4

Non- Thinking in the

Name of the Normative

In a recent exchange, 1 the British sociologist Chetan

Bhatt remarked that "in sociology, cultural theory or
cultural studies, many of us assume a field of truths ...
a (albeit contested) field of theoretical intelligibility for
understanding or describing 'Self', 'Other', the subject,
identity, culture." 2 He adds: "I am no longer sure these
concepts necessarily have the expansive capacity to speak
to the massive transformations of life-worlds outside
Euro America, the rapid unscrambling and repackaging
of what we call 'identity' ... " If Bhatt is right, then the
very framework by which we proceed, whether that of
multiculturalism or human rights, presumes specific
kinds of subjects that may or may not correspond to the
British Journal of Sociology 59: 1 (2008). My essay, "Sexual Politics,
Torture, and Secular Time," appearing in revised form as Chapter 3 of the
present volume, was originally given as the annual lecture for the British Journal
of Sociology in October 2007 at the London School of Economics. It was first
published in the BJS along with several responses. This chapter is a revised and
expanded version of the rejoinder I offered to those responses ("A Response to
Ali, Beckford, Bhatt, Modood and Woodhead," in British Journal of Sociology 59:
2, 255-60) and includes a discussion of Tala! Asad's work that did not appear
in those pages.
2 Chetan Bhatt, "The Times of Movements: A Response," British Journal of
Sociology, 59: 1 (2008), 29.
 138 FRAMES OF WAR NON-THINKING AND THE NORMATIVE 139

modes of life in play within the present time. The subjects that they "emerge" but that is, of course, not to be taken
presumed by the liberal. and multicultural frameworks for granted, since such new formations can "emerge"
(and we will have to try to distinguish between them) are only when there are frames that establish the possibility
characterized as belonging to certain kinds of cultural for that emergence. Thus, the question is: are there such
identities, variously conceived as singularly or multiply frames and, if so, how do they work? There are variants
determined by lists of categories that include ethnicity, on liberalism and multiculturalism which propose to think
class, race, religion, sexuality, and gender. There about what recognition might be in light of the challenge
persistent questions about whether and how such subjects to notions of the subject and identity proposed by Bhatt
can be represented in law, and what might count as above. Some of these positions seek to extend a doctrine
sufficient cultural and institutional recognition for such of recognition to coalitional subjects. Sociologist Tariq
subjects. We ask such normative questions as if we know Modood, for example, proposes a conception of citizenship
what we mean by the subject even as we do not always relying less on subject-based perspectives or claims than
know how best to represent or recognize various subjects. on the inter-subjective exchange that takes place, for
Indeed, the "we" who asks such questions for the most instance, as a result of "coalitional possibilities between
part assumes that the problem is a normative one, namely, sexual politics and religious multiculturalism." In his view,
how best to arrange political life so that recognition and citizenship has to be understood as dynamic and revisable,
representation can take place. And though surely this is as marked by "conversations and re-negotiations." A
a crucial, if not the most crucial, normative question to substantial conception of citizenship implies modes of
ask, we cannot possibly approach an answer if we do not dialogue that reconstitute the participants in significant
consider the ontology of the subject whose recognition ways. Modood makes clear that "the one thing that civic
and representation is at issue. Moreover, any inquiry into inclusion does not consist of is an uncritical acceptance
that ontology requires that we consider another level at of an existing conception of citizenship, of 'the rules of
which the normative operates, namely, through norms that the game' and a one-sided 'fitting-in' of new entrants or
produce the idea of the human who is worthy of recognition the new equals (the ex-subordinates)." He then makes this
and representation at all. That is to say, we cannot ask important addition to his remarks: "To be a citizen, no less
and answer the more commonly understood normative than to have just become a citizen, is to have a right to not
question, regarding how best to represent or to recognize just be recognized but to debate the terms of recognition. " 3
such subjects, if we fail to understand the differential of Making the demand to become a citizen is no easy
power at work that distinguishes between those subjects task, but debating the terms by which that citizenship is
who will be eligible for recognition and those who will not. conferred is surely even more difficult. In this perspective,
In other words, what is the norm according to which the the citizen is itself a coalitional exchange; in other words,
subject is produced who then becomes the presumptive there is no singly or multiply determined subject, but a
"ground" of normative debate?
3 Tariq Modood, "A Basis for and Two Obstacles in tbe Way of a
The problem is not merely or only "ontological" since
Multiculturalist Tradition," British Journal of Sociology, 59: 1 (2008), 49; see also
the forms the subject takes as well as the life-worlds that do Modood, Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea, London: Polity, 2007, and Sara Ahmed,
not conform to available categories of the subject emerge Claudia Casteneda, Anne-Marie Fortier, and Mimi Sheller, eds., Uprootings/
in light of historical and geopolitical movements. I write Regroundings: Questions of Home and Migration, London: Berg Publishers, 2003.
 140 FRAMES OF WAR NON-THINKING AND THE NORMATIVE 141

dynamic social process, a subject who is not only under and policy. As Wendy Brown has persuasively argued,
way, but constituted and reconstituted in the course tolerance is a weak instrument, often presupposing a
of social exchange. One is not only entitled to a certain disdain for those toward whom it is directed. 4 Others favor
status as a citizen, but this status is itself determined and recognition as a more robust and affirmative alternative
revised in the course of social interaction. We might say to tolerance (less tolerant, and so more tolerant!). But
that this dialogic form of social ontology is all well and recognition becomes a less than perspicacious concept
good, but that legal recognition makes juridical subjects when we think about how it might work in relation to
of us all. Although that may well be true, there are extra- such scenarios. Apart from the question of who confers
legal conditions for becoming a citizen, indeed, for even recognition and what form it takes, we also have to ask

•
becoming a subject who can appear before the law. To what is it precisely that would be "recognized"? Is it the
appear before the law means that one has entered into the "homosexuality" of the gay person? Is it the religious belief
realm of appearance or that one is positioned to be entered of the Muslim? If our normative frameworks presuppose
there, which means that there are norms that condition that these ostensibly defining features of singly determined
and orchestrate the subject who can and does appear. The subjects are its proper objects, then recognition becomes
subject who is crafted to appear before the law is thus not part of the very practice of ordering and regulating
fully determined by the law, and this extra-legal condition subjects according to pre-established norms. If recognition
of legalization is implicitly (non-juridically) presupposed reconsolidates the "sexual subject," the "cultural subject,"
by law itself. and the "religious subject," among others, does it make
We might be tempted then to resolve on formulating a or find the subject of recognition, and is there any way
new conception of the subject, one that might be termed of distinguishing between making and finding within the
"coalitional." But what will constitute the parts of the scene of recognition based on such terms? What if the very
coalition? Shall we say that there are several subjects features that are "recognizable" prove to rely on a failure
within a single subject, or that there are "parts" that enter of recognition?
into communication with one another? Both alternatives The fact that no subject can emerge without being
beg the question of whether the language of the subject differentiated has several consequences. In the first
suffices. Consider the scenario invoked by those who instance, a subject only becomes discrete through excluding
pursue the normative goal of tolerance: if one subject other possible subject formations, a host of "not-me's." In
exercises tolerance toward another, or two different subjects the second instance, a subject emerges through a process
are enjoined to exercise tolerance reciprocally, then these of abjection, jettisoning those dimensions of oneself that
two subjects are considered differentiated from the start. fail to conform to the discrete figures yielded by the
But what accounts for that differentiation? And what if norm of the human subject. The refuse of such a process
"differentiation" is precisely what must be repressed and includes various forms of spectrality and monstrosity,
relocated in order for the subject to appear within such usually figured in relation to non-human animal life. In
a scenario? Posited within some discourses of tolerance,
for instance, are two different kinds of subjects, such as 4 See Wendy Brown, "Tolerance as Supplement: The 'Jewish Question' and
"homosexuals" and "Muslims," who either do or do not the 'Woman Question'," in Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity
tolerate each other in the spheres of public transaction and Empire, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006,48-77.
 142 FRAMES OF WAR NON-THINKING AND THE NORMATIVE 143

a way, this formulation is a kind of (post)structuralist well as in the way those forms are presupposed by prevalent
truism in the sense that difference not only preconditions normative frameworks. The homosexual person at issue
the assertion of identity, but proves as a result to be more may or may not be Muslim, and the Muslim person at
fundamental than identity. Laclau and Mouffe offered issue may or may not be homophobic. But if the framework
their extremely important reformulation of this notion in of cultural conflict (gay versus Muslim) determines
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, where it would seem that how we conceive of those identities, then the Muslim
the condition of differentiation becomes at once the sign of becomes defined by his or her ostensible homophobia,
a constitutive lack in all subject formation and a basis for a ·' and the homosexual becomes defined, depending on the
non-substantial conception of solidarity. 5 framework, either as presumptively anti-Muslim or fearful
Is there a way of turning this set of formal insights into
a historically specific analysis of the differential working
of Muslim homophobia. In other words, both positions
get defined in terms of their putatively conflictual relation •
of recognition in these times? Mter all, if the subject is
always differentiated, we have to understand precisely
with one another, at which point we come to know very
little about either category or the sites of their sociological
I
what that means. We tend to understand differentiation convergence. Indeed, the framework of tolerance, even
both as an internal feature of a subject (the subject the injunction to tolerance, orders identity according to its
is internally differentiated and composed of several requirements and effaces the complex cultural realities of
mutually determining parts) and as an external feature gay and religious lives.
(the subject excludes other formations of the subject as The consequence is that the normative framework
well as specters of abjection or the loss of subject status). mandates a certain ignorance about the "subjects" at
But these two forms of differentiation are not as distinct issue, and even rationalizes this ignorance as necessary
as they might appear, since the one I exclude in order to the possibility of making strong normative judgments.
to constitute my discreteness and specificity remains Indeed, it takes some effort to "understand" the cultural
internal to me as the prospect of my own dissolution. Any realities designated by "homosexual" and "Muslim,"
internal differentiation I might make between my parts or especially in their transnational "life-worlds," to invoke
my "identities" relies upon some way of unifying those Bhatt, both inside, outside, and at the periphery of Euro-
differences, and so re-installs the subject as the ground of America (understanding that these spatial categories can
difference itself. In turn, this subject gains its specificity operate simultaneously). After all, to understand this
by defining itself against what is outside itself, and so the relation would involve considering a number of formations
external differentiation proves to be central to the account in which sexuality and religion operate as vehicles for one
of internal differentiation as well. another, sometimes in antagonism, and sometimes not.
One need go no further than Hegel to make such points, To say that there are rules against homosexuality within
but perhaps there is something more to be considered in Islam is not yet to say how people live in relation to such
the specific forms that ostensible cultural conflicts take, as rules or taboos, or how such rules and taboos vary in their
intensity or centrality, depending on the specific religious
5 Ernesto Lad au and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards
contexts and practices at issue. Especially of interest
a Radical Democratic Politics, London: Verso, 1985. See also Simon Critchley would be an analysis of how sexual practices explicitly
and Oliver Marchart, eds., Laclau: A Critical Reader, London: Routledge, 2004. tabooed take place in relation to the taboo, or in relative
 144 NON-THINKING AND THE NORMATIVE 145
FRAMES OF WAR

indifference to it. To say fuat there is a taboo at a doctrinal devise new constellations for thinking about normativity if
level is not yet to explain what function the taboo has we are to proceed in intellectually open and comprehensive
within that doctrine and how sexual lives are conducted ways to grasp and evaluate our world.
in relation not only to the taboo itself, but to several other There are, of course, some options that I am not
kinds of cultural realities, whether religiously inflected or promoting. For instance, the problem we are addressing
not. Indeed, even to say that religion and sexuality may is not one in which the rights of culture threaten to
both constitute driving forces for a way of life is still not trump rights of individual freedom, since that framing of
to say how much of a drive they might be, or in what ways ·' the problem refuses to rethink the very concepts of the
they drive (or fail to drive), or what precisely it is that they individual and of culture being presumed. In this context,
drive (and in tandem with what other driving forces?). In it is important to emphasize that the effort of secular elites
other words, the binary framework assumes that religion to exclude religion from the public sphere may be rooted
and sexuality are both singly and exhaustively determining in a certain class privilege and blindness to the fact that
of identity (which is why there are two identities, distinct religious networks often provide the support on which
and opposed). Such a framework fails to consider that vulnerable populations necessarily rely. Some have made
even where there are antagonisms, that does not imply the case for the associational rights of religious communities
contradiction or impasse as necessary conclusions. on the grounds that the infringement of such rights leads
Antagonism can be lived within and among subjects as to substantive disenfranchisement for such communities
6
a dynamic and productive political force. Finally, such a or, indeed, the deracination of community itself. Of
framework does not bother to ask about the complex ways course, such a project would have to be able to locate
that religion and sexuality are organized, since the binary communities, to treat them as stable and discrete entities,
framework assumes to know all that it needs to know and this would lead to some complicated sorts of decisions
prior to any actual investigation of this complex cultural about how group membership is to be determined. Indeed,
reality It is a form of non-thinking ratified by a restrictively the advantage of such an approach is that it supplements
normative model, one that wants a map of reality that can a certain individualism through a notion of group rights;
secure judgment even if the map is clearly false. Indeed, but the limitation is that the "group" or the "community"
it is a form of judgment that falsifies the world in order functions as a unified subject precisely at a time in which
to shore up moral judgment itself as the sign of a certain new social formations require that we think beyond or
cultural privilege and "perspicacity"-a way of keeping the against such assumed unities.
hordes at bay (which would presumably not only include The strategy of devising associational rights and a
non-Europeans, but also comparativists of all kinds). And coalitional concept of citizenship might be understood
such claims often go along with a spurious assertion of to expand existing democratic norms in ways that make
"political courage," understood as the willingness to defy them more inclusive, and that may overcome the "stand-
those who would have us think about cultural differences offs" between individual and religious claims and rights.
in more grounded, patient, or complex ways. In other Doubtless, such strategies have their strengths and
words, we do not need to understand, but only and always
to judge! My point, though, is not to paralyze judgment or 6 See Linda Woodhead, "Secular Privilege, Religious Disadvantage," in
to undermine normative claims, but to insist that we must British Journal of Sociology, 59: 1 (2008), 53-8.
 146 FRAMES OF WAR NON-THINKING AND THE NORMATIVE 147

promise. I wish only to draw attention to the tension identities, may be formed under the rubric of immigration
between (a) expanding the existing normative concepts politics. If the terms of multiculturalism and the politics of
of citizenship, recognition, and rights to accommodate recognition require either the reduction of the subject to a
and overcome contemporary impasses, and (b) the call single, defining attribute, or the construction of a multiply
for alternative vocabularies grounded in the conviction determined subject, then I am not sure we have yet faced
that the normative discourses derived from liberalism the challenge to cultural metaphysics posed by new global
and multiculturalism alike are inadequate to the task of networks that traverse and animate several dynamic
grasping both new subject formations and new forms of determinations at once.
social and political antagonism. When such networks form the basis of political coalitions,
Although I would be loath to underestimate the place they are bound together less by matters of "identity" or
of social and cultural conflict in contemporary politics, I commonly accepted terms of recognition than by forms of
would be equally reluctant to take "impasse" for granted as political opposition to certain state and other regulatory
a structural feature of multiculturalism, however prevalent policies that effect exclusions, abjections, partially or fully
the construal of a certain "stand-off" between, for instance,
religious and sexual minorities may be. There are numerous
suspended citizenship, subordination, debasement, and
the like. In this sense, "coalitions" are not necessarily
•
religious gay and lesbian groups, some of which have been based on subject positions or on reconciling differences
responsible for some of the pro-marriage agendas in the among subject positions; indeed, they can be based on
7
US. There are existing coalitions of queers and "illegal provisionally overlapping aims and there can be-perhaps
aliens" or sans papiers in the US and across Europe that must be-active antagonisms over what these aims should
work together without conflicts over sexual identity and be and how best to reach them. They are animated fields
religious belief affecting their coalitional efforts. And of differences, in the sense that "to be effected by another"
there are numerous networks of Muslim lesbians and gays and "to effect another" are part of the very social ontology
(consider the Kreuzberg bar, S036, in Berlin) that undo the of the subject, at which point "the subject" is less a discrete
necessity of the opposition between sexuality and religion. substance than an active and transitive set of interrelations.
If we consider how their HN status has adversely effected I am not at all convinced that there is one "unifying"
the ability of certain individuals to migrate or, indeed, to term to cover all the forms of dispossession that link
attain adequate health care, we can see how communities minority politics, nor do I think there need be one for the
struggling for enfranchisement, characterized by a fusion of strategic purposes of political alliance. What is necessary
is that those engaged in such coalitional efforts be actively
7 Consider a few of the organizations that represent Muslims and Arab involved in thinking through the category of the "minority"
sexual minorities: Imaan, an organization in the UK for gay, lesbian, bisexual, as it crosses the lines that divide citizen from non-citizen.
and transgendered Muslim people, offering social services and community By focusing on state and regulatory powers, how they
outreach: [Link]. See also [Link], a website offering orchestrate debate and manipulate the terms for creating a
various resources for Arab lesbian and gay people, some of which have a
religious content while others do not. See also "The International Initiative for
political impasse, we move beyond the kind of framework
the Visibility of Queer Muslims," [Link], and [Link]-fatiha. that presumes a dyadic opposition or that extracts a
org, an international organization for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender "conflict" from a complex formation in such a way that
Muslims. occludes the coercive and orchestrating dimensions of
 148 FRAMES OF WAR NON-THINKING AND THE NORMATIVE 149

normative frames. By bringing the question of power to keep an alliance together is different from the question
the center, the terms of the debate are bound to change of what keeps an alliance mobile. What keeps an alliance
and, indeed, to become more politically responsive. mobile is, in my view, the continued focus on those
So, how do forms of power, including state power, formations of power that exceed the strict definition of
orchestrate a scene of dyadic opposition, requiring two identity applied to those included in the alliance. In this
discrete subjects, qualified by single or plural attributes, case, an alliance would need to stay focused on methods
and mutually exclusive? To take such subjects for granted of state coercion (ranging from immigration tests to
is to deflect critical attention from the operations of power explicit torture) and on the invocations (and reductions)
itself, including the orchestrating effects of power in and of the subject, nature, culture, and religion that produce the
on subject formation. As a consequence, I caution against ontological horizon within which state coercion appears
narrative forms of progressive history in which either necessary and justified.
dyadic conflict is overcome through more encompassing The operation of state power takes place within an
and inclusive liberal frameworks, or else in which the ontological horizon saturated by power that precedes and
conceit of progress itself becomes the defining issue in the exceeds state power. As a result, we cannot take account
battle to defend liberalism. In the first case, we develop of power if we always place the state at the center of its
more inclusive frameworks to solve the antagonism; in the operation. The state draws upon non-statist operations
second, we claim that the secular and progressive alternative of power and cannot function without a reserve of power
is the sine qua non ofliberal democracy and declare effective that it has not itself organized. Further-and this is not
war on any effort to rethink or challenge the necessity, particularly new-the state both produces and presupposes
sufficiency, and ultimate value of that alternative. The certain operations of power that work primarily through
first characterizes dialectical, pragmatist, and progressive establishing a set of "ontological givens." Among those
notions of history; the second makes the "progressive" givens are precisely notions of subject, culture, identity,
into one pole of a conflict and casts as threats to liberalism and religion whose versions remain uncontested and
all non-secular and counter-progressivist vocabularies, incontestable within particular normative frameworks.
including all efforts to develop alternative vocabularies for So when we speak about "frameworks" in this respect,
thinking about emergent subjects and effective languages, we are not simply talking about theoretical perspectives
media, and idioms for political enfranchisement. that we bring to the analysis of politics, but about modes
I certainly do not imagine a "seamless" alliance between of intelligibility that further the workings of the state and,
religious and sexual minorities. There are existing alliances, as such, are themselves exercises of power even as they
and it makes sense to ask how they are formed. It also exceed the specific domain of state power.
makes sense to assume that they will contain within them Perhaps the most salient site where an "impasse"
certain fractures, failures, and continuing antagonisms. By emerges is not between the minority sexual subject and
saying "contain within them," I do not mean to suggest the minority religious subject, but between a normative
that the alliance sutures or resolves such antagonisms. On framework that requires and produces such subjects in
the contrary, with Laclau and Mouffe, I would continue mutual conflict and a critical perspective that questions
to argue that antagonism keeps the alliance open and whether and how such subjects exist outside-or in various
suspends the idea of reconciliation as a goal. What might relations to-that presumptive antagonism. This would
 NON-THINKING AND THE NORMATIVE 151
150 FRAMES OF WAR

imply a consideration of how that framework depends rework our conceptions of what normativity is, and in that
upon and induces a refusal to understand the complexity way he makes a distinct contribution to normative theory.
of the historical emergence of religious/sexual populations Asad makes very clear that he is attempting to provide an
and subject formations that cannot be reduced to either understanding of"suicide bombing" as it is constructed and
identity form. On the one hand, it is possible to say that such elaborated within "Western public discourse." He remarks
reductions, however falsifying, are necessary because they that he is not in the business of elaborating moral judgment,
make possible normative judgments within an established even though he insists, in a repeated and significant aside,
and knowable framework. The desire for epistemological that he does not approve of suicide bombing tactics. 9 He
certainty and certain judgment thus produces a set of wants, however, for the purposes of his analysis, to set aside
ontological commitments that may or may not be true, that kind of judgment in order to ask and to pursue other
but which are deemed necessary in order to hold firm to kinds of questions. In a similar vein, he is not interested in
existing epistemological and ethical norms. On the other reconstructing the motivations of suicide bombers, though
hand, the practice of critique, as well as the practice of I have no doubt he would agree that such a study might
providing a more adequate historical understanding, focus furnish interesting results. Given that he is restricting
on the violence effected by the normative framework itself, himself to the analysis of what, perhaps over-broadly, he
thus offering an alternative account of normativity based terms "Western" public discourse on suicide bombing,
less on ready judgment than on the sorts of comparative how are we to understand this self-restriction? Are we
evaluative conclusions that can be reached through the to take him at his word when he tells us that normative
practice of critical understanding. Indeed, how do we judgments are not at work in the "understanding" of the
reapproach the politics of judgment and evaluation once phenomenon that he seeks to provide? Over and against
we begin to think critically and comparatively about Asad's explicit claims, I want to reintroduce some of the
competing schemes of evaluation? normative questions that are set aside in his book. But I
In order to broach this last question, I want to return do this not to prove the book wrong or misguided, only to
to Talal Asad's recent book, On Suicide Bombing, which suggest that there is a stronger normative position here-a
I considered briefly in Chapter 1. 8 This may seem like a more consequential exploration of normativity-than its
surprising move since Asad makes it clear that his own author explicitly allows.
work is "not an argument" but, rather, an attempt at My question, then: can we find a way of rethinking the
"understanding"-he explicitly refuses to decide on the terms of normativity by virtue of the kind of account Asad
matter of what kind of violence is justified and what is not. gives? At first one might feel justified, if not righteous, in
At first glance, Asad would seem to offer a point of view demanding that Asad make more clear where he stands:
that directly conflicts with those who would maintain the can he offer an analysis of suicide bombing that does
necessity of moral judgment even when, or precisely when, not ultimately lead to a conclusion about whether it is
they maintain ignorance of the cultural practices they a justified form of violence? If we pose this question too
judge. Asad argues in favor of understanding. He does quickly, we may well miss the chance to understand what
so, I want to suggest, precisely in order to destabilize and he is trying to tell us about the question itself. To be clear:

8 Asad, On Suicide Bombing. 9 Ibid., 4.

 152 FRAMES OF WAR NON-THINKING AND THE NORMATIVE 153

he is offering no justification for suicide bombings, and circumscribing in advance the domain in which it makes
neither is he dwelling on the normative arguments against sense to debate justifications at all. Walzer's point is not
them. He is, I want to suggest, standing to the side of that some forms of violence are justified and others not
the "for and against" arguments in order to change the (although this is a point he will also make), but that we can
framework in which we think about these kinds of events only rightly debate whether or not certain forms of violence
or, rather, to understand how such phenomena are seized are justified if we restrict ourselves to those kinds of violence
upon by certain moral and cultural frameworks and he has already delimited: state violence for the purposes of
instrumentalized for the purposes of strengthening the ·' just wars; that is, the defense of the "community," when
hold of those frameworks on our thinking. In the preface the community in question is recognizable according to
to the Japanese edition of On Suicide Bombing, Asad writes: established and familiar norms of recognition. Apparently,
there are other forms of violence that are not worth
I examine the arguments that try to distinguish the terror debating, and for which we are not expected to supply
of modem warfare from the terror inflicted by militants, reasons for their justification.
arguments whose main thrust is to claim a moral superiority What Walzer calls "terrorism" is one such instance,
for 'just' war and to describe the acts of terrorists-and and he warns against any efforts to explain or justify this
especially the suicide bombers-as uniquely evil. My phenomenon. 12 As we know, "terrorist" can apply variously
argument is that the fundamental difference is merely and wildly to both insurgency and counter-insurgency
one of scale, and that by this criterion the state-directed groups, to state and non-state sponsored violence, to those
destruction of civilians and the disruption of their normal who call for more fully democratic forms of government
life is far greater than anything terrorists can do. 10 in the Middle East, and even to those who criticize the
repressive measures of the US government. Given this
Another instance in which Asad distances himself from the semantic sliding, it seems all the more necessary to take
question of justification in order to open up the possibility the time to clarify what precise meaning the term is
of a different sort of evaluative claim occurs in his review meant to convey. Without knowing precisely what we
of Michael Walzer's position on just wars. 11 For Walzer, are speaking about, how are we to understand the strong
wars in defense of a community are justified when that normative judgments that follow with regard to the term
community is (a) threatened with elimination, or (b) "terrorism"? For Walzer, "terrorist violence" falls outside
subject to a coercive transformation ofits way oflife. Walzer the parameters of both justified and unjustified violence.
also reviews the reasons why states ought to go to war To distinguish between the latter we must consider
and explores a set of justificatory arguments for engaging
in violence. His enumeration of possible justifications 12 Note the resonance with Walzer's infamously anti-intellectual response
makes assumptions about what any justification might be, after 9/11, when he argued that we should make no room for those who seek
to understand the reasons for the attacks on the US. Calling those who would
offer such analyses "excuseniks," he cast a curious aspersion, likening those
10 Text cited courtesy ofTalal Asad. who might seek to understand the events with "refuseniks"-the dissidents who
11 Asad, On Suicide Bombing, 14-24. See also Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust opposed the censorious practices of the Soviet Union. The term is currently
Wars, New York: Basic Books, 1992; and Arguing About War, New Haven: Yale used to describe those young Israelis who refuse to be conscripted into the Israeli
University, 2004. The latter is the focus of Asad's extended critique. army on moral or political grounds.
 155
NON-THINKING AND THE NORMATIVE
154 FRAMES OF WAR
Asad's point is that the definitions at work circumscribe
whether the forms of violence in question conform to the
the means of justification. So, if state killing is justified
normative requirements Walzer has laid out, but so-called
by military necessity, then any and all sorts of state killing
"terrorist" violence, as he conceives it, falls outside of the
can be justified by this norm, including those that kill
purview of this debate. Since Walzer's scheme thus refuses
innocents, introduce fear into everyday life, violate private
to consider the reasons given for certain kinds of violence,
purposes, render public spaces insecure, and produce
especially when they are considered simply "evil," what he

'.
infinitely coercive precautionary measures. We can indeed
calls "terrorist violence" forms the constitutive outside for
think about the wars in Iraq and Mghanistan along with
those forms of violence that might reasonably be debated.
their domestic repercussions in all of these ways, as we can
The form of violence his scheme puts outside of reflection
and debate is patently unreasonable and non-debatable.
But for whom is this true? And what does this tell us about
also about most of the wars launched by the US and its
allies during the past decades.
In any event, this takes us back to the question of
•
the kinds of restricted normative vocabularies that form
whether there is a stronger normative dimension to
the uncritical precondition for Walzer's own reflections?
this kind of inquiry than its author explicitly allows. If
Asad points out that Walzer's condemnation of terrorism
Asad sets aside the question of whether or not a form
follows from his definition of it, and that that definition
of violence is justified, it is not because he has some
could easily prove to be too inclusive. Walzer writes that
particular sympathy for that violence, but because he is
the evil of terrorism consists "not only in the killing of
interested in showing us how the domain of justifiability
innocent people but also the intrusion offear into everyday
is preemptively circumscribed by the definition of the
life, the violation of private purposes, the insecurity of
form of violence at issue. In other words, we think of
public spaces, the endless coerciveness ofprecaution." 13 Is
definitions as purely heuristic and as preceding the
there any reason to think that all of these consequences do
matter of judging. We define the phenomenon so that
not also follow from state-sponsored wars? Asad focuses
we know what we are talking about, and then we submit
on the stipulative definition of terrorism in Walzer's
the phenomenon to judgment. Conventionally, the first
work in order to show how such definitions not only
task is descriptive, and the second is normative. But
carry normative force, but also effectively-and without
if the very definition of the phenomenon involves a
justification-make normative distinctions. Asad writes:
description of it as "evil," then the judgment is built into
the definition (we are, in fact, judging before knowing),
I am not interested here in the question, "When are
at which point the distinction between the descriptive
particular acts of violence to be condemned as evil, and
and the normative becomes confused. Moreover,
what are the moral limits to justified counter-violence." I
we have to ask whether the definition is right, since
am trying to think instead about the following question:
it may well consist of a conceptual elaboration of the
"What does the adoption of particular definitions of
phenomenon that takes place without any descriptive
death dealing do to military conduct in the world?" 14
reference. Indeed, it may well be that definition has
been substituted for description, and that both are,
in fact, judgments-at which point judgment, and the
13 Asad, On Suicide Bombing, 16.
normative, have preempted the descriptive altogether.
14 Ibid., 20.
 NON-THINKING AND THE NORMATIVE 157
156 FRAMES OF WAR

We judge a world we refuse to know, and our judgment analysis is not that there ought to be no conclusions, but
becomes one means of refusing to know that world. only that our conclusions need to be based upon a field of
The point is not to insist upon a neutral description of the description and understanding that is both comparative
phenomenon, but rather to consider how a phenomenon and critical in character.
like "terrorism" becomes defined in ways that are vague It may be that Asad opens up some questions for us when,
and overly inclusive. Most importantly, though, if we were for instance, he asks about the ways in which "terrorism" is
to try to take stock of the different forms of violence that defined, but if one looks closely at the questions he poses,
emerge within contemporary life, how might our normative .. , it turns out that they make sense only on condition that
distinctions be altered, and how would we compare and reference is made to a horizon of comparative judgment.
contrast these forms of violence? Would they be as distinct
as Walzer claims they are? And if they were not so distinct,
what would follow? Would we have to devise new criteria
So, although Asad himself claims that his book "makes
no case for accepting some kinds of cruelty as opposed
to others," but seeks merely to "disturb" the reader and
produce some critical distance from a "complacent public
•
I
and new forms of judgment? And which vocabulary-or
set of vocabularies-would have to be available for those
new judgments to emerge?
15
discourse," much more is actually at stake. I assume
that we are not being asked simply to stay in a state of
•
If we begin with the assumption that justified violence "disturbance" and "distance" from ready-made moral
will be undertaken by certain kinds of states (those reactions. To take distance from the "ready-made" is
generally regarded as embodying principles of liberal precisely a critical activity.
democracy) or certain kinds of communities (those where Further, when Asad asks how we are to conceive of
the population's cultural and material life is already valued death-dealing at this time, and whether state-sponsored
and explicitly represented by liberal democracies), then wars disrupt everyday life any more or less than do
we have already built a certain political demographics into "terrorist" acts, he effectively points out that once we
the definition of what might qualify as justified violence. are able to think comparatively about these forms of
In other words, concrete assumptions will already have violence-which means understanding them as part of a
been made about the kinds of populations whose lives- contemporary spectrum of death-dealing-we will see that
and modes of life-are worth defending by military the disruptions and invasions caused by state violence far
means. If, however, we open up those very demographic exceed those caused by acts falling under the category of
distinctions to critical analysis, then we have to ask how it "terrorist." If this is the case, and if we can only arrive
is that our conception of violence, in both its justified and at this comparative judgment through an understanding
unjustified forms, has built into it certain pre-conceptions of scale, then part of the critical project of Asad's work
about what culture ought to be, about how community is precisely to make this scale of violence available for
is to be understood, about how the state is formed, and subsequent judgments-something that cannot be done
about who might count as a recognizable subject. Here when, prior to any comparative analysis, we ratify certain
we can see that some of the very terms through which epistemic commitments that bias our understanding of
contemporary global conflicts are conceptualized dispose "state violence" as a precondition for justifiable violence.
us in advance towards certain kinds of moral responses
and normative conclusions. What follows from this 15 Ibid., 5.
 158 FRAMES OF WAR NON-THINKING AND THE NORMATIVE 159

If Asad's analysis shows us that state violence can and does inversions of discourse take place, in order, finally, to make
produce all the "evil" consequences that Walzer attributes better judgments.
to "terrorism"-and if, further, we understand those In concluding his book Asad poses again the question
consequences to be truly lamentable and unjust-then it with which he began: "why do people in the West react
follows that any condemnation of violence will logically to verbal and visual representations of suicide bombing
extend to forms of state violence that produce those same with professions of horror?" 16 In asking the question,
consequences. he is assuming that powerful affective responses are
Asad's argument is presented as an attempt to reveal the .. , conditioned and structured by interpretations, and that
self-contradiction or hypocrisy inherent in positions such these interpretations are formed within taken-for-granted

•
as Walzer's, but I would argue that Asad's own position frameworks, largely Western and liberal. These interpretive
derives its rhetorical force from a political opposition to structures remain inchoate when we take "moral affect"-
forms of violence that intrude on everyday life, deracinate
infrastructures, produce unacceptable levels of fear, and
including horror and indignation-to be so many emotive
emanations of the universal human that supposedly I
involve relentless coercion. It is only on the condition that we
do, in fact, oppose such forms of violence that we can come
resides in us all. The fact is that "horror" and "outrage"
are differentially distributed, and what is worth noting-
•
to understand the normative importance of the comparative with surprise and a different register of horror-is how
judgment Asad's work makes available to us. I would this differential distribution remains so often unremarked
suggest, then, that it is not the case that Asad's work merely and unmarked. The point is not to dispute the nascent
opens up new avenues for description or understanding intelligence of "horror" as an affective response, but only
while eschewing the hard work of moral judgment. On to ask about those occasions in which horror becomes
the contrary, by exposing the ways in which normative the predominant reaction in contrast with those other
dispositions enter into stipulative claims that circumscribe encounters with violence in which horror is clearly and
the domain of "understanding," As ad provides us with the emphatically absent. 17 What are the social conditions
tools to develop a critique of this parochial circumscription, and abiding interpretative frameworks that make horror
and offers a new framework by which to make comparative possible in the face of certain kinds of violence, and
judgments, leading us to the conclusion that there is no when and where is it "ruled out" as an available affective
reason to assume that justified violence is the sole prerogative response in the face of other kinds?
of states while unjustified violence is exercised only by Asad offers a complex argument about the liberal
illegitimate states and insurgency movements. To refer constituents of identity, suggesting that suicide bombing
to the violence committed by an "insurgency" is already strikes at what holds the liberal subject together, asking
to invoke another framework, even though it does not by whether "suicide terrorism (like a suicidal nuclear strike)
itself resolve the question of whether or not that violence belongs in this sense to liberalism?" One of "the tensions
is justified. For the US, yesterday's "terrorists" have a way
of becoming tomorrow's "freedom fighters," and vice versa 16 Ibid., 65.
(nota bene: Nicaragua, Mghanistan). The point is not to 17 For an interesting account of contemporary horror, see Adriana Cavarero,
conclude that cynicism is the only option, but to consider Horrorism: Naming Contemporary Violence, New York: Columbia University
more closely the conditions and terms under which such Press, 2008.
160 FRAMES OF WAR NON-THINKING AND THE NORMATIVE 161

that hold modem subjectivity together" involves two about these issues; for example, that there are "subjects,"
apparently opposite values: "reverence for human life Muslim or homosexual, who stand in positions of moral
and its legitimate destruction." Under what conditions opposition to one another; that they represent different
does that reverence become primary? And under what "cultures" or different "times in historical development,"
conditions is that reverence abrogated through recourse or fail to conform to established notions of "culture" or
to precepts of just wars and legitimate violence? Asad intelligible conceptions of "time," as the case may be.
remarks, "Liberalism, of course, disapproves of the violent One response to this framework is to insist that there are
exercise of freedom outside the frame of law. But the .. , different constructions of the subject at work, and that
law is founded by and continuously depends on coercive most versions of multiculturalism err when they assume
violence." This paradoxical founding of political liberalism
makes itself known in the "tensions that hold modem
subjectivity" in what Asad calls "the West. " 18
that they know in advance what the form of the subject
must be. The multiculturalism that requires a certain kind
of subject actually institutes that conceptual requirement
•I
In fact, these tensions expose the rifts in modem as part of its description and diagnosis. What formations of
subjectivity, but what is particularly modem is the
vacillation between these two principles that are split off
subjectivity, what configurations of life-worlds, are effaced
or occluded by such a mandatory move?
•
from one another, forming something like a dissociative Sociologists such as Chetan Bhatt draw attention to the
disorder at the level of political subjectivity. Paradoxically, complex and dynamic character of new global subject-
what holds the subject together for Asad is the capacity to formations, which would include the crossing of gay and
shift suddenly from one principle (reverence for life) to Muslim identities, the production of alliances among the
another (legitimate destruction of life) without ever taking legally disenfranchised, and the migratory constitution
stock of the reasons for such a shift and for the implicit of dynamic subject positions that do not reduce to single
interpretations that condition these distinct responses. identities. Bhatt's conceptualization attempts to produce
One reason we want to know about such apparently an alternative vocabulary for thinking about the subject;
inexplicable shifts is that they appear to form the moral in a sense, Asad addresses this problem from the opposite
groundwork for an acceptable political subjectivity, which direction. Taking as his point of departure the political
is to say that an unreasoned schism functions at the basis subject instituted through liberalism, Asad shows how
of this contemporary political rationality. its moral responses and evaluative schemes are culturally
I would like to suggest that what Asad offers us is a specific and politically consequential precisely at that
critique of a certain kind of liberal subject that makes moment when its parochialism passes itself off as universal
that very subject into a political problem to be explicitly reason. Taken together, these positions offer at least two
addressed. We can take this subject as the ground of good reasons not to treat a specific form of the subject,
politics only if we agree not to think well or carefully about or the reduction of the subject to identity, as a taken-
the conditions of its formation, its moral responses, and for-granted feature of normative frameworks: the risk of
its evaluative claims. Let us recall the kind of fundamental anachronism and the risk of mandating parochialism as
claims that are made in the course of "normative" debate universality. Such arguments do not destroy the basis
of normative reasoning, but they do raise normative
18 Ibid., 65. questions about how that form of reasoning has been
 162 FRAMES OF WAR NON-THINKING AND THE NORMATIVE 163

preemptively circumscribed. It is important to argue that we confront a certain rift or schism that recurs at the heart
there are normative reasons for opposing this move on of contemporary politics. If certain lives are deemed worth
the part of prevalent normative frameworks. The point, living, protecting, and grieving and others not, then this way
again, is not to dispense with normativity, but to insist of differentiating lives cannot be understood as a problem
that normative inquiry take on a critical and comparative of identity or even of the subject. It is rather a question
form so that it does not unwittingly reproduce the internal of how power forms the field in which subjects become
schisms and blind spots inherent to those versions of the possible at all or, rather, how they become impossible.
.. ,
subject. These internal schisms become the unjustifiable And this involves a critical practice of thinking that refuses
ground (actually, the failure of any ground) for the unjust to take for granted that framework of identitarian struggle
judgment that certain lives are worth saving and others which assumes that subjects already exist, that they occupy
worth killing. In this sense, it is under the aegis of equality a common public space, and that their differences might
and toward a greater egalitarianism that Asad's criticism be reconciled if only we had the right tools for bringing
takes place. them together. The matter is, in my view, more dire and
My last point is that coalition itself requires a rethinking requires a kind of analysis capable of calling into question
of the subject as a dynamic set of social relations. Mobilizing the framework that silences the question of who counts as
alliances do not necessarily form between established and a "who"-in other words, the forcible action of the norm
recognizable subjects, and neither do they depend on on circumscribing a grievable life.
the brokering of identitarian claims. Instead, they may
well be instigated by criticisms of arbitrary violence, the
circumscription of the public sphere, the differential of
powers enacted through prevalent notions of "culture,"
and the instrumentalization of rights claims for resisting
coercion and enfranchisement. Whether we expand our
existing frameworks or allow them to be interrupted by
new vocabularies will determine, in part, how well we
consult both the past and the future for our present-day
critical practices.
If we take for granted the theoretical field of
multiculturalism that assumes distinct subjects with
opposing points of view, then the solution to the problem
is one in which we find domains of compatibility or
incompatibility. We expand our notions of rights to include
everyone, or we work to construct more robust notions
of recognition that will allow for some kind of reciprocal
relationship and future harmony. But that very theoretical
field is based on a set of foreclosures (and here I use the
term outside of its regular Lacanian meaning). As a result,