[ G.R. No. 240337.

January 04, 2022 ]

FRANCIS O. MORALES PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

CARANDANG, J.:

Before Us is a Motion for Reconsideration1 of this Court's

Resolution2 dated September 21, 2020, which affirmed the Decision3 dated
March 15, 2018 and the Resolution4 dated June 22, 2018 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 39341. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 1, 2016 of the

Regional Trial Court, Angeles City, Branch 56 in Criminal Case
No. R-ANG-15-02275-CR (MTCC Case No. 13-8513), which
affirmed the judgment of conviction rendered by the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Angeles City, Pampanga, Branch III for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage to Property and
Multiple Serious Physical Injuries is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

1) Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of

imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor;

2) The award of lost income for one (1) month at P400 per
day, or the sum of P12,000.00, to spouses Rico and Leilani
Mendoza is DELETED and, in lieu thereof, petitioner is ORDERED
to pay temperate damages in the amount of P8,000.00;

3) The award of lost income for one (1) week at P400 per
day, or sum of P2,800.00 to Myrna Cunanan is DELETED and, in
lieu thereof, petitioner is ORDERED to pay temperate damages
in the amount of P2,000.00; and

4) The award of P350,000.00 to Noel G. Garcia representing

the cost of the repairs of the jeepney is DELETED and, in lieu
thereof, petitioner is ORDERED to pay Noel G. Garcia or his
authorize[d] representative temperate damages in the amount
of P150,000.00.

SO ORDERED.5

Facts of the Case

On June 5, 2013, an information was filed against Francis O. Morales

(petitioner) for the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property and Multiple Physical Injuries. The accusatory portion of the
information reads:

That on or about 14th day of May, 2013, in the

City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then the driver of a
Mitsubishi Delica Van with Plate No. XKZ-528
owned and driven by Francis O. Morales, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive
and operate the said vehicle along Sto. Rosario St.
 corner San Jose St., Brgy. San Jose, Angeles City, in
a careless, reckless and imprudent manner and in
utter disregard of traffic laws, rules, and
regulations and without taking the necessary
precaution and care to avoid accident, thereby
causing such recklessness and imprudence to hit
and bump a Isuzu Jitney with Plate No. CWR-138
owned by a certain Noel F. Garcia a resident of 333
Dela Paz Norte, CSFP and driven by Rico M.
Mendoza as a result thereof, the driver of said
Isuzu Jitney with Plate No. CWR-138
sustained serious physical injuries and the three
(3) other passengers namely: Lailani Mendoza,
Myrna Cunanan and Albert Vital sustained slight
physical injuries, likewise said Isuzu Jitney with
Plate No. CWR-138 incurred damages in the
estimated amount of THREE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P350,000.00), Philippine
Currency to the prejudice of said complainant.

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.6 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, trial

ensued. The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely Rico Mendoza
(Rico), Leilani Mendoza7 (Leilani), and Myrna Cunanan (Myrna). The defense
presented petitioner as its sole witness.8

The witnesses for the prosecution alleged that on May 15, 2013 at around
3:00 a.m., Rico, Leilani, and Myrna, together with Albert Vital (Albert;
collectively, private complainants), were on board a passenger jeepney with
Plate No. CWR-138. Rico was driving the jeepney. They came from Maimpis
and were traversing the road of Sto. Rosario Street, Angeles City on their
way to Angeles City Market. They were on the right lane. Meanwhile, the
Delica van driven by petitioner with Plate No. XKZ-528 was on the opposite
lane going to San Fernando. Petitioner suddenly overtook the vehicle in front
of him, causing him to occupy the lane of the jeepney. Rico tried to avoid the
collision to no avail as petitioner was driving in a fast speed. Petitioner
bumped the jeepney resulting in physical injuries to the passengers and
driver as well as extensive damage to the jeepney amounting to
P350,000.00. Rico suffered a deep laceration in the forehead and a cervical
strain. He underwent suturing and hospitalization in the amount of
P14,345.00. Leilani sustained skin and soft tissue avaltion, posterior lateral
aspect right forearm and sprain ankle, costing her hospitalization expenses
in the amount of P34,763.50. Myra suffered multiple physical injury and
incurred damages in the amount of P3,045.00. Albert incurred hospitalization
expenses in the amount of P2,895.80.9

Petitioner countered that after a night of merry making, he and his friends
decided to go to a gotohan in Angeles City at the midnight of May 15, 2013.
He rode his Delica van with his 13-year-old son. They stayed at
the gotohan until 3:00 a.m. On their way home, they passed Sto. Rosario
Street bound for San Fernando City. They occupied the inner lane of the road
going to San Fernando. The right side of the jeepney driven by Rico suddenly
hit the Delica van. Petitioner and his son were injured and brought to the
Sacred Heart Medical Center. The Delica van also sustained extensive
damages.10

Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities

In its Decision11 dated June 30, 2015, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of Angeles City convicted petitioner of the crime charged, viz:
 WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court finds accused Francisco
Morales GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to multiple physical injuries and damage to property
and he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
one month and twenty one days to two months.

Likewise, Francisco Morales is ordered to pay the following

indemnifications:

1. To Spouses Rico Mendoza and Leilani Mendoza:

a)Hospitalization expenses for the sum of P49,108.50;

b)Lost Income for one (1) month for P400 per day at a sum
of P12,000.00;

c)Moral damages of P10,000.00 each spouse.

2. To Myra Cunanan:

a)Hospitalization expenses for the sum of P3,045.00;

b)Lost income for one (1) week for P400 per day at a sum of
P2,800.00;

c)Moral damages of P10,000.00.

3. Albert Vital:

a)Hospitalization expenses for the sum of P2,895.00.

4. To Noel G. Garcia the registered owner of the passenger jeep with plate
number CWR-138 or any of his authorized representative, the amount of
three hundred fifty thousand pesos (P350,000.00) representing the cost of
the repair of the damage of the passenger jeep.

SO ORDERED.12

The MTCC found that the proximate cause of the collision was the
recklessness and negligence of petitioner in driving his Delica van. Petitioner,
in violation of Section 37 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4136, as amended,
hastily overtook the vehicle in front of him without first determining whether
the road was clear. He was also driving his van at a fast speed, as evidenced
by the extent of damage incurred by both vehicles in violation of the speed
restriction stated in Section 35 of R.A. No. 4136.13

The MTCC ruled that it is undisputed that the jeepney driven by Rico was
traversing along its rightful lane when the van coming from the opposite
direction suddenly overtook another vehicle and encroached on the
passenger jeep. The accident would not have happened had the accused
stayed on his lane and not recklessly try to overtake another vehicle,
especially not at 3:00 a.m. while the road is dark and not well lighted.14

The MTCC held petitioner liable for: (1) the lost income of spouses Rico
and Leilani as well as Myrna who, as vendors, were earning P400.00 to
P500.00 per day; (2) the medical and hospital expenses of Rico, Lailani,
Myrna, and Albert; and (3) moral damages to Rico, Leilani, and Myrna.15

Petitioner sought reconsideration but the MTCC denied in its

Order16 dated August 25, 2015. Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC).
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision17 dated December 1, 2016, the RTC affirmed the ruling of
the MTCC. It agreed with the MTCC that petitioner's negligence in overtaking
the vehicle in front of his without taking the necessary precaution is the
proximate cause of the injury and damage suffered by the private
complainants. It noted that the sketch of the incident showed that the point
of impact was at the inner lane occupied by the jeepney. This proves that
petitioner encroached into the rightful lane of the jeep. Evidence tending to
illustrate the relative positions of the vehicles immediately after the accident
tends to throw light on the issue of speed and direction of the vehicle's
movement prior to, and at the time of the accident. The RTC also sustained
the MTCC's finding that petitioner was speeding at the time of the accident,
which very act is indicative of imprudent behavior.18

Undaunted, petitioner elevated the case to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision19 dated March 15, 2018, the CA affirmed the RTC with
modification as to the penalty imposed and the damages granted.

Preliminarily, the CA upheld the conviction of petitioner for the crime of

reckless imprudence resulting in multiple physical injuries and damage to
property. It agreed with the RTC and the MTCC that it was petitioner's act of
overtaking the vehicle in front of his, without taking the necessary care and
precaution to ensure that he can safely do so, that was the proximate cause
of the injury suffered by Rico and his passengers. Petitioner was at fault
because he was driving at the wrong side of the road when the collision
happened. As shown in the Traffic Accident Report (TAR) and the testimonies
of the witnesses, before the collision, the jeepney driven by Rico was cruising
along its rightful lane when the Delica van driven by petitioner, suddenly
swerved and encroached its lane. The accident would not have happened
had petitioner driven his vehicle on its lane and did not recklessly try to
overtake another vehicle. Significantly, petitioner did not deny the fact that
he overtook another vehicle.20

The CA noted that petitioner is presumed to be negligent at the time of

the mishap pursuant to Article 2185 of the New Civil Code, since he was
violating a traffic regulation, that is, he was driving on the wrong side of the
road at the time of the accident. Petitioner failed to rebut the
presumption.21

The CA also rejected petitioner's argument that Rico was at fault because
the latter testified that he saw the approaching van but failed to evade the
same. It held that R.A. No. 4136, as amended, provides that the one
who is overtaking on the road has the obligation to let other cars in
the opposite direction know his/her presence and not the other way
around as petitioner seems to suggest. Likewise, the CA ruled that the last
clear chance doctrine does not apply in the case because it presupposes that
both parties are negligent. Here, it was established that petitioner's
negligence caused the damage and the injury.22

With respect to the penalty imposed, the CA explained that the penalty
prescribed for reckless imprudence is dependent on whether the
act, if committed with intent, would have resulted in a grave felony,
less grave felony, or light felony. The CA found that the evidence
presented by the prosecution shows that the injuries sustained by Rico,
Leilani, and Myrna amount only to slight physical injuries, which is a less
grave felony. Per the Certificates of Confinement, Leilani was confined for
three to five days only, Rico for two to three days, and none was mentioned
for Myrna. No other proof was shown that they were incapacitated for labor
or that they required medical attendance for a longer period. Pursuant to
Section 97 of R.A. No. 10951, the prescribed penalty for reckless imprudence
for an act, which if it had been intentional would have been a less grave
felony, is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, or from one (1)
month and one (1) day to four (4) months. Since the maximum term of
imprisonment in this case, four (4) months, does not exceed one (1) year,
the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law find no application. The CA
ruled that a straight penalty taken from arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods should be imposed. It meted the penalty of imprisonment of
two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor.23

As to the damages awarded, the CA sustained the grant of moral

damages and actual damages representing hospitalization expenses.
However, on the award for lost income, Rico, Leilani, and Myrna failed to
present evidence sufficiently showing their respective income. Hence, the
awards for lost income should be deleted. Similarly, Noel G. Garcia failed to
adduce competent proof of the amount spent for the repair or replacement
of the wrecked jeep. The sum of P350,000.00 is merely a cost estimate from
a motor repair shop and not the actual amount expended to repair the jeep.
Due to the lack of documentary proof, the CA awarded temperate damages
in lieu of actual damages since some pecuniary loss was suffered though its
amount cannot be proven with certainty.24

Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the CA denied in its

Resolution25 dated June 22, 2018. He elevated the case before Us via a
petition for review on certiorari. The People of the Philippines, represented
by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a comment.

Proceedings Before this Court

Arguments of
Petitioner

Petitioner raised the following: first, the CA erred in giving full faith and
credence to the TAR, which stated that petitioner was at fault when the
collision happened because he was driving at the wrong side of the road.
Petitioner insisted that the TAR was prepared without his presence since he
and his child were then being treated at the hospital for the severe injuries
they suffered. The TAR was prepared at the instance of the private
complainants; thus it does not provide a truthful account of what transpired
during the accident.26

Second, the object evidence, particularly the physical depression on the

vehicles, showed that Rico instead of steering the jeepney away from
petitioner's approaching van, steered right into the van's direction head on.
The point of impact of the van and the jeepney was within petitioner's lane.
Rico admitted that he saw petitioner's approaching vehicle from the opposite
direction, but he did not evade it. Thus, it was Rico who was negligent in
driving his vehicle. It was he who had the last opportunity to reflect and
deliberate on the impending danger of an overtaking vehicle from the
opposite direction of the road. More, the prosecution failed to establish the
actual speed of petitioner's vehicle and the circumstances of place and time
immediately prior to the collision. Neither did it prove that Rico was driving
the jeepney with due diligence.27

Third, the award of temperate damages to the private complainants has

no basis because petitioner was not shown to have been negligent when he
drove his vehicle prior to, or during the collision. Private complainants failed
to adduce evidence that they sustained substantial pecuniary losses due to
the accident or even establish their earning capacity.28

Fourth, the CA, applying Section 97 of R.A. No. 10951,29 imposed upon
the petitioner the straight penalty of two (2) months imprisonment, an
increase from the lower court's-imposed penalty of one (1) month and
twenty (20) days to two (2) months of imprisonment. R.A. No. 10951 was
passed in 2017, while the alleged infraction was committed in 2013.
Inasmuch as R.A. No. 10951 is not favorable to him, the same should not be
applied in the case.30

Arguments of
respondent

The OSG maintained that the courts a quo correctly found that the
prosecution established all the elements of the crime charged. The MTCC's
finding of guilt was based on the evidence that petitioner overtook the
vehicle without checking whether the opposite lane was clearly visible from
incoming vehicle. It also considered the evidence that it was 3:00 a.m., the
road was not well lighted, and petitioner was driving at a fast speed. The
RTC, meanwhile, based its ruling on a sketch which showed that the impact
occurred at the inner lane occupied by the private complainants' jeepney.
The CA anchored its findings on the unrebutted presumption of negligence
that arose because petitioner was violating a traffic regulation during the
mishap. Thus, the CA did not rely solely on the contents of the TAR. As for
the award of damages, the OSG argued that that it was in conformity with
prevailing jurisprudence.31

In Our assailed Resolution32 dated September 21, 2020, We denied the

petition for failure to show any reversible error on the part of the CA as to
warrant the exercise of Our discretionary appellate jurisdiction.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed this present Motion for

Reconsideration,33 repleading and reiterating the arguments in his petition
for review.

Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether We should uphold petitioner's

conviction.

Ruling of the Court

We affirm petitioner's conviction but modify the penalty imposed.

Petitioner was charged of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple

physical injuries and damage to property. Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) punishes the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence." It
defines reckless imprudence as voluntarily, but without malice, doing or
failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing
to perform such act, taking into consideration his/her employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.34

The Ivler Doctrine

In Ivler v. Hon. Judge Modesto-San Pedro35 (Ivler), We emphasized that

simple and reckless imprudence are distinct species of crimes, separately
defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws. Reckless
imprudence is not merely a way of committing a crime. We noted that: (1)
the object of punishment in quasi-crimes is the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, while in
intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; (2) the legislature intended to
treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses otherwise they would have been
subsumed under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent; and (3) the
penalty structure for quasi-crimes differ from intentional crimes in that the
criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual wilful crime but is set
in relation to a whole class, or series of crimes.36 Thus, the correct way of
alleging quasi-crimes is to state that their commission resulted in damage,
either to person or property, such as reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide or simple imprudence causing damage to property.37

In Ivler, the accused was charged of two separate offenses arising from
the same vehicular accident, which are reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries and reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and
damage to property. He pleaded guilty to the first charge and was meted the
penalty of public censure. He was tried for the second charge, but he moved
to quash the information on the ground of double jeopardy. The Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) denied the quashal finding no identity of offenses in the
two cases. The RTC dismissed the accused's petition for certiorari for lack of
standing. The accused elevated the case before Us arguing that his
constitutional right against double jeopardy bars his prosecution for the
second charge, having been convicted previously in the first charge for the
same imprudent act. He maintained that there is only one offense of reckless
imprudence, and the multiple consequences of such act are material only to
determine the penalty. We ruled in favor of the accused.

We recognized in Ivler that there are two approaches in the prosecution

of quasi-crimes. The first approach applies Article 48 of the RPC while the
second approach forbids its application. Article 48 deals with complex
crimes. It allows the single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under
either of two categories, namely: (1) when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies; and (2) when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other. Light felonies are excluded in Article 48 and
must be charged separately from resulting acts penalized as grave or less
grave offense. In complex crimes, the accused will serve only the maximum
penalty for the most serious crime. It is a procedural tool for the benefit of
the accused. In contrast, the second approach sanctions a single prosecution
for all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge,
regardless of their number and severity. After exhaustively discussing
numerous case law, We declared that Article 48 of the RPC is not applicable
to quasi-crimes. We forbade the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by
breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except light felonies) to
keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and
intentional crimes. This way, the splitting of charges under Article 365 which
results to rampant occasions of impermissible second prosecution based on
the same act/s or omission/s are avoided. We explained Our ruling in this
wise:

A becoming regard of this Court's place in our scheme of

government denying it the power to make laws constrains us to
keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes
and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is
incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article
365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to
stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave
or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a
necessary means for committing another. This is why, way
back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General's
argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second
prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless
 imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could
not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code:

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that

the charge for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence could not be joined with the
accusation for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of
grave or less grave felonies. This same argument
was considered and rejected by this Court in the
case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:

[T]he prosecution's contention might be true.

But neither was the prosecution obliged to first
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence before pressing the
more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant
for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the
defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a
position to press in this case the more serious
charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of
the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the
defendant has been previously cleared by the
inferior court.

[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of

this appellant ...by the Justice of the Peace ...of the
charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the
province, where both charges are derived from the
consequences of one and the same vehicular
accident, because the second accusation places
the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By

prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365,
irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting
acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally
impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to
mention that scarce state resources are conserved and
diverted to proper use. (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)38

Accordingly, We laid down the rule that there shall be no splitting of

charges under Article 365. Only one information shall be filed regardless of
the number or severity of the consequences of the imprudent or negligent
act. The judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for
each consequence alleged and proven.39

Ivler Cannot
Reverse a Prior En
Banc
Case Applying
Article 48 to
Quasi-Offenses

While the 2010 case of Ivler comprehensively discussed the nature of

Article 365 and the inapplicability of Article 48 to quasi-offenses, it was
decided by the Second Division of the Court and not by the Court sitting En
Banc. This finds significance considering the 2001 En Banc case of People v.
De los Santos40 (De los Santos), where We held that Article 48 applies to
crimes through negligence. De los Santos was among the string of cases
stated in Ivler, referring to the rulings which "complexed" one quasi-crime
with its multiple consequences, unless one consequence amounts to a light
felony, in which case charges where split by grouping, on the one hand,
resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge
with the second level courts, and on the other hand, resulting acts
amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with first level courts. Article
VIII, Section 4(3) of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no doctrine or
principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in
division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc[.]"
Thus, there is a need for the Court, sitting En Banc, to clarify whether it
subscribes to the view pronounced in Ivler, thereby abandoning De los
Santos.

The accused in De los Santos was charged with the complex crime of
Multiple Murder, Multiple Frustrated Murder, and Multiple Attempted Murder
in an Information filed in the RTC of Cagayan De Oro City. The RTC convicted
the accused as charged, with the use of motor vehicle as the qualifying
circumstance. The RTC sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims of frustrated and
attempted murder. On automatic review, We found lack of criminal intent on
the part of the accused, hence he cannot be held liable for intentional felony.
We convicted him of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical
injuries and 10 counts of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries. We ruled that Article 48 applies in this wise:

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code

provides that when the single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.
Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is
applicable to crimes through negligence in
view of the definition of felonies in Article 3
as "acts or omissions punishable by law"
committed either by means of deceit (dolo)
or fault (culpa). In Reodica v. Court of Appeals,
we ruled that if a reckless, imprudent, or negligent
act results in two or more grave or less grave
felonies, a complex crime is committed. Thus,
in Lapuz v. Court of Appeals, the accused was
convicted, in conformity with Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, of the complex crime of
"homicide with serious physical injuries and
damage to property through reckless imprudence,"
and was sentenced to a single penalty of
imprisonment, instead of the two penalties
imposed by the trial court. Also, in Soriao v. Court
 of Appeals, the accused was convicted of the
complex crime of "multiple homicide with damage
to property through reckless imprudence" for
causing a motor boat to capsize, thereby drowning
to death its twenty-eight passengers.

The slight physical injuries caused by GLENN to

the ten other victims through reckless imprudence,
would, had they been intentional, have constituted
light felonies. Being light felonies, which are not
covered by Article 48, they should be treated and
punished as separate offenses. Separate
informations should have, therefore, been filed.

It must be noted that only one information (for

multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder and
multiple attempted murder) was filed with the trial
court. However, nothing appears in the record that
GLENN objected to the multiplicity of the
information in a motion to quash before his
arraignment. Hence, he is deemed to have waived
such defect. Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules
of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in
a single complaint or information and the accused
fails to object to it before trial, the court may
convict the accused of as many offenses as are
charged and proved, and impose on him the
penalty for each of them.41 (Emphasis supplied.;
citations omitted.)

Thus, it appears that in De los Santos, reckless imprudence is not treated

as a crime itself. Rather, it is regarded as a way of committing a crime.
There, We stated that "[s]ince Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to
crimes through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as
"acts or omissions punishable by law" committed either by means of deceit
(dolo) or fault (culpa)."42 "Crimes through negligence" pertain to the
offenses committed under Article 365.

Subsequently, Our ruling in De Los Santos was cited in Dayap v.

Sendiong,43 where the accused was charged with the complex crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, less serious physical injuries, and
damage to property. However, We acquitted the accused on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. We affirmed the Municipal Trial Court's (MTC)
finding that there was no evidence proving that a crime has been committed
and that the accused was the person responsible for it.44

A survey of case law reveals that the last case which cited De los
Santos is Ivler. However, as previously stated, Ivler declared that a quasi-
offense cannot be "complexed" with its resulting acts or consequences. As
opposed to De los Santos, Ivler sees reckless imprudence as a crime itself
and not as a modality or way of committing a crime. De los Santos'
characterization of reckless imprudence as a way of committing a crime
traces its roots from the 1939 case of People v. Faller45 (Faller), where We
categorically ruled that, "[r]eckless imprudence is not a crime in itself. It is
simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of
criminal liability."46 In Faller, the accused was charged with the crime of
damage caused to another's property maliciously and willfully. After hearing,
the CFI found that damage was caused through reckless imprudence. On
appeal, We stated "[n]egligence being a punishable criminal act when it
results in a crime, the allegation in the information that the appellant also
committed the acts charged unlawfully and criminally includes the charge
that he acted with negligence."47

Conversely, in the 1955 case of Quizon v. The Justice of the Peace of

Pampanga48 (Quizon), We rejected the earlier concept that reckless
imprudence is simply a way of committing a crime. We explained, viz:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of

the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless
imprudence" is not a crime in itself but
simply a way of committing it and merely
determines a lower degree of criminal
liability" is too broad to deserve unqualified
assent. There are crimes that by their
structure cannot be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery,
malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as
a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately
from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of
classification or terminology. In international
crimes, the act itself is punished; in
negligence or imprudence, what is principally
penalized is the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness,
lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from
the common use of such descriptive phrases as
"homicide through reckless imprudence," and the
like; when the strict technical offense is, more
accurately, "reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide"; or "simple imprudence causing
damages to property".

Were criminal negligence but a modality in

the commission of felonies, operating only to
reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be
absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of
Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit
so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed. Furthermore, the theory would
require that the corresponding penalty should be
fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for
each crime when committed willfully. For each
penalty for the willful offense, there would then be
a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety.
But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365)
fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence arresto
mayor maximum, to prision correccional minimum,
if the willful act would constitute a grave felony,
notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter
could range all the way from prision mayor to
death, according to the case. It can be seen that
the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no
relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in
relation to a whole class, or series, of
crimes.49 (Emphasis supplied.)

Quizon is the bedrock of Ivler's dicta that simple or reckless imprudence

are distinct species of crime.
 Meanwhile, at this juncture, We acknowledge the observation of Associate
Justice Benjamin Caguioa about the concerning volume of inconsistent
jurisprudence relating to Article 365.50 Thus, We shall finally settle in this
case the conflicting rulings of the court on complex crimes and quasi-crimes.

Case Law after

Ivler

On its face, Ivler had already settled the nature, proper designation, and
treatment of quasi-crimes and their resulting act/s, but jurisprudence after it
appears to be in disarray.

In Dumayag v. People51 (Dumayag), the accused was charged before the

MTC of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries and damage to property.
The MTC convicted the accused of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide. The RTC affirmed the MTC with modification in that the accused
was found liable for the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide and for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries and damage to property. The CA affirmed the RTC in toto. On appeal
before Us, We acquitted the accused of the crimes charged because his
recklessness was not the proximate cause of the damage. However, We did
not take issue on the characterization made by the RTC and the CA of the
crime that the accused was charged and convicted of, which is "complex
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide."52

In Gonzaga v. People53 (Gonzaga), We affirmed the accused's conviction

of the "complex crime" of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide with
double serious physical injuries and damage to property under Article 365 of
the RPC in relation to Article 263 of the same Code.54

In Dr. Cruz v. Agas, Jr.,55 We affirmed the ruling of the CA that the
Department of Justice did not err in sustaining the dismissal of the complaint
against Dr. Cruz for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence
and medical malpractice.56 Similar to Dumayag, We did not take issue or
corrected the proper designation of the offense to be reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries.

In Senit v. People57 (Senit), We affirmed the CA, which convicted the

accused of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple serious physical injuries
and damage to property.58 The CA imposed the penalty of three (3) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor "since the petitioner has, by reckless
imprudence, committed an act which had it been intentional, would have
constituted a less grave felony, based on the first paragraph of Article 365 in
relation to Article 48 of the RPC."59

Conversely, in other cases, We applied Our pronouncement in Ivler, to

wit:

In Sevilla v. People,60 We observed that the Sandiganbayan designated

the felony committed by the accused as "falsification of public document
through reckless imprudence."61 We noted that this is an inaccurate
designation of the felony and emphasized that reckless imprudence is not
simply a modality of committing a crime but is a crime itself. Thus, the
proper designation of the offense is reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public documents.62
 In Esteban v. People63 (Esteban), the accused was convicted of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, serious physical injuries, and damage to
property. We agreed with the CA that: (1) Article 48 of the RPC does not
apply to acts penalized under Article 365 since the former is incongruent to
the notion of quasi-crimes; and (2) prosecutions under Article 365 should
proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the
consequences.64 Thus, the CA did not err in affirming the RTC (with
modification), which in turn sustained the Municipal Circuit Trial Court's
(MCTC) imposition of three separate penalties for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, serious physical injuries, and damage to property. The
MCTC imposed the following penalties:

(a) for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, an

indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and ten (10)
months and twenty (20) days of prision correcional as
maximum; and to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
death of Antonieto Manuel; P35,000.00 as actual damages for
funeral expenses; P602,000.00 for loss of earning capacity; and
P25,000.00 as moral damages.65

(b) for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical

injuries, a straight penalty of two month imprisonment.

(c) for damage to property, to pay the victim Librado Felix in

the amount of P42,996.40 as actual damages and a fine of
P50,000.00.66

Penalties under
Article 365 of the
RPC

Article 365 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 10951,67 reads:

Article 365. Imprudence and negligence. – Any

person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit
any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión
correccional in its medium period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods shall be imposed; if it would
have constituted a light felony, the penalty
of arresto menor in its maximum period shall
be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or

negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a
less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in
its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by

this article shall have only resulted in
damage to the property of another, the
offender shall be punished by a fine ranging
from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three (3) times such value, but
 which shall in no case be less than Five
thousand pesos (P5,000).

A fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos

(P40,000) and censure shall be imposed upon any
person, who, by simple imprudence or negligence,
shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously,
would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court

shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.

The provisions contained in this article shall not

be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the

offense is equal to or lower than those
provided in the first two (2) paragraphs of
this article, in which case the court shall
impose the penalty next lower in degree than
that which should be imposed in the period
which they may deem proper to apply. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)

The penalties provided in Article 365 are clear and straightforward except
for its third paragraph, in instances where the imprudent or negligent act
resulted not only to damage to property but also to physical injuries. The
third paragraph provides that when an imprudent or negligent act resulted in
damage to property only, the offender shall be punished by a fine. The
question that arises is whether the third paragraph still applies when there is
also damage to persons. We answered in the affirmative in the 1954 case
of Angeles v. Jose68 (Angeles). There, We ruled that the third paragraph
applies to the resulting damage to property, and an additional penalty shall
be imposed on the resulting injury to person. The "additional penalty"
pertains to the penalty scheme under Article 365.69

In Angeles, the accused was charged before the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of the crime of damage to property in the sum of P654.22 with less
serious physical injuries through reckless negligence. The CFI dismissed the
case upon motion of the defense on the ground that the penalty prescribed
by Article 365 is only arresto mayor in its minimum and medium period,
which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court. However,
the prosecution argued that the CFI has jurisdiction because the fine that
may be imposed on account of the damage to property is a sum equal to the
amount of damage to three times such amount, which in no case shall be
less than P25.00. We reversed the CFI and remanded the case for further
proceedings. In effect, We held that the CFI has jurisdiction because the fine
for the damage to property should be considered in determining
jurisdiction.70 We also interpreted the third paragraph of Article 365 in this
manner:

The respondent court, however, relies on the

wording of the third paragraph of said article,
which reads as follows:

"When the execution of the act covered by this

article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished
by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the
 value of said damage to three times such value,
but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos."

The above-quoted provision simply means

that if there is only damage to property the
amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if
there are also physical injuries there should
be an additional penalty for the latter. The
information cannot be split into two; one for
the physical injuries, and another for the
damage to property, for both the injuries and the
damage committed were caused by one single act
of the defendant and constitute what may be
called a complex crime of physical injuries and
damage to property. It is clear that the fine fixed
by law in this case is beyond the jurisdiction of the
municipal court and within that of the court of first
instance. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)71

Simply put, if the imprudent or negligent act covered by Article 365

results to both damage to property and persons, a fine shall be imposed for
the former and an additional penalty based on the penalty scheme of Article
365 shall be meted for the latter. The information cannot also be split into
two – one for physical injuries and another for damage to property.

Nevertheless, in the 1998 case of Reodica v. Court of Appeals,72 which

involved an Information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property with slight physical injuries, We held that the third paragraph of
Article 365 does not apply since the reckless imprudence did not result in
damage to property only. What applies is the first paragraph of Article 365
which provides for arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods for an
act committed through reckless imprudence which, had it been intentional,
would have constituted a less grave felony.73

Significantly, in Ivler, We went back to Our pronouncement

in Angeles that the third paragraph of Article 365 applies even if the
imprudent or negligent act resulted not only in damage to property but also
in damage to persons, in which case an additional penalty for the latter shall
be imposed aside from a fine.

Interestingly, We did not apply this in Gonzaga where despite a finding

that the accused was guilty of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide
with serious physical injuries and damage to property, no separate fine was
imposed for damage to property. The same goes for Senit where the accused
was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple serious physical
injuries and damage to property. There was no fine imposed for the resulting
damage to property. In both these cases, the imprudent acts and their
consequences were treated as complex crimes.

Meanwhile, there is a seeming flaw in Angeles that We need to

address. Angeles teaches that an "additional penalty" should be imposed
when the negligent or imprudent act resulted not only in damage to property
but also to physical injuries. Only one information shall be filed for both the
injuries and the damages. The reasoning stated in Angeles is because "the
injuries and damage committed were caused by one single act of the
defendant and constitute what may be called a complex crime of physical
injuries and damage to property."74 Hence, on its face, Angeles is among
the case law which applied Article 48 of the RPC to quasi-crimes. Ivler, by
citing Angeles, seems to affirm a case which allows the "complexing" of
quasi-crimes. We now clarify Our ruling in Angeles.
 The crux of the controversy in Angeles is the interpretation of the third
paragraph of Article 365 in relation to determining the jurisdiction of courts.
We ruled that the fine for damage to property and the additional penalty for
damage to persons should both be considered in ascertaining which court
has jurisdiction over the quasi-offense. While We referred to the "complex
crime of physical injuries and damage to property,"75 Our declaration that
an additional penalty should be imposed for the resulting physical injuries
defies or disregards the sentencing formula under Article 48 for complex
crimes, which is the imposition of only one penalty – the penalty for the most
serious crime, the same to be applied in its maximum period.76 Thus, the
contradiction in Angeles seems to be more apparent than real. Angeles, in
prescribing an additional penalty for the resulting damage to persons, does
not, in essence, allow the "complexing" of the resulting acts of a single
quasi-crime.

In fine, the Angeles and Ivler interpretation of the third paragraph of

Article 365 conform/dovetail with the second approach that quasi-crimes
should be prosecuted in one charge, regardless of their number and severity,
and each consequence should be penalized separately. We applied this
interpretation in the recent case of Esteban.

Jurisdiction of
Courts over Quasi-
Crimes

In Angeles and the succeeding cases that cited it, both the fine for
damage to property and the penalty for damage to persons were considered
in determining which court has jurisdiction. Hence, in People v.
Villanueva77 (Villanueva), which involved the complex crime of serious and
less serious physical injuries with damage to property in the amount of
P2,636.00,78 We ruled that the CFI (now the RTC) had jurisdiction, viz.:

Considering that it is the court of first

instance that would undoubtedly have
jurisdiction if the only offense that resulted
from appellant's imprudence were the
damage to property in the amount of
P2,636.00, it would be absurd to hold that for
the graver offense of serious and less serious
physical injuries combined with damage to
property through reckless imprudence,
jurisdiction would lie in the justice of the
peace court. The presumption is against
absurdity, and it is the duty of the courts to
interpret the law in such a way as to avoid absurd
results. Our system of apportionment of criminal
jurisdictions among the various trial courts
proceeds on the basic theory that crimes
cognizable by the Courts of First Instance are more
serious than those triable in justice of the peace or
municipal courts.79 (Emphasis supplied)

Villanueva was followed by People v. Malabanan.80 However, with the

amendment of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129 by R.A. No. 7691 on March
25, 1994, the amount of fine in criminal negligence resulting to damage to
property is no longer relevant in determining which court has jurisdiction.
Section 32(2) of BP 129, as amended, reads:

Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial

Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. – Except in cases
 falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan,
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all

violations of city or municipal ordinances
committed within their respective territorial
jurisdiction; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all

offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including
the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature,
value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That
in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof. (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)

Hence, the MeTCs, MTCs, MCTCs, and MTCCs have exclusive original
jurisdiction over criminal negligence cases which results to damage to
property, regardless of the imposable fine. Note that prior to the amendment
of BP 129, the first level courts only have jurisdiction when the imposable
fine does not exceed P20,000.00.

Similarly, BP 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691, extended the jurisdiction

of the first-level courts over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable
with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of
fine, and other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from the crime. Thus, the first level courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction over acts penalized under Article 365 of the RPC. The
most serious imposable penalty under Article 365 is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum period or two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1)
day to six (6) years of imprisonment. This is the imposable penalty, "[w]hen,
by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, the
death of a person shall be caused."81 The only exception is when the
offender in the foregoing offense "fails to lend on the spot to the injured
parties such help as may be in his/her hands to give,"82 in which case the
penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed.83 The penalty next higher in
degree to prision correcional in its medium and maximum periods is prision
mayor in its minimum and medium periods or six (6) years and one (1) day
to ten (10) years of imprisonment. The jurisdiction for the qualified offense
will now lie in the RTC.

De los Santos is no
longer a good law.

We rule that Ivler is a good law, notwithstanding the few stray cases that
allowed the "complexing" of the effects of a single quasi-offense. Forbidding
the application of Article 48 of the RPC to quasi-offenses and their resultant
acts/effects preserves the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and
intentional felonies under the RPC. We thus declare that De los
Santos84 is abandoned. We agree with Our pronouncements
in Ivler. Article 48 does not apply to quasi-offenses under Article
365 because reckless imprudence is a distinct crime and not a mere
way of committing a crime. Simple or reckless imprudence does not
strictly fall under the term "felonies" or acts or omissions committed
by fault or culpa.

Applying what We had discussed in the present case, We find that the
offense charged against petitioner was properly designated as reckless
imprudence resulting to multiple physical injuries and damage to property.
The Information was also correctly filed before the MTCC.

The elements of the crime of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the
offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that
act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage
results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack
of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and
other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.85

The prosecution was able to establish the foregoing elements beyond

reasonable doubt. Petitioner has exhibited, by his voluntary act, without
malice, an inexcusable lack of precaution in overtaking the vehicle in front of
him. He did not ensure that the road was clear and free of oncoming traffic.
Section 41 of R.A. No. 4136, also known as the "Land Transportation and
Traffic Code," as amended, provides that, "the driver of a vehicle shall not
drive to the left side of the center line of a highway in overtaking or passing
another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, unless such left side is
clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for sufficient distance to permit
such overtaking or passing to be made in safety." As stated in the TAR86 and
shown in the Sketch Plan,87 the point of impact occurred at the inner lane
occupied by the private complainants' jeepney. This proves that petitioner
encroached on the rightful lane of the private complainants. Petitioner was
violating a traffic regulation at the time of the collision as he was driving on
the wrong side of the road.88 Under Article 2185 of the New Civil Code, he is
presumed to be negligent at the time of the accident, which presumption he
failed to rebut.89

The CA, the RTC, and the MTCC uniformly held that petitioner failed to
observe the necessary care and precaution required of a driver who
abandons his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle,
which recklessness resulted in the injuries sustained by the private
complainants and the damage to the jeepney. Settled is the rule that
findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are
binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court.90

Consequently, contrary to the claim of petitioner, the last clear chance

doctrine is inapplicable. The said doctrine presupposes that both parties are
negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably at a later point in time
than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose
negligence or fault brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one
who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to
do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom.91 The
documentary and testimonial evidence in this case show that petitioner was
at fault.

Accordingly, the courts a quo did not err in finding that petitioner's
reckless act is the proximate cause of the injuries and damage to
property. However, the said courts failed to apply Ivler in
determining the imposable penalty. While they found that petitioner was
guilty of reckless imprudence resulting to both physical injuries and damage
to property, they did not impose a separate fine for damage to property,
manifesting that they treated the single imprudent act and its effects as a
complex crime. The correct approach is to impose separate penalties for
each consequence of the imprudent act alleged and proven.
 More, the CA found that the injuries sustained by Rico, Leilani, and Myrna
from the collision amounted to slight physical injuries only, yet it erroneously
characterized it as a less grave felony in its Decision dated March 15, 2018.
The Certificates of Confinement92 presented by the prosecution showed that
the estimated days of confinement for Leilani is only 3-5 days; for Rico 2-3
days; and none was mentioned for Myrna. Under Article 266 (1) of the RPC,
as amended, the crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished by arresto
menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one (1) to nine (9) days, or
shall require medical attendance during the same period. Arresto menor has
a duration of 1-30 days of imprisonment. Hence, pursuant to Article 9 in
relation to Article 25 of the RPC, as amended, slight physical injuries is only a
light felony.

The correct
penalty for the
crime

The reckless driving of petitioner resulted in slight physical injuries to

Rico, Leilani, and Myrna. As previously stated, slight physical injuries is a
light felony. Pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 365,93 reckless
imprudence resulting in a light felony is punishable by arresto menor in its
maximum period, that is, imprisonment of twenty-one (21) to thirty (30)
days. On the contrary, if the reckless act of petitioner was intentional, it
would have been penalized under Article 26694 of the RPC, as amended by
R.A. No. 10951, as a crime of slight physical injuries punishable by arresto
menor or imprisonment with a duration of one (1) to thirty (30)
days.95 Evidently, the penalty under Article 266, had the act been
intentional, is equal to or lower than that prescribed in the first paragraph of
Article 365. In this connection, the sixth paragraph of Article 365 provides
that:

When the penalty provided for the offense is

equal to or lower than those provided in the first
two (2) paragraphs of this article, in which case the
court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree
than that which should be imposed in the period
which they may deem proper to apply.

The underlying reason for this reduction in penalty is to preserve the

difference between an act wilfully performed from one committed through
negligence.96 Otherwise, a reckless or imprudent act would be punished
with the same penalty imposable to an intentional act.

Thus, the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight

physical injuries is public censure, this being the penalty next lower in
degree to arresto menor. Since that the reckless act of petitioner resulted in
slight physical injuries to three persons (Rico, Leilani, and Myrna), the
penalty of public censure shall be imposed for each of the slight physical
injuries committed.

With respect to the resulting damage to property, We concur with the CA

that while it is evident that the jeepney driven by Rico and owned by Noel G.
Garcia (Garcia) was damaged, the prosecution failed to present competent
proof to establish the amount actually spent for the repair or replacement of
the wrecked jeep. The Vehicle and Equipment Work Order presented in the
trial court only provided for an estimated expense of P350,000.00. No
representative from the Maglanque Motor Shop testified to authenticate the
document. Only Rico and Lailani testified that they brought the jeep for
repair to the shop and the cost of repair is P350,000.00. In any case, this will
not prevent Us from imposing temperate damages in favor of owner of the
wrecked jeepney. Under Article 2224 of the New Civil Code, temperate or
moderate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be provided with
certainty. Here, We rule that the amount of P150,000.00 which the CA
awarded as temperate damages to Garcia is fair and reasonable.

As to the amount of fine, petitioner should pay P150,000.00 conformably

with the third paragraph of Article 365 which states that, when the reckless
act "resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three (3) times such value, but which shall in no case be less
than Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00)."

Additionally, We agree with the CA that Rico, Leilani, and Myrna suffered
some pecuniary loss due to their physical injuries, which prevented them
from working. However, aside from their bare allegations they failed to
present proof that they are earning P400.00 to P500.00 per day. Therefore,
the CA's award of temperate damages in the amount of P8,000.00 to
Spouses Rico and Leilani, and P2,000.00 to Myrna, are in order. All the
monetary awards shall be subject to a legal interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of the Resolution until fully paid.97

Lastly, for technical propriety, We shall correct the designation of the

offense stated in the dispositive portion of the Decision dated March 15,
2018 of the CA. It seems that the CA inadvertently indicated that petitioner is
guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple
serious physical injuries, whereas based on the evidence presented and the
body of the Decision, private complainants only suffered slight physical
injuries.

WHEREFORE, the motion is DENIED. Our Resolution dated

September 21, 2020 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
that:

(1) petitioner is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of

reckless imprudence resulting in multiple slight physical injuries
and damage to property, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of public censure for each of the resulting slight physical injuries
committed to private complainants Rico Mendoza, Leilani
Mendoza, and Myrna Cunanan, and to pay a fine in the amount
of P150,000.00 as penalty for the resulting damage to property;

(2) petitioner is ORDERED to pay temperate damages in the

amount of P8,000.00 to Spouses Rico and Leilani Mendoza and
P2,000.00 to Myrna Cunanan;

(3) petitioner is ORDERED to pay Noel G. Garcia or his

authorized representative temperate damages in the amount of
P150,000.00;

(4) all monetary awards shall earn six percent (6%)

interest per annum from the finality of this Resolution until fully
paid.

SO ORDERED.

[ G.R. No. 210816, December 10, 2018 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. EDGAR S. GO,
RESPONDENT.

[G.R. No. 210854]

PURITA HIBE, JONATHAN A. TESSLER, CAROL T. MEJIAS, HEIDE V.

LAUREL, NISSAN V. LAUREL, ESTELA LAURELGELI, KATHERINE DELA
CRUZ LAUREL, ARLENE OLANG, SARLINA SEPE, ALLAN CARONO-O,
EPHRAIM OSORIO, JUARINA R. CRUZ, NESHAMIE PAGLINAWAN,
JOSEPHINE PADUA, VICENTA R. CHUA, ILLUMINADA TIMAJO,
LILYBETH CUNANAN, ELORDE ILUSTRISIMO, BOB ILLUT, ERNESTO B.
CLARIN, ROQUE LABAD, EVELYN BAJIT, * LARINA L. MATRIZ, BENITO S.
ESPINA, MARLYN T. HIBE, CELERNA M. CALAYAG, NELLY T. LOPEZ,
AND SONIA O. MANZANILLA, VS. EDGAR S. GO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
REYES, J. JR., J.:
Assailed in these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the March 22, 2013 Decision [1] and the
January 8, 2014 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No.
115165 which dismissed the charge for reckless imprudence against
respondent Edgar S. Go (respondent).

The Facts

On June 20, 2008, M/V Princess of the Stars (Stars), a passenger cargo owned
and operated by Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (SLI), was expected to depart at 8:00
p.m. from the Port of Manila for Cebu City. At 11:00 a.m. of June 20, 2008,
the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services
Administration (PAGASA) issued Severe Weather Bulletin (SWB) No. 7, raising
Storm Warning Signal (SWS) No. 1 over Romblon, Marinduque, Southern
Quezon, Cebu, Bohol, Panay Island, and Surigao del Norte. SWB No. 7 stated
that the eye of Typhoon Frank was located 60 kilometers northeast of
Guiuan, Eastern Samar, and forecasted to move west northwest at 19
kilometers per hour.[3]

At 3:00 p.m., Captain Benjamin Eugenio (Captain Eugenio), SLI Manila Port
Captain, met with Captain Florencio Marimon (Captain Marimon), Master of
the vessel, at SLI's Engineering Office for a pre departure conference to
discuss SWB No. 7. At said conference, Captain Eugenio and Captain
Marimon decided to await the next PAGASA typhoon forecast, which was
expected at around 5:00 p.m., considering that based on SWB No.7, Stars'
regular route would not be affected by Typhoon Frank. [4]

At 4:45 p.m., PAGASA issued SWB No. 8, hoisting SWS No. 3 over Camarines
Norte, Camarines Sur, Burias Islands, Sorsogon, Catanduanes, Masbate, and
the Samar provinces; SWS No. 2 over Quezon, Marinduque, Romblon,
Northern Cebu, and Southern Leyte; and SWS No. 1 over Aurora, Rizal,
Laguna, Batangas, Cavite, Mindoro provinces, Metro Manila, Panay Island,
Guimaras, Cebu, Bohol, Siquijor, Negros provinces, Dinagat and Siargao
Island. SWB No. 8 indicated that Typhoon Frank, then located in the vicinity
of Western Samar, had intensified and was forecasted to move west
northwest and cross Samar within the day and Camarines Sur in the
afternoon of the following day, June 21, 2008. [5]

Prior to Stars' departure, Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Boarding Officer PO1
Felix Sardan (POl Sardan) boarded the vessel to inspect its documents and
conduct verification, specifically the correctness of the entries in the Master's
Oath of Safe Departure, and the soundness and sufficiency of the cargo hold,
the life saving devices, and all the navigational lights. Finding the vessel's
documents in order and noting no deficiency in its safety equipment, PO1
Sardan concluded his inspection and informed Captain Marimon that SWS
No. 3 was hoisted over Masbate, which was along the vessel's regular route.
In response, Captain Marimon showed PO1 Sardan a new voyage plan and
explained that he would instead navigate the route west of Tablas below
Panay Island which would not be affected by SWS No. 3. PO1 Sardan
immediately relayed the alternate route via text message to PCG Station
Commander Erwin Balagtas who approved the alternate plan with the order
that should SWS No. 3 affect the alternate route, the vessel should either
take shelter or return to the port of Manila for the safety of the passengers
and the crew. SLI received SWB No. 8 a few minutes prior to 8:00 p.m. [6]

After obtaining a clearance from the PCG, Stars departed at 8:04 p.m. for its
regular Friday voyage to Cebu under Voyage No. 392 along its regular route.
On board the vessel were 709 passengers, 29 contractors and 111 crew
members or a total of 849 persons, which number was in compliance with
the Minimum Safe Manning Certificate and the PCG rules and regulations. [7]

At around 11:20 p.m., when Stars was in the vicinity of Cape Santiago, within
its regular route, Manila radio operator Edgar Gorillo (Gorillo) received
PAGASA's SWB No. 9 which forecasted that Typhoon Frank was moving
northwest away from the vessel's route. Gorillo relayed SWB No.9 to Stars'
radio operator Santiago Doroy (Doroy). From that time until 1:00 a.m. of June
21, 2008, Gorillo kept close contact with Stars and SLI's ship officers were
confident that the vessel was in the safe zone in view of SWB No. 9. [8]

At 5:00 a.m. of June 21, 2008, Gorillo and Captain Eugenio received SWB No.
10 indicating that for the past six hours, Typhoon Frank had been moving
westward away from its original northwest movement. At 5:30 a.m.,
respondent arrived at SLI's Manila Office and checked on the radio room.
Gorillo informed respondent that Captain Marimon assessed the sea
condition as "slight." At 6:20 a.m., Doroy relayed to Gorilla that the vessel
was still navigating its regular route at 1.3 miles off Sibuyan Point of
Romblon and approaching Apunan Point and that the sea was rough but
manageable.[9]

At 7:05 a.m., Captain Marimon sent SLI Manila a telegram stating that he
was steering Stars away from its regular course, moving towards the south of
Tablas to take shelter and evade the center of Typhoon Frank. At 8:30 a.m.,
the vessel was within the vicinity of Aklan Point where it was caught in the
center of Typhoon Frank. At 9:00 a.m., communications with the vessel were
cut off. Then, at 11:30 a.m., Captain Nestor Ponteres (Captain Ponteres),
Cebu port captain, received a text message from his nephew Jay Franco
Labiada (Labiada), then second mate in Stars, informing him that the vessel
was "listing to port 25-30 degrees." At that point, Stars was within the
vicinity of Aklan and was retreating to San Fernando, Sibuyan. Captain
Ponteres called Labiada and asked to talk to Captain Marimon. Captain
Marimon informed Captain Ponteres that the vessel had listed and he could
no longer steer it and would instead adapt to the wind to keep the vessel
stable and upright. Captain Ponteres communicated with Captain Marimon
thrice between 11:30 a.m. and past 12 noon, the last of which was Captain
Marimon's declaration that he had given the order to abandon ship via the
vessel's public announcement system. Continuously pounded by heavy
waves and buffeted by strong winds, Stars eventually capsized and sank in
the Sibuyan Sea at around 12:30 p.m. of June 21, 2008. [10]

Respondent called the PCG to dispatch a rescue team and ordered that SLI's
cargo vessel Surcon 12 and its M/V Princess of Caribbean sail to the area to
undertake rescue operations. Due to inclement weather, immediate rescue
efforts had to be deferred and it was only at noon time of June 23, 2008. 1en
the rescue arrived at the site. Of the 849 persons on board, only 32 survived,
227 died and 592 were reported missing.[11]
Board of Marine Inquiry Findings

In an Investigation Report[12] dated August 18, 2008, the Board of Marine

Inquiry (BMI) stated that SLI and its senior officers failed to ensure the safety
of Stars, its passengers and its cargo because it did not assess the potential
danger of Typhoon Frank before the vessel departed on June 20, 2008 and
while the vessel was in transit. It added that SLI failed to monitor the
condition of the vessel during the critical moment from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00
a.m. of June 21, 2008, a period when the vessel was about 40 nautical miles
from Typhoon Frank. The BMI also noted that SLI could have discouraged the
Master from sailing in its intended voyage considering that SWS No. 3 was
hoisted in the vessel's route. It further observed that SLI did not inform
immediately the PCG when the vessel lost contact with the company at 9:00
a.m. of June 21, 2008.[13] The BMI concluded:
B. Conclusion

1. Causes of the Incident

1.1 Immediate Cause

After a thorough deliberation, the Board concludes that the immediate cause
of the capsizing of MV Princess of the Stars was the failure of the Master to
exercise [extraordinary] diligence and good seamanship thereby committing
an error of judgment that brought MV Princess of the Stars in harm's way
into the eye of typhoon "Frank."

x x x x

Another cause was the failure of the company to exercise [extraordinary]

diligence in preventing or discouraging the Master from leaving port and
sailing despite the very severe weather condition (PSWS [N]o. 3) in the
vessel's route particularly in Masbate and Biliran Island. The company
likewise failed to monitor closely and assess the movement of the vessel
relative to [the] movement of the typhoon which could have prompted the
Master to take effective typhoon evasion procedures.

1.2 Proximate Cause

The Board further concludes that the proximate cause of [the] capsizing of
[the] MV Princess of the Stars was the failure of SLI management to
effectively implement its Safety Quality Management Manual issued on 07
May 2002 in compliance with IMO's-ISM Code for the Safe Operation of Ships
and Pollution Prevention including the requirements of Quality/Safety System
ISO 9001:2000. It was indicative of a system failure in which the company
was responsible.

1.3 Contributory Cause(s)

President - x x x

Chief Executive Officer/ Executive Vice-President - x x x

First Vice-President - He failed to exercise [extraordinary] diligence to

apprise the Master of M/V Princess of the Stars of the potential danger of
typhoon Frank and its failure to discourage the Master from sailing on its
intended voyage inspite of the severe weather condition (PSWS [N]o. 3) in
the vessel's route specifically in Masbate and Biliran Island. This incident
resulted to the capsizing of MV Princess of the Stars and the death of 227
persons onboard, 592 missing and only 32 persons survive and damage to
cargo and marine environment. He also failed to implement effectively the
QSMS of the company and ensure smooth coordination between the different
department heads in the company and effective ship/shore communication
and for lack of contingency response plan on this account the Board finds
him negligent.[14]
On September 2, 2008, the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption and
petitioners in G.R. No. 210854, who are some of the heirs of the passengers
of Stars, instituted in the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint for reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, serious physical injuries, and
damage to property under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
against SLI, its officers and Captain Marimon. They alleged that the rough
seas encountered by Stars on June 21, 2008 was reasonably foreseeable by
the owners and officers of SLI had they performed their bounden duty to
keep track of the weather conditions. They averred that SLI's officers allowed
Stars to sail and proceed on its usual sailing schedule despite the presence
of the typhoon.

The DOJ Panel's Resolution

In a Resolution[15] dated June 22, 2009, the panel of four prosecutors (DOJ
Panel) created by the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation found
probable cause to indict Captain Marimon and respondent for reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, physical injuries, and damage to
property. It declared that the alleged alternate route for Stars was a mere
afterthought, employed merely to secure departure clearance from the PCG,
especially considering that subsequent events established by uncontroverted
evidence in fact showed that Stars embarked on that particular voyage using
its original or regular route to Cebu. As a consequence, it navigated towards
the center of Typhoon Frank and eventually ran into the eye of the typhoon
at the vicinity of Sibuyan Island in the province of Romblon. The DOJ Panel
pronounced that the lack of an appropriate passage plan, be it alternate
voyage plan or alternate route, on the part of SLI was a clear evidence of
inexcusable negligence and lack of foresight, and that such recklessness was
further demonstrated when the vessel was allowed to sail despite severe
weather condition along its route. It added that Captain Marimon and SLI
failed to comply with PCG Memorandum Circular 04-07 which requires the
former to study carefully the typhoon movement to ensure that the vessel
would not be within the areas directly affected by typhoon signals, and for
the latter to discourage any vessel movement except for sheltering purposes
especially when typhoon signals are hoisted or expected to be hoisted within
the area of origin, the route and the destination.

As regards respondent, the DOJ Panel found that as First Vice-President for
Administration and team leader of the Crisis Management Committee,
respondent was involved in making decisions on whether a vessel should be
allowed to sail such that he should have cancelled or discouraged the voyage
considering the severe weather at that time. The DOJ Panel held that
allowing Captain Eugenio and Captain Marimon to decide if the vessel should
depart speaks of respondent's failure to exercise extraordinary care and
precaution in light of the brewing storm along the vessel's route. It also
found out that upon learning that the vessel was navigating its regular route
when the eye of Typhoon Frank was already in the vicinity of Romblon,
respondent admittedly did not give instruction to take shelter or drop
anchor, thus:
As for the persons criminally liable for the resulting deaths and injuries, as
well as damage to properties, well-settled is the rule that a corporation, like
SLI in the instant case, acts through its officers, therefore, criminal liability
for an offense attaches to those officers who appear to be responsible for its
commission. To be sure, criminal liability is personal and circumscribed to
acts or omissions of the person of the offender, not of other persons, natural
or juridical, whom he might represent in his capacity as officer of a
corporation. Taken in this light vis-a-vis the evidence adduced by the parties,
the Panel finds probable cause for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide, physical injuries and damage to properties against respondent
Edgar S. Go. As 1st [V]ice [P]resident for Administration and team leader of
Crisis Management Committee, both Capt. Benjamin Eugenio who is in
charge of vessel operations in Manila and Engr. Emelson Morales, SLI safety
officer, report directly to him. Thus, he is unarguably involved in making
decisions on whether a vessel would be allowed to sail out of the Port of
Manila, in fact Capt. Eugenio reported to him on the pre-departure
conference with respondent Marimon. Considering the severe weather
condition prevailing at that time, prudence should have dictated him to
cancel or discourage voyage no. 392 of "Stars" especially after SWB No. 8
was issued by PAGASA, pursuant to the guidelines provided under PCG MC
04-07 as explained elsewhere above. The fact that he admittedly allowed
respondent Marimon, Capt. Eugenio, and Engr. Morales to decide among
themselves whether "Stars" should depart likewise bespeak[s] of his failure
to exercise extraordinary care and precaution considering the brewing storm
along the vessel's route and in reckless disregard to the 849 persons on
board the "Stars." Then, after learning that "Stars" was navigating along its
regular route when the eye of Typhoon Frank was already at the vicinity of
Romblon, he admittedly did not give any specific instruction to take shelter
or drop anchor. The Panel cannot subscribe to his defense that he trusted
the judgment of respondent Marimon, for, to begin with, the latter's
judgment in navigating along the vessel's regular route, thus, taking "Stars"
into the eye of Typhoon Frank, is far from being reliable and trustworthy. [16]
The other SLI officers were excluded from the charge. The DOJ Panel
declared that their specific participation in Voyage No. 392 was not
satisfactorily established and there was no proof of their complicity in the
negligent acts complained of. Although probable cause was also found
against Captain Eugenio and Captain Ponteres for their direct involvement in
Voyage No. 392, they were excluded from the indictment, considering that
they were not impleaded as respondents. Nevertheless, preliminary
investigation was recommended against them. [17]

On June 22, 2009, an Information[18] for reckless imprudence, docketed as

Crim. Case No. 09-269169, was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila
and raffled to Branch 5 thereof.

Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for review with the DOJ Secretary.

During the pendency of respondent's petition for review with the DOJ
Secretary, then Department of Transportation and Communications
Secretary Leandro Mendoza issued a Resolution [19] on August 28, 2009,
exculpating SLI from any negligence and holding Captain Marimon solely
responsible for the sinking of Stars, viz.:
xxxx
1. That from all the evidence on hand as evaluated, assessed and
considered[;] it can be stated that the capsizing and demise of the M/V
"Princess of the Stars" as not entirely and completely attributable to a
fortuitous event (Typhoon Frank) and that the determining element
established herein is that the STARS' navigation and operation was
dependent on the skill, discretion and authority of her Master, Captain
Florencio M. Marimon, Sr. It can be deduced from the records and the
evidence gathered during the investigation that the proximate cause of
the tragedy was the fact that Captain Marimon made a calculated option
and decision of maintaining his regular passage via East Tablas, despite
the said area and its vicinity being earlier on tracked and identified to be
affected by Typhoon Frank, and his not considering the West Tablas route
earlier during the voyage. x x x. The proximate cause of the tragic
encounter with Typhoon Frank and the eventual capsizing of the M/V
"Princess of the Stars" is mainly attributable to HUMAN ERROR on the part
of its Master, Captain Florencio Marimon, Sr. who with erroneous
 [judgment] and lack of sufficient foresight took a calculated option of
maintaining his regular course while the vessel was already underway and
solely under his authority and command.[20]
The DOJ Secretary's Resolution

On March 22, 2010, then DOJ Secretary Alberto Agra denied respondent's
petition for review.[21] The DOJ Secretary ruled that there was sufficient
evidence to warrant respondent's indictment and that the issue on whether
or not respondent was responsible in the movement of Stars on June 20,
2008 was a matter that could be better appreciated by the trial court. He
declared that when the DOJ Panel recommended the filing of information
against respondent for reckless imprudence, it merely found probable cause
that a crime had been committed and that respondent was probably guilty
thereof, which finding was not tantamount to a declaration of guilt. [22]

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the DOJ
Secretary in a Resolution[23] dated June 8, 2010.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision dated March 22, 2013, the CA held that the rule on non
interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations is not absolute such
that where the prosecutor's findings are tainted with grave abuse of
discretion or manifest error, or when, for various reasons, there was a
misapprehension of facts, judicial interference is warranted, for then it
becomes the duty of the courts to temper the exclusive and unilateral
authority of the prosecuting authorities lest they be used for persecution. It
ruled that respondent's act of allowing the officers of the vessel to decide
whether to set sail or not did not make him criminally liable as such decision
was within the authority of the captain of the vessel, in coordination with the
PCG, in view of the weather bulletin. The appellate court also found
erroneous the finding of the DOJ Panel that respondent was criminally liable
for not instructing the vessel to seek shelter or drop anchor in the face of the
storm because there was not a shred of evidence from which such power to
decide matters pertaining to the vessel's navigation could be inferred. It
observed that the DOJ Panel did not cite any law or regulation that grants an
administrative officer of a company operating a vessel the power to direct
the vessel at sea and requires him to so act in times of emergency. Thus, the
CA concluded that the charge for reckless imprudence against respondent in
Criminal Case No. 09-269169 must be dismissed as the latter's constitutional
right to due process and the higher interest of substantial justice must
prevail over adherence to the policy of non-interference on the executive
prerogatives of the DOJ.

The petitioners in G.R. No. 210854 moved for reconsideration, but the same
was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated January 8, 2014. Hence, these
consolidated petitions for review which were initially denied by the Court in a
Resolution[24] dated July 2, 2014. However, in a subsequent
Resolution[25] dated August 18, 2014, the Court granted the petitioners'
motion for reconsideration and reinstated the consolidated petitions for
review.
Issues

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE SUBJECT
PETITION FOR [CERTIORARI AND GRANTING THE SAME, DESPITE THE
FAILURE TO IMPLEAD THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AS AN
INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW[; and]
xxxx

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO PROBABLE
CAUSE TO INDICT RESPONDENT EDGAR S. GO [THE PETITIONER
BELOW], AND CONSEQUENTLY IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO.
09-269169 AS AGAINST RESPONDENT EDGAR S. GO. [26]

xxxx
The People argue that the CA erred in exercising jurisdiction and taking
cognizance of the petition for certiorari and, thereafter, in granting the same
because respondent failed to implead the People of the Philippines which is
an indispensable party in criminal prosecutions; that the determination of the
existence of probable cause for indictment is left to the sound discretion of
the prosecutor, and the same may not be interfered with by courts, absent a
showing of any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutor; that
the CA unmistakably substituted its own judgment for that of the prosecutor
and the Secretary of Justice; that the CA gravely erred in ruling that the case
falls under the exception to the non-interference by the courts in the
determination of the existence of probable cause; that in recommending that
respondent be indicted for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide, physical injuries and damage to property, the DOJ Panel, in
accordance with law, and without unnecessary haste, conducted the
requisite preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining whether or
not probable cause exists in order to hold respondent for trial; that the DOJ
Panel conducted clarificatory hearings on March 13 and 20, 2009 for the
purpose of eliciting important facts necessary in determining whether
probable cause exists; that it must be emphasized that the issue at hand
involves only the existence of probable cause to indict and hold respondent
for trial, and not his conviction for the crime charged; that it was established
that respondent was remiss in his responsibilities as an officer of SLI; that
respondent failed to exercise extraordinary care and precaution in securing
the safety of the passengers, among others, when he admittedly allowed
Captain Marimon, Captain Eugenio and. Engineer Ernelson Morales to decide
among themselves on whether to permit the vessel to depart or not,
notwithstanding the severe weather condition at that time; that respondent
did not even dictate upon Captain Marimon to cancel or discourage the
voyage of the vessel or to take shelter or drop anchor in order not to come
face to face with the eye of the typhoon; and that the determination and
appreciation of respondent's culpability for the crime charged are better left
to the trial court's assessment.[27]

For their part, petitioners in G.R. No. 210854 contend that respondent
possesses the authority and duty to control and decide matters pertaining to
the vessel's navigation at sea; that the Port Captains and Safety Officers of
SLI directly report to him; that it is within the power of respondent to order
the Master of the vessel to drop anchor or seek shelter in a safe location
immediately upon learning that the vessel was already in the path of
Typhoon Frank; that despite his knowledge that Stars was moving towards
the area where SWS No. 3 was already hoisted, he did not instruct the
Master to take shelter to the nearest port; that if it becomes apparent that
the Master's course of action would be disastrous, then it becomes the
bounden duty of the company to avert the impending disaster; that the
liability of respondent is not premised on his ownership of SLI, but on his
active management and control over SLI's vessels and employees; that the
DOJ Panel did not commit grave abuse of discretion because it did not just
rely on the affidavits of the complainants and their witnesses and the
counter-affidavits of respondent and his witnesses, but also conducted
clarificatory hearings; and that the defenses raised by respondent are better
threshed out in a full-blown trial.[28]

In his Consolidated Comment,[29] respondent counters that in a reckless

imprudence case involving a common carrier, it is the captain who should be
subjected to criminal culpability as he is in the best position to determine the
best measures to be taken for the protection of the passengers, crew, vessel
and its cargo, a land-based person far removed from the situation, is
unaware of the circumstances confronting the voyage; that the liability of the
common carrier or shipowner is merely civil in nature even if the accident
results in the death or injury of passengers, and even when the negligence of
the shipowner concurs with the negligence of the captain; that the ship
captain is the one in control, being the one actually in the open sea with
direct first-hand knowledge of the running condition of his vessel and the
actual wind and sea conditions prevailing at any given time affecting the
voyage; that the ship captain is the one actually manning the vessel, hence,
he is the one responsible for its safe navigation to its intended destination;
that the DOJ committed manifest injustice by ordering his prosecution
because he is not an officer or crew member manning the vessel or a person
responsible for the vessel's safe navigation; that respondent's duties as
Vice-President for Administration for Land-Based Personnel of the Manila
Branch Office and the Head of the Crisis Management Committee did not
include the authority to control and supervise matters pertaining to vessel
movement and navigation; that no liability for criminal negligence may be
imputed against respondent because he was never on board the vessel when
the tragic accident occurred; and that he did not order the Master of the
vessel to find a safe place and drop anchor because he had no authority to
do so, the decision on how to navigate the vessel clearly resting solely on the
captain thereof.

The Court's Ruling

Failure to implead the People of the Philippines does not ipso facto deprive
the CA of jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari.

Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the
public prosecutor. Therefore, respondent's petition for certiorari before the
CA which failed to implead the People of the Philippines as a party thereto
was defective. It must be stressed that the true aggrieved party in a criminal
prosecution is the People of the Philippines whose collective sense of
morality, decency and justice has been outraged. [30]

The Court, however, has repeatedly declared that "the failure to implead an
indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. In such a
case, the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
Parties may be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its
own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the
petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the
order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the
petitioner's/plaintiff' s failure to comply." [31] The Court declared the rationale
for this exception in Commissioner Domingo v. Scheer[32] in this wise:
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or
contents. Their sole purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to the
rival claims of contending parties. They were created, not to hinder and
delay, but to facilitate and promote, the administration of justice. They do
not constitute the thing itself, which courts are always striving to secure to
litigants. They are designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing.
In other words, they are a means to an end. When they lose the character of
the one and become the other, the administration of justice is at fault and
courts are correspondingly remiss in the performance of their obvious duty.
In this case, the CA, in a Resolution [33] dated September 24, 2010, required
then DOJ Secretary Leila De Lima, public respondent in the petition
for certiorari, to comment on the said petition. However, in its Manifestation
and Motion[34] dated October 5, 2010, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) declared that "being the real party interested in upholding public
respondent's questioned rulings, private respondents therefore have the
duty to appear and defend in their behalf and in behalf of public
respondent."[35] It further stated, "being merely a nominal party, public
respondent thus should not appear against petitioner, or any party for that
matter, who seeks the reversal of her rulings that are unfavorable to the
latter."[36] Thus, the People, through the OSG, was given the opportunity to
refute respondent's arguments, but it refused in the belief that it was merely
a nominal party with little interest in upholding respondent's indictment for
reckless imprudence. Accordingly, it would be the height of injustice to
sustain the People's claim of denial of due process and to dismiss the
petition for certiorari for a procedural defect.

Courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause
for the purpose of filing an information in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion.

In First Women's Credit Corporation v. Hon. Perez,[37] the Court declared that
the policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations
was meant to leave to the investigating prosecutor "ample latitude of
discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will
establish probable cause for the filing of an information against a supposed
offender."[38]

The rationale for this policy was enunciated in PCGG Chairman Elma v.
Jacobi,[39] viz.:
The necessary component of the Executive's power to faithfully execute the
laws of the land is the State's self-preserving power to prosecute violators of
its penal laws. This responsibility is primarily lodged with the DOJ, as the
principal law agency of the government. The prosecutor has the
discretionary authority to determine whether facts and circumstances exist
meriting reasonable belief that a person has committed a crime. The
question of whether or not to dismiss a criminal complaint is necessarily
dependent on the sound discretion of the investigating prosecutor and,
ultimately, of the Secretary (or Undersecretary acting for the Secretary) of
Justice. Who to charge with what crime or none at all is basically the
prosecutor's call.

Accordingly, the Court has consistently adopted the policy of non--

interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to leave the
investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination
of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. Courts
cannot order the prosecution of one against whom the prosecutor has not
found a prima facie case; as a rule, courts, too, cannot substitute their own
judgment for that of the Executive. (Citations omitted)
In accordance with the policy of non-interference, courts do not reverse the
Secretary of Justice's findings and conclusions on the matter of probable
cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion. [40] "[j]udicial review
of the resolution of the Secretary of Justice is limited to a determination of
whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction considering that full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the executive branch in the determination of probable cause
during a preliminary investigation. Courts are not empowered to substitute
their judgment for that of the executive branch; it may, however, look into
the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of
discretion."[41] Instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Jacobi, thus:
In fact, the prosecutor may err or may even abuse the discretion lodged in
him by law. This error or abuse alone, however, does not render his act
amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari. To justify judicial intrusion into what is fundamentally the
domain of the Executive, the petitioner must clearly show that the
prosecutor gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in making his determination and in arriving at the conclusion he
reached. This requires the petitioner to establish that the prosecutor
exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility; and it must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, before judicial relief
from a discretionary prosecutorial action may be obtained.
[42]
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
In the case at bar, the Court rules that no grave abuse of discretion attended
the DOJ Panel's Resolution finding probable cause to indict respondent for
reckless imprudence.

Probable cause refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances as

would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime
for which he was prosecuted.[43] It does not mean "actual and positive cause"
nor does it require absolute certainty. [44] A finding of probable cause is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. [45] A finding of probable cause
merely binds over the suspect to stand trial for the reception of prosecution
evidence in support of the charge. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. [46]

"The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails
to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3)
that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless
imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part
of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding
persons, time, and place."[47]

In this case, the DOJ Panel, in charging respondent with reckless imprudence,
reasoned "As [First Vice-President] for Administration and team leader of
Crisis Management Committee, both Capt. Benjamin Eugenio[,] who is in
charge of vessel operations in Manila, and Engr. Ernelson Morales, SLI safety
officer, report directly to him. Thus, he is unarguably involved in making
decisions on whether a vessel would be allowed to sail out of the Port of
Manila, in fact[,] Capt. Eugenio reported to him on the pre-departure
conference with respondent Marimon. Considering the severe weather
condition prevailing at that time, prudence should have dictated him to
cancel or discourage [V]oyage [N]o. 392 of [']Stars['] especially after SWB
No. 8 was issued by PAGASA, pursuant to the guidelines provided under PCG
MC 04-07 as explained elsewhere above. The fact that he admittedly allowed
respondent Marimon, Capt. Eugenio, and Engr. Morales to decide among
themselves whether [']Stars['] should depart likewise bespeak[s] of his
failure to exercise extraordinary care and precaution considering the brewing
storm along the vessel's route and in reckless disregard to the 849 persons
on board the [']Stars.['] Then, after learning that [']Stars['] was navigating
along its regular route when the eye of Typhoon Frank was already at the
vicinity of Romblon, he admittedly did not give any specific instruction to
take shelter or drop anchor."[48]

First, the DOJ Panel explicitly identified the decisions which respondent could
have taken to prevent Stars from sailing and, consequently, to avert the
accident. Among others, he failed to closely monitor and assess the
movement of the vessel as against the movement of Typhoon Frank such
that he did not instruct Captain Marimon to take shelter in the vicinity of
Batangas despite information from PAGASA that the vessel would come face
to face with the eye of Typhoon Frank if it continued along its regular
route. Second, the DOJ Panel also made it clear that respondent's acts,
though not malicious, were indeed voluntary. Third, it is undisputed that as a
result of the sinking of Stars, only 32 persons survived out of the 849 on
board the vessel. Finally, there was an explicit and reasonable conclusion
drawn by the DOJ Panel that respondent's act of allowing the vessel to sail
despite· the severe weather condition at that time demonstrated inexcusable
lack of precaution on the latter's part.

The Court, thus, concludes that the DOJ Panel's Resolution clearly supports
a prima facie finding that reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC
has been committed. The DOJ Panel, in arriving at such conclusion, did not
just rely on the affidavits of the complainants and the respondents as well as
their respective witnesses. It also conducted clarificatory hearings on March
13 and 20, 2009 wherein respondent, Captain Eugenio (SLI Manila Port
Captain), Captain Ponteres (SLI Cebu Port Captain), Engineer Morales (SLI
Manila Safety Officer), Juanito Cabangonay and Gorillo (SLI Manila Radio
Operators), and Noelito Alpas (SLI Cebu Radio Operator) appeared and
testified.[49] The DOJ Panel merely acted on the belief that respondent's acts
or omissions constitute the offense of reckless imprudence. Further, it is
worthy to note that when a party files a special civil action for certiorari, he
or she must allege the acts constituting grave abuse of discretion.
[50]
However, respondent's petition for certiorari before the CA merely
identified the alleged errors of fact and law in the DOJ Panel's Resolution.

It must be emphasized that in this case, the Court is merely charged with
determining whether the DOJ Panel acted with grave abuse of discretion in
filing an Information for reckless imprudence against respondent. The Court
does not concern itself yet with the evidence presented by the petitioners
and respondent in support of their respective arguments. The presence or
absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter
of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.
[51]
Hence, to be clear, the present ruling of the Court is not equivalent to a
determination of respondent's guilt in the criminal case for reckless
imprudence.

Shipowner's liability based on the contract of carriage is separate and

distinct from the criminal liability of those who may be found negligent.

Under Article 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the
circumstances. Moreover, under Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in case of
death or injuries to passengers, a common carrier is presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed
extraordinary diligence. In addition, pursuant to Article 1759 of the same
Code, it is liable for the death of, or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former's employees. These provisions
evidently refer to a civil action based not on the act or omission charged as a
felony in a criminal case, but to one based on an obligation arising from
other sources, such as law or contract. Thus, the obligation of the common
carrier to indemnify its passenger or his heirs for injury or death arises from
the contract of carriage entered into by the common carrier and the
passenger.[52]

On the other hand, "the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under [A]rticle 365 of the RPC lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The
law penalizes, thus, the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the offense." [53]

Consequently, in criminal cases for reckless imprudence, the negligence or

fault should be established beyond reasonable doubt because it is the basis
of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted
merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the
common carrier failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.
[54]
The first punishes the negligent act, with civil liability being a mere
consequence of a finding of guilt, whereas the second seeks indemnification
for damages. Moreover, the first is governed by the provisions of the RPC,
and not by those of the Civil Code. Thus, it is beyond dispute that a civil
action based on the contractual liability of a common carrier is distinct from
an action based on criminal negligence.

In this case, the criminal action instituted against respondent involved

exclusively the criminal and civil liability of the latter arising from his criminal
negligence as responsible officer of SLI. It must be emphasized that there is
a separate civil action instituted against SLI based on culpa
contractual incurred by it due to its failure to carry safely the passengers of
Stars to their place of destination. The civil action against a shipowner for
breach of contract of carriage does not preclude criminal prosecution against
its employees whose negligence resulted in the death of or injuries to
passengers.

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for review are GRANTED. The

March 22, 2013 Decision and the January 8, 2014 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 115165 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 5 is ORDERED to
forthwith REINSTATE Criminal Case No. 09-269169 as against
respondent EDGAR S. GO.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-19660 May 24, 1966

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellant,

vs.
AMBROCIO CANO Y PINEDA, defendant and appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General

Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor R. I. Goco for plaintiff and appellant.
Angel A. Sison for plaintiff and appellant as private prosecutor.
G. F. Yabut, R. Monterey and F. R. Sotto for defendant and appellee.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Appeal, taken by the prosecution, from an order of the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga.

On or about August 2, 1961, the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga filed with the
said court an information accusing defendant-appellee Ambrocio Cano y
Pineda of the crime of damage to property with multiple physical injuries,
thru reckless imprudence, alleging:

That on or about the 21st day of September, 1960, on the National

Highway at San Isidro, municipality of San Fernando, Province of
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused Ambrocio Cano y Pineda, being then
the driver and person in charge of La Mallorca Pambusco bus with body
 No. 846, Plate No. TPU 23177 (Pampanga '60), in utter disregard of
traffic rules and regulations and without exercising due precaution to
avoid accident to persons and/or damage to property, and by driving at
a speed more than that allowed by law and on the wrong side of the
road, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive,
manage and operate said vehicle in a careless, negligent and
imprudent manner, causing, as a result thereof the said bus driven by
him to hit and bump a Philippine Rabbit Bus with body No. 257, bearing
Plate No. TPU-25589 (Tarlac '60), then driven by Clemente Calixto y
Onia, thereby causing damages to the said Philippine Rabbit Bus in the
amount of P5,023.55, to the damage and prejudice of the owner, the
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., in the said amount of P5,023.55,
Philippines Currency, and on the same occasion inflicting physical
injuries to the passengers of said buses, namely, Francisco Feliciano,
Hilario Pasamonte Linda Ongria, Lorenzo Calixto, whose physical
injuries, barring complications, required and will require medical
attendance for a period of not less than three (3) months; Regina
Mendoza de Gacuain, Virginia Camba, Francisco Guevarra, George
Sebastian, Francisco Rabago, Oscar Favorito, Lida Toledo, whose
physical injuries, barring complications, required and will require
medical attendance for a period ranging from one week to one month;
Adelaida Buenconsejo Vda. de Shaup, Eulogio Catalico, Marina
Gonzales, Abraham Serrano, Epifanio Payas, Seprando Fontanilla,
Pedro Bingcang, Tomas Ortega, Mateo Estaris, Andres Espinosa, Ligaya
Garcia, Romeo Rivera, Mateo Estacio, Jaime Castillo, Clemente Calixto,
Dedicacion San Juan, Antonio Calixto, Teofilo Raon, Francisco Mallari,
Alfonso Aquino, Esmeralda Cayasi, Salvacion Vda. de Ortega,
Patrocinio Caasi, Lily Ortarsa, Eulogio Canlas, Esperanza de la Cruz,
Benita Cesar, Laulita Batalia, Miguela Quilay, Benjamin Tiglao, Ligaya
Garcia Bindua, Marlita Balmonte, Geronimo Briones, Juan Velasco,
Tomasa Mateo, and Bobby Galhoun whose physical injuries, barring
complications required and will require medical attendance for a period
ranging from seven to nine days, and incapacitate said injured persons
from performing their customary labor for the same period of time,
respectively.1äwphï1.ñët

All contrary to law.

Upon arraignment,1 defendant entered a plea of not guilty. Months later, 2 he

filed a motion to quash the information upon the ground:

1. That the crime charged, slight physical injuries thru reckless

imprudence, has already prescribed;

2. That this Honorable Court has no jurisdiction of the crime charged,

slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence; and

3. That the crime of slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence

cannot be complexed with damage to property, serious and less
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence.

After due hearing, the lower court issued an order 3 holding that, "without
discussing whether or not this particular misdemeanor of slight physical
injuries" — through reckless imprudence — "has prescribed ... it is clear that
said misdemeanor cannot validly be complexed with grave or less grave
felonies", and, accordingly, granting the motion to quash and ordering the
prosecution "to amend the information within ten (10) days" from notice, by
"deleting therefrom all reference to slight physical injuries". A
reconsideration of this order having been denied, the prosecution interposed
the present appeal.
The order appealed from is predicated upon the theory that the offense of
slight physical injuries thru reckless negligence cannot be complexed with
that of damage to property with multiple physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence, because "misdemeanor" may not, under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, be complexed with grave or less grave felonies.

However, the information herein does not purport to complex the offense of
slight physical injuries with reckless negligence with that of damage to
property and serious and less serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence. It is merely alleged in the information that, thru reckless
negligence of the defendant, the bus driven by him hit another bus causing
upon some of its passengers serious physical injuries, upon others less
serious physical injuries and upon still others slight physical injuries, in
addition to damage to property. Appellee and the lower court have
seemingly assumed that said information thereby charges two offenses,
namely (1) slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence; and (2) damage
to property, and serious and less serious physical injuries, thru reckless
negligence — which are sought to be complexed. This assumption is, in turn,
apparently premised upon the predicate that the effect or consequence of
defendants negligence, not the negligence itself, is the principal or vital
factor in said offenses. Such predicate is not altogether accurate.

As early as July 28, 1955 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
had the occasion to state, in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor,
Pampanga (G.R. No. L-6641), that:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that
"reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal
liability" is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes
that by their structure can not be committed through imprudence:
murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi-
offense, and dealt separately from wilful offenses. It is not a mere
question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act
itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally
penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the "imprudencia
punible." Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of
such descriptive phrases as "homicide through reckless imprudence",
and the like; when the strict technical offense is more accurately,
"reckless imprudence resulting in homicide", or "simple
imprudence causing damages to property."

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies,

operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be
absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Article 13, specially the
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed. Furthermore, tile theory would require that the
corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty
prescribed for each crime when committed wilfully. For each penalty
for the wilful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for
the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365)
fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum,
to prision correccional minimum if the wilful act would constitute a
grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could
range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It
can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no
relation to the individual wilful crime, but is set in relation to a whole
class, or series, of crimes.
Thirdly, regardless of whether the issue adverted to above should be decided
in the affirmative or in the negative the proper procedure for the lower court
was to reserve the resolution thereof until after the case has been heard on
the merits, when decision is rendered thereon, there being no question that
the court has jurisdiction and can properly try the defendant for damage to
property and serious or less serious physical injuries thru reckless
negligence. It may not be amiss to add that the purpose of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code in complexing several felonies resulting from a single
act, or one which is a necessary means to commit another, is to favor the
accused by prescribing the imposition of the penalty for the most serious
crime, instead of the penalties for each one of the aforesaid crimes which,
put together, may be graver than the penalty for the most serious offense.

Fourthly, from the viewpoint both of trial practices and justice, it is, to say
the least, doubtful whether the prosecution should split the action against
the defendant, by filing against him several informations, namely, one for
damage to property and serious and less serious physical injuries, thru,
reckless negligence, before the court of first instance, and another for slight
physical injuries thru reckless negligence, before the justice of the peace of
municipal court. One thing is, however, certain. Such splitting of the action
would work unnecessary inconvenience to the administration of justice in
general and to the accused in particular, for it would require the presentation
of substantially the same evidence before two different courts, the municipal
court and the court of first instance. Worse, still, in the event of conviction in
the municipal court and appeal to the court of first instance, said evidence
would still have to be introduced once more in the latter court.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case
remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits and the rendition of the
judgment that the facts proven and the applicable law may warrant, with the
costs of this instance against the defendant-appellee,

It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 172778 : November 26, 2012

SABINIANO DUMAYAG, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the November 26, 2004 Decision 1ςrνll and the May
10, 2006 Resolution2ςrνll of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No.
26513, which affirmed the June 24, 2002 Decision3ςrνll of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 21, Cebu City (RTC). The RTC decision upheld with
modification the Decision4ςrνll of the Municipal Trial Court of San Fernando,
Cebu City (MTC), finding accused Sabiniano Dumayag (petitioner) guilty of
the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and
reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries.

The Facts:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On July 6, 1995, at around 11:30 oclock in the morning, along the national
highway in Magtalisay, Sangat, San Fernando, Cebu, a passenger bus of
Petrus Bus Liner (passenger bus), driven by petitioner, collided with a tricycle
driven by Elsie Genayas (Genayas), resulting in the death of four (4) persons
and causing physical injuries to five (5) others, who were all passengers of
the tricycle.5ςrνll The passenger bus was bound for Dalaguete, Cebu, while
the tricycle came from the opposite direction, going towards Cebu City. At
the time of the mishap, the tricycle was overtaking a Mitsubishi pick-up when
it collided with a passenger bus coming from the opposite direction. 6ςrνll

Petitioner was charged before the MTC with reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide for the deaths of Genayas, Orlando Alfanta (Alfanta),
Grace Israel (Israel), and Julius Amante (Amante); and with reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries sustained by Crispin Cada,
Jannette Bacalso, Carmela Lariosa, Fediliza Basco (Basco), and Nelfe Agad
(Agad) and damage to property.7ςrνll

During the trial, one of the witnesses presented by the prosecution was
Rogelio Cagakit (Cagakit), a driver of Badian Island Resort. He testified that
on July 6, 1995, at around 11:30 oclock in the morning, he was driving a
Mitsubishi Pajero with tourist passengers bound for Cebu City; that along the
national highway somewhere in Barangay Magtalisay, Balud, San Fernando,
Cebu, he was trailing a tricycle bearing a total of 8 passengers; that upon
reaching the first blind curve of the road, he noticed the tricycle following a
Mitsubishi pick-up; that when the Mitsubishi pick-up slowed down upon
reaching the second blind curve, the tricycle tried to overtake the pick up
and, while overtaking, a fast moving vehicle from the opposite direction hit
the tricycle which was thrown towards his direction; and that two passengers
of the tricycle died on the spot.8ςrνll

Senior Police Officer 3 Gregorio Patalinghug (SPO3 Patalinghug) was also

presented as a witness and he narrated that on the said date and time he
and Senior Police Officer 2 Felipe Yap (SPO2 Yap) responded to a report
about a traffic accident somewhere in Magtalisay, Balud, San Fernando,
Cebu. When they arrived at the place, SPO2 Yap immediately boarded the
injured victims in a vehicle and brought them to the hospital. He noticed two
lifeless bodies lying on the road, later identified as those of Alfanta and
Genayas. He then inspected the place of the incident; measured the relative
positions of the tricycle, the Mitsubishi Pajero and passenger bus; and drew a
sketch. From the sketch, he identified the point of impact, which was one (1)
foot away from the centerline of the road, crossing the lane occupied by the
passenger bus. He also pointed to the skid mark, about sixty (60) feet in
length, produced by the bus when its driver stepped on the brake pedal.
Based on his observation from the point of impact and on the information he
gathered from several persons present at the time of the accident, he was of
the opinion that the driver of the tricycle was at fault. 9ςrνll

The prosecution also presented Cada, Agad and Basco, who related the
collision they witnessed. The parents of the victims and the owner of the
tricycle, meanwhile, both testified on their respective claims for damages;
while Dr. Rolando Anzano, reported his findings on the injuries sustained by
the victims.

In his defense, petitioner testified that he was a professional driver for 26

years and worked for five (5) different employers, the fifth of which was the
Petrus Bus Liner; that his everyday route was from Dalaguete, Cebu to Cebu
City and back, with two (2) round trips a day; that he was familiar with the
road since he had been traversing it for around 20 years; that the road
where the accident happened had two (2) blind curves and upon
approaching the first blind curve, he slowed down by stepping on the brakes;
that while negotiating the second blind curve, he noticed that his lane was
clear and so he stepped on the accelerator in order to gain momentum; that
it was at this moment that the tricycle while in the process of overtaking a
vehicle ahead of it, suddenly occupied his lane; that he tried to avoid hitting
the tricycle but to no avail; that he could not swerve the bus to the left
because there was another vehicle occupying the same; and he could not
also swerve the bus to the road shoulder on the right side of the lane
because it was sloping down and there was a canal. He posited that the
accident would not have taken place at all if the tricycle driver had not
attempted to overtake another vehicle and occupied his lane. 10ςrνll

On March 18, 1999, the MTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide. 11ςrνll It
explained:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Taking into account the circumstances and condition of the road there being
two (2) blind curves involved, the length of the skidmark produced at sixty
(60) feet in length clearly speaks for itself that the accused drove and
operated the passenger bus negligently without taking the necessary
precautions and without due regard to the road condition.

Simply stated, if in the exercise of reasonable care as contended by the

accused, the speed of the passenger bus at that time was commensurate
and corresponds with the demands of the circumstances and conditions of
the road where as is obtaining, the conditions are such as to increase the
danger of accident, no matter how sudden the tricycle appeared at the bus
front, indisputably, the skid mark produced would not have reached that
much or the accident may have been avoided and if not, the damage or
injuries caused could only be slight and manageable. 12ςrνll

The dispositive portion reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Sabiniano Dumayag, guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2)
years and one (1) day minimum to three (3) years, six (6) months and
twenty (20) days maximum and to pay the following civil liabilities:

1. To the surviving heirs of deceased Orlando Alfanta:

a. P50,000.00 death Indemnity;

b. P50,000.00 for wake, funeral, burial and other related miscellaneous

expenses; and

c. P20,000.00 moral damages for the agony, mental anguish and sorrow
suffered by the surviving heirs;

2. To the surviving heirs of deceased Julius Amante;

a. P50,000.00 death Indemnity;

b. P50,000.00 for wake, funeral, burial and other related miscellaneous

expenses; and

c. P20,000.00 moral damages for the agony, mental anguish and sorrow
suffered by the surviving heirs;

3. To the surviving heirs of deceased Grace Israel:

a. P50,000.00 death Indemnity;

b. P50,000.00 for wake, funeral, burial and other related miscellaneous

expenses; and
c. P20,000.00 moral damages for the agony, mental anguish and sorrow
suffered by the surviving heirs;

plus P50,000.00 by way of attorneys fees and P20,000.00 exemplary

damages.

With costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.13ςrνll

On appeal, the RTC affirmed with modification the decision of the

MTC.14ςrνll The modified judgment reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the appealed decision is

hereby AFFIRMED but modified as follows:

1. For the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple

homicide of Alfante, Israel and Amante, accused is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS (of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period),
as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS (of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods), as the maximum thereof, with all the accessory penalties
thereto.

2. For reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries accused is

sentenced to PUBLIC CENSURE for the injuries sustained by each of the
private complainants, to wit, Canieda, Bacalso, Lariosa, Bascon and Agad. In
other words, accused is sentenced to said penalty for as many private
complainants as were injured.

3. For his civil liabilities, accused is directed

3.1 To pay the surviving heirs of each of the deceased tricycle passengers,
namely, Alfante, Amante and Israel the following:

3.1.1 Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for the death each of the defendant;

3.1.2 Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) for the wake, funeral, burial and
other related expenses in connection with the said death;

3.1.3 Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) pesos for moral damages

3.1.4 Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for exemplary damages;

3.1.5 Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as attorneys fees.

3.2 To pay Beethoven Bernabe, the owner of the damaged tricycle, EIGHTY

THOUSANDS PESOS (P80,000.00) as compensatory damage representing the

value of the said property after deducting therefrom its salvage value and
allowance for depreciation; and
3.3 The costs.

SO ORDERED.15ςrνll

The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. It found the petitioner and
the tricycle driver equally guilty of negligence, the former for failing to
observe the precautionary measure when approaching a blind curve and the
latter for unsuccessfully overtaking a vehicle. The CA stated that the
petitioner should have been more careful considering that the area had blind
curves and there could be oncoming vehicles from the other side. The fact
that petitioner was driving on the right side of the road did not relieve him of
the obligation of exercising due and ordinary care to prevent collision and
avoid injury to persons or property, including others who may be on the
wrong side of the road.16ςrνll

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in a

Resolution, dated May 10, 2006.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHETHER OR NOT NEGLIGENCE, IMPRUDENCE AND RECKLESSNESS WAS

CORRECTLY ATTRIBUTED TO PETITIONER BY THE COURTS BELOW WHEN THE
VEHICULAR MISHAP COMPLAINED OF IN THIS PROCEEDING OCCURRED LAST
6 JULY 1995;

IF INDEED PETITIONER WAS NEGLIGENT, RECKLESS AND IMPRUDENT WHEN

THE MISHAP LITIGATED IN THIS PROCEEDING OCCURRED LAST 6 JULY 1995,
WHETHER OR NOT SAID NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND IMPRUDENCE,
WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE SAME;

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS CONVICTION, AS SUSTAINED BY THE COURT

OF APPEALS, IS VIOLATIVE OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW AND TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED AT BAR.17ςrνll

Petitioner argues that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt,
claiming that the vehicular mishap was purely an accident. He insists that he
was not negligent, reckless and imprudent in the operation of the motor
vehicle at the time of the accident and that he was driving the bus on the
lane properly belonging to him at a moderate speed.

He asserts that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligent,
reckless and imprudent act of the tricycle driver, who suddenly overtook
another vehicle while approaching a blind curve. He stresses that had the
tricycle driver not attempted to suddenly overtake another vehicle while
approaching a blind curve, the accident would not have taken place.

Petitioner further avers that, at the time of the accident, the tricycle was
overloaded with eight passengers, in addition to the driver; that the driver of
the tricycle was operating along the national highway, a route specifically
prohibited under the franchise; and that the tricycle driver also violated
Section 41 (a) and (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4136, 18ςrνll as amended,
otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code of the
Philippines when he tried to overtake another vehicle while approaching a
blind curve of the highway. Therefore, due to serious violations committed
by the tricycle driver, the resulting deaths and injuries arising from the

vehicular accident should be his sole responsibility. 19ςrνll

The Court finds merit in the petition.

Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive upon this Court. 20ςrνll The
Court, however, recognizes several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of
the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) when the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (9)
when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence
and are contradicted by the evidence on record. 21ςrνll Several exceptions
obtain in this case; hence, a departure from the general rule is warranted.

The MTC, the RTC and the CA found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and physical injuries and
damage to property. They all concluded that petitioner was guilty because
he was driving fast at the time of the collision. Consequently, he was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment and ordered to pay the
victims civil indemnity.

Reckless imprudence, as defined by our penal law, consists in voluntarily, but

without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and
other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. 22ςrνll In order to
establish a motorists liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must
be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence
and the injuries or damages complained of.23ςrνll Thus, to constitute the
offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere
negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and a willful and wanton
disregard of the consequences is required. 24ςrνll

After going over the records of this case, the Court is unable to sustain the
findings of fact and conclusion reached by the courts below. The totality of
the evidence shows that the proximate cause of the collision was the
reckless negligence of the tricycle driver, who hastily overtook another
vehicle while approaching a blind curve, in violation of traffic laws.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous

sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred. And more
comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.25ςrνll

The evidence indubitably shows that before the collision, the passenger bus
was cruising along its rightful lane when the tricycle coming from the
opposite direction suddenly swerved and encroached on its lane. The
accident would not have happened had Genayas, the tricycle driver, stayed
on his lane and did not recklessly try to overtake another vehicle while
approaching a blind curve. Section 37 of R.A. No. 4136, as amended,
mandates all motorists to drive and operate vehicles on the right side of the
road or highway. When overtaking another, it should be made only if the
highway is clearly visible and is free from oncoming vehicle. Overtaking
while approaching a curve in the highway, where the drivers view is
obstructed, is not allowed.26ςrνll Corollarily, drivers of automobiles, when
overtaking another vehicle, are charged with a high degree of care and
diligence to avoid collision. The obligation rests upon him to see to it that
vehicles coming from the opposite direction are not taken unaware by his
presence on the side of the road upon which they have the right to
pass.27ςrνll

The MTC opined that the accident could have been avoided or damage or
injuries could only be slight and manageable, if the speed of the passenger
bus was commensurate with the demands of the circumstances and the
condition of the road. The Court, however, cannot subscribe to the
conclusion that petitioner was driving fast and without regard to the
condition of the road at the time of the collision.

The testimony of Cagakit that the passenger bus was running fast at the
time of the collision lacks probative value. The actual speed of the bus was
not established because he merely stated that when the tricycle was trying
to overtake the Mitsubishi pick-up, a fast moving vehicle hit it. Also, it was
not indubitably shown that petitioner was driving at a speed beyond the rate
allowed by law.28ςrνll In a similar case, Vallacar Transit, Inc. v.
Catubig,29ςrνll the Court, in adopting the conclusion of the RTC,
wrote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Based on the evidence on record, it is crystal clear that the immediate and
proximate cause of the collision is the reckless and negligent act of Quintin
Catubig, Jr. and not because the Ceres Bus was running very fast. Even if
Ceres Bus is running very fast on its lane, it could not have caused the
collision if not for the fact that Quintin Catubig, Jr. tried to overtake a cargo
truck and encroached on the lane traversed by the Ceres Bus while
approaching a curve. As the driver of the motorcycle, Quintin Catubig, Jr. has
not observed reasonable care and caution in driving his motorcycle which an
ordinary prudent driver would have done under the circumstances.
Recklessness on the part of Quintin Catubig, Jr. is evident when he tried to
overtake a cargo truck while approaching a curve in Barangay Donggo-an,
Bolisong, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental.

x x x.

Furthermore, it was undisputed that the tricycle was overloaded, with a total
of eight (8) passengers (excluding the driver), which is a clear violation of
traffic rules and regulation. It was likewise admitted by the owner of the
tricycle, Beethoven Bernabe (Bernabe), that his driver violated the conditions
specified in the tricycle franchise which prohibited all tricycles to travel along
the national highway. In fact, he admitted that Genayas was only the
alternate driver of his son and that he did not interview him anymore when
he applied as a company driver because he was a neighbor and a nephew of
his wife. For said reason, the award of damages to Bernabe by the courts
below has no justifiable basis.

The immediate and proximate cause being the reckless and imprudent act of
the tricycle driver, petitioner should be acquitted. Nevertheless, he is civilly
liable. The rule is that an "acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding
that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
based on quasi delict."30ςrνll

Under the proven circumstances, there was contributory negligence on the

part of petitioner. It is to be noted that there were two blind curves along the
national highway. Having travelled along it for the past 20 years, he was
aware of the blind curves and should have taken precaution in operating the
passenger bus as it approached them. In the situation at hand, he did not
exercise the necessary precaution. After negotiating the first curve, he
claimed to have stepped on the accelerator pedal because his lane was
clear. According to SPO2 Patalinghug, he found skid marks produced by the
passenger bus. It could only mean that petitioner had slammed on the brake
brought about by the sudden emergence of the tricycle in front of him.
Notwithstanding, it was still short of reckless or criminal negligence as he
was driving along his rightful lane.

Considering that the proximate cause was the negligence of the tricycle
driver and that negligence on the part of petitioner was only contributory,
there is a need to mitigate the amounts of the civil liability imposed on the
latter. The determination of the mitigation of the civil liability varies
depending on the circumstances of each case. 31ςrνll The Court allowed the
reduction of 50% in Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 32ςrνll 20% in
Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. IAC33ςrνll and LBC Air Cargo, Inc. v.
CA, 34ςrνll and 40% in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. CA 35ςrνll and
Philippine Bank of Commerce v. CA.36ςrνll

In this case, a reduction of 50% of the actual damages is deemed equitable

considering that the negligence of the tricycle driver was the proximate
cause of the accident and that of petitioner was merely contributory.
Moreover, under the circumstances, petitioner cannot be made liable for
moral and exemplary damages for lack of basis. The award of attorney's fees
is not warranted either.ςηαοblενιrυαllαωlιbrαr

WHEREFORE, the petition 1s PARTLY GRANTED. Petitioner Sabiniano

Dumayag is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide and damage to property. He is, however, civilly liable and,
accordingly, ORDERED to pay each of the surviving heirs of Orlando Alfanta,
Grace Israel and Julius Amante the following:

1ςrνll P25,000.00 as civil indemnity; and

2ςrνll Pl5,000.00 for funeral expenses.

The award of damages to Beethoven Bernabe, the owner of the tricycle, is

DELETED.ςrαlαωlιbrαr

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-6518. March 30, 1954. ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRANCISCO

DIAZ, Defendant-Appellee.

Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose G. Bautista

for Appellant.

Felix Padua for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

CRIMINAL LAW; HOMICIDE WITH SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND DAMAGED

TO PROPERTY THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE; APPLICABILITY OF REVISED
PENAL CODE AFTER AMENDMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLE LAW. — Where the
information for homicide with serious physical injuries alleged facts sufficient
to constitute such crime as defined and penalized by section 67(d) of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law and the information for damage to property
through reckless imprudence is under the Revised Penal Code, defendant’s
two separate convictions were proper. However, Republic Act No. 557
amended section 67(d) of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law in the sense that
"if, as the result of negligence or reckless or unreasonably fast driving any
accident occurs resulting in death or serious bodily injury to any person, the
motor vehicle driver at fault shall, upon conviction, be punished under the
provisions of the Penal Code." Although this Act took effect after the accident
in question had occurred, the same may be applied, it being more favorable
to the accused. In conformity with article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the
defendant should be convicted only of the complex crime of homicide with
serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless
imprudence.

DECISION

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

On November 24, 1951, Francisco Diaz was accused in the Municipal Court of
Pasay City of a violation if Section 52 of Act 3992 known as the Revised
Motor Vehicles Law committed as follows:jgc:[Link]

"That on or about the 12th day of November, 1951, in Pasay City, Philippines,
the abovenamed accused Francisco Diaz being then the driver and person in
charge of Automobile bearing plate No. 1560 (should be 1560), did then and
there wilfully and unlawfully drive and operate said automobile along Taft
Avenue, this city, in a fast and reckless manner, without taking the
necessary precautions to avoid accident to persons and damage to property,
thereby causing an accident."cralaw virtua1aw library

Diaz pleaded not guilty to the charge and after the case was called for
hearing twice without the prosecution appearing, the Municipal Court on
motion of the defense dismissed the case "for failure of the Government to
prosecute." This was on December 22, 1951.

On May 9, 1952, the Assistant City Attorney of Pasay City filed an information
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal charging the same Francisco Diaz with
Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence committed as
follows:jgc:[Link]

"That on or about the 12th day of November, 1951, in Pasay City, Philippines,
the abovenamed accused Francisco Diaz being the driver and person in
charge of automobile bearing plate No. 1560, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloneously drive, operate and manage the same along Taft
Avenue, this city, in a reckless, negligent and imprudent manner, without
taking the necessary precautions to avoid accident to persons and damage
to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the
said automobile with plate No. 1560, hit, bumped and collided against an
Oldsmobile car with plate No. 12348 driven by Potenciano Eria, thereby
causing damage to the latter vehicle in the amount of P249.50 to the
damage and prejudice of the owner Say Koc Chuan in the aforesaid sum of
P249.50." On October 10, 1952, the Rizal Court issued an order postponing
the arraignment of the accused to October 27, 1952, giving counsel for the
defendant until October 16th within which to file a motion to quash. On said
date defendant’s counsel filed his motion based on double jeopardy because
of the previous charge of violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law sec. 52
thereof) with the Municipal Court of Pasay City. On November 17, 1952, the
Rizal Court issued an order sustaining the motion to quash and dismissing
the case with costs de oficio. The Government is appealing from that order
and because the appeal involves only questions of law, the same was taken
directly to this Court.

Is there double jeopardy in the present case?

As regards the dismissal of the first case in the Municipal Court of Pasay City,
it is true that since the defendant himself asked for said dismissal, at first
blush, it may not be considered as coming under the provisions of Rule 113,
section 9 of the Rules of Court which provides that there is former jeopardy
"when a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent
of the defendant." But in the case of Gandicela v. Hon. Lutero, 88 Phil., 299,
w held:red:[Link]

"If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial,
he should ask, not for the dismissal but for the trial of the case. If the
prosecution asks for the postponement of the hearing and the court believes
that the hearing cannot be postponed anymore without violating the right of
the accused to a speedy trial, the court shall deny the postponement and
proceed with the trial and require the fiscal to present the witnesses for the
prosecution; and if the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and
consequently fails to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
the Court, upon the motion of the defendant, shall dismiss the case. Such
dismissal is not in reality a mere dismissal although it is generally so called,
but an acquittal of the defendant because of the prosecution’s failure to
prove the guilt of the defendant, and it will be a bar to another prosecution
for the offense even though it was ordered by the Court upon motion or with
the express consent of the defendant, in exactly the same way as judgment
of acquittal obtained upon the defendant’s motion (People v. Salico, 84 Phil.,
722).."

The dismissal of the charge in the Pasay City Municipal Court is even a
stronger case than the example considered in the case of Gandicela above
referred to. Here the prosecution was not even present on the day of trial so
as to be in a position to proceed with the presentation of evidence to prove
the guilt of the accused. The case was set for hearing twice and the
prosecution without asking for postponement or giving any explanation, just
failed to appear. So the dismissal of the case, the at the instance of
defendant Diaz may, according to what we said in the Gandicela case, be
regarded as an acquittal.

The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of
violation of the Motor Vehicles Law prosecuted before the Pasay City
Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless
imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of
double jeopardy is whether of not the second offense charged necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information (Rule 113, section 9). Another test is whether the
evidence which proves one would prove the others, that is to say, whether
the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to
support the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an
ingredient of the other. 1

It is clear that in the present case the second charge of Damage to Property
thru Reckless Imprudence includes the first charge of reckless driving; that
the facts alleged in the information on damage to property thru reckless
driving, if proven, would have been sufficient to support the first charge of
reckless driving, and finally, that the offense of reckless driving is an
ingredient of the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence, all
for the simple reason that the basic element in both offenses is reckless
driving. Thus it is evident that we have here a case of double jeopardy. And
there is no explanation why when Diaz was first charged with a violation of
the Motor Vehicle Law because of reckless driving, the damage to property
was not included.

A defendant should not be harassed with various prosecutions based on the

same act by splitting the same into various charges, all emanating from the
same law violation, when the prosecution could easily and well embody them
in a single information.

The order of dismissal by the Rizal Court of First Instance is affirmed, with
costs de oficio.

G.R. No. 178145

REYNALDO S. MARIANO, Petitioner,

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The courts of law are hereby reminded once again to exercise care in the
determination of the proper penalty imposable upon the offenders whom
they find and declare to be guilty of the offenses charged or proved. Their
correct determination is the essence of due process of law. The Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan charged the petitioner with frustrated
murder for hitting and bumping Ferdinand de Leon while overtaking the
latter's jeep in the information filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, in
Malolos, Bulacan (RTC), viz:

That on or about the 12th day of September, 1999, in the municipality of

Angat, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of the motor vehicle he was then
driving, with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior
strength, hit, bump and run over with the said motor vehicle one Ferdinand
de Leon, thereby inflicting upon him serious physical injuries which ordinarily
would have causedthe death of the said Ferdinand de Leon, thus performing
all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder
asa consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to said Ferdinand de Leon. Contrary to law.

The CA summarized the antecedent events as follows:

At about 6:30 in the evening of September 12, 1999, Ferdinand de Leon was
driving his owner type jeep along Barangay Engkanto, Angat, Bulacan. With
him were his wife, Urbanita, and their two-year old son, as they just came
from a baptismal party. Luis de Leon, an uncle of Ferdinand, also came from
the baptismal party and was driving his owner type jeep. Accused-appellant
Reynaldo Mariano was driving his red Toyota pick-up with his wife, Rebecca,
and their helper, Rowena Años, as passengers. They had just attendeda
worship service in Barangay Engkanto.

The Toyota pick-up overtook the jeep of Ferdinand de Leon and almost
bumped it. Ferdinand got mad, overtook the pick-up and blocked its path.
Reynaldo Mariano stopped the pick-up behind the jeep. Ferdinand alighted
from his jeep and approached Reynaldo. Ferdinand claimed that he and
Reynaldo had an altercation. However, Reynaldo insisted that he just stayed
inside the pick-up and kept quiet while Ferdinand hurled invectives at him.
Urbanita tried to pacify Ferdinand and sought the assistance of Luis de Leon.
Luis intervened and told Ferdinand and Reynaldo "magpasensiyahan na
lamang kayo at pagpasensiyahan mo si Ferdinand." Ferdinand and Reynaldo
heeded the advice of Luis and they went their separate ways.

Instead of proceeding to his house in Norzagaray, Ferdinand decided to drop

by his mother’s house in San Roque, Angat to pick up some items. He parked
his jeep in front of the house of his mother and alighted therefrom. However,
hewas bumped by a moving vehicle, thrown four (4) meters away and
lostconsciousness. Urbanita shouted, "Mommy, Mommy, nasagasaan si
Ferdie." She identified the fast moving vehicle that bumped Ferdinand as the
same red Toyota pick-up driven by Reynaldo.

On the other hand, Reynaldo and his wife, Rebecca, tried to show that the
jeep of Ferdinand stopped on the road in front of the house of the latter’s
mother about five (5) to six (6) meters away from their pick-up. Reynaldo
stopped the pick-up as he saw an oncoming vehicle, which he allowed to
pass. Thereafter, Reynaldo made a signal and overtook the jeep of
Ferdinand. However, Ferdinand suddenly alighted from his jeep, lost his
balance and was sideswipedby the overtaking pick-up. Reynaldo did not stop
his pick-up and he proceeded on his way for fear that the bystanders might
harm him and his companions. After bringing his companions to their house
in Marungko, Angat, Bulacan, Reynaldo proceeded to Camp Alejo S. Santos in
Malolos, Bulacan to surrender and report the incident.

Ferdinand was brought to the Sto. Niño Hospital in Bustos, Bulacan, where he
stayed for two and a half days and incurred medical expenses amounting to
₱17,800.00 OnSeptember 15, 1999, Ferdinand was transferred to St. Luke’s
Medical Center in Quezon City, where he stayed until September 25, 1999
and incurred medical expenses amounting to ₱66,243.25. He likewise spent
₱909.50 for medicines, ₱2,900.00 for scanning, ₱8,000.00 for doctor’s fee
and ₱12,550.00 for the services of his caregivers and masseur from
September 12 to October 31, 1999. Ferdinand suffered multiple facial
injuries, a fracture of the inferior part of the right orbital wall and subdural
hemorrhage secondary to severe head trauma, as evidenced by the
certification issued by Dr. Hernando L. Cruz, Jr. of St. Luke’s Medical Center.
Urbanita, received the amount of ₱50,000.00 from Reynaldo Mariano by way
of financial assistance, as evidenced by a receipt dated September 15, 1999.

Under its decision rendered on May 26, 2003 after trial, however, the RTC
convicted the petitioner of frustrated homicide,

to wit:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby finds the accused
Reynaldo Mariano GUILTYfor the lesser offense of Frustrated Homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 50 thereof and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of three (3) years and
four (4) months of Prision Correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one
(1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum and is hereby directed to pay the
complainant, Ferdinand de Leon, the amount of ₱196,043.25 less ₱50,000.00
(already given) as actual damages, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, and the
costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the CA promulgated itsassailed decision on June 29, 2006,

modifying the felony committed by the petitioner from frustrated homicide

to reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries, ruling thusly:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIEDand accused-appellant

Reynaldo Mariano is found guilty of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries and is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty oftwo (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year, seven (7) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify Ferdinand de Leon in the
amount of ₱58,402.75 as actual damages and ₱10,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

In this appeal, the petitioner arguesthat his guilt for any crime was not
proved beyond reasonable doubt, and claims that Ferdinand’s injuries were
the result of a mere accident. He insists that he lacked criminal intent; that
he was not negligent in driving his pick-up truck; and that the CA should
have appreciated voluntary surrender asa mitigating circumstance in his
favor.

Ruling

We affirm the conviction of the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting

in serious physical injuries.

The following findings by the CA compel us to affirm, to wit:

Reynaldo tried to show that he stopped his pick-up five (5) to six (6) meters
behind the jeep of Ferdinand, as he allowed an oncoming vehicle to pass.
Thereafter, he overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. However, the fact that
Ferdinand’s body was thrown four (4) meters away from his jeep showed that
Reynaldo was driving his pick-up at a fast speed when he overtook the jeep
of Ferdinand. It is worthy to note that Reynaldo admitted that he has known
Ferdinand and the latter’s family since 1980 because they have a store
where he used to buy things. As aptly observed by the OSG, Reynaldo should
have foreseen the possibilitythat Ferdinand would alight from his jeep and go
inside the house of his mother where the store is also located.

xxxx

As aptly observed by the court a quo, only a vehicle that is moving beyond
the normal rate of speed and within the control of the driver’s hands could
have caused Ferdinand’s injuries. The very fact of speeding is indicative of
imprudent behavior, as a motorist must exercise ordinary care and drive at a
reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions encountered,
which will enable him or her to keep the vehicle under control and avoid
injury to others using the highway. As held in People v. Garcia:

"A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it
is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not frominstinct, then
through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as
anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed
except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and
property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner
of danger and injury."

Thus, had Reynaldo not driven his pick-up at a fast speed in overtaking the
jeep of Ferdinand, he could have easily stopped his pick-up or swerved
farther to the left side of the road, as there was no oncoming vehicle, when
he saw that Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and lost his balance, in order to
avoid hitting the latter or, at least, minimizing his injuries.

The findings by the CA are controlling on the Court. Indeed, the findings of
both lower courts on the circumstances that had led to the injuries of
Ferdinand fully converged except for the RTC’s conclusion that malicious
intent had attended the commission of the offense. Such findings cannot be
disturbed by the Court in this appellate review, for it is a well-settled rule
that the findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are
binding and conclusive upon the Court.

"Reckless imprudence consists involuntary, but without malice, doing or

failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing of failing
to perform such act, taking intoconsideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place."

To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something

more than a mere negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle, but a
willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required.

The Prosecution must further show the direct causal connection between the
negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. In Manzanares v.
People,

the petitioner was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple

homicide and serious physical injuries because of the finding that hehad
driven the Isuzu truck very fast before it smashed into a jeepney. In
Pangonorom v. People,

a public utility driver driving his vehicle very fast was held criminally
negligent because he had not slowed down to avoid hitting a swerving car. In
the absence of any cogent reasons, therefore, the Court bows to the CA’s
observations that the petitioner had driven his pick-up truck at a fast speed
in order to overtake the jeep of Ferdinand, and in so attempting to overtake
unavoidably hit Ferdinand, causing the latter’s injuries.

Contrary to the petitioner’s insistence, the mitigating circumstance of

voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated in his favor. Paragraph 5 of
Article 365, Revised Penal Code, expressly states that in the imposition of
the penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard
to the rules prescribed in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. "The rationale
of the law," according to People v. Medroso, Jr.:

x x x can be found in the fact thatin quasi-offenses penalized under Article

365, the carelessness, imprudence or negligence which characterizes the
wrongful act may vary from one situation to another, in nature, extent, and
resulting consequences, and in order that there may be a fair and just
application of the penalty, the courts must have ample discretion in its
imposition, without being bound by what We may call the mathematical
formula provided for inArticle 64 of the Revised Penal Code. On the basis of
this particular provision, the trial court was not bound to apply paragraph 5
of Article 64 in the instant case even if appellant had two mitigating
circumstances in his favor with no aggravating circumstance to offset them.

Even so, the CA erred in imposing on the petitioner the penalty for reckless
imprudence resulting in seriousphysical injuries. The error should be avoided
because no person should be condemned tosuffer a penalty that the law
does not prescribe or provide for the offense charged or proved. Verily,
anyone judicially declared guiltyof any crime must be duly punished in
accordance with the law defining the crime and prescribing the punishment.
Injustice would always result to the offender should the penalty exceed that
allowed by the law. The imposition of the correct penalty on the offender is
the essence ofdue process of law.

The penalty for the offender guilty ofreckless imprudence is based on the
gravity of the resulting injuries had his act been intentional. Thus, Article 365
of the Revised Penal Codestipulates that had the act been intentional, and
would constitute a grave felony, the offender shall suffer arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccionalin its medium period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, arresto mayorin its minimum and medium
periods shall be imposed; and if it would have constituted a light felony,
arresto menorin its maximum period shall be imposed. Pursuant to Article 9
of the Revised Penal Code, a grave felony is that to which the law attaches
the capital punishment or a penalty that in any of its periods is afflictivein
accordance with Article 25 of theRevised Penal Code; a less grave felony is
that which the law punishes with a penalty that is correctionalin its
maximum period in accordance with Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code;
and a light felony is an infraction of law for the commission of which a
penalty of either arresto menoror a fine not exceeding ₱200.00, or both is
provided.

In turn, Article 25 of the Revised Penal Codeenumerates the principal

afflictive penaltiesto be reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, andprision
mayor; the principal correctional penaltiesto beprision correccional, arresto
mayor, suspension and destierro; and the light penalties to be arresto
menorand fine not exceeding ₱200.00. Under this provision, death stands
alone as the capital punishment.

The Revised Penal Codeclassifies the felony of serious physical injuries based
on the gravity ofthe physical injuries, to wit:

Article 263. Serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall wound, beat, or
assault another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and
shall suffer:

1. The penalty of prision mayor, if in consequence of the physical injuries

inflicted, the injured person shall become insane, imbecile, impotent, or
blind;

2. The penalty of prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods, if

in consequence ofthe physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have
lost the use of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an
eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or a leg or shall have lost the use of any such
member, or shall have become incapacitated for the work in which he was
therefor habitually engaged;

3. The penalty of prision correccionalin its minimum and medium periods, if

in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall
have become deformed, orshall have lost any other part of his body, or shall
have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the
performance of the work in which he as habitually engaged for a period of
more than ninety days;

4. The penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum period to prision

correccionalin its minimum period, if the physical injuries inflicted shall have
caused the illness or incapacity for labor of the injured person for more than
thirty days.
If the offense shall have been committed against any of the persons
enumerated in Article 246, or with attendance of any of the circumstances
mentioned in Article 248, the case covered by subdivision number 1 of this
Article shall be punished by reclusion temporalin its medium and maximum
periods; the case covered by subdivision number 2 by prision correccionalin
its maximum period to prision mayorin its minimum period; the case covered
by subdivision number 3 by prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods; and the case covered by subdivision number 4 by prision
correccionalin its minimum and medium periods.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to a parent

who shall inflict physical injuries upon his child by excessive chastisement.

In its decision,

the CA found that Ferdinand had sustained multiple facial injuries, a fracture
of the inferior part of the right orbital wall, and subdural hemorrhage
secondary to severehead trauma; that he had become stuporous and
disoriented as to time, place and person. It was also on record that he had
testified at the trial thathe was unable to attend to his general merchandise
store for three months due to temporary amnesia; and that he had required
the attendance of caregivers and a masseur until October 31, 1999.

With Ferdinand not becoming insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind, his

physical injuries did not fall under Article 263, 1, supra. Consequently, the CA
incorrectly considered the petitioner’s act as a grave felony had it been
intentional, and should not have imposed the penalty at arresto mayorin its
maximum period to prision correccionalin its medium period. Instead, the
petitioner’s act that caused the serious physical injuries, had it been
intentional, would be a less grave felonyunder Article 25 of the Revised Penal
Code, because Ferdinand’s physical injuries were those under Article 263, 3,
supra, for having incapacitated him from the performance of the work in
which he was habitually engaged in for more than 90 days.

Conformably with Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty
is arresto mayorin its minimum and medium periods, which ranges from one
to four months. As earlier mentioned, the rules in Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Codeare not applicable in reckless imprudence, and considering
further that the maximum term of imprisonment would not exceed one year,
rendering the Indeterminate Sentence Lawinapplicable,

the Court holds that the straight penalty of two months of arresto mayorwas
the correct penalty for the petitioner.

The Court agrees with the CA’s modification of the award of actual and moral
damages amounting to ₱58,402.75 and ₱10,000.00, respectively.

Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but

must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. This is
because the courts cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in
determining the fact and amount of damages. To justify an award of actual
damages, there must be competent proof of the actual loss suffered, which
should be based on the amounts actually expended by the victim,

or other competent proof. Here, the receipts presented by the Prosecution

proved the expenses actually incurred amounting to₱108,402.75, but such
aggregate was reduced by the victim’s earlier receipt of ₱50,000.00 from the
petitioner in the form of financial assistance. Hence, the victim should
recover only the unpaid portion of ₱58,402.75.
Moral damages are given to ease the victim's grief and suffering. Moral
damages should reasonably approximate the extent of the hurt caused and
the gravity of the wrong done.

Accordingly, the CA properly reduced to ₱10,000.00 the moral damages

awarded to Ferdinand. In addition, we impose an interest of 6% per annum
on the actual and moral damages reckoned from the finality of this decision
until the full payment of the obligation. This is because the damages thus
fixed thereby become a forbearance. The rate of 6% per annum is pursuant
to Circular No. 799, series of 2013, issued by the Office of the Governor of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas on June 21, 2013, and the pronouncement in
Nacar v. Gallery Frames.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006,
subject to the modifications that: (a) the penalty to be imposed on the
petitioner shall be a straight penalty of two months of arresto mayor; and (b)
the awards for actual and moral damages shall earn 6% interest rate per
annum commencing from the finality of this decision until fully paid.

The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 140698. June 20, 2003]

ROGELIO ENGADA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Former
Fourteenth Division, Manila, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision[1] dated May 31,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18358, which affirmed with
modification the judgment[2] dated August 25, 1994, of the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City, Branch 29, in Criminal Case No. 36223. The RTC found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple imprudence resulting in
physical injuries and damage to property, and sentenced him to (a) suffer
imprisonment for one month and one day of arresto mayor, (b) pay private
complainant, Mrs. Sheila Seyan, the amount of fifty one thousand pesos
(P51,000) for the total destruction of the Toyota Tamaraw jeepney, and one
hundred ten thousand pesos (P110,000) for her hospital and medical
expenses, and (c) pay the costs of suit. The CA increased the prison term
imposed on petitioner to four months of arresto mayor.
The facts culled from the records are as follows:
On November 29, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Edwin Iran was
driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney bound for Iloilo City. On board was
Sheila Seyan, the registered owner of the Tamaraw. While traversing the
road along Barangay Acquit, Barotac Nuevo, the Tamaraw passengers
allegedly saw from the opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pick-up, driven by
petitioner Rogelio Engada. The pick-up had just negotiated a hilly gradient on
the highway. When it was just a few meters away from the Tamaraw, the
Isuzu pick-up’s right signal light flashed, at the same time, it swerved to its
left, encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw and headed towards a head-
on collision course with it. Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up. Iran
swerved to his left but the pick-up also swerved to its right. Thus, the pick-up
collided with the Tamaraw, hitting the latter at its right front passenger side.
The impact caused the head and chassis of the Tamaraw to separate from its
body. Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. The
pick-up stopped diagonally astride the center of the road.
Seyan and Iran were brought to Barotac Nuevo Medicare Hospital.[3] Seyan
was profusely bleeding from her nose and was in a state of shock with her
eyes closed. In the afternoon of the same day, November 29, 1989, she was
transferred to St. Paul’s Hospital in Iloilo City where she was confined. Her
medical certificate revealed that she suffered a fracture on the right femur,
lacerated wound on the right foot, multiple contusions, abrasions, blunt
abdominal injury, and lacerations of the upper-lower pole of the right kidney.
[4] She was discharged from the hospital only on January 15, 1990.
Seyan incurred P130,000 in medical expenses. The Toyota Tamaraw
jeepney ended up in the junk heap. Its total loss was computed at P80,000.
A criminal complaint for damage to property through reckless imprudence
with serious physical injuries was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of
Barotac Nuevo against petitioner Rogelio Engada and Edwin Iran.[5] Probable
cause was found against petitioner, while the complaint against Iran was
dismissed.[6]
Consequently, an Information was filed against petitioner charging him with
serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless
imprudence, thus:
That on or about November 29, 1989, in the Municipality of Barotac Nuevo,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused Rogelio Engada driving an Isuzu Pick-up
with Plate No. SAR 117 owned by the Land Bank of the Philippines, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and with reckless imprudence drive said pick-up
in a careless, reckless and imprudent manner with disregard of traffic laws
and regulations, and as a result of such negligent and reckless driving the
Isuzu Pick-up driven by the accused bumped a Toyota Tamaraw jeep with
Plate No. FBF 601 owned by Joelito and Sheila Seyan and driven by Edwin
Iran thereby causing damage to the Toyota Tamaraw in the amount of
P80,000.00 and serious physical injuries to Mrs. Sheila Seyan who was riding
said vehicle, the injuries barring complications will heal in more than 30
days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
After trial, the court rendered on August 25, 1994 a decision, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Simple Imprudence resulting [in] physical injuries and damage to property
defined and penalized in Article 263, paragraph 4 and in relation with Article
365, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences the accused
Rogelio Engada to suffer imprisonment of ONE (1) MONTH and ONE (1) DAY
of arresto mayor.
Accused is further ordered to pay complainant Mrs. Sheila Seyan the amount
of P51,000.00 for the total destruction of the Toyota Tamaraw Jeepney and
P110,000.00 for indemnification of hospital and medical expenses, and to
pay the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On May 31, 1999, the CA
dismissed the appeal and affirmed with modification the trial court’s
decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the
appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with modification as to the penalty
imposed upon the accused who is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment
of FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto mayor.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, the
instant petition, wherein petitioner raises the issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARE
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE OR BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS
RESULTING IN A MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN INFERENCE SPECIFICALLY ON WHAT
WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT AND WHOSE ACT WAS IT.
[10]
Petitioner claims innocence and seeks acquittal. He contends that in this
case we should relax the rule that only legal questions can be raised in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. According to him, the
Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts, and erred in its conclusion as to
the proximate cause of the collision. He insists that the Court of Appeals
erred when it found him negligent for occupying the lane of the Tamaraw
jeepney, and then failing to return to his original lane at the safest and
earliest opportunity.
Petitioner further contends that the CA failed to consider that he already
relayed his intention to go back to his lane by flashing the pick-up’s right
signal light. He submits that at that moment Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw,
had no more reason to swerve to his left. Had Iran not swerved to the left,
according to petitioner, the collision would have been avoided. It was Iran
who was clearly negligent, says petitioner. Citing our ruling in McKee v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,[11] petitioner avers that although his act of
occupying the Tamaraw’s lane was the initial act in the chain of events,
Iran’s swerving to the left after petitioner flashed his right turn signal,
constituted a sufficient intervening event, which proximately caused the
eventual injuries and damages to private complainant.
Petitioner also claims that the Court of Appeals erred when it found that the
pick-up approached the Tamaraw at a fast speed. He maintains that this was
not borne by the evidence on record.
The Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the state, counters that the
Court of Appeals did not err in convicting the accused, now petitioner
herein. Petitioner’s negligence was the proximate cause of the accident,
according to the OSG, for the following reasons: First, petitioner for no
justifiable reason occupied the opposite lane. Second, while on the wrong
lane, petitioner was driving the Isuzu pick-up fast, and he returned to his own
lane only at the last minute. This left Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw, with no
opportunity to reflect on the safest way to avoid the accident. Iran’s
swerving to the left was his reaction to petitioner’s wrongful act, which
appropriately calls for the application of the emergency rule. The rationale
of this rule is that a person who is confronted with a sudden emergency
might have no time for thought, and he must make a prompt decision based
largely upon impulse or instinct. Thus, he cannot be held to the same
standard of conduct as one who had an opportunity to reflect, even though it
later appears that he made the wrong decision. Clearly, under the
emergency rule petitioner cannot shift the blame to Iran, concludes the OSG.
As to petitioner’s claim that there was no evidence showing that the pick-up
was running very fast, the OSG avers that this is rebutted by the testimony
of Seyan and Iran who both testified that petitioner drove the pick-up at a
fast speed when it encroached on their lane immediately before the collision.
Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that the action of petitioner, Rogelio
Engada, was the proximate cause of the collision? This is the crux of the
present petition.
In our view, petitioner’s attempt to pin the blame on Edwin Iran, the driver of
the Tamaraw, for the vehicular collision is unfounded. Iran swerved to the
left only to avoid petitioner’s pick-up, which was already on a head to head
position going against Iran’s Tamaraw jeepney immediately before the
vehicles collided. This fact has been established by the evidence on record.
No convincing proof was adduced by petitioner that the driver of the
Tamaraw, Iran, could have avoided a head-on collision.
We note that petitioner admitted his Isuzu pick-up intruded into the lane of
the Tamaraw jeepney. Prosecution witness Nelson Alobin, one of those who
went to the scene of the incident immediately, testified that when he arrived
at the place where the collision took place, he saw the pick-up positioned
diagonally at the center of the road.[12] Its head was towards the direction
of Barotac Nuevo and the rear tires were just a few inches beyond the center
of the lane.[13] Moving backwards facing Barotac Nuevo, at two arms length
away from the pick-up, Alobin also saw a tire mark, 12 inches long and
located at the left side of the center line going to the right side.[14]
The above circumstance corroborates the testimony of both Seyan and Iran
that, immediately before the collision, the pick-up was not on its proper lane
but on the other lane (the left lane rather than the right) directly on collision
course with the Tamaraw jeepney. The tire mark reveals the short distance
between the two vehicles when the Isuzu pick-up attempted to return to its
proper lane.
It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of
overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it
that the road is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot do so in safety.
[15] This rule is consistent with Section 41, paragraph (a) of R.A. 4136 as
amended, otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
which provides:
Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. – (a) The driver of a vehicle
shall not drive to the left side of the center line of a highway in overtaking or
passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, unless such left
side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance
ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be made in safety.
In the present case, there was only a distance of 30 meters from the
Tamaraw jeepney when the Isuzu pick-up abandoned its lane and swerved to
the left of the center line.[16] In addition, petitioner was running at a fast
clip while traversing this lane. This was testified to by Seyan and Iran,
unrebutted by petitioner. The resulting damage to the Tamaraw jeepney, at
the point where the head and chassis were separated from the body,
bolsters this conclusion that petitioner was speeding. In our view, petitioner
was negligent in several ways, and his negligence was the proximate cause
of the collision. In abandoning his lane, he did not see to it first that the
opposite lane was free of oncoming traffic and was available for a safe
passage. Further, after seeing the Tamaraw jeepney ahead, petitioner did
not slow down, contrary to the rule set in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co.
v. IAC,[17]thus:
…[O]r if, after attempting to pass, the driver of the overtaking vehicle finds
that he cannot make the passage in safety, the latter must slacken his speed
so as to avoid the danger of a collision, even bringing his car to a stop if
necessary.
For failing to observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on drivers of
vehicles abandoning their lane, petitioner must be held liable.
Iran could not be faulted when in his attempt to avoid the pick-up, he
swerved to his left. Petitioner’s acts had put Iran in an emergency situation
which forced him to act quickly. An individual who suddenly finds himself in a
situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was
brought by his own negligence.[18]
Petitioner tries to extricate himself from liability by invoking the doctrine of
last clear chance. He avers that between him and Iran, the latter had the
last clear chance to avoid the collision, hence Iran must be held liable.
The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear
chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent
acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident.[19] But as already stated on this point, no
convincing evidence was adduced by petitioner to support his invocation of
the abovecited doctrine. Instead, what has been shown is the presence of an
emergency and the proper application of the emergency rule. Petitioner’s
act of swerving to the Tamaraw’s lane at a distance of 30 meters from it and
driving the Isuzu pick-up at a fast speed as it approached the Tamaraw,
denied Iran time and opportunity to ponder the situation at all. There was no
clear chance to speak of. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in
holding petitioner responsible for the vehicular collision and the resulting
damages, including the injuries suffered by Mrs. Sheila Seyan and the total
loss of the Tamaraw jeepney. It also did not err in imposing on petitioner the
sentence of four (4) months ofarresto mayor.[20]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18358 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

CAGUIOA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] (Petition) filed on May 7, 2016
pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the Decision [2] dated August
27, 2015 (assailed Decision) of the Court of Appeals (CA) Twentieth (20 th)
Division and Resolution[3] dated February 29, 2016 of the CA Former
Twentieth (20th) Division in C.A.-G.R. CEB-CR No. 02067. The assailed
Decision affirmed the Decision[4] dated November 29, 2012 rendered by
Branch 48, Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City (RTC) in Criminal Case No.
15640 (RTC Decision), which, in turn, affirmed the Judgment [5] dated
February 9, 2012 rendered by Branch 2, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Tagbilaran City (MTCC) in Criminal Case No. 17603 (MTCC Judgment) which
found petitioner Michael John N. Robles (Robles) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide, Less Serious Physical
Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code[6] (RPC).

The accusatory portion of the Information against Robles reads:

That on or about the 27th day of July 2009, in the City of Tagbilaran,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive
without license an unregistered Suzuki Raiders motorcycle with no plate
number along CPG North Avenue comer Benigno Aquino Avenue, Tagbilaran
City, in a careless, negligent and imprudent manner, in violation of the traffic
rules and regulations and ordinances, without due regard to safety, life and
property and without taking the necessary precautions to avoid accident to
person or damage to property, thereby causing by such carelessness,
negligence and imprudence said Suzuki Raiders motorcycle to hit and bump
a Yamaha Crypton motorcycle bearing plate No. GL-6197 driven by Ronelo
Franco Solas causing damage to the motorcycle in the amount of FOUR
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS ([P]4,570.00), Philippine
Currency, causing death to the latter and less serious physical injuries to the
backrider Renilda S. Dimpel, to wit: 'ABRASION ON LEFT ILIAC & LUMBAR
AREA, ABRASIONS ON LEFT FOREARM' and which injuries have incapacitated
or will incapacitate her from performing her customary labor for a period of
seven (7) to ten (10) days barring complications not apparent at the time of
examination, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Ronelo Franco
Solas and Renilda S. Dimpel.[7]
When arraigned on March 25, 2010, Robles pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.[8] After the pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits ensued.

The Facts

This case is rooted in a vehicular collision that happened between a Yamaha

Crypton motorcycle driven by Ronelo Solas (Ronelo) and a Suzuki Raider
motorcycle[9] driven by Robles. The mishap occurred at the wee hours of July
27, 2009 in Tagbilaran City, particularly, along the intersection of Carlos P.
Garcia North Avenue (CPG Avenue), a through street or highway, Calceta
Street leading to the east, and Benigno Aquino Avenue (formerly Airport
Road) leading to the northwest.[10]

As might be expected, the prosecution and defense had conflicting versions

of how the mishap happened. The conflicting versions of the prosecution and
the defense, respectively, are as follows:

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, Renilda S. Dimpel

(Renilda), Carmelino Franco Solas (Carmelina), and Arcadia Bendanillo. [11]

According to the prosecution, in the evening of July 26, 2009, Renilda was
with the family of Carmelina in Tagbilaran City. At around 1:00 a.m. of July
27, 2009, Renilda decided to go home. Ronelo offered to take her home
using a Yamaha Crypton motorcycle with Plate No. GL-6197. [12] While they
were navigating CPG Avenue, and upon reaching the intersection of CPG
Avenue and Calceta Street, a speeding Suzuki Raider motorcycle, with no
plate number, suddenly crossed CPG Avenue from Calceta Street causing the
collision of the two motorcycles. Renilda and Ronelo were flung away as a
result thereof.[13]

Robles was the driver of the Suzuki Raider motorcycle which collided with
Ronelo's Yamaha Crypton motorcycle. Robles had no driver's license and his
motorcycle had no plate. He did not give assistance to Renilda or to the
family of Ronelo.[14]

As a result of the collision, both Ronelo and Renilda were brought to Gov.
Celestino Gallares Memorial Hospital (Gallares Hospital). Ronelo, because his
condition was critical, was later transferred to Ramiro Community Hospital.
[15]
At around 9:20 a.m. of July 27, 2009, Ronelo died due to his injuries.
Meanwhile, Renilda was transferred to Borja Family Hospital where she paid
P19,533.50 for medical expenses. Her injuries healed within 7-14 days.
[16]
Carmelina, Ronelo's brother, stated that he paid for all the hospital,
funeral, and burial expenses incurred by and for his brother, including
attorney's fees in the amount of P99,587.67 and P85,766.15. Ronelo had a
professional driver's license and the Yamaha Crypton motorcycle he drove
was duly registered.[17]

Arcadia Bendanillo, a habal-habal driver, corroborated the testimony of

Renilda. He declared that he was near St. Jude Hospital when he saw a
Suzuki Raider motorcycle cross CPG Avenue without stopping at the
intersection, and thereafter colliding with a Yamaha Crypton motorcycle. He
later came to know the drivers of the Suzuki Raider and Yamaha Crypton
motorcycles as Robles and Ronelo, respectively. [18]

Version of the Defense

The defense presented eight witnesses, namely Robles, Bonifacio Dinampo

(Dinampo), Police Officer 3 Fabio Maulas (PO3 Maulas), Dr. Glenn Eduard
Oppus, Concordia Robles, Renan Lopas (Lopas), Alma Paelmao, and Dr.
Isagani Jodi de las Santos (Dr. de los Santos). [19]

According to the defense, on July 27, 2009, at around 1:10 a.m., Robles was
driving his motorcycle along CPG Avenue with Lopas as his back rider. Upon
reaching the CPG Avenue — Benigno Aquino Avenue intersection, he
signaled to turn left. But then, a speeding motorcycle driven by Ronelo, with
back rider Renilda, suddenly came from behind him and without slowing
down, attempted to overtake him, causing the collision of the two vehicles.
The incident was witnessed by many people who were at the vicinity and
who were interviewed by the responding policeman who came to the site to
conduct an investigation. As a result of the incident, Robles suffered injuries
and his motorcycle was damaged.[20]

Robles offered in evidence pictures showing the damages to his motorcycle,

which were all on its left side. According to Robles, this negates the
prosecution's claim that he came from Calceta Street, because if the
prosecution's version is to be believed, then there would have been damage
on the front wheel portion of Robles' motorcycle, but it had none. According
to Robles, he was actually cruising along CPG Avenue, but when he was
about to turn left to Benigno Aquino Avenue, he was hit by Ronelo's speeding
motorcycle when the latter attempted to overtake him. [21] Robles was also
brought to Gallares Hospital for treatment and there he declared that he was
hit by a speeding motorcycle.[22]

Dr. de los Santos, Ronelo's attending physician at Ramiro Community

Hospital, testified that, based on Ronelo's admitting notes and history, as
well as interviews taken of the persons accompanying Ronelo, Ronelo after
having "a drinking spree with his friends" [23] drove his motorcycle during
which he collided with another motorcycle. [24] He added that Ronelo "had this
intoxicated or positive alcoholic breath" when he was examined at the
hospital.[25]

Lopos, a holder of a driver's license and who, at the time of the mishap, was
Robles' back rider, corroborated Robles' testimony. The testimonies of
Robles and Lopos were likewise corroborated by Dinampo, a habal-
habal driver who witnessed the collision between the two motorcycles.
[26]
According to Dinampo, while he was driving his motorcycle along CPG
Avenue near St. Jude Hospital with a passenger on board, he saw Robles,
with back rider Lopos, signaling to the left when a speeding Yamaha Crypton
motorcycle driven by Ronelo bumped the motorcycle of Robles. [27]

PO3 Maulas testified that he, in his capacity as traffic investigator, conducted
factual gathering and interviewed witnesses and bystanders available right
after the incident, and prepared a police report and sketch based on his
investigation.[28] Based on ms police report and sketch, the motorcycles
driven by Robles and Ronelo, respectively, were actually travelling in the
same direction of CPG North Avenue, both heading north, [29] which was
contrary to the claim of the prosecution witnesses that Robles came
speeding from Calceta Street. When Robles, who was ahead at the
intersection, made a signal to the left to turn towards Benigno Aquino
Avenue, the speeding Yamaha Crypton motorcycle of Ronelo suddenly
overtook at the left side,[30] resulting in a collision of the two motorcycles in
front of Saint Jude Hospital. Consistent with Robles' testimony, PO3 Maulas'
police report indicates that Robles' Suzuki Raider motorcycle sustained
damages on its left side[31] while Ronelo's Yamaha Crypton sustained
damages on its right side.[32]
The Rulings of the MTCC and the RTC

On February 9, 2012, the MTCC found Robles guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the charge against him, and sentenced Robles to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of one (1) year of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years
of prision correccional as maximum.[33] The MTCC found credible the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses that Ronelo was driving along CPG
Avenue, a through street or highway, while Robles, coming from Calceta
Street, suddenly crossed the intersection into CPG Avenue, thereby causing
the collision,[34] in violation of Republic Act No. 4136, otherwise known as the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code[35] (Traffic Code), particularly Sections
42 (d)[36] and 43 (c)[37] thereof.

The MTCC considered against Robles the circumstance that Robles was
found to have been violating traffic rules, and hence presumed to be
negligent.[38] The MTCC noted that Robles was driving an unregistered motor
vehicle and only had a student driver's permit without the company of a
licensed driver-instructor.[39] The MTCC also concluded that even if Robles'
version of the incident were to be believed, Robles would still be at fault —
as Robles, before making a left turn, should have made sure that the road
was clear of vehicles on both sides, and that had he done so, he "could have
seen the fast speeding motorcycle behind which x x x according to him[,]
attempted to overtake him."[40] As such, the MTCC disposed the case as
follows:

WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered finding accused John Michael

Robles guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property
and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ONE (1)
YEAR of prison correccional as minimum to FIVE (5) YEARS of prison
correccional as maximum and ordering the accused to pay the following:
1. To Renilda Dimpel the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
([P]20,000.00) as nominal damages;
2. To the Heirs of Ronelo Franco Solas in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS ([P]50,000.00) as death indemnity;

3. To Carmelina Franco Solas in the amount of ONE HUNDRED TWO

THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY THREE PESOS AND 82/100
([P]102,653.82) as actual damages and temperate or moderate
damages of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS ([P]35,000).

SO ORDERED.[41]
Petitioner appealed the MTCC Judgment before the RTC. The RTC, in a
Decision dated November 29, 2012, sustained the ruling arrived at by the
MTCC, and concluded that the latter's findings were based on the evidence
on record.[42] On January 23, 2013, the RTC denied Robles' motion for
reconsideration.[43] Robles thereafter appealed to the CA via a petition for
review.[44]

The Ruling of the CA

In the assailed Decision, the CA denied the appeal and held as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 29,

2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48 of Tagbilaran City in Crim. Case
No. 15640 convicting Michael John Robles for Reckless Imprudence Resulting
to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[45]
The CA found that there was nothing in the records which showed that the
RTC, in affirming the Judgment of the MTCC, overlooked relevant and
undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion. Addressing Robles' claim that he did not come from Calceta
Street, and that instead, it was Ronelo who hit his motorcycle when Ronelo
attempted to overtake him, the CA likewise ruled that even if Robles' claim is
to be believed, the mishap would not have happened nonetheless, had
Robles simply "been in the correct position on the road." [46]

Hence, this recourse.

In gist, Robles posits that it was Ronelo's attempt to ove1iake him, while
driving at a very fast speed and under the influence of alcohol, which was
the proximate cause of the accident.[47] Contrary to the prosecution's claim,
he did not come from Calceta Street. Rather, he was driving in the same
direction as Ronelo along CPG Avenue heading north, and about to turn left
to Benigno Aquino Avenue, when Ronelo, in the latter's attempt to overtake
Robles, hit Robles' motorcycle.[48] He argues in this regard that the findings of
the police investigator and even the medical records, both of which
corroborated his testimony, must be given credence, especially considering
that these came from impartial sources.[49]
Finally, he also points out that even the Information filed by the prosecution
alleges that both Robles and Ronelo came from the same direction.
According to him, the deviation of the witnesses of the prosecution
themselves from what was stated in the Information, not only violates his
right to due process, but also puts in doubt the credibility of said witnesses.
[50]

On February 8, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its

Comment[51] to the Petition, where it reiterated that the findings of the lower
courts are supported by the evidence on record. [52]

Issue

The main question for resolution is whether Robles is guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide, Less Serious
Physical Injuries, and Damage to Property under Article 365 of the RPC.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

As a general rule, factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight
and respect especially when they are affirmed by the appellate court.
However, as with every rule, there are exceptions. In the case of Quidet v.
People,[53] the Court held:

x x x where the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some

facts or circumstances of weight and substance which can affect the result of
the case, this Court is duty-bound to correct this palpable error for the right
to liberty, which stands second only to life in the hierarchy of constitutional
rights, cannot be lightly taken away. x x x [54]
In addition, it bears emphasis that "the Court, in the course of its review of
criminal cases elevated to it, still commences its analysis from the
fundamental principle that the accused before it is presumed
innocent."[55] This presumption continues although the accused had been convicted in the trial
court, as long as such conviction is still pending appeal.

After going over the records of this case, the Court is unable to sustain the findings of fact and
conclusion reached by the courts below. A careful review of the records inevitably leads to the
conclusion that the prosecution failed to establish that Robles committed the crime charged against
him.

The defense version

is more credible and
deserves more
weight and credit

Reckless imprudence, as defined by our penal law, consists in voluntarily, but

without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his or her
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and
other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. [56] It has the
following elements: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that
the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be done without
malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and
(5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender,
taking into consideration his or her employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons,
time and place.[57]
Here, the lower courts found to be credible Renilda's testimony that Ronelo
was cruising along CPG Avenue, a through street or highway, and that
Robles, in violation of traffic laws, suddenly crossed CPG Avenue from
Calceta Street.[58] This appears to be the lower courts' assessment of Robles'
guilt, considering that Section 42(d) and Section 43(c) of the Traffic Code,
require a driver of a vehicle entering a "through highway" to bring to a full
stop such vehicle prior to entering, and to yield the right of way to vehicles
approaching in either direction on such through highway. [59] Thus, according
to the lower courts, Robles "should have given way to Ronelo Solas who was
negotiating a through street or highway." [60]

The Court, however, disagrees. The Court finds that the premise for the
lower courts' finding is erroneous.

First, PO3 Maulas' findings, which were reflected in his police report and
sketch,[61] and which he thereafter repeated in open court, are clear and
categorical that Robles did not, in fact, come from Calceta Street. Rather, at
the time of the incident, he was driving along CPG Avenue heading north,
and was about to turn left to Benigno Aquino Avenue at the intersection
when Ronelo attempted to overtake him.[62]

In PO3 Maulas' police report, which he prepared immediately after the

incident, and which was duly recorded in the traffic blotter of the Philippine
National Police, Tagbilaran City Police Station, [63] he reported that:

Further investigation revealed that the two motorcycle[s] involved were

travelling on the same direction along CPG North Avenue heading towards
North and upon reaching in front of St. Jude Hospital they collided with each
other, when the Suzuki Raider MC which was ahead signaled and about to
turn left towards B. Aquino Avenue while the speeding Yamaha MC suddenly
overtook at the left side.[64]
Likewise, PO3 Maulas' testimony was categorical that based on his
investigation, Robles actually came from CPG Avenue, and not from Calceta
Street. In other words, his findings directly contradicted Renilda's testimony.
He testified that:

[Direct examination of PO3 Maulas by Atty. Cristifil D. Baluma]

In the scene Mr. Witness, based on your sketch could you tell us what
Q: were your findings as far as who caused the collision based on your
investigation?

xxxx

They collided to each other because this motorcycle, the Suzuki Raiders
Motorcycle when about to turn left, suddenly the speeding Yamaha
A:
Crypton Motorcycle passed at the left side and they collided. The reason,
it is an accidental. I presumed, it was accidental.

xxxx

Now, you mentioned earlier that this Renilda Dimpel told you that the
other motorcycle was coming from the other road, this Calceta Street.
Q: Now, could you explain to us Mr. Witness, when you heard from Renilda
Dimpel that information, and why is it that what Renilda Dimpel told you
is not indicated in your police report?

A: Because based on the investigation there was no indication that

the other motorcycle came from that road Calceta Street
because if ever the collision happened in that particular point he
 would be thrown to the other portion of the road. He must be
thrown to the North CGP Avenue which is ahead of the intersection not in
this portion which is different from my sketch where this portion that the
vehicle was thrown is the intersection of Calceta and CPG Avenue.
[65]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
PO3 Maulas' police report and sketch also indicated that Robles' Suzuki
Raider motorcycle sustained damages on its left side while Ronelo's Yamaha
Crypton sustained damages on its right side. He testified on this point that:

[Direct examination of PO3 Maulas by Atty. Cristifil D. Baluma]

Now, concerning the sketch which you prepared and you labeled A and
Q: B, may we know if at the time when you arrived, may we know if [these]
two labels indicated the position where you saw the two motorcycles?

A: Yes, they were in that position.

xxxx

Now on the basis of the damages which you placed on this sketch, please
Q:
tell us what were your findings or your observations?

A: (Witness reading)

The Suzuki Raiders Motorcycle incurred damages: x x x Change pedal

deformed, left driver's foot rest slightly deformed, left near foot rest cut,
etc.

How about your observation of the other motorcycle as far as the

Q:
Yamaha Crypton. Could you tell us your observation of the damages?

The Yamaha Crypton incurred damages: x x x the foot brake lever

A:
deformed, front right signal light detached, hand brake lever cut, etc. [66]
Notably, such findings are likewise reflected in the photographs of Robles'
Suzuki Raider motorcycle taken after the incident, [67] which indicate that the
motorcycle sustained damages only on its left side, particularly on the
change pedal and driver's left foot rest.[68]

More importantly, on cross examination, PO3 Maulas was unwavering that

despite interviewing both Renilda and Robles, he found Robles' account to be
more consistent with his factual findings, while Renilda's account was, in his
view, improbable. Thus:

[Cross-examination of PO3 Maulas by Atty. Menedio Thadeus P. Bernido]

What were your basis in saying that the motorcycle came from this
Q:
portion South portion of CPG North?

Because if ever that Suzuki Raider came from Calceta Street, he should
be placed in the very exact center portion of the CPG and
A:
Calceta Street. Whereas, in my sketch here of the incident happened
right near the front of the tip of (St.) Jude Hospital.

xxxx

That is why I am asking you if Michael Robles narrated to you his version
Q:
of the incident?

A: Yes Sir.

Q: And Renilda Dimpel also narrated to you her version of the incident?
A: Yes Sir.

But unfortunately Mr. Witness, what has been reflected in your report
Q:
was the version of Robles, is it not?

I cannot say that I was in the side of Michael Robles because it is

A: just timely that his version was in line with those persons whom
I asked Sir.

So, meaning to say Mr. Witness, that after talking with Michael Robles,
Q: and Renilda Dimpel you already knew that there were conflicting
versions of what happened?

Yes Sir. But if I will [believe] her it is very far from the truth
A: because there was no indication that he came where he came
from, otherwise he could be thrown away from the center.

xxxx

So, you mean to say that even if the Yamaha [m]otorcycle was the one
[that] hit the Suzuki Raiders, still the Yamaha Crypton was the one
Q:
[which was] thrown out from the point of impact? That is what you are
trying to say?

The Suzuki Raiders only turned and then the Yamaha Crypton was the
A:
one being thrown. The Yamaha Crypton was thrown forward.

But you will agree with me that the two colliding vehicles after the
Q:
collision they could be thrown anywhere?

A: It depends.

So, it could be also possible that this Suzuki Raiders was coming from
Calceta Street and this Yamaha Crypton also coming from the South of
CPO Avenue and after reaching in the intersection of Calceta and Airport
Q:
Road [or Benigno Aquino Avenue] and after colliding each other they
were thrown in their respective position[s] as shown in the sketch. It is
also possible?

It is very remote Sir. Because what was being hit was the change
pedal of the Suzuki Raiders. So, it could be impossible if it goes
A:
left side ways. It must be in the right.[69] (Emphasis supplied and
underscoring)
It bears stressing that PO3 Maulas did not simply wrest his findings out of
thin air. As testified by him, said findings were based on his interviews with
various bystanders and witnesses,[70] on the damages actually sustained by
the two motorcycles,[71] and on his own independent assessment of the
relative positions of the vehicles when he arrived at the scene of the
accident.[72] Ultimately, based on the totality of such evidence, PO3 Maulas
categorically concluded that Renilda's version is "very far from the truth,"
"very remote," and, in fact, "impossible." [73]

Indeed, the damages sustained by the two motorcycles, as well as the

relative positions of the motorcycles, as observed by PO3 Maulas and
inferred from said damages, constitute real evidence that ranks higher in the
hierarchy of evidence compared to testimonial evidence. [74]

It is well-settled that object or physical evidence, when offered in accordance

with the requisites for its admissibility, becomes evidence of the highest
order and speaks more eloquently than witnesses put together. [75] It has
been characterized as "that mute but eloquent manifestations of truth which
rate high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence," [76] such that "where the
physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonial evidence of the
prosecution witnesses, x x x the physical evidence should prevail." [77] Thus,
in People v. Vasquez,[78] this Court refused to lend credence to the
incriminating assertions of prosecution witnesses as to an alleged mauling,
and stated that "[t]his Court cannot be persuaded by the prosecution's claim
of perpetration of physical violence in the absence of any marked physical
injuries on the various parts of the victim's face and body." [79]

The same principle finds relevance here, considering that the physical
evidence belies the prosecution's testimonial evidence.

Yet, neither the MTCC, the RTC, nor the CA attempted to remotely discuss
why the findings of PO3 Maulas, and more importantly, the nature and
locations of the damages sustained by the said motorcycles, did not at all
warrant any consideration. In convicting Robles, the lower courts simply and
solely relied on Renilda's testimony, which they precipitously concluded to be
credible, without any explanation as to why such version deserves more
credence than the traffic investigator's investigation report. [80] On this score,
the Court finds the lower courts to have been mistaken and, to a degree,
remiss in the performance of their duties.[81]

Second, PO3 Maulas' account has in its favor the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official functions, which presumption the prosecution
utterly failed to overturn.

In Yap v. Lagtapon,[82] the Court described the presumption of regularity in

the performance of official duties in this wise:

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties is an aid

to the effective and unhampered administration of government functions.
Without such benefit, every official action could be negated with minimal
effort from litigants, irrespective of merit or sufficiency of evidence to
support such challenge. To this end, our body of jurisprudence has
been consistent in requiring nothing short of clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary to overthrow such presumption.
[83]
(Emphasis supplied)
The presumption may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty.[84] Conversely, unless the official act in question is
irregular on its face,[85] or where the records suggest that the law enforcers
involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for
in the law,[86] the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. [87] Thus, unless the
presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. [88]

Here, the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to show any deficiency
or irregularity on the part of PO3 Maulas in the performance of his official
duty as the traffic investigator of the accident. Also, the prosecution did not
show that he was impelled by any ill motive or bias to testify falsely. As such,
PO3 Maulas' investigation report has in its favor the presumption that official
duty had regularly been performed,[89] and thus entitled to weight and
respect.

Notably, the prosecution simply harped on the fact that PO3 Maulas did not
actually witness the accident.[90] However, the Court has time and again
given weight to the report of the traffic or investigating officer in cases
involving vehicular accidents, even if the investigating officer did not actually
witness the accident. In Serra v. Mumar,[91] which involved a civil action for
damages in relation to a charge of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, the Court upheld the traffic investigator's report despite the
investigator not having been an actual eyewitness, thus:

Petitioner insists that the traffic investigator SPO3 Haran Abdullatip's report
should be disregarded because he was not at the scene when the accident
happened.

Rarely does it happen that the investigating officer personally witnesses an

accident that he investigates, yet this does not mean that his observations
are not valid. A traffic investigator's training and experience allow him to
determine how an accident occurred even without witnessing the accident
himself.

In this case, Abdullatip had been a traffic investigator for nine years. Even if
he arrived at the scene after the accident, he saw the vehicles in
their relative positions as a result of the accident. His experience,
as well as his evaluation of the statements from various witnesses,
guided him in assessing who was at fault. In any case, the
presumption of regularity in the exercise of functions is in his favor
and therefore his report must be given credence.[92] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in BJDC Construction v. Lanuzo,[93] which involved a civil action for
damages arising from a road accident, the Court upheld the contents of the
police officer's investigation report as it enjoyed the presumption of
regularity in the performance of the police officer's duties. This presumption
was upheld by the Court in this case, as no evidence was adduced to show
any deficiency or irregularity in the performance of the police officer's official
duty as the police investigator of the accident, and that it was not shown
that he was "impelled by any ill motive or bias to testify falsely." [94]

Meanwhile, in Manuel v. Court of Appeals,[95] which involved a civil action

based on quasi-delict, therein petitioners questioned the accuracy of the
sketches prepared by the police investigator, as "it was prepared the day
after the incident and the alleged 'tell-tale' skid marks and other details had
already been obliterated by the heavy downpour which lasted for at least an
hour after the accident."[96] The Court, however, rejected this assertion, as
the "strong presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty x x x
erases, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, any susp1c10ns that the
police investigator just invented the skid marks indicated in his report." [97]

Finally, in Caminos, Jr. v. People[98] (Caminos), the Court even convicted

therein accused of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
based on, among others, the entries in the traffic accident investigation
report (TAIR) and sketch made by the traffic investigator depicting the post-
collision positions of the two vehicles. In convicting therein accused, the
Court noted that the "TAIR itself shows that petitioner approached the
intersection in excess of lawful speed x x x which raises the presumption of
imprudent driving x x x."[99]

The foregoing principles find utmost relevance here, especially considering

that the traffic investigator's findings, rather than implicate, actually
exonerate the accused.

Certainly, in criminal cases, the presumption of regularity in the performance

of official functions cannot, by itself, overcome the superior presumption of
innocence.[100] Corollarily, if the official findings actually favor the accused,
then such findings, if unrebutted, should inevitably yield the acquittal of the
accused. After all, if the "facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other consistent with his [or her] guilt, then the evidence does not
pass the test of moral certainty and will not suffice to support a
conviction."[101] Indeed, while the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption
of innocence,[102] which prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond
reasonable doubt,[103] with much more reason should this presumption, if
unrebutted, be considered "binding truth"[104] in favor of the accused,
especially considering that the accused is protected by the overwhelming
presumption of innocence.

Third, contrasting the two versions of the incident, the Court finds the
version of Renilda incredible, contrary to the findings of the lower courts.

Indeed, as correctly pointed out by PO3 Maulas, had Robles come speeding
from Calceta Street and, in doing so, hit Ronelo's motorcycle which resulted
in Ronelo and Renilda getting flung away, then the point of impact should
not have been in front of St. Jude Hospital, which is located at the
intersection of CPG Avenue and Calceta Street,[105] but rather somewhere
further at the middle of the said intersection. In addition, based on the
prosecution's version of the facts, had Robles's Suzuki Raider motorcycle "hit
and bump[ed]"[106] Ronelo's Yamaha Crypton motorcycle, there should
likewise have been damage on the front wheel portion of Robles' motorcycle,
and not on its left side where the change pedal is located.

The relative positions of the two vehicles at the point of impact and
thereafter, as reflected in PO3 Maulas' sketch below, likewise lead to the
conclusion that Ronelo was the one who hit Robles and was, in fact, driving
at a much faster speed.

(image supposed to be here)

That Robles and his motorcycle were thrown further to the north (forward
into CPG Avenue) would also indicate that Robles had indeed slowed down,
while Ronelo, having gained much momentum, was thrown upon impact.
Moreover, had Renilda's version been true, then Ronelo's Yamaha Crypton
should have been flung toward either CPG Avenue or further to the side of
Benigno Aquino Avenue, instead of forward into CPG Avenue, as indicated in
the sketch.

Even more telling is the fact that the Information itself alleges that Robles
was driving "along CPG North Avenue comer Benigno Aquino Avenue,"
consistent with PO3 Maulas' findings. If Robles really came from the east at
Calceta Street and crossed through CPG Avenue at the intersection, as
claimed by the prosecution, then why was this not alleged in the
Information? Indeed, a defective Information which lacks certain essential
allegations may still sustain a conviction when the accused fails to object to
its sufficiency during the trial, and the deficiency was cured by competent
evidence presented therein.[107] However, that the Information itself contradicts the
prosecution's evidence, and supports the defense's version of events, as here, further lends to the
conclusion that the latter's account is indeed more consistent with how the events actually transpired.
To be sure, that the prosecution presented a version contrary to that stated in the Information
undeniably puts in doubt the entire version of the prosecution as to what truthfully happened. As well, it
lends credence to the version of the defense as testified to by Robles, PO3 Maulas, and the other
defense witnesses.

Accordingly, a thorough reading of the records of the case induces the Court to believe and approve the
defense's version of the incident. In checkered contrast, the Court finds the version of the prosecution
doubtful and incongruous with reality.

A causal connection
between Robles'
negligence and the
injuries or damages
complained of was
not proven beyond
reasonable doubt

Notwithstanding the obvious gaps in the prosecution's evidence, the lower

courts alternatively hinge Robles' conviction on their finding that Robles was
then driving an unregistered motor vehicle and only had a student driver's
permit without the company of a licensed driver, for which reason, according
to the lower courts, he would be presumed to be negligent under Article
2185 of the Civil Code.[108]

Again, the Court disagrees.

Gonzaga v. People,[109] and more recently, Ofracio v. People[110] instruct that

in order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent operation of a
vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between
such negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. [111] Otherwise
stated, mere negligence, presumed or otherwise, does not warrant a
conviction under Article 365 of the RPC, as a direct causal connection
must additionally be shown between the accused's negligence and
the accident.[112] In the same light, the Court, in Valencia v. People,
[113]
further held that mere negligence will not suffice because it is the
motorist's willful and wanton act done in utter disregard of the
consequence of his or her action, which criminalizes an imprudent
or negligent act.[114]

Likewise, Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals[115] clarifies that while the violation of

a statute may establish some degree of negligence, pursuant to Article 2185
of the Civil Code, the complainant must nevertheless show that the
violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the
injury, or that it substantially contributed thereto.[116] After all,
negligence consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other
negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of
the injury.[117]

From the foregoing premises, it thus cannot be said that Robles could be
presumed negligent, considering that there is no causal connection that
could be reasonably drawn between his violations — lack of driver's license
and driving an unregistered vehicle — and the proximate cause of the
accident. Additionally, there is also no evidence that the violations even
contributed to the accident.

In this connection, the Court notes that the lower courts failed to consider
that Robles was, at the time of the mishap, actually accompanied by a back
rider in the person of Lopos, a duly licensed driver. [118] In fact, the RTC in the
instant case even took judicial notice of the Decision rendered in Crim. Case
No. 14906,[119] wherein Robles was acquitted of the criminal offense of
driving without a license because he was actually accompanied by Lopos, "a
duly licensed driver."[120] Hence, that Robles only had a student driver's
permit could not at the onset give rise to a presumption that he was
negligent, considering that the Traffic Code explicitly allows a student driver
to operate a motor vehicle when accompanied by a duly licensed driver. [121]

The foregoing discussions point to no other conclusion than that Robles is not guilty of the crime
charged and should consequently be acquitted.

Robles' conviction
may not be
sustained based on
an alternative set of
facts not supported
by the prosecution's
evidence
Finally, to support Robles' conviction, the CA nonetheless holds that even if
Robles' version were to be believed, he nevertheless should have complied
with Section 45(b) of the Traffic Code, which necessitated that he correctly
positioned himself "nearest to the center line of the highway" prior to making
a left turn,[122] and that he be on the proper lookout for incoming vehicles.
[123]
"Had he done so," the CA concludes, "he could have seen the fast
speeding motorcycle behind which x x x according to him, attempted to
overtake him."[124] Thus, the CA finds Robles guilty of the crime charged as
"had Robles been in the correct position on the road, the mishap would not
have happened."[125]

Again, the Court disagrees.

Notably, the bulk of the CA's assailed Decision was centered on justifying
Robles' conviction, if his claim "will be believed that he was also cruising
along CPG Avenue when he was hit by the motorcycle driven by Solas on his
left side."[126] It did not, at all, touch on why Robles should be convicted
based on the facts as actually presented by the prosecution.

On this score, the CA obviously overlooked that under the defense's version
of the incident: (1) both parties were approaching the intersection from the
same direction, (2) thereafter, Robles signaled his intention to turn left, (3)
Ronelo, meanwhile, was speeding in his attempt to overtake Robles, and (4)
such attempt on the part of Ronelo to overtake caused the collision. Likewise
on record is Dr. de los Santos' testimony finding Ronelo to have been
"intoxicated" at the time of this accident. [127] Given these alternative set of
facts, it cannot simply be concluded that had Robles been in the correct
position on the road, the mishap would not have occurred. These are just
speculations. There are various other factors at play in a vehicular accident,
as here, such as the relative distances and speeds of the two vehicles in
their approach of the intersection — which, for obvious reasons, the
prosecution, in this case, had not been able to address under the said
"alternative" version of the facts.

On this point, the Court's ruling in Ladeco v. Angala,[128] finds relevance. In

that case, a pick-up truck running along the outer lane was slowing down to
about five to 10 kilometers per hour (kph) and was making a left turn
preparatory to turning south, or a U-turn, when it was bumped from behind
by the crewcab which was running along the inner lane at around 60 to 70
kph. Interestingly, the owner of the crewcab alleged therein, as the CA holds
in the present case, that the driver of the pick-up did not take the proper
lane before executing the U-turn, in violation of Section 45(6) of Traffic Code
and hence, it was the latter's recklessness that was the proximate cause of
the accident. The Court, disagreeing with the CA, held that the parties were
both negligent, as while the pick-up truck was not in the correct lane, the
accident would not have happened if the driver of the crewcab was not
driving very fast. The Court went further to say that the crewcab, based on
the doctrine of last clear chance, was ultimately at fault. Said the Court:

Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear chance
applies.

The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent
but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or
where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the
loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to
do so is chargeable with the loss. In this case, Deocampo had the last clear
chance to avoid the collision. Since Deocampo was driving the rear vehicle,
he had full control of the situation since he was in a position to observe the
vehicle in front of him. Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding bumping
the vehicle in front of him. A U-turn is done at a much slower speed to
avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running straight
ahead. Deocampo could have avoided the vehicle if he was not
driving very fast while following the pick-up. Deocampo was not
only driving fast, he also admitted that he did not step on the
brakes even upon seeing the pick-up. He only stepped on the brakes
after the collision.[129] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Further, in Caminos, the Court likewise clarified that the right of way rule,
[130]
as stated in Section 42 of the Traffic Code,[131] is applicable in instances
where two colliding vehicles are approaching the intersection at
approximately the same time.

In Caminos, the Court held that whether one of the drivers has the right of
way or, as sometimes stated, has the status of a favored driver on the
highway, is a question that permeates a situation where the vehicles
approach the crossing so nearly at the same time and at such distances and
speed that if either of them proceeds without regard to the other a collision
is likely to occur.[132] Nevertheless, the right of way accorded to vehicles
approaching an intersection is by no means a legal straitjacket, and is
subject to and is affected by the relative distances of the vehicles from the
point of intersection, and their respective speeds. [133] Notably, the Court
here declared that "it is much unsafe as it is unjust to
assume"[134] that the one making a left turn had performed a risky
maneuver at the intersection in simply "failing to keep a proper
lookout for oncoming vehicles."[135]

Likewise, in Adzuara v. Court of Appeals,[136] a criminal case involving

reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with less serious
physical injuries, it was established that a motorist crossing a through stop
street has the right of way over the one making a turn; but if the person
making the turn has already negotiated half of the turn and is almost on the
other side so that he or she is already visible to the person on the through
street, the latter, having the last clear chance to avoid the accident, is bound
to give way to the former.[137]

In sum, a motorist's liability for a road accident is not determined simply by

who among the parties had the right of way or was in the proper lane.
Rather, the same is determined by various factors, which include, among
others, the relative distances and respective speeds of the vehicles, [138] or
who among the parties had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. [139]

To stress, here, the prosecution, and later the lower courts, proceeded on
the theory that Robles came from Calceta Street, and not CPG Avenue. As
such, the prosecution did not, at all, present any evidence as to the speed
and distance of Robles relative to Ronelo, had Robles come from CPG
Avenue, and whether such directly caused, or at least materially contributed
to, the injuries or damages complained of. Thus, the CA erred in justifying
Robles' conviction based simply on the alternative speculative theory that
had Robles been in the correct pos1t10n on the road, the mishap would not
have happened.[140] This undoubtedly does not satisfy the core requirement
of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

To be sure, in a prosecution for reckless driving, the contributory negligence

of the person who was injured or who was the driver of the motor vehicle
with which the accused's vehicle collided does not constitute a complete
defense.[141] However, it is likewise true that a conviction must rest on the
strength of the prosecution's evidence, and not on the weakness — or in this
case, the strength — of the defense.[142]

All told, the prosecution failed to establish that Robles committed the act and
ultimately, the crime, for which he is being charged. The prosecution likewise
neither established that Robles committed inexcusable lack of precaution in
driving his motorcycle, nor proved that his alleged negligence was the legal
cause of the injury complained of.

Based on the abovementioned premises, the Court is likewise unable to

sustain the award of damages in favor of Renilda, Carmelino, and the heirs of
Ronelo, considering that the prosecution failed to prove that Robles
committed the act complained of.[143] On this score, the Court also notes that
Robles submitted before this Court[144] affidavits of desistance respectively
executed by Renilda[145] and Carmelino,[146] wherein both of them waived their
respective claims for damages and indemnity against Robles. [147]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. CEB-CR No. 02067 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Michael John Robles is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove that he committed the offense charged beyond
reasonable doubt. If detained, he is ordered immediately RELEASED, unless
he is confined for any other lawful cause. Any amount paid by way of a
bailbond is ordered RETURNED. Let entry of judgment be issued
immediately.

SO ORDERED.

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, G.R. No. 172716

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J. Chairperson,
CARPIO
MORALES, *

- versus
- PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-

SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and Promulgated:
EVANGELINE PONCE,
Respondents. November 17, 2010
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

The petition seeks the review[1] of the Orders[2] of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling finding
inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This,
despite the accused’s previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the
second prosecution.
 The Facts

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler

(petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce);
and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in

Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure.
Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment
for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two

cases.[3]

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the

matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a
petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from
the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366,
including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a
prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC
proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence,
cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. [4] Seven days later, the MeTC issued
a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and
postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. [5] Petitioner sought
reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained
unresolved.

Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce

sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss of
standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No.

2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to
maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner
for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus,
without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed
the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing. [6]

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No.

2803 constrained him to forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of
jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants
because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-
trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction. [7]

Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition
in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his
constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been
previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of
reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits
that the multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine
his penalty.

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s
decision forfeiting petitioner’s standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A.
2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to
jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot
be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less
grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to
separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical
injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to
property.

In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor

General’s motion not to file a comment to the petition as the public
respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is
represented by counsel.

The Issues

Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner

forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his
arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No.
82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioner’s constitutional right
under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366.
 The Ruling of the Court

We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in

Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the
petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution
shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366.

Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in

Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803

Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from

custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second
paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,[8] in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of
Appeals to “also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the
appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or
flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.” The “appeal”
contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of
convictions.

The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to

review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due
Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis
under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance on People v.
Esparas[9] undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a
proposition contrary to the RTC’s ruling. There, the Court granted review to
an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death for importing
prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus
tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory
review of death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to
Section 8 of Rule 124.[10]

The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at

his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing
becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment
of a defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under
Section 21, Rule 114[11] of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its
bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the
accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he
fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or
acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce
the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso
facto convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.

Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided “no explanation

why he failed to attend the scheduled proceeding” [12] at the MeTC is belied
by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the
suspension of the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of
his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to
defer arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC
ordered petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion
remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.

Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367

Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366

The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be “twice put in

jeopardy of punishment for the same offense” [13] protects him from, among
others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior
verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information.[14] It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case
No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No.
82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the “same offense.” Petitioner
adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely
separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property “as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which
the other does not.”[15]

We find for petitioner.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The
text of the provision reads:

Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by

reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a
 less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have
constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its
maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall

commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall
be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall

have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the
offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount
equal to the value of said damages to three times such value,
but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall

be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously,
would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall

exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article sixty-four.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be

applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or

lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this
article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next
lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period
which they may deem proper to apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of

the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in
which case the defendant shall be punished by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without

malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of
the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution

displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be
caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in

this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend
on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this
hand to give.

Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-

groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of
“imprudence” and “negligence” (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty
scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a
generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the
definition of “reckless imprudence” and “simple imprudence” (paragraphs 7-
8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize “the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight,
the imprudencia punible,”[16] unlike willful offenses which punish
the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of
quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the
first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or

simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized
under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the
middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field
by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition
that “reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it x x x”[17] on three points of analysis: (1) the object of
punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the
legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to
subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and;
(3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal

Code) that “reckless imprudence” is not a crime in itself but
simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower
degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified
assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be
committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery,
malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our
Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt
with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of
classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself
is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally
penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible. x x x x

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission

of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it
would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13,
specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the
one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require
that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to
the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully.
For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a
corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our
Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless
imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision
correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave
felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could
range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the
case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal
 negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is
set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.[18] (Emphasis
supplied)

This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to

state that their commission results in damage, either to person or property.
[19]

Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without

jurisdiction to hear a case for “Damage to Property through Reckless
Imprudence,” its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious
Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the element of
imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.

Quizon, rooted in Spanish law[20] (the normative ancestry of our present

day penal code) and since repeatedly reiterated, [21] stands on solid
conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v.
Faller[22] that “[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply
a way of committing it x x x,”[23] has long been abandoned when the Court en
banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court
decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of quasi-
crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of
crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found
expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence [24]
only by dint of lingering doctrinal
confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining
Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on
erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of
quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the
Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a
quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of
a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the same
reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based.

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of

Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single

quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such
that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting
acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double
jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,[25] decided in
1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered
the dismissal of a case for “damage to property thru reckless imprudence”
because a prior case against the same accused for “reckless driving,” arising
from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been
dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought
before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless
imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court
unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v.
Belga[26] (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v.
Lutero[27] (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v.
Narvas[28] (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.),
People v. Silva[29] (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per
Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay[30] (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en
banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan[31] (promulgated in 1968 by the
Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of
Appeals [32]
(promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.),
and People v. City Court of Manila [33] (promulgated in 1983 by the First
Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second
prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.

The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional

protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best
articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a
subsequent prosecution for “serious physical injuries and damage to
property thru reckless imprudence” because of the accused’s prior acquittal
of “slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence,” with both charges
grounded on the same act, the Court explained: [34]

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted

or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused
may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence
of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not
the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken
into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the
substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single,
whether the injurious result should affect one person or several
persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.[35] x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended

to its logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
 There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this
unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El
Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,[36] decided by the pre-war colonial Court in
November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous
conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the same reckless
operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was
based. Estipona’s inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of
jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this
matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano.[37] There, we reviewed the Court
of Appeals’ conviction of an accused for “damage to property for reckless
imprudence” despite his prior conviction for “slight and less serious physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence,” arising from the same act upon which the
second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We
reversed on the strength of Buan:[38]

Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the

ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona
decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case
of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this
Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that –

Reason and precedent both coincide in that

once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be
prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence
of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony.
The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act,
not the result thereof. The gravity of the
consequence is only taken into account to determine
the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether
the injurious result should affect one person or
several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into
different crimes and prosecutions.

xxxx

. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose

Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal)
Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight
physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of
the province, where both charges are derived
from the consequences of one and the same
vehicular accident, because the second
accusation places the appellant in second
 jeopardy for the same offense.[39] (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively

overruled Estipona.

It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of

his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact which did
not escape the Court’s attention:

Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his

MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the
Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining
petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy and submits that “its
affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No.
05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through
reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs.” He
stressed that “if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act
resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the same
consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act
caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical
injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a
vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of
damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same
mishap.”[40] (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts

erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by
the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be
tailored to petitioner’s case than People v. Silva, [41] a Diaz progeny. There,
the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in
two separate Informations with “Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence” and “Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence.” Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the
quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court
initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s
claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted
with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People
v. Belga:[42]

On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of

May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case, holding: —

[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely

within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in
People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga
and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of
physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising
from a collision between the two automobiles driven
by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid
complaint having been dismissed or otherwise
disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed
in the same justice of the peace court, in connection
with the same collision one for damage to property
through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95)
signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved
in the collision, and another for multiple physical
injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No.
96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident.
Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose
Belga only. After trial, both defendants were
acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case
No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to
quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries
through reckless imprudence filed against him by the
injured passengers, contending that the case was
just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of
Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The
motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga
was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court
of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case
for damage to property through reckless imprudence
filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in
the collision had been remanded to the Court of First
Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the
second stage of the preliminary investigation. After
such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court
of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga,
one for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, and another for damage to property
through reckless imprudence. Both cases were
dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion
of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double
jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the
Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by
the Supreme Court in the following language: .

The question for determination is whether

the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case
filed by the chief of police constitutes a
bar to his subsequent prosecution for
multiple physical injuries and damage to
property through reckless imprudence.

In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-

6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was
charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with
reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor
Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a
῾fast and reckless manner ... thereby causing an
accident.’ After the accused had pleaded not guilty
the case was dismissed in that court ῾for failure of
the Government to prosecute’. But some time
thereafter the city attorney filed an information in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the
same accused with damage to property thru reckless
imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged
to be P249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the
accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the
Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other
things we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor
—
 The next question to determine is
the relation between the first offense of
violation of the Motor Vehicle Law
prosecuted before the Pasay City
Municipal Court and the offense of
damage to property thru reckless
imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of
First Instance. One of the tests of double
jeopardy is whether or not the second
offense charged necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or
information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another
test is whether the evidence which
proves one would prove the other that is
to say whether the facts alleged in the
first charge if proven, would have been
sufficient to support the second charge
and vice versa; or whether one crime is
an ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx

The foregoing language of the Supreme Court

also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting
attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence could not have been
joined with the charge for homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this
case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecution’s
contention might be true. But neither was the
prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
before pressing the more serious charge of homicide
with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant
for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the
defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a
position to press in this case the more serious charge
of homicide with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence which arose out of the same
alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant
have been previously cleared by the inferior court.
[43]

Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to

reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) “for the purpose of delimiting or
clarifying its application.” [44]
We declined the invitation, thus:

The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in
dismissing the case, on the ground of double jeopardy, upon the
basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight
Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath
said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the
case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x,
upon which the order of dismissal of the lower court was
anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-
examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the
 purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find,
nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling
in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to
those in the present case, will yield no practical advantage to the
government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant
a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga
case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the
views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v.
Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.[45] (Emphasis supplied)

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which

the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to
harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in
criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and
Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code.
Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple
felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its
operation light felonies[46]); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit
the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the
maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule

penalizing not an act defined as a felony but “the mental attitude x x x
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x
x,”[47] a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences.
Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more
consequences.

Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works

to combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under
Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365
governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences.
However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-
offense not falling under either models – that of a single criminal negligence
resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with
varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The
ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be
prosecuted? Should Article 48’s framework apply to “complex” the single
quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those
amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the
prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the
consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following
the scheme of penalties under Article 365?

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none

of which involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by
“complexing” one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences [48] unless one
consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were split
by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less
grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the
other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge
with the first level courts. [49] Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC
impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under
Republic Act No. 7691,[50] the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to
impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision
correccional in its medium period.

Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the
“complexing” of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts
penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single
prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if
one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are
penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not
deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately
from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.

The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single

prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one
charge, regardless of their number or severity,[51] penalizing each
consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,[52] we interpreted
paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging “reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical
injuries,” as follows:

[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:

When the execution of the act covered by this

article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished
by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value
of said damage to three times such value, but which
shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.

The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is

only damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be
imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be
an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be
split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the
damage to property, x x x.[53] (Emphasis supplied)
By “additional penalty,” the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme
under Article 365.

Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable.

Coherence in this field demands choosing one framework over the other.
Either (1) we allow the “complexing” of a single quasi-crime by breaking its
resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-
conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365,
discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the
multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies
defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the
application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes,
require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number
and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus
maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365,
articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in
the Diaz line of cases.

A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government

denying it the power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the
conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under
our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under
Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a
single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2)
an offense which is a necessary means for committing another. This is why,
way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that
double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense
could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge

for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not
be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave
felonies. This same argument was considered
and rejected by this Court in the case of People
vs. [Silva] x x x:

[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true.

But neither was the prosecution obliged to first
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence before pressing the
more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant
for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the
defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a
position to press in this case the more serious charge
 of homicide with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence which arose out of the same
alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant
has been previously cleared by the inferior court.

[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this

appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his
being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province,
where both charges are derived from the consequences of
one and the same vehicular accident, because the second
accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.[54] (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting

of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the
resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second
prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are
conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed
from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the
consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply
the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In
short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court. [55]

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge
a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect
of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage
thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution
for quasi-crime effects qualifying as “light offenses” (or, as here, for the
more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress
can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula
of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a
single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less
grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-
offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365,
befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the
effect of this ruling.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders

dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No.
82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
 Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133323 &nbsp &nbsp &nbsp &nbsp &nbsp &nbsp March 9,
2000

ALBERTO AUSTRIA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is a petition for review an certiorari, seeking to set aside (1) the
decision dated August 13, 1997, of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. CR No. 16889, affirming with modification the March 21, 1994, judgment
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of San Fernando, Pampanga, in
Criminal Case No. 5784, which convicted the petitioner of reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries, and (2) the resolution of
said respondent court dated March 25, 1998 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

The original Information dated August 27, 1990, charging petitioner Alberto
Austria and his co-accused was amended as to correctly state the name of
co-accused Rolando M. Flores, which was Rolando Torres in the original
Information. Consequently, the Amended Information reads:

AMENDED INFORMATION

The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor and Assistant Provincial

Prosecutor accuse ALBERTO AUSTRIA y PEÑAFLOR and ROLANDO M.
FLORES of the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide and
Multiple Physical Injuries, committed as follows:

That on or about the 9th day of July 1989, in barangay Cabetican,

municipality of Bacolor, province of Pampanga, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Alberto Austria y Peñaflor, being then the driver and person-in-charge
of a Ford Fiera Crew Cab bearing Plate No. DEB 558 UV Pil. "88 and
registered under the name of Geronimo Noceda, without due regard to
traffic laws, rules and regulations, without taking the necessary
precaution to avoid accident to persons and by giving said vehicle a
speed far greater than is allowed by law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate said vehicle in a
careless, reckless and imprudent manner, causing as a result of his
carelessness, recklessness and imprudence to bump and hit a cargo
trailer truck bearing Plate No. CES 518 which was improperly and
carelessly parked along the right shoulder of the road by accused
Rolando M. Flores, driver of said cargo trailer truck, thereby causing
fatal injuries upon Virginia Lapid Vda. de Diwa, occupant of said Ford
Fiera Crew Cab, which directly caused her death shortly thereafter, and
 inflicted physical injuries upon the following occupants of said Ford
Fiera Crew Cab, to wit:

Armin Q. Manalansan — which required and did require medical

attendance for a period of more than thirty (30) days and
incapacitated and did incapacitate said victim from performing
her customary labor for the same period of time;

Mylene S. Gigante — which required and did require medical

attendance for a period of five (5) to seven (7) days and
incapacitated and did incapacitate from performing her
customary labor for the same period of time;

Luzviminda S. Diwa — which required and did require medical

attendance for less than two (2) weeks and incapacitated and did
incapacitate her from performing her customary labor for the
same period of time;

Mark S. Diwa — which required and did require medical

attendance for an unknown duration and incapacitated and did
incapacitate him from performing his customary labor for the
same period of time.

All contrary to law.1

The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent court are as follows:

On July 9, 1989 at around 7:00 P.M. along the Olongapo-Gapan Road in

the vicinity of barangay Cabetican, Bacolor, Pampanga, the appellant
was driving his Ford Fiera with ten (10) passengers. They came from
the Manila International Airport bound to Dinalupihan, Bataan.

One of the vehicle's tire suddenly hit a stone lying in the road, while
thus cruising, which caused the appellant to lose control and collide
with the rear of an improperly parked cargo truck trailer driven by
accused Rolando M. Flores. As a result of the collision, five (5)
passengers suffered varying degrees injuries.2

While trial ensued, accused truck driver Rolando M. Flores remained at-large.

On March 21, 1994, the trial court promulgated its decision, disposing as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable

doubt hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
Imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two (2) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days
of Prision Correccional, as maximum.

The accused is likewise ordered to:

1) Pay the heirs of Virginia Lapid Vda. de Diwa the amount of

P50,000.00 as indemnity;

2) P6,320.00 as and for actual expenses incurred by Luzviminda Diwa,

representing medical and funeral expenses; and

3) Cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, on June 10, 1994, the court modified its decision after the
accused filed his motion for reconsideration dated April 4, 1994. The
modified judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision promulgated on March 21, 1994 is hereby

modified as follows:

The Court, finding accused Alberto Austria guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Serious
Physical Injuries (Art. 365 in relation to Art. 263 (3), Revised Penal
Code), hereby sentences the said accused to suffer a[n] indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4)
months of arresto mayor.

The said accused is likewise ordered to indemnify Luzviminda Diwa the

amount of P1,345.75; Mark Diwa the amount of P4,716.31; and Mylene
Gigante the amount of P6,199.62 as and for actual damages incurred.

No pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused to private

complainant Armin Manalansan considering that the latter filed a
separate civil action against accused Alberto Austria before the
Regional Trial Court of Bataan (TSN., p. 7, February 18, 1992).

SO ORDERED.3

Defendant Austria timely appealed his conviction before the Court of

Appeals, which affirmed with modifications the lower court's decision. The
appellate court's decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED

with modification that: 1) a straight penalty of one (1) month and one
(1) day of arresto mayor for the imprisonment of the accused is
imposed; and 2) the award in favor of Mylene Gigante of P6,199.62 is
deleted.

SO ORDERED.4

Petitioner now comes before the Court assigning the following errors:

1. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER'S

CONVICTION FOR THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE;

2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONER

NEGLIGENT;

3. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE

PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS;

4. IF THE PETITIONER IS INDEED GUILTY OF SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE, THE

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING A PENALTY OF ARRESTO
MAYOR, INSTEAD OF DESTIERRO.

Petitioner faults respondent court for its failure to appreciate and give
credence to his testimony that when the accident occurred, the petitioner
was driving along the Olongapo-Gapan road on the lane properly belonging
to him and driving at a moderate speed. 5 Petitioner cites the case of Phoenix
Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 393 (1987),
which he alleges, contains a set of almost identical facts. Further, he claims
that the other driver's negligence in parking his vehicle caused the
collision.6 He asserts that the truck driver, Rolando Flores, negligently parked
his trailer truck with the rear end protruding onto road, without any warning
device. This being so, he should not be held responsible for Flores'
negligence.7
Worth noting, the first and second assigned errors are factual in nature. As a
general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and
conclusive upon this Court, and we will not normally disturb such factual
findings unless the findings of the court are palpably unsupported by the
evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on
misapprehension of facts.8 We find no palpable factual error that would
warrant a reversal of the appellate courts' factual determination in this wise:

In his direct examination, the appellant admitted that he saw the

trailer at a distance of about six (6) meters but at the same time stated
that the distance of the focus of the vehicle's headlight in dim position
was twenty (20) meters. These inconsistent statements, taken
together with his claim on cross-examination that he saw the trailer
only when he bumped it, only show that he was driving much faster
than thirty (30) kilometers per hour. Assuming that he was driving his
vehicle at that speed of thirty (30) kilometers per hour, appellant
would have not lost control of the vehicle after it hit the stone before
the collision. Under these circumstances, the appellant did not exercise
the necessary precaution required of him. He was negligent. 9

While we note similarities of the factual milieu of Phoenix to that of the

present case, we are unable to agree with petitioner that the truck driver
should be held solely liable while the petitioner should be exempted from
liability. In Phoenix, we ruled that the driver of the improperly parked vehicle
was liable and the driver of the colliding car contributorily liable. We agree
with the respondent court in its observation on the petitioner's culpability:
"That he had no opportunity to avoid the collision is of his own making and
[this] should not relieve him of liability." 10 Patently, the negligence of the
petitioner as driver of the Ford Fiera is the immediate and proximate cause
of the collision.

On the third issue, petitioner argues that there is no basis for the award of
damages since the medical certificates and receipts presented did not
directly reveal the relation of these documents to the accident. Petitioner's
argument is flawed. The materiality of these documents is amply supported
by evidence on record, and we are constrained to adhere to these factual
holding of the appellate court, thus:

The award of liability by the trial court to Luzviminda Diwa and Mark
Diwa was justified because the expenses for hospitalization and
treatments were incurred as a direct result of the collision caused by
the appellant's negligence. The fact that the doctors did not testify on
the medical certificates is of no moment. Appellant's counsel admitted
their due execution and genuiness (sic) during the trial. 11

Anent the last issue, petitioner prays for the modification of the penalty. He
avers that respondent court erred when it found the petitioner guilty of
simple negligence and imposed a straight penalty of One (1) month and One
(1) day of arresto mayor, invoking the second paragraph of Art. 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to the sixth paragraph of the same article. He
submits that the correct and proper penalty to be imposed against him
should be destierro.

It is not quite accurate, however, for the petitioner to state that the
respondent court found him guilty of simple negligence. The assailed
decision reveals that the respondent court AFFIRMED the findings of the trial
court convicting the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
Reckless Imprudence resulting in Serious Physical Injuries. The respondent
court only MODIFIED the trial court's decision by imposing the straight
penalty of one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor and deleted the
award in favor of Mylene Gigante in the amount of P6,199.62. 12
We find nothing objectionable legally in the imposition of a straight penalty
of one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor by the respondent court
against the petitioner. The penalty imposed is well within the limits fixed by
law and within the sound discretion of the respondent court as well. As
Article 365 pertinently provides:

Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless

imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it
would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it
would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in
its maximum period shall be imposed.

xxx xxx xxx

In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their

sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in article sixty-
four. (Revised Penal Code)

Since the determination of the minimum and maximum periods of the

penalty as provided by law is left entirely to the discretion of the respondent
court, its exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal, unless
there is a clear abuse. 13 And finding no such clear abuse in this case, we are
constrained to sustain the judgment of respondent court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 177960 : January 29, 2009]

JEFFREY RESO DAYAP, Petitioner, v. PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG, GENESA

SENDIONG, ELVIE SY and DEXIE DURAN, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review 1 on certiorari of the Decision2 dated 17

August 2006 and Resolution3 dated 25 April 2007 by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 01179 entitled, Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa R. Sendiong,
Elvie H. Sy and Dexie Duran v. Hon. Judge Cresencio Tan and Jeffrey Reso
Dayap.

The case had its origins in the filing of an Information 4 on 29 December 2004
by the Provincial Prosecutor's Office, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, charging
herein petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap with the crime of Reckless Imprudence
resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and Damage to
Property. The pertinent portion of the information reads:

That at about 11:55 o'clock in the evening of 28 December 2004 at Brgy.

Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously drive in a reckless and imprudent manner a 10-
wheeler cargo truck with plate number ULP-955, color blue, fully loaded with
sacks of coconut shell, registered in the name of Ruben Villabeto of Sta.
Agueda Pamplona, Negros Oriental, thereby hitting an automobile, a Colt
Galant with plate number NLD-379 driven by Lou Gene R. Sendiong who was
with two female passengers, namely: Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, thus causing
the instantaneous death of said Lou Gene R. Sendiong, less serious physical
injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy and extensive damage to
the above-mentioned Colt Galant which is registered in the name of Cristina
P. Weyer of 115 Dr. V. Locsin St., Dumaguete City, to the damage of the
heirs of the same Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the other two offended parties
above-mentioned.

An act defined and penalized by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan,

Negros Oriental, petitioner was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the
charge.5

On 17 January 2005, respondents Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa Sendiong

and Dexie Duran filed a motion for leave of court to file an amended
information.6 They sought to add the allegation of abandonment of the
victims by petitioner, thus: "The driver of the 10-wheeler cargo truck
abandoned the victims, at a time when said [Lou-Gene] R. Sendiong was still
alive inside the car; he was only extracted from the car by the by-standers." 7

On 21 January 2005, however, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an Omnibus

Motion praying that the motion to amend the information be considered
withdrawn.8 On 21 January 2003, the MTC granted the withdrawal and the
motion to amend was considered withdrawn. 9

Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. Respondents testified for the
prosecution. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner sought
leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted. Petitioner filed his
Demurrer to Evidence10 dated 15 April 2005 grounded on the prosecution's
failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he is criminally liable for
reckless imprudence, to which respondents filed a Comment 11 dated 25 April
2005.

In the Order12 dated 16 May 2005, the MTC granted the demurrer and
acquitted petitioner of the crime of reckless imprudence. The MTC found that
the evidence presented by respondents failed to establish the allegations in
the Information. Pertinent portions of the order state:

An examination of the allegations in the information and comparing the

same with the evidence presented by the prosecution would reveal that the
evidence presented has not established said allegations. The facts and
circumstances constituting the allegations charged have not been proven. It
is elementary in the rules of evidence that a party must prove his own
affirmative allegations.

xxx

Nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution can this Court find that it was
the accused who committed the crime as charged. Its witnesses have never
identified the accused as the one who has committed the crime. The
prosecution never bothered to establish if indeed it was the accused who
committed the crime or asked questions which would have proved the
elements of the crime. The prosecution did not even establish if indeed it
was the accused who was driving the truck at the time of the incident. The
Court simply cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is the person responsible for it. There
was no evidence on the allegation of the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong as
there was no death certificate that was offered in evidence. The alleged less
serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy were not
also proven as no medical certificate was presented to state the same nor
was a doctor presented to establish such injuries. The alleged damage to the
[C]olt [G]alant was also not established in any manner as no witness ever
testified on this aspect and no documentary evidence was also presented to
state the damage. The prosecution therefore failed to establish if indeed it
was the accused who was responsible for the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong
and the injuries to Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, including the damage to the
Colt Galant. The mother of the victim testified only on the expenses she
incurred and the shock she and her family have suffered as a result of the
incident. But sad to say, she could not also pinpoint if it was the accused who
committed the crime and be held responsible for it. This Court could only say
that the prosecution has practically bungled this case from its inception.

xxx

The defense furthermore argued that on the contrary, the prosecution's

[evidence] conclusively show that the swerving of vehicle 1 [the Colt Galant]
to the lane of vehicle 2 [the cargo truck] is the proximate cause of the
accident. The court again is inclined to agree with this argument of the
defense. It has looked carefully into the sketch of the accident as indicated in
the police blotter and can only conclude that the logical explanation of the
accident is that vehicle 1 swerved into the lane of vehicle 2, thus hitting the
latter's inner fender and tires. Exhibit "7" which is a picture of vehicle 2
shows the extent of its damage which was the effect of vehicle 1's ramming
into the rear left portion of vehicle 2 causing the differential guide of vehicle
2 to be cut, its tires busted and pulled out together with their axle. The
cutting of the differential guide cause[d] the entire housing connecting the
tires to the truck body to collapse, thus causing vehicle 2 to tilt to its left side
and swerve towards the lane of vehicle 1. It was this accident that caused
the swerving, not of [sic] any negligent act of the accused.

xxx

Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two things'the

fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of the crime for which
the accused stands charged, and the fact that the accused is the perpetrator
of the crime. Sad to say, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove these
two things. When the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of establishing
the guilt of the accused, an accused need not even offer evidence in his
behalf.

xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer is granted and the accused

JEFFREY RESO DAYAP is hereby acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The
bail bond posted for his temporary liberty is also hereby cancelled and
ordered released to the accused or his duly authorized representative.

SO ORDERED.13

Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,14 alleging
that the MTC's dismissal of the case was done without considering the
evidence adduced by the prosecution. Respondents added that the MTC
failed to observe the manner the trial of the case should proceed as provided
in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court as well as failed to rule on the civil
liability of the accused in spite of the evidence presented. The case was
raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Br. 32.
In the order15 dated 23 August 2005, the RTC affirmed the acquittal of
petitioner but ordered the remand of the case to the MTC for further
proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. The RTC ruled that the MTC's
recital of every fact in arriving at its conclusions disproved the allegation that
it failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records
also demonstrated that the MTC conducted the trial of the case in the
manner dictated by Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, except that the
defense no longer presented its evidence after the MTC gave due course to
the accused's demurrer to evidence, the filing of which is allowed under Sec.
23, Rule 119. The RTC however agreed that the MTC failed to rule on the
accused's civil liability, especially since the judgment of acquittal did not
include a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist. Thus, the RTC declared that the aspect of civil liability was not
passed upon and resolved to remand the issue to the MTC. The dispositive
portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan on

accused's acquittal is AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the court of
origin or its successor for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.16

Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration of the RTC order, but
these were denied for lack of merit in the order 17 dated 12 September 2005.

Respondents then filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals under
Rule 42, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179. The appellate court
subsequently rendered the assailed decision and resolution. The Court of
Appeals ruled that there being no proof of the total value of the properties
damaged, the criminal case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC and the
proceedings before the MTC are

null and void. In so ruling, the appellate court cited Tulor v. Garcia (correct
title of the case is Cuyos v. Garcia)18 which ruled that in complex crimes
involving reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or physical injuries and
damage to property, the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the
case is determined by the fine imposable for the damage to property
resulting from the reckless imprudence, not by the corresponding penalty for
the physical injuries charged. It also found support in Sec. 36 of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 and the 1991 Rule 8 on Summary Procedure,
which govern the summary procedure in first-level courts in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence where the
imposable fine does not exceed P10,000.00. As there was no proof of the
total value of the property damaged and respondents were claiming the
amount of P1,500,000.00 as civil damages, the case falls within the RTC's
jurisdiction. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated 17 August 2006
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by Us

REMANDING the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region,
Branch 32, Negros Oriental for proper disposition of the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.19

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals

decision,20 arguing that jurisdiction over the case is determined by the
allegations in the information, and that neither the 1991 Rule on Summary
Procedure nor Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 can be the
basis of the RTC's jurisdiction over the case. However, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in the Resolution
dated 25 April 2007.21 It reiterated that it is the RTC that has proper
jurisdiction considering that the information alleged a willful, unlawful,
felonious killing as well as abandonment of the victims.

In the present Petition for Review, petitioner argues that the MTC had
jurisdiction to hear the criminal case for reckless imprudence, owing to the
enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691,22 which confers jurisdiction to
first-level courts on offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence. He asserts that the RTC could not have acquired jurisdiction on
the basis of a legally unfiled and officially withdrawn amended information
alleging abandonment. Respondents are also faulted for challenging the
MTC's order acquitting petitioner through a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule 42.

The petition has merit. It should be granted.

The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that jurisdiction
over the offense charged pertained to the RTC.

Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the case on the basis of the
Information dated 29 December 2004 charging petitioner only with the
complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, less serious
physical injuries and damage to property. The Court of Appeals however
declared in its decision that petitioner should have been charged with the
same offense but aggravated by the circumstance of abandonment of the
victims. It appears from the records however that respondents' attempt to
amend the information by charging the aggravated offense was unsuccessful
as the MTC had approved the Provincial Prosecutor's motion to withdraw
their motion to amend the information. The information filed before the trial
court had remained unamended.23 Thus, petitioner is deemed to have been
charged only with the offense alleged in the original Information without any
aggravating circumstance.

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who, by reckless
imprudence, commits any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its medium period. When such reckless
imprudence the use of a motor vehicle, resulting in the death of a person
attended the same article imposes upon the defendant the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

The offense with which petitioner was charged is reckless imprudence

resulting in homicide, less serious physical injuries and damage to property,
a complex crime. Where a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act results in
two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is
committed.24 Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through
negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or
omissions punishable by law" committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or
fault (culpa).25 Thus, the penalty imposable upon petitioner, were he to be
found guilty, is prision correccional in its medium period (2 years, 4 months
and 1 day to 4 years) and maximum period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to
6 years).

Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear
and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive
application thereof.26 When this case was filed on 29 December 2004,
Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been amended by
R.A. No. 7691. R.A. No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts
over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of
other imposable accessory or other penalties including those for civil liability.
It explicitly states "that in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof." It
follows that criminal cases for reckless

imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its medium and

maximum periods should fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC and not the
RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the same pertained to the
MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the criminal
case.27 Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken
cognizance of the case and the proceedings before it were valid and legal.

As the records show, the MTC granted petitioner's demurrer to evidence and
acquitted him of the offense on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The
demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after
the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls
"for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its
sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a
dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the
accused."28 Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to
evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in
double jeopardy.29 But while the dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to
evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is still reviewable but only
by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the
factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing court,
and the only legal basis to reverse and set aside the order of dismissal upon
demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing that the trial court, in acquitting
the accused, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed
judgment void.30

Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition

for certiorari alleging that the MTC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing
the case and failing to consider the evidence of the prosecution in resolving
the same, and in allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as
mandated by the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did
not abuse its discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint. The MTC's
conclusions were based on facts diligently recited in the order thereby
disproving that the MTC failed to consider the evidence presented by the
prosecution. The records also show that the MTC correctly followed the
procedure set forth in the Rules of Court.

The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the
remand of the case of the matter of civil liability for the reception of
evidence.

We disagree with the Court of Appeals on directing the remand of the case to
the RTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect, as well as with the RTC in
directing a similar remand to the MTC.

The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment

against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil;
and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based
upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. 31 However, the civil action
based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist32 or where the accused did not commit the
acts or omission imputed to him.33

Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the
accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case
unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist.34 This is because when the accused files a
demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal
and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for
the prosecution. What the trial court should do is issue an order or partial
judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused, and
set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence on
the civil aspect of the case and for the private complainant to adduce
evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on
the civil aspect of the case.35

A scrutiny of the MTC's decision supports the conclusion that the acquittal
was based on the findings that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist and that petitioner did not commit the acts or
omission imputed to him; hence, petitioner's civil liability has been
extinguished by his acquittal. It should be noted that the MTC categorically
stated that it cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime had
been committed and that accused was the person responsible for it. It added
that the prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner who committed
the crime as charged since its witnesses never identified petitioner as the
one who was driving the cargo truck at the time of the incident. Furthermore,
the MTC found that the proximate cause of the accident is the damage to the
rear portion of the truck caused by the swerving of the Colt Galant into the
rear left portion of the cargo truck and not the reckless driving of the truck
by petitioner, clearly establishing that petitioner is not guilty of reckless
imprudence. Consequently, there is no more need to remand the case to the
trial court for proceedings on the civil aspect of the case, since petitioner's
acquittal has extinguished his civil liability.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated

17 August 2006 and Resolution dated 25 April 2007 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated 16 May 2005 of the
Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan, Negros Oriental in Criminal Case No. 3016-
04 granting the Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting petitioner Jeffrey Reso
Dayap of the offense charged therein is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.