1

The Prehistory of Science and

Technology Studies

A View of Science
Let us start with a common picture of science. It is a picture that coincides more or
less with where studies of science stood some 50 years ago, that still dominates
popular understandings of science, and even serves as something like a mythic
framework for scientists themselves. It is not perfectly uniform, but instead includes a
number of distinct elements and some healthy debates. It can, however, serve as an
excellent foil for the discussions that follow. At the margins of science, and discussed
in the next section, is technology, typically seen as simply the application of science.
In this picture, science is a formal activity that creates and accumulates knowledge by
directly confronting the natural world. That is, science makes progress because of its
systematic method, and because that method allows the natural world to play a role in
the evaluation of theories. While the scientific method may be somewhat flexible and
broad, and therefore may not level all differences, it appears to have a certain
consistency: different scientists should perform an experiment similarly; scientists
should be able to agree on important questions and considerations; and most
importantly, different scientists considering the same evidence should accept and
reject the same hypotheses. The result is that scientists can agree on truths about the
natural world.
Within this snapshot, exactly how science is a formal activity is open. It is worth taking
a closer look at some of the prominent views. We can start with philosophy of science.
Two important philosophical approaches within the study of science have been logical
positivism, initially associated with the Vienna Circle, and falsificationism(=否定一個主張
claims that the main activity of a researcher is to invalidate a theory by observation or experiment, as opposed to
verificationism. The goal of science is to create knowledge by identifying true statements as true (verified) and
false statements as false (falsified) ) , associated with Karl Popper. The Vienna Circle was a
group of prominent philosophers and scientists who met in the early 1930s. The project
of the Vienna Circle was to develop a philosophical understanding of science that
would allow for an expansion of the scientific worldview – particularly into the social
sciences and into philosophy itself. That project was immensely successful, because
positivism was widely absorbed by scientists and non-scientists interested in increasing
the rigor of their work. Interesting conceptual problems, however, caused positivism to
become increasingly focused on issues within the philosophy of science, losing sight of
the more general project with which the movement began (see Friedman 1999;
Richardson 1998).
 2 Prehistory of Science and Technology Studies

Logical positivists maintain that the meaning of a scientific theory (and anything else)
is exhausted by empirical and logical considerations of what would verify or falsify it.
A scientific theory, then, is a condensed summary of possible observations. This is one
way in which science can be seen as a formal activity: scientific theories are built up
by the logical manipulation of observations (e.g. Ayer 1952 [1936]; Carnap 1952
[1928]), and scientific progress consists in increasing the correctness, number, and
range of potential observations that its theories indicate.
For logical positivists, theories develop through a method that transforms individual
data points into general statements. The process of creating scientific theories is
therefore an inductive 歸納的 one. As a result, positivists tried to develop a logic of
science that would make solid the inductive process of moving from individual facts to
general claims. For example, scientists might be seen as creating frameworks in which
it is possible to uniquely generalize from data (see Box 1.1).
Positivism has immediate problems. First, if meanings are reduced to observations,
there are many “synonyms,” in the form of theories or statements that look as though
they should have very different meanings but do not make different predictions. For
example, Copernican 哥白尼 astronomy(This model positioned the Sun at the center of the Universe,)
was initially designed to duplicate the (mostly successful) predictions of the earlier
Ptolemaic(referring to Greek astronomer Ptolemy or his theories[Earth spinning around the
Sun]. )system; in terms of observations, then, the two systems were roughly equivalent,
but they clearly meant very different things, since one put the Earth in the center of the
universe, and the other had the Earth spinning around the Sun. Second, many
apparently meaningful claims are not systematically related to observations, because
theories are often too abstract to be immediately cashed out in terms of data. Yet surely
abstraction does not render a theory meaningless. Despite these problems and others,
the positivist view of meaning taps into deep intuitions, and cannot be entirely
dismissed.
Even if one does not believe positivism’s ideas about meaning, many people are
attracted to the strict relationship that it posits 假設 between theories and observations.
Even if theories are not mere summaries of observations, they (theories) should be
absolutely supported by them(observations). The justification we have for believing a
scientific theory is based on that theory’s solid connection
Box 1.1 The Problem of Induction
Among the asides inserted into the next few chapters are a number of
versions of the “problem of induction.” These are valuable background for
a number of issues in Science and Technology Studies (STS). At least as stated
here, these are theoretical problems that only occasionally become practical
ones in scientific and technical contexts. While they could be paralyzing in
principle, in practice they do not come up. One aspect of their importance,
then, is in finding out how scientists and engineers contain these problems,
and when they fail at that, how they deal with them.
The problem of induction arose with David Hume’s general questions
about evidence in the eighteenth century. Unlike classical skeptics, Hume
was interested not in challenging particular patterns of argument, but in
showing the fallibility 易錯性 of arguments from experience in general. In the sense
of Hume’s problem, induction extends data to cover new cases. To take a
standard example, “the sun rises every 24 hours” is a claim supposedly estab-
lished by induction over many instances, as each passing day has added
another data point to the overwhelming evidence for it. Inductive argu-
 Prehistory of Science and Technology Studies 3

ments take n cases, and extend the pattern to the n+1st. But, says Hume, why
should we believe this pattern? Could the n+1st case be different, no matter
how large n is? It does no good to appeal to the regularity of nature, because
the regularity of nature is at issue 有爭議. Moreover, as Ludwig Wittgenstein
(1958) and Nelson Goodman (1983 [1954] ) show, nature could be perfectly
regular and we would still have a problem of induction.
This is because there are many possible ideas of what it would mean for the
n+1st case to be the same as the first n. Sameness is not a fully defined
concept.
It is intuitively obvious that the problem of induction is insoluble. It is
more difficult to explain why, but Karl Popper, the political philosopher
and philosopher of science, makes a straightforward case that it is. The prob-
lem is insoluble, according to him, because there is no principle of induc-
tion that is true. That is, there is no way of assuredly going from a finite
number of cases to a true general statement about all the relevant cases.
To see this, we need only look at examples. “The sun rises every 24 hours”
is false, says Popper, as formulated and normally understood, because in
Polar regions there are days in the year when the sun never rises, and days
in the year when it never sets. Even cases taken as examples of straight-
forward and solid inductive inferences can be shown to be wrong, so why should we
be at all confident of more complex cases?

to data. Another view, then, that is more loosely positivist, is that one can by purely
logical means make predictions of observations from scientific theories, and that the
best theories are ones that make all the right predictions. This view is perhaps best
articulated 明白地說出 as falsificationism, a position developed by (Sir) Karl Popper (e.g.
1963), a philosopher who was once on the edges of the Vienna Circle.
For Popper, the key task of philosophy of science is to provide a demarcation 劃界
criterion, a rule that would allow a line to be drawn between science and non-science.
This he finds in a simple idea: genuine scientific theories are falsifiable, making risky
predictions. The scientific attitude demands that if a theory’s prediction is falsified the
theory itself is to be treated as false. Pseudo-sciences(a collection of beliefs or practices
mistakenly regarded as being based on scientific method .), among which Popper includes
Marxism and Freudianism, are insulated from criticism, able to explain and incorporate
any fact. They do not make any firm predictions, but are capable of explaining, or
explaining away, anything that comes up.
This is a second way in which science might be seen as a formal activity. According to
Popper, scientific theories are imaginative creations, and there is no method for
creating them. They are free-floating, their meaning not tied to observations as for the
positivists. However, there is a strict method for evaluating them. Any theory that fails
to make risky predictions is ruled unscientific, and any theory that makes failed
predictions is ruled false. A theory that makes good predictions is provisionally 暫時
accepted – until new evidence comes along. Popper’s scientist is first and foremost
skeptical, unwilling to accept anything as proven, and willing to throw away anything
 4 Prehistory of Science and Technology Studies

that runs afoul 犯規 of the evidence. On this view, progress is probably best seen as the
successive refinement and enlargement of theories to cover increasing data. While
science may or may not reach the truth, the process of conjectures 猜想 and refutations 反
駁 allows it to encompass increasing numbers of facts.
Like the central idea of positivism, falsificationism faces some immediate problems.
Scientific theories are generally fairly abstract, and few make hard predictions without
adopting a whole host of extra assumptions (e.g. Putnam 1981); so on Popper’s view
most scientific theories would be unscientific. Also, when theories are used to make
incorrect predictions, scientists often – and quite reasonably – look for reasons to
explain away the observations or predictions, rather than rejecting the theories.
Nonetheless, there is something attractive about the idea that (potential) falsification is
the key to solid scientific standing, and so falsificationism, like logical positivism, still
has adherents today.
For both positivism and falsificationism, the features of science that make it scientific
are formal relations between theories and data, whether through
Box 1.2 The Duhem–Quine thesis

The Duhem–Quine thesis is the claim that a theory can never be con-
clusively tested in isolation: what is tested is an entire framework or a web
of beliefs. This means that in principle any scientific theory can be held in
the face of apparently contrary evidence. Though neither of them put the
claim quite this baldly, Pierre Duhem and W.V.O. Quine, writing in the begin-
ning and middle of the twentieth century respectively, showed us why.
How should one react if some of a theory’s predictions are found to be
wrong? The answer looks straightforward: the theory has been falsified, and
should be abandoned. But that answer is too easy, because theories never
make predictions in a vacuum. Instead, they(theories) are used, along with many
other resources, to make predictions. When a prediction is wrong, the culprit
might be the theory. However, it might also be the data that set the stage
for the prediction, or additional hypotheses that were brought into play,
or measuring equipment used to verify the prediction. The culprit might
even lie entirely outside this constellation (a group of associated or similar people or
things.) of resources: some unknown object or process that interferes with
observations or affects the prediction.
To put the matter in Quine’s terms, theories are parts of webs of belief.
When a prediction is wrong, one of the beliefs no longer fits neatly into
the web. To smooth things out – to maintain a consistent structure – one
can adjust any number of the web’s parts. With a radical enough redesign
of the web, any part of it can be maintained, and any part jettisoned 拋棄. One
can even abandon rules of logic if one needs to!
When Newton’s predictions of the path of the moon failed to match the
data he had, he did not abandon his theory of gravity, his laws of motion,
or any of the calculating devices he had employed. Instead, he assumed that
there was something wrong with the observations, and he fudged 蒙混 his data.
While fudging might seem unacceptable, we can appreciate his impulse:
in his view, the theory, the laws, and the mathematics were all stronger
than the data! Later physicists agreed. The problem lay in the optical
assumptions originally used in interpreting the data, and when those were
changed Newton’s theory made excellent predictions.
 Prehistory of Science and Technology Studies 5

Does the Duhem–Quine thesis give us a problem of induction? It shows

that multiple resources are used (not all explicitly) to make a prediction,
and that it is impossible to isolate for blame only one of those resources
when the prediction appears wrong. We might, then, see the Duhem–
Quine thesis as posing a problem of deduction, not induction, because it
shows that when dealing with the real world, many things can confound 攪亂
neat logical deductions.

the rational construction of theoretical edifices(a complex system of beliefs.) on top of

empirical data or the rational dismissal of theories on the basis of empirical data. There
are analogous views about mathematics; indeed, formalist pictures of science probably
depend on stereotypes of mathematics as a logical or mathematical activity.
But there are other features of the popular snapshot of science. These formal relations
between theories and data can be difficult to reconcile 調和 with an even more
fundamental intuition about science: Whatever else it does, science progresses toward
truth, and accumulates truths as it goes. We can call this intuition realism, the name
that philosophers have given to the claim that many or most scientific theories are
approximately true.
First, progress. One cannot but be struck by the increases in precision of scientific
predictions, the increases in scope of scientific knowledge, and the increases in
technical ability that stem from scientific progress. Even in a field as established as
astronomy, calculations of the dates and times of astronomical events continue to
become more precise. Sometimes this precision stems from better data, sometimes
from better understandings of the causes of those events, and sometimes from
connecting different pieces of knowledge. And occasionally, the increased precision
allows for new technical ability or theoretical advances.
Second, truths. According to realist intuitions, there is no way to understand the
increase in predictive power of science, and the technical ability that flows from that
predictive power, except in terms of an increase of truth. That is, science can do more
when its theories are better approximations of the truth, and when it has more
approximately true theories. For the realist, science does not merely construct
convenient theoretical descriptions of data, or merely discard falsified theories: When
it constructs theories or other claims, those generally and eventually approach the
truth. When it discards falsified theories, it does so in favor of theories that better
approach the truth.
Real progress, though, has to be built on more or less systematic methods. Otherwise,
there would only be occasional gains, stemming from chance or genius. If science
accumulates truths, it does so on a rational basis, not through luck. Thus, realists are
generally committed to something like formal relations between data and theories.
Turning from philosophy of science, and from issues of data, evidence, and truth, we
see a social aspect to the standard picture of science. Scientists are distinguished by
their even-handed 不偏不倚 attitude toward theories, data, and each other. Robert
Merton’s functionalist view, discussed in Chapter 3, dominated discussions of the
sociology of science through the 1960s. Merton argued that science served a social
 6 Prehistory of Science and Technology Studies

function, providing certified knowledge. That function structures norms of scientific

behavior, those

Box 1.3 Underdetermination underdetermined by

 Prehistory of Science and Technology Studies 7

Scientists choose the best account of data from among competing hypotheses. This choice can never
be logically conclusive, because for every explanation there are in principle an indefinitely large
number of others that are exactly empirically equivalent. Theories are empirical evidence. This is
easy to see through an analogy.
Imagine that our data is the collection of points in the graph on the left (Figure 1.1). The
hypothesis that we create to “explain” this data is some line of best fit. But what line of best fit? The
graph on the right shows two competing lines that both fit the data perfectly.

Clearly there are infinitely many more lines of perfect fit. We can do further testing and eliminate
some, but there will always be infinitely many more. We can apply criteria like simplicity and
elegance to eliminate some of them, but such criteria take us straight back to the first problem of
induction: how do we know that nature is simple and elegant, and why should we assume that our
ideas of simplicity and elegance are the same as nature’s?
When scientists choose the best theory, then, they choose the best theory from among those that
have been seriously considered. There is little reason to believe that the best theory so far considered,
out of the infinite numbers of empirically adequate explanations, will be the true one. In fact, if there
are an infinite number of potential explanations, we could reasonably assign to each one a probability

The status of underdetermination has been hotly debated in philosophy of science. Because of the
underdetermination argument, some philosophers positivists and their intellectual descendants) argue
that scientific theories should be thought of as instruments for explaining and predicting, not as true
or realistic representations (e.g. van Fraassen 1980). Realist philosophers, however, argue that there
is no way of understanding the successes of science without accepting that in at least some
circumstances evaluation of the evidence leads to approximately true theories (e.g. Boyd 1984; see

(
norms that tend to promote the accumulation of certified knowledge. For Merton,
science is a well-regulated activity, steadily adding to the store of knowledge.
 8 Prehistory of Science and Technology Studies

On Merton’s view, there is nothing particularly “scientific” about the people who do
science. Rather, science’s social structure rewards behavior that, in general, promotes
the growth of knowledge; in principle it also penalizes behavior that retards 阻止 the
growth of knowledge. A number of other thinkers hold that position, such as Popper
(1963) and Michael Polanyi (1962), who both support an individualist, republican
ideal of science, for its ability to progress.
Common to all of these views is the idea that standards or norms are the source of
science’s success and authority. For positivists, the key is that theories =can be no
more or less than the logical representation of data. For falsificationists, scientists are
held to a standard on which they have to discard theories in the face of opposing data.
For realists, good methods form the basis of scientific progress. For functionalists, the
norms are the rules governing scientific behavior and attitudes. All of these standards
or norms are attempts to define what it is to be scientific. They(norms) provide ideals
that actual scientific episodes can live up to or not, standards to judge between good
and bad science. Therefore, the view of science we have seen so far is not merely an
abstraction from science, but is importantly a view of ideal science.

A View of Technology
Where is technology in all of this? Technology has tended to occupy a secondary role,
for a simple reason: it is often thought, in both popular and academic accounts, that
technology is the relatively straightforward application of science. We can imagine a
linear model of innovation, from basic science through applied science to development
and production. Technologists identify needs, problems, or opportunities, and
creatively combine pieces of knowledge to address them. Technology combines the
scientific method with a practically minded creativity.
As such, the interesting questions about technology are about its effects: Does
technology determine social relations? Is technology humanizing or dehumanizing?
Does technology promote or inhibit freedom? Do science’s current applications in
technologies serve broad public goals? These are important questions, but as they take
technology as a finished product they are normally divorced from studies of the
creation of particular technologies.
If technology is applied science then it is limited by the limits of scientific knowledge.
On the common view, then, science plays a central role in determining the shape of
technology. There is another form of determinism that often arises in discussions of
technology, though one that has been more recognized as controversial. A number of
writers have argued that the state of technology is the most important cause of social
structures, because technology enables most human action. People act in the context of
available technology, and therefore people’s relations among themselves can only be
understood in the context of technology. While this sort of claim is often challenged –
by people who insist on the priority of the social world over the material one – it has
helped to focus debate almost exclusively on the effects of technology.
Lewis Mumford (1934, 1967) established an influential line of thinking about
technology. According to Mumford, technology comes in two varieties. Polytechnics 理
工學院 are “life-oriented,” integrated with broad human needs and potentials.
Polytechnics produce small-scale and versatile tools, useful for pursuing many human
goals. Monotechnics(in a single scientific or technical subject) produce “mega machines”
that can increase power dramatically, but by regimenting(organize according to a strict,
 Prehistory of Science and Technology Studies 9

sometimes oppressive system or pattern) and dehumanizing(depriving a person or group

of positive human qualities).
A modern factory can produce extraordinary material
goods, but only if workers are disciplined to participate in the working of the machine.
This distinction continues to be a valuable resource for analysts and critics of
technology (see, e.g., Franklin 1990, Winner 1986).
In his widely read essay “The Question Concerning Technology” (1977 [1954]),
Martin Heidegger develops a similar position. For Heidegger, distinctively modern
technology is the application of science in the service of power; this is an objectifying
客觀化 process. In contrast to the craft tradition that produced individualized things,
modern technology creates resources, objects made to be used. From the point of view
of modern technology, the world consists of resources to be turned into new resources.
A technological worldview thus produces a thorough disenchantment(a feeling of
disappointment about someone or something you previously respected or admired;
disillusionment.) of the world.
Through all of this thinking, technology is viewed as simply applied science. For both
Mumford and Heidegger modern technology is shaped by its scientific rationality.
Even the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey (e.g. 1929), who argues that all rational
thought is instrumental 有幫助的, sees science as theoretical technology (using the word
in a highly abstract sense) and technology (in the ordinary sense) as applied science.
Interestingly, the view that technology is applied science tends toward a form of
technological determinism. For example, Jacques Ellul (1964) defines technique as
“the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a
given stage of development)” (quoted in Mitcham 1994: 308). A society that has
accepted modern technology finds itself on a path of increasing
 10
Prehistory of Science and Technology Studies

efficiency, allowing technique to enter more and more domains. The view that a formal
relation between theories and data lies at the core of science informs not only our picture
of science, but of technology.
Concerns about technology have been the source of many of the movements critical of
science. After the US use of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War
II, some scientists and engineers who had been involved in developing the weapons
began The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, a magazine alerting its readers about major
dangers stemming from the military and industrial technologies. Starting in 1955, the
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs responded to the threat of nuclear
war, as the United States and the Soviet Union armed themselves with nuclear weapons.
Science and the technologies to which it contributes often result in very unevenly
distributed benefits, costs, and risks. Organizations like the Union of Concerned
Scientists, and Science for the People, recognized this uneven distribution. Altogether,
the different groups that made up the Radical Science Movement engaged in a critique of
the idea of progress, with technological progress as their main target (Cutliffe 2000).
Parallel to this in the academy, “Science, Technology and Society” became, starting in
the 1970s, the label for a diverse group united by progressive goals and an interest in
science and technology as problematic social institutions. For researchers on Science,
Technology and Society the project of understanding the social nature of science has
generally been seen as continuous with the project of promoting a socially responsible
science (e.g. Ravetz 1971; Spiegel-Rösing and Price 1977; Cutliffe 2000). The key issues
for Science, Technology and Society are about reform, about promoting disinterested 無私
的 science, and about technologies that benefit the widest populations. How can sound
technical decisions be made democratically (Laird 1993)? Can and should innovation be
democratically controlled (Sclove 1995)? To what extent, and how, can technologies be
treated as political entities (Winner 1986)? Given that researchers, knowledge, and tools
flow back and forth between academia and industry, how can we safeguard pure science
(Dickson 1988; Slaughter and Leslie 1997)? This is the other “STS,” which has played a
major role in Science and Technology Studies, the former being both an antecedent 先行者
of and now a part of the latter.

A Preview of Science and Technology Studies

Science and Technology Studies (STS) starts from an assumption that science and
technology are thoroughly social activities. They are social in that scientists and
engineers are always members of communities, trained into the practices of those
communities and necessarily working within them. These communities set standards for
inquiry and evaluate knowledge claims. There is no abstract and logical scientific method
apart from evolving community norms. In addition, science and technology are arenas 競技
場 in which rhetorical work is crucial, because scientists and engineers are always in the
position of having to convince their peers and others of the value of their favorite ideas
and plans – they are constantly engaged in struggles to gain resources and to promote
their views. The actors in science and technology are also not mere logical operators, but
instead have investments in skills, prestige, knowledge, and specific theories and
practices. Even conflicts in a wider society may be mirrored by and connected to
 11
conflicts within science and technology; for example, splits along gender, race, class, and
national lines can occur both within science and in the relations between scientists and
non-scientists.
STS takes a variety of anti-essentialist 反本質主義 positions with respect to science and
technology. Neither science nor technology is a natural kind, having simple properties
that define it once and for all. The sources of knowledge and artifacts are complex and
various: there is no privileged scientific method that can translate nature into knowledge,
and no technological method that can translate knowledge into artifacts. In addition, the
interpretations of knowledge and artifacts are complex and various: claims, theories,
facts, and objects may have very different meanings to different audiences.
For STS, then, science and technology are active processes, and should be studied as
such(in the exact sense of the word.). The field investigates how scientific knowledge and
technological artifacts are constructed. Knowledge and artifacts are human products, and
marked by the circumstances of their production. In their most crude forms, claims about
the social construction of knowledge leave no role for the material world to play in the
making of knowledge about it. Almost all work in STS is more subtle than that, exploring
instead the ways in which the material world is used by researchers in the production of
knowledge. STS pays attention to the ways in which scientists and engineers attempt to
construct stable structures and networks, often drawing together into one account the
variety of resources used in making those structures and networks. So a central premise of
STS is that scientists and engineers use the material world in their work; it is not merely
translated into knowledge and objects by a mechanical process.
Clearly, STS tends to reject many of the elements of the common view of science. How
and in what respects are the topics of the rest of this book.
Video:

1.1 : Let's Talk About Science- Science

as the Scientific Method

Karl Popper’s Ideas

• “Falsification” and testing of scientific theories
• Distinguishing science from pseudo-science (fake
science) or science from non-science

Popper’s Concerns
• Not concerned with truth or falsity
• Rather, concerned with the theories that make
predictions
o In other words, the scientific method
 12
(not the result)
o Example:
Pythagoras' Theorem: c^2 = a^2 + b^2
o Who knows how to prove Pythagoras’ Theorem?
o But we can predict value of “c” if value of “a” and “b” are
given

Popper didn’t care about the outcome or the findings of science(not care about whether it
is true or not), but concerned with pt2(how can we evaluate the theories and can we find
methods to distinguish the theories to be scientific or non-scientific(the process to find
the result, but not the result)

Karl Popper (1902-1994)

-Context from which Popper developed his position
-Einstein’s theory of relativity
- Marx’s theory of history

- Freud’s psychoanalysis

- Adler’s individual psychology

Popper lived in Austria. In 1960s where there were Einstein’s relativity. Etc. he is
concerned that whether these theories are scientific or not. How to determine if they are
scientific, what criteria do we use, what method do we use to distinguish science from
non-science. He is interested to determine the scientific status of theories. How to
determine if a theory is scientific and how to differentiate those theories from non-
scientific theories

Karl Popper (1902-1994)

• Which theories are ‘scientific’?
• How to determine the scientific nature of theories?

Karl Popper (cont’d)

• Some theories are always verified, regardless of
observations (which Popper disagreed)
• Weakness of these theories: they explain
 11
everything based on the outcome!
o Ad hoc(for a particular purpose or need, esp. for an immediate need, not planned
before) explanations reduce scientific status of theory

Another problem that bothered popper is the statement that Some theories regardless of
the outcome are always verified, which he didn’t agree. The weakness of these theories is
pt2. A theory should be able to make predictions. If the prediction contradicts the theory,
it should have implications for the theory. We should not use ad hoc explanations to
improve the scientific status of the theory.

Karl Popper (cont’d)

• Theories need to make risky predictions
o Event that might refute theory
o The results of risky predictions are unknown
• Example: Predict how a child will turn out growing
up in a bad environment

Popper said theories need to make risky predictions(pt1).Why risky? Cuz risky have the
potential /possibility of refuting a theory., to result in an event that might show the theory
to be false, so the result of the risky predictions are unknown in advance. When we make
a risky prediction based on our theory, we don’t know the [Link] is risky cuz it has
an implication for the theory. If the prediction is shown to be untrue, then we must
discard our theory. It is unknown if a child will grow up successful or unsuccessful. This
is the risky prediction that a theory should make.

Popper’s Beliefs (1/4)

• Popper believed that science has a special method:

falsification
• Scientists (and by extension, the scientific theories
they hold) should make bold, risky hypotheses
(conjectures/guesses) that have the potential to
refute or confirm a theory
In fact, the seminar paper in which Popper presented
his idea was titled “conjectures and refutations”, for
the reason that we should make risky guesses or
hypothesis, that have the potential to refute or
 14
confirm a theory. And then, if the outcomes of the
predictions contradicts our theory, we should refute
that theory.

• Scientists should always be trying to refute their

hypotheses continuously
• There is continual revolution in science (a never-
ending cycle), finding better theories and improve the
scientific status of the existing theories

Popper’s Beliefs (2/4)

• Attempts to refute a theory are sometimes known
as ‘crucial experiments’ (because if a hypothesis is
proved false so is the theory)
• Popper: If a theory is falsified, it should be
abandoned, and a new one proposed in its place; if,
however, the prediction is correct, the theory is
reinforced → good science

When we make a risky prediction, we conduct an experiment to see what the outcome of
that prediction is. This experiment is titled as a “crucial experiment”, for the reason that
the prediction is risky, cuz the outcome of the experiment has the potential to refute our
theory.
1. Make risky predictions
2. Form crucial experiment
3. If the outcomes contradict our theory, we discard the theory ; if the outcomes
coincide our theory, the theory is reinforced. (the discarding or retaining of a
theory=good science)
This process is to differentiate science from non-science.

Example: Earth Shape

(Square → Round →Sphere)
• Idea of “Square” is wrong → replaced by idea of
“Round” (People believed the earth is flat, they travel
long distances)
• Idea of “Round” not exactly → replaced by idea of
 11
“Sphere”
• Idea of “Sphere” is wrong → replaced by ???

Popper’s Beliefs (3/4)

• Therefore . . .
• Science is a form of trial and error
o Scientists climb an endless mountain of truth, always
refuting their theories for better ones, but never reaching
summit 巔峰
o Can climb higher and higher, but can never reach the top
o Science works because of this characteristic of continual
revolution
Always trying to prove a theory is false, we are engaging in a science that is engaged in
trials and errors. Science never stops to refute a theory, and falsify a theory. We can climb
higher and higher up the mountain but never reach the top. The reason that science is
good, reason why science works well, reason we believe in science is cuz of this
continuous revolution, always trying to show the theory is false.

Popper’s Beliefs (4/4)

• For falsificationists, science is a set of temporary
hypotheses which try to accurately describe
something (which they then try to refute/falsify)
• What matters is how hypotheses are tested
• Pseudo-science(fake science, non-science) cannot
stand up to the falsification method because it
makes no risky predictions , no crucial experiments
Theories are temporary cuz scientists are always trying to refute the existing theories.

According to Popper . . .
• If a theory:

o makes risky predictions

→ the theory is considered to be ‘science’
 16

o does not make risky predictions

→ It is considered to be ‘non-science’ or ‘pseudo-science’

If a theory is falsified:

o then it should be abandoned in favor of a new, better

theory

If a theory is confirmed by crucial experiment, the theory is

reinforced

The process is very important. If the theory can make risky predictions, and if we cannot
test them with crucial experiment, it is not science, then the activities continue to be non-
science or pseudo-science.

‘A falsified theory is NOT scientific.’ This statement is:

a. TRUE because unless we can falsify a theory, it cannot be scientific

b. FALSE because if a theory adheres to the scientific method, it cannot be falsified
c. TRUE because falsifiability is a principle that can be tested scientifically
d. FALSE because a theory that is falsified can also have followed the scientific method

1.2 : Problems with the Idea of

Falsificationism

Problems with Popper’s Arguments (1/6)

• Problem 1 →Testability
o People do not agree on what counts as a test of
falsifiability
o What is testable is constrained by physical limits
• Sophistication of equipment and tools
• Testability only a principle
o Much science fails to produce predictive (or testable)
statements
 11
• Classification of organisms in biology

Testability is not easily done.

Problems with Popper’s Arguments (2/6)

• Problem 2 → Social Side of Science
o If you look historically, falsifications exist but are ignored
by scientists
• Even the best theories sometimes explain outcomes incompletely
Scientists don’t agree as and when falsification sufficiently refute a theory
for that theory to be discarded.
o Why are falsifications ignored?
• One answer: controversy

o Controversy is a social side to science that Popper misses

• Theories guide activities

• Observations are connected to theory
• Theories are connected to groups
• Groups are connected to careers, (disciplinary) interests, beliefs
and aims

o Sometimes controversies in science are internal (limited to

scientists), at other times they become external (public)

o Science is a human endeavor and therefore involves
politics, interests and aspirations
Popper ignored the social side of science. Popper presented a very objective view of
science, which individuals, idiosyncrasy, prejudices, preferences don’t have much a part
to play.
Popper missed “controversy”. He failed to see that theories guide activities, observations
are connected to a theory, theory are connected to groups and groups are connected to
careers and interdisciplinary influence. Popper insufficiently acknowledged the social
element of science, which is actually performed by human beings. When human beings
perform science, they possess disciplinary interests, their own beliefs, and their aims. And
different groups are trying to form their own particular aims and beliefs all the time.
>When 2 groups form their own beliefs, they engaged in controversy>>even if
falsification may occur, they are not sufficiently acknowledged by the scientific
community at large to refute the theory.
External: the public also has a part to play or contribute
The social side of Science, which involves politics, interests and aspirations are
not sufficiently acknowledged by Popper.
 18
Problem 3 → Theory-Ladenness 負擔 of Observation
(theory affects observations)
o Popper assumes that observation and theory are distinct
o but Observations constitute theory in practice
o Theory-ladenness of observation: when you make an
observation, theory informs observation
Observations are informed by theories/ laden with theories
• If one theory says a certain kind of cell should be triangular,
scientists who support the theory would see a cell which could be
either triangular or square as triangular.

E.g. if we hold the theory that the earth is flat, it is very likely that our observation are
going to be constrained by the idea that the earth is flat. Cuz we don’t want to kill our
theories, so reluctant to go long distance to prove that the earth is flat, so only travel to a
certain distance that the theory agrees with, otherwise they are afraid that we would fall
off the edge.
Cuz the scientists are informed by theories.

To Summarize:
o Scientific theories are not made in a vacuum; they are
made by humans who have personal aims, interests, and
goals
o Popper provides an idealist/objective view of science
rather than a realistic view of science
Popper ‘s belief :

Science and Technology are both the elements of science. The scientific and
technological practice in science and engineering takes place within the societal context,
after which we would better acknowledge science and tech are conducted by human
beings with aims, interests and goals.

Popper’s Influence
• despite the 3 problems, his idea had made a Big
 11
step forward from previous theories of science
o made us believe that Science is more than just truth and
falsity
• Method(falsification) more important than the result
• Scientific theories have to be predictable, testable
o Testing becomes key activity of science (or the scientific
method)
• Proposing an idealized view of science

1.3 : Let’s Talk about Science (Again):

Science is What Scientists Do!

To Recap: The Scientific Method

(according to Karl Popper)
• Theory
• Hypothesis (an assumption about how things work)

• Experiment (test using a crucial experiment)

• Confirm or reject

A Linear Scientific Method (Popper)

Theory
↓
Hypothesis
↓
Experiment
↓
Confirm/Reject Theory
(based on outcome of experiment)

Linear cuz we have a step-by-step manner in which science proceeds

Popper’s Concerns
• Popper was concerned with the ‘Context of
 20
Justification’
o How to justify a theory whether it is scientific or not
• Is a theory science or pseudo-science? How to distinguish a scientific
theory from a non-scientific theory.

• He was not concerned with the ‘Context of

Discovery’
o How to find out about the natural world .not care about
what we find out about the natural world, doesn’t care if sth is
true or false

Problems with Popper’s Ideas

• Unrealistic (because idealistic)
• Fail to consider the whole spectrum of science (sth
is not a testable area of science)
• Ignore certain social features common to scientists
o Interests
o Controversies
o Etc.

Thomas Kuhn vs. Karl Popper

• Popper stands for ‘objective’ knowledge

• Thomas Kuhn stands for the viewpoint that science

has a social dimension

o Focuses on activities of scientists
o Science is what scientists do
o Considers science as a social activity
• Adopts a subjective view of science
 11

Thomas Kuhn
- Harvard-trained physicist who moved into the
history of science later in his life
- Kuhn asked the question: how do we understand
the past? (this is the fundamental question that lead
him to develop his subjective view of science)

Understanding the Past

• Do we use the current state of knowledge as the
benchmark?

or

• Do we understand science historically on its own

terms?

Understand the Past IN the Past

• Kuhn advocated that we should understand the
past in its historical context
o Consider historical actors’ own ways
o What information, knowledge, materials and tools were
available to them?
Once the information, knowledge, materials and tools are
available to historical actors in the past, that would give us a
better understanding of the past, of why people in the past
believed what they did
• CONTEXT (i.e. surrounding situation) very
important!
o Do not use current knowledge to evaluate theories
established in the past
 22
Should rather use the knowledge that scientists in the past
helped in order to evaluate the theories they held, to know
how the theories they held worked

Understanding History (1/3)

• In their own terms, scientists of the past made
perfect sense
o They were able to explain phenomena in their time, even
though the same explanations may be considered wrong
today
Understanding History (2/3)
• Not correct to use a linear understanding of history
o Moves forward unilaterally (in one direction only), from
one understanding to another
Rather, we should understand history in the way that it took
place, very messy, many dead-ends, many alternatives
understanding of history that was pursued before we arrived
at the current stage of understanding of science
• Must consider all the alternatives understanding of the world that arose
throughout history

Putting ourselves in the past scientists’ shoes

Idea of “Whig History”

(which Kuhn opposed it)
• History that attempts to construct the past as a
series of steps toward the present
Using the current-stage knowledge to construct the past
series of steps to what we now understand (understand the
past using current-stage knowledge)
What we now believe to be true, correct, to be accurate has
determined the series of steps that we have taken in the past
to arrive at where we are
• Using Whig History, we view progress towards
 11
what we now believe to be true as more rational,
more natural
We may not have alternative understanding of
history, which is different from today’s understanding
of science, which in their time may have been
equally justifiable. What we now believe to be true
do not need to be explained according to Whig
History.

• What we now believe to be true does not need to

be explained
But Kuhn believed that what we now believe to be true has to be explained on equal
terms just as much as we have to explain other alternatives that arose throughout
history that we do not believe in today.
e.g. in the past, ppl might think the earth is in diamond shape, which doesn’t mean it
doesn’t have to be explained. The belief that the earth is round is just one of the
alternative explanations.

The past cars are excellent cars at that time. Even though we now have better vehicles , it
doesn’t mean that those cars at that time are bad . should not use the present days’s
benchmark to understand those vehicles made in the past

Understanding History (3/3)

• Kuhn argues AGAINST Whig History
• It is wrong to use current knowledge to look back at

past scientists’ errors

 24
o Should use the knowledge of their times to evaluate
scientists of the past
Should use the tools and equipment at that time to
evaluate the theories in the past
• The people in the past were not crazy!
Cuz they had justifiable reasons to hold the beliefs, e.g. they
believed the earth was flat. They were doing their best, given
the prevailing knowledge that they had in the past
o They were doing their best given the prevailing knowledge

Understanding History Example

• Example 1: Square Earth supporters are NOT
crazy
o They had not viewed the earth from space
o Their ships could not travel over long distances
• Example 2: pi / = 3.14159 26535
o If you can prove, good but not difficult
o [Link]
o For mathematicians in the 19th century BC,
proving pi = 3.1415... was brilliant

What is Whig history?

i. A type of political analysis formulated by Charles Whig
ii. History that attempts to construct the past as a series of steps towards the present
iii. A form of understanding of the past based only on social and political context
iv. The ideological position that the historical context in which scientists act is unimportant
v. A position in the history of science which views what we now believe as more rational, more natural, and less needing of explanation
than opposition to what we now believe

a. ii and v
b. i, ii and iv
c. i, ii and v
d. All of the above

1.4 : Kuhn’s Major Ideas

PARADIGM: Kuhn’s Major Idea
• Paradigm 範例 = framework within which people work
during a given period
 11
o Shared framework
o School of thought
o Way of seeing the world/worldview
o Set of principles about how the world works, assumptions
o Paradigms involve skills and practices

Paradigms Shape Observations

• People working within alternative paradigms see
things differently
o Observations are affected by paradigms
• No such thing as ‘raw’ observation
o Observations are laden with theory, guided by concepts
and ideas
Observations don’t take place in a vacuum, observations are
affected by people with different beliefs and aims

Paradigms Shape Observations:

Examples
• Example: Picture
• Example: View of Death
o Christian
o Buddhist
o People without Religion

e.g. Each religion believes different concepts after death

Paradigm Incommensurability 不可通約性

• When science moves from one paradigm to a
second, there is no common measure between the
two paradigms(cuz they have fundamental
disagreement on sth)
• Leads to scientists’ talking ‘past’ one another
 26
o Cannot communicate with one another
• Scientists can only be ‘converted’ from one
paradigm to another (can’t believe in both)
o Like a religious conversion
(like changing religion)
• Never believe both earth is round & earth is flat
• Never Christian & Buddhist at the same time

‘Normal’ Science
• Working within a paradigm
o =Not challenging the paradigm (unlike Popper who said
we should always falsify and refute a theory)
• Puzzle-solving
o Working to accumulate evidence for existing worldview
o if has Unexpected results = failure, unless they provoke a
crisis (you must have measure it wrongly, you must have
gone in the wrong direction )
The unexpected results provoke a crisis when these
unexpected results accumulate, that can’t be simply
explained as failures>a crisis
o Example: Proving earth is a square
Travel 100m, 200m ... (accumulate evidence)
Travel until return to start point without falling to the edge
(provoke a crisis)

Many scientists engage in “normal science”, which is the activity that scientists
participated when they work within a paradigm
We are solving problems within a fundamental understanding of the way the earth works,
instead of challenging the paradigm

Normal Science → Anomalies 異常 when they

find unexpected results, evidence goes against
their existing paradigm
• Anomaly = Irregular, abnormal, deviating from existing
paradigm
• New observations contradict theory of prevailing
 11
paradigm
o We tend to see what we expect to see
• New observations accumulate until they require another
new explanations due to accumulation of unexpected
results

Anomalies → Revolution
• When a paradigm is unable to explain a growing
number of observations, a paradigm shift or
‘revolution’ occurs
• Revolution leads to a NEW paradigm, which could
explain the previous paradigm explained plus the
anomalies that the previous paradigm was unable to
explain

• Example: Proving earth is a square

o Return to starting point without falling to the edge
o New Paradigm appears (earth is a sphere)

The Cycle of Scientific Progress

(according to Kuhn)
• Paradigm 1
o → Normal Science
o → Accumulation of anomalies
o → Crisis leading to emergence of a rival paradigm
• Paradigm 2 (can explain anomalies of Paradigm 1)
(revolution/paradigm shift)
• etc...

Kuhn’s Contribution
• Science does not necessarily progress towards truth
(similar to popper)(cuz what is true today may not
 28
be true tmr)
o Instead we adopt alternative paradigms that are more-or-
less adequate for our understanding of the world now
• Argues that science has a socio-political side that
affects how knowledge is produced
• Science is a social process, based on human
understanding , central to the production process of theories

Two Problems with Kuhn’s Ideas

• he thought There is no relationship between paradigms
1 and 2
(incommensurability)
He thought it is not possible for 2 paradigms to meet or
match

o But anomalies arose in paradigm 1 that led to paradigm 2,

so there must be some relationship (2 is able to explain the anomalies
that 1 is unable to explain)

• Can identify revolutions only in hindsight 事後; difficult to

do so while they are occurring
o his idea is Useful for analysis, but difficult for scientists to use in
practice , difficult to identify if they are undergoing a revolution and
a paradigm shift

1.5 : Introducing Technology

Technology in History
• Humans have used tools (technology) since
antiquity 古代
o Hunting, farming
 11

• Some animals also use tools!

• Today, technology is usually associated with high-

technology products and services
• Innovation: commercialization and dissemination
(or widespread use) of technology

Original Meaning of ‘Technology’?

• From Aristotle’s time (384-322 BC) technology =
“Study of the arts, techniques”
o A term with origins in Greek, "technologia",
“techne” = "craft" and “logia” = "saying"
• “Technology” as a word was seldom used before
1880
• Came into common vocabulary with the industrial
revolution in England (1760-1850 and 1820-1890 in
the US) when large technological systems (railways)

began to dominate
 30

A Three-Part Definition of Technology

Part I (Tangible)
• Artifacts 人工製品, systems, networks (material aspect)
o Things you can touch and feel
o Computer, iPod, etc.

Part II (Intangible)
• Knowledge, skill and technique
o Seems low tech, but usually more important than the
actual artifact (cuz if don’t have the skill, the artifact is
useless)
o For example, how to type on a computer

Part III (Intangible)

• Related social practices/social relations
o Organization of work (workers, supervisors, managers,
etc.)

Characteristics of Technology
• Some technologies require certain conditions to
 11
operate
o Nuclear power plants (strict safety standards)
o Airports (authority) (require central authority, has to be 1
person to control)

Some technologies promote inequality

o Deliberate or unintended
o For example, bridge design
• Designed to allow cars (wealthy people) but not buses (poor people) to
pass through

Some technologies create dependence

o For example, mobile phones, electricity

Technological Determinism( all events are determined

=

completely by previously existing causes, as opposed to randomness.) (1/3)

• Idea that technological change determines

(drives/shapes) social change (gives too much
weight on technology alone)
o Example: Speeding cars (technological change) →CAUSE
 32

more accidents (social change)

• technological determinism is A critic’s term (not
widely believed)
o cuz Cause and effect are difficult to determine

i.e. it is more than cars that have an influence on the no. of

traffic accidents, e.g. how well are the drivers trained? The
road markings, pedestrians?
>>the statement of technological determinism is an oversimplification.
So we cannot just blame all the fault on cars

o Social aspects prevalent in all stages of technological

design, manufacture and use
i.e. Social aspect has the capacity to influence social change equally as much as
technologies do.
It is possible to design and manufacture cars to reduce traffic accidents.

Technological Determinism (2/3)

• Technologies work,
and technological
change occurs within
society

• Cannot conceive of technology (or science) outside

of society
o Both are part of society and affected by people
Rather than promoting the view of technology causes social change, it is more appropriate
to understand tech and science to be working and for a change to be occurring within a
societal framework.
i.e. tech and science are the integral parts of the society
tech is created, used, manufactured within a societal framework by human beings.
We are less likely to be technologically deterministic in our thinking about tech. we
should not think tech is independent of society.
>>tech and science are affected/shaped by societal aspects
 11

Technological Determinism (3/3)

• Rather than being deterministic, we have to clearly
understand the context in which technologies
function
i.e. how tech functions and how tech operates>have a better
appreciation for the social aspect that are involved in technological
design, manufacture and use
o That will help us identify the societal influences upon
technology
• However, should not fall into the opposing end of
the spectrum (the view that all social changes are
caused by societal influence alone, tech does have a
part to play, give too much weight on society alone)
(don’t be socially deterministic also)
>>both tech and society interact with one another to create
outcomes(in moderation, the middle ground)

1.6 : Introducing Innovation

Importance of Innovation
• Importance of innovation depends on context
o In some societies tradition is respected more than doing
something new
• Maintaining balance is more important than creating new
knowledge or products (balance and equilibrium is much
more important)
It’s not accurate to think of innovation to be equally
important in all contexts and all societies
• In modern world, innovation has become central
o Following the Industrial Revolution btw the mid-1700s uptil
the mid-1800s
Innovation has become increasingly important to the modern world
 34

What is an Innovation?
• Creation of something new or different
o New goods or services are important, esp. for businesses,
cuz they drive the economic world
• They have become the key to economic growth
o innovation Represents a move into an unknown area (doing
something new)
o Uncertainty and risk involved , we don’t know what the
outcomes are, cuz we haven’t tried that before
e.g. sth simply finding a new route from classroom to toilet

What is an Innovation? (cont’d)

• Often, innovations are ‘local’(not global in nature),
not new to the universe
i.e. it is new to a specific country, market, region,
economy, but not the globe

o Taobao is an innovation in Mainland China, but outside,

eBay already exists

o Touchscreen technology used in Apple’s iPhone

What is an Innovation? (cont’d)

• Innovation is how we DO something new
• Innovation requires new knowledge
• Innovation is not accidental
o Systematic attempt to learn something new; produce
knowledge and use it
o R&D(research and development) has a specific aim → create a
new product/tech
• Example: new cars using water-based cooling systems
 11
• Therefore, question of creating and using
knowledge is central in business innovation literature
Example: How to use nanotechnology to produce new
products (nano-pen, nano-clothes...) , how to use the new
knowledge

What is Innovation and Where it Happens

• Technological creation
o Made possible through human agency (i.e. tech is created
in society, through societal influence by human beings)
(talked in previous section)

o Constrained by existing technological knowledge and

physical capabilities (i.e. cannot be too technologically
deterministic)(i.e. technological knowledge and physical
capabilities have an influence in what we can created in new
products and services)

What is Innovation and Where it Happens

(cont’d)
• Previously, technological creation was
predominantly the domain of individuals
i.e. technological creation is associated with individual efforts
before
o Example: electric lightbulbs from Edison, airplanes from
the Wright Brothers

• Today, technological creation takes place in formal

R&D labs
large companies have large research and
development budgets, to invest in people and labs
through new products and services emerged
 36
o Example: Halftone Image Watermarking from HKUST
research lab

Context-Dependent Nature of Innovations

• Innovations can depend on:
o The sectors in which they occur
• Industrial Revolution: cotton, iron and steel
o The geographic areas in which they occur
• England, Germany, USA
o The time periods in which they occur
• Industrial Revolution

Science is only One of the Ingredients in

Successful Innovation
• No single discipline addresses all aspects of
innovation
Cuz science is not the only one contributor in
successful innovations
When we look at innovations, don’t just look at scientists and
science
• Necessary to combine insights from several
disciplines → multidisciplinary
o Economics (how economics help us understand how new
innovation come about in society)
o Sociology
o S&TS (science and technology studies)
o History (study innovation through history, what are some
of the patterns?, what lay the foundations of sth?)
o Etc.
Science is important to innovation, but science is only one of the ingredients in successful
innovation, so don’t consider just scientists and science as the contributors to innovation

Science is only One of the Ingredients

 11

in Successful Innovation (cont’d)

• For example, economics treated the innovation
process as a black box:
o How to allocate resources
o Economic effects of innovation
• Black box metaphor: we know the inputs into the innovation
process and the outputs from the process, but we do not know
what happens in between (don’t know how the inputs are combined with
one another to create a successful process, thus have to combine all
disciplines in order to understand how the black box operates)

Formal Definitions
• Invention: First appearance of a new idea
(the 1st time we see/find sth)
• Innovation:
But not all innovations are sold in the
marketplace
o Developing idea into a product that can find widespread
use

How is innovation differ from inventions?

1.7 : Examining Innovation

38

Categories of Innovation
• Joseph Schumpeter = preeminent 卓越的 innovation
theorist
(An Austrian economist in 1940s laid out some
central core ideas of innovation)

• he Defined five categories of innovation

Five Categories of Innovation

(J. A. Schumpeter)
1. New product or [a qualitative change in an
existing product ]
o Walkman → Discman → mp3 player
o Desktop → laptop
2. New process (for creating a product)
o Assembly line production (Fordism) in car
manufacturing by Ford Motors
• Break down the work process → specialization
(different people work for different parts)
o Mechanical arms that perform
percutaneous(=made, done, or effected through the skin.)
transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA & PTCS)

[Link] markets (even for something you already

have)
Open up A new market for a service or
product that may have existed
o Ear-piercing for men
 11
o Low-budget airlines
o Air-conditioned buses

4. New sources of inputs (new materials)

o Tennis rackets, wood → carbon composite
o Titanium glasses
5. Organizational innovation (running a firm)
The method/processes we employ in order to
run an organization
o New organization of a company (vertical to
horizontal)

 Three Ways of Classifying Innovations

1. Offensive(break out from the existing mode/operations, to
create sth new ; “attacking” ; Creative destruction : Break/destroy what you
have in order to create sth >> Forcing a company to find a new product (apple
ipod)) vs. Defensive
 (by following a market leader, follow a company that has already
engaged in offensive innovation, and we just defend our market share
by copying what the offensive innovator has already done)
 “defending”/”defensive”
 Innovating to survive (Following, not leading)
 Catching up with the rest of the industry
 Maintain (sales) position within an industry (lower the risk of elimination, cuz
spending less on R&D
 40
o Business perspective
• Example: Manufacture of the ‘iPod’ mp3 player to increase market
share (offensive)
• Competing companies produce new mp3 players to hold on to
their existing customers (defensive)

 2. Radical(have larger impact on society +

Finding sth completely new, unrelated to the past)
vs.
Incremental (have subtle impact on society +
Innovating based on previously held knowledge)

o classify it as radical or incremental

based on the Historical-social perspective
(impacts on society)
• Example: From Discman to mp3 player (radical)
• Larger storage capacity in mp3 player (incremental)

Most innovations are incremental – to varying

degrees ⃝ If you look historically, you will find most
innovations are
related to the past to some degree; there are few truly
radical innovations (most of the time, we innovate sth by
accumulating knowledge)

3. Product(tangible 有形的) vs. Process (intangible 無形的,

involve a new way of doing things)
o Innovation-centered perspective (look at the innovation
itself, after studying the actual innovation to classify as
product or process)
• Example: iPod mini, iPod Nano (product)
• New production process to reduce the cost (process)
 11
Offensive defensive
 “attacking”  “defending”/”defensive”
 Creative destruction  Innovating to survive (Following,
 Break/destroy what you have not leading)
in order to create sth  Catching up with the rest of the
 Forcing a company to find a new industry
product (apple ipod)  Maintain (sales) position within an
industry (lower the risk of
elimination, cuz spending less on
R&D

Radical / disruptive incremental

 Also known as disruptive  Innovating based on
 Finding sth completely new, previously held
unrelated to the past
knowledge

Most innovations are incremental – to varying degrees

⃝
If you look historically, you will find most innovations are
related to the past to some degree; there are few truly
radical innovations (most of the time, we innovate sth by
accumulating knowledge)

Innovating Incrementally
• Most innovations are related to the past to some
degree
o Walkman → Discman → mp3 player → mobile phone that
can play mp3 files
o Desktop → laptop → PDA

Product innovation Process innovation

 Tangible  Skills, knowledge
 Goods, products, artifacts  Services, ideas, organizational
 Mobile phones, ipod, etc innovations
e.g. Assembly line manufacturing
of Ford Motor cars
 42

Why do Firms (or People) Innovate?

• Product innovation undertaken to earn monopoly
rents for a certain period (they feel they can earn a
large amount of profit by innovating)

• Firms can undertake innovation as

offensive/defensive strategies
o To increase market share or hold on to existing customers

Innovation and Diversity

• A comparison to help understand innovation
o Innovation creates diversity
o Innovation is similar to mutation in biology:
• Market process (natural selection) will select the innovation
(organism) most fit for living in the economic system (ecosystem)

Technological Paths (or Trajectories)

• new technologies Become fixed in certain directions
i.e. when we create sth, we are unable to break out from the
previous mode of creations
• Firms want to be able to use the knowledge they already
have—not waste already-acquired resources
• Lock-in effect (revolve around a certain standard)
- stuck in technological paths
o QWERTY keyboards; right-hand drive cars, USB standard;

Windows operating system

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1.8 : Relationship Between Science and

Technology
What is Science? What is Technology?
• Science usually refers to a systematic body of
knowledge about the observable world
o Facts or observations about the world

• Technology usually refers to material goods,

methods, or knowledge used to carry out human
ends
o Usually associated with functionality, the human-
focused function that technology carries out
• Helps us achieve some goal/complete some task

What is Science? What is Technology?

(cont’d)
• Knowing why = science
o Why something works/behaves/acts the way it does (in
the natural world)

• Knowing how = technology

o How something works/behaves/acts the way it does

Science Technology
 Knowing why  Knowing how
 Systemic body of knowledge about  Material goods, methods (help us
the observable world to complete the task)
 Method for understanding the  Artifacts, systems and network
natural world  Knowledge, skills, techniques
 Falsification/scientific method
 Use minds to do science(to  Use hands to make/create
understand how the natural world technology
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works)
 Over-estimated (we give more  Under-estimated (less emphasized)
emphasis on science) (considered less important)

Technological Knowledge
• Usually downplayed 輕描淡寫
(cuz technological work is usually more
laborious, symbolizing lower social status,
thus is considered less important)

1. Because historically those who worked with

their hands were considered to be inferior to
those who worked with their minds (cuz
technological work is usually more laborious,
symbolizing lower social status, thus is considered
less important)
2. Because traditionally we use our hands to
‘make’ technologies and our ‘minds’ to do
science
3. Because of the prevalence of the idea that
science and scientific theories give rise to
technologies and technological knowledge

• cuz we Use ‘hands’ to make technology and ‘mind’

to do science
• Has its own tradition
o Not all technologies have a scientific foundation (to
understand technology, we should use multidisciplinary view
to understand it, not just science alone) (science doesn’t
have a monopoly on technology)

Science is very important , and is creating new technologies. But Not all
technologies have a scientific foundation
In-class Discussion:
1. scientific perspectives of Popper and Kuhn, using the example of climate change
 11
Popper: scientific method: falsification: have to make bold, risky predictions/hypotheses
that have the potential to confirm or falsify a theory by crucial experiments. The results of
risky predictions are unknown that might falsify or confirm a theory. If a theory is
falsified, it should be abandoned, and a new one proposed in its place; if, however, the
prediction is correct, the theory is reinforced → good science

Kuhn: stands for the viewpoint that science has a social dimension
o Focuses on activities of scientists
o Science is what scientists do
o Considers science as a social activity
• Adopts a subjective view of science
- should understand the past in its historical context
- Consider historical actors’ own ways
- What information, knowledge, materials and tools were available to them?
- CONTEXT (i.e. surrounding situation) very important!
o Do not use current knowledge to evaluate theories established in the past
- Should rather use the knowledge that scientists in the past helped in order to
evaluate the theories they held, to know how the theories they held worked
‘Normal’ Science
• Working within a paradigm =Not challenging the paradigm (unlike Popper who said we
should always falsify and refute a theory)
• Puzzle-solving
o Working to accumulate evidence for existing worldview
o if has Unexpected results = failure, unless they provoke a crisis
The unexpected results provoke a crisis when these unexpected results accumulate, that
can’t be simply explained as failures>a crisis > anomalies> after enough evidence, a
revolution/paradigm shift

Climate change:
Current Situation:
China consumes more coal than the rest of the world combined,
and it is the leading emitter of greenhouse gases, accounting
for nearly 30% of global emissions.
Unless China takes rapid steps to control its greenhouse gas
emissions, there is no plausible path to achieving the Paris
climate agreement aim to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees
Celsius (2.7 F), or even the less ambitious target of “well below
 46

Policy 1: Investing in Renewable Energy

- Increase in the use of electric vehicles
- Decrease in the reliance on coal
China: the world’s leading investor in renewable energy since
2013, and it has been buying up raw materials those industries
need, such as cobalt mines in Africa. It has three
times more renewable energy capacity than any other country,
and its electric vehicle use is growing. As of 2019, about half
the world’s electric vehicles and 98% of electric buses were in
China.

China achieved nine of the 15 quantitative targets in its 2015

climate commitments ahead of schedule. Over the past
decade, coal has fallen from about 70% to 57% of its energy
consumption. In September 2021, China will stop financing
overseas coal power plants. This is likely to lead to the
cancellation of much of the 65 gigawatts of coal power plants it
had planned in Asia, roughly three times the annual emissions
 11
of Bangladesh. And unlike the U.S., China has also established
a national emissions trading system for the electricity sector

Policy 2: Carbon Neutrality & an emissions peak in 2030

Striving for Carbon Neutrality

To achieve the goals of peaking carbon emissions and subsequent

carbon neutrality is one of China’s major strategies, defined after

careful consideration. This is a must-do in order to relieve the serious

constraints imposed by resources and the environment on China’s

economic growth, and to achieve sustainable development. It is also a

solemn 莊嚴 commitment towards building a global community of shared

future. China has incorporated this decision into its overall economic

and social development, adopting a holistic approach and balancing

the relationships between economic growth and emissions reduction,

between overall and regional interests, and between short, medium,

and long-term growth. Led by the green economic and social

transition, China is focusing on green and low-carbon development of

the energy sector, and accelerating the formation of industrial

structures, production modes, ways of work and life and spatial

configurations that help to conserve resources and protect the

environment. It is fully committed to high-quality development that

prioritize eco-environmental protection and green and low-carbon way

of life.

Policy 3: Synergizing the Reduction of Pollution and Carbon Emissions

Carbon dioxide and other ordinary pollutants often come from the same sources,

mainly from the burning and utilization of fossil fuels. Controlling the use of

fossil fuels and consequently reducing carbon emissions have a lasting impact
 48
on the economic structure, energy mix, forms of transport, modes of production,

and ways of life. It will boost high-quality development by pressing for the green

transition of the economy; it will be conducive to mitigating climate change and

the damage it causes to life, property, society, and the economy; it will facilitate

the source control of pollution, achieving synergy between pollution and carbon

reduction and improvement of the eco-environment; it will help conserve

biodiversity and improve ecosystems.

China sees pollution prevention and control as an integral part of the response

to climate change. Through structural adjustment, optimized configuration,

policy synergy and innovative mechanisms, efforts to reduce pollution and

carbon emissions are planned and carried out in tandem, and the performance

assessment of the two is also conducted jointly. Balancing environmental,

climate and economic gains, China has found a unique path to reducing

greenhouse gas emissions that conforms to its actual conditions.

Intensifying Efforts in Response to Climate Change

It will not be easy for China to achieve its new NDC targets; it will take

approximately 30 years of painstaking effort to transit from peak carbon

emissions to achieving carbon neutrality and the largest reduction in carbon

dioxide emissions per unit of GDP (“carbon intensity”) in the world. Walking the

talk, China has already begun to implement positive and effective moves in its

strategy to peak carbon emissions and achieve carbon neutrality.

Improving overall planning and coordination in response to climate change. The

response to climate change covers a wide range of areas; therefore, to improve

coordination and pool strengths, China has set up a national leading group

headed by Premier of the State Council and with officials from 30 ministries and

commissions as members. Its remit 緩和 is responding to climate change,

 11
conserving energy, and reducing emissions, and all provinces, autonomous

regions, and municipalities directly under the central government (PARMs) have

set up corresponding groups. In April 2018, China adjusted the functions of

relevant government departments, and put the newly established Ministry of

Ecology and Environment in charge of responding to climate change, thus

reinforcing the coordination between responding to climate change and

protecting the eco-environment. In 2021, China set up a special leading group to

guide and coordinate the work related to peaking carbon emissions and

achieving carbon neutrality.

Incorporating the response to climate change into national economic and social

development plans. Starting from the 12th Five-year Plan period (2011-2015),

China has incorporated reducing carbon intensity into the outline of the plans

for national economic and social development as binding targets, and defined

key tasks, priority areas, and major projects. China’s Outline of the 14th Five-

Year Plan (2021-2025) for National Economic and Social Development and the

Long-Range Objectives Through the Year 2035 sets a binding target of slashing

carbon intensity by 18 percent from 2020 to 2025. All PARMs have taken on the

response to climate change as an important part of the 14th Five-year Plan, and

set themselves specific targets and tasks.

Establishing a mechanism of breaking down and meeting the targets for

responding to climate change. To meet its targets, China has set tiered

provincial-level carbon emission caps for its PARMs based on factors such as

their development stage, resource endowment, strategic positioning, and eco-

environmental protection. It has assessed the performance of the relevant

governments in meeting the targets and fulfilling the responsibilities for

controlling greenhouse gas emissions, and uses the results as an important

reference for the comprehensive performance assessment and appraisal of

officials holding principal posts and leadership teams in the PARMs, as well as
 50
for the appointment, reward, sanction, and removal of officials. PARM

governments have also assessed the performance of administrative divisions at

lower levels in meeting their targets and fulfilling their responsibilities for

controlling greenhouse gas emissions, thus ensuring that the effort is

coordinated and effective.

Continuing to update NDC targets. In 2015, China set its nationally determined

action objectives by 2030: to peak carbon dioxide emissions around 2030 at the

latest and make every effort to peak early. By the end of 2019, China had

delivered on its 2020 climate action target ahead of schedule. In 2020, China

announced new NDC targets and measures. China aims to:

• peak carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality

before 2060.

• lower its carbon intensity by over 65 percent by 2030 from the 2005 level.

• increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around

25 percent by 2030.

• increase the forest stock volume by 6 billion cubic meters by 2030 from the

2005 level.

• bring its total installed capacity of wind and solar power to over 1.2 billion kW

by 2030.

Compared with the objectives set in 2015, the new targets are more ambitious

in timeframe. They involve a steeper cut in carbon intensity, an increase of

another five percentage points in the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy

consumption, a new target for installed capacity of non-fossil fuels, an additional

forest stock of 1.5 billion cubic meters, and a clear announcement to aim for

carbon neutrality before 2060. China has announced in 2021 a decision to stop

building new coal-fired power projects overseas, demonstrating its concrete

actions in response to climate change.

 11
Accelerating work on 1+N policies for peaking carbon emissions and achieving

carbon neutrality. The country has formulated and released a top-level design

document for peaking carbon emissions and achieving carbon neutrality, and is

working on an action plan for peaking carbon emissions before 2030, with

implementation plans for fields and sectors such as energy, industry, urban and

rural construction, transport, and agriculture and rural areas. Support plans are

being created in areas such as science and technology, fiscal funding, finance,

pricing, carbon sinks, energy transition and coordination of pollution reduction

and carbon emission reduction, with clearer timetables, roadmaps, and working

plans. The country is shaping policies and actions with clear objectives,

reasonable assignment of labor, effective measures, and sound coordination,

ensuring that all efforts deliver positive results.

Problem 1: lacks a hard cap on emissions.

Problem 2: lack of policy ambition.

This is evident both in China’s revised commitments presented

at the U.N. climate summit in Glasgow in November 2021 and
in its current Five-Year Plan (2021-2025). Both represent
piecemeal 零碎的 improvements but will make it difficult to keep
global warming well below 2 C.

For instance, China aims to have its carbon dioxide

emissions peak before 2030 and be carbon neutral by 2060.
These soft targets reflect a Chinese tendency in international
negotiations to underpromise so that it can overdeliver. To be
consistent with the Paris Agreement aims, China will need to
set a cap on emissions and move forward its peak dates.
 52
Current policy and recent history have also raised concerns
that China’s coal use will not decline fast enough over the
2020s to achieve the 1.5 C target.

Problem 3: still addressing emergencies using coal

production

Three times in the past four years China responded to either an

energy shortage or economic slowdown by allowing coal
production and consumption to surge. In 2020, it added almost
40 gigawatts of new coal capacity, roughly equal to the
entire coal fleet of Germany, the world’s fourth-largest
industrial power.

2. brainstorming exercises for technologies and innovations