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037 – 27 March 2024
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No. 037/2024 dated 27 March 2024
China’s Two Sessions:
Key Policy Priorities and Challenges
Stefanie Kam
SYNOPSIS
China's recently concluded "Two Sessions" discussed key policies amid external
challenges. The main themes for the year encompassed China’s peaceful
development, advocacy for the Global South amid competition with the United States,
cross-strait relations, and productivity. These themes underscore China's
assertiveness as a rising power amid challenges.
COMMENTARY
China recently concluded its "Two Sessions", its annual parliamentary gatherings, with
top leaders outlining key directives on domestic and foreign policy. Premier Li Qiang
highlighted external challenges posed by the current global environment that may
exert an “adverse impact on China’s development”.
The main themes introduced for the year included China’s peaceful development;
China’s role as a champion of the Global South amid sustained strategic competition
with the United States; peaceful development of cross-strait relations; and productivity,
development, and modernisation. These themes underscore China's assertiveness as
a rising power amid challenges.
The recently concluded Two Sessions unveiled China’s policy priorities amid structural and practical challenges
both domestically and internationally, highlighting the complex challenges that China will have to contend with as
a rising power. Image from Wikimedia Commons.
Peaceful Development
The premier’s work report emphasised China’s pursuit of an “independent foreign
policy of peace and peaceful development”, “opening up for mutual benefit”, “an equal
and orderly multipolar world”, and “a new type of international relations”.
The notion of peaceful development, from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, underscores China's
rise within a peaceful global order. It was also mentioned in the 2015 and 2019
defence white papers on China's foreign policy and modernisation path.
Premier Li highlighted the country's efforts to expand “global partnerships” to play “an
active and constructive role in addressing international and regional hotspot issues”.
The goal is in line with efforts to enhance China’s image as a responsible global power
and Xi's vision of promoting a "human community with a shared future" through
Chinese-style modernisation (zhongguo shi xiandaihua). The report also referenced
China’s global development, security, and civilisation initiatives.
China has engaged in peacebuilding activities where it has overseas interests. It
sent Special Envoy Li Hui to meet with officials in Moscow and Kyiv to persuade both
parties to engage in negotiations. It has also pressed Iran to rein in attacks by Yemen’s
Houthis on commercial ships travelling through key shipping routes in the Red Sea.
Beijing has also been working to support the peace and reconstruction of Afghanistan.
In addition, for both domestic reasons and to avoid tarnishing its international image,
China has been cracking down on criminal activities in Southeast Asia involving
Chinese nationals. However, while proactive in some areas, China exercises restraint
in others to avoid entanglement in sensitive issues.
The work report referenced China’s role as champion of the Global South, echoing
Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s earlier remarks that the expansion of the BRICS economic
bloc was a reflection of the “collective rise of the Global South” in the shift toward
“multipolarity”.
In addition to mentioning increasing foreign trade and partnerships with countries
under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through free trade agreements and investment
treaties, the work report highlights China’s role in environmental conservation. China
aims to boost “the green and low-carbon economy” and to work towards achieving
carbon neutrality through 10 major initiatives.
The work report references a “new type of international relations” that mirrors Xi’s
2014 mention of a "new type of great power relations", which would “break [from] the
traditional law of conflict and confrontation between major powers”.
China continues to face sustained strategic competition with the United States despite
recent stabilisation efforts. It faces ongoing trade tensions with the European Union
and a potential US ban on the Chinese tech company Bytedance. China’s more
assertive foreign policy under Xi amid these challenges reflects greater willingness to
challenge the US-led order.
While the Chinese government is assertive overseas, the Chinese Communist Party
has enhanced its control over state and society. The country’s financial regulation
structure, national data bureau, and science and technology ministry are set to
undergo reform and reorganisation.
Also, this year China cancelled its annual press conference, typically led by the
premier alongside the Two Sessions, and indicated that this tradition will no longer be
continued. Over the last three decades, China's premiers have used the annual press
conferences to discuss matters relating to the economy and other policy issues.
Cancelling the annual premier press conferences signals a reduced focus on the
premier’s role, further centralisation of power under CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping,
and the tightening of media and information control at the top level.
Peaceful Unification
Premier Li reaffirmed Beijing's stance on Taiwan during the Two Sessions, stating that
China will firmly oppose separatist activities aimed at Taiwan independence and will
“push for the peaceful development of cross-strait relations” (tuidong liangan guanxi
heping fazhan). Key themes highlighted include "one country, two systems", the "1992
consensus", and “unification with the motherland” (zuguo tongyi daye), all aligned with
China's aspiration to achieve great power status by 2049.
Recent incidents in the Taiwan Strait – the February 2024 clash between a Fujian
fishing boat and Taiwan authorities, and Beijing's unilateral flight path changes – bear
resemblance to brinksmanship. Amid tensions over US arms sales to Taiwan, such
manoeuvres raise concerns over potential conflict escalation.
China’s Productivity, Development, and Modernisation
Another focus at the Two Sessions was leveraging "new productive forces" for "high-
quality development" to modernise industries. The work report stressed innovative
development in advanced sectors like electric vehicles (EVs), artificial intelligence (AI),
renewable energy, infrastructure, semiconductors, and quantum computing, as well
as technological investments and support for entrepreneurs in boosting the science
and technology industry. Projecting a target of 5% GDP growth, the central
government pledged 370.8 billion yuan (US$51.51 billion) towards science and
technology investments to help boost productivity in 2024.
Economic development
Science and technology innovation are central to achieving China's pursuit of high-
quality growth. China’s science and technology industry leaders have proposed
creating more “independent and controllable” AI ecosystems, strengthening top-level
design, clarifying development goals and key tasks, increasing investment, and
narrowing the gap with advanced systems in the United States. A nationwide push to
integrate AI into education across all levels is under way, from primary to tertiary
institutions.
Xi's emphasis on the party's centrality has curtailed market forces, hindering bottom-
up innovation. This state-centric approach may impede collaboration, affecting global
solutions for climate change and public health. Domestically, it affects innovation,
foreign investment, and talent retention.
Local actors play an important role in AI development, challenging the idea of unified
state control over the sector. However, there is a risk that as geopolitical risks
intertwine with Xi’s national security agenda for AI, the space for local innovation may
narrow. The central government may also view "hard" technologies like EVs more
favourably than "soft" ones like social media and gaming, which are much harder to
regulate. Balancing technological progress with reforms and global understanding is
critical for China's leadership in technology.
Military modernisation
Premier Li announced a 7.2% increase in China's defence budget from the previous
year to 1.67 trillion yuan (US$232 billion). This is in line with efforts to build a modern
and technologically advanced joint fighting force, “basically complete national defence
and military modernisation by 2035”, and possess a “world-class military by mid-
century”.
China’s ongoing efforts to integrate the military with its hi-tech commercial sector and
academic enterprise is expected to bring about fresh challenges to China’s civil-
military fusion strategy. These are in addition to the practical challenges highlighted in
a RAND report: recruitment, training and retention of a professional fighting force, and
corruption. US efforts to restrict China's access to advanced AI chips used for
developing military technology have also posed a challenge to China’s military
development. Analysts warn against collaboration with China owing to the security
risks arising from the lack of a clear line between defence and commercial
endeavours.
Conclusion
The Two Sessions unveiled China’s policy priorities amid structural and practical
challenges both domestically and internationally. Faced with economic headwinds and
heightened geopolitical tensions, including growing hostility from Western powers,
China's response to these complexities will be closely watched by many observers as
it treads a path towards its avowed peaceful development.
Stefanie KAM is an Assistant Professor at the China Programme and Deputy
Coordinator of the MSc Programme in Asian Studies at RSIS.
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