital chromium ore from Rhodesia, despite UN
sanctions against such exchanges.34 Under the current administration, the
Amendment was repealed in March 1977, and the US remains a staunch supporter
of the UN sanctions measures. For Washington, the precedence of Cold War
geopolitics has coloured its lenses when viewing the Situation, and although it has
followed an official line of minimal engagement with the Rhodesian state, it has
nonetheless assisted the UK in opening negotiations with the ruling RF party. Most
notably, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has been actively clamouring for
Rhodsian PM Ian Smith to resume talks, with the end goal of achieving a gradual
transition away from minority rule.35 However, the US’s conditions for a settlement
will also likely be influenced by the Cold War politics of the region, as the spillover

32
J. Leo Cefkin, ‘The Rhodesian Question at the United Nations,’ International Organization 22, no. 3 (1968): 649-669.
33
Michael Stephen, ‘Natural Justice at the United Nations: The Rhodesia Case,’ The American Journal of International
Law 67, no. 3 (1973): 479-490.
34
Michel, The White House and White Africa.
35
Lofchie, ‘The British-Rhodesian Agreement’.
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from the Bush War has drawn in a number of non-African powers whose influence
may not be entirely welcome by the US Government.

France on the other hand has displayed a certain ambivalence towards the
Situation. Whilst it has complied with the UN sanctions, it initially abstained on the
General Assembly Resolution condemning Rhodesia’s UDI. Following the waves of
decolonisation that have taken place in Francophone Africa, the Government has
demonstrated a keen interest in resolving the situation in Rhodesia, owing to the
fact that the UDI was an alarming development that some feared would inspire
similar actions from former colonial territories.

The Soviet Union and China

The ‘Eastern’ Permanent Members have also been significant in the development of
the Situation in the region. Neither of them have engaged with the Rhodesian
regime–and the PRC has maintained support for the UN sanctions following its
admittance to both the organisation and the SC in 1971. Beyond international fora
however, the two Powers have provided consistent support to various
anti-Rhodesian factions: the Soviets to ZIPRA and China to ZANLA. Following the
Sino-Soviet split, it is unlikely that the two Permanent Members are cooperating to
sponsor the nationalist side, but rather channeling their own rivalry through their
respective proxy.36 Since the UDI, Moscow has followed a policy of indirect
intervention in the conflict, with one Soviet diplomat expressing the views of the
Government to a Tanzanian minister as such: ‘The Soviet Union will of course take a
strong position at the UN, but it has no intention of intervening militarily in any way in
Rhodesia.’37 Thus, these two Members are likely to agree on some common points
regarding a settlement of the Situation, but are equally likely to disagree on the
finer details insofar as external involvement and post-conflict stabilisation are
concerned.

Zambia and Mozambique

As two of Rhodesia’s neighbours, these two nations are inextricably connected to
the external relations of the regime in Salisbury. Zambia’s historical connection to
36
Vladimir Shubin, The Hot ‘Cold’ War: The USSR in Southern Africa (London: Pluto Books, 2008).
37
CIA Intelligence Memorandum, ‘Soviet and Chinese Communist Attitudes Toward the Rhodesian Problem.’
Originally released 11 December 1965. Accessed at [Link]
[Link].
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Southern Rhodesia—being the former British protectorate of Northern

Rhodesia—complicated its policy towards the fellow post-colonial state following
the 1965 UDI.38 Until a breakdown in relations in 1973, Zambia was obliged to follow
a policy of careful engagement with Rhodesia, on account of the latter’s economic
and military strength. During this period, Rhodesia’s use of economic diplomacy
and intimidation tactics on the borderlands of the Zambezi River compelled the
Government in Lusaka to establish an informal modus vivendi: Zambia needed
access to Rhodesian infrastructure and manufactured goods for its development,
whilst Rhodesia required the markets of Zambia to circumvent the financial
restrictions placed by UN sanctions.39 Since 1973 with the closure of the border and
a complete breakdown in relations, Zambia has hosted ZANLA and ZIPRA fighters,
and has faced violations of its airspace as well as sovereign territory by South
African and Rhodesian troops launching counter-raids to pre-empt further
infiltration by these guerillas.

Mozambique, by contrast, was a former ally of Rhodesia when it was still under the
colonial administration of Portugal. Indeed, the Rhodesians made use of
Mozambican facilities to receive oil shipments from pipelines that ran through the
region, thereby preventing an effective application of the UN sanctions on its
energy supplies.40 Following the victory of FRELIMO in the Mozambican War of
Independence (1964-1975), the situation turned drastically against the Rhodesian
regime, with the newly-independent neighbour immediately halting all financial
and political assistance to the state. Since then, RSF incursions onto Mozambican
territory have occurred, with the most notable being the bloody Nyadzonya Raid.
Mozambique has also witnessed a sizable influx of refugees fleeing the cross-border
violence, and will likely be requesting UN support in handling the humanitarian
dimensions alongside a pro-nationalist settlement.

Portugal
Prior to 1975 and the fall of the Estado Novo in Portugal, it was the main
non-African ally of Southern Rhodesia, with the latter possessing a mission in
Lisbon. This was hitherto the closest Rhodesia had come to achieving de jure

38
Richard Brown, ‘Zambia and Rhodesia: A Study in Contrast,’ Current History 47, no. 284 (1965); 201-206, 242-243.
39
Mugutu, ‘“A Necessary Evil?”’.
40
Robert McNamara and Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, ‘The Last Throw of the Dice: Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa,
1970–4,’ Portuguese Studies 28, no. 2 (2012): 201-215.
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recognition and formal diplomatic relations with another state, although the
mission was shut down on 1 May 1975 following a reversal in Portuguese foreign
policy. Portugal’s relation to the Situation also revolves around its post-colonial
relationship with Rhodesia’s neighbour Mozambique, through which the regime in
Salisbury was able to receive trade despite the UN sanctions. Although the new
leadership in Lisbon is likely to be more open-minded towards negotiations and a
political settlement than its predecessor, this will likely be based on the condition
that any steps taken towards the end of the conflict must be mutual and possibly
also with assurances of regional cooperation.

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Past Resolutions
The following is a list of Security Council Resolutions adopted in sessions with
agenda items pertaining to the Question of Southern Rhodesia and the ongoing
conflicts in southern Africa. Delegates may take these as a starting point for their
own preparations on the matter alongside those documents contained in the
‘Further Reading’ section of this Study Guide.

Resolution Date (D/M/Y) Description

S/RES/216 12/11/1965 Condemnation and non-recognition of the Rhodesian

UDI.

S/RES/217 20/11/1965 Further condemnation of the regime in Rhodesia and

recognition of the UK as the main intervening power

S/RES/221 09/04/1966 Calls for the Portuguese Government to cease oil

exports to Rhodesia through Mozambique; authorising
use of force by the Royal Navy’s Beira Patrol.

S/RES/232 16/12/1966 Introduction of the first ever sanctions measures by the

UNSC against the Rhodesian regime.

S/RES/253 29/05/1968 Expansion of the sanctions measures put in place and

the withdrawal of assistance in any form by Member
States to Rhodesia.

S/RES/268 28/07/1969 Response to a complaint by Zambia about incursions

from Mozambique by Portuguese anti-guerilla
squads, calling on Portugal to cease any such actions.

S/RES/277 18/03/1970 Non-recognition and condemnation of Rhodesia’s

proclamation of a republic and further calls for Member
States to comply with current measures in place

S/RES/288 17/11/1970 Reaffirmation of the UK’s responsibility as the

administering power in the SItuation and the extension
of the sanctions measures.

S/RES/318 28/02/1972 Further restatement of action already taken on the

Question and another call for Member States to comply

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S/RES/320 29/09/1972 Extension of sanctions measures alongside follow-up

investigation into the circumvention of such measures
by Portugal and South Africa.

S/RES/326 02/02/1973 Condemnation of Rhodesia and South Africa regarding

military and economic measures taken against Zambia,
as well as the creation of a ‘Special Mission’ to assess
the regional situation.

S/RES/327 02/02/1973 Appraisal of Zambian sanctions placed on Rhodesia in

S/RES/328 10/03/1973 response to the escalation of hostilities and the
S/RES/329 10/03/1973 assignment of UN-based economic policy assistance.

S/RES/333 22/05/1973 Expansion of sanctions measures to include indirect

dealings with Rhodesia through Portugal and South
Africa as well as regional neighbours.

S/RES/386 17/03/1976 Appraisal of newly-independent Mozambique’s

severance of economic and political relations with
Rhodesia and the attachment of UN-based assistance

S/RES/388 06/04/1976 Further expansion of the sanctions measures already in

place to include foreign-insured goods exported to
Rhodesia and other financial assets.

S/RES/403 14/01/1977 Condemnation of Rhodesian hostilities towards

S/RES/406 25/05/1977 Botswana and the welcoming of the latter’s invitation
for UN assistance on the Situation.

S/RES/409 27/05/1977 Most recent expansion of sanctions measures to include

the prohibition of any funds or assets from Rhodesia in
Member States, and a decision to investigate further
punitive action under the Charter.

As of 30 June 1977, the Security Council has adopted a grand total of 20

Resolutions on the Question of Southern Rhodesia, though it should be noted
that this does not include any Presidential Statements, Press Releases, or other
materials passed by the Council in relation to the spillover from the conflict into the
wider region. Whilst the effects of these Resolutions remains to be seen, delegates
should keep in mind the commonalities in approaches taken thus far for the
purpose of their deliberations at ScotMUN 2025.

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Questions to Address
Delegates should keep in mind that this list of points is neither exhaustive nor a
required ‘checklist’ to go through when discussing the agenda topic. It is meant to
serve instead as a guide to potential sub-topics that may go on to form the
substance of clauses in a working paper and/or draft resolution. Likewise, the
Presidents of the Council wholeheartedly encourage explorations of points that
may not strictly fall under this list but nonetheless remain relevant and important to
holistically addressing the topic and progressing the cause of the Council.
●​ How should the Council ●​ What measures might be used to
intervene in the region given the ensure a peaceful transitional
overlapping nature of the Bush period in Southern Rhodesia?
War? What should be the role of the
authorities in Salisbury?

●​ What steps should be taken by ●​ How can the Council minimise

parties to the conflict in order to and contain the humanitarian
de-escalate hostilities and spillover from the conflict?
resolve their differences?

●​ How should the international ●​ How can the Council reliably

community continue to treat ensure that the tensions of the
Rhodesia vis-a-vis its claim to Cold War do not continue to
statehood? influence/complicate the matter?

●​ Does the United Kingdom ●​ Should legal action be brought

possess a greater burden of against the various perpetrators
responsibility to act on the of brutalities and crimes
question given its historical committed during the Bush War?
contributions to the situation? How will these be handled?

●​ If any Chapter VII interventions ●​ How can the Council help

are deemed necessary, how can reconcile the different nationalist
the Council ensure that punitive and race-based views on the
measures are taken in the best trajectory of Rhodesia’s domestic
interests of the regional development? What measures
community and international might be used to encourage
opinion? greater inter-communal
dialogue?

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References:
Topic One
Burtenshaw, Ronan. “Forward Ever, Backward Never: Grenada’s Revolution at 40.”
Tribune, August 4, 2019.
[Link]

​Curtis, Mark. “The Only US Military Intervention Britain (Somewhat) Opposed.”

Declassified Media Ltd, October 25, 2023.
[Link]
mewhat-opposed/.

​The Editors of the Encyclopædia Britannica. “U.S. Invasion of Grenada.”

Encyclopædia Britannica, October 18, 2024.
[Link]

Gailey, Phil, and Warren Weaver. “Briefing.” The New York Times, March 26, 1983.
[Link]

“General Assembly, 38th Session : 43rd Plenary Meeting, Wednesday, 2 November

1983, New York.” United Nations, November 2, 1983.
[Link]

Kukielski, Philip G. “Secret Mission of Urgent Fury.” U.S. Naval Institute, October 1,
2021.
[Link]
et-mission-urgent-fury.

Laumann, Dennis. “Grenada Marks 40 Years since the Assassination of

Revolutionary Leader Maurice Bishop.” People’s World, October 19, 2023.
[Link]
assination-of-revolutionary-leader-maurice-bishop/.

“Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly at Its 38th Session.” UN General

Assembly Resolutions Tables, 1983.
[Link]

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​Rust, Owen. 2023. “How the Invasion of Grenada Exposed the Brutality of the US
Military.” TheCollector.
[Link]

​​Smith, Wren. “Legal Narratives of the Invasion of Grenada, 1983.” Institute of

Advanced Legal Studies, October 22, 2024.
[Link]

Sunkara, Bhaskar. “The US Invaded the Island of Granada 40 Years Ago. The Legacy
of Revolution Lives On.” The Guardian, October 25, 2023.
[Link]
he-island-of-grenada-40-years-ago-the-legacy-of-revolution-lives-on.

United Nations. “Text of the U.N. Resolution.” The New York Times, October 29,
1983.
[Link]

United States Military Academy. “Invasion of Grenada by US and Caribbean Nations,

1983.” Wikimedia Commons.
[Link]

Us Army PAO. Op Urgent Fury Invasion Map, February 2, 2012.

[Link]

Additional Useful Background Reading:

Lewis, Patsy, Gary Williams, and Peter Clegg. Grenada : Revolution and Invasion. 1st
ed. Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 2015. Proquest Ebook
Central.

​Williams, Gart. US-Grenada Relations : Revolution and Intervention in the Backyard.

New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. ProQuest Ebook Central.

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Topic Two
Brown, Richard. ‘Zambia and Rhodesia: A Study in Contrast.’ Current History 47, no.
284 (1965): 201-206, 242-243.

Cefkin, J. Leo. ‘The Rhodesian Question at the United Nations.’ International

Organization 22, no. 3 (1968): 649-669.

Dietrich, Christopher R. W. ‘ “The Sustenance of Salisbury” in the era of

Decolonization: The Portuguese Politics of Neutrality and the Rhodesian Oil
Embargo, 1965-7.’ The International History Review 35, no. 2 (2013): 235-255.

Eze, Osita C. ‘OAU Faces Rhodesia.’ The African Review: A Journal of African Politics,
Development and International Affairs 5, no. 1 (1975): 43-62.

Hull, Richard W. ‘The Conflict in Rhodesia.’ Current History 71, no. 421 (1976):
149-152, 185.

Lofchie, Michael F. ‘The British-Rhodesian Agreement and United States Policy.’

Africa Today 19, no. 1 (1972): 44-50.

McNamara, Robert and Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses. ‘The Last Throw of the Dice:
Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa, 1970–4.’ Portuguese Studies 28, no. 2
(2012): 201-215.

Michel, Eddie and Thula Simpson. ‘Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: The Diplomacy of

Isolation and Liberation under UDI.’ South African Historical Journal 71, no. 3
(2019): 363-364.

Michel, Eddie. The White House and White Africa: Presidential Policy Toward Rhodesia
During the UDI Era, 1965-1979. New York, NY: Routledge, 2019.

Mlambo, Alois S. ‘“Honoured More in the Breach than in the Observance”: Economic
Sanctions on Rhodesia and International Response, 1965 to 1979.’ South
African Historical Journal 71, no. 3 (2019): 371-393.

Muguti, Teverayi. ‘“A Necessary Evil?”: (Southern) Rhodesia’s Diplomatic and

Economic Relations with Zambia, 1963 to 1973.’ Journal of Southern Africa
Studies 50, no. 2 (2024): 331-346.

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Nyamunda, Tinashe. ‘In Defence of White Rule in Southern Africa:

Portuguese–Rhodesian Economic Relations to 1974.’ South African Historical
Journal 71, no. 3 (2019): 394-422.

Pattenden, Hugh. ‘British Public Opinion on the Rhodesian Issue, 1963-1980.’ The
International History Review 44, no. 2 (2022): 335-356.

Perham, Margery. ‘The Rhodesian Crisis: The Background.’ International Affairs 42,
no. 1 (1966): 1-13.

Shubin, Vladimir. The Hot ‘Cold War’: The USSR in Southern Africa. London: Pluto
Press, 2008.

Stephen, Michael. ‘Natural Justice at The United Nations: The Rhodesia Case.’ The
American Journal of Interdisciplinary Law 67, no. 3 (1973): 479-490.

Turner, William B. ‘The Rhodesian Bush War/Zimbabwe War of Liberation: A

Political-Military Analysis.’ Small Wars Journal. Originally published 25
February 2022.
[Link]
r-liberation/.

Watts, Carl-Peter. Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence: An

International History. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Watts, Carl P. ‘The United States, Britain, and the Problem of Rhodesian
Independence, 1964–1965.’ Diplomatic History 30, no. 3 (2006): 439-470.

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