Report of the

Comptroller and Auditor General of India

on
Implementation of Phase-III
Delhi Mass Rapid Transit System by DMRC

Union Government
Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs
No. 11 of 2021
(Performance Audit)

Laid on the table of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha on ………………….

 Index
Particulars Page No.

Preface i

Executive Summary iii-xi

Chapter 1 Introduction 1-8

Chapter 2 Policy, Planning and Selection of Technology 9-58

Chapter 3 Contract and Project Management 59-84

Chapter 4 Project Monitoring 85-95

Chapter 5 Operation & Maintenance and Revenue Management 97-114

Chapter 6 Conclusion 115-116

Annexure I to XI 117-131
 PREFACE

The Performance Audit Report on ‘Implementation of Phase-III

Delhi Mass Rapid Transit System’ by DMRC has been prepared
under the provisions of Section 19-A of the Comptroller and
Auditor General’s (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act,
1971 for submission to the Governments. The Audit has been
carried out in line with the Regulations on Audit and Accounts, 2007
(revised in August 2020) and Performance Audit Guidelines, 2014
of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India.
The Audit covered the period from 2011-12 to 2019-20. This report
examines planning, implementation, monitoring and operations &
maintenance of corridors and outcome of the activities of Phase III
project for the period April 2011 to March 2020.
Audit wishes to acknowledge the assistance provided by the
Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) and co-operation extended by the
officers and staff of DMRC, Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs
and Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi for this
Performance Audit.

i
 Executive Summary
Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Limited (DMRC) is a joint venture with equal equity (50:50)
contribution from Government of India (GoI) and Government of National Capital Territory of
Delhi (GNCTD). Delhi Mass Rapid Transit System Project Phase-I covering 65 km was
conceptualised (September 1996) and completed (November 2006) by DMRC. This was
followed by Phase-II (124.93 km during 2006-2011), Phase-III (160.75 km during 2011-2019)
and Phase-IV covering 103.93 km which is under implementation and scheduled to be
completed by December 2024. The Performance Audit of Phase-I was taken up in March 2007
and completed in July 2008. Compliance Audit of Airport Metro Express Line was taken up
under Phase-II and included in Report No 13 of 2013. Performance Audit of Delhi Mass Rapid
Transit System Phase-III was taken up to assess implementation of the project in terms of
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness due to public interest in the project, growing transport
requirement of Delhi, substantial cost involved, and delay in completion of the project.
The objectives of the Performance Audit were to examine whether (i) effective planning was
done to ensure economic viability and selection of the most appropriate technologies;
(ii) implementation in terms of project execution and contract management was done with due
care, economy, and in a timely and transparent manner; and (iii) an adequate mechanism was
in existence to monitor the project to ensure timely completion and conformity of works
executed with laid down specifications, and (iv) the operation and maintenance were efficient,
and the planned benefits were achieved after commercial operation of Phase-III.
The Performance Audit covered the 13 corridors1 and outcome of the activities of Phase-III
project for the period since inception (April 2011) to March 2020. A total of 93 (four more
contracts added during audit) out of 259 contracts valued above ₹5 crore relating to civil, rolling
stock, track, electrical, signalling & telecom, property development and operation &
maintenance were covered during the audit. The coverage in terms of number of contracts was
36 per cent. In terms of monetary value, the audit coverage was ₹25,616 crore out of sanctioned
cost of ₹48,565.12 crore which amounts to 53 per cent. The Indian Institute of Technology,
Delhi (IIT Delhi) provided technical consultancy during review of the technical aspects of the
Phase-III project.
A summary of the main audit findings is given below:
Policy, Planning and Selection of Technology
• National Urban Transport Policy 2006, stipulated that GoI contribution shall not exceed
20 per cent of the capital cost of the project (including equity, subordinate debt and grant
etc.) excluding the cost of land and Rehabilitation and Resettlement. The funding pattern
of Dwarka-Najafgarh, Mundka-Bahadurgarh and Badarpur-Faridabad extensions
envisaged GoI contribution of more than 20 per cent leading to additional contribution of
₹421.34 crore by GoI.
(Para 2.1.1)

1
Jahangir Puri to Badli (Line–2 Extension), Mukundpur (Majlis Park) to Yamuna Vihar (Line-7) , Janak Puri West to Kalindi Kunj
(Line–8), Badarpur-Faridabad Extension (Line-6), Maujpur to Shiv Vihar (Line-7 Extension), Kalindi Kunj-Botanical Garden
(Line–8 Extension), Dwarka–Najafgarh, Mundka–Bahadurgarh, Escorts Mujesar (Faridabad)–Ballabhgarh, Najafgarh to Dhansa
Bus Stand extension, Noida City Centre–Noida Sector -62, Central Secretariat-Kashmiri Gate and Dilshad Garden–New Bus Adda,
Ghaziabad

iii
• There was no minimum Financial Internal Rate of Return criteria for approval of a metro
corridor before 2013. This resulted in sanctioning of two corridors (Badarpur-Faridabad
and Shiv Vihar extension) with negative Financial Internal Rate of Return. After Ministry
of Housing and Urban Affairs instructions (August 2013), for minimum eight per cent
Financial Internal Rate of Return, Detailed Project Report of (i) Dilshad Garden to
Ghaziabad, New Bus Adda, (ii) Noida City Centre to Noida Sector-62, (iii) Kalindi Kunj
to Botanical Garden, (iv) YMCA Chowk to Ballabhgarh corridors were revised (up to
October/ December 2014) to make them viable and higher Financial Internal Rate of
Return of 12.23 per cent, 8.63 per cent, 9.85 per cent and 11.01 per cent were computed
as against the earlier 4.02 per cent, 2.03 per cent, 1.11 per cent and 4.50 per cent,
respectively. Increased Fare Box Revenue ranging from 111 per cent to 175 per cent has
been considered to attain the Financial Internal Rate of Return of eight per cent or more
for sanctioning the projects.
(Para 2.1.2)
• DMRC did not have any protocol for scientifically estimating the cost of an upcoming
project. They also did not have any approved policy for selection of type of corridor i.e.,
elevated, at grade or underground; policy for providing interchange between two stations
and mode of interchange facility.
(Para 2.1.3)
• Gross infirmities and adoption of different assumptions in formulation of Detailed Project
Report were noticed. Chapter on Comprehensive Mobility Plan highlighting developing
an integrated plan was not included in the DPR. Guidelines/ instruction/ standard
operating procedures were not formulated by DMRC for preparation of the Detailed
Project Reports. No cost and benefit analysis was conducted for adopted Technologies.
(Para [Link])
• Detailed Project Reports were inadequate and lacked specific information on the project.
There was no information on tunnel details, cut and cover method, tunnelling methods,
support system, lining, excavation methods etc. Detailed Project Reports also did not
mention about any quick and cost-effective geophysical methods to get the strata condition
depth wise along the alignment.
(Para [Link])
• Memorandum of Understanding was not signed among GoI, GNCTD and DMRC although
it was required as per condition of sanction letter of Phase-III Delhi Mass Rapid Transit
System project to ensure effective implementation of the project and conditions of
sanction.
(Para 2.2.1)
• Government of India sanction letter for Shiv Vihar extension required that a Memorandum
of Understanding be signed between DMRC and Government of Uttar Pradesh, as some
portion of this extension was passing through territory of Uttar Pradesh and required partial

iv
 funding by Government of Uttar Pradesh. DMRC utilised ₹63.27 crore from their own
funds for construction of the Uttar Pradesh portion. Since the Memorandum of
Understanding is not in place, Government of Uttar Pradesh has not released the funds,
although construction work has been completed by DMRC and the corridor is operational.
(Para 2.2.2)
• As per the Detailed Project Report, Dwarka-Najafgarh metro corridor was not financially
viable with assessed negative cash flow of ₹5,178 crore during the horizon period of 33
years. A requirement of 4.03 hectare of land at Najafgarh station for Property Development
was, therefore, included in the Detailed Project Report to make the corridor viable. The
metro corridor was completed in October 2019, but DMRC had not ensured availability of
land for Property Development till December 2020 although Property Development from
the land was the only way to make this corridor viable. This section was further extended
to Dhansa Bus Stand.
{Para 2.2.3(i) and 2.2.3(iii)}
• Since the metro corridor of Mundka-Bahadurgarh was not financially viable, 4 hectare
land with ‘residential’ land use for Property Development at Ghevra (Delhi) and 1.56
hectare in Haryana was envisaged in Detailed Project Report to make it viable. Metro
corridor has been completed in June 2018, but as on December 2020, 4 hectare land in
Delhi portion has not been acquired by DMRC for Property Development. Further, out of
1.56 hectare land for Property Development in Haryana portion, only 0.8 hectare space is
available, which also remained unutilised as of March 2020.
(Para 2.2.3(ii))
• The Board of Directors of DMRC approved (February 2011) the Detailed Project Report
of Phase-III with nine car operation on new standalone corridors of Phase-III i.e. Line-7
and Line-8. However, DMRC decided (27 May 2011) to change the plan of running nine
cars to six cars on Line-7 and Line-8 due to reduction in the train’s headway under
Communication Based Train Control system. The decision of nine cars to six cars train
operations was taken without any cost benefit analysis. This eliminated the possibility and
scope for further increase in cars in a rake to cater to increase in ridership in future.
(Para 2.2.5)
• DMRC awarded RS-11 and RS-13 contracts at the same time but the clauses of Heating
Ventilation and Air-Conditioning, Coefficient of Performance in the two contract
agreements were different. This resulted in additional payment of ₹3.24 crore for lower
Heating Ventilation and Air-Conditioning, Coefficient of Performance (i.e., 2.3) in RS-11
contract as compared to 2.5 in RS-13 contract.
(Para [Link])
• After approval of Phase-III project by DMRC, GNCTD and GoI, DMRC decided to adopt
Unattended Train Operation/ driverless technology on all new lines of Phase-III i.e.
Line-7, Line-8 and Line-9 without preparedness and cost-benefit analysis.
(Para [Link])

v
• Quality issues of rails and wheels of rolling stock were noticed. Comparison of hardness
as specified in contracts and actuals were different. There was higher vibration and noise
level in the trains and stations. Lubricant waste on the track, and maintenance issues were
also noticed.
(Para [Link])
• With the same specifications for train control and signalling system and common
Pre-Qualification tender, DMRC awarded two separate tenders for Line-7 and Line-8. Due
to deficiency in tender evaluation of not comparing the per km cost, DMRC incurred an
avoidable expenditure of ₹23.97 crore.
(Para 2.4.1)
• Communication Based Train Control system had the deficiency of reduced reliability due
to wireless connections of access points, excess values of mean time between hazardous
events, mean time to repair and mean time between failures and vulnerability to
interference and jamming in Communication Based Train Control system.
(Para 2.4.2(ii))
• The capacity and design of the Traction Transformer on Line-7 and Line-8 was planned for
nine car and 90 seconds headway operation, however, DMRC decided to have six car
operations on Line-7 and Line-8. DMRC procured Traction Transformer and Auxiliary
Main Transformer of higher size and location of Receiving Substation was predefined
rather than the optimal placement.
(Para 2.5)
• DMRC did not carry out any detailed study on installation of Platform Screen Doors during
Phase III. Resultantly, DMRC did not consider full height Platform Screen Doors which
would have ensured not only improved climate control within the station but also energy
saving.
(Para 2.6.1)
With reference to Audit findings on Policy, Planning and Selection of Technology, Audit
recommends that:
1. DMRC should ensure at the project planning stage itself that Detailed Project Reports
are prepared with realistic assumptions for computation of Financial Internal Rate of
Return to ensure economic viability of the corridor.
2. DMRC may formulate a policy for selection of type of corridor, interchange between
two stations, and mode of interchange facility, which would benefit future Mass Rapid
Transit System projects in the country. Also, the policy document may clearly define the
circumstances under which deviations from the stated policies are allowed.
3. DMRC may consider preparing Guidelines/ Standard operating Procedures for
formulation of the Detailed Project Reports for future metro rail projects/ expansion.
The revised Detailed Project Reports may be approved by the Board of Directors before
submission to Government of India and Government of National Capital Territory of
Delhi.

vi
4. A Guideline/ criteria for selection of mode of transport for different scenarios like Light
Metro, Bus Rapid Transit system based on viability and alternative analysis may be
formulated.
5. DMRC should ensure timely availability of land for Property Development which is of
paramount importance to make the project financially viable.
6. DMRC may consider optimising the sizing of Traction Transformers in Receiving Sub
Stations instead of putting transformers of uniform capacity across all Receiving
Substation on a Line.
7. DMRC may consider full height Platform Screen Doors including evaluation of its
effect on Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning requirements in the under-ground
station design studies.

Contract and Project Management

• DMRC prepared cost estimates of CC-26 R on the basis of awarded rates of civil contracts
awarded in the year 2006 by adding @ 5 per cent p.a. escalation (i.e. 34 per cent) to obtain
the estimated rate as on February 2012 instead of taking completed rates having actual
escalation (i.e. 11.02 per cent). This has resulted in higher cost estimation by 23 per cent.
There is no practice of preparing a justified cost estimate to know the reasonable cost to
execute the given project.
(Para 3.1.1 and 3.1.2)
• DMRC released special advance of ₹555.69 crore to 13 civil contractors beyond
contractual provisions. There were two instances where outstanding advances availed by
the contractor was more than balance work to be executed.
(Para 3.3)
• Social Impact Assessment study and Detailed Project Report of Phase-III was silent on
relocation of Project Affected Persons of Trilokpuri. During the execution, DMRC
frequently changed the relocation site thereby delaying the completion of Mayur Vihar
Pocket-I to Trilokpuri section. This further led to delay in awarding of revenue contracts,
cost escalation of the balance work, and under-utilisation of Rolling Stock and depot
facilities.
(Para 3.5)
• DMRC envisaged at grade metro station at Majlis Park (earlier Mukundpur) without
ensuring land availability from Delhi Police. Resultantly, DMRC had to construct elevated
Majlis Park station after incurring extra expenditure of ₹72.73 crore without exploring the
possibility of construction at grade station on the vacant PWD land available under the
existing elevated alignment, which could have saved ₹39.01 crore to DMRC.
(Para 3.6)
• DMRC on the request of Delhi International Airport Limited extended passenger subway
from Terminal 1C to Terminal 1D and to the new terminal building with its own fund.

vii
 DMRC did not recover ₹40 crore from Delhi International Airport Limited for this
connectivity.
(Para 3.7)
• DMRC appointed General Consultant on nomination basis in violation of Detailed Project
Report recommendations. Further, DMRC constructed Sadar Bazar cantonment and
Shankar Vihar stations without the approval of GoI and GNCTD and the flawed design of
Hauz Khas interchange station resulted in inconvenience to the commuters.
(Paras 3.2, 3.8 and 3.13)
• Environmental clearance was not obtained by DMRC for the Phase-III project even though
it had constructed four car maintenance depots2 each having built up area of more than
20,000 sqm. DMRC did not conduct water audit though it was required under the National
Water Policy, 2012 and DMRC Water Policy. No details and records were maintained
either by DMRC or by the contractors for water extracted, consumed or loss of water
during Phase-III.
(Para 3.15)

• There were discrepancies in tree cutting estimation in Detailed Project Report and
Environment Impact Assessment study, and estimation of cost of compensatory plantation.
There was no monitoring of compensatory afforestation locations and disposal of wood as
per permit letters. DMRC deposited an excess amount of ₹14.20 crore in advance with
Forest Department, GNCTD as the number of trees cut was less than the permission
granted.
(Para 3.16)
With reference to Audit findings on Contract and Project Management, Audit
recommends that:

8. DMRC may ascertain cost estimates of projects on the basis of scientific method;
establish a cell to study the cost aspects of various contracts and may consider
formulating a schedule of rates like Delhi Schedule of Rates for metro projects.
9. DMRC may formulate a policy on grant of special advances to the contractors.
10. DMRC should ensure efficient planning and timely completion of rehabilitation and
resettlement activities for smooth completion of project.
11. DMRC may ensure adherence to relevant environmental requirements of obtaining
environmental clearance, carry out water audit, maintain records for water
consumption and prepare Water Management Plans for future projects.

2
Mukundpur (45,686 sqm), Kalindi Kunj (29,310 sqm), Vinod Nagar (32,104 sqm) and Badli (46,063 sqm)

viii
Project Monitoring
• DMRC failed to complete the corridors within stipulated time-period due to various
impediments like delay in land acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement activities,
slow progress of work by contractors etc., resulting in foregoing of Fare Box and Non Fare
Box Revenue. Besides, the Board Sub Committee on Project Management did not meet
at regular intervals to monitor the progress of work and suggest measures to expedite the
projects.
(Paras 4.1.2 and 4.1.3)
• Absence of a proper formwork3 system of civil structure at Hauz Khas and other metro
stations were noticed. Non-optimisation of quantities of construction materials, lack of
uniform project Quality Management Plan were also noticed.
(Paras 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3 and 4.2.4)
• DMRC had Building Management System for controlling and monitoring the building's
mechanical and electrical equipment such as Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning,
lighting, power systems, fire systems, and security systems. But, in the absence of real
time performance monitoring, Building Management System is of not much value. No
record was maintained on the actual fresh air being introduced or the CO2 levels
maintained inside the coaches and the energy consumption of the air-conditioning unit.
(Paras 4.2.5 and 4.2.8)
• The method of duct designing was based on equal friction instead of better optimisation
methods which can help in minimisation of space, material or operating cost savings. For
Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning load calculations, DMRC adopted outdated
carrier method in comparison to the well-established state of the art hourly load calculation
methods using software such as Hourly Analysis Programme, Trane etc.
(Para 4.2.7)

With reference to Audit findings on Project Monitoring, Audit recommends that:

12. DMRC may strengthen the monitoring mechanism by ensuring periodic review by
the below Board level Sub Committee on Project Management and follow up
thereon, to ensure timely completion of the projects.
13. DMRC may formulate a template for (i) Quality Management Plans and
(ii) specifications for the system of formwork.
14. DMRC may ensure optimal utilisation of Building Management System for better
monitoring of the ambient conditions at the metro stations to achieve anticipated
energy savings, and to render maximum comfort to the commuters.
15. DMRC may adopt latest method of load calculations for Heating Ventilation and
Air Conditioning for simulation and better estimations.

3
Formwork is the term used for the process of creating a temporary mould into which concrete is poured
and formed under civil construction

ix
16. DMRC may consider real time monitoring and data logging of parameters relating
to Rolling Stock Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning.
Operation & Maintenance and Revenue Management
• As per sanction letters, and instructions of GoI and GNCTD, DMRC had to ascertain line-
wise operation profit and loss, and in case of operational loss, if any, necessary claims are
to be made with the respective State Governments. While DMRC did not maintain line
wise operational loss/ profit statements till 2019-20, it decided (January 2021) to apportion
operating loss from 2020-21. However, it remained silent on recovery of past years’
operational loss, if any.
(Para 5.2.1)
• As against the projected ridership of 20.89 lakh in 2019-20 from initially sanctioned
Phase-III four corridors, the actual ridership in 2019-20 was 4.38 lakh only, which is
79.02 per cent, less than projected ridership. Similarly, in case of National Capital
Region/other extension, the actual ridership on these corridors were 15.12 per cent to
87.63 per cent lower than projected ridership. The total ridership of entire DMRC network
(Phase-I, Phase-II and Phase-III) in the year 2019-20 was estimated as 53.47 lakh. Against
this, the actual ridership of DMRC was 27.79 lakh (2019-20) i.e. 51.97 per cent of
projected ridership.
(Para 5.2.2)
• DMRC utilises only 174 buses, out of 400 buses (43.5 per cent) for providing last mile
connectivity to metro commuters. Due to shortage of buses, DMRC was operating buses
on only 32 out of 73 approved routes (44 per cent). Since January 2021, even these 174
Midi feeder CNG Non-AC buses are not operating on the 32 routes and the operators have
requested for termination of contracts.
(Para 5.2.3)
• While calculating operating ratio, which indicates operational efficiency, DMRC excluded
the depreciation & amortisation expenses and interest cost as part of the operating
expenses, thereby reducing the operating expenses. Thus, DMRC was suffering
operational loss instead of earning operating profit. Even without considering the
depreciation and interest expenses, there has been a consistent increase in the operating
cost ratio, from 48.99 per cent in 2011-12 to 80.55 per cent in 2019-20, which indicates
inefficient operational performance of DMRC.
(Para 5.2.4)
• DMRC did not keep the provision for additional land areas required for implementation of
complete Multi Modal Integration. Non-implementation of all the components of Multi
Modal Integration at metro stations resulted in denial of seamless interchange between
various modes of transport to the daily commuters, non-availability of safe pedestrian
crossing facilities near metro stations, absence of traffic calming measures, improved
access and last mile connectivity, safety, improved short term parking and drop off
facilities, Non- Motorised Vehicle lanes, bus shelters, public toilets etc.
(Para 5.2.5)

x
• As against consolidated targeted earning of ₹2,505 crore (from Phase-II & Phase-III) from
Property Development as per sanction letters issued by GoI, DMRC could generate only
₹657.13 crore (26.23 per cent) from Property Development till 31 March 2020.
(Para 5.3.1)
• DMRC constructed Property Development area of 44,751 sqm on Badarpur-Faridabad-
Ballabhgarh metro corridor at a cost of ₹151.49 crore, out of which 40,071 sqm area
remained idle as DMRC has not been able to lease them out till date.
(Para 5.3.2)
• For Phase-III and extensions, revenue from Property Business during 2016-17 to 2019-20
was estimated at ₹1,917.25 crore. DMRC generated only ₹76.06 crore during 2016-17 to
2019-20 from Property Business.
(Para 5.4.1)
With reference to Audit findings on Operation & Maintenance and Revenue
Management, Audit recommends that:
17. DMRC may prepare line-wise profit and loss account and claim operation losses, if
any, from respective State governments.
18. DMRC may also ensure last mile connectivity for augmentation of ridership through
various modes including planned feeder bus services.
19. DMRC may enhance its efforts to increase operating efficiency by reducing the
operating ratio and also estimate more realistic ridership for future DPRs.
20. DMRC may ensure implementation of a complete Multi Modal Integration (MMI) as
per extant guidelines with integrated planning of land use and various modes of
transport.
21. A structured and approved Property Development and Property Business manual may
be formulated for ensuring uniformity and consistent decision making. DMRC may
also consider preparing a road map to accomplish targeted Non-Fare Box Revenue on
the basis of combined experience of Phase-I, Phase-II & Phase-III.
22. There should be a member/expert with marketing skill in Board for efficient dealing
with Property Development and Property Business related activities.

xi
 CHAPTER-1
INTRODUCTION
 Report No. 11 of 2021

Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 About DMRC
Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Limited (DMRC) was registered on 03 May 1995 under
the Companies Act, 1956 for the implementation and subsequent operation of the metro
rail in Delhi. DMRC is a joint venture between the Government of India (GoI) and the
Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD) with 50:50 equity
participation. DMRC is under the administrative control of Ministry of Housing and
Urban Affairs (MoHUA), erstwhile Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD).
1.2 Organisation Set up
The Board of Directors of DMRC consists of 13 Directors as on 31 March 2020. The
Chairman of DMRC is the nominee of the GoI while the Managing Director is the
nominee of the GNCTD and the Chief Executive Officer of DMRC. The Managing
Director is assisted by seven functional Directors viz. Director (Project and Planning),
Director (Works), Director (Finance), Director (Operations), Director (Electrical),
Director (Rolling Stock) and Director (Business Development). The Board of Directors
of DMRC also has four GoI nominee non-executive Directors, besides four GNCTD
nominee non-executive Directors, whose post was vacant.
1.3 Need for Mass Rapid Transit System for Delhi
In view of the intra-city traffic volume in Delhi and the urgent need for a full-fledged
integrated multi modal mass rapid passenger system, Delhi Government entrusted the
task of conducting a feasibility study for an ‘Integrated Multi Modal Mass Rapid
System’ to RITES1 in 1990-1991. Accordingly, Phase-I of Delhi Metro was
conceptualised (September 1996) and completed (November 2006) with 65 km of
length. This was followed by Phase-II (124.93 km during 2006-2011), Phase-III
(160.75 km during 2011-2019) and Phase-IV covering 103.93 km, which is under
progress. The last Performance Audit of DMRC was conducted during 2007-2008 on
completion of Phase-I and Performance Audit Report No 17 of 2008 was placed before
the Parliament of India and the Legislative Assembly of Delhi. Under Phase-II of Mass
Rapid Transit System (MRTS) project, Audit of Airport Metro Express Line was
conducted in 2012-13 and reported in CAG’s Audit Report No 13 of 2013. As per the
Detailed Project Report (DPR) (1995) of Phase-I, the ridership was estimated as
31.85 lakh which was subsequently reduced to 22.60 lakh in 2003. As against this, the
actual ridership was 6.62 lakh in November 2007 which was 21 per cent of the original
projection and 29 per cent of the revised estimates. Under Phase-II, the estimated
ridership of Airport Line was 42,500 against which the actual ridership was 17,794 viz.,
42 per cent of the estimated ridership. The total ridership of entire DMRC network
(Phase-I, II and III) in the year 2019-20 was estimated as 53.47 lakh. Against this, the
actual ridership of DMRC was 27.79 lakh (2019-20) only i.e., 51.97 per cent of

1
RITES Limited erstwhile Rail India Technical & Economic Service

1
Report No. 11 of 2021

projected ridership. In case of Phase-III specifically, as against the projected ridership

of 18.56 lakh in 2016 (20.89 lakh in 2019-20) from initially sanctioned four corridors,
the actual ridership in 2019-20 was only 4.38 lakh, which is 79.02 per cent lower than
projected ridership as per DPR. Similarly, in case of NCR/ other extension, the actual
ridership on these corridors was 15.12 per cent to 87.63 per cent lower than projected
ridership as per DPRs as mentioned in table 1.1 below. In this Report, Audit reviewed
the performance of Delhi MRTS Phase-III.

Table 1.1
Details showing projected, actual ridership and shortfall in 2019-2020
(A) Initial Phase-III corridors
Sl. Name of the corridor Projected daily Actual daily Percentage
No. ridership as per ridership shortfall
DPR
1. Jahangir Puri-Badli 52,081 27,600 47.01
(Line-2 extension/ Red line)
2. Mukundpur (Majlis Park)- 11,44,467 1,76,876 84.55
Maujpur (Line-7/ Pink line)
3. Janak Puri West-Kalindi 6,50,188 1,71,262 73.66
Kunj (Line-8/ Magenta line)
4. Central Secretariat- 2,42,688 62,578 74.21
Kashmiri Gate
(Line-6 Extension/ Violet
line)
Total 20,89,424 4,38,316 79.02

(B) NCR/ other extensions

Sl. Name of corridor/ section Projected daily Actual daily Percentage
No. ridership as ridership shortfall
per DPR
1. Badarpur-Faridabad 2,98,080
(Line-6 Extension/Violet line) 60,648 82.10
2. Faridabad-Ballabhgarh (Line-6 40,793
Extension/ Violet line)
3. Mundka-Bahadurgarh (Line-5 1,27,776 22,968 82.02
Extension/Green line)
4. Dwarka-Najafgarh 97,070 12,012 87.63
(Line-9 Extension/ Grey line)
5. Dilshad Garden-New Bus 1,72,679 43,617 74.74
Adda (Ghaziabad)
(Line-1 Extension/ Red line)
6. Maujpur-Shiv Vihar 18,724 6,168 67.06
(Line-7 Extension/ Pink line)
7. Noida City Centre-Noida 93,312 67,978 27.15
Electronic City
(Line-3 Extension/ Blue line)
8. Kalindi Kunj-Botanical Garden 51,917 44,068 15.12
(Line-8 Extension/ Magenta
line)

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

1.4 Phase-III of Mass Rapid Transit System

Phase-III of Delhi Metro was conceptualised to provide the required level of metro
coverage for the size and spread of population of Delhi. The plan was to generate
additional induced ridership on the existing Phase-I2 and Phase-II3 corridors through
Phase-III corridors and also to maximise the coverage provided by the metro network
as a whole. The main objective of the recommended corridors for Phase-III was to give
a metro network to the commuters with smooth connectivity by providing more
interchange stations for switching from one corridor to another. As per the sanction
(26 September 2011) of the GoI, the initial four corridors4 of Phase-III were approved
for a length of 103.05 km (sanctioned cost ₹35,242 crore which was further extended
to 160.76 km with sanctioned cost of ₹48,565.12 crore) after sanctioning of nine more
sections/ corridors by the GoI. Against this, DMRC constructed 160.75 km (107.27
elevated and 53.48 km underground section) metro lines during Phase-III as detailed
below:
Table 1.2
Corridors of Phase-III of Delhi MRTS project
Sl. Corridor Date of Length as Sanctioned Actual
No. sanction per cost expenditure
sanction (`` in crore) as on
letter Including 31.03.2020
(in km) DVAT ` in crore)
(`
1 Central Secretariat to 9.37
Kashmiri Gate (Line-6
Extension)*
2 Jahangir Puri to Badli (Line-2 4.49
Extension)* 26.09.2011 36,702@
3 Mukundpur (Majlis Park) to 55.69
Maujpur (Line-7)*
4 Janak Puri West to Kalindi 33.49
Kunj (Line-8)* 38,836.90
5 Badarpur-Faridabad 13.09.2011 13.88 2,494
Extension (Line-6)
6. Maujpur to Shiv Vihar (Line- 11.09.2012 2.72 302.78#
7 Extension)
7 Kalindi Kunj-Botanical 20.12.2017 3.96 997
Garden (Line-8 Extension)
8 Dwarka-Najafgarh (Line-9) 11.09.2012 5.5 1,099.61 1,053.32
9 Mundka-Bahadurgarh 11.09.2012 11.18 2,076.52 1,778.36
10 Escorts Mujesar (Faridabad)- 27.03.2017 3.21 580.00 444.60
Ballabhgarh
11 Najafgarh to Dhansa Bus 09.05.2017 1.18 565.00 472.01
Stand Extension

2
Phase-I comprising of three corridors (Line-1, Line-2 and Line-3) having 65 km length
3
Phase-II (125 km) comprising of three new corridors (Line-5, Line-6, Airport Line) and seven
extensions of existing lines
4
Comprising of two new corridors i.e., Line-7 and Line-8 and two extensions of existing lines i.e.,
Line-2 extension and Line-6 extension

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Report No. 11 of 2021

Sl. Corridor Date of Length as Sanctioned Actual

No. sanction per cost expenditure
sanction (`` in crore) as on
letter Including 31.03.2020
(in km) DVAT ` in crore)
(`
12 Noida City Centre-Noida 15.06.2018 6.68 1,967.00 1,489.66
Sector 62
13 Dilshad Garden-New Bus 14.02.2019 9.41 1,781.21 1,394.03
Adda, Ghaziabad
Total 160.76 48,565.12 45,468.89
*Initially sanctioned Phase-III corridors having length of 103.05 km
@ It includes `1,460 crore towards State taxes as per sanction letter 26 September 2011 issued by GoI
# It includes `21 crore towards State taxes as per sanction letter 11 September 2012 issued by GoI

1.5 Agency wise funds sanctioned for Phase-III (including NCR extension)
The details of total funds sanctioned of ₹48,565.12 crore and details of total expenditure
incurred of ₹45,468.89 crore for Phase-III are depicted below:

Table 1.3
Funds allocated and expenditure incurred of Phase-III as on 31 March 2020
` in crore)
(`
Sl. Source of fund Total funds Total funds Expenditure
No. sanctioned* received incurred
1 JICA5 loan (through GoI) 19,656.00 19,556.32 18,593.82
2 GoI 9,123.57 9,123.57 8,883.68
3 GNCTD 8,407.38 8,407.38 8,830.39
4 Haryana Urban Development 2,830.16 2,830.16 2,704.76
Authority (HUDA)
5 Delhi Development Authority (DDA) 1,554.00 1,554.00 1,554.00
6 Government of Uttar Pradesh 63.27 0.00 63.27
(GoUP)
7 NOIDA 1,966.40 1,741.80 1,719.92
8 Ghaziabad Development Authority 1,184.34 1,033.36 1,122.05
(GDA)
9 DMRC 3,780.00 544.51 1,997.00^
Total 48,565.12 44,791.10 45,468.89
(*) Share of sanctioned cost as approved by GoI
(^) The excess expenditure against the funds received till 31 March 2020 has been met out of the
temporary funds from operation and maintenance etc.

5
Japan International Cooperation Agency

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

Chart 1.1

Details of the total funds sanctioned

GDA DMRC
GoUP NOIDA
2.44% 7.78%
0.13% 4.05%

DDA JICA
3.20% 40.47%
HUDA GNCTD
5.83% 17.31%
GOI
18.79%

JICA GOI GNCTD HUDA DDA GoUP NOIDA GDA DMRC

1.6 Audit objectives

Performance Audit on implementation of Phase-III of Delhi Metro was conducted
between November 2018 to March 2020. The objectives of Audit were to verify
whether:
(i) Effective planning was done to ensure economic viability and selection of the
most appropriate technologies;
(ii) Implementation in terms of project execution and contract management was
done with due care, economy, and in a timely and transparent manner;
(iii) An adequate mechanism was in existence to monitor the project, to ensure
timely completion and conformity of works executed with laid down
specifications; and
(iv) Operation and maintenance of this phase was efficient, and the planned benefits
were achieved after commercial operation of Phase-III.

1.7 Scope of Audit

The Performance Audit covered planning, implementation, monitoring and operations
and maintenance of completed corridors and outcome of the activities of Phase-III
projects for the period since its commencement from April 2011 to March 2020.

1.8 Audit criteria

The criteria to assess the performance of DMRC were derived from the following
sources:
i. Agenda and Minutes of meetings of the Board of Directors and other sub
committees;
ii. Schedule of Powers;

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

iii. Detailed Project Reports;

iv. Applicable General Financial Rules;
v. Guidelines issued by the Central Vigilance Commission;
vi. Directions and guidelines issued by the Administrative Ministry;
vii. Policies, standards, directives and guidelines of the DMRC;
viii. Annual Reports of the DMRC, and of the Administrative Ministry;
ix. General Conditions of Contracts and Special Conditions of Contracts;
x. National Urban Transport Policy, 2006; and
xi. Annual Sankalp Reports issued by DMRC.

1.9 Audit methodology

Audit methodology included review and examination of the agenda and minutes of the
meetings of the Board, Empowered Committee6 and Empowered Group of Ministers
and below Board level Sub-committees. Questionnaire, audit enquiries and audit
requisitions were also issued to DMRC for clarification, information, and records.
Other methods adopted include interaction with DMRC officials, physical inspection of
project sites, and photographic evidence collection.
Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi (IIT Delhi) was appointed as Technical
Consultant on 26 September 2019 to review the technical aspects of civil works,
signalling and telecom, rolling stock, heating, ventilation and air conditioning and
electrical works executed by DMRC during implementation of Phase-III. Their
observations and suggestions have been suitably incorporated in this report.
1.10 Sample selection
A total of 93 contracts were selected using stratified random sampling methodology.
The details of the selected contracts are given in Annexure-I. The Audit coverage in
terms of number of contracts was 36 per cent7 and was 53 per cent8 in terms of monetary
value of the Phase-III project. Besides, four more related contracts9 were also selected
and audited. The contracts CS10-03 and CC11-11 were related to the selected contract.
However, for better understanding two more contracts, CC-86 R and CC-95 were
audited during the Performance Audit.

6
Empowered Committee is headed by Cabinet Secretary, the other members are Secretary, MoHUA,
Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Secretary, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH),
Secretary, Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF and CC), Member
Secretary, Planning Commission, Member, Railway Board, Chief Secretary, GNCTD and
Managing Director, DMRC
7
93 contracts out of 259 contracts above `5 crore
8
`25,616 crore out of `48,565.12 crore
9
CS-03, CC-11, CC-86 R and CC-95
10
CS represents contract related to signaling work of phase-III
11
CC represents contract related to civil construction of phase-III

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

1.11 Audit process

The draft Audit Report was issued to DMRC in two stages, one with Financial and
general observations (15 May 2020) and another with technical observations (23 July
2020); responses to which were received from DMRC in July 2020 and August 2020,
respectively. Responses of DMRC to the draft report have been duly considered and
relevant portions incorporated in this report as appropriate.
The Entry Conference before commencement of Performance Audit with DMRC was
held on 12 November 2018. An Exit Conference with DMRC was held on 27/ 28 July
2020 to discuss the financial and general observations. This was followed by an Exit
Conference on 18 September 2020 to discuss the technical observations. The draft
Audit Report was issued to the Ministry/ GNCTD with a copy to DMRC on
2 November 2020 followed by an Exit Conference with Secretary, MoHUA on
11 January 2021 wherein it was suggested by Secretary, MoHUA that one more
opportunity may be provided to DMRC to provide responses to some audit observations
which the Ministry considered to be technically justified. Accordingly, a follow up Exit
Conference was held with DMRC on 18 January 2021. The views expressed during the
Exit Conferences along with MoHUA’s reply (01 January 2021) and GNCTD’s reply
(29 January 2021) have also been duly considered while finalising the report.

1.12 Structure of the Report

Chapter 1 of the Report gives the background information of DMRC, the need for
MRTS project, audit objectives, scope of audit, audit criteria, audit methodology,
sample selection etc. Audit findings have been broadly categorised into four chapters
aligning with four audit objectives.

Chapter 2 on Policy, Planning & Selection of Technology contains audit findings on

the first audit objective and brings out inefficiencies in planning, which adversely
affected economic viability and selection of appropriate technology. The audit findings
include non-compliance of funding pattern prescribed in the National Urban Transport
Policy, inconsistencies in computation of Financial Internal Rate of Return and traffic
estimation to make the corridors viable, infirmities in formulation of DPRs including
preparation of DPRs in contravention of Working Group on Urban Transport
recommendations, non-approval of revised DPRs by the Board of Directors, execution
of unviable corridors, violation of General Financial Rules, introduction of Unattended
Train Operation without cost benefit analysis, deficiencies in Rolling Stock and rails,
deficiencies in Communication Based Train Control system, and installation of
transformer of higher capacity.

In Chapter 3 on Contract and Project Management, audit findings on the second audit
objective are addressed which indicate deficiencies in project execution and contract
management. Deficiencies include appointment of General Consultant on nomination
basis, grant of special advance beyond the contractual provisions, delay in execution of
Trilok Puri section affecting smooth connectivity on Line-7, flawed design of Hauz

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Khas metro station, construction of two metro stations without the approval of GoI and
GNCTD, and non-compliance to environmental requirements.
Chapter 4 on Project Monitoring addresses the third audit objective and highlights
inadequacies in the mechanism for project monitoring. Audit findings under this
chapter includes significant delay in completion of various corridors of Phase-III of
MRTS, poor quality of civil structure, lack of uniform project Quality Management
Plan, absence of real time monitoring, capacity control, and energy saving strategies,
lack of real time monitoring of heating ventilation & air conditioning and absence of
automatic monitoring of the health of rails.
Chapter 5 on Operation & Maintenance and Revenue Management contains audit
findings on the fourth audit objective and highlights deficiencies in operation and
maintenance leading to shortfall in achievement of planned benefits after commercial
operation. These include DMRC’s failure to accomplish the projected ridership with
only 21 per cent of the total projected ridership of initial Phase-III corridors being
actually achieved in 2019-20, non-compilation of line-wise operational profit/ loss, sub-
optimal performance of DMRC in providing last mile connectivity services, inefficient
operational performance of DMRC with increasing operating ratio, and non-
implementation of all components of Multi Modal Integration.
The overall conclusion of the Report based on the major audit findings on the four audit
objectives is brought out in Chapter 6. Audit recommendations on the key audit findings
have also been included for each audit objective.

1.13 Acknowledgement
The assistance provided by the Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) and cooperation
extended by DMRC, MoHUA, GNCTD during the conduct of this audit is appreciated
and acknowledged.

8
 CHAPTER-2
POLICY, PLANNING AND
SELECTION OF TECHNOLOGY
 Report No. 11 of 2021

Chapter-2
Policy, Planning and Selection of Technology
2.1 Policy Framework
Policy is a deliberate system of principles to guide decisions and achieve rational
outcomes. A policy is a statement of intent and is implemented as a procedure or
protocol. Policies can assist in both subjective and objective decision making. Policies
usually assist senior management with decisions that must be based on the relative
merits of a number of factors and as a result are often hard to test objectively.
Government of India approved (April 2006), the National Urban Transport Policy
which inter-alia, seeks to promote integrated land use and transport planning, greater
use of public transport, non-motorised modes of travel, and use of cleaner technologies.
It offers Central Government’s financial support for investments in public transport;
infrastructure for greater use of non-motorised modes; construction of parking facilities,
including demonstrative pilot projects. Accordingly, a common set of guidelines for
preparation as well as appraisal of DPR for Mass Transit proposals was circulated
(November 2006) to Heads of Metro Corporations across the country by the Ministry
of Urban Development (MoUD).
As per sanction letters issued by GoI for Phase-III MRTS Project, equity was to be
contributed 50:50 by GoI and GNCTD for corridors within Delhi. For acquisition of
land in Delhi and bearing of central taxes, subordinate debt was provided by GoI and
GNCTD. Besides, 4.5 per cent of project cost was to be funded by earning revenue
from property development and about 40 per cent of project cost was to be financed
through principal loan from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) at
concessional rates by GoI and the same has been transferred to DMRC as Pass Through
Assistance12.
For corridors outside Delhi in the NCR, the entire project cost (except Rolling Stock,
which are to be procured by DMRC through its internal accruals) is funded by the
respective State Government and the GoI in 80:20 ratio. In the NCR, land is provided
free of cost while for bearing of state taxes, subordinate debt is provided by the
respective State Governments. Further, there is no funding from loan in NCR extension
projects.
Audit reviewed the approval of the initial Phase-III projects having four corridors and
nine extension corridor to assess whether effective planning was in place and observed
deficiencies as brought out in the following paras.

12
Pass Through Assistance is a mechanism through which the GoI obtains loan from JICA in
Japanese Yen (JPY) and passes it to DMRC in rupee terms.

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Report No. 11 of 2021

2.1.1 Funding pattern in the DPRs of Phase-III were not in accordance with
provisions of National Urban Transport Policy 2006
National Urban Transport Policy stipulated that in the metro rail projects being set up
through the mechanism of Special Purpose Vehicle, the Central Government would
offer financial support either in the form of equity or one time Viability Gap Funding
(VGF) subject to a ceiling of 20 per cent of the capital cost of the project (including
equity, subordinate debt and grant etc.,) excluding the cost of land and Rehabilitation
and Resettlement. DMRC formulated DPRs for Phase-III corridors and extension of
metro to NCR towns. The sanction orders issued by the GoI revealed that funding
pattern projected in the DPRs of Dwarka-Najafgarh, Mundka-Bahadurgarh and
Badarpur-Faridabad corridors were 18 per cent, 6 per cent and 8 per cent in excess over
the prescribed ceiling of 20 per cent of the project cost. This resulted in excess
contribution by GoI amounting to ₹165.92 crore, ₹98.82 crore and ₹156.6 crore for
Dwarka-Najafgarh, Mundka-Bahadurgarh and Badarpur-Faridabad corridors,
respectively.
Thus, DMRC’s funding plan in the DPR was in contravention of National Urban
Transport Policy, 2006.
Chart 2.1
Funding pattern in deviation of National Urban Transport Policy
80%
80% 74% 72%
70%
62%
60%

50%
38% Other than GOI
40%
28% GOI Funding
30% 26%
20%
20%

10%

0%
Funding as Dwarka Mundka Badarpur
per NUTP Najagfgarh Bahadurgarh Faridabad

The Ministry/ DMRC in the Exit Conference (11 January 2021) has agreed to
implement the funding pattern as per National Urban Transport Policy 2006.

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

2.1.2 Inconsistency in Financial Internal Rate of Return criteria for approval of

corridors
In August 2013, the MoUD instructed that Financial Internal Rate of Return13 of
investment in MRTS projects should preferably be eight per cent or more for
consideration by the GoI. Prior to this circular (August 2013), there was no minimum
criteria of Financial Internal Rate of Return for approval. Accordingly, the MoUD
instructed for modification of all DPRs prepared after August 2013 to comply with the
criteria of eight per cent of Financial Internal Rate of Return.
In compliance, DPRs of (i) Dilshad Garden to Ghaziabad, New Bus Adda, (ii) Noida
City Centre to Noida Sec-62, (iii) Kalindi Kunj to Botanical Garden, (iv) YMCA
Chowk to Ballabhgarh corridors were revised (up to October/ December14 2014) and
higher Financial Internal Rate of Returns of 12.23 per cent, 8.63 per cent, 9.85 per cent
and 11.01 per cent were computed as against the earlier Financial Internal Rate of
Return of 4.02 per cent, 2.03 per cent, 1.11 per cent and 4.50 per cent, respectively.
In this regard, Audit observed that:
(i) Financial Internal Rate of Return of all the corridors/ sections sanctioned before
August 2013 were in the range of 0.08 per cent to 6.06 per cent except Shiv Vihar and
Badarpur-Faridabad extensions which had negative return of ₹755 crore and ₹798 crore,
respectively, over the horizon period of 30 years.
(ii) In pre-revised DPRs15, 15 fare slabs from ₹10 to ₹44 (with a difference of ₹1 to
₹3) were considered while in the revised DPRs, 7 fare slabs from ₹10 to ₹60 (in
multiples of ₹10) were considered. For instance, in the pre revised DPRs, fare slabs of
₹19 to ₹24 for the distance of 6 km to 12 km were considered, whereas, in the revised
DPRs for the same distance, fare of ₹30 was considered. Consequently, Fare Box
Revenue16 has increased from ₹9,443 crore to ₹19,928 crore (111 per cent increase),
₹5,327 crore to ₹12,624 crore (137 per cent increase) and ₹2,573 crore to ₹7,066 crore
(175 per cent increase) in Dilshad Garden to Ghaziabad, Noida City Centre to Noida
Sector-62, and Kalindi Kunj to Botanical Garden, respectively. In case of pre revised
DPR (January 2013) of Faridabad to Ballabhgarh section, 15 fare slabs in range of
₹11 to ₹40 with escalation factor @ 7.5 per cent for every two year was considered.
However, while revising the DPR (December 2014), 15 fare slabs in range of ₹14 to
₹52 with escalation factor @ 15 per cent for every two year was considered resulting in
increase in Fare Box Revenue from ₹2,578 crore to ₹6,559 crore (154 per cent increase).
(iii) DMRC prepared (December 2014) the feasibility report of Najafgarh-Dhansa
Bus Stand but did not revise the Financial Internal Rate of Return of 3.4 per cent which
was lower than benchmark of eight per cent and still recommended it as a viable

13
An indicator to measure the financial return on investment of an income generation project and is
used to make the investment decision
14
YMCA Chowk (Faridabad) to Ballabhgarh
15
Dilshad Garden to Ghaziabad, Noida City Centre to Noida Sector-62, and Kalindi Kunj to
Botanical Garden
16
Fare Box Revenue is the revenue collected from passengers through sale of tokens and smart cards

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Report No. 11 of 2021

corridor. Financial Internal Rate of Return was calculated after considering 15 per cent
escalation after every two years on fare slab as recommended by Third Fare Fixation
Committee. The Fourth Fare Fixation Committee in its Report (September 2016) had
suggested to DMRC that if no Return on Investment is to be considered, the repayment
of loan is to be taken into account for considering the viability of the project. Audit
also noticed that the effective rate of interest (after considering foreign exchange
fluctuation risk) of JICA loan was 5.20 per cent. Hence, considering lower Financial
Internal Rate of Return of 3.4 per cent than effective rate of interest of 5.20 per cent
was unjustifiable.
(iv) Resultantly, Financial Internal Rate of Return of five corridors17 sanctioned
from August 2013 to February 2019 were in the range of 8.63 per cent to 12.23 per cent
except Najafgarh-Dhansa Bus Stand (3.4 per cent) as detailed in Annexure-II.
Thus, out of the 13 corridors proposed for Phase-III, DMRC recommended two
financially unviable corridors18 with negative Financial Internal Rate of Return and one
corridor i.e., Najafgarh-Dhansa Bus Stand extension was approved with Financial
Internal Rate of Return less than the benchmark of eight per cent. In four corridors19
Financial Internal Rate of Return was enhanced considering inflated Fare Box Revenue
to meet out the benchmark of eight per cent.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that:
• The Group of Ministers had directed (August 2011) for the Shiv Vihar
extension. Accordingly, the proposal was prepared and submitted to the Government
despite low ridership.
• The fare slabs with 15 slabs recommended by the Third Fare Fixation
Committee were mostly in odd figures and created a lot of problems in tendering change
to the passengers at the stations. Accordingly, the new fare structure with seven slabs
was included in the revised DPRs.
• GoI realised that achieving the Financial Internal Rate of Return of eight
per cent is normally difficult and subsequently dispensed with the requirement of
Financial Internal Rate of Return and switched over to Economic Internal Rate of
Return20 in the Metro Policy, 2017. DMRC agreed with Audit that lending interest rate
including exchange fluctuation should have been quoted for such comparison.
However, in this case, loan amount was only 38.32 per cent with the balance as equity
and subordinate debt. Therefore, the Financial Internal Rate of Return of 3.4 per cent
on the project cost established its viability even up to the interest rate of 8.87 per cent
on the loan component.
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not acceptable as approving of DPRs
with negative and low Financial Internal Rate of Return would lead to operational loss

17
Corridors mentioned at Sl. no. 9 to 13 in Annexure-II
18
Maujpur-Shiv Vihar and Badarpur-Faridabad
19
Dilshad Garden to Ghaziabad, Noida City Centre to Noida Sector-62, Kalindi Kunj to Botanical
Garden and Faridabad to Ballabhgarh
20
Economic Internal Rate of Return is the discount rate at which discounted net benefits (Revenue-
Cost) equals to zero. It quantifies the financial and non-financial benefits from the investments.

12
 Report No. 11 of 2021

for DMRC and extra burden on the Government exchequer/ taxpayer’s money. The
rate of return should be compared with weighted average cost of capital i.e., borrowed
fund and equity. DMRC should have prepared DPR with realistic and objective
assumptions for computation of Financial Internal Rate of Return based on the fare
existing at the time of preparation of DPR with prevailing escalation. Reply of DMRC
regarding inclusion of new fare structure with seven slabs in the revised DPRs (October
2014) is not tenable as in case of revised DPR for YMCA Chowk to Ballabhgarh
(December 2014), DMRC continued to consider 15 slabs. Besides, Audit also noticed
that currently 70 per cent (approximately) of commuters use smart cards, where the
need for tendering of change is largely minimised.
2.1.3 Non-formulation of various policies by DMRC
Policies are standing plans that provide guidelines for decision making. It establishes
the boundaries or limits within which decisions are to be made. Various policies/
procedures/ practices adopted by DMRC in preparation of cost estimates, taking
decisions on selection and modification of routes, distance between inter change
stations etc., have been reviewed by Audit along with the Technical Consultant (IIT
Delhi) and the following is observed:
(i) There is no protocol in DMRC for estimating the cost of an upcoming project in
a scientific manner. Rather, DMRC uses the concept of derivation of cost estimate
based on ‘similar project’. Also, the coefficients in the Price Variation Clause formulas
are applied uniformly across all types of projects irrespective of whether they are at
grade, underground, or elevated.
DMRC while accepting the observation stated that in the Phase-IV contracts, estimates
are being prepared by enhancing the Last Accepted Rates based on Price Variation
Clause formulas available in the contracts.
(ii) There is no approved policy on the selection of type of corridor i.e., elevated, at
grade or underground.
DMRC responded that type of alignment is decided based on the Right of Way of the
road, traffic on the road and other factors like Archaeological Survey of India
monuments in the area, localities wherein the corridor passes through etc.
DMRC needs to formulate a policy document on the selection of type of corridor and
should also clearly indicate the circumstances under which deviations are allowed.

(iii) There is no approved policy of permissible ground water lowering21 while

constructing underground structures in the absence of which decisions are going to be
subjective and may not always result in optimal solution.

21
Permissible ground water: Normally underground construction below groundwater table will face
certain problems. To facilitate the construction, DMRC allows to do the lowering of water table
by dewatering systems at a locality based on assessment. This temporary lowering is known as
“permissible ground water lowering”. But lowering should not disturb the ecosystem and habitat
of the area.

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Report No. 11 of 2021

DMRC did not provide specific reply to the point.

(iv) There is no approved policy for providing interchange between two stations and
mode of interchange facility. For instance, Dhaula Kuan-Durga Bai Deshmukh South
Campus interchange (1.2 km length) was constructed with additional expenditure of
₹73.17 crore over DPR provision of ₹5.25 crore which indicates poor planning and
absence of an approved policy in this regard.
DMRC replied that as per the DPR, Dhaula Kuan station was planned at an isolated
location with no habitation nearby. Therefore, the station was shifted towards a location
with many colleges and residential areas, which resulted in increase in the length of
interchange. However, it was not clear under which premise/ assumption the station
was planned in a forest area in the DPR in the first place.
2.1.4 Formulation of Detailed Project Reports of Phase-III corridors
Audit reviewed the DPR of the initial Phase-III project of four corridors and DPRs for
nine NCR/ other extensions executed during Phase-III, and observed the following
deficiencies:
[Link] Gross infirmities and adoption of different assumptions in the
formulation of DPRs
The MoUD issued (01 November 2006) guidelines22 for preparation of DPR for
Integrated Mass Transit System Development Plan. In this regard, Audit observed that:
(i) As per the guidelines, a Comprehensive Mobility Plan23 is a prerequisite for
planning metro rail in any city. A chapter on Comprehensive Mobility Plan highlighting
developing an integrated plan was to be included in the DPRs. However, no chapter on
Comprehensive Mobility Plan highlighting developing an integrated plan was included
in the Phase-III DPR formulated by DMRC. Resultantly, integrated planning with
respect to land use and transport, integration of various modes (fares, routes, and
facilities) and institutional framework for coordination was not ensured by DMRC.
(ii) Cost and benefit analysis of the adopted technologies was not conducted and
incorporated in the DPRs by DMRC during Phase-III of MRTS project, although this
was a requirement under Para 4.3 ‘Alternative Analysis’ of the above guidelines.
(iii) Delhi Metro Master Plan was prepared by DMRC for guidance in planning the
expansion of the network and the DPR. However, this was not approved by the Board
of Directors or Managing Director of DMRC.

22
The guidelines inter-alia stipulates that based on the plan outline, projects are to be detailed out,
conceptually designed, costs worked out, financial and economic feasibility examined and
environmental and social impacts analysed and mitigation measures planned. This would include
overall funding plan, including risk analysis.
23
“Comprehensive Mobility Plan” is a plan for improvement and promotion of public transport,
non motorised vehicles and pedestrians. It also provides a recognised and effective platform for
integrating land use and transport planning.

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

(iv) Guidelines/ instructions/ Standard Operating Procedures were not formulated by

DMRC for preparation of the DPRs.
(v) Detailed Project Reports were prepared on different assumptions (Annexure III
A & B). Replacement cost (after 20 years) of Signalling and Telecom equipment
considered in the DPRs (Annexure-III A) ranged from 10 per cent to 50 per cent.
Similarly, replacement cost of electrical equipment ranged from 10 per cent to 25 per
cent. Besides, escalation factors of 5 per cent and 7.5 per cent were considered for
calculating Operation & Maintenance cost. No justification was given for the different
assumptions in various DPRs. While estimating Fare Box Revenue, DMRC did not
consider 10 per cent discount on every journey made through contactless smart card,
resulting into higher projection of Fare Box Revenue by 7 per cent.
(vi) The revised DPRs24 were not approved by the Board of Directors. Since the
original DPRs were approved by Board of Directors, it is imperative that revised DPRs
are also got approved by Board of Directors.
Thus, DPRs prepared by DMRC were not in conformity with Guidelines (2006) of
MoUD for preparation of DPR and in the absence of any internal guidelines/ Standard
Operating Procedures of DMRC for preparation of DPRs, DPRs were prepared on
different assumptions.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that the
corridors recommended for metro in the DPR were as suggested in the Comprehensive
Transport and Traffic Study Report prepared by RITES. Hence, no chapter on
Comprehensive Mobility Plan was incorporated in the DPRs. DMRC claimed that cost
benefit analysis of the adopted technology and the implementation Plan of Phase-III
corridors were incorporated in the Project Viability chapter in the DPR. It stated that
Delhi Metro Master Plan is not an approved document by the Board of Directors or
Managing Director, DMRC, but only a guideline for planning future metro network. It
is further replied that the sanction of Phase-III including its various extensions to NCR
was not done in one go. While original project of Phase-III of Delhi MRTS project was
sanctioned on 26 September 2011, its extensions to NCR were sanctioned subsequently
on different dates. The concerned State Government and not DMRC has to approve
the DPR, and the discount of 10 per cent does not change the Fare Box Revenue
significantly.
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not tenable because Comprehensive
Mobility Plan chapter in DPR was meant for integrated planning and not for
recommendation of corridors. While the Viability Chapter of DPR highlights the
estimated cost of the project, revenue projections for computation of Financial Internal
Rate of Return, Economic Internal Rate of Return etc., it does not have any information
of cost benefit analysis of adopted technology25. Since Delhi Metro Master Plan is a
guideline for planning future metro network, it has to be approved by the Managing

24
i)Dilshad Garden to Ghaziabad, New Bus Adda, (ii) Noida City Centre to Noida Sec-62, (iii) Kalindi
Kunj metro to Botanical Garden, (iv) YMCA Chowk to Ballabhgarh
25
Like Communication Based Train Control, Platform Screen Door, Unattended Train Operation etc.

15
Report No. 11 of 2021

Director or Board for efficient and effective implementation. As all the DPRs
mentioned in the Annexure-III (A & B) pertained to Phase-III of Delhi MRTS,
uniform and consistent assumptions should have been followed in their preparation
which should be based on some policy, guidelines, or Standard Operating Procedure.

[Link] Preparation of Detailed Project Reports in contravention of Working

Group on Urban Transport guidelines

The Planning Commission had constituted (18 May 2011) a Working Group on Urban
Transport under the Chairmanship of then Managing Director, DMRC to make
recommendations on urban transport for the 12th Five Year Plan. Terms of reference
include determination of broad norms for selecting the different mode of transport in
Indian cities. The recommendations (September 2011) specified the eligibility
guidelines for the choice of different mode of transport, which is as follows:
For Metro Rail:
(a) Peak Hour Peak Direction Traffic 26 in 2021 should be >= 15,000 for at least 5
km continuous length;
(b) Population as per 2011 census should be >=2 million
For Bus Rapid Transit System:
(a) Peak Hour Peak Direction Traffic in 2021 should between 4,000 to 20,000
(b) Population as per 2011 census should be > 1 million
Further, as per the RITES traffic study (October 2010), for Peak Hour Peak Direction
Traffic up to 20,000 (in 2021), Bus Rapid Transit System and for Peak Hour Peak
Direction Traffic up to 30,000 (2031), Light metro can be proposed.
In this regard, Audit observed that:
(i) In case of Dwarka-Najafgarh corridor, Peak Hour Peak Direction Traffic of
5,780 and 10,373 in the year 2021 was assessed by RITES (October 2010) and DPR
(March 2009), respectively. Further, as per 2011 census, the population of Najafgarh
was 13.65 lakh. However, the proposal for Bus Rapid Transit System/ Light metro was
not explored before sending the DPR to the MoUD/ GNCTD for approval.
(ii) In case of Mundka-Bahadurgarh corridor, average Peak Hour Peak Direction
Traffic of entire section during the year 2021 was estimated as 6,817. As per 2011
census, the population of Bahadurgarh was 1.78 lakh. However, the proposal of Light
metro/ Bus Rapid Transit was not explored before sending the DPR to MoUD/
Government of Haryana for approval.
(iii) In case of Maujpur-Shiv Vihar extension, Peak Hour Peak Direction Traffic at
Shiv Vihar and Gokulpuri was only 1,805 and 3,935, respectively, in the year 2021 and
the population was 63,752 only27. Hence, this stretch did not qualify for any mode of

26
means the number of passenger trip in one peak hour
27
As per RITES traffic study report October 2010 of Shiv Vihar

16
 Report No. 11 of 2021

transport according to the recommendations of the Working Group on Urban Transport

guidelines.
(iv) Thus, DPR of above corridors prepared28 and submitted (after September 2011)
by DMRC to the Ministry did not meet the eligibility criteria for choice of different
modes of transport, recommended by the Working Group on Urban Transport and
RITES Traffic Study. Further, based on projected Peak Hour Peak Direction Traffic,
other modes of transport like Light Metro/ Bus Rapid Transit were not explored. While
the sanctioned cost of Dwarka-Najafgarh, Mundka-Bahadurgarh and Shiv Vihar
extension were ₹1,070 crore, ₹1,991.61 crore and ₹437.85 crore, respectively, DMRC
did not furnish line/ corridor wise actual expenditure. As per DPR of Phase-IV MRTS
Project, capital expenditure for construction of 1 km Heavy Metro, Light metro and Bus
Rapid Transit are ₹250 crore, ₹175 crore and ₹20 crore respectively. Similarly, annual
operation & maintenance expenditure for operating Heavy Metro, Light Metro and Bus
Rapid Transit will also be in descending order.
Thus, DPRs prepared by DMRC were in contravention of guidelines of Working Group
on Urban Transport and RITES study regarding selection of mode of transport on the
basis of Peak Hour Peak Direction Traffic and the population criteria. This has resulted
in infusing high capital into the projects and consequent higher operation and
maintenance cost.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that the
recommendations of the Working Group on Urban Transport are only for guidance and
were applicable for selection of mode of urban transport for a city as a whole. The
recommendations of a mode are to be made after considering techno-economic factor.
Detailed Project Reports were prepared as per directives of the respective State
Governments in-spite of low ridership and not in line with the recommendations of
Working Group on Urban Transport. Light Metro is the same as Medium or Heavy
Metro but with reduced train length i.e., four coaches or three coaches instead of eight/
six coaches. Bus Rapid Transit system can carry maximum Peak Hour Peak Direction
Traffic of only up to 6,000 to 8,000 while for Mundka-Bahadurgarh, the projected Peak
Hour Peak Direction Traffic was 9,883 in 2016 and 21,168 in 2026. DMRC also
claimed that the Bus Rapid Transit could be sufficient for a few years but cannot be
relied upon for seamless connectivity.
The reply of DMRC is not tenable as the Working Group on Urban Transport guidelines
did not specify a single mode of urban transport for an entire city. Further, without
conducting the techno-economic evaluation of other modes of transport like Light
metro/ Bus Rapid Transit System, which have comparatively low cost, DMRC
concluded that heavy metro was the most suitable option despite the low Peak Hour
Peak Direction Traffic on these corridors. In case of Mundka-Bahadurgarh section, the
projected Peak Hour Peak Direction Traffic of 21,168 in 2026 is only for 1 km stretch

28
DPR prepared for Dwarka-Najafgarh in March 2009 and Mundka-Bahadurgarh in April 2012.
The same were sent to Ministry for approval in October 2011 and April 2012, respectively

17
Report No. 11 of 2021

and reduces to 1,673 at the last station. However, the actual Peak Hour Peak Direction
Traffic of the entire section in December 2019 was only 2,558. There is also a huge
difference between MRTS and Bus Rapid Transit System in terms of capital cost. The
differences between Light Metro and Heavy Metro are not only in terms of reduced
train length but also in terms of length of platform (185 meter/ 90 meter), width of car
(3.2 meter/ 2.7 meter), and length of car (22 meter/ 18 meter) etc., which may cost
almost half or less than the cost of elevated metro29. DMRC in its 86th Board meeting
(December 2011) and Empowered Committee meeting (January 2012) had also stated
that a heavy metro is not really justified for this level of traffic at Dwarka-Najafgarh.
Yet, DMRC designed and constructed all civil structures for Heavy Metro.
[Link] Inconsistency in traffic estimation/ data in Detailed Project Report
(i) Dwarka-Najafgarh: As per the DPR, projected daily passenger ridership of
Dwarka-Najafgarh corridor was estimated as 1,01,867 (2021), while table 9.3 of the
same DPR mentioned it as 61,000 (2021). Projected ridership of 61,000 was considered
in 2020-21 for calculation of Financial Internal Rate of Return. Thus, there was
significant inconsistency in projected ridership in the DPR, which remained
unreconciled before submission to MoUD for approval. The Ministry/ GNCTD and
DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that traffic estimation was done by one
of the best available agencies, namely, Central Road Research Institute. Further, this
estimation was moderated since the projected ridership of the earlier phase did not
materialise.
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not acceptable as no details/
methodology of moderation was mentioned in the DPR of Dwarka-Najafgarh and the
same moderation was not done in any of the DPRs prepared for Phase-III corridors. All
the system planning like traction system, signalling system and rolling stock system
were done on the basis of 1,01,867 ridership/ 10,373 Peak Hours Peak Direction Traffic.
Incidentally, the actual ridership on the section from October-December 2019 was
12,012 only i.e., 12.37 per cent of the projected ridership of 97,070 in 2019-20.
(ii) Najafgarh-Dhansa Bus Stand: As per the MoUD guidelines (November
2006), DPR should contain travel characteristics based on primary survey data, and
present travel patterns to forecast the future travel demand. But DMRC did not conduct
any traffic survey for the Najafgarh-Dhansa Bus Stand section. Feasibility Report of
Najafgarh-Dhansa Bus Stand was circulated (October 2016) to NITI Aayog (erstwhile
Planning Commission) and other ministries for appraisal. NITI Aayog objected that the
Peak Hour Peak Direction Traffic data are not provided in the Public Investment Board
note, which was in-contravention of benchmark of Metro Policy 2013. DMRC
responded (October 2016) to NITI Aayog that maximum Peak Hour Peak Direction
Traffic anywhere on Line-3 is to be considered for this stretch as Najafgarh-Dhansa Bus
Stand is the extension of Line-3 where maximum Peak Hour Peak Direction Traffic of
50,000 is being achieved by October 2016. DMRC did not intimate NITI Aayog that

29
As per DPR of Kirti Nagar-Bamnoli (Dwarka) prepared in 2019

18
 Report No. 11 of 2021

as per RITES study, Peak Hour Peak Direction Traffic was assessed as 2,394 while it
was stated as 10,373 (2021) in the Feasibility Report.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC accepted (January 2021) that traffic survey was not
conducted for Najafgarh-Dhansa Bus Stand section as the catchment area remained the
same. The reply of DMRC regarding Peak Hour Peak Direction Traffic is not
acceptable as it vary from station to station and is estimated only after traffic study.
Further, Najafgarh-Dhansa Bus Stand is not an extension of Line-3, but a standalone
corridor i.e., Line-9.
[Link] Other observations on preparation of Detailed Project Report
Audit along with the Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) observed that the DPR of initial
Phase-III (February 2011) corridors did not have information or had minimal
information on the following:
• tunnel details, cut and cover method, tunnelling methods, support system, lining,
excavation methods etc;
• geological and geotechnical investigations methods mentioned in the DPR are
general in nature and information about rock and rock mass properties which are
essential for the foundations, tunnel design, ramps, support system were not found
mentioned.
• excavation methodology including selection of suitable Earth Pressure Boring
Machine, Tunnel Boring Machine or mixed type of system, would depend on the
strata and their mechanical properties which were missing in the DPR; and
• quick and cost-effective geophysical methods to get the strata condition depth wise
along the alignment were also not mentioned.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC agreed (January 2021 and July 2020) to the
suggestions for further improvements in the DPRs as stated above.
[Link] Non-consideration of Planning Commission observations
The DPR (Mundka-Bahadurgarh) was circulated (November 2011) to Planning
Commission and other ministries for appraisal. The Planning Commission raised (May
2012) various observations like (a) Reconsideration of metro on this corridor on the
basis of low Peak Hour Peak Direction Traffic; (b) At least 4.5 per cent of the cost to
be recovered under Property Development; (c) Inconsistency in per capita trip rates used
for Delhi and Bahadurgarh region; and (d) Dropping of last metro station at City Park
due to very low level of traffic etc. In response, DMRC stated that this extension
corridor is proposed on Transit Oriented Development concept that wherever metro
goes, development follows.
In this regard, Audit observed that except for a residential project constructed by DMRC
at NSIC Okhla station on Line-8 no other instance of metro lines based on Transit
Oriented Development was noticed.

19
Report No. 11 of 2021

The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that all
observations of Planning Commission were complied with and incorporated in the
revised DPR submitted to GoI in April 2012.
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not acceptable as all the above issues
persist in the revised DPR submitted in April 2012. Further, DMRC accepted that the
actual traffic on this corridor has not been achieved as development along the corridor
has not taken place as was envisaged.
[Link] Excess estimation of `138.40 crore for acquisition of private land
Detailed Project Report Phase-III provides that private land for Mass Rapid Transit
System project shall be acquired by the GNCTD and compensation shall be paid as per
Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The average rate of private land was computed as ₹34,500
per square meter (sqm) based on awards issued for four cases (three industrial and one
commercial) during 2009-10. In this regard, Audit observed that:
i. Corridor-wise location of required land including area, land use and ownership
has been mentioned in the DPR and the Social Impact Assessment study. However,
DMRC had estimated the land rates for entire corridors of Phase-III based on four
locations of South Delhi instead of estimating the cost of land based on land usage like
residential, industrial, commercial, agricultural etc.
ii. The cost of land acquired (December 2009) at Harkesh Nagar taken for
estimation purpose, included cost of structures of ₹2.09 crore also. However, the cost
of the structure was not excluded by DMRC while computing the land rate of ₹34,500
per sqm. After excluding the same, the average land rate comes to ₹31,365.69 per sqm.
Thus, there was higher estimation of land cost of ₹11.12 crore due to adoption of higher
land rate.
iii. Detailed Project Report of Dwarka-Najafgarh (March 2009) states that private
land of 5.98 hectare required for alignment, station and Property Development from
chainage 4,400 meter to 5,600 meter which is an agricultural land. As per GNCTD
circular (24 January 2008), the agricultural land rate applicable was ₹53 lakh per acre.
However, DMRC applied (March 2009/ April 2012), the rate of ₹8.09 crore/ ₹8.21 crore
per acre30 instead of ₹53 lakh per acre in the DPR of Dwarka-Najafgarh and Mundka-
Bahdurgarh (Delhi portion), respectively. This resulted in over-estimation of land cost
by ₹104.48 crore for Dwarka-Najafgarh corridor and ₹22.80 crore for Mundka-
Bahadurgarh. In the subsequent land award (October 2012) of Urban Extension Road
II near Mundka Industrial Area Station and land award (December 2013) of Greater
Kailash land (Phase-III), agricultural land rate of ₹53 lakh per acre was considered.
Thus, DMRC did not prepare cost estimation for land in the DPRs after considering
actual land usage and applicable land rates. This resulted in excess estimation and
sanctioning of higher funds for the corridors.

30
`20 crore and `20.29 crore per hectare (equivalent to 2.47105 acre) as mentioned in DPR of
Dwarka-Najafgarh and Mundka-Bahadurgarh corridor, respectively.

20
 Report No. 11 of 2021

The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (July 2020 and January 2021) that the
detailed survey of location and adjacent area is being determined after approval of the
project as the exact/ detailed assessment of the land requirement from all the land
categories is not possible during DPR stage. Private land at Dwarka-Najafgarh corridor
acquired by DMRC was under residential use and it was not possible to procure the land
by offering agriculture rate.
The Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC acknowledged that detailed assessment based on land
usage is done after approval of the project. DMRC did not provide the supporting
documents relating to land usage as ‘Residential’ as mentioned in the reply. The reply
of DMRC is silent on the land acquisition award pronounced for land near Mundka
Industrial Area station and Greater Kailash station, which were based on land usage
(viz. agricultural). The reply was also silent on inclusion of structure cost for estimation
of land. Thus, DMRC’s preparation of cost estimation of private lands was flawed
leading to excess estimation of ₹138.40 crore.
[Link] Excess estimation of `142.11 crore of Rehabilitation and Resettlement
activities
Social Impact Assessment study of initial Phase-III corridors was conducted
(June 2011) by RITES on behalf of DMRC after approval of DPR by the Board of
Directors.
Audit observed that as per the Social Impact Assessment study, total cost of
Rehabilitation and Resettlement activities on initial Phase-III corridors (four corridors)
was ₹182.51 crore on the basis of land cost of ₹34,500 per sqm and construction cost
as mentioned in the DPR. However, DMRC estimated ₹324.62 crore for Rehabilitation
and Resettlement including hutments and road restoration, etc., on lump sum basis
which was submitted to and approved by the MoUD on 26 September 2011. DMRC’s
estimation for Rehabilitation and Resettlement activities in the DPR was thus higher by
₹142.11 crore than that estimated in the Social Impact Assessment study. Despite
vigorous pursuance, DMRC did not provide the details of amount paid for resettlement
against the estimated amount.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that in the
DPR, DMRC estimated ₹324.62 crore for Rehabilitation and Resettlement including
hutments and road restoration etc., on lump-sum basis whereas in Social Impact
Assessment report, cost of road restoration work, and cost of Government land was not
included.
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not acceptable as Rehabilitation and
Resettlement computed in DPR was not based on any scientific method, whereas
Rehabilitation and Resettlement estimates in Social Impact Assessment were calculated
after considering Government guidelines relating to eligibility for rehabilitation of
project affected persons and average awarded rates of private land in the past. The cost
of road restoration is part of civil work and cost of the Government land was already
included in the land estimation in the DPR.

21
Report No. 11 of 2021

2.2 Planning Process adopted for Phase-III Projects

Planning is an organisational management activity for setting priorities, distributing
resources, strengthening operations, and ensuring achievement of common goals.
DMRC’s planning work not only covers their core work of construction and operation
of metro rail services, but also consultancy services to other metro organisations in India
and neighbouring countries.
DMRC has a separate Planning Department whose core activities are coordination with
various departments of DMRC, liasioning with MoHUA and GNCTD, attending to
Parliament questions etc. The preparation of DPRs and other studies, which are
essential for planning of MRTS projects are carried out by the Consultancy Division of
DMRC. The core activities in Consultancy Division are carried out by the officers/ staff
of DMRC, while activities like Traffic Survey, Topographical Survey, Environmental
Impact Assessment and Social Impact Analysis and Geo technical investigations are
outsourced. Based on the data obtained from the studies/ surveys, DMRC prepared
DPR for Phase-III and the extensions of metro to various NCR towns. The basic
parameters adopted for selection of project and formulation of DPR are Delhi’s high
population growth rate, high economic growth rate, and the excessive pressure on the
city’s existing transport system. The DPRs formulated by the Consultancy Division are
approved by the Board of Directors and submitted to the MoHUA and GNCTD.
Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs then forwards the DPRs to Niti Aayog
(erstwhile Planning Commission) and various Ministries31 and departments for their
views, comments and remarks which are then shared with DMRC for inclusion in the
DPRs. Detailed Project Reports are also revised based on guidelines and further
directions of the MoHUA and GNCTD. The Planning Department is headed by
Director (Project and Planning) and Consultancy Division is headed by Director
(Business Development).
DMRC initiated the work of preparation of Phase-III DPR in 2008. The initial DPR
was submitted to the GNCTD and the GoI in March 2010. However, based on the
traffic study report submitted (October 2010) by RITES and suggestions of GNCTD,
revised DPR was sent (09/ 11 February 2011) to the MoHUA and the GNCTD for
approval. The implementation of metro Phase-III was approved by Board of Directors
in its 83th meeting (8 March 2011) and by GNCTD on 11 April 2011. The Empowered
Committee and Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM) approved the Phase-III of
Delhi MRTS project on 26 April 2011 and 09 August 2011, respectively. The sanction
of the President of India was accorded (26 September 2011) for implementation of
Phase-III of Delhi MRTS project with four corridors32 of 103.05 km length at an
estimated completion cost of ₹35,242 crore over a period of five years. The same was
further extended to 160.76 km (sanctioned cost of ₹48,565.12 crore) after sanctioning

31
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Railways, Ministry of Home Affairs and other concerned
Ministries
32
comprising of two new corridors i.e., Line-7 and Line-8 and two extensions of existing lines i.e., Line-
2 extension and Line-6 extension

22
 Report No. 11 of 2021

of nine more sections/ corridors by the GoI. The DPRs of the nine sections/ corridors
were also prepared by DMRC.
In this regard, Audit observed the following about planning aspects in DMRC.
2.2.1 Non-signing of Memorandum of Understanding for implementation of
Phase-III
As per sanction letters of Phase-I and Phase-II of Delhi MRTS projects, operational
loss, if any, was to be borne equally by GoI and GNCTD. However, as per the sanction
letter of Phase-III, the entire operational loss was to be borne by the GNCTD and a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was to be signed amongst the GoI, GNCTD
and DMRC to ensure effective implementation of the project and conditions of sanction.
The MoU was yet to be signed (February 2021).
2.2.2 Non recovery of `63.27 crore due to non-signing of Memorandum of
Understanding with Government of Uttar Pradesh
The Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD) sanctioned (September 2012) the
Maujpur-Shiv Vihar extension. As per Paragraph 2 (c) of sanction letter, a MoU shall
be signed by DMRC with Government of Uttar Pradesh (GoUP) to ensure effective
implementation of the project. DMRC forwarded (March 2013) the draft MoU for
approval to GoUP. DMRC also apprised (November 2018) the Chief Secretary, GoUP
that it had constructed the portion in Uttar Pradesh by diverting its own funds provided
for Delhi State, and that these funds were immediately required for the work execution
within Delhi. However, the Special Secretary, GoUP stated (January 2019) that there
was no MoU between DMRC and the Ghaziabad Development Authority (GDA) in this
regard, and hence there is no rationale for releasing the fund by the GDA for this
corridor. Audit observed that after completion of construction work, the section has
been opened (October 2018) for public, but the approval of MoU from GoUP and
release of funds was still awaited. DMRC had utilised ₹63.27 crore for construction of
corridor in the Uttar Pradesh portion which were earmarked for other corridors.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that DMRC
has been pursuing with the GoUP/ GDA for release of funds of ₹63.27 crore and
admitted that no amount has been received till date from GoUP.
2.2.3 Execution of unviable corridors
(i) Execution of Dwarka-Najafgarh corridor with net cash outflow of
`5,178 crore
As per the DPR, Dwarka-Najafgarh metro corridor was not financially viable. To make
the corridor viable, a provision of 4.03 hectare of land at Najafgarh station was included
for Property Development. The same was to be made available by GNCTD to DMRC.
Without income from Property Development during the horizon period of 33 years,
DMRC assessed negative cash flow of ₹5,178 crore (i.e., total cash outflow/ total cost
of ₹7,504 crore minus total revenue of ₹2,326 crore). However, after considering net
Property Development revenue of ₹5,675 crore, Financial Internal Rate of Return was

23
Report No. 11 of 2021

estimated as 1.18 per cent over the horizon period with estimated net cash inflow of
₹125 crore. The corridor was approved (September 2012) by the MoUD at the cost of
₹1,070 crore and was to be completed by 2015 (actual completion in October 2019).
Audit observed that DMRC had assumed that 4.03 hectare land area would be made
available by GNCTD, but no consent of the same was taken from the GNCTD. Further,
no correspondence regarding acquisition of 4.03 hectare land was available. Normally,
Non-Fare Box Revenue33 of a Mass Rapid Transit System is in the range of 10 per cent
of the Fare Box Revenue, but DMRC estimated Non-Fare Box Revenue of 126 per cent
to 296 per cent of Fare Box Revenue from the period 2014 to 2046-47 to make this
corridor viable.
Hence, DMRC had not ensured availability of land for Property Development till
December 2020 despite the DPR highlighting this as the only way to make the corridor
viable.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that when the
DPR for the section was prepared in 2007-08, the estimated cost of 4.03 hectare private
land was ₹80.60 crore. But when the project was approved in 2012, there was
substantial development along the alignment raising the estimated cost to more than
₹1,000 crore making it impossible to acquire the identified plot. DMRC expressed their
inability to acquire the identified land till date due to various impediments and the
anticipated Non-Fare Box Revenue considered at the DPR stage could not materialise.
The Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC did not furnish specific reply to the Audit query on
projection of unrealistic assumption of Non-Fare Box Revenue in DPR to make it
viable. Thus, the fact remained that assessed revenue of ₹5,178 crore could not be
realised in the absence of land required for envisaged Property Development.
(ii) Execution of unviable Mundka-Bahadurgarh corridor
As per the DPR, the proposed metro corridor of Mundka-Bahadurgarh was not
financially viable. To make it viable, four hectare of land with ‘residential’ land use
near Ghevra crossing (Delhi) was required for Property Development. As on March
2020, the said land had not been acquired for Property Development, although this was
the determining parameter to make the project viable. Audit observed that the identified
four hectare land was already planned for establishment of Public Health University
and was under litigation since June 2008. However, DMRC did not carry out due
diligence at the time of preparation of DPR to ensure availability of land at the approval
stage. Rather, DMRC estimated upfront money of ₹168 crore from this four hectare
land in the DPR. However, assessed revenue in Delhi portion could not be realised in
the absence of envisaged Property Development area. As per the sanction letter
(September 2012), it was also stipulated that in case the estimated Property
Development revenue of ₹168 crore is not generated, the GoI and the GNCTD have to

33
Non-Fare Box Revenue comprising of revenue from lease out of commercial space,
advertisements, consultancy work etc.

24
 Report No. 11 of 2021

contribute the same as equity to DMRC. However, DMRC did not approach the GoI
and the GNCTD for providing the additional equity in lieu of land for Property
Development in Delhi portion.
Further, the DPR stated that Government of Haryana (GoH) will provide 1.56 hectare
land for Property Development in Haryana portion. While as per the sanction letter,
GoH was to provide 10 hectare of land for depot with some element of Property
Development, GoH provided 12 hectare land for depot including Property
Development. Audit observed that the depot has been constructed and only 0.8 hectare
space was available for Property Development, which also remained unutilised as of
March 2020. Thus, DMRC has not executed any Property Development activity even
in the available 0.8 hectare of land after lapse of seven years from the sanctioning of
the project though ₹549.27 crore (during horizon period of 30 years) was estimated
from this 1.56 hectare land for estimating Financial Internal Rate of Return.
The Financial Internal Rate of Return was calculated after considering the Property
Development income from 4 hectare land in Delhi portion and 1.56 hectare land in
Haryana portion.
Thus, DMRC recommended two financially unviable corridors after considering
revenue from Property Development without ensuring the availability of required land.
The Ministry and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that the GNCTD has
not provided four hectare land at Ghevra as proposed in the DPR. Necessary action to
develop the remaining 0.8 hectare land (Haryana portion) has since been taken. The
Ministry/ GNCTD while accepting (January 2021) the Audit observation for additional
equity of ₹168 crore stated that the GNCTD does not have any land, and the required
land is to be provided by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA). Accordingly, DDA
has been requested to provide funds in lieu of the lands for Property Development.
GNCTD endorsed the reply of DMRC.
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC is not acceptable as DMRC had not
ensured availability of said land for Property Development which was of paramount
importance to make the project viable.
(iii) Extension of unviable Najafgarh-Dwarka corridor upto Dhansa Bus Stand
DMRC prepared (December 2014) Feasibility Report for Najafgarh-Dhansa Bus Stand
(1.18 km length) which was an extension of the Line-9 and had one underground station
at Dhansa Bus Stand.
The MoUD sanctioned Figure 2.1
(09 May 2017) Najafgarh-
Dhansa Bus Stand section
with an estimated
completion cost of
₹565 crore. Audit observed
that Dwarka-Najafgarh corridor was viable only if the private land for Property
Development (4.03 hectare) near Najafgarh station was made available to DMRC.

25
Report No. 11 of 2021

Since the land could not be acquired, further extension of this unviable Dwarka-
Najafgarh corridor up to Dhansa Bus Stand without any Property Development will
further increase net cash outflow as construction cost (two times) and O&M cost
(10 times) of underground section is much higher than elevated section.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that due to
time gap and substantial development, it was not possible to acquire the identified land.
Further, while preparing the Feasibility Report for Dhansa Bus Stand extension, fare
structure escalation of 7.5 per cent per annum and average lead of 16 km was
considered for calculation of Financial Internal Rate of Return. This led to positive
value of Financial Internal Rate of Return (3.4 per cent) even without Property
Development land.
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not acceptable as without Property
Development activities on four hectare land, the net cash flow of Dwarka-Najafgarh
corridor was negative to the extent of ₹5,178 crore and extending this line to Dhansa
Bus Stand will further add to negative cash flows. Also, for an extension of 1.18 km
section, fare of average lead/ journey of 16 km had been considered for calculating
Financial Internal Rate of Return, which was already considered in earlier extension
(Dwarka-Najafgarh). This has resulted in estimation of higher Fare Box Revenue for
1.18 km of Najafgarh-Dhansa Bus Stand.
2.2.4 Non-approval and implementation of Corporate Plan of DMRC
In August 2009, DMRC proposed to revisit its original vision, mission etc., and to
prepare a long-term Corporate Plan. Accordingly, consultancy work of revisiting the
vision, mission etc., and preparation of a Corporate Plan was awarded (January 2010)
to M/s Feedback Ventures with scheduled completion period of 100 calendar days. The
consultant submitted its report in 2017-18 and was paid an amount of ₹0.32 crore by
DMRC. Audit observed that the horizon period of the proposed Corporate Plan was
2011 to 2021. Thus, a significant period of nine years of the horizon period had already
elapsed by the time the Corporate Plan was submitted. The delay was attributed to
extension of time given by DMRC due to delay in completion of Phase-II of MRTS and
subsequent discussions and presentations to DMRC. The Corporate Plan was approved
neither by the Managing Director nor by the Board of DMRC. Thus, even after a lapse
of 10 years, DMRC did not have a formal and approved Corporate Plan for guidance
towards effective and efficient achievement of its targets and goals.
During Exit Conference (January 2021), the Ministry/ DMRC has agreed for submitting
the Corporate Plan to Board of Directors for approval. As horizon period of the said
Corporate Plan was upto 2021, a revised Corporate Plan for next horizon period may
be prepared and approval of Board of Directors obtained before its implementation.
2.2.5 Change of planning from nine cars to six cars train platform after approval
of Phase-III DPR
As per Phase-III DPR, the length of elevated stations was 210 meter and 280 meter to
320 meter in case of underground stations. The Managing Director, DMRC while

26
 Report No. 11 of 2021

discussing (27 May 2011) the change of planning of running nine cars to six cars pointed
out that savings in the cost of underground stations for Line-7 and Line-8 shall be the
same as given in DPR for Central Secretariat-Kashmiri Gate34, which was built for six
cars trains. For elevated stations, savings was expected to be ₹2 crore for each station.
The Managing Director, DMRC pointed out that Peak Hour Peak Direction Traffic of
Phase-III as projected in the DPR can be carried by six car trains even up to 2031.
Additional Peak Hour Peak Direction Traffic beyond 2031, if any, can be catered to by
reducing the train’s headway35, which will be feasible under the Communication Based
Train Control system. Accordingly, it was decided that Line-7 and Line-8 should have
six car trains instead of nine cars as proposed in DPR. In this regard, Audit observed
that:
(i) Due to the decision to change the planning for running nine cars to six cars train,
the length of the platform size had to be reduced to 140 meter. Resultantly, the length
of the tunnel (in underground) and viaduct (on elevated) also increased. As per the
DPR, the cost of tunnelling per km and elevated viaduct was ₹144.31 crore and ₹29.87
crore, respectively. Due to change of decision from nine cars to six cars train
operations, there was additional cost of ₹6.49 crore and ₹2.09 crore per station in case
of underground and elevated stations, respectively. Thus, DMRC had to incur an
additional expenditure of ₹211.53 crore36. While the total estimated savings by DMRC
due to change of running nine cars to six cars train was ₹234.54 crore, the actual saving
was ₹23.01 crore only for Lines-7 and Line-8.
(ii) The design life of the station building is 120 years. In Phase-I & Phase-II, the
platforms were designed for eight car trains. Initially train operations were started with
four car trains which was increased to eight cars to cater to the increased ridership.
However, the reduction in size of platform to six car trains only (in Line-7 & Line-8)
has eliminated the possibility and scope for further increase in cars in a rake to cater to
the increase in ridership in the future.
(iii) DMRC also decided (27 May 2011) that the saving in civil cost of underground
stations for Line-7 and Line-8 shall be the same as given in the DPR for Central
Secretariat-Kashmiri Gate. DMRC adopted the estimated cost of underground station
building of Line-6 (₹113.01 crore) for Line-8. However, it was observed that width of
the Rolling Stock was different in the two lines: in Line-6, type ‘A’ Rolling Stock of
2.9 meter was used, while in Line-7 and Line-8, type ‘B’ Rolling Stock of 3.2 meter
was proposed. Further, the operations on Line-6 and Line-8 were not similar. Thus,
the specifications of both the corridors being different, the cost was not comparable.
(iv) The decision of running six cars train operations instead of nine cars was taken
without any cost benefit analysis. Further, no reasons for the reduction were recorded
at the time of approval. The decision was neither apprised to the Board of DMRC nor

34
This was the only corridor having six cars train operations in initial Phase-III DPR
35
The distance between two metro trains in a transit system measured in time or distance
36
(`6.49 crore x 21 underground station) + (`2.09 crore x 36 elevated station) = `211.53 crore

27
Report No. 11 of 2021

to the Administrative Ministry. Since the decision of changing of running nine cars to
six cars was taken (May 2011) before the sanction letter (26 September 2011) issued by
the MoHUA, the Phase-III DPR should have been revised accordingly.
Thus, DMRC changed the train operation from nine cars to six cars without detailed
justification, after sanctioning of Phase-III projects. This has resulted in elimination of
scope of further expansion to cater to the increased ridership in future.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that the
overall saving due to this change was ₹53.25 crore. The decision to reduce the platform
station length from nine coaches to six coaches was taken after due deliberation as being
advantageous on technical and financial grounds. For underground stations of Line-6,
design for coach-width is 2.9 meter whereas for Line-7 and Line-8 the underground
stations were designed for the coach width of 3.2 meter. Accordingly, cost of station
has been considered in the DPR and no change in other cost like Viaduct/ Tunnel was
considered. Since the DPR was submitted in February 2011, while decision was taken
in May 2011, it was already in the advanced stage of approval. Hence, revision of DPR
at that stage would have further delayed the approval process. As per Delegation of
Powers, Managing Director DMRC has been authorised to take such decisions.
The reply of Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC is not acceptable as low saving in the civil
cost is not justified in view of the fact that six cars platform station box has eliminated
the possibility and scope for further increase in cars in train composition in the future.
Further, total estimated savings due to change of running nine cars to six cars train was
₹234.54 crore, with actual saving of ₹23.01 crore37 only and not ₹53.25 crore. There
was also inconsistency in the decision making, as in Phase-IV of Delhi MRTS from
Aerocity to Tuglakabad corridor, nine cars operation was proposed in the DPR though
the ridership was less than that of Line-7 and Line-8 of Phase-III. Additionally, as per
the minutes of the 13th Board Meeting (January 1998), any substantive change in the
scope of work from DPR should be put up to the Board for approval. However, in this
case no such approval of the Board was obtained.
2.2.6 Blockage of funds of `106.24 crore due to construction of residential
complex under Transit Oriented Development
A Transit Oriented Development is a project that mixes residential and commercial
opportunities with the objective of optimising the use of land and maximising access to
public transport.
Transportation Chapter-12 of Master Plan of Delhi, 2021 as part of review of Master
Plan of Delhi-2021 was notified (14 July 2015) by the MoUD, GoI. This chapter
envisages Transit Oriented Development policy and development control norms. Delhi
Development Authority (DDA) have formulated and notified (November 2015) draft
regulations for operationlisation of Transit Oriented Development policy. DMRC
planned (August 2015) construction of a residential block at Okhla NSIC station under
Transit Oriented Development policy. In this regard, Audit observed that: -

37
`234.54 crore-`211.53 crore

28
 Report No. 11 of 2021

(i) There was no approved and notified Transit Oriented Development regulations
as the same were under review (from July 2015) of DDA and MoHUA. However,
DMRC constructed the residential project under Transit Oriented Development and
incurred a cost of ₹82.54 crore on structure and ₹23.7 crore on land cost. The residential
complex has been completed (November 2018), but so far, no dwelling unit has been
sold/ leased for generating Non-Fare Box Revenue.
(ii) DMRC has been requesting DDA since November 2018 to grant permission of
higher floor area ratio of 1.4 as against the permitted 1.0 for residential block. But DDA
has not granted any such permission. Audit noticed that Master Plan of Delhi does not
provide for any relaxation in floor area ratio for metro stations. Further, due to non-
availability of such permission/ approval from DDA, South Delhi Municipal
Corporation (SDMC) has not granted statutory approvals for allotment of residential
units. Delhi Fire Services provided (August 2016), no objection to DMRC for
construction of the said building. However, fire safety certificate from Delhi Fire
Services for the residential complex after its completion has not been obtained by
DMRC.
(iii) The Ministry has not allowed construction of residential project by DMRC.
Moreover, funds for the residential project were utilised from the Phase-III project. No
approval of the Board or the Ministry was obtained for implementation of residential
project under Transit Oriented Development.
(iv) Transit Oriented Development norms stipulated that 50 per cent dwelling units
of size ranging between 32 sqm to 40 sqm and balance 50 per cent less than and equal
to 65 sqm can be constructed. Total 108 dwelling unit areas ranging from 32 sqm to 50
sqm was approved by the Managing Director, DMRC. However, only 93 dwelling units
areas ranging from 42 sqm to 110 sqm were actually constructed. Further, six economic
weaker section flats were planned but not constructed by DMRC. In addition, 20 per
cent of the area of the amalgamated plot was to be designed as green public open space.
However, this has not been provided at the residential complex.
Thus, DMRC constructed residential project under Transit Oriented Development
policy without approved regulations for the same. This has resulted in blockade of
funds of ₹106.24 crore.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that the
proposal of development of Transit Oriented Development was in accordance with the
mandate given to DMRC by MoUD (March 2009) to explore Property Development
options, wherever feasible, as an accepted source of resource mobilisation towards
capital cost as well as sustainable operations. Accordingly, a commercial cum
residential complex was planned at Okhla NSIC as a mixed-use development. Since
Transit Oriented Development regulation by the MoHUA was not notified, the proposal
could not be submitted to the local authority. The project under consideration consists
of 93 residential units of one and two bed-rooms units, commercial area and public
spaces as per Transit Oriented Development norm as notified in July 2015 with 1.4 floor
area norm excluding operational area and ground coverage of 30 per cent which is

29
Report No. 11 of 2021

within the Transit Oriented Development norms. The Okhla NSIC project qualifies as
a Transit Oriented Development project as per both the policies except that Okhla does
not fall under any of the Transit Oriented Development nodes as per the new policy.
The number of residential units and their sizes cannot be predicted cent per cent before
completion of the structure design. While developing the concept design, DMRC
anticipated 108 residential units but while making the structural drawings, DMRC were
able to construct only 93 residences of various sizes. If the project gets approved as per
Transit Oriented Development necessary modification can be done to fulfil the size
requirement of the guidelines.
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not tenable because the guidelines of
MoUD does not encourage development of residential project under Property
Development. The proposal for approval of connection of water, electricity and
occupancy certificate etc., has not been issued by local authority due to non-notification
of Transit Oriented Development regulations. DMRC in their reply has accepted that
it had initially planned to construct 108 dwelling units but ultimately constructed 93
units only. Further, the residential project at NSIC Okhla does not fall under any of the
Transit Oriented Development Nodes approved by DDA. The fact remains that
construction of residential project without approved Transit Oriented Development
Regulations, resulted in blockage of funds of ₹106.24 crore.
2.2.7 Non-adoption of General Financial Rules for sanction and administrative
approval from the appropriate authority and for incurring expenditure

[Link] Execution of work of `2,912.21 crore without administrative approval and

expenditure sanction
As per Rule 129 (1) of General Financial Rules (GFR), 2005, no works shall be
commenced or liability incurred in connection with it until administrative approval has
been obtained from the appropriate authority in each case and sanction to incur
expenditure has been obtained from the competent authority. In this regard, Audit
observed that the works were started by DMRC in violation of GFR as discussed below:
(i) The work on three corridors i.e., Kalindi Kunj-Botanical Garden, Noida City
Centre to Noida Sector-62 and Dilshad Garden to New Bus Adda, Ghaziabad were
commenced on the basis of signing of Memorandum of Agreement between DMRC
and NOIDA/ Ghaziabad Development Authority, but without obtaining the sanction of
the competent authority i.e., MoHUA.
(ii) The work on the Faridabad- Ballabhgarh corridor was commenced even without
signing of Memorandum of Agreement between DMRC and Government of Haryana
and without the sanction of the competent authority. The same was signed on 04
January 2019 i.e., after Revenue Operation Date on 19 November 2018.
(iii) In the case of Kalindi Kunj-Botanical Garden corridor (Line-8 extension),
sanction of Cabinet was granted (20 December 2017) after completion of work and just
five days before commissioning of corridor. In the case of Dilshad Garden-New Bus

30
 Report No. 11 of 2021

Adda, sanction order was issued (14 February 2019) by GoI with stipulated scheduled
completion date as 31 January 2019 (14 days before the issue of sanction order).
(iv) An expenditure of `1,081.85 crore, `537.68 crore, `1,081.72 crore and
`210.96 crore for Noida City Centre to Noida Sector-62, Kalindi Kunj- Botanical
Garden, Dilshad Garden to New Bus Adda, and Faridabad-Ballabhgarh corridors,
respectively, was incurred even before sanction/ administrative approval from the
competent authority in contravention of the GFR.
Thus, work of three corridors was started without approval of Administrative Ministry
and in case of Ballabhgarh extension, DMRC neither signed the MoU with Government
of Haryana nor got the project sanctioned from GoI before commencement of work.
DMRC replied (July 2020) that while ordering the work, it was for the State
Government to ensure that relevant approvals have been obtained to undertake the work
and to get the project sanctioned from GoI. DMRC started the work on getting part
money in advance from the State Government. Any delay in getting the sanction by
GoI is the responsibility of the Government of Uttar Pradesh (GoUP). However, GoUP
had signed the MoU before the project was sanctioned by GoI. Therefore, there is no
violation of GFR. The Ministry/ GNCTD replied (January 2021) that these corridors
were taken up after signing of Agreement with the respective authorities and release of
fund by them. Procuring administrative approval and expenditure sanction was the
responsibility of the concerned authorities and the same were obtained before
commissioning of the lines.
The reply of DMRC is not acceptable as the work on these NCR extensions was
commenced without the approval of the MoHUA and GNCTD. Commencement of
work without approval of the competent authority is violation of GFR provisions. In
2012, at the time of drafting Memorandum of Agreement for Phase-III, MoUD
instructed not to assign any other work to DMRC without prior consent of MoUD.
However, the consent/ approval of the same from GoI was not taken before
commencement of work. Being a Government organisation, DMRC has to abide by the
procedure for construction of any metro corridor. Hence, it is also the responsibility of
DMRC to ensure that all obligations have been fulfilled before commencement of any
construction work.
[Link] Additional estimated expenditure of `3,246.80 crore relating to
modification/ change in alignment of already sanctioned Phase-III
corridors without approval of Cabinet
As per Rule 131 of GFR, 2005, any anticipated or actual savings from a sanctioned
estimate for a definite project, shall not, without special authority, be applied to carry
out additional work not contemplated in the original project.
Phase-III Delhi MRTS project was sanctioned and funded by the GoI and the GNCTD,
and any modification/ deviation in sanctioned project/ corridor having financial
implications require approval of sanctioning authority as per GFR provisions. Further,
MoUD vide its letters dated 18 December 2012/ 31 October 2014, directed that any

31
Report No. 11 of 2021

deviation in Phase-III projects and extensions as against approved DPR would require
Cabinet sanction with details/ justifications. In this regard, Audit observed that:
(i) Managing Director, DMRC modified (December 2011) the elevated alignment
between Janak Puri (West) to Palam into underground section as a result of which the
number of stations got reduced from four to three just after three months from
sanctioning (September 2011) of the project by the GoI due to infirmities in the DPR.
This change in alignment from elevated to underground led to additional cost of
₹601 crore which was to be met from the savings in the project. Besides, five other
sections were also modified.
(ii) DMRC, in its midterm appraisal (2013) on Phase-III MRTS corridors had
apprised the Board that there was marginal increase of ₹106 crore (0.26 per cent) over
the sanctioned cost. It also apprised to the Board that there was an increase of 13.30 km
length in the underground section and decrease of 11.214 km length in the elevated
section. Based on estimated completion cost for the underground section and elevated
section for Phase-III as per DMRC letter dated 08 April 2011, Audit calculated the
additional estimated cost of these modification in alignment as ₹3,246.80 crore38, which
was 8.58 per cent (₹3,246.80 crore/ ₹37801.61 crore) of the sanctioned cost of initial
phase-III corridors and Dwarka-Najafgarh. Moreover, for increase in completion cost
vis-à-vis sanctioned cost, approval of the Cabinet was not sought.
(iii) Utilisation of saving from already sanctioned projects without the approval of
the competent authority i.e., the Administrative Ministry (MoHUA) as per GFR was not
prudent.
Thus, DMRC modified the alignments after sanctioning of the corridors by the GoI and
approval was not obtained from GoI. Further, DMRC incurred expenditure of
₹3,246.80 crore after utilising the saving of already sanctioned Phase-III corridors in
contravention of GFR provision.
DMRC replied (July 2020) that the cost of change in alignment from elevated to
underground was to be met from the expected saving of Phase-III. Hence, the case was
not sent to the MoUD. As per the preliminary expenditure details, the total expenditure
for Phase-III is ₹42,734 crore (approx.) against the DPR provision of ₹39,796 crore.
Further, out of ₹2,938 crore i.e., extra expenditure over and above the sanctioned cost,
only ₹525 crore (1.47 per cent) was on account of actual construction of Civil, Electrical
and Mechanical, Traction, Signalling and Telecom and Rolling Stock. The remaining
expenditure was mainly on account of delay in handing over of land by various agencies
and consequent extension of period of Phase-III. The completion cost as mentioned is
the DPR cost and not the actual completion cost of Phase-III. Therefore, additional cost
worked out by Audit was not correct, as it does not include savings obtained in
contracts.
The Ministry/ GNCTD replied (January 2021) that Empowered Group of Ministers vide
meeting held on 4 August 2000 directed that changes of design/ technical nature

38
`3,246.80 crore = {13.29 x `408 crore} – {11.214x `194 crore}

32
 Report No. 11 of 2021

vis-à-vis the DPR should be settled by DMRC Board unless these involve significant
cost and time overruns or have major implications of such a nature as cannot be
considered to be internal to the project. These changes are purely due to technical
reasons internal to the project. The excess cost on this account was contemplated to be
adjusted from the expected saving of Phase-III. Thus, the approval of these
modifications was within the power of DMRC Board of Directors whose approval was
taken by DMRC.
DMRC accepted that ₹2,938 crore was the extra expenditure incurred over and above
the sanctioned cost. Hence, approval of both utilisation of funds from savings of
sanctioned funds and incurring of additional expenditure should have been obtained
from GoI. Further, break up (line wise and item wise) of expenditure of ₹42,734 crore
against the DPR provision of ₹39,796 crore has not been provided to Audit despite
requisition39 and repeated reminders. The details of actual savings made in contracts
has also not been furnished to Audit. The reply of the Ministry is not acceptable as
modifications from elevated section to underground section involve significant cost
overrun (i.e., 2 times) and time over run (i.e., 6 months to12 months). Further, MoUD
letters issued in December 2012 and October 2014 also require approval of Cabinet for
any deviation in Phase-III projects and extensions as against approved DPR.
2.3 Selection of Technology
A metro system requires a complex set of technological infrastructures and components
to ensure its smooth operations. These components include Rolling Stock, Signalling
system, Electrical, Track and Traction System etc. DMRC’s planning and execution of
various technologies in various lines of the metro system were examined by Audit along
with the Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) and the observations are as brought out in the
following paragraphs.

2.3.1 Rolling Stock

During Phase-III, DMRC procured 924 metro cars at a cost of ₹7,862.71 crore through
four contracts which include three contracts (RS-9, RS-11 and RS-13) for augmentation
of Rolling Stock in existing Line-1 to Line-6 and a contract (RS-10) for newly
constructed Lines-7, 8 and 9 as detailed below:
Table 2.1
Details of Rolling Stock contracts executed during Phase-III
Name Procured Name of the Date of No. of cars Awarded
of the for Line contractor award of procured cost of one
contract Contract car
` in crore)
(`
RS-9 5 & 6 M/s BEML & 01.07.2013 92+70= 8.22
Hyundai Rotem 162
consortium (BR
Consortium)

39
vide Audit Requisition no. 92 in December 2019

33
Report No. 11 of 2021

Name Procured Name of the Date of

No. of cars Awarded
of the for Line contractor award of
procured cost of one
contract Contract car
` in crore)
(`
RS-10 7, 8 & 9 M/s Hyundai Rotem 01.04.2013 486+18= 8.62
Company 504
RS-11 2, 3 & 4 M/s Bombardier 12.06.2015 124+38= 9.25
Transportation India 162
Private Ltd
RS-13 1, 2, 3 & 4 M/s BEML Ltd 21.05.2015 74+22=96 8.82
Total cars 924
In this regard, Audit observed the following:

[Link] Inconsistency in variation clauses of Rolling Stock contracts

DMRC awarded four contracts40 for procurement of Rolling Stock during the
implementation of Phase-III. The variation clause in the contract agreements except
RS-9 stipulates that the employer at his discretion may advise the contractor in writing
about increase of the total quantity up to 30 per cent of the tendered quantity. However,
the variation clause of RS-9 contract stipulates the variation quantity up to 60 cars (65
per cent) of the tendered quantity of 92 cars. The quantity was augmented up to 70 cars
(76 per cent of tendered quantity) through a variation order.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that there is
no stated guideline for quantity variation option to be followed in all contracts and the
variation quantity is worked out based on anticipated requirement of additional quantity
in the near future and included in the tender so that the additional quantity can be
procured at the contracted terms without going through the process of fresh tendering.
It is suggested that as DMRC deals with significant number of contracts in metro
projects, they should have a stated guideline for quantity variation in order to maintain
consistency.

[Link] Avoidable expenditure of `3.24 crore due to non-incorporation of rate of

Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning Coefficient of Performance in
RS-11 contract
Employer’s Requirements Technical Specification (ERTS) of Heating Ventilation and
Air-Conditioning under RS-11 contract stipulates that employer expects that energy
efficient system comparable with the best available in the market shall be provided.
However, in contract RS-13 under ERTS, it was mentioned that Coefficient of
Performance41 of Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning shall not be less than 2.5 in
summer and monsoon season under both outdoor and indoor conditions. DMRC
initiated the tendering process of both RS-11 and RS-13 contracts in 2014. Hence, there

40
RS-9, RS-10, RS-11 and RS-13
41
Coefficient of Performance indicate the ratio of heating or cooling provided by a unit relative to
the amount of electrical input required to generate it. Higher Coefficient of Performance equate
to higher efficiency, lower energy (power) consumption and thus lower operating cost

34
 Report No. 11 of 2021

was no reason for the clauses of Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning Coefficient
of Performance to be different in the two agreements.
Further, instead of approving the Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning Coefficient
of Performance of 2.5 (as in the case of RS-13 which was comparable with the best
available) without any extra expenditure, DMRC granted variation of ₹3.24 crore
(November 2017) to the contractor for Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning
Coefficient of Performance 2.3 in RS-11, which was a lower version than RS-13.
Besides, the awarded cost42 of RS-13 with Coefficient of Performance of 2.5 is less than
RS-11. If RS-11 having Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning with Coefficient of
Performance 2.3 would have been purchased without variation and consistent clauses
were incorporated in the tenders, DMRC could have saved up to ₹3.24 crore.
Thus, DMRC procured less efficient Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning system
in RS-11 contract after incurring additional expenditure of ₹3.24 crore.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that Notice
Inviting Tender of RS-11 (augmentation of RS-2/ 5/ 7) and RS-13 were floated on
22 July 2014 and 22 August 2014, respectively. During the design evaluation phase
(October 2015), it was noticed that Coefficient of Performance was as low as 1.7.
DMRC informed M/s Bombardier Transportation (contractor) to improve Coefficient
of Performance to the level of 2.5. The contractor informed (May 2016) that improved
Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning with Coefficient of Performance 2.3 is
developed by the Original Equipment Manufacturer and mentioned that additional time
and cost would be required for this additional work. Based on the mainline tests, total
saving of energy per Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning per hour works out to
be 7.35 units. Considering energy cost of ₹6.03 per unit and 12 hours of operation
daily, saving per day works out to be ₹532.36 per system. Considering the same, the
variation cost will get paid back to DMRC through energy savings in approximately
175 days (approximately six summer months).
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not acceptable as it is silent on the Audit
observation regarding non-incorporation of the rate of Heating Ventilation and Air
Conditioning Coefficient of Performance in RS-11 contract as mentioned in RS-13
contract although approval for procurement of RS-11 and RS-13 was taken at the same
time in June 2014. In this regard, Audit observed that a highest possible value of
Coefficient of Performance of Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (keeping up
with industry state of art) may be specified in the contract instead of comparing to later
variations, which might be difficult or have cost implications at a later stage. DMRC
is justifying the variation amount paid on the basis of saving in energy. Further,
incorporation of the clause for Coefficient of Performance 2.5 energy efficient Heating
Ventilation and Air Conditioning, would have resulted in continuous saving of energy
in the future years without any variation.

42
Awarded cost of RS-11 Rolling Stock: `9.25 crore per car, RS-13 Rolling Stock: `8.83 crore per
car

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Report No. 11 of 2021

[Link] Introduction of Unattended Train Operation technology without

preparedness and cost-benefit analysis
DMRC issued (03 March 2012) Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) on International
Competitive Bidding basis for 486 standard gauge cars (RS-10). Meanwhile, a detailed
note was submitted (29 May 2012) to the Managing Director, DMRC by three Directors
of DMRC stating that DPR of Phase-III corridors envisages train control and signalling
system based on Communication Based Train Control which is an excellent opportunity
for introduction of Unattended Train Operation43 feature with marginal cost and
attendant benefits. The note was approved (31 May 2012) by the Managing Director,
DMRC. The benefits would include saving in manpower in depot and, to a certain
extent, in the main Line too. In case of RS-10 contract, a clause related to minimum
Guaranteed Energy Consumption during one round trip of Line-7 (factory test and
actual Line) was included. In case of non-achievement of Guaranteed Energy
Consumption, penalty was to be levied according to the penalty clause as mentioned in
the contract.
In this regard, Audit observed that:
(i) During the preparation and approval stage of DPR of Phase-III (2008-11),
proposal for introduction of new technology i.e., Unattended Train Operation along
with proposed benefits/ merits were neither discussed nor appraised by DMRC at any
stage before May 2012.
(ii) Although the mode of operation of Rolling Stock was modified, DMRC did not
revise the estimated cost considering Unattended Train Operation mode and their
features like additional Closed Circuit Television etc., in NIT.
(iii) Since DPR was prepared based on normal Rolling Stock, there was no provision
for Platform Screen Doors in the DPR for Phase-III lines. Later, due to shifting at
Unattended Train Operation mode, DMRC had to award the supply and installation of
Platform Screen Doors contract for Line-7 and Line-8 at ₹312 crore.
(iv) At approval stage, DMRC stated that after introduction of Unattended Train
Operation there would be cost reduction as number of Train Operators would be
reduced. Yet, no cost benefit analysis was made by DMRC’ and moreover in many
countries Unattended Train Operation with staff/ driver was in operation for a long time.
Thus, claim of DMRC regarding cost cut due to reduction/ rationalisation in number of
Train Operators after the introduction of Unattended Train Operation is doubtful.
(v) Rolling Stock (RS-10) was operational since 25 December 2017 and due to lack
of connectivity of Line-7, DMRC had not conducted Guaranteed Energy Consumption
test online. Hence, any achievement of Guaranteed Energy Consumption value in real
conditions by the contractor, and penalty, if any, in case of non-achievement of
Guaranteed Energy Consumption could not be ascertained (31 March 2021).

43
Unattended Train Operation is level of automation (GoA4), wherein the train shall be operated
without train operator. Operation Control Centre will send a command to ATC system onboard to
operate the train so as to align train doors with the Platform Screen Doors.

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

Thus, DMRC introduced Unattended Train Operation technology without mentioning

the same in DPR and also cost benefit analysis was not conducted at the approval stage.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that
Communication Based Train Control technology had reached its maturity. Further,
features required for operation in GoA344/ GoA445 could be incorporated in the new
Rolling Stock and Signalling and Train Control System at incremental additional cost
but within the provisions available in the DPR of Phase-III, and that if these features
were incorporated at a later date, the cost would be very high. As Unattended Train
Operation with Communication Based Train Control was already a rapidly evolving
and preferred technology for a number of metro systems, no major cost implications
were envisaged and thus the estimate was not revised. The cost cut due to reduction of
numbers of Train Operators can be ascertained only after introduction of Unattended
Train Operation. DMRC agreed that initially, Platform Screen Doors were not
considered. However, although not essential, under Indian conditions with Unattended
Train Operation provision, Platform Screen Doors is expected to increase passenger
safety against accidental falls and unauthorised entry to track. The demonstration on
mainline is pending as the specified section from Mukundpur (Majlis Park) to Maujpur
is still not ready due to pending construction work.
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not acceptable as introduction of new
technology was neither discussed nor appraised by DMRC at any stage before May
2012. DMRC admitted that no cost estimation was made before introduction of
Unattended Train Operation. Further, Audit has not been provided any component wise
cost of Rolling Stock, either actual or estimated. Estimates are prepared on lump sum
basis and to say that Unattended Train Operation functionality involves only marginal
cost, is unverifiable. Further, Platform Screen Doors is an essential feature46 for
Unattended Train Operation System. In Phase-I, out of three Lines executed during
Phase-I, Automatic Train Operation was introduced on only Line-2. Later, the same
was introduced on all new Lines of Phase-II i.e., Line-5 and Line-6, whereas,
Unattended Train Operation was introduced in all new lines of Phase-III (Line-7, Line-8
and Line-9) without any prior experience.

[Link] Excess procurement of Rolling Stock in Phase-III resulting in its idling

DMRC awarded four contracts for the procurement of Rolling Stock during Phase-III.
Three of them viz. contract RS-9, RS-11 and RS-13 were awarded to meet the
procurement of 420 metro cars of existing lines (Line-1 to Line-6) and extension of

44
Grade/level of automation wherein fully automated train operation but train driver will remain in
cab for attending emergency situations
45
Grade/level of automation wherein fully automated train operation without driver in cab. In case
of emergency situation, the same is handled by the operation control centre staff
46
In response to Board of Directors observation (91st meeting) on installation of Platform Screen
Doors, Director (Operation) stated that Platform Screen Doors are becoming necessity in case of
manual train operation also. Further, in response to Audit observation mentioned in para 3.11,
DMRC stated that use of Platform Screen Doors is mandatory with Unattended Train Operation.

37
Report No. 11 of 2021

existing lines during Phase-III. RS-10 contract was awarded for procurement of 504
metro cars for Line-7, Line-8 and Line-9.
Audit observed that DMRC estimated the requirement of Rolling Stock in the DPR
prepared in February 2011, whereas the procurement was initiated in 2013-14. At the
time of tendering, DMRC did not conduct any analysis for the projections of
requirement of Rolling Stock on the basis of actual turnaround time of each line, actual
length of metro line, actual speed of Rolling Stock (Automatic Train Protection,
Automatic Train Operation, Unattended Train Operation mode), reserve stock criteria,
and Peak Hour Peak Direction Traffic. Considering actual parameters i.e., actual
operational plan, actual speed of Rolling Stock, actual reversal time on the lines, Audit
had worked out (by using formula of DMRC for procurement of RS) that DMRC had
procured 84 excess metro cars during Phase-III amounting to ₹739.20 crore.
Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) stated that no mathematical/ scientific model was
found to justify the excess purchase of Rolling Stock in Phase-III. DMRC’s stand that
it was done on the basis of their experience, appears to be unjustified. Thus, DMRC
should consider a scientific model like “Rolling Stock Circulation Model for Railway
Rapid Transit Systems” for procurement of metro cars.
Thus, DMRC did not analyse the requirement of Rolling Stock on the basis of actual
parameters at the time of procurement. This has resulted in excess procurement of
Rolling Stock and its idling.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that DPR is
the only available document to determine Rolling Stock requirement. For factors like
turnaround time, length of Line, speed of Rolling Stock, there is rarely any change from
DPR provisions. The train operation plan had taken into consideration all these factors
while assessing the requirement of cars. Traffic forecast considers several factors into
account. All these assumptions may not materialise in the expected way. Further, the
percentage of unutilised cars depends on several factors. The trains on Line-7 are not
being operated fully owing to discontinuity at Trilokpuri due to Rehabilitation and
Resettlement issue.
The Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC reply is not acceptable as the operational plan
determined in the DPR differs from the actual operational plan. Hence, DMRC should
have analysed the requirement of Rolling Stock on the basis of actual operational plan,
turnaround facility available at terminal metro station, actual length of metro corridor,
speed of Rolling Stock i.e., Automatic Train Protection, Automatic Train Operation,
actual increase in ridership and Peak Hour Peak Direction Traffic during the period as
Audit noticed inconsistencies in these parameters from DPR provisions. The
contention of DMRC regarding partial operation of Line-7 is not tenable as the same
headway (frequency), as mentioned in DPR, has been maintained.

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

[Link] Deficiencies in the Rolling Stock and Rail

(A) Quality issues of rails and wheel of Rolling Stock

(i) Hardness measurement (at site/ depot and laboratory) were conducted by the
Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) along with Audit Team the in the presence of DMRC
team on Line-7 (IP extension metro station, Vinod Nagar Depot and Mukundpur Depot)
which revealed that both the rails (NHH47-880 and HH48-1080) possess relatively low
values of hardness as compared to the values as per set standards. As per Indian
Railway Standard Specification (December 2009) and as per DMRC specifications, the
hardness value of rail should not be less than 260 BHN49 for HH 880 rail head (Depot
area) and hardness value should be in the range of 340-390 BHN for HH 1080 (main
Line). However, actual hardness values measured were in the range of 217-292 BHN
(Depot area) and 260-360 BHN (main Line). This indicates that DMRC has used rails
of relatively less hardness. This may result in increased maintenance cost for DMRC
due to decreased life of rails and wheels.

Figure 2.2
Measuring of rail surface hardness of Line-7 (IP extension metro station on
31 January 2020)

47
Non-Head Harden
48
Head Harden
49
Brinell Hardness Number (BHN)- The Brinell hardness test is commonly used to determine the
hardness of materials like metals and alloys

39
Report No. 11 of 2021

(ii) DMRC stated that hardness of rail should be more than wheels, as through
passes of runs, will lead to the wear and tear of wheels and rail, and replacing the worn
rails would be easier than replacing the wheels. During on-site investigation, it was
found that hardness of wheels (at the locations which contact rail) and rails were almost
the same, which is good for longer wheel life. Keeping this in mind (i.e., increase in
hardness at the contacts due to strain hardening during run), DMRC should have used
rail and wheels with equal hardness (or may be even more) from the beginning itself in
order to have good performance from running-in periods.
Figure 2.3
Photographic view of a wheel’s surface hardness in three zones (A, B, and C)
measured in presence of DMRC (Vinod Nagar depot on 31 January 2020)

(iii) DMRC sends wheels for grinding/ turning after they have run for some
kilometres. It was observed that the decision on grinding/ turning of wheels should be
taken after considering the permissible increase in noise and vibrations as well. After
grinding/ turning, the harden layer of the wheel is removed with increased surface
roughness. In such a case, DMRC did not have any technical means to increase the
hardness of wheels and to improve the surface finish of the wheels and rails. Restoring
the hardness on flanges of the wheels and rails (after grinding) is paramount as increase
in vibration and noise was recorded after turning and grinding of wheels and rails,
respectively.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that DMRC
procures Rails and Wheels according to International Standards. Wheel profiling is
measured as per the parameter provided by Original Equipment Manufacturers
(OEMs). The Ministry added that DMRC is open to refer to the suggestions made to
Rolling Stock manufacturers and Research Designs and Standards Organisation/
Ministry of Railways as no such technical instructions are available as of now.
The Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC reply is not acceptable as the rail samples (unused)
were collected from DMRC for measurement of hardness in the IIT Delhi laboratory.
Measurement of hardness revealed low value of hardness in critical areas. Technical

40
 Report No. 11 of 2021

Consultant (IIT Delhi) observed that the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC’s reply regarding
grinding and turning of wheels lacks technical explanation. DMRC should integrate
the vibration and noise levels while deciding the time for turning the wheel and grinding
the rails head. For this vibration and noise inside the car near the side wall and in the
vicinity of floor should be picked-up. These two parameters will also reveal the quality
(in terms of hardness and wear) of rails and wheels. Hence, DMRC may explore ways
to restore the hardness of rails and wheels.
(B) Higher vibration and Noise
As per ISO 2631 norms, passengers should not be subjected to vibration level more than
0.315 meter per second squared (m/s2). Audit along with the Technical Consultant (IIT
Delhi) observed that vibration and noise levels were higher than permissible values at
different locations of Line-7 (inside Rolling Stock, noise and vibration tests were
conducted from Mayur Vihar Pocket -1 to Majlis Park and vice versa and outside
Rolling Stock, noise test was conducted at Sarai Kale Khan and Majlis Park metro
station). The vibration level was higher in several places with maximum value up to
2.5 m/s2. This indicated that interface of wheels and rails was not proper, and the noise/
vibration absorption system needs attention. Exterior noise level was also found
exceeding the permissible limit in the range of 69 decibel to 80 decibel.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that the noise
and vibration inside and outside of metro trains are measured as per the technical
standards (specified in the Contract).
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not acceptable because if rails have less
hardness (as found during the measurements), friction is found to increase at rail and
wheel interfaces. Thus, DMRC may regularly review vibrations and noise levels inside
and outside the Rolling Stock.
(C) Issue of lubricant waste on the track
Lubrication at the interface of rail and wheel flanges (during negotiating a turn) is
achieved by spraying directed lubricant (synthetic chemicals). While the lubricant may
be essential for machine contacts, it is hazardous for humans and the environment.
Visual inspection of track revealed presence of contaminants at the side of railhead,
which is for interfacing with wheel’s flanges. Thus, DMRC did not have an integrated
system of biodegradable lubrication based on bio-degradable oils.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that during
Phase-III oil-based wheel flange lubricator was used which was technically defined as
“Readily Biodegradable according to OECD50 301B”.
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC needs to be viewed in the light of the fact
that DMRC was unable to provide the FTIR51 spectra of lubricant for understanding

50
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
51
Fourier-transform i.e., used for detecting degradation, dilution, or illegal additives in different
types of oils

41
Report No. 11 of 2021

whether lubricant used was biodegradable or not. DMRC further noted the suggestions
for use of biodegradable oil.
(D) Maintenance issues of Rolling Stock
(i) A visit of tunnel at Hauz-Khas metro station was conducted by Audit along with
Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) for assessing the maintenance aspects of rail track and
related matters. It was noticed that there were corrosions of rail, tie plates, nuts and
bolts indicating that there was presence of water/ moisture near the track. Hence,
DMRC should have ensured prevention of water leakage during maintenance for good
rail life.
(ii) For removing the contaminants/ingress from lubricated surface of head, there
should be regular process, else lubricant will not be effective at the interface of rail and
wheel. This will result in accelerated wear of wheel flange and side of rail head causing
increase in the maintenance cost.
(iii) Missing bolts from the plate, besides damage on rail heads were also noticed
during site visit, as shown in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4
Views of tie plates and bolts
(a) Missing bolts (b) corroded bolts & nuts
(Hauz-Khas station, l8 December 2019)

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that O&M
wing of DMRC takes all needful action to ensure longer service life of Rails and
ensured to take higher level of precautions as recommended. As per RDSO52 approval,
Pandrol fastening system has arrangements for four bolt holes in base plates but
provision of two bolts is adequate for Tangent track & curves sharper than 500 meter.
DMRC adopted two bolts for the Tangent track and curves sharper than 1,000 meter.
The Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC explanation of needful action taken is not convincing
because Audit noticed corrosion of rail and contaminants/ ingress from lubricated
surface of head on rails during verification and there should be a process for removing
the contaminant and ingress. Further, using a plate of four holes in place of two holes
and leaving two holes empty may allow moisture/ water and is a source of
contamination & storage.
2.4 Signalling system
Signalling system is used to control traffic and to ensure safe operation of trains. The
parameters of the system used in the project have been worked out keeping in mind the
smaller headway of train operations and consequent safety requirements. In Phase-I
and Phase-II, DMRC adopted Distance to Go, Automatic Train Protection, Automatic
Train Supervision and Automatic Train Operations to optimise Rolling Stock
operations. Detailed Project Report for Phase-III corridors envisaged adoption of Train
Control & Signalling System based on Communication Based Train Control
technology. This technology offers inherent built-in capability of better two-way
communication between train locations on track and train. In this regard, Audit
observed the following:
2.4.1 Avoidable expenditure of up to `23.97 crore due to deficient tender
evaluation
Tenders for train control and signalling system for Line-7 and Line-8 were issued
(28 September 2012 to 08 October 2012) by DMRC. The contract package CS 03 and
CS 04 are given as under: -
Table 2.2
Tender Line Description of Route Number Estimated Estimated Awarded
Sections km of stations cost as per cost put to cost per/
DPR tender km
` in crore)
(` ` in crore)
(` ` in crore)
(`
CS03 Line-7 Mukundpur- 58.59 38 568.69 435.28 6.09
Maujpur-
Shiv Vihar
CS04 Line-8 Janak Puri 37.46 25 383.91 290.43 6.73
West-Botanical
Garden

52
Research Design & Standards Organisation: It is a research and development organisation under
the Ministry of Railways of GoI, which functions as a technical advisor and consultant to the
Railways Board, RITES, RailTel and IRCON International in respect of design and
standardisation of railway equipment and problems related to railway construction, operations and
maintenance.

43
Report No. 11 of 2021

As per Para A 1.7 of Notice Inviting Tender (NIT), CS 03 and CS 04 may not be
awarded to the same tenderer.
In this regard, Audit observed that:
(i) The cost per km for Line-7 and Line-8 was ₹6.09 crore and ₹6.73 crore,
respectively. The financial bid of CS 03 was opened (05 June 2013) initially and
followed by opening of the financial bid of CS 04 on 15 July 2013. Since the price bid
of Line-8 was opened subsequently and DMRC was aware that M/s Bombardier has
quoted less, efforts should have been made by DMRC to ask M/s Nippon Signalling to
match the price quoted by M/s Bombardier. The price difference was ₹64 lakh per km
in CS 03 and CS 04 tender. This may have resulted in a saving of up to ₹23.97 crore
(37.46 km x ₹0.64 crore) to DMRC.
(ii) As per NIT, the work of Line-7 and Line-8 may not be awarded to one
contractor. Once the lowest eligible tenderer is established for CS 03, the financial bid
of CS 04 shall be opened. At this stage, the financial bid of the tenderer who has been
established lowest in CS 03, shall not be opened. This condition put by DMRC was
restrictive and did not ensure fair competition. Further, in contract CS 03,
M/s Bombardier was L1 and M/s Nippon Signalling was L2. Due to restrictive
condition put by DMRC, M/s Nippon Signalling who was L2 in CS 03 contract was
bound to come L1 in CS 04 contract.
(iii) Calling of separate tenders resulted in two separate and distinct signalling
systems for Line-7 & Line-8 for the same Rolling Stock (RS 10). Thus, DMRC has to
maintain separate inventory, impart separate training to the personnel, and have separate
train control system at the Operation Control Center etc. DMRC had to incur extra cost
for inventory as well. Besides, rotating of personnel from one line to another may create
operational difficulties due to differential understanding of the signalling systems.
Thus, the condition placed by DMRC was restrictive and did not ensure fair
competition. This has resulted in avoidable expenditure of ₹23.97 crore.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC has accepted (January 2021 and July 2020) the
Audit observation and stated that for similar contracts in future, after deciding L1 in the
first tender, financial bids of all the bidders in the 2nd tender would be opened. If L1 is
the same for both the tenders, then L2 would be asked to counter offer the rates of L1.
2.4.2 Deficiencies in the Communication Based Train Control System
As per the final Report (November 2013) of Sub- Committee on Standardisation of
Signalling & Train Control System constituted by MoUD, the Communication Based
Train Control System, as defined in the IEEE53 1474 standard, is a “continuous
automatic train control system utilising high resolution train location determination,
independent of track circuits, continuous, high capacity, bidirectional train-to- wayside
data communications, and train borne and wayside processors capable of implementing
vital functions. Communication Based Train Control system includes the following

53
the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

44
 Report No. 11 of 2021

subsystems, 1) train onboard system, 2) train-to-trackside radio system, and 3)

backbone trackside signalling system. The subsystems work individually and, in case
of failure, coordinates with each other without disturbing their operation.
The onboard system contains Automatic Train Protection, which controls safety-related
functions and determines movement authority and Automatic Train Operation, which
controls the actual train driving functions and can be used to realise driverless
operations.
The onboard system detects the train location and sends this information to the trackside
signalling system, which further uses this information to form the control pattern
(information) sent to each train. The onboard system calculates the control pattern and
controls the speed of the train.
The trackside signalling system controls the train headway and controls interlock
(route). It contains Automatic Train Supervision responsible for the overall centralised
signalling and train operation data. Centralisation of the system improves the
availability of the track operation by controlling all functions from a single processing
unit.
Figure 2.5
Functional diagram of the Communication Based Train Control system

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Report No. 11 of 2021

This technology has been approved by MoHUA and following is observed in this
regard.
(i) Reduced reliability due to wireless connections of Access Points of the
Communication Based Train Control system
During verification at Line-8, it was observed that Access Points are wirelessly
connected inside the tunnels without any redundancy. Due to curvature in the tunnels,
the wireless signal from one Access Point reaches another Access Point after getting
reflected through multiple paths, resulting in multipath fading (interference from
several reflected paths). This may result in severely reduced amplitudes at the receiver,
decreasing the reliability of the link. Due to multipath fading, this architecture has a
decreased reliability54, which is a deficiency in planning or designing by DMRC. Thus,
proper measurements and tests must be conducted to gain assurance regarding the
possibility of fading in such architectures.
In Line-7, the Access Points are connected using optical fibres. The transmission mode
of the free wave has the worst anti-interference capability to WiFi signals55. Thus, the
architecture of the Line-7 has better reliability (due to no fading and low interference
susceptibility to WiFi), and consequently, better up-times. However, DMRC did not
put this (wired connections of the Access Points) as a requirement in their tender,
leading to a less reliable architecture in Line-8.
There are also other noted advantages of using wired connections between the Access
Points, such as longer link length, as a signal in free space suffers from a higher
attenuation. Thus, a higher number of Access Points are typically required in wireless
Access Points compared to the Access Points connected through wired infrastructure.
During site visit from Hauz Khas metro station to IIT metro station at Line-8, discussion
with the metro staff also revealed that the speed of the train is less in the tunnel as
compared to viaduct. However, the actual up time data to assess the speed inside tunnels
was not provided by DMRC. It is felt that one of the reasons for the speed being
curtailed was due to non-installation of adequate number of signalling equipment.
Thus, Access Points are wirelessly connected without any redundancy thereby reducing
the up-times56 of the Communication Based Train Control system which would pose
reliability concerns in the required up-time.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC agreed (January 2021 and July 2020) that the system
connected using wired cables is more reliable and is cost-effective in principle.
However, it felt that only allowing the vendors who supply the system connected using
wired connections will make the tender very restrictive.

54
L. Ming, H. S. Wang, H. Zhao, and L. Zhu, “Test and analysis on the interference to the
Communication Based Train Control systems by WiFi signals,” International Journal of u-and
e-Service, Science and Technology, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 123-132, 2015
55
T. Wen, C. Constantinou, L. Chen, Z. Tian, and C. Roberts, “Access Point Deployment
Optimisation in Communication Based Train Control Data Communication System,” IEEE
transactions on intelligent transportation systems, vol. 19, no. 6, June 2018
56
Availability of a system

46
 Report No. 11 of 2021

Reply of Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not acceptable as it is possible to create

competitiveness amongst vendors who supply wired connections. In spite of an open
tender (where both wired and wireless connectivity was allowed), a vendor with wired
connectivity had qualified for Line-7, which indicate that vendors with wired
connectivity are available. Thus, explicit demand for wired connectivity would have
ensured the vendors to supply Communication Based Train Control system with wired
connectivity. Moreover, considering the advantages that wired connectivity provides,
this should be made as a requirement. DMRC further, agreed to specify certain
reliability specifications that every prospective vendor must satisfy to achieve the
desired performance. Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) suggested that reliability needs
be measured differently for tunnels and viaduct and to prescribe different sets of
specifications for each scenario. The reliability needs should also consider the future
evolution of the metro, e.g. if they plan to run the trains with headway of 90 seconds,
the reliability parameter should take that into account. A proper study of the actual
channel between the Access Points and the duration of its going into deep fade (when
the received power is too low to receive accurately) must also be examined.
(ii) Excess values of Mean Time between Hazardous Events, Mean Time to
Repair and Mean Time between Failures
DMRC must quantitatively estimate the Communication Based Train Control
performance safety requirements as is outlined in IEEE1474.1TM-200457. DMRC
should ensure that the total calculated aggregate Mean Time between Hazardous Events
(a total of all critical and catastrophic hazards) is less than 109 operating hours. Also,
IEEE 1474.1 TM-2004 specifies a Mean Time to Repair level 1 of less than 30 minutes
and Mean Time between to Repair level 2 of less than 2 hours.
Table 2.3
Mean Time between Failures and Mean Time to Repair data
for Line-7 and Line-8
Equipment Line-7 Line-8
Computer based Interlocking 48,551.13 33,748.63
Communication Based Train Control on Board 245.05 366.37
Communication Based Train Control Wayside 9,325.83 1,24,749.73
Automatic Train Supervision 3,817.87 20,605.23
Mean time to Repair (in hrs ) for line-7 and line-8
Computer based Interlocking 5.29 6.26
Communication Based Train Control on Board 4.19 5.08
Communication Based Train Control Wayside 4.71 7.31
Automatic Train Supervision 9.98 10.50

57
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) P1474.1 is a Standard for
Communications-Based Train Control Performance and Functional Requirements

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Report No. 11 of 2021

Data provided by DMRC (Table 2.3) indicates that the Mean Time between Failures58
and Mean Time to Repair values are relatively high. For example, values of Mean Time
to Repair are greater than 4 hours and extend up to 10 hours, which is high. Also, the
availability values reported by DMRC in its reply was 98.32 per cent for Line-7 system
and 98.63 per cent for Line-8 system. In contrast, the requirement in Safety Integrity
Levels-4 standard is of 99.999 per cent. Thus, the availability of the system is also low
as compared to norms.

DMRC agreed that these values are low, as this is their first experience with the
Communication Based Train Control system. DMRC also agreed for regular tracking
of these parameters in future and to take proper action if some parameters are not found
meeting the standard requirements. DMRC, however, failed to provide any data on
Mean Time between Hazardous Events. It is imperative to ensure continuously
gathering the value of parameters, namely, Mean Time between Failures, Mean Time
to Repair, and availability, and to take proper corrective measures (re-planning routes,
e.g., by reducing the frequency of the trains) if any of these are found not within their
proper limits as a poor design of the Communication Based Train Control system will
raise safety and performance issues (the frequent breakdown of the Communication
Based Train Control system).
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that DMRC
is implementing Communication Based Train Control for the first time and that all
teething problems regarding design will be identified and resolved within the Defect
Liability Period. DMRC is also continuously gathering various parameters namely,
Mean Time between Failures, Mean Time to Repair and taking corrective measures to
improve performance of the system. During Exit Conference (September 2020),
DMRC stated that there has been no failure so far for their signalling system in terms
of safety. Therefore, there parameters related to Mean Time between Hazardous Events
are satisfactory. However, they have not calculated this parameter as there is no
hazardous event so far to some extent.
In view of above, it is suggested that the parameters may be gathered and monitored by
DMRC continuously and corrective measures should be taken as and when required.

(iii) Vulnerability to Interference and Jamming in the Communication Based

Train Control
Communication Based Train Control system uses 2.4 GHz, which has the same
spectrum as WiFi. This is likely to cause interference with the increase in mobile WiFi,
besides being prone to intentional jamming of the signal. Several incidents of jamming
of the Communication Based Train Control system have been reported in other
countries. The Communication Based Train Control system of different lines uses
different technologies as mentioned below:

58
Mean Time between Failures should be greater than one lakh hours for an MTTR of 2 hours, for
an availability of 59 seconds

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

Table 2.4
Features of various signaling systems adopted
System Advantages Disadvantages
Nippon signalling, Radios are not IEEE 802.11n compatible Only uses 2.48
Line-8 Uses code division multiple access (CDMA) and GHz
frequency division multiple access (FDMA)
Bombardier Radios are not IEEE 802.11n compatible Only uses 2.48
transportation, Uses a direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) GHz
Line-7
Ansaldo ATS, Noida Uses two bands 2.48 GHz and 5.8 GHz Use simple
metro differential
phase-shift
keying (DPSK)
Audit along with the Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) noted that irrespective of the
physical layer solution adopted, there is no system immune to jamming, which remains
a challenge for the Communication Based Train Control system working in 2.4 GHz.
Thus, the best solution is to adopt the Communication Based Train Control system at
some other licensed band so that the manufacturing of equipment in that band is strictly
prohibited. Also, DMRC must conduct a test to measure the power required to jam
various systems and assess a possibility for that. It is also important to note that in case
of failure of the Communication Based Train Control system, the signalling system
operates on the manual mode using the axle detectors and the axle detector slows down
the trains, thereby affecting the revenues of DMRC.
DMRC acknowledged their awareness of the problem of interference and jamming and
indicated that they have considered using a licensed spectrum in the past. However,
this was not followed up as it would not be cost-effective.
It is recommended to carry out proper tests on the possibility of jamming and to identify
the power levels at which various systems could be jammed. Based on the test results,
DMRC must take proper corrective measures. Thus, DMRC needs to remain alert about
interference and jamming and take appropriate action, as that and the arrival of 5G may
further compound the problem of interference and jamming.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC has accepted (January 2021 and July 2020) the
Audit observation.
2.5 Electrical issues
Electrical energy59 is required for operation of metro system. Various issues related to
procurement of traction transformer and auxiliary main transformer of higher size and
non-optimal location of Receiving Substation in Phase-III were noticed.

59
Receiving substation comprises of Traction & Auxiliary substations where Traction substation is
for running of trains and Auxiliary substations for station services including illumination of
buildings, air conditioning of underground stations, ventilation of tunnels, lifts, escalators,
signaling, telecommunication, fire fighting, workshops, depots and other maintenance
infrastructure within the premise of metro systems.

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

(i) Traction Transformer

As per the DPR, the projected power demand was estimated to be 150 MVA on Line-7
and 90 MVA on Line-8 for the year 2031 for nine car 90 second headway operation.
This was the basis on which the capacity and design of the Traction Transformer was
done by DMRC. After deliberation, Managing Director DMRC decided to have six car
operations on Line-7 and Line-8 during Phase-III. At the time of calculating the
requirement of Traction Transformer, DMRC had taken 90 seconds headway which was
not envisaged till 2046 as per Phase-IV DPR. Detailed Traction Simulation sizing
Study was conducted by Detailed Design Consultant, Ardanuy Ingenieria on Line-7 and
SYSTRA on Line-8. Five new Receiving Substation were constructed on Line-7 and
three new Receiving Substation on Line-8 while one Receiving Substation at Botanical
garden was augmented for Line-8. The power supply by each Receiving Substation
catering to several metro stations is shown in the picture below:
Figure 2.6
Line-7 (55.697 km and 38 metro stations)

Receiving Receiving
Sub Station-5 Sub Station-4

Yamuna Vihar, Vinod Nagar Receiving

Elevated=7 Elevated=9 Sub Station-3
UG=0 UG=0
INA
Elevated=1
UG=8
Receiving
Receiving
Sub Station-1
Sub Station-2

Mukundpur RSS 1
Dhaula Kuan
Elevated=3
Elevated=6
UG=3
UG= 1

Figure 2.7
Line-8 (33.494 km and 25 metro stations)

Janak Puri Botanical Garden

West
Receiving Receiving Receiving Receiving
Substation-1 Substation-2 Substation-3 Substation-4

Palam RK Puram Okhla Ph III Botanical Garden

Elevated=1 Elevated=1 Elevated=6 Elevated=2
UG=5 UG=10 UG=0 UG=0

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

Table 2.5
Total power demand estimates as per DPR
Line Corridor 2016 2021 2026 2031 (for 6 Designed
car) Headway of (9
car train at 90
Seconds)
7 Yamuna Vihar 69.9 80.6 89.8 110.7 198.7
Mukundpur (37.5+32.4) (62.3+48.4) (150.3+48.4)
8 Janak Puri West 53.2 63 67.8 77.8 136.4
Kalindi Kunj (18.5+34.7) (31.4+46.4) (90+46.4)

Audit along with Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) observed that the estimated traction
power for Line-7 is 62.3 MVA in 2031. The design of the Traction Power is mentioned
as 150.3 MVA for 9 Car 90 seconds headway. Thus, higher value of designed power
demand was assumed (150.3 MVA) for the traction purpose against required traction
power of 62.3. For Line-8, requirement was 31.4 MVA and design was done for
90 MVA. This increase in power demand was without any proper justification. Any
justification for this higher design for traction power was also not available in the DPR.
Also, there exists an ambiguity in the number of car operation and headway60 for
deciding the traction power requirement for Line-7 and Line-8 within the DPR.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that Traction
Power Requirement for nine Coach 90 second headway is 150 MVA (Line-7) and for
six Coach 90 second headway is 100.2 MVA (Line-7). Five Receiving Substations were
planned to feed a total of 54 km long Line-7. The total traction power requirement is
100 MVA for six Car configurations at 90 second headway. The capacity of Traction
Transformer shall be designed based on N-1 configuration61, therefore 40 MVA
(100/5=20x2) traction transformer at each Receiving Substation is required and 40/ 50
MVA Traction Transformers have been installed.
The Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC reply is not acceptable as deciding the Traction
Transformer capacity by the thumb rule and dividing the total power requirement with
the number of Receiving Substation is technically not justified as observed by the
Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi). Transformer capacity should be decided with proper
simulation study for various train running conditions, load etc.
(ii) Traction Transformer for Line-7
a) Audit along with the Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) observed that total Root
Mean Square62 power requirement for Line-7 is 75.352 Mega Volt Ampere (MVA).
The maximum power drawn is for a very small time which depends on the gradient of
the track, operating condition of the rail and other factors. It is observed that Root Mean
Square loading of 12.114 MVA (Mukundpur), 19.605 MVA (Vinod Nagar) and

60
In DPR Annexure 6.1 design of Receiving Substation considers nine car operation and Annexure
6.1.2 considers six cars
61
N-1 Configuration means when one Receiving Substation fails
62
Root Mean Square – The sizing of the Traction Transformers is done on the Root Mean Square
power

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Report No. 11 of 2021

12.625 MVA (Yamuna Vihar), were well below the normal rating of 40 MVA. Hence,
Traction Transformer can be of lesser capacity than 40/ 50 MVA in these stations.
b) Under normal operating condition (without contingency), the loading of all the
Traction Transformers is not uniform, this could have been achieved at the planning
stage, to make the loading uniform, thereby reducing the stress in contingency.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that the study
was done with six coach configurations at headway of 135 second whereas system was
designed for nine car configuration with 90 second headway. So, for design condition
and for six car configuration 90 second headway condition, maximum MVA
requirement will be greater than 132.416 MVA. Transformer at Mukundpur and
Yamuna Vihar Receiving Substation are kept of the same rating for separability/
standardisation purpose. Further, during Phase-IV of the project, extension of Line-7
is also planned from Mukundpur to Maujpur-Babarpur corridor for an approx. length
of 12.6 km. The traction power requirement of this extended corridor was also
envisaged at the time of selection of rating of Traction Transformer. Further, the
traction power requirement (Root Mean Square value) under (N-1) conditions are
generally in the range from 38 MVA (Mukundpur) to 55 MVA (Dhaula Kuan). Hence,
Traction Transformer of rating 40/ 50 MVA were selected.
The Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC reply is not acceptable as power requirement at each of
the Traction Transformer throughout the line will never attain the maximum value at the
same time and the total maximum power demand will never reach 132.416 MVA. It is
not technically clear why all the transformers are of same capacity for separability/
standardisation purpose. This view is also endorsed by the Technical Consultant (IIT
Delhi). The calculation/ simulation of power requirement for the Phase-IV project,
where the extension of Line-7 is planned from Mukundpur to Maujpur-Babarpur
corridor was not provided to justify the size of Mukundpur Traction Transformer.
Further, DMRC is referring to old study report (June 2012) while giving the Root Mean
Square values, whereas Audit had considered the subsequent report (September 2013).
In the Exit Meeting, it was discussed and recommended that DMRC being a world class
metro operator should carry out technical study to decide on the sizing of Traction
Transformer.
(iii) Traction Transformer for Line-8
The scope of the study as per the Detailed Design Consultant contract is to validate the
location of Receiving Substation and sizing of the transformers and cables. All the N-1
contingency (when one Receiving Substation fails) has been studied for a minimum of
135 Second headway for a portion of Line-8.
In the case of N-1 contingency, the maximum loading of Palam Traction Transformer
is around 30 MVA and for Okhla just around 20 MVA. Besides, Traction Transformer
at R K Puram is just 40 MVA even in contingency. Hence, the sizing of the transformer
at all the three stations is oversized as observed by Audit along with the Technical

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

Consultant (IIT Delhi). Also, location of Receiving Substation was predefined rather
than finding the optimal placement.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that the
transformer of Palam Receiving Substation is at Dead End of the Line-8 and hence, its
optimum capacity is not utilised. In Phase-IV, Botanical Garden-Janak Puri West
corridor is proposed to be extended upto R K Ashram Marg. The traction power
requirement of this extended portion will increase by 10 MW. Further, under (N-1)
conditions, the Traction Transformer capacity works out generally in the range from
32 MVA (Okhla) to 55 MVA (R. K. Puram) at 90 second headway. Therefore, traction
transformer capacity was decided based on the simulation report and with maximum
capacity required under N-1 condition i.e., 40/ 50 MVA.
The reply of Ministry is not acceptable as no supporting calculation/ simulation
document to justify why the additional size of 10 MW for Palam to dead end of the
Line -8 (5 km approximately) was provided. Even additional loading of 10 MW
(8 MVA) at Palam Traction Transformer will make the normal condition loading less
than 30 MVA (17.143 + 8). The heavy loading at R K Puram and Okhla are during C2
and C3 mode, which are done at lower headway than C1 and C4 mode in N-3
contingency63. The study could have been done with the relaxation of these two modes
to find the transformer loading. Hence, the sizing of all transformers is oversized, which
would have resulted in the increase in size of the cables too.
(iv) Auxiliary Main Transformer
a) In Phase-I and Phase-II, DMRC constructed metro stations for eight car trains
operations and the capacity of the auxiliary main transformer installed in the Receiving
Substation was of 15 MVA and 30/ 45 MVA. In Phase-III, DMRC constructed metro
stations for six car train operations on Line-7 & Line-8. However, each Receiving
Substation has two auxiliary main transformer of 30/ 45 MVA.
b) For Line-7, Audit along with the Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) observed that
although the DPR envisages a total load demand of 48.4 MVA, the load demand based
on which the auxiliary transformer (33 KVA) sizing was done by Ardanuy was 75.927
MVA. It was also observed that the maximum load required during the contingency is
well below the capacity of 45 MVA. Some of the auxiliary main transformer could
have been of lower rating as each Receiving Substation is of 30/ 45 MVA. Further
contingency analysis done by the Detailed Design Consultant and DMRC are resulting
in different MVA requirement. Hence, a proper sizing of the auxiliary main
transformers at various Receiving Substation could have been achieved by making
suitable number of stations attached to the auxiliary main transformer at a particular
Receiving Substation.
c) For Line-8, Audit along with the Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) observed that
none of the auxiliary main transformer is reaching its natural rating of 30 MVA. The
auxiliary main transformer at Okhla Phase-III is loaded to only 17 MVA and at Palam

63
N-3 Configuration means when three Receiving Substation fails

53
Report No. 11 of 2021

it is loaded to 21.5 MVA which are much below the normal rating of 30 MVA. Further,
the contingency analysis is not found for the auxiliary main transformer by the Detailed
Design Consultant. Further, with proper planning either the capacity of auxiliary main
transformer at Palam or at Okhla could have been reduced.
Thus, the DMRC procured and installed auxiliary main transformer of higher capacity
than the actual power requirement based on the size of stations of Line-7 and Line-8.
DMRC replied (July 2020) that in Phase-I & Phase-II, 15 MVA transformer were
installed for the section supplying load to only elevated stations and 30/ 45 MVA
auxiliary main transformers were installed for the section supplying load to both
elevated and underground stations. Line-7 of Phase-III has a mixture of both elevated
and underground Stations, therefore transformers of 30/ 45 MVA were installed. The
Ministry replied (January 2021) that during detailed design stage, DMRC had
considered load factor based on the past experience and demand of auxiliary power was
reduced at each elevated station as 500 kW, at each underground station as 2,500 kW
and at maintenance depot as 2,000 KW and was accordingly considered for calculating
the rating of auxiliary main transformer at each Receiving Substation. To meet the
requirement, 30/ 45 MVA transformer available as a standard product with the
manufacturers was selected to cut down time as well as cost required for type testing
for speedy completion of project.
The Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC reply is not acceptable as the size of the stations
constructed during Phase–III were small as compared to stations constructed in Phase-
I and II. Further, Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) also stated that rather than deciding
the capacity of the auxiliary main transformer based on the type of stations, it should
be based on the power requirement calculation after proper study in the planning stage.
2.6 Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning is the technology of indoor and vehicular
environmental comfort. Its goal is to provide thermal comfort and acceptable indoor
air quality. Audit noticed the following in this regard:
2.6.1 Provision for Platform Screen Doors
Platform Screen Doors, also known as Platform Edge Doors, are used at train or subway
stations to separate the platform from trains. Platform Screen Doors act as a physical
barrier preventing people or objects from falling onto the tracks. Platform Screen Doors
also improve climate control within the station. In Phase-III, DMRC adopted half
height Platform Edge Doors, mainly from the passenger safety point of view. Since
decision for investment in Platform Edge Doors infrastructure was already made,
switching to full height Platform Screen Doors would not have caused any significant
cost increment.

54
 Report No. 11 of 2021

Figure 2.8
Full Height Platform Screen Doors and Half Height Platform Edge Doors

Audit along with the Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) observed that the matter of using
Platform Screen Doors is an important one for underground station design and Heating
Ventilation and Air Conditioning energy savings, DMRC did not carry out an extensive
study on the Platform Screen Doors in Phase-III, even though civil structure for the
same was part of the DPR. This was despite availability of design experience from the
two earlier Phases of DMRC, and other metro agencies in the country (Chennai Metro,
Airport Line in Delhi etc.), going ahead with full height Platform Screen Doors for
energy savings in similar timeframe.
It was also observed that tunnel cooling is only needed in extreme weather (ambient
T>43o C), and congested mode operation with trains stopping in the tunnel. Such short
duration loads can be catered by tunnel ventilation and by thermal inertia of tunnel. But
the use of Platform Screen Doors may help in reducing the station Heating Ventilation
and Air Conditioning load substantially.
The station heat load summary for reviewed stations indicated that typically more than
60 per cent of station air conditioning load are Subway Environment Simulation loads,
or heat coming from the tunnel. With the help of Platform Screen Doors, the station
air-conditioning load would have reduced significantly, leading to smaller Heating
Ventilation and Air Conditioning capacity requirement. This would also result in lower
requirements of electrical infrastructure and space needed for the station Heating
Ventilation and Air Conditioning equipment including ducting.
Thus, DMRC installed half height Platform Screen Doors without energy saving
studies. This has resulted in installation of higher capacity electrical equipment and
consequent higher operation & maintenance cost.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that with the
introduction of full height Platform Screen Doors, the station loads are decreased but it
necessitates the provision of tunnel cooling. Platform Edge Doors in Phase-III have
been provided majorly to control crowd at the platform. It was also submitted that

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Report No. 11 of 2021

based on this observation, during extreme ambient conditions, active tunnel cooling
would be required. This is achieved by locally cooling tunnel air at a number of
locations. The motion of the train carries the cooled air down the tunnels. The heated
air at the end of the tunnel run is captured by the track way exhaust system and
recirculated to an air handling unit for re-cooling. Cooled air is then also available to
be directed across stalled trains during congestion. If the total cooling required per
station to achieve design limits in this way is less than that evaluated as part of the non-
Platform Screen Doors analysis, the plant capacity initially installed would be adequate
to perform satisfactorily when platform screen doors are installed. Therefore, to deal
with the congestion during the summer months (15 April to 15 July), it is required to
regularly cool the tunnel so that cooled air is available to be directed by Tunnel
Ventilation Fan in case of congestion. In Phase-IV, full height Platform Screen Doors
has been considered in view of the increased headway of about four to five minutes of
upcoming corridors.
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not tenable because their response on
Platform Screen Doors was not justified through any studies so far. It seems more like
an expectation or general statement about the suitability of Platform Screen Doors for
increased headway in Phase-IV and needs to be qualified with more detailed studies.
The active tunnel cooling and recirculation of heated air through Air Handling Unit also
needs to be evaluated by DMRC more critically and carefully from all perspectives.
With Phase-IV already underway, the strategy and detailed design calculations of
implementation of Platform Screen Doors seem to have been much delayed.
2.6.2 Tunnel Ventilation and Fire safety
The importance of Tunnel Ventilation and Fire safety aspects in underground station
design cannot be understated as it concerns with safety of human lives. It also received
significant attention in the design documents reviewed. It could be said that there is no
major concern with the tunnel ventilation, fire-safety and smoke extraction
arrangements.
The Ministry/ GNCTD in its reply (January 2021) has accepted the Audit observation.
Conclusion
DMRC’s funding plan for three Phase-III corridors was in contravention of National
Urban Transport Policy, 2006 as GoI contribution towards capital cost exceeded the
20 per cent limit, resulting in excess contribution of ₹421.34 crore. DMRC
recommended two financially unviable corridors (Badarpur-Faridabad and Maujpur-
Shiv Vihar) with negative Financial Internal Rate of Return, one corridor (Najafgarh-
Dhansa Bus Stand) having below benchmark Financial Internal Rate of Return of 8 per
cent and considered inflated Fare Box Revenue to make the four corridors of (i) Dilshad
Garden to Ghaziabad, New Bus Adda, (ii) Noida City Centre to Noida Sector-62, (iii)
Kalindi Kunj metro- Botanical Garden, and (iv) YMCA Chowk (Faridabad) to
Ballabhgarh viable.

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

Further, in violation of the MoUD Guidelines, a chapter on Comprehensive Mobility

Plan highlighting the development of an integrated plan was not included in the Phase-
III DPR formulated by DMRC. Resultantly, integrated planning with respect to land
use and transport, integration of various modes (fares, routes, and facilities) and
institutional framework for coordination was not ensured by DMRC.
In the absence of any internal guidelines/ Standard Operating Procedures of DMRC for
preparation of DPRs, DPRs were prepared on different assumptions. Detailed Project
Reports of three corridors (Dwarka-Najafgarh, Mundka-Bahadurgarh and Maujpur-
Shiv Vihar) were prepared in contravention of guidelines of Working Group on Urban
Transport and RITES study as other modes of transport like Light Metro/ Bus Rapid
Transit were not explored. Resultantly, high capital cost was infused into the projects
and consequent higher operation and maintenance cost. DMRC also recommended two
financially unviable corridors (Dwarka-Najafgarh and Mundka-Bahadurgarh) after
considering revenue from Property Development without ensuring the availability of
required land.
DMRC changed the train operation from nine cars to six cars without detailed
justification after sanctioning of Phase-III projects eliminating the possibility of further
expansion to cater the increase in future ridership. DMRC procured rails of relatively
low hardness which may result in increased maintenance cost due to decreased life of
rails and wheels. DMRC also procured higher capacity of Traction Transformer due to
estimation of higher projected demand, which resulted in higher capital expenditure.
Further, DMRC procured and installed Auxiliary Main Transformer of higher capacity
than the actual power requirement in Line-7 and Line-8. Half height Platform Screen
Doors were installed instead of full height Platform Screen Doors resulting in
installation of higher capacity electrical equipment and consequent higher operation &
maintenance cost.
Thus, various deficiencies were noticed in the planning process adopted by DMRC
adversely affecting the operations and financial viability of the MRTS as brought out
in the chapter on operation and maintenance and Revenue Management. Besides, the
deficiencies also affected the selection of the most appropriate technology.
Recommendations
1. DMRC should ensure at the project planning stage itself that Detailed Project
Reports are prepared with realistic assumptions for computation of Financial
Internal Rate of Return to ensure economic viability of the corridor.
2. DMRC may formulate a policy for selection of type of corridor, interchange
between two stations, and mode of interchange facility, which would benefit
future Mass Rapid Transit System projects in the country. Also, the policy
document may clearly define the circumstances under which deviations from
the stated policies are allowed.
3. DMRC may consider preparing Guidelines/ Standard operating Procedures for
formulation of the Detailed Project Reports for future metro rail projects/

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Report No. 11 of 2021

expansion. The revised Detailed Project Reports may be approved by the Board
of Directors before submission to Government of India and Government of
National Capital Territory of Delhi.
4. A Guideline/ criteria for selection of mode of transport for different scenarios
like Light Metro, Bus Rapid Transit system based on viability and alternative
analysis may be formulated.
5. DMRC should ensure timely availability of land for Property Development
which is of paramount importance to make the project financially viable.
6. DMRC may consider optimising the sizing of Traction Transformers in
Receiving Sub Stations instead of putting transformers of uniform capacity
across all Receiving Substation on a Line.
7. DMRC may consider full height Platform Screen Doors including evaluation of
its effect on Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning requirements in the
under-ground station design studies.

58
 CHAPTER-3
CONTRACT AND PROJECT
MANAGEMENT
 Report No. 11 of 2021

Chapter 3
Contract and Project Management
3.1 A comprehensive framework of rules and procedures for tendering and contract
management is essential for execution of works in an economic, efficient, effective and
transparent manner. DMRC formulated (2012) and adopted Procurement Manual for
procurement of goods and services. DMRC also formulated General Conditions of
Contract, formats for Notice Inviting Tender, Instructions to Tenderers, and Schedule
of Powers to different levels of officers. Besides, DMRC followed guidelines of Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) for JICA funded contracts.
Audit analysed the procurement of goods and services at the Pre-tender64, tender65 and
execution stages by reviewing 47 selected civil contracts and 03 other contracts (CC-
11, CC-86 R and CC-95) out of 127 civil contracts (more than ₹ 5 crore) executed during
Phase-III to assess whether project execution and contract management was done with
due care, economy and in a timely and transparent manner. The significant deficiencies
noticed are brought out in the following paragraphs.

3.1.1 Discrepancies in estimation of cost of work

In the DPR (February 2011), the estimated cost of elevated station and viaduct were
₹20.59 crore per station and ₹29.87 crore per km, respectively. These were assessed on
the basis of the completion cost of Phase-II, duly updated to January 2011 price level
by adding escalation of five per cent per annum. DMRC estimated (March 2012) the
civil construction cost as ₹598.19 crore for CC-26R contract for construction of viaduct
of 9.03 km and eight elevated stations.
In this regard, Audit observed that the cost estimation was made by escalating the
awarded rates (awarded in 2006) of BC-7, BC-8 and BC-9 by five per cent per annum
to obtain the estimated rate as in February 2012 (i.e., 34 per cent increase). These works
were completed in 2009-2010. Computation of estimated price of CC-26R contract by
escalating the six year’ old rate by five per cent per annum, resulted in higher estimated
cost by 23 per cent (i.e., 34 per cent calculated on the basis of five per cent per annum
minus actual price escalation i.e., 11.02 per cent). DMRC invited (August 2012) Notice
Inviting Tender at ₹537 crore (i.e., 90 per cent of estimated cost of ₹598.19 crore i.e.,
as per prevailing practice). Considering the actual escalation, the estimated cost was
derived at ₹486.33 crore (598.19/ 1.23). Thus, the estimates were prepared on the
higher side by ₹111.86 crore (i.e. ₹598.19 crore -₹486.33 crore).
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC accepted (January 2021 and July 2020) that rates of
completed projects are more reliable and should be considered for estimation of tender
value of any work rather than using escalation @ five per cent per annum. Actual price
escalation on the rates of completed similar work are more reliable and appropriate.

64
Pre-tender stage includes cost estimation, finalisation of bidding criteria, preparation of Notice
Inviting Tender etc.
65
Tender stage includes opening of bids, evaluation of bids, award of work etc.

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Report No. 11 of 2021

3.1.2 Non-preparation of justified cost estimates

The justified cost is prepared to ascertain if the bid price is reasonable and reflects the
current market rates to ensure responsiveness of the bidder. The criteria could be to
assign current market rates to the standard labour, material, and equipment coefficients.
Since this process was not adopted in DMRC, it was not possible to be assured at any
given point of time that the price quoted by the lowest bidder was justified or not. There
was also the risk of susceptibility to manipulation in case of a cartel among the bidders.
In case of contract CC-18, it was noticed that the contractor had quoted a rate of
24.4 per cent below the DPR provision and the work was awarded. There were many
such cases where the tendered cost was well below the estimated cost as detailed in
Chart 3.1.
Chart 3.1

30 29 29
CC-04
25 25 CC-05
25 24
23 23
21 CC-07
20 CC-18
17
15 CC-20
15
CC-23
10
10 CC-24
CC-27
5 CC-30
CC-32
0
Percentage below than estimated cost CC-34

It would be unreasonable to assume that the contractor quoted for such huge contracts
at a prospective loss66 or they were expecting to compromise the quality of the
deliverables for the project. Had there been a system to estimate the justified cost,
DMRC would have been able to know the likely cost.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that the
practice of making justified cost estimate is relevant when works are executed based on
Bill of Quantity basis such as building works wherein the risk due to unpredictable
scenario is substantially low or absent. However, in case of metro system, works are
executed in an urban environment wherein the level of uncertainties regarding
geotechnical strata, soil conditions, water-table, building conditions, utilities etc., are
much higher. Besides, most of these works are high expertise works and cannot be

66
i.e., quoting 10 per cent to 29 per cent lower than estimated price given by DMRC

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

based on item rate schedules. Hence, last accepted rate of Phase-II completed works
were adopted to derive the cost estimates for the works in reference.
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC needs to be viewed in the light of the fact
that DMRC has been working in the same urban environment since 1996 and has gained
adequate expertise to estimate costs of non-standard items like geotechnical strata, soil
conditions, water-table, building conditions, utilities etc. Thus, the explanation of
adopting last accepted rate is far from convincing and a progressive organisation like
DMRC should not continue with it just because it is the adopted practice. Hence,
DMRC may establish a cell to study the cost aspects of various projects and come up
with a schedule like Delhi Schedule of Rates for metro projects. This would be a great
contribution to the metro community across the country.

3.2 Appointment of General Consultant on nomination basis

During the implementation of Phase-I of Delhi MRTS project, DMRC appointed
General Consultant67 at a price of ₹208.15 crore. During the Performance Audit of
Delhi MRTS Phase-I, Audit recommended (Recommendation No. 10) that the
appointment of General Consultant should be based on a system where the best bid is
selected based on both technical quality and financial cost.
Para [Link] of DPR of Phase-III states that implementation of Phase-I and Phase-II
has enabled DMRC to acquire expertise for implementation of metro projects. The need
to engage an all-embracing team of ‘General Consultant’ for execution of Phase-III will
therefore not arise. However, a few expatriate specialists may still be needed to assist
in certain specialised areas like signalling, boring of tunnels by Tunnel Boring
Machines, etc. Detailed Design Consultants for a few areas may, however, be engaged.
However, DMRC continued the consultancy service of the same General Consultant
during the Phase-III project on nomination basis. Letter of Acceptance (LoA) was
issued on 08 June 2012 for contract period of 51 months and their services continued
upto 31 March 2020 with total expenditure of ₹235.83 crore. In addition, Detailed
Design Consultants viz. M/s Ayesa and M/s Systra were also appointed for Line-7 and
Line-8 and work was awarded (2011) to them at ₹64 crore. In this regard, Audit
observed that:
(i) In violation of the DPR recommendations, DMRC continued the services of the
existing General Consultant for the entire Phase-III and NCR extensions, in addition to
appointment of Detailed Design Consultants for Line-7 and Line-8. Thus, even after
20 years in the field of execution of MRTS project, DMRC availed the services of
General Consultant and Detailed Design Consultants during Phase-III indicating that
DMRC was unable to develop/ strengthen its internal design or supervision mechanisms
and had to depend on outside consultant. Besides, Central Vigilance Commission
(CVC) guidelines restrict the award of tender on nomination basis and emphasised that

67
a consortium of M/s PCI-PBI-TONICHI-JARTS-RITES

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appointment of consultant should be done in a transparent manner. Yet, DMRC did not
explore the possibility of open tendering for appointment of consultant.
(ii) As per the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA) guidelines (Section
3.02), single-source selection may be appropriate only if it presents a clear advantage
over competition in terms of natural continuation of previous work, emergency cases,
very small assignment, and single eligible firm. However, a major part of the initial
Phase-III corridors was based on state of art technology like Communication Based
Train Control system, Unattended Train Operation based Rolling Stock, etc., which
were not implemented during the earlier phases of DMRC and the length of Phase-III
corridors was more than metro corridors constructed during Phase-II. Thus, the
continuation of the existing consultant was not justifiable.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that to rope
in the new technology of tunnelling in underground sections, Communication Based
Train Control technology for Unattended Train Operation mode of operation (for the
first time in India), necessitated the induction of General Consultant. The names of
stations are mentioned in the DPR but design and construction method, integrating with
the multi modal system required the expertise provided by General Consultant. The
scope of Detailed Design Consultant was to stipulate the broad technology and
assistance in preparation of Tender Documents while the role of General Consultant
was to implement (including supervision of site) the project with the latest technology,
construction method and assurance of high level of Safety and Quality. Since the award
of contract to General Consultant was a natural continuation and the rates were
negotiated in conformity with the prevailing rates, there was no need of bid comparison.
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not acceptable as the same technology
was used in the construction of underground section of Phase-I. Even after execution
of two phases of DMRC and supervision consultancy of other metros, DMRC still has
to depend on supervision and monitoring by General Consultant. Further, without
resorting to open bidding and comparison with other consultancy work, it is not clear
how DMRC’s negotiated rates were the prevailing rates. Further, Bangalore Metro Rail
Corporation appointed General Consultant for Phase-I MRTS project based on Global
tender/ competitive bidding basis. For Phase-II projects, Bangalore Metro Rail
Corporation did not appoint any General Consultant and the work is being supervised
by Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Engineers. In case of Kochi Metro and Jaipur
metro, DMRC itself is working as General Consultant. However, DMRC continued
with the same General Consultant in Phase-III even after implementation of Phase-I
and Phase-II of Delhi MRTS project.

3.3 Grant of special advance of `555.69 crore beyond contractual provisions

Audit observed that there was no provision in the contract agreements for providing
special advance to the contractor. However, DMRC granted special advances of
₹555.69 crore in 13 contracts. As per the Standard Operating Procedure
(December 1998) of DMRC, special advance is considered only under exceptional

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circumstances in the exigencies of the progress of work with prior approval of

Managing Director and finance concurrence and at an interest rate of State Bank of
India Prime Lending Rate plus two per cent against bank guarantee of equal amount.
Audit also observed that the special advance in 13 contracts were provided without
analysing the financial statements of the contractors. Details of special advance paid to
various contractors are given in Annexure-IV.
Audit further observed that there were two instances in contract CC-26 R (31 December
2016 and 25 July 2017) where outstanding advances availed by the contractor was more
than the balance work to be executed.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that special
advances were granted on genuine grounds after due diligence to facilitate the
contractor to execute and complete the work. In addition, the contractor had to pay
interest on such advance.
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not tenable as there was no provision in
the contract agreement to provide special advance to the contractor.

3.4 Awarding of work with major change in structural drawing after award of
work
DMRC floated (August 2014) Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) for construction of elevated
stabling lines near Kalindi Kunj Depot and miscellaneous work (CC-90) at Jasola Vihar
on Line-8 at a cost of ₹159 crore. Tender Committee evaluated (6 January 2015) the
financial bids and found that the bid of M/s Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. was the lowest
among three bidders at ₹184.4 crore. This offer of L-1 bidder was 15.78 per cent above
the estimated cost of ₹159 crore. DMRC accepted the recommendation of Tender
Committee to accept the offer of M/s Afcons Infrastructure Ltd., with condition to
review the structure design to keep the cost within original estimates. In this regard,
Audit observed that the drawing of the elevated stabling line was revised after the
opening of financial bid. After this change in structural drawing, the actual completion
cost of the contract was ₹150.64 crore. Thus, there was possibility of reducing the cost
by changing the drawing. However, this was not explored by DMRC prior to tender.
It was only explored when the quoted price of L-1 bidder was above the estimated cost.
DMRC procurement manual permits retendering only “When the lowest offer obtained
exceeds the amount available under the administrative approval and it is proposed to
modify the design and or specifications to bring down the cost”. However, instead of
re-tendering (with revised design), DMRC decided to change the design of the structure
to keep the total cost within the original estimates.
Thus, DMRC has changed the structural design after the award of work. This has
resulted in violation of DMRC Procurement Manual and undue favour to the contractor.
DMRC replied (July 2020) that Tender Committee minutes showed that there was
possibility of bringing down the cost by suitably revising the design of structure such
as span arrangement, foundation type and loading conditions. As the Tender was Bills

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of Quantity based, decision was taken by the accepting authority to award the tender
with necessary changes in the drawings while keeping the total cost within the original
estimate. The Ministry/ GNCTD also submitted (January 2021) that discharge of tender
& re-invitation would have resulted in abnormal delay in project execution as well as
invite representation from L1 bidder.
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not tenable because the tender was Bill
of Quantity based, there were significant changes in the drawing (i.e., span
arrangement, foundation type, loading conditions) after opening of financial bids.
These changes should have been brought to the notice to the prospective bidders to get
the best quotation by re-inviting the tender as per DMRC procurement manual.

3.5 Delay in execution of Mayur Vihar Pocket I to Trilokpuri section due to

indecisiveness in rehabilitating of project affected persons of Trilokpuri
As per the DPR (February 2011) of Phase-III, 18,612 square meter (sqm) government
land and 685 sqm private land was required for Trilokpuri-Vinod Nagar alignment on
Line-7. Social Impact Assessment study of Phase-III was conducted (June 2011) by
RITES on behalf of DMRC after approval of DPR by the Board of Directors. DMRC
did not envisage the relocation of 108 project affected persons in the DPR submitted
(February 2011) to the MoUD and the GNCTD. In this regard, Audit observed that:
(i) As per the Social Impact Assessment study, only 88 project affected families
were interviewed at two locations i.e., Shakurpur and Rajouri Garden on the
Mukundpur-Yamuna Vihar section (55 km), while 325 affected structures (including
245 residential structures) were identified on the Mukundpur-Yamuna Vihar Line.
However, at the time of execution, DMRC identified (September 2011) 364 structures/
units for relocation at a single location of Trilokpuri, which is over and above already
identified 325 structures.
(ii) Due to delay in obtaining land from project affected persons, the work (300
meter viaduct at Trilokpuri) of ₹7.64 crore was de-scoped from CC-26 R contractor i.e.,
M/s ITD-ITDCEM JV and re-awarded (December 2019) to M/s Pragati Construction
Consultant (CC-125 R2) at the cost of ₹20.59 crore (i.e., ₹10.28 crore68 higher). Excess
expenditure could have been avoided, if rehabilitation and resettlement of project
affected persons had been done in a timely and planned manner.
(iii) Break in Line-7 at Trilokpuri affects the ridership as it was constructed for
providing radial connectivity along with ring road, which connects majority of metro
lines of DMRC and connects Ghaziabad/ East Delhi region directly to South Delhi/
Gurgaon region. Against the daily projected ridership of 11.11 lakh in 2019 as per the
DPR, the actual ridership per day on Line-7 was only 1.73 lakh (i.e., 84 per cent
shortfall). Thus, with the same assumptions as in DPR, DMRC has been losing
estimated annual Fare Box Revenue of up to ₹1,369.16 crore69. Besides, DMRC was

68
`20.59 crore-`10.31crore (escalated awarded cost `7.64 crore from 2012 to 2019)
69
11,11,133 (projected ridership of Line-7)-1,73,348 (actual ridership of Line-7) in 2018-19 X fare
of average journey of 16 km i.e., `40X365

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also losing Non-Fare Box Revenue due to problems related to delay in awarding
advertisement contracts, co-branding contracts etc.
(iv) There was also under-utilisation of Rolling Stock as out of 312 cars purchased
for Line-7, only 239 cars were running/ operational in September 2019 due to low
ridership.
(v) Contractor had partially completed pier and viaduct from Pier 52 to Pier 53.
This work was descoped from the contractor and the balance work re-awarded to a new
contractor. However, the overpayment of ₹1 crore has not been recovered till date.
Thus, Social Impact Assessment study conducted for Phase-III was deficient as it did
not envisage 108 project affected person at Trilokpuri resulting in delay in rehabilitation
and resettlement process. Due to delay in operationalisation of metro in this section for
more than five years, DMRC has lost estimated annual Fare Box Revenue upto
₹1,369.16 crore as well as cost overrun of ₹10.28 crore.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that during
Social Impact Assessment study, out of 686 (578+108) project affected families, 188
families (27.4 per cent) were surveyed. Further 108 plot holders having 364 project
affected families at Trilokpuri did not figure in the Social Impact Assessment study due
to non-cooperation of project affected persons. DMRC has been floating open e-tenders
for advertisement and co-branding etc., of Line-7 and the quotes received are as per the
market potential of the said inventory. Under-utilisation of Rolling Stock and depot
facilities is due to non-completion of approximately 300 meter of viaduct at Trilokpuri
which is in progress. DMRC has faced various problems in rehabilitation and
resettlement at Trilokpuri. Rehabilitation and Resettlement is nearly complete and
ongoing construction work of viaduct work will be completed by March 2021.
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not acceptable as non-consideration of
project affected families at Trilokpuri in Social Impact Assessment study resulted in
delay in planning and execution of Rehabilitation and Resettlement activities. Pre
consultation with project affected families to obtain their willingness for alternative
arrangements etc., which is essential for smooth rehabilitation and resettlement
activities, was not done. Social Impact Assessment study which was conducted in June
2011 after approval of DPR by Board is silent on non-cooperation by project affected
families of Trilokpuri. Only 88 project affected families were surveyed on Line-7
without considering 108 plot-holders having more than 500 project affected families at
single location. The Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC has accepted that letter for recovery
has been written to the contractor and final bill will be made to the contractor after
making recoveries for the incomplete work.

3.6 Extra expenditure of `72.73 crore due to construction of elevated Majlis

Park station
As per the DPR of Phase-III, Mukundpur station (now Majlis Park) was planned to be
constructed at grade on the vacant land belonging to Delhi Police and Public Works
Department (PWD). DMRC had to revise (21 March 2012) the alignment due to non-

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availability of Delhi Police land. Thereafter, Mukundpur station (changed to elevated

from at grade as mentioned in DPR) was shifted towards the left of PWD road no 51.
Chief Project Manager office estimated (21 June 2012) the cost of ₹137.86 crore for
construction of elevated Mukundpur metro station and depot entry, the same was
approved (11 July 2012) by the Managing Director, DMRC against DPR provision of
₹62.15 crore while stating that additional financial implication of ₹75.76 crore shall be
met from expected savings in civil tenders. The work was awarded (02 January 2013)
to M/s Arvind Techno Pvt Ltd at ₹123.4 crore and completed on 31 May 2016 at
₹134.88 crore. In this regard, Audit observed that:
(i) DPR was not prepared with due diligence as the Consultancy Division of DMRC
seemed unaware of Delhi Police’s plans for the same land. Tender process for the Delhi
Police Housing project was in an advance stage and going on since 2008 whereas
DMRC submitted the DPR of Phase-III (containing at grade Mukundpur metro station
on Delhi Police land) in February 2011. Due to non-availability of Delhi Police land
for DMRC project, the alignment of Mukundpur station had to be shifted to the other
side of the road, resulting in extra cost of ₹72.73 crore70.
(ii) Mukundpur (now Majlis Park) station was constructed as an elevated station on
vacant land of PWD instead of constructing at grade station, which could have saved
₹39.01 crore71. Elevating this station would also have repercussions for Phase-IV which
would require new elevated interchange station and increase in height of piers for
crossing the existing line, thereby substantially increasing the cost. Thus, DMRC did
not plan Mukundpur station and alignment after exploring the possibility of at grade
station.
(iii) It was also observed by the Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) that no cost
comparison of various alternatives was considered and justification for the chosen
option was neither on record nor furnished. Such kind of issues can be avoided if there
exists a policy for selection of a corridor. DMRC should, therefore, formulate a policy
to address all the issues in connection with corridor selection. Further, the public has
no option but to use whatever facilities are provided by DMRC either at ground level
or at an elevation.
Thus, DMRC did not determine the location of Mukundpur station with due diligence
at the time of preparation of DPR. DMRC also did not explore the possibility of
construction of at grade station on the vacant land of PWD after denial of Delhi Police
for construction of metro station on its land.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that the
Phase-III DPR was sent to the Government for approval on the basis of the Government
land available at site. The Delhi Police issue came up only at the time of transfer of
land. The best possible solution was, thus, adopted after leaving the Delhi Police land

70
Completion cost `134.88 crore – estimated cost `62.15 crore
71
The amount was calculated after exploring feasible alternative i.e., at grade station, 600 meter at
grade section and integrated depot entry and exit at present location of Majlis Park station

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while also keeping in view the integration of Phase-IV work. In case Majlis Park station
is to be made at grade, the rail level just before Shah Alam Marg must be minimum nine
meter to ensure minimum headroom of six meter as per PWD requirement/ norms.
Further, the turnout/ cross over before the station and after the station are also to be
accommodated in the length of 741.39 meter as per operation requirements including
the length required for achieving a rail level of nine meter just before Shah Alam Marg
which is 250 meter with maximum permissible gradient i.e., four per cent. Thus,
technically the rail level at Majlis park station cannot be kept at grade.
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not acceptable, in the absence of any
records relating to permission/ approval for utilising the Delhi Police land before
finalisation of DPR and approval stage. Further, DMRC stated that 741.39 meter length
was available between end of ramp and start of Shah Alam Marg. Hence there was
enough length for construction of Majlis Park station (140 meter), and front cross over
facility (220 meter) at grade nine-meter headroom, with four per cent gradient could
have been provided in 225 metre and the subsequent stretch could have been used for
providing turnouts and crossover facilities. However, the same was not done resulting
in extra expenditure of ₹39.01 crore to DMRC.

3.7 Construction of subway at the request of Delhi International Airport

Limited at Indira Gandhi Domestic Airport
DMRC entered (March 2013) into a contract agreement with M/s ITD-ITD Cem JV
for design and construction of tunnel by shield Tunnel Boring Machine, Palam and
Indira Gandhi Domestic Airport underground stations (CC-32) by cut & cover method.
The awarded cost of the contract was ₹752 crore. A meeting between DMRC & Delhi
International Airport Limited (DIAL) was held (17 January 2013) to resolve transfer of
land and other issues for construction of underground Indira Gandhi Domestic Airport
station. DIAL requested DMRC to extend the passenger subway from Terminal 1C
(Arrival Terminal) to Terminal 1D (Departure Terminal) with DMRC fund, and DMRC
agreed to the proposal of the DIAL. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was
signed (30 March 2013) between DIAL & DMRC to provide the passenger tunnel from
Terminal 1C to Terminal 1D. DMRC decided (August 2016) that the work of subway
is to be done by inviting open tender. Accordingly, DMRC entered (July 2017) into a
new contract (CC-32AR) with M/s Dharamraj Constructs India Private Limited to
construct a subway from Indira Gandhi Domestic Airport metro station to Terminal 1C
(arrival terminal) and Terminal 1D (departure terminal) at an awarded cost of ₹40 crore.
In this regard, Audit observed that:
(i) As per the original CC-32 contract, a subway was to be constructed from Indira
Gandhi Domestic metro station to Terminal 1C (arrival terminal) of the airport only.
DMRC, on the request (17 January 2013) of DIAL extended passenger subway from
Terminal 1C to Terminal 1D, parking space of G+5 building and to the new terminal
building which was under construction adjacent to Terminal 1C at a cost of ₹40 crore

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which will be used by the DIAL for inter terminal connectivity. Thus, the actual
expenditure incurred by DMRC on behalf of DIAL should be recovered from the DIAL.
(ii) The work of subway from Indira Gandhi Domestic Airport metro station to
Terminal 1C (arrival terminal) was deleted from the scope of contract CC-32
(₹2.77 crore) and awarded to a new contractor at ₹40 crore citing that the alignment of
Phase-IV station will be passing under the subway. Till January 2021, 98 per cent of
32-AR work has been completed. However, approval of the MoHUA/ GNCTD under
Phase- IV was from Tughlakabad to Aerocity only.
(iii) DMRC has transferred (07 June 2013) the commercial rights to DIAL for
display of advertisement panels in the underground tunnel connecting Indira Gandhi
Domestic Airport station and Terminal 1C and the tunnel connecting 1C and 1D. This
has resulted in undue favour to the DIAL. However, the operation and maintenance of
the subway was to be done by DMRC.
(iv) It was also observed by Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) that even though space
was already available on the ground, it is not clear as to whether DMRC explored the
possibility of connecting them at the ground level as opposed to the more uneconomical
option of underground connection. Further, the requirement was perceived based on the
estimated forecast of passengers and keeping the convenience of passengers in mind.
The expected ridership has not been achieved so far. As against projected daily
ridership of 1,16,002 as per DPR in 2019, the actual daily ridership in December 2019
was 5,830 only. The fact that DMRC is relying on future possibility of improvement in
the situation with further development at the T1 terminal further reflects the lacuna of
ridership estimation and planning based on such estimates.
Thus, DMRC constructed additional subway from Terminal 1C to Terminal 1D without
any provision in the DPR on the request of DIAL at the cost of ₹40 crore. This needs to
be recovered from the DIAL.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that in order
to provide better accessibility to metro station from departure terminal, it was decided
to extend the arrival subway up to the departure terminal and the underground subway
was constructed solely on DMRC requirement to attract more commuters to the metro
station. Hence, its cost is not required to be recovered from DIAL. Further, the work
of subway was deleted from the scope of CC-32 because keeping the contract CC 32
open would have resulted in high idling cost as the decision of the interface issues are
pending with DIAL. Provision is kept in the subway in advance for Phase-IV
alignment. The Ministry stated (January 2021) that the purpose of the subway was to
connect the Arrival and Departure Terminal with the existing metro station and not to
interconnect the two terminals mutually. Further, definitive agreement (including
commercial rights) shall be signed only after finalising all the balance minor interface
issues related to integration of airport development plan with all stakeholders including
DMRC.

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The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not tenable because construction of a
subway tunnel for connecting Terminals at the airport is not within the mandate of
DMRC but DIAL as they charge passenger service fees from passengers for the services
provided for their comfort and convenience. Connection of Arrival and Departure
building results in inter terminal connectivity only. Construction of subway within the
airport is beyond the scope of DMRC’s mandate, which is to provide facilities and
amenities within the metro stations. The reply of DMRC in respect of deleted work
from earlier contractor is also not acceptable as the same amount of time will be
required for meeting the interface issue in both the scenarios (i.e., executed through
variation or through new contractor). Further, it is evident from the reply that the work
was deleted from CC-32 before finalisation of interface issues with DIAL. At the time
(May 2007) of construction of Airport Line of Delhi metro during Phase-II, DIAL paid
an upfront grant of ₹350 crore to DMRC towards civil works inside the airport. On the
same analogy, DMRC should have demanded grant for the work done for the subway
inside the airport. Till date, neither any DPR nor the alignment from Aerocity to Indira
Gandhi Domestic metro station has been approved by the MoHUA/ GNCTD. The
proposal of connecting Arrival and Departure Terminal with the existing metro station
was done solely on the request of DIAL and that too in the unpaid area72. Moreover, a
definitive agreement is to be signed within two months from the date of signing of MoU
(30 March 2013). However, despite lapse of eight years, definitive agreement has not
been executed till date.

3.8 Flawed design of Hauz Khas interchange station resulting in inconvenience

to the commuters
DMRC entered (January 2013) into a contract (CC 27) with M/s L&T- SUCG JV for
design and construction of tunnel from end of underground ramp (near Shankar Vihar
metro station) to Hauz Khas metro station on Line-8. The chainage of the new tunnel
for Line-8 was passing below the existing tunnel of Line-2 constructed during Phase II.
Hence, the rail level was provided at 196 meter with concourse and platform with three
intermediate levels.
Audit noticed that for interchanging the metro from Line-8 to Line-2, the commuters
have to come at the concourse level by passing through three intermediate levels after
which they have to pass through the concourse level with ramp of two meter (above the
sewer line) and then come down by using staircase/ escalator to connect the concourse
level of the Line-2.

72
Area outside Automatic fare collection system i.e., common area prior to ticketing

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Figure 3.1
Layout of interconnecting stations at Line-8 and Line-2

In this regard, Audit observed that:

(i) For interchanging facility at Hauz Khas metro station, commuters have to pass
through three intermediate levels before passing through ramp over the sewer line to
come down to the concourse level of the Line-2 (shown in above figure). If the
concourse level connected to Line-8 and Line-2 passed below the sewer line, it would
have been more convenient to the commuters.
(ii) By constructing the concourse level at 205.73 meter, instead of two intermediate
levels, only one would have been sufficient. However, due to additional intermediate
level, four environment control systems and three auxiliary sub stations had to be
installed at Hauz Khas metro station (Line-8). This is in contrast to other underground
stations where only two environment control systems and two auxiliary sub stations
were provided. For additional intermediate level, extra lifts/ escalators/ staircases were
also installed. There are several void areas at intermediate level which are presently of
no use.
(iii) As per tender drawing, staircase was provided between two escalators (up and
down) from concourse to intermediate level and symmetrical layout of escalators.
Staircase was also provided from intermediate level to platform level. Layout of
escalators and staircase from platform to intermediate level were kept as per tender
drawing. However, from intermediate level to concourse, the staircase was provided

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adjacent to the escalators (up & down). Thus, there was no symmetry in the layouts for
both levels resulting in inconvenience to the passengers, as they cross each other.
(iv) Technical consultant (IIT Delhi) observed that the constraint of the presence of
a sewer line of 1,200 mm diameter should not have been a major bottleneck as DMRC
has shifted even larger sewer pipes of about 1,650 mm diameter for construction works,
for example, near Jawahar Lal Nehru Stadium. The existing pipelines and other
infrastructure facilities could have easily been shifted for the straight crossing thereby
eliminating extra intermediate levels. Review of drawings also revealed that the
concourse could have been connected with the previous level instead of taking it up and
bringing it down to avoid the sewer line.
Thus, DMRC constructed the concourse level at 214.35 meter instead of at 205.73
meter. This has resulted in construction of two additional intermediate levels and
inconvenience to the commuters.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that if the
concourse level were provided below the sewer line, the concourse level would be
205.73 meter73. The concourse level of existing Hauz Khas station is 211.64 meter.
Hence, there would still be a difference of 5.91 meter for passengers to travel. The top
of roof slab would be 212.3 meter (214.3 meter-2 meter) and the overburden height
would be 11.2 meter (223.5 meter-212.3 meter). Such a design would be very difficult
and uneconomical. DMRC also stated that due to additional area of connecting subway,
which is air-conditioned, the requirement of additional Environment Control Systems
was unavoidable. Further, the diversion was not required if concourse was kept at
205.73 meter as suggested by Audit. DMRC had explored various option of Hauz Khas
station before deciding the final design.
Reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not tenable as the sewer line of 1,200 mm
diameter could have been diverted. Moreover, if the concourse level had been provided
below the sewer line, the concourse level would be at 205.73 meter eliminating the need
to construct two additional floors i.e., intermediate level-3 at 208.60 meter & Concourse
level 214.35 meter. DMRC has accepted that two additional environment control
systems and one auxiliary sub stations have been provided due to the additional area.
However, the facts remain that faulty layout of alignment of staircase and escalator
causes inconvenience to the commuters.
In the Exit Conference, DMRC accepted and appreciated the Audit observation and
stated that the option as pointed by Audit was not explored which would have been
more convenient to the commuters.

73
214.3 -2m (soil cushion)-5.5m (clear height) -1.5 m (slab thickness)

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3.9 Payment of `21.05 crore directly to sub-contractors/ vendors despite joint

venture reservation/ refusal for the same
DMRC issued (19 June 2012) Letter of Acceptance (LoA) to M/s FEMC-Pratibha joint
venture (JV Contractor) for design and construction of tunnels and four stations between
Moti Bagh and Lajpat Nagar Stations (CC-18) at ₹1,089.59 crore. As per LoA, the
work was to be completed by 24 December 2015. However, due to slow progress,
labour unrest and other issues, DMRC offloaded the work and got them executed at the
risk and cost of contractor. Managing Director, DMRC approved (September 2019)
encashment of performance bank guarantee amounting to ₹54.48 crore for adjustment
of liability amount spent at the risk and cost of joint venture and performance bank
guarantee was encashed on 04 September 2019. Audit observed that DMRC released
(September 2019) ₹21.05 crore to these sub-contractors/ vendors on the basis of joint
venture letter dated 18 September 2018. But, from 01 February 2019, co-venture of
joint venture was in suspension and the powers of its Board and all rights vests in
Resolution Professional. Resolution Professional stated (August 2019) that more than
60 vendors have already filed their claims with the undersigned. Hence, until complete
scrutiny of their claims, no amount can be released to the said vendors.
Thus, DMRC without reconciliation of the claims of sub-contractors/ vendors with
Resolution Professional, released ₹21.05 crore to the sub-contractors/ vendors. This
was based on JV’s old letter, when Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process was not in
place.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that the
release of ₹21.05 crore post completion of defect liability Period is merely honoring the
contractor’s request letter dated 18 September 2018. Further, the decision of not
considering Resolution Professional as the authorised representative of the joint venture
was taken based on the judgement of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in another case
of M/s PIL-CRFG JV. Therefore, no cognizance has been given to the letter received
from the Resolution Professional. Prior to transfer of the above amount, the contractor
had already been asked (14 June 2019) to convey any deviations from their letter dated
18 September 2018. However, no reply was received.
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not acceptable as after commencement
of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process against one joint venture partner and
receiving a letter from Resolution Professional, letter of 18 September 2018 does not
have relevance. Further, without any contractual relationship, DMRC released
₹21.05 crore to these sub-contractors/ vendors in violation of contractual provisions.
The judgement given in another case cannot be directly applied in this case, as the
circumstances and merits of two cases may be different. Further, after being informed
by Resolution Professional that more than 60 vendors have already filed their claims
with them, it is imprudent to release any amount to the said vendor until a complete
scrutiny of their claims is done. The confirmation/ receipt of letter dated 14 June 2019
from joint venture/ Resolution Professional/ contractor was not provided. As, DMRC
has no contractual relationship with sub-contractor and vendors, any surplus amount

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after adjusting DMRC claim should be transferred in the account of joint venture as per
contractual provisions.
3.10 Construction of smaller width platform at Dwarka (new) and Nangli station
During review of Dwarka-Najafgarh corridors, the following inconsistencies were
noticed:
Figure 3.2
Construction of Dwarka (new/ Line-9) platform with lesser width

As per the DPR of Dwarka-Najafgarh, all elevated stations are planned with two side
platforms (4.5 meter wide each). Further, the DPR stated that stations have been planned
following the norms and criteria being adopted by DMRC for Phase-I and Phase-II of
Delhi Metro. Audit observed that the platform width of Dwarka (new station) and
Nangli station was 2.9 meter (clear width 2.57 meter, which may further be reduced to
2.27 meter (approximately) post Platform Screen Doors facility in future), whereas
platforms of existing Dwarka metro station constructed during Phase-I in 2005 is of
more than four meter. New Dwarka station is an interchange station with front
crossover facility, means boarding and de-boarding takes place from same side of the
platform. Audit also observed that in other metros, platform widths have been worked
out on the basis of holding capacity of the platform for worst-case scenario (i.e., two
missed headways) in the design year. The same exercise/ calculation was not mentioned
in DPR of Dwarka-Najafgarh section.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that detailed
calculation of platform width is not required at DPR stage. However, the calculation
details are reproduced now i.e., peak hour boarding/ alighting is given as 839.

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Reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not tenable as it was clearly mentioned in
the DPR that all elevated stations are planned around two side platforms (4.5 meter wide
each). As per DPR, Peak Hour Peak Direction Traffic of 10,373 and 13,187 were
mentioned from Dwarka to Najafgarh depot in 2021 and 2031, respectively, whereas in
the calculation, Peak hour boarding/ alighting is given as 839 for Dwarka station.
However, in addition to boarding/ alighting passengers, there are also interchange
passengers who use the Dwarka (new) station platform.
3.11 Non-provisioning of Platform Screen Doors
In May 2012, DMRC proposed for procurement of a new type of Rolling Stock i.e.,
Unattended Train Operation based Rolling Stock on standalone Line-7 and Line-8.
Director (Rolling Stock) apprised to the Board of Directors that for operation in GoA3/
GoA4, Platform Screen Doors are required to be provided to stop intrusion from the
platform to the track. Audit observed that DMRC had planned to operate Unattended
Train Operation based Rolling Stock on standalone Dwarka-Najafgarh corridor without
installing Platform Screen Doors which is essential for Unattended Train Operation.
DMRC also constructed lesser width platform at Dwarka (new) and Nangli station as
against DPR provisions. Installation of Platform Screen Doors at a later stage would
have higher cost implication, passenger safety issue and interface issue. It will also be
a time-consuming process as already experienced by DMRC during the installation of
Platform Screen Doors on existing operational Line-2.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that Dwarka-
Najafgarh section is using Unattended Train Operation compliant Rolling Stock and
Signalling System i.e., can be upgraded to fulfil Unattended Train Operation
requirements in due course as and when required. Given the volume of traffic as of
now, this section is not planned for Unattended Train Operation. Use of Platform
Screen Doors is mandatory with Unattended Train Operation, which is not the case in
this section.
DMRC reply regarding Platform Screen Doors is not acceptable as Unattended Train
Operation based Rolling Stock was procured for the section. By constructing lesser
width of platform and not installing Platform Screen Doors, DMRC is compromising
passenger safety. Further, DMRC while responding to para no [Link] stated that
although not essential, under Indian conditions with Unattended Train Operation
provision, Platform Screen Doors is expected to increase passenger safety against
accidental falls and unauthorised entry to track.
3.12 Extra payment of `5.01 crore to the contractor
As per Letter of Award of contract CC-23, the contractor had to construct five
underground stations and underground section between Kalkaji to Hauz Khas on
Line-8. The horizontal and vertical track alignment between Panchsheel station and
Chirag Delhi station was passing below a deep open nallah (drain). The tunnelling prior
to the open nallah was to be made by Tunnel Boring Machine and beyond that
(including open nallah and station box) by cut and cover. As the cushion between top

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of tunnel structure and open nallah bed is only 1.3 meter which was grossly inadequate
for tunnelling by Tunnel Boring Machine, it was proposed (21 December 2012) by
Chief Project Manager that the depth of tunnel at nallah location may be lowered by
about 2 meter, so that crossing of open nallah can be done using Tunnel Boring Machine
as the cushion available will be 3.23 meter which can allow tunnelling by Tunnel Boring
Machine and the track level of Chirag Delhi station may also be lowered by 2 meter.
The recommendations of the Chief Project Manager were accepted (03 January 2013)
by Managing Director, DMRC. The contractor submitted (26 March 2015) a claim for
variation of ₹25.16 crore for the above variation against which DMRC paid an amount
of ₹5.01 crore. In this regard, Audit observed that:
(i) As per the agreement, the tunnel crossing from West bank of nallah was to be
constructed by cut and cover up to Chirag Delhi Station. However, instead of cut and
cover method, DMRC decided to construct the tunnel by Tunnel Boring Machine by
lowering the rail level by two meter. Due to this, the level of the Chirag Delhi metro
station was also lowered by two meter.
(ii) The depth of the nallah between Chirag Delhi station and Panchsheel was known
to DMRC prior to award of the contract. The tender alignment for nallah was finalised
by DMRC. The construction of tunnel by cut & cover was part of Schedule-A, which
was lump sum. Due to the above variation, DMRC incurred an avoidable expenditure
of ₹5.01 crore.
Thus, DMRC incurred additional expenditure of ₹5.01 crore due to change in
methodology of construction resulting in lowering the rail level by two meter against
cut and cover method mentioned in the contract agreement.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (July 2020/ January 2021) stated that in
tender alignment, work was proposed by cut & cover method as the cushion between
crown of tunnel structure and bottom of nallah was only 1.3 meter. This was grossly
inadequate for tunnelling with Tunnel Boring Machine. At the time of excavation, it
was found that the foundations of culvert are strip foundations infringing the alignment.
The excavation of cut and cover section in this area would have disturbed the foundation
of the culvert. If the details of foundations of road bridge were known prior to tender,
then DMRC would have planned crossing nallah with Tunnel Boring machine in which
case station level would have been kept two meter lower in tender drawings itself so
that Tunnel Boring Machine can pass safely below Bridge foundation.
Reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC that the tunnelling was proposed through
Tunnel Boring Machines to ensure safety of culvert is not acceptable as it is not possible
to construct tunnel by cut and cover without disturbing the foundation of the culvert.
Moreover, Strip Foundation is a common type of foundation, presence of which, in a
structure, cannot be ruled out in designing at tender stage. As per tender drawing, if
the tunnel was constructed through cut and cover method, contractor has to remove
Tunnel Boring Machine through retrieval shaft and re-launch it through launching shaft.
However, the effect of saving in this regard was not recovered from the contractor. If
the construction was done as per tender drawing no additional financial burden would

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have fallen on DMRC. Due to this variation, DMRC has to construct Chirag Delhi
metro station at two meter below from the approved tender drawings. Besides,
knowledge of foundations of the road bridge and flow of nallah are essential
prerequisites for starting the project. This was also endorsed by the Technical
Consultant (IIT Delhi).
3.13 Construction of Sadar Bazar cantonment and Shankar Vihar stations
without the approval of GoI and GNCTD
Chief Project Manager submitted (February 2012) to the Managing Director, DMRC
that as per DPR on Line-8, inter-station distance between Palam to Indra Gandhi
Domestic Airport and Indra Gandhi Domestic Airport to Vasant Vihar stations were
5.213 km and 4.259 km, respectively. The inter-station distance was unusually high as
the alignment was passing through defence area. Defence authorities requested DMRC
to provide stations at Sadar Bazaar and Shankar Vihar to cater to the requirement of the
large number of defence personnel living in these areas since there was a separate
catchment of non-defence personnel in the vicinity of Sadar Bazaar. Providing two
more stations rationalizes the inter-station distances and would bring additional traffic
for Delhi Metro. As per the DPR estimates, there was an additional cost implication of
₹54.24 crore including the cost of electrical and mechanical works. The above proposal
was approved (February 2012) by the Managing Director, DMRC. In this regard, Audit
observed that:
(i) The decision to construct additional stations was without any study or survey
for assessment and projection of ridership. Phase-III DPR was formulated on the basis
of detailed report of Central Road Research Institute and RITES. However, no such
supplementary study was conducted at the time of submission of proposal and the same
was approved in one day by Director (Project) and Managing Director, DMRC.
(ii) As these two stations were not provided in the DPR, they were not approved by
the GoI and the GNCTD. Fund provision for these two stations was also not made in
the DPR.
(iii) As these stations were constructed on the request of Defence authorities, DMRC
could have requested the Defence authorities for provision of funds for construction of
the stations. DMRC took possession of 4.48 acre of permanent land for construction of
station at a total cost of ₹13.46 crore and paid annual rent of ₹0.48 crore for temporary
land instead of taking up the matter with Ministry of Defence (MoD) for waiver of land
cost. Further, Defence land cannot be used for property development or any other
commercial purpose. No lease deed has been signed between DMRC and MoD.
Thus, DMRC had constructed two stations on the request of Ministry of Defence
without any provision in DPR, traffic study and without approval of GoI and GNCTD.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that DPR
requirement of mid shaft at Shankar Vihar was eliminated with the construction of an
elevated station at Shankar Vihar. The cost of mid shaft as per DPR was ₹29.96 crore
and total cost of Shankar Vihar station is ₹31.55 crore which is comparable. The station

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is also a source of revenue. By constructing the station inside Shankar Vihar,

commuters and defence families living in the area now have access to public transport.
Since the overall construction cost of two additional stations was within the funds
provided in DPR, approval was taken from the Managing Director, DMRC. Property
Development is being carried out through advertisements, Sulabh complex etc., inside
the metro stations. However, external land of defence is not being used for commercial
purpose, as it does not belong to them. The signing of lease deed between DMRC and
MoD is under progress. The provision of Shankar Vihar and Sadar Bazar stations is
more of technical requirement to break the long inter station distance of underground
sections, hence no separate traffic study was found necessary.
Reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not acceptable because even at the time of
approval from the Managing Director, DMRC for construction of Shankar Vihar
station, there was neither such requirement for construction of mid shaft at Shankar
Vihar station nor any approval for construction of metro station in lieu of mid shaft
sought. Audit noticed that at Shankar Vihar station, entry and exit for general public is
restricted, being a defence area. Due to permit system and being a landlocked metro
station, the ridership was low and revenue was lowest among all stations on Line-8. In
the absence of Property Development and Property Business, being located in defence
area, the Non-Fare Box Revenue from these stations will be negligible. Further, DMRC
has to incur the operational cost for running the station in the form of energy,
manpower, maintenance and housekeeping. Thus, DMRC has already incurred the
capex and would continue to incur operational expenses throughout the life of the
station. The Ministry in its reply accepted that no separate traffic study was done.
Besides, building stations is not an alternative to the mid shaft. Metro stations are built
for operational requirement while construction of mid shafts is a technical requirement.
3.14 Variation in CC-04 amounting to `78.75 crore for unforeseen conditions
DMRC awarded (29 December 2011) the work of tunnel between Mukundpur and
Shalimar Bagh section and underground station at Azadpur on Line-7 to M/S CEC-
CICI JV (contractor) at the awarded cost of ₹416.80 crore on lumpsum basis. DMRC
revised (21 March 2012) the alignment between Azadpur to Mukundpur due to non-
availability of Delhi Police land. As per General Condition of Contract clause, in case
of unforeseen physical condition, which could not have been reasonably foreseen by an
experienced contractor, the contractor shall give written notice thereof to the Engineer
and if, in the opinion of the Engineer, such conditions could not have been reasonably
foreseen by an experienced contractor, the Engineer shall certify and the employer shall
pay reasonable additional cost to which the contractor shall have been put by reason of
such conditions.
During construction, two Tunnel Boring Machines were launched from tunnelling work
between Azadpur and Mukundpur. After completion of 658.8 meter for Tunnel Boring
Machines 1 and 595.2 meter for Tunnel Boring Machines 2 of the tunnel drive from
Azadpur to Mukundpur, Tunnel Boring Machines -1 & 2 were stuck due to rock
encounter beneath the Rameshwar Nagar Gurudwara and three houses. Accordingly,

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the contractor after demolishing three houses and the Gurudwara, constructed a shaft to
retrieve Tunnel Boring Machines.
The contractor submitted (29 June 2018) a claim of ₹242.35 crore on account of
unforeseen physical condition due to shifting of horizontal & vertical alignment from
Azadpur to Mukundpur by DMRC and encountering of rock strata at Rameshwar Nagar
below Gurudwara. After scrutiny of claim of the contractor, DMRC approved
(November 2019) the net variation amount of ₹78.75 crore. In this regard, Audit along
with the Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) observed that:
(i) Geological and geotechnical details of Delhi region are well known especially
after the experience of Phase-I and Phase-II. Detailed geological maps are also
available indicating the extension of ridge outcrops in North-East direction and
extending up to the Yamuna river, very close to the alignment. Besides, it is common
sense to expect rock outcrops in the vicinity at varying depths despite borehole data
being available sparingly. The boreholes conducted by DMRC and the contractor along
the alignment were spaced around 67 meter, however, the rock outcrop encountered at
the said Rameshwar crossing under the Gurudwara and housing colony was only
32 meter width, indicating that they might have missed due to large spacing between
the boreholes (67 meter).
(ii) The contractor conducted his own investigations and used DMRC’s pre bid
borehole data for selecting Tunnel Boring Machines which can cut only through soil
strata. If DMRC changed vertical and horizontal alignment by few meter, it is the
contractor’s responsibility to make sure of the ground conditions and select the suitable
Tunnel Boring Machine for the site rather than use something that worked elsewhere.
Normally, any pre bid data provided by the owner along with the tender must be treated
as first-hand information and the contractor should conduct detailed investigations for
the designs. Also, as the said site was unapproachable for placing the drilling rig, they
could have conducted indirect geophysical methods such as Ground Penetration Radar
or Multi-Channel Analysis of Surface Waves, which are quick and accurate methods to
differentiate between soil and rock. A prudent contractor would have assessed the
ground conditions based on better refined geological and geotechnical methods and
selected mixed Tunnel Boring Machines, as per prevailing practice in such conditions
across the world. Hence, the Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) was of view that the
conditions are not latent requiring compensation.
DMRC replied (July 2020) that the present variation arose due to change in alignment
because of non-availability of Delhi Police land and the alignment was shifted to the
other side of road no. 51. Further, the depth of tunnel increases at the location where
rock was encountered directly beneath the Gurudwara and three houses. As per the
General Consultant report, a 30 meter length of rock was present along the length of
tunnel alignment from Azadpur to Mukundpur. DMRC soil report comprised of 23
bore holes while the contractor’s soil report comprised 15 further boreholes. Total 38
bore holes represented an average spacing of 67 meter along the alignment of 2.6 km
which formed the basis for reasonable representation of the likely ground condition

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along the alignment. The location of presence of rock was between the Gurudwara and
three adjacent houses making it impossible to know about the rock. General Consultant
Report also mentioned that it finds it difficult to argue that an ‘experienced’ contractor
could have anticipated rock along either the tender or revised alignments from a review
of the pre & post contract borehole data samples at site. Suggesting that the contractor
should have foreseen rock when there is a clause to unforeseen ground conditions would
be illogical. General consultant report clearly mentioned that there was confined patch
of intact rock encounter during tunnelling & this constitutes an unforeseen ground
condition. Therefore, it was decided to construct emergency escape shaft on that
location and retrieve Tunnel Boring Machine.
Thus, contractor relied upon bore hole data at the distance of 67 meter instead of
application of latest geophysical methods for assessing ground conditions. Resultantly,
DMRC had to incur additional expenditure of ₹78.75 crore.
The Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC further stated (January 2021) that Geological map
showed extent of rocks at 2.89 km away from alignment. Hence, extension of ridge
outcrops along alignment could not be anticipated as confirmed from 38 boreholes
which were made since none of them showed any rock. Application of Ground
Penetration Radar and Multi-Channel Analysis of Surface Waves are considered not
accurate in case of geophysical investigation works due to various limitation74.
However, the Audit observations have been noted for further optimisation of
geotechnical & geological records in future.
Reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not acceptable as the variation had resulted
due to change in alignment post tender stage. Delhi Police intimated (September 2011)
inability to provide land to DMRC before finalisation of tender CC-04 in December
2011. But DMRC intimated the change in alignment in March 2012 after awarding of
work. If DMRC had intimated the change in alignment during tendering stage, soil
investigations and other risks would have been the responsibility of the contractor.
Notwithstanding the cited reasons, when the alignment is changed, fresh investigations
should be conducted along the new routes unless the stratigraphy is known. Further,
the mentioned limitations of the geophysical methods in the present situation are not
convincing.
3.15 Non-compliance of various environment requirements
DMRC is required to comply with various environmental provisions under the National
Environment Policy, the Central Water Commission, Water (Prevention & Control of
Pollution) Act, and Air (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act etc.
As per the National Environment Policy (14 September 2006), environment clearance
is required for activities based on their potential environmental impacts as indicated in

74
Ground Penetration Radar has been found to perform satisfactorily up to a depth of 4 meter to
5 meter, MASW required a flat ground within at least one receiver spread length i.e., minimum
30 meter for analysing up to depth of 10 meter to 20 meter below the ground surface also the
receiver spacing is to be maintained 1 meter to 2 meter, which was not possible in congested area.

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the Schedule to the notification of Rule 5, sub-rule (3) of the Environment (Protection)
Rules, 1986. As per the Schedule, environment clearance was required for building and
construction projects having built up area of more than 20,000 sqm.
“General Guidelines for Water Audit & Water Conservation” by the Central Water
Commission (2017), Ministry of Water Resources recommends water audit as an
important management tool for effective conservation of water. DMRC Water Policy
(2013) also provides to minimise wastages by carrying out half yearly water audits at
selected stations and depots.
Central Water Commission and Central Ground Water Board recommends that supplies
to industries should be from surface water and if ground water supply is considered
essential, it should be managed by a Government Agency.
In this regard, Audit observed the following deficiencies regarding compliance to the
above provisions:
(i) No environment clearance was obtained by DMRC for the Phase-III project
even though it had constructed four metro car maintenance depots75 each having built
up area of more than 20,000 sqm.
(ii) DMRC uses water for construction work (project) and operation & maintenance
purpose. However, it did not conduct any water audits at stations, depots and
construction sites from 2011 till date. It neither assessed the extent of water losses and
efficiency of system nor performed any cost benefit analysis for optimum recovery of
water nor any benchmarking of suitable parameters for water use. It also did not
formulate a Water Management Plan.
(iii) It is DMRC’s responsibility as per its water policy to manage extraction and
supply of ground water to the contractors. However, during the entire Phase-III project,
no details and records were maintained either by DMRC or the contractors for water
extracted, consumed or loss of water. The agreements signed by DMRC with the
contractors also did not have any provision for maintenance of such record. Thus, there
were no checks and balance for extraction and consumption of water by the contractors.
Further, although the agreement included that the contractor had to meet the water cost
from his own funds, DMRC permitted the contractor to extract water from ground
resulting in undue benefit and cost saving to contractor.
(iv) Further, General Conditions of Contract provisions under Clause76 2.1.6 were
also not honoured for installation and operation of Sewage Treatment Plant as DMRC
did not ensure that Consent to Establish and Consent to Operate are obtained by the
contractors.

75
Mukundpur (45,686 sqm), Kalindi Kunj (29,310 sqm), Vinod Nagar (32,104 sqm) and Badli
(46,063 sqm)
76
As per GCC 2.1.6 (Scope of Works), it was agreed that “obtaining statutory permissions for consent
to establish and consent to operate including all costs, fees for obtaining such permission from
Pollution Control Board” was a part of the lump sum price of contract

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Thus, DMRC did not adhere to various environment requirements including obtaining
environmental clearances, conducting water audit and maintaining records of water
extracted, consumed and lost during Phase-III.
Regarding environment clearance, DMRC stated (July 2020) that metro project is a
physical infrastructure project as per Schedule of Environmental Impact Assessment
Notification, 2006 and exempted from seeking environment clearance from the State
and Central authorities. It accepted that there is no formal water management plan of
DMRC. It added that Phase-III contracts had no provision to quantify consumption of
water through instrumentation of water meters. As such neither water meters were
installed, nor records maintained. Hence quantity and cost are not available. However,
in Phase-IV contracts under Safety, Health and Environment, provision for installation
of meters and maintenance of records has been incorporated.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that the
previous phases of DMRC also had similar clause in the contract regarding usage of
water; water for construction was always drawn through borewells with contractors at
their own cost, and that contractors have not saved money by pumping water from
ground. No prior environment clearance is also required. The Audit observation
implies that the project is linear, which is not the case. Lastly, there is no specific
category under which metro rail can approach the State/ Centre for environment
clearance. Wherever borewell existed, records were maintained. However, contractor’s
record keeping was not robust. This will be strengthened in future. For Phase-IV of
Delhi Metro, specific clauses have been incorporated in the Conditions of Contract for
better water management at construction site.
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC regarding environment clearance is not
acceptable as the comments of Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change
on the Phase-III DPR forwarded (November 2015) by MoHUA to DMRC clearly
mentioned that while metro rail projects are not covered under the Environment Impact
Assessment Notification, 2006, if the total built up area is more than 20,000 sqm, prior
Environment Clearance is required from the State. Further, DMRC’s claim that they
are not required to follow the environmental clearance is incorrect as DMRC itself came
into existence after complying with the “Guidelines for Environmental and Social
Considerations” of an international funding organisation which are based on the World
Bank Operational Policy (OP 4.01). DMRC operations are classified under Category
A, which refer to projects likely to have significant adverse impact on the environment
and society.
3.16 Discrepancies in tree cutting estimation, compensatory afforestation and
disposal of wood
During the execution of Phase-III of Delhi MRTS project, 100 per cent plantation is
being done by the Forest Department of GNCTD. As per permission letters issued by
Forest Department, 1,74,550 trees were to be planted under compensatory afforestation
by DMRC during the period from 2011 to 2019. Planting of these many trees by DMRC
alone could contribute 2.69 sq km (1,74,550/ 65,000) increase in forest and tree cover

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of Delhi77. DMRC deposited ₹51.76 crore as security deposit for cost of compensatory
plantation in lieu of 17,455 trees78 to be cut during the period from 2011-12 to 2018-19.
DMRC had actually cut 12,646 trees79 on the basis of actual requirement. However, in
the absence of proper records relating to tree plantations by Forest Department and
monitoring by DMRC, Audit could not verify whether Forest Department planted the
required number of trees on behalf of DMRC. The corridor/ line wise details of
estimation of compensatory afforestation and actual tree felled is given in Annexure-V.
In this regard, Audit observed that:
(i) There is no approved policy and Standard Operating Procedure for tree cutting,
disposal of wood/ timber after tree cutting, preservation and plantation after execution
of three Phases by DMRC. Forest Department, GNCTD provides for social auditing
and departmental monitoring of compensatory plantations. However, no site visit/
inspection was conducted by DMRC officials for monitoring purposes during April
2011 to December 2018.
(ii) In the absence of any follow up or data maintained by DMRC regarding actual
tree plantation, it can be said that claims of DMRC regarding number of compensatory
tree plantation in its website (Sankalp Report 2018-19) is misleading as it is stated that
1,90,688 trees have been planted during Phase-III.
(iii) There was inconsistency in the figure of number of trees to be cut in respect of
initial four corridors as provided in DPR submitted to the Board of Directors, GoI,
GNCTD and the Environment Impact Assessment study conducted by RITES in this
regard (Annexure-V).
(iv) There was vast difference in the cost of compensatory afforestation as assessed
in DPR (₹1.44 crore @ ₹1,250 per tree) in comparison to Environmental Impact
Assessment study (₹46.50 crore @ ₹28,000 per tree).
(v) In the DPR of Dwarka-Najafgarh, Mundka-Bahadurgarh (Delhi portion)
sanctioned in 2012, the estimated cost of one tree was taken as ₹1200 and ₹700,
respectively, as against ₹28,000 per tree. Whereas, in case of Kalindi Kunj-Botanical
Garden, which was executed on the request of Government of Uttar Pradesh, the
estimated cost of compensatory afforestation was assessed as ₹11.96 crore @ ₹28,000
per tree. But no actual expenditure was incurred on compensatory afforestation on this
corridor, as the same was done by Government of Uttar Pradesh at its own cost. Details
regarding number of trees to be felled and estimated expenditure on compensatory
afforestation was not mentioned in the DPR/ Feasibility Report of Shiv Vihar,
Najafgarh-Dhansa Bus Stand and Faridabad-Ballabhgarh corridors.
(vi) As per the permit condition, permit holder (i.e., DMRC) shall transport the
wood, and loops arising out of felling of trees at their expense to the nearest public
crematorium managed by Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD)/ New Delhi

77
Considering 65,000 tree for increase in 1 km for forest and tree cover of Delhi
78
As per Forest Department of GNCTD
79
As per information furnished by DMRC

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Municipal Corporation (NDMC) to give them free of cost and under proper receipt from
such crematorium and submit a copy of such receipt to the Forest Department. DMRC
produced some receipts for delivering the wood to crematoria operated by a Non-
Government Organisation instead of MCD as per permission letter. Further, at Chief
Project Manager-2, Inderlok, wood was auctioned/ sold to private parties and revenue
amounting to ₹5.82 lakh was realised, which is in contravention of permit condition.
(vii) DMRC had deposited advance payment for the cost of compensatory
afforestation for 17,455 trees and reallocation of 746 trees. But during the execution,
only 12,646 trees were cut/ felled, and 484 trees were reallocated by DMRC. Hence,
the excess amount of ₹14.20 crore for 5,071 trees80 should have been recovered from
the Forest Department, GNCTD (Annexure-VI).
Thus, in absence of any approved Policy/ Standard Operating Procedure there were
inconsistency in tree cutting estimation, compensatory afforestation and disposal of
wood. Further in absence of monitoring, claim of DMRC regarding the compensatory
tree plantation cannot be ensured.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that approved
policy or standard operating procedure on this issue cannot be formulated by DMRC as
DMRC is fully dependent on terms and conditions imposed by the Forest Department.
DPR contains the preliminary survey data. However, Environmental Impact
Assessment study is conducted after the approval of the corridor by the Government.
Hence, there was variation in the data & number of trees. Small plants like shrubs are
also included as tree while obtaining tree felling permission from the Forest
Department, GNCTD. However, it is not possible to keep account of these trees while
executing the work. Since majority of permission letters for tree cutting have been
obtained during 2011-12, identification of saved trees (i.e., for which permission of
cutting were taken from Forest Department, but not actually cut due to change in
alignment or entry/ exit gate location etc) and convincing Forest Department is not
feasible. DMRC ensures compliance of conditions in the permission letter while
disposing cut wood. Since insignificant amount has been realised by disposal of cut
wood in few cases, it has been facilitated to public crematorium free of cost and receipt
obtained from public crematorium has been kept on record.
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC needs to be viewed in the light of the fact
that DMRC had formulated various internal policies in consonance with applicable
Act/ Rules for example water policy. Hence, they could have framed a suitable policy
in this regard also. Further DMRC on one hand has claimed savings in the number of
trees to be cut, while on the other hand it states that they have not maintained record of
small plant/ trees and time gap between permission and execution. As such the entire
process needs streamlining.

80
17,455+746-12,646-484 trees

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Conclusion
Thus, number of deficiencies were noticed which adversely affected the contract
management and project execution of Phase-III of Delhi MRTS. There is no protocol
for estimating the cost of upcoming projects in a scientific manner as DMRC used the
concept of derivation of cost estimate based on last accepted rates of ‘similar project’.
This led to sanctioning of higher funds. Social Impact Assessment study conducted for
Phase-III was deficient as it did not envisage 108 project affected persons at Trilokpuri
resulting in delay in Rehabilitation and Resettlement process and operationalisation of
metro in this section for more than five years. Further, DMRC did not determine the
location of Mukundpur station with due diligence at the time of preparation of DPR and
did not explore any possibility of construction of at-grade station on the vacant land of
PWD. DMRC constructed additional subway from Terminal 1C to Terminal 1D, on
the request of DIAL and also constructed Sadar Bazar and Shankar Vihar stations on
the request of Ministry of Defence, without any provisions in DPR and without
approval of GoI and GNCTD. Flawed design of Hauz Khas interchange station resulted
in construction of two additional intermediate levels and inconvenience to the
commuters. Besides, DMRC did not adhere to various environment requirements
including obtaining environmental clearances, conducting water audit and maintaining
records of water extracted/ consumed. There was also inconsistency in tree cutting
estimation, and compensatory afforestation.
Recommendations
8. DMRC may ascertain cost estimates of projects on the basis of scientific
method; establish a cell to study the cost aspects of various contracts and may
consider formulating a schedule of rates like Delhi Schedule of Rates for metro
projects.
9. DMRC may formulate a policy on grant of special advances to the contractors.
10. DMRC should ensure efficient planning and timely completion of
rehabilitation and resettlement activities for smooth completion of project.
11. DMRC may ensure adherence to relevant environmental requirements of
obtaining environmental clearance, carry out water audit, maintain records for
water consumption and prepare Water Management Plans for future projects.

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 CHAPTER-4
PROJECT MONITORING
 Report No. 11 of 2021

Chapter 4
Project Monitoring
4.1 Implementation of Project
4.1.1 Audit assessed the project implementation to examine whether an adequate
mechanism was in existence to monitor the project, to ensure timely completion and
conformity of works executed with laid down specifications. The significant
deficiencies are brought out in the following paragraphs.

[Link] The Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD) stated (12 July 2013) that the
50:50 joint ownership metro companies are essentially Board run companies. It is
desirable that the various issues/ agenda be first deliberated in detail in the Board Sub
Committees before these are brought to the Board of Directors. This will facilitate
Board of Directors to take decision in a short period of time. In pursuance of this
purpose, a Project Management Committee was constituted (November 2013) in
DMRC with Terms of Reference (ToR) as suggested by the Ministry. The ToR
prescribed by MoUD and Audit observations81 thereto are as follows:
i. To review the project cost periodically and determine the cost escalation and
make suitable recommendations to Board.
ii. To review Risk Management Strategy for DMRC.
iii. To review the physical and financial progress of the projects.
iv. To identify the impediments responsible for delaying the projects.
v. To suggest measures for expediting the projects.
vi. To monitor whether all the safety measures are being taken.
vii. Review preparatory activities for operation and maintenance and Commissioner
of Metro Rail Safety (CMRS) clearance.
viii. Review documentation to be submitted to CMRS.
ix. Any other matter as may be referred by the Board.

4.1.2 As per sanction letter (26 September 2011), Phase-III of Delhi MRTS was to be
taken up for implementation and was to be commissioned by 2016. It was planned that
total work can be completed within a period of 36 months to 48 months from date of
start. The work was to start by April 2011 and various sections were planned to be
opened in phases by 31 March 2016. Originally four corridors were taken up under
MRTS Phase-III. Subsequently, nine more corridors were undertaken for extension of
existing corridors. Status of implementation of corridors is depicted in Table 4.1 below:

81
Refer paras 3.1.1, 3.5, 3.11, 4.1.2, 4.3.1

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Table 4.1
Delay in completion of corridors
Sl. Corridors Date of Length Proposed Actual Date of Delay in
No. sanction (in km) Opening opening months
1 Central September 9.370 December Central Sect- --
Secretariat to 2011 2015 Mandi House --
Kashmiri Gate (June 2014) 17
(Line-6 Mandi House-
Extension)* ITO
(June 2015)
ITO-Kashmiri
Gate
(May 2017)
2 Jahangir Puri to September 4.373 December November 2015 11
Badli 2011 2014
(Line-2
Extension)*
3 Mukundpur September 55.69 March Majlis Park-DD
(Majlis Park) to 2011 2016 South Campus
Yamuna Vihar March 2018 24
(Line-7) * DD South to
4 Maujpur to Shiv September 2.9 March campus-Lajpat 33
Vihar (Line-7 2012 2016 Nagar
Extension) August 2018
Shiv Vihar-
TrilokPuri
October 2018
Vinobha Puri-
Mayur Vihar
Pocket-I
December 2018
5 Janak Puri West September 33.94 February May 2018 27
to Kalindi Kunj 2011 2016
(Line -8)*
6. Kalindi Kunj- December 4.3 December December 2017 --
Botanical 2017 2017
Garden (Line-8
Extension)
7 Badarpur- September 13.875 December September 2015 9
Faridabad 2011 2014
Extension
(Line-6
Extension )
8 Mundka- September 11.182 March June 2018 27
Bahadurgarh 2012 2016
(Line-5
Extension)
9 Dilshad Garden- February 9.635 January March 2019 2
New Bus Adda, 2019 2019
Ghaziabad
(Line-1
Extension)

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10 Noida City June 2018 6.799 September March 2019 6

Centre-Noida 2018
Sector-62 (Line-
3 Extension)
11 Escorts Mujesar March 3.205 December November 2018 --
(Faridabad- 2017 2018
Ballabhgarh
(Line-6
Extension )
12 Dwarka- September 4.295 December October 2019 46
Najafgarh 2012 2015
(Line-9)
13 Najafgarh to May 2017 1.180 December Yet to be put 3
Dhansa Bus 2020 into operation as
Stand (Line-9 on 31 March
Extension) 2021
Total 160.745
* Initially sanctioned Phase-III corridors having length of 103.05 km

4.1.3 In this regard, Audit observed the following:

(i) There were delays ranging from 2 months to 46 months in completing the
corridors as per scheduled dates. The significant reasons for the delay were;
• delay in land acquisition;
• delay in Rehabilitation & Resettlement activities;
• change in alignment/ scope; and
• slow progress of work by contractor etc.

(ii) DMRC was requested to form the Board Sub Committee on Project
Management comprising of Managing Director DMRC as Chairman, Additional
Secretary, (Delhi & Urban Transport) MoHUA, Additional Member Works, Railway
Board, Director (Projects) and Director (Works) of DMRC to have detailed
deliberations on various subject before these were brought to the Board of Directors.
The Committee was constituted during November 2013. However, no periodicity was
fixed for conducting the meeting. Meetings were held on need basis. During the
implementation of Phase-III project, only two meetings (November 2013/ February
2014) of the Committee were conducted up to March 2020. During these meetings, the
physical and financial progress of the corridors were reviewed along with discussions
on various impediments i.e., non-availability of land, tree cutting permission and forest
clearance affecting the projects and measures for expediting the projects were
suggested. Though the projects were implemented and completed during the period
September 2015 to October 2019, meeting of the Project Management Committee was
not conducted after February 2014.

Thus, DMRC failed to complete the corridors within stipulated time-period due to
various impediments like delay in land acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
activities, slow progress of work by contractors etc., resulting in foregoing of Fare Box
and Non Fare Box Revenue. Besides, the Board Sub Committee on Project Management

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did not meet at regular intervals to monitor the progress of work and suggest measures
to expedite the projects.

4.2 Audit along with Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) reviewed the quality controls
measures in DMRC and observed the following:

4.2.1 Lack of uniform project Quality Management Plans

The Project Quality Management Plan documents, the necessary information required
to effectively manage project quality from project planning to implementation. In
DMRC, project Quality Management Plans were prepared by the executing agencies
and there was no uniformity in these documents across projects. Resultantly, the quality
of the end product is dependent on the contractor executing the project.

The end product should be of the same quality irrespective of the contractor executing
the project. Hence, there is a need for DMRC to formulate a standard template for
Quality Management Plan and ensure its implementation. It should also involve
government testing laboratories and reputed engineering institutions with good testing
facilities for testing and third-party quality services.

The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that in Phase-
III, as per contract conditions, each contractor has to submit Quality Management Plans
based on employer requirements. However, at the approval stage of Quality
Management Plan by DMRC, uniformity was more or less maintained. Standard
formats of Project Quality Management Plan were made part of Phase-IV tender
document in order to bring uniformity. Besides, a dedicated ‘Quality Cell’’ has been
set up in Phase-IV to improve quality assurance systems in DMRC.

The Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC has agreed to implement the observation.

4.2.2 Poor quality of civil structure

The Audit team along with Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) and DMRC officers visited
Hauz Khas station and other stations. Site inspection and review of the design and
drawing documents revealed instances of poor quality civil structure such as bulging,
honey combing, and exposed reinforcement indicating absence of a proper formwork82
system. In the absence of proper formwork system, the quality, safety, and economy of
reinforced cement concrete structures cannot be ensured. DMRC responded that the
defects have been repaired. Further, DMRC while accepting that the shuttering was
not proper at some locations stated that such defects will be eliminated by proper
formwork and stringent supervision in future projects.

It is recommended that DMRC may formulate a detailed specification for the system of
formwork to be used in its projects. The safe load carrying capacity of the formwork
members should also be checked periodically as part of the quality assurance system.

82
Formwork is the term used for the process of creating a temporary mould into which concrete is
poured and formed under civil construction

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This would not only ensure quality but also ensure safety as most accidents at
construction site involving reinforced cement concrete are primarily on account of
formwork failure.

4.2.3 Non-optimisation of quantities of construction materials

Review of the design and drawings of station buildings, viaducts and tunnels revealed
that optimisation of quantities was not attempted and there was overdesigning. Further,
Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) observed instances of honeycombing and bulged
concrete, in Malviya Nagar, Najafgarh, Hauz Khas, Kalkaji metro stations etc., as
indicated in figures below:
Figure-4.1
Civil work at Kalkaji Metro Station

Honeycombing and bulged concrete Honeycombing and poorly made

surface formwork joints

The Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC has accepted the observation.

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4.2.4 Uneconomical design of structures

Review of adequacy of quality assessment mechanism of DMRC for assessment of
execution of work by Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) revealed that the columns were
not aligned and stub columns were used which tend to transfer the load to the
supporting beams instead of directly to the footings indicating uneconomical
design. Exposed reinforcement was also noticed due to improper cover blocks
during concreting.
The Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC has noted the observation for future compliance.
4.2.5 Absence of real time performance monitoring, capacity control, energy
saving strategies
DMRC opted for Building Management System which is a control system installed in
buildings that typically controls and monitors the building's mechanical and electrical
equipment such as Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning, lighting, power systems,
fire systems, and security systems. This helps in automation for more efficient and safe
operation of the stations.
In this regard, Audit along with Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) observed that;
(i) The station Building Management System assesses real time station air
temperature and relative humidity data. for capacity modulation. However, the data
logged in Building Management System is not being reviewed and analysed with the
perspective of improving energy efficiency. Instead, the temperature and relative
humidity conditions on platform and concourse levels are recorded manually at regular
intervals. The significant investment in a real time performance monitoring system with
data being logged into a Central Building Management System continuously becomes
meaningful only if the data is reviewed and analysed. It would also help DMRC to
improve its productivity factor, potentially leading to lowering of its fares for common
people.
(ii) Performance of chillers at stations can be assessed by using real time data. The
data provided by DMRC was found to be inaccurate and incomplete and does not seem
to be in order as it showed very low and intermittent loading of chillers. On an average,
25 per cent of total installed capacity is being used at Hauz Khas and Hazrat
Nizamuddin stations. In peak season (August) only 40 per cent of the chillers capacity
has been utilised for Hauz Khas station. Similarly, there was lower utilisation for other
stations. The aim of Environmental Control System should be to maintain the comfort
conditions at low capital and operational costs. Over sizing of equipment not only leads
to higher capital investment but also poor efficiency due to part load operation. An
accurate assessment of the percentage loading of chillers may provide actual demand
on the equipment. Monitoring and analysis would have provided actual validation of
the same. This could not be satisfactorily concluded during this review due to inaccurate
and missing data.
(iii) It was also observed that while there were component level energy efficiency
requirements such as minimum efficiency, Coefficient of Performance etc., posed to the

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contractors, the system level optimisation, possible through effective monitoring and
controls for energy savings was totally overlooked by DMRC.
(iv) Further, the design comfort conditions were not being maintained at the station
including both platform and concourse.
Thus, in the absence of monitoring of logged data in Building Management System,
energy efficiency measures cannot be ensured. Installation of higher size chiller at the
stations resulted in not only higher capital cost but also higher Operation &
Maintenance cost.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC has accepted (January 2021 and July 2020) the
Audit observations at (i) to (iv) above.
4.2.6 Absence of testing and maintenance of Heating Ventilation and Air
Conditioning equipment
Audit along with Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) and DMRC officers visited Hauz
Khas station and observed that the station temperature and humidity sensors were
placed in the false ceilings. This can lead to deviation of the recorded reading from the
station’s actual condition due to formation of a stagnant zone inside the false ceiling.
DMRC stated that the false ceiling team changed the type of false ceiling. Hence, the
sensors got above the perforated false ceiling. The same sensors are now planned to be
shifted.
Various deficiencies were also noticed in the testing of the equipment, such as:
(a) Equipment Performance test reports showed large difference in rated and
measured values (e.g. Chiller Coefficient of Performances varying from five to nine) in
many cases but there were no corresponding remarks/ comments on the same. Thus,
there is a need for detailed investigations behind the seemingly unrealistic values.
(b) Temperature of chilled water seem to varied significantly from 19°C to 24°C at
the inlet and 14°C to 19°C at the outlet, while the design value is 15°C at inlet and 8°C
at the outlet.
(c) The test report shows that velocities of air are near 0.5 m/s around some grilles.
This seems to be rather low for a reasonable grille size but was still found acceptable.
The deviations in performance during testing were not looked into.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC has accepted (January 2021 and July 2020) the
Audit observation.
4.2.7 Non-utilisation of optimisation methods for life cycle cost minimisation
Life cycle cost is the process of compiling all costs that the owner of an asset will incur
over its life span. These costs include initial investment, future additional investment
and annual recurring cost minus salvage value. In this regard, Audit along with
Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) observed the following:
(i) The methods for duct design such as equal friction are very simplistic without
any optimisation, and the detailed explanations were not provided by DMRC. DMRC
stated that the design is based on an equal friction method (i.e., taking the same value

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of pressure loss per unit length of duct). However, there are optimisation methods
available such as the T-method recommended by American Society of Heating,
Refrigerating and Airconditioning Engineers for life cycle cost minimisation which can
help in space, material or operating cost savings.
The Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC has accepted the Audit observation.
(ii) The method used for Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning load
calculations under Phase-III was based on the older Carrier handbook in comparison to
the now well-established state of the art hourly load calculation methods using software
such as Hourly Analysis Programme, Trane etc. This was considered quite
comprehensive at the time when it was published (in the 1950) but is completely
outdated in the current scenario. The new methods require computer simulations and
provide hourly varying load estimates.
The Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC has accepted the Audit observation.
(iii) For the Hazrat Nizamuddin station, the calculated loads of the selected
equipment are much lower than their installed capacities.
The Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC has accepted the Audit observation.
(iv) The inside conditions for Back of House areas such as ticketing office, station
manager etc., are taken as 25oC and few others as 24oC, which is low and not as per
DPR (28oC). This would lead to higher capacity requirement of Heating Ventilation
and Air Conditioning system and more energy consumption.
The Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC has accepted the Audit observation.
(v) Further, no humidity control mechanism has been provided in the equipment
rooms. Also, a very large number of multiple conventional Fan Coil units have been
installed due to these having high flow rates. Hence, it could be better designed to meet
the need rather than over sizing.
The Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC has accepted the Audit observation.
4.2.8 Lack of real time monitoring of Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
in Rolling Stock
Audit along with Technical Consultant (IIT Delhi) analysed the real time monitoring of
Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning in Rolling Stock and observed the following:
(i) Real time performance of Rolling Stock Heating Ventilation and Air
Conditioning systems including the energy being consumed by it and the conditions
being maintained were not recorded by DMRC and could not be obtained. DMRC
submitted the verification testing done in the climate control chamber during
Guaranteed Energy Consumption type testing. While verification testing is only
required for proving equipment capability to meet the requirements, real time
monitoring provides insights on the real-world system efficiency with varying
passenger load, ambient conditions etc., which could be potentially utilised for energy
saving.

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(ii) It was noticed during site visit at Kalindi Kunj depot that DMRC was not doing
any real time monitoring. It was also observed that the suction line of the Heating,
Ventilation and Air Conditioning system in Rolling Stock was kept uninsulated.
(iii) There was no record of the fresh air being introduced or the CO2 levels
maintained inside the coaches and the energy consumption of the Heating Ventilation
and Air Conditioning system in the Rolling Stock.
(iv) As per report on Cooling Capacity, test was carried out only three times instead
of nine times due to urgency. DMRC submitted that since there was not much variation
between tests, the number was reduced to three instead of nine, based on mutual
understanding between DMRC and supplier (Toshiba). Although a single test would
give all the desired information, repeatability remained an important parameter, which
was not adhered to. The reply of DMRC is not correct as multiple tests are conducted
to ascertain repeatability and check variations in range parameters.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that the
present system of power measurement does not bifurcate the total power consumption
into individual power consumptions in the sub-components, e.g. for Heating
Ventilation and Air Conditioning, Traction motors, etc., separately. The suggestion is
noted and the possibility to incorporate the same in future procurements shall be
explored. Insulation of the suction line will be considered for improving the
performance of the Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning. Fresh airflow and energy
consumption are measured during type testing of Heating Ventilation and Air
Conditioning. After the commissioning of trains, exercises are taken up to monitor
airflows, CO2, cooling performance, energy consumption, etc., and corrective actions
are taken accordingly.
The Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC has accepted and assured to explore the possibility of
incorporating power consumption in the sub-components in future procurement.
Regarding measurement of fresh air flow and energy consumption after commissioning
of trains, records of such exercises/ measurements were not made available. It is
recommended that fresh air for both passenger comfort and energy savings, based on
varying conditions in real time operation is controlled and monitored.
4.3 Other Issues
4.3.1 Non-approval of Risk Management Policy of DMRC by the Board
Risk management is an integral part of strategic planning, business planning and
investment/ project appraisal procedures. Section 134(3)(n) of the Companies Act,
2013 stipulates that the Board’s Report shall contain a statement indicating
development and implementation of a risk management policy for the company
including identification of elements of risk. Audit observed that although DMRC has
formulated a Risk Management Policy, the same has not been approved by the Board
of Directors. Further, no such statement in pursuance of Section 134(3)(n) of the
Companies Act, 2013 was disclosed in the Board report.

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The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that the Board
of Directors (23 March 2015) considered the Risk Management Policy and authorised
Managing Director to constitute a committee to oversee the risk management functions
of DMRC. Further, continuous efforts are being made by the Director level committee
to identify risks to the company and mitigation thereof before submission to Board of
Directors. Disclosure as per provisions of Section 134(3)(n) of the Companies
Act, 2013 is made in the Board Report every year and the same will be put up to the
Board of Directors for approval.
4.3.2 Non-formulation of hedging policy
Para 5.8 of the Risk Management Policy of DMRC related to financial risks stipulates
that the financial risk is the risk related to liquidity, treasury, foreign currency and
interest rate fluctuation. To mitigate this risk, DMRC may frame a hedging policy.
This will make the system financially viable without dependence on external cash
subsidy for its operation from the stakeholders. Board of Directors in the 108th meeting
(24 June 2014) was apprised that impact of fluctuation in exchange rate on project cost
involving foreign currency payment was ₹8,172 crore. Due to depreciation of the rupee
in the concerned years, the impact of exchange rate variation was computed as
₹740 crore by the management. Audit observed that DMRC did not formulate a hedging
policy to safeguard its financial interest in violation of Risk Management Policy of the
DMRC. Further, no cost benefit analysis was conducted to ascertain the cost involved
and benefit for entering into a hedging contract. There was also no separate provision
for foreign exchange rate variation in the DPR for the Phase-III.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that due to
negligible exposure in foreign currency the creation of hedging policy was not felt
required, and since there was no requirement of entering into any hedging contract,
question of cost benefit analysis does not arise.
Reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not tenable as the Risk Management Policy
recommends creation of a hedging fund to mitigate risks related to liquidity, treasury,
foreign currency and interest rate fluctuation. Further, during the period from
31 March 2011 to 31 March 2019, DMRC has booked a loss of ₹56.76 crore on account
of foreign exchange variation which cannot be called negligible.
4.3.3 Non-entering of Integrity Pact with the contractors by DMRC
Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) has emphasised the necessity to adopt Integrity
Pact in Government organisations in their major procurement activities. The
Commission had also directed that in order to oversee and monitor the compliance of
obligations under the Pact, by the concerned parties, Independent External Monitors
should be nominated with the approval of the Commission. Independent External
Monitors are vital to the implementation of Integrity Pact and at least one Independent
External Monitor should be invariably cited in the Notice Inviting Tender. A maximum
of three Independent External Monitors would be appointed in Navratna Public Sector
Enterprises and up to two Independent External Monitors in other Public Sector

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Enterprise. The 2ndAdministrative Reforms Commission, in its 4th Report

(January 2007) on “Ethics in Governance” has also recommended the adoption of
Integrity Pact. Despite this, Audit observed that DMRC has neither entered into any
integrity pact with the contractors nor appointed Independent External Monitors as per
the guidelines of CVC.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that various
provisions of the contract entered into with the contractors meet the requirement of
integrity pact. DMRC has a Vigilance Department headed by Chief Vigilance Officer.
Hence, it has been decided not to adopt Integrity Pact in DMRC.
Reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not acceptable because making a provision
in the contract does not obviate the requirement of Integrity Pact. Further appointment
of Independent External Monitors cannot be replaced by having a provision in the
contract.
Conclusion
There were deficiencies in DMRC’s mechanism for project monitoring which adversely
affected timeliness in completion of works and conformity of executed works with laid
down specifications. Thus, there were delays ranging from 2 months to 46 months in
completing the corridors as per the scheduled dates in DMRC MRTS Phase-III.
Besides, the Quality Management Plans were prepared by the executing agencies and
there was no uniformity across these documents across the projects. Also, Real time
performance of Rolling Stock Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning systems
including the energy being consumed had not been analysed, which would have helped
in introducing energy saving strategies.
Recommendations
12. DMRC may strengthen the monitoring mechanism by ensuring periodic review
by the below Board level Sub Committee on Project Management and follow up
thereon, to ensure timely completion of the projects.
13. DMRC may formulate a template for (i) Quality Management Plans and
(ii) specifications for the system of formwork.
14. DMRC may ensure optimal utilisation of Building Management System for
better monitoring of the ambient conditions at the metro stations to achieve
anticipated energy savings, and to render maximum comfort to the commuters.
15. DMRC may adopt latest method of load calculations for Heating Ventilation
and Air Conditioning for simulation and better estimations.
16. DMRC may consider real time monitoring and data logging of parameters
relating to Rolling Stock Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning.

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 CHAPTER-5
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE AND
REVENUE MANAGEMENT
 Report No. 11 of 2021

Chapter 5
Operation and Maintenance & Revenue Management
5.1 DMRC follows a mixed approach for operation and maintenance wherein the
core operation and maintenance of major assets are done in-house with the regular staff
specially recruited and trained for this purpose, while non–core and offline activities
are generally out-sourced though some of them are managed in-house. Revenue
generation through Property Development by metro projects is a global practice as the
metro projects are highly capital intensive and they can remain financially sustainable,
without government subsidies, by generating Non-Fare Box Revenue from property
development activities viz advertisements, retailing, real estate at metro stations.
DMRC has Property Development and Property Business divisions for earning Non-
Fare Box Revenue. DMRC has been mandated to generate 4.5 per cent of the project
cost in Phase-III from Property Development. Property Business division is responsible
for generating revenue for meeting operation & maintenance expenses. Property
Development division conducts studies for estimation of reserve price or action plan for
generating revenue to meet the targets set by Ministry. Generally, Property Business
division does not conduct any studies as they have to lease the area which is constructed
by the Project division on the metro stations. Audit reviewed the actual ridership vis-
a- vis the DPRs projections, operational efficiency of DMRC and the guidelines of
Unified Traffic & Transportation Infrastructure Planning & Engineering Centre in
respect of Multi Modal Integration.
Audit noticed inefficiencies in operation and maintenance, shortfall in achievement of
planned targets in respect of Property Development and estimated earnings and
Property Business after commercial operation as brought out in the succeeding paras.

5.2 Operation and Maintenance

5.2.1 Non-maintenance of line-wise operational profit/ loss statements and non-

claiming of operational loss from respective State Government
Secretary, MoUD directed (April 2012) DMRC to prepare line-wise profit and loss
account. Extracts from sanction letters issued by MoUD/ MoHUA during 2011 to 2019
regarding bearing/ sharing of operation loss are shown in the Annexure-VII.
Comparison of projected ridership and actual ridership which indicated shortfall of 15
per cent to 88 per cent during 2019-20 of various lines/ corridors under Phase-III is
shown in Table 1.1.
However, Audit observed that all the corridors/ lines (except Dhansa Bus Stand
extension) constructed during Phase-III including NCR extensions are operational as
on 31 March 2020. DMRC did not prepare line-wise operation profit and loss, in the
absence of which it could neither apprise the Board of Directors of the operational
profit/ loss nor make necessary claims with the respective State Governments, wherever
required, thereby making the recovery of past years’ operational loss from respective
State Governments as per sanction letters seems doubtful.

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The Ministry/ GNCTD while accepting the Audit observation replied (January 2021)
that it has been decided and approved at the 138th meeting of Board of Directors (12
November 2020) to apportion operating loss from 2020-21. However, the fact remains
that in the absence of line wise operational profit and loss, past year’s operational losses,
if any, could not be claimed from respective State Governments.

5.2.2 Non-accomplishment of projected ridership after completion of Phase-III

and National Capital Region extensions
Government of India sanctioned (26 September 2011) four corridors of 103.05 km of
metro lines and nine extensions (within Delhi and to NCR) of 57.70 km
(September 2011 to March 2020). As on 31 March 2020, all the corridors except
Dhansa Bus Stand are operational. The corridor/ section wise projected ridership and
actual ridership of initial Phase-III corridors NCR/ other extensions is shown below:
Figure 5.1
Projected Ridership and Actual Ridership

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In this regard, Audit observed that:

(i) As against the projected ridership of 18.56 lakh in 2016 (20.89 lakh in 2019-20)
from initially sanctioned four corridors of Phase-III, the actual ridership in 2019-20 was
only 4.38 lakh, which is 79.02 per cent lower than projected ridership as per DPR.
Similarly, in case of NCR/ other extension, the actual ridership on these corridors was
15.12 per cent to 87.63 per cent lower than projected ridership as per DPRs. DMRC
had selected the Heavy Metro system for Delhi MRTS based on ridership projection in
the DPR. However, since the shortfall in ridership during operation ranged from 15.12
per cent to 87.63 per cent, DMRC may henceforth consider adopting an objective and
rational method for selecting the most suitable form of transportation from the available
modes like Light Metro and Bus Rapid Transit System as suggested by the Working
Group on Urban Transport.
(ii) As per the DPRs of Phase-III and NCR extensions, the total ridership of entire
DMRC network (Phase-I, Phase-II and Phase-III) after completion of the project in the
year 2016 was estimated as 43.79 lakh (53.47 lakh in 2019-20). Whereas, after
completion of entire Phase-III and NCR extensions, except for a small portion of
Dwarka-Dhansa Bus Stand (1.2 km), the actual ridership of DMRC was 27.79 lakh
(2019-20) only i.e., 51.97 per cent of projected ridership.
(iii) Ridership of Dwarka-Najafgarh (Line-9) section was 11,972 (November 2019)
after its opening in October 2019 whereas the ridership in the existing Dwarka Mor and
Dwarka station reduced83 by 11,074 from September to November 2019 indicating that
only 898 new passengers (0.92 per cent as per DPR projected ridership of 97,070) were
added after incurring an estimated expenditure of ₹1,065 crore and recurring significant
operation & maintenance expenditure. Similarly, after opening of Mundka-Bahdurgarh
section in June 2018 and actual ridership was 17,304, there was reduction of 5,762 in
ridership84 of existing Mundka station during May and July 2018. Thus, only 11,542
new passengers (i.e., 10.93 per cent of projected ridership of 1,05,6,00) were added
after incurring an estimated expenditure of ₹1,991 crore.
(iv) Total ridership of the entire DMRC network was on an increasing trend for the
period 2011-12 to 2016-17 (Annexure-VIII) when no fare was revised. However, there
was steep increase in fare by 91 per cent during 2017-18 as per Fourth Fare Fixation
Committee which impacted the ridership. The actual ridership of 25.21 lakh during
2018-19 was lower than actual ridership of 25.94 lakh during 2015-16 indicating that
there was no incremental growth in ridership despite addition of new lines/ sections of
131 km length during this period and annual growth of ridership as per DPRs.
(v) After completion of Phase-III, ridership per km for the year 2019-20 was 8,543
which was far lower than 9,921 for the year 2011-12.

83
Daily ridership of Dwarka mor station September 2019–44,729, November 2019-35,478 Daily
ridership of Dwarka station September 2019–9963, Nov. 2019-8140 Net reduction in ridership of
existing Dwarka and Dwarka mor station-11,074
84
Difference in ridership of Mundka station for the month of May 2018 and July 2018

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The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that ridership
decreased due to various reasons including opening of Phase-III in a phased manner,
discontinuity at Trilokpuri, implementation of recommendation of Fourth Fare Fixation
Committee, operation of cab services etc., which were not considered at the time of
preparation of DPR. However, DMRC has not only regained its ridership but also
achieved maximum average ridership of 27.79 lakh in Financial Year 2019-20. Initially
high-density regions were covered which led to high passengers/ network length.
Moreover, some of the expansions were designed to ease out passenger load on some
of the densely used corridors of DMRC which was otherwise overcrowded. However,
DMRC is taking a number of measures to attract passengers and to increase its
ridership. DMRC also uses scientific four stage traffic modelling for projection of
ridership which is duly established.
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC needs to be viewed in the light of fact that
the opening of Phase- III in a phased manner was considered at the time of formulation
of Phase-III DPR. Out of 103.05 km length of initial Phase-III corridors, only a small
portion of 300 meter at Trilokpuri is still under construction. Whereas, against
projected ridership of 20.89 lakh in 2019-20, actual ridership in 2019-20 from Phase-
III corridors was only 4.38 lakh i.e., 21 per cent. DMRC did not provide any document
to substantiate shifting of number of metro commuters to other mode of transport like
cab. Besides, other reasons for low ridership include poor last mile connectivity, lack
of Multi Model Integration facilities etc. DMRC reply is silent regarding reduction in
passenger per km after implementation of Fourth Fare Fixation Committee
recommendations. Even though the projected ridership could not materialise in Phase-
I and Phase-II after applying the same model, DMRC still continued with the same
traffic modelling without any modification.
5.2.3 Last mile connectivity services to the commuters
The feeder buses project was undertaken by DMRC to ensure last mile connectivity in
the interior areas of the city. Its major envisaged benefit was improvement in ridership,
partly due to increased supply and partly due to more attractive and convenient vehicles.
DMRC awarded (May 2012/ January 2013) contracts to procure, operate and maintain
400 Midi DMRC Feeder Buses to two operators, M/s Rajdhani Coach Clusters Service
Private Limited for 300 buses and M/s Prasanna Purple Mobility Solutions Private
Limited for 100 buses. As per the terms and conditions of the agreement, these buses
will operate from 73 State Transport Authority approved routes.
In this regard, Audit observed the following:
(i) Till date only 174 Midi feeder CNG Non-AC buses out of 400 buses
(43.5 per cent) were procured by the private operators for providing last mile
connectivity. Due to availability of lesser buses, DMRC was operating buses on
32 routes, out of 73 routes. Further, the operators have requested (January 2021) for
termination of contracts citing Covid-19 pandemic and GNCTD scheme for free travel
by women passengers.

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(ii) About 800 electric-rickshaw were operational prior to lockdown and Covid-19
scenario; at present about 250 electric-rickshaw are operational. Similarly, cab
aggregator and electric-scooter services are operational from 11 and 6 metro stations
only, respectively (out of 254 stations). Auto aggregator service is yet to be
operationalised.
(iii) During 2018-19, in order to strengthen the last mile connectivity, DMRC also
floated (13 April 2018) a wholly owned subsidiary company ‘Delhi Metro Last Mile
Services Limited (Company)’ with which it proposed to run AC Electrical/ CNG buses
as feeder services with viability gap funding by GNCTD. Two Operators for North
and East clusters on 10 routes comprising 100 electric-buses AC low floor have
been selected (December 2019) but buses are yet to be put to operation. As on
31 March 2020, there was no operational income and expense of the Company.
Thus, commuters were denied the envisaged benefits of last mile connectivity.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that DMRC
awarded contracts to procure, operate and maintain 400 Midi DMRC Feeder Buses.
Meanwhile, operators requested to reduce the scope of work on account of various
factors. Subsequently, the number of Midi Feeder Buses was reduced and DMRC
allowed the operators to operate the existing 174 Non-AC Midi feeder buses with
signing of addendum to the contract agreements. The buses could not be procured by
the operator as the specifications of buses released by MoHUA were not readily
available in the market.
The statement of DMRC regarding non-availability of buses with tendered
specifications is not acceptable as it was the responsibility of DMRC to ensure
availability of buses in the market before floating and finalisation of tender process.
5.2.4 Inefficient operational performance of DMRC
Operating Ratio establishes the relationship between operating costs i.e., cost of
revenues from operations plus operating expenses and revenue from operations. The
objective of operating ratio is to assess the operational efficiency of the business. A
rise in the operating ratio indicates decline in efficiency.
Chart 5.1
Operating ratio of DMRC (Phase-I, Phase-II and Phase-III)
100
80.55
80 69.35 73.55 68.98 71.41
67.22
56.25 60.06
60 48.99
40

20

0
2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20

Operating Ratio (per cent)

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In this regard, Audit observed that:

(i) As per Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, operating profits refer to an
accounting statistic that calculates the profit earned by a company/ corporation from its
core business operation including depreciation and amortisation but excluding interest
and tax deductions. Further, as per Fourth Fare Fixation Committee report (September
2016), Operation & Maintenance cost of Delhi metro have been categorised under the
five major heads i.e., staff cost, maintenance cost, energy cost, interest charges and
depreciation. Hence, depreciation & amortisation and interest cost are part of the
operating expenses. While calculating operating ratio, DMRC excluded the
depreciation & amortisation expenses and interest cost as part of the operating expenses
thereby reducing the operating expenses. Thus, DMRC was rather suffering operational
loss instead of earning operating profit as reported in its annual report as shown in
Annexure–IX.
(ii) Even without considering the depreciation and interest expenses, there has been
a consistent increase in the operating cost ratio (barring 2017-18), which indicates
inefficient operational performance of DMRC.
Chart 5.2
Details of DMRC income from traffic operation and operating expenses
` in crore)
(`
4500

4000
3897.29

3500 3582.8

3139.28
3000 3027.26

2500 2558.56

2179 2088.34
2000 2037.43
1820.32
1645.4 1602.68
1500 1523.74
1412.95
1281.57 1223.56
1000 988.17
857.16
627.85
500

0
2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20

Income from traffic operations Operating Expenses

The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that the profit/
loss incurred after considering the interest and depreciation during the financial year is
reflected in the financial statement of DMRC. The calculation of operating ratio shows

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the efficiency and recoverability of operating expenses excluding depreciation and

interest from the revenue earned while running the metro trains.
Reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not acceptable because a rise in the operating
ratio indicates decline in efficiency of the organisation. DMRC has also accepted that
while calculating the operating ratio, the operating expenses relating to depreciation
and financing cost were excluded, which resulted in operating profits.
5.2.5 Non-implementation of all components of Multi Modal Integration
One of the objectives of GoI’s National Urban Transport Policy, 2006 was enabling the
establishment of an integrated and quality focused multi modal public transport system
providing seamless travel across modes. On all new stations of Phase-III metro
corridors, necessary components of Multi Modal Integration85 are to be incorporated as
per Unified Traffic & Transportation Infrastructure Planning & Engineering Centre
Street Design, Connectivity and Pedestrian Design Guidelines (2009).
Figure 5.2
Multi Modal Integration

In this regard, Audit observed that:

(i) DMRC neither envisaged implementation of complete Multi Modal Integration
in the DPR stage nor included any budget provision or additional land areas. It also did
not include the same even at the time of finalisation of tenders for Phase-III of the
MRTS.
(ii) As implementation of Phase-III works was delayed by almost two years, focus
of DMRC was on immediate road restoration work only and not on implementation of

85
The objective of Multi Modal Integration includes seamless interchange between various modes of
transport, availability of safe pedestrian crossing facilities near metro stations, creation of traffic
calming measures, improving access and last metro connectivity, walk ability, safety, improve short
term parking and drop off facilities, creation of Non-Motorised Vehicle (NMV) lanes, bus shelters,
public toilets and to promote green and clean transport.

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complete Multi Modal Integration. In the name of Multi Modal Integration, DMRC
carried out road restoration work on the land at all new stations of Phase-III.
(iii) Thirty metro stations of Phase-I and Phase-II facing traffic congestion
throughout the day were identified in February 2019 for retrofitting. Audit observed
that complete Multi Modal Integration has not been implemented in any of them except
Chhatarpur station.
(iv) The conceptual drawing of Multi Modal Integration plan for Chhatarpur metro
station was approved on 28 February 2012. The tender for implementation of same was
floated (05 April 2017) by DMRC and Letter of Acceptance was issued on
09 August 2017. As per the contract, the work was to be completed within 10 months
from 14 August 2017 i.e., by 13 June 2018. However, the work was completed in
August 2019. While DMRC took five years in floating of tender, there was delay of
more than one year in completion of work of Multi Modal Integration at Chhatarpur
Station.
Thus, in absence of complete multi model integration, the envisaged benefits could not
be achieved.
During the Exit Conference (January 2021) for this report, Ministry agreed for
implementation of all components of Multi Modal Integration.
5.3 Revenue from Property Development and Property Business
5.3.1 Short fall of revenue of `1,847.87 crore from Property Development
As per the directive of Administrative Ministry (MoHUA), revenue generated from
Property Development was to be used for funding of Phase-III Project and 4.5 per cent
of project cost is to be met out from Property Development. DMRC has projected an
amount of ₹2,505 crore (including short fall of ₹751 crore of Phase-II) to be generated
through Property Development during Phase-III.
Accordingly, DMRC appointed (21 June 2012) consortium of M/s KPMG Advisory
Services Private Limited & M/s Knight Frank (India) Limited (the consortium) to
advice on formulation of an actionable strategy to generate targeted revenue for Phase-
III through Property Development. The consortium submitted (May 2013) their final
report by identifying three sites86 for Property Development to be developed during the
Phase-III.
In this regard, Audit observed that even after lapse of seven years, as on 31 March 2020,
so far only ₹657.13 crore has been earned by DMRC against the targeted earning of
₹2,505 crore. Therefore, there was an overall shortfall of ₹1,847.87 (₹2,505-₹657.13)
crore (i.e., 73.77 per cent). Audit also observed the following:
(i) DMRC has not explored any possibility for Property Development at site of
Vasant Vihar site which alone has the potential earning of ₹2,292 crore.

86
Vasant Vihar, Bhikaji Cama Place, Anand Vihar

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In response, DMRC stated that it had requested (March 2014) DDA for allotment of
plot at Vasant Vihar. However, DDA suggested that in lieu of land, it will be
appropriate if DMRC seeks funds corresponding to Property Development Budget.
Accepting this proposal, DMRC communicated demand of ₹2,505 crore for Phase-III
to DDA. Despite follow up, DDA has not taken any favorable action. However, the
facts remain that DMRC was unable to get either the plot at Vasant Vihar or any amount
as suggested by the DDA.
(ii) Although land of 14,000 sqm for Property Development has been identified at
Bhikaji Cama Place, till date no tender has been finalised.
In response, DMRC stated that Property Development at Bhikaji Cama Place is
envisaged above the station box. After initial delay by Land & Development office,
land has been allotted on 16 April 2019. The project is on hold as the land use of the
area has not been changed from ‘District Park’ to ‘Transportation’. Further, an
application against the proposed commercial development has been filed in the Hon’ble
National Green Tribunal which has ordered to maintain ‘status-quo’ in this area.
DMRC is pursuing with DDA for change of land use and also in National Green
Tribunal for vacation of stay. However, the fact remains that the envisaged revenue
from Property Development could not be materialised.
(iii) At Anand Vihar, as against the proposed land of 1.5 hectare (15,000 sqm), only
1,358 sqm land has been identified for Property Development and no proposal has been
initiated for the Property Development.
In response, DMRC stated that at Anand Vihar, an area of approximately 9,000 sqm has
been identified for commercial development in the station box of Phase-II metro station.
The project could not be taken up due to upcoming interchange of Phase-III station.
Tenders for leasing of the vacant space shall be invited soon. The reply of DMRC is
not tenable as the station under Phase-III was started for commercial operation on 31
December 2018 while the area identified for Property Development was pertaining to
Phase-II. Thus, fact remains that DMRC failed to lease out the identified area to meet
the project cost of Phase-III.
Thus, considering the potential upfront and lease income from these plots, necessary
approval and planning should have been completed earlier so that loss of potential
revenue could have been mitigated.
5.3.2 Non-accomplishment of revenue from the Property Development area
constructed at a cost of `151.49 crore
The Ministry of Urban Development sanctioned (13 September 2011) the extension of
Line-6 from Badarpur (in Delhi) to YMCA Chowk (Haryana) over a route of length of
13.875 km comprising nine stations87. Four hectares of land was to be provided by the
Government of Haryana free of cost for Property Development for augmenting the

87
Sarai, NHPC Chowk, Mewala Maharajpur, Sector 27 A, Badkal Mor, Old Faridabad, Ajronda,
Faridabad New Town and YMCA Chowk

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earnings and making the corridor viable. As per the DPR (February 2007), two plots of
land owned by Government were identified for Property Development and commercial
utilisation which were expected to generate ₹234.22 crore. DMRC was also allowed
commercial exploitation of the air space above the metro stations and parking area for
early re-coupment of loan taken for Rolling Stock. The corridor was further extended
to Ballabhgarh with a length of 3.25 km with two stations viz NCB Colony and
Ballabhgarh (now Raja Nahar Singh). The corridor from Badarpur to YMCA Chowk
(nine stations) and NCB colony to Raja Nahar Singh (two station) were opened for
commercial operation on 06 September 2015 and 19 November 2018, respectively.
Property Development areas of 44,751 square meter (sqm) were constructed with
expenditure of ₹151.49 crore88 on 11 stations of the above mentioned corridors. In this
regard, Audit observed that:
(i) An area of 44,751 sqm constructed on metro stations including three additional
floors each at Sarai and Raja Nahar Singh stations at a cost of ₹151.49 crore which was
exclusively created for Property Development remained idle as DMRC has not been
able to lease them out till date.
(ii) Land at Sector 5 and Sector 20 of Faridabad handed over by Haryana Urban
Development Authority for Property Development have not been leased out by DMRC
till date. Thus, DMRC has not been able to generate ₹234.22 crore from Property
Development as estimated in the DPR.
(iii) As per the Para 12.8 of DPR for Badarpur-Faridabad corridor, there was
negative cash inflow of ₹798 crore in a period of 30 years. Hence, the extension of
metro line up to YMCA Chowk was not recommended. It was recommended that
DMRC should be permitted to commercially exploit the land made available for the
project and air rights above stations without sharing of revenues with any other
authority/ body/ organisation. This will enable repayment of the commercial loan taken
by DMRC for procurement of Rolling Stock. However, DMRC failed to generate any
Property Development revenue from the two plots allotted by Government of Haryana
and the Property Development area constructed on the eleven stations at a cost of
₹151.49 crore.
Thus, DMRC was unable to let out 40,071 sqm (out of 44,751 sqm) during the last five
years which is approximately 90 per cent of total areas constructed exclusively for
Property Development.

DMRC stated (July 2020) that cost of construction for the framework which was
required to attain the height cannot be attributed to Property Development and that
₹151.49 crore have not been spent on construction of Property Development area.

88
Property Development area construction cost in respect of nine station were obtained from the cost
sheet prepared by DMRC and in respect of two stations viz. Sant Surdas (NCB Colony) & Raja
Nahar Singh (Ballabhgarh) the actual cost of construction was not provided by DMRC, the same
have been considered on the basis of actual construction cost of Ajronda and Sarai station
respectively.

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DMRC had successfully floated tenders for Property Development spaces at five
stations in 2015-16. For Sarai and Neelam-Chowk Ajronda stations, tenders have been
floated thrice. Continuous efforts are being made by Property Development department
by way of re-tendering based on experience gained, besides efforts to lease out spaces
to Government departments of Government of Haryana and other PSUs.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that Audit
contention that an amount of ₹151.49 crore has been spent on creation of Property
Development spaces is not agreed to as the methodology used by Audit to work out the
cost of creating the Property Development spaces is wrong. In the recent past, Property
Development plot measuring 7,615 sqm in Sector 20-B has been leased out and an up-
front payment of ₹6 crore has been received along with requisite security. Similarly,
the floor space measuring 4,680 sqm at old Faridabad metro station has been leased out
and an up-front payment of ₹2 crore has been received along with requisite security.
As regards early recoupment of loan, the cost of Rolling Stock was met by DMRC from
its internal resources. On the issue of negative cash flow, it is stated that DMRC never
projected that with Property Development.
Reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not tenable because Audit did not adopt any
methodology of its own for calculation of Property Development area construction cost.
Rather, the cost of construction of nine stations were obtained from the cost sheet
prepared by DMRC. The area of 44,751 sqm was constructed exclusively for Property
Development at the cost of ₹151.49 crore which was over and above the construction
cost of stations. Government land pockets have been identified in the DPR of 2007 and
the line opened for commercial operation in September 2015. Yet, till date DMRC is
not able to let out the properties. It was clearly mentioned in the DPR para 12.8 that the
project was not recommended and DMRC should be permitted to commercially exploit
the land made available for the project and air rights above stations for early repayment
of commercial loan.
5.3.3 Undue benefit to the single bidder
DMRC invited (24 February 2016) bids for Property Development of 12,219 sqm plot
at Malviya Nagar for lease period of 50 years (including three-year moratorium) and
upfront payment was assessed as ₹120 crore. The tender was opened (11 May 2016)
but no bid was received. The revised tender was floated (September 2016) on the revised
parameters by reducing the upfront fee to ₹50 crore. Only one bidder i.e., M/s Eldeco
Infrastructure & Properties Limited (EIPL) has submitted its bid upto closing date (01
December 2016). M/s EIPL quoted monthly lease fee of ₹19.70 per square feet per
month (₹212 per square meter per month). The Tender Committee accepted the offer
of M/s EIPL and Letter of Acceptance (LoA) was issued (13 February 2017) to M/s
EIPL. In this regard, Audit observed that:
(i) Prior to opening of financial bid (27 January 2017), the bidder has submitted
(15 November 2016) their financial proposal of monthly lease fee of ₹19.70 per square
feet per month along with fixed upfront lease fee of ₹50 crore. This was prior to the
evaluation of the technical bid (20 January 2017). Since the price bid was known to

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DMRC before opening of technical bid, the tender should have been cancelled by
DMRC. Instead, the work was awarded to the single bidder. The fact that the contractor
had submitted its financial proposal was known to the Director (Business Development)
who was also the member of Tender Committee. Yet, this fact was neither brought to
the notice of Tender Committee nor apprised to the Managing Director, DMRC while
seeking his approval.
(ii) As per the modified bid parameter for inviting Property Development tender for
standalone plots, the upfront lease should be kept up to 30 per cent to 35 per cent of the
Project Net Present value (NPV). There were no criteria for reducing the upfront fee in
the approved bid parameter. However, the upfront fee has been consistently reduced
from ₹120 crore to ₹60 crore and then to ₹50 crore by DMRC, without any justification.
(iii) DMRC engaged three consultants89 to provide details of prevailing rentals of
constructed properties at five locations near Malviya Nagar metro station. However,
DMRC considered only the rental rate of ₹151 per square feet per month of the Square
One mall which was the second lowest among rental rates of the five locations for
tendering purpose. Based on rental of Square one Mall of ₹151 per square feet per
month90, DMRC computed the Reserve Price91 of ₹41.47 per square feet per month92
(as it was a vacant plot, cost of construction, upfront fee etc. was considered for its
calculation) with upfront fee of ₹60 crore. However, this was further reduced (January
2017) to ₹14.21 per square feet per month93 considering rental of ₹110 per square feet
per month by the Reserve Price Committee without any justification though quoted
price of ₹19.70 per square feet per month was known ((November 2016) to DMRC.
This indicates the undue benefit to the sole bidder.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that any
additional financial information if submitted by bidder with the technical package
cannot be treated as financial offer. Post demonetisation, the Real Estate market was in
bad shape for a long time. DMRC could have lost huge revenue if that bid was not
processed. DMRC further stated that achieving 30 per cent to 35 per cent of project
NPV through upfront was not possible during the previous invitation of tender and
therefore, moderation of upfront amount was done to make it more attractive, and the
NPV was reduced. Average rates of areas which are similar in location and size was
accordingly kept as base for reserve price estimation of ₹110 per square feet per month.
The reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not tenable as Dy. Chief Engineer and
Executive Director/ Contract had brought to the notice of Director (Business
Development) that the sole bidder has submitted its financial bid. DMRC reply is also
silent about withholding of information from the Tender Committee. Four tenderers
had submitted tender security up to the stipulated date i.e., 1 December 2016. Thus,
there was ample response for the tender. If the market was in bad shape, DMRC should

89
M/s JLL, M/s CBRE and M/s Knight Frank (I) Private Limited
90
Potential monthly lease income of ready to move in property
91
Minimum reserve price below which tender can’t be awarded
92
`446.38 per sqm per month
93
`153 per sqm per month

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have extended the bid submission date instead of evaluation of single bid. The bidding
parameters were revised in such a way that nominal upfront payment would be received
during the construction period and maximum recurring lease fee would be received over
the operational period. The upfront fee received by DMRC will help in reducing the
project cost and the lease fee will enhance the operating income of DMRC over the
lease period. Instead of considering the average rent as suggested by the consultant,
lowest rent was considered by DMRC which resulted in fixation of lower reserve price.
Thus, to give undue benefit to M/s EIPL, reserve price was fixed at ₹14.21 per square
feet per month below the known price bid of ₹19.70 per square feet per month of single
bidder.
5.3.4 Transfer of lease right to a third company
M/s EIPL submitted their proposal (3 July 2017) to execute the Malviya Nagar Project
through Special Purpose Company. Accordingly, they requested DMRC for executing
the lease deed in favour of Special Purpose Company. DMRC granted (7 August 2017)
approval for formation of Special Purpose Company for implementation & monitoring
of the project through M/s Best View Infracon Limited (BVIL) (a subsidiary of EIPL).
For this purpose, an addendum to agreement was signed (22 November 2017) among
DMRC, EIPL, and BVIL and they entered (27 March 2018) into supplementary lease
agreement where it was decided that BVIL will execute the project and advance lease
fee will be submitted by them. In this regard, Audit observed that:
(i) Since Request for Proposal (RFP) does not provide for the transfer of project to
subsidiary company/ Special Purpose Company, the transfer of development rights to
BVIL was in violation of tender conditions. Thus, DMRC granted the development
rights to BVIL who had not participated in the bidding process.
(ii) BVIL was not a new Special Purpose Company created for the specific purpose
but an existing subsidiary of EIPL which was incorporated in 2008. This fact was not
brought to the notice of DMRC while seeking approval for transfer of project to BVIL.
Executive Director (Property Development) also rejected (10 March 2017) the proposal
of formation of any Special Purpose Company as RFP documents does not have such a
provision. Besides, while transferring work to the BVIL, the financial and technical
capacity was not evaluated. Reviewing the financial results (half yearly) for the year
ended 2016 and 30 September 2017 revealed that BVIL does not have any operational
income. Thus, BVIL was not financially competent to enter into the bidding process.
(iii) Further, Clause 3 of supplementary lease agreement executed (27 March 2018)
among DMRC, EIPL and BVIL states that “all rights transferred to the EIPL/ Lessee
vide lease agreement dated 29 June 2017 shall now vest with BVIL”. Thus, DMRC
granted the development rights to BVIL who did not participate in the bidding process
and was also not financially competent to enter into the bidding process. EIPL
participated in the tender process and work was granted to them but later transferred to
BVIL.

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Thus, EIPL participated in the tender process and then the work was granted and
transferred to BVIL.
DMRC replied (July 2020) that formation of Special Purpose Vehicle/ Special Purpose
Company for a company was not mentioned in the contract agreement. But, for
effective implementation & monitoring of the project, EIPL submitted proposal of
wholly owned subsidiary company (controlling 99.99 per cent equity share of Special
Purpose Company). Hence, modification was made in the contract condition to allow
SPC by taking the approval of Managing Director. The Ministry/ GNCTD endorsed
(January 2020) the replies of DMRC.
The Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC has accepted that there was no provision in the
agreement for formation of Special Purpose Company. No new Special Purpose
Company was formed but the work was transferred to BVIL (existing subsidiary of
EIPL). Reply of DMRC is silent on financial and technical capacity of BVIL.
5.3.5 Construction of Property Development space over Vinod Nagar depot
without market survey/ analysis
As per DPR (September 2011) of Phase-III, a new at-grade Depot at Mayur Vihar
(presently Vinod Nagar) was proposed. But, due to land constraint during execution
stage, DMRC planned (July 2014) and constructed elevated Vinod Nagar depot and
Property Development area above the depot.
Audit observed that DMRC had made provision of ₹37.71 crore for strengthening of
structures for Property Development area at Vinod Nagar depot. However, no market
analysis on potentiality of the plan and future probability was carried out before
deciding for Property Development in the Depot. This Property Development space
has not been let out till date even though the depot work is operational since 2018.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (July 2020 and January 2021) that the
provision for future Property Development over double deck stabling was considered
due to its location on NH-24 with good connectivity from all directions. The system
was planned for stabling of trains on the first two floors and Property Development after
market survey on the four floors over these floors.
Reply of the Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not acceptable as in the absence of any
market survey/ analysis, potentiality of Property Development in future cannot be relied
upon. Further, no records relating to marketing survey was furnished along with
response.
5.4 Revenue from Property Business
5.4.1 Shortfall in revenue generation of `1,841.19 crore from Property Business
divisions
Detailed Project Report of Phase-III stipulates that the revenue from Property
Business94 and advertisement during the operation stage would be 25 per cent of the

94
In July 2012 a new division namely Property Business was carved out from existing Property
Development division

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

Fare Box collection. During 87th Board of Directors meeting held on 15 March 2012,
it was stated that non-operational revenue of DMRC constitute only 21.6 per cent of the
total revenue and there is tremendous scope for increasing non-operational revenue to
at least 30 per cent of total revenue in the next five years. In this regard, Audit observed
that:
(i) DMRC had no Standard Operating Procedure/ approved plan/ strategy for
generating Non-Fare Box Revenue as estimated in DPR for Phase-III including
extensions and for guidance and decision making of Property Development/ Property
Business Divisions.
(ii) Detailed Project Report of Phase-III and other extensions had a target of
₹1,917.25 crore for Non-Fare Box Revenue during 2016-17 to 2019-20 (Annexure-X),
out of which, major portion of earning pertained to semi-naming rights/ co-branding
rights of Phase-III stations, which was a new concept and was not contemplated in
DPRs. Against this target, DMRC earned only ₹76.06 crore (3.97 per cent) till
March 2020. Hence, there was shortfall of ₹1,841.19 crore (₹1917.25 crore–₹76.06
crore) from Property Business revenue during 2016-2020.
(iii) Inputs/ suggestions were not taken by Consultancy Division from Property
Development/ Property Business division at the time of preparation of DPRs for
estimated Property Development/ Property Business income. For example, Property
Development/ Property Business area was planned and constructed at Haiderpur Badli
Mor station and Vinod Nagar depot, which are located near a landfill site without duly
considering that they were underdeveloped areas and with traffic connectivity issues.
Besides, space for advertisement, kiosk, ATMs etc., inside and outside the proposed
stations on the corridors of Phase-III was not ensured.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that 25 per
cent of the Fare Box Collection was to flow from recurring payments on the leased
properties, advertisement rights, leasing of kiosks, ATMs, semi-naming rights of
stations, etc., on full commissioning of Phase-III. Non-fare Box Revenue was
estimated on the presumption that the entire Phase-III network will be operational by
the year 2016-17. However, Phase-III Project could only be completed by December
2018 except a small portion of 1.5 km. The total Property Development/ Property
Business earning up to March 2020 for Phase–III contracts is approximately
₹76.06 crore. The architecture wing provides a tentative list of spaces marked for
Property Business activities. However, the final list of the spaces is ascertained after
opening of said section/ line/ station. Property Business is a volatile activity and
depends upon the existing market conditions.
DMRC accepted that DPR target has not been achieved. The facts remain that there
was no coordination between Consultancy Division and Operation Department
regarding location, area for Property Development/ Property Business activities. At the
time of preparation of DPR, a fixed per cent of Fare Box Revenue like 1 per cent to 25
per cent was fixed for computation of Financial Internal Rate of Return/ viability
without mentioning the area for Property Business activities, market trends, expected

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rental in the vicinity. Property Development/ Property Business income is estimated at

the time of preparation of DPR i.e., before commencement of construction of particular
line section/ corridor without any market analysis and demand projections. Reply of the
Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is silent on other issues like formulation of Standard
Operating Procedure/ Property Development manual. Further, the DPR containing the
targets for Property Business was approved by the BoDs, the Board has not reviewed
periodically the achievement of target of Property Business division as mentioned in
the DPRs and did not take necessary action for accomplishment of the same.
5.4.2 Loss of revenue of `15.80 crore due to delay in award of contract
Co-branding contracts: Vigilance Circular (06 October 2012) of DMRC regarding
procedure order for calling of Tender/ Award of Tender/ Extensions/ Execution in
Property Development and Operation & Maintenance Contracts states that the
administrative approval of the proposal should commence at least four months in
advance of the contract closure and tenders should be floated at least three months in
advance. Further, it was stipulated that Tender Committee should be constituted well
before calling of tenders. Property Business division awarded several contracts for
co-branding of metro stations constructed during Phase–III with delays ranging from
71 days to 1,270 days in awarding of the 15 co-branding contracts (Annexure-XI). As
a result, DMRC had to forgo revenue of ₹15.80 crore which could have been earned if
the vigilance circular was adhered to and contract of the said metro stations were
awarded in scheduled time.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that Co-
branding is a very innovative concept of advertisement introduced by DMRC in 2014.
The process of calling of tenders of co-branding as well its awarding started well before
the completion of Phase-III and is a continuous process. Hence, considering the delay
from the date of floating of tender to the date of operation of an individual station is not
reasonable. The tender for licensing Semi Naming Rights of metro stations are being
called on the principle of expression of interest. Only those metro stations for which
expression of interests are received are included in the tender to avoid unnecessary
expense of valued revenue of DMRC.
The reply of Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not correct as vigilance circular was
introduced in 2012 whereas DMRC introduced the co-branding concept in 2014 for
Phase-I and Phase-II stations existing at that time. Therefore, advance planning for
tendering process should have been done so that time frame as per the circular could be
adhered to. Further, till scheduled date of completion of Phase-III i.e., March 2016,
tenders for only seven stations (excluding above mentioned) Semi Naming Rights
contracts were finalised as there was sufficient time (two years/ four years) before
scheduled opening of Phase-III corridors i.e., March 2016 and majority stations were
opened in 2018-19. But due to delay in finalisation of semi naming rights tenders and
awarding before commencement of revenue operation of Phase-III stations, DMRC had
to forego revenue amounting to ₹15.80 crore.

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5.4.3 Non-utilisation of advertisement space on Platform Screen Doors installed

on metro stations of Line-7 and Line-8
In May 2012, DMRC proposed for procurement of Unattended Train Operation based
Rolling Stock on Line-7 and Line-8, besides suggesting for installation of Platform
Screen Doors on all the stations of Line-7 and Line-8. The proposal of Platform Screen
Doors was placed (July 2012) in the 91st meeting of Board of Directors. The Board of
Directors appointed sub-committee deliberated that since the initial cost of Platform
Screen Doors is high, earning from advertisement has been estimated to explore the
method of funding. The sub-committee recommended (August 2012) for installation
of Platform Screen Doors on 63 stations on Line-7 and Line-8 with the facility to use
space for advertisement and after considering 15 square meter area per station available
for advertisement, the potential earning from advertisement on Platform Screen Doors
on 63 stations of Line-7 and Line-8 for 30 years was assessed to be ₹225 crore. There
was an average advertisement space of 200 sqm on stations as intimated by DMRC.
Audit observed that as per NIT of inside advertisement rights for selected 49 metro
stations on Line-7 and Line-8, minimum area of advertisement of 40 square meter to
80 square meter is given to licensee after categorisation of each station on the basis of
projected ridership, without specifying the actual area of advertisement available at each
station including Platform Screen Doors.
The Ministry/ GNCTD and DMRC replied (January 2021 and July 2020) that despite
offering the optimum area, more than 40 per cent to 45 per cent of advertisement
inventories are generally lying vacant but successful licensee has to pay the fixed
license fee according to contract conditions. Floating separate tender for advertisement
rights of Platform Screen Doors and inside stations may attract conflict of interest
between the parties which may lead to unnecessary litigation for DMRC. Moreover,
the basic thrust of the installation of Platform Screen Doors was to prevent accidental
fall or jump by commuters on the track. Earning from the advertisement was envisioned
with a noble concept to earn revenue.
The reply of Ministry/ GNCTD/ DMRC is not acceptable as DMRC never floated tender
exclusively for Platform Screen Doors advertisement which was envisaged by Board of
Directors at the time of approval for installation of Platform Screen Doors. DMRC
calculated the estimated price of Line-7 and Line-8 in advertisement contracts on the
basis of existing lines wherein Platform Screen Doors was not installed. The conflict
of interest between two advertisers is presumption of DMRC and DMRC had already
awarded separate tender for digital advertisement other than inside station
advertisement contract at ITO station. As potential of Platform Screen Doors
advertisement is high, instead of awarding separate contract as recommended by Board
of Directors, DMRC allowed existing contractors for station to utilise this huge area
without specifying the advertisement area of Platform Screen Doors.
Conclusion
Thus, there were deficiencies in operation and maintenance and shortfall in
achievement of planned benefits after commercial operation. DMRC did not prepare

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line-wise operational profit/ loss statements and not claiming operational losses, if any
from the respective State Governments till March 2020. The actual ridership after
completion of Phase-III was only 4.38 lakh against projected ridership of 20.97 lakh in
2019-20, which was 79.03 per cent less than the projections. In the NCR and other
extensions, the actual ridership was 15.12 per cent to 87.63 per cent lower than the
projections. The operational efficiency of DMRC was also declining with the operating
cost ratio rising from 48.99 per cent in 2011-12 to 80.55 per cent in 2019-20.
DMRC’s method of calculating operating expenses excluded the depreciation and
amortisation expenses and interest cost, resulting in reduced operational expenses and
depicting operating profit although in reality they were incurring operational losses.
DMRC not only failed to provide last mile connectivity services, but also did not
comply with extant guidelines and was unable to provide Multi Modal Integration
facilities.
There was shortfall of ₹1,847.87 crore95 in earning from Property Development, against
the targeted earning of ₹2,505 crore. Further, there was shortfall of ₹1,841.19 crore in
Non-Fare Box Revenue generation through Property Business against the estimated
Non-Fare Box Revenue of ₹1,917.25 crore during 2016-17 to 2019-20.
Recommendations
17. DMRC may prepare line-wise profit and loss account and claim operation loss,
if any, from respective State governments.
18. DMRC may also ensure last mile connectivity for augmentation of ridership
through various modes including planned feeder bus services.
19. DMRC may enhance its efforts to increase operating efficiency by reducing the
operating ratio and also estimate more realistic ridership for future DPRs.
20. DMRC may ensure implementation of a complete Multi Modal Integration as
per extant guidelines with integrated planning of land use and various modes
of transport.
21. A structured and approved Property Development and Property Business
manual may be formulated for ensuring uniformity and consistent decision
making. DMRC may also consider preparing a road map to accomplish targeted
Non-Fare Box Revenue on the basis of combined experience of Phase-I, Phase-
II & Phase-III.
22. There should be a member/expert with marketing skill in Board for efficient
dealing with Property Development and Property Business related activities.

95
`2,505crore -`657.13 crore

114
CHAPTER-6
CONCLUSION
 Report No. 11 of 2021

Chapter 6
Conclusion
Delhi Mass Rapid Transit System implemented by DMRC is a landmark step in the
sphere of mass urban transportation in India and revolutionised the mass transportation
sector across the Country. Delhi Mass Rapid Transit System Project Phase-I covering
65 km was conceptualised (September 1996) and completed (November 2006) by
DMRC. This was followed by Phase-II (124.93 km during 2006-2011), Phase-III
(160.74 km during 2011-2019) and Phase-IV covering 103.93 km which is under
implementation and scheduled to be completed by December 2024.
Performance Audit of Delhi Mass Rapid Transit System Phase-III was taken up during
November 2018 to March 2020 with the objective to examine whether (i) planning was
done in a rational manner to ensure economic viability of corridors and selection of the
most appropriate technology; (ii) implementation in terms of project execution and
contract management was done with due care, economy, and in a timely and transparent
manner; (iii) an adequate mechanism was in existence to monitor the project, and
(iv) the operation and maintenance were efficient, and the planned benefits were
achieved after commercial operation of Phase-III.
Audit observed that there were inconsistencies in recommending and approval of
corridors as the benchmark of eight per cent of Financial Internal Rate of Return was
not adhered to. The Detailed Project Reports of three corridors were prepared in
contravention to recommendations of Working Group on Urban Transport & RITES
Study in terms of the mode of selection of transport. After sanctioning of Phase-III
projects for Lines 7 & 8 and its extensions, the train operation was changed from nine
cars to six cars, thus eliminating the possibility of catering to the increased ridership in
future. Further, in case of selection of technology, rails of relatively low value of
hardness, as compared to standards, were procured, which may result in increased
maintenance cost. Traction Transformers and Auxiliary Main Transformer of higher
capacity were procured due to estimation of higher projected demand and size of
stations, respectively. Also, half height Platform Screen Doors were installed instead
of full height Platform Screen Doors resulting in installation of higher capacity
electrical equipment and consequent higher energy cost.
With regard to project execution and contract management, Audit observed that the cost
of projects was not estimated in a scientific manner; they were estimated on the basis
of the last accepted rate. In case of Line-7 (Mukundpur-Maujpur corridor), the Social
Impact Assessment study was deficient to the extent of identification of project affected
persons at Trilokpuri, which led to more than five year’s delay in operationalisation of
the entire section. In case of Line-8 (Janak Puri West-Kalindi Kunj corridor), Sadar
Bazar & Shankar Vihar stations and additional subway from Terminal 1C to Terminal
1D were constructed, without any provisions in DPR and without approval of GoI and
GNCTD. Additionally, the design of Hauz Khas interchange station was flawed,
resulting in inconvenience to the commuters. Besides, DMRC did not adhere to various
environment requirements including obtaining environmental clearances, conducting
water audit and maintaining records of water extracted/ consumed.

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Audit noticed delays ranging from 2 months to 46 months in completing the corridors
as per the scheduled dates. The Board Sub Committee on Project Management did not
meet at regular intervals to monitor the progress of projects and suggest measures for
expediting the same. Besides, the Quality Management Plans were prepared by the
executing agencies without uniformity across the projects. Real time performance of
Rolling Stock Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning systems including the energy
being consumed has not been analysed in the real conditions, which could help in
introducing energy saving strategies.
DMRC did not prepare line-wise operational profit/ loss statements as per the sanction
letters. Due to this, DMRC is unable to claim the loss, if any, from the respective State
Governments. The actual daily ridership of different corridors was 15.12 per cent to
87.63 per cent lower than the projections. DMRC not only failed to provide last mile
connectivity services, but also did not adhere to the guidelines relating to Multi Modal
Integration facilities. There was shortfall of ₹1,847.87 crore in earning from Property
Development and ₹1,841.19 crore from Property Business, against the projections for
Phase-III.
Thus, Performance Audit of Implementation of Phase-III Delhi Mass Rapid Transit
System by DMRC indicated execution of unviable corridors without exploring the other
modes of transport, lower ridership and short realisation of Non-Fare Box Revenue than
projected which may lead to operational loss for DMRC and extra burden on the
Government exchequer even after incurring an expenditure of ₹45,468.89 crore.
Based on the shortcomings and the implications of such deficiencies, 22 Audit
recommendations have been proposed for further improvement of the performance of
the DMRC.

New Delhi (R G Viswanathan)

Dated: 29 October 2021 Deputy Comptroller and Auditor General
and Chairman, Audit Board

Countersigned

New Delhi (Girish Chandra Murmu)

Dated: 2 November 2021 Comptroller and Auditor General of India

116
ANNEXURES
 Report No. 11 of 2021

Annexure-I (Reference: Para 1.10)

(a) Selection of Contract (in number)

Department/ Contract value range above `100 `5 Total No. of

Division `500 crore- crore- contract contracts
crore `500 `100 selected
crore crore
Civil Total no. of Contract 10 29 88 127
No. of Contract Selected 10 15 22 47
Rolling Stock Total no. of Contract 4 0 1 5
No. of Contract Selected 4 0 0 4
Electrical Total no. of Contract 0 18 35 53
No. of Contract Selected 0 9 8 17
Signalling & Total no. of Contract 0 7 24 31
Telecom No. of Contract Selected 0 3 7 10
Track Total no. of Contract 0 5 18 23
No. of Contract Selected 0 3 5 8
Operation & Total no. of Contract 0 0 17 17
Maintenance No. of Contract Selected 0 0 4 4
Property Total no. of Contract 3 0 0 3
Development No. of Contract Selected 3 0 0 3
259 93

(b) Selection of Contract (in money value)

Department/Division `5 crore-`
`100 `100 crore- Above `500 Total
crore `500 crore crore
Civil 710 4,179 8,575 13,464
Rolling Stock 0 0 7,938 7,938
Electrical 181 2,005 0 2,186
Signaling & Telecom 219 1,004 0 1,223
Operation & Maintenance 89 0 0 89
Track 144 572 0 716
Property Development No expenditure involved
(Revenue contract)
1,343 7,760 16,513 25,616

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

Annexure-II (Reference: Para 2.1.2)

Statement showing Financial Internal Rate of Return and Non Fare Box Revenue of
corridors executed during Phase III

Sr. Corridors Sanction Financial Non Fare Box

No. date Internal Rate of Revenue as
Return proportion of
(Including Fare Box
Central and Revenue as per
State Tax) as DPR
per DPR
Initial Phase III
corridors
1 Jahangir Puri -Badli
2 Central Sectt-Kashmiri Gate
26.09.2011 0.08 % 25%
3 Mukundpur (Majlis Park)-
Sanctioned up to August 2013

Yamuna Vihar
4 Janak Puri West-Kalindi
Kunj
NCR/ other extensions
5 Badarpur – Escort Mujessar 13.09.2011 (-)798 crore 10%
6 Mundaka- Bahadurgarh 11.09.2012 6.04% (Delhi) 12.5%
2.29% (Haryana)
7 Maujpur- Shiv Vihar 11.09.2012 (-) 0.11%1 25%
(-) 755 crore
8 Dwarka-Najafgarh 11.09.2012 1.18% 126% to 296%
9 Faridabad to Ballabhgarh 27.03.2017 11.01% 5%
Sanctioned After August 2013

10 Najafgarh to Dhansa Bus 09.05.2017 3.4% 10%

stand
11 Kalindi Kunj- Botanical 20.12.2017 9.85% 10%
Garden
12 Noida city center to Noida 15.06.2018 8.63% 10%
sector 62
13 Dilshad Garden to New Bus 14.02.2019 12.23% 1%
Adda Ghaziabad

1
FIRR of Maujpur-Shiv Vihar was not available. Hence, FIRR of phase III corridors including Maujpur
Shiv-Vihar was taken from DPR.

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

Annexure-III (A)(Reference: Para [Link])

Statement showing different assumptions considered at the time of preparation of various DPRs
Assumptions Phase III Maujpur to Dilshad Faridabad Kalindi Najafgarh Dwarka - Mundka- Noida Badarpur-
taken while Corridors Shiv Vihar - Garden to to Ballabh Kunj to to Dhansa Najafgarh Bahadur City Faridabad
preparing DPRs Feb, 2011 Nov Ghaziabad - garh - Botanical Bus Stand - Garh Center- February
2011 October December Garden - - March April Noida 2007
2014 2014 October December 2009 2012 Sec-62
2014 2014
October
2014
Escalation 5% 5% 7.5% 7.5% 7.5% 7.5% 7% 5% 7.5% 5%
Factor
(per annum)
Replacement 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 10% 10% 50% 10%
Cost
(Equipment-
S&T)
After 20 Years
Replacement 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 10% 10% 25% 10%
Cost
(Equipment-
Electrical)
After 20 Years
Staff 35 35 35 35 35 35 45 35 35 45
Deployment
(Per Km)
Escalation of 5% 5% 7.5% 7.5% 7.5% 5% 7% 5% 5% 5%
other expenses
based on the
O&M unit cost

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Report No. 11 of 2021

Annexure-III (B)(Reference: Para [Link])

Fare slabs and distance range considered at the time of preparation of various DPRs
Phase III Maujpur to Dilshad Garden Faridabad to Najafgarh Dwarka – Mundka- Noida City Badarpur-
Corridors Shiv Vihar - to Ghaziabad - Ballabhgarh to Dhansa Najafgarh - Bahadur Center- Faridabad
Feb, 2011 Nov October 2014 - Bus Stand – March 2009 Garh Noida February
2011 and Kalindi December December April 2012 Sec-62 2007
Kunj to 2014 2014 October
Botanical 2014
Garden -
October 2014
Fare Structure Fare Structure Fare Structure in Fare Fare Fare Fare Fare Fare
(2016) (2016) 2017-18 Structure in Structure Structure in Structure Structure Structure in
Escalation Escalation Escalation Factor 2017-18 Escalation 2010-11 Escalation Escalation 2010-11
Factor @ 7.5% Factor @ 7.5% @ 15% once in Escalation Factor @ Escalation Factor @ Factor @ Escalation
at the end of at the end of two Years Factor @ 15% once in Factor @ 5% 7.5% per 7.5% per Factor @
every 2 Years every 2 Years 15% once in two Years for every two annum at annum at 5% per
two Years Years the end of the end of annum for
every 2 every 2 every two
Years Years Years
Distance Fare `) Distance
Distance Fare (` `)
Fare (` Distance Fare Distance Fare Distance Fare Distance Fare Distance Fare Dist- Fare
(Km) `)
(` (Km) (Km) (Km) `)
(` (Km) `)
(` (Km) `)
(` (Km) `)
(` (Km) `)
(` ance `)
(`
(Km)
0-2 10 0-2 10 0-3 10 0-2 14 0-2 14 0-2 7 0-2 11 0-3 20 0-2 7
2-4 12 2-4 12 3-6 20 2-4 17 2-4 17 2-4 10 2-4 14 3-6 20 2-4 9
4-6 15 4-6 15 6-12 30 4-6 21 4-6 21 4-6 11 4-6 17 6-12 30 4-6 10
6-9 19 6-9 19 12-18 30 6-9 26 6-9 26 6-9 13 6-9 21 12-18 40 6-9 13
9-12 20 9-12 20 18-24 40 9-12 28 9-12 28 9-12 15 9-12 22 18-24 40 9-12 14
12-15 22 12-15 22 24-31 40 12-15 31 12-15 31 12-15 16 12-15 25 24-31 50 12-15 15

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

Phase III Maujpur to Dilshad Garden Faridabad to Najafgarh Dwarka – Mundka- Noida City Badarpur-
Corridors Shiv Vihar - to Ghaziabad - Ballabhgarh to Dhansa Najafgarh - Bahadur Center- Faridabad
Feb, 2011 Nov October 2014 - Bus Stand – March 2009 Garh Noida February
2011 and Kalindi December December April 2012 Sec-62 2007
Kunj to 2014 2014 October
Botanical 2014
Garden -
October 2014
15-18 24 15-18 24 >31 50 15-18 33 15-18 33 15-18 17 15-18 26 >31 60 15-18 16
18-21 26 18-21 26 18-21 37 18-21 37 18-21 18 18-21 30 18-21 17
21-24 27 21-24 27 21-24 38 21-24 38 21-24 19 21-24 31 21-24 19
24-27 29 24-27 29 24-27 40 24-27 40 24-27 21 24-27 32 24-27 20
27-31 31 27-31 31 27-31 44 27-31 44 27-30 22 27-31 35 27-30 21
31-35 34 31-35 34 31-35 47 31-35 47 31-35 39 30-33 22
35-39 36 35-39 36 35-39 49 35-39 51 35-39 40 33-36 23
39-44 39 39-44 39 39-44 51 39-44 54 39-44 41 36-39 24
>44 40 >44 40 >44 52 >44 56 >44 42 >39 25

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Report No. 11 of 2021

Annexure-IV (Reference: Para 3.3)

Statement showing special advance beyond contractual provisions paid to various contractors during Phase III

Contract Name of the Contractor Date of LOA Amount of special advances

No. paid to contractor
` in crore)
(`
CC-126 M/s STEC-SUCGIN 12-10-2017 15
CC-66 M/s Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. 11-04-2014 31.25
CC-24 M/s J. Kumar CRTG-JV 16-07-2012 25
CC-30 M/s Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd 22-10-2012 20
CC-20 M/s J. Kumar-CRTG-JV 12-07-2012 15
CC-04 M/s CEC-CICI(JV) 29-12-2011 30
CC-18 M/s FEMC- Pratibha JV 22-10-2012 50
CC-64R M/s Vijay Nirman Company Pvt. Ltd 30-04-2014 8.5
CC-32 M/s. ITD-ITD Cem JV 01-03-2015 60
CC-23 M/s FEMC-Pratibha JV 29-01-2013 70
CC-27 M/s L&T-SUCG JV CC 27 Delhi 01-11-2012 50
CC-15 M/s Afcons Infrastructure Limited 09-05-2012 40
CC-26 R M/s ITD-ITD CEM JV 09-09-2012 140.94
Total 555.69

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

Annexure-V (Reference: Para 3.16)

Statement showing details of tree cutting estimation in DPR, permission taken from Forest Department, Actual tree cutting and
amount deposited with Forest Department
Name of corridor/ Numbe Number of Cost of Estimated cost Permission Actual Actual Actual
Section r of trees to be one tree of for tree tree cut amount expenditure on
trees to felled as per plantatio compensatory cutting paid for compensatory
be cut Environment n as per afforestation as granted by compensa- afforestation
as per Impact DPR (in per DPR Forest tory over DPR
DPR Assessment `) ` in crore)
(` deptt. afforestation projection (in
(A) study ` in crore)
(` %)
conducted by (C ) (D ) (G )
M/s RITES ( E) (F ) (H) =
(Aug 2011) (B) (G)/(D)/100
Mukundpur- 2,470 7,123 7,091 5,266 17.91
YamunaVihar 3,083.33
Janak Puri West- 8,205 7,891 1250 1.44 6,381 4,650 20.23
Botanical Garden
Kashmiri Gate- 695 1,049 1,629 807 4.92
Central Sectt.
Jahangir Puri-Badli 141 546 427 230 1.34
Dwarka-Najafgarh 176 1200 0.04 240 225 0.77 1,925
Mundka- 700 700 0.021 567 550 1.96 9,333.33
Bahadurgarh
Najafgarh-Dhansa 0 0 0 178 157 1.01 0
Bus Stand
IT Park, Shastri 0 0 0 97 101 0.82 0
Park
Badli depot 0 0 0 845 660 2.80 0
Total 12,387 16,609 1.50 17,455 12,646 51.76

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Report No. 11 of 2021

Annexure-VI (Reference: Para 3.16)

Statement showing excess payment deposited with Forest Department
Name of Name of Number of Number of Actual Actual Total number of trees Total excess
corridor/ Chief tree cutting tree relocation number number which were either not payment made
Section Project permission permission of tree of tree cut or relocated/ to forest
Manager was granted was granted felled/cut relocated transplanted, but department
office by forest by forest (C) (D) payment made to after
department department forest department considering
(A) (B) [(A-C) +(B-D)} ` 28,000 per tree
Jahangir Puri- CPM-2 427 53 230 0 250 70,00,000
Badli
Badli Depot CPM-2 845 22 660 50 157 43,96,000
Mukundpur- CPM-2 2,455 166 1,770 46 805 2,25,40,000
YamunaVihar CPM-3 1,323 0 1,159 128 36 10,08,000
CPM-4 3,313 304 2,337 175 1,105 3,09,40,000
Janak Puri CPM-5 1,330 114 936 63 445 1,24,60,000
West-Kalindi CPM-6 3,901 30 2,566 0 1,365 3,82,20,000
Kunj CPM-7 1,150 4 1,148 0 6 1,68,000
Kashmiri Gate- CPM-8 1,629 31 807 0 853 2,38,84,000
Central Sectt.
Dwarka- CPM-1 240 0 225 0 15 4,20,000
Najafgarh
Najafgarh- CPM-1 178 0 157 0 21 5,88,000
Dhansa Bus
Stand
IT Park, Shastri CPM-1 97 0 101 0 -4 -1,12,000
Park
Mundka- CPM-9 567 22 550 22 17 4,76,000
Bahadurgarh
(Delhi portion)
Total (Delhi ) 17,455 746 12,646 484 5,071 14,19,88,000

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

Annexure-VII (Reference: Para 5.2.1)

Statement showing extract from various sanction letters regarding bearing of operational loss

Name of corridor Date of Length Scheduled Actual date of Relevant clause regarding bearing operation loss as
sanction (in km) date of Completion and per sanction letter.
letter completion commercial
operation date

Initial Phase III 26-09-2011 103.05 March Opened in Clause 1 (v) (f) of sanction letter stated that operating
having 4 corridors 2016 phased manner losses of Phase III, if any shall be borne by GNCTD only.
from November
2015 to
December 2018
(except 0.3 km
approx at
Trilokpuri)

Dwarka-Najafgarh 11-09- 2012 5.5 December October 2019 Clause 1 (v) (e) of sanction letter stated that operating
2015 losses of this line shall be borne by GNCTD only.

Badarpur- YMCA 13-09-2011 13.875 06-09-2015 Clause 2(i) of sanction letter stated that DMRC will work
Chowk (Faridabad) out what sort of mechanism is feasible for operational
profit/losses for a particular line in future. If there is a
case of operational losses for a particular line in future,
the Board of Director of DMRC would consider the issue
with specific inputs from the chief Secretary, GNCTD
and chief Secretary, Haryana.

Maujpur- Shiv Vihar 11-09-2012 2.717 31-10-2018 Clause 2 (f) of sanction letter stated that DMRC will
extension work out what sort of mechanism is feasible for
operational profit/losses for a particular line in future. If
there is a case of operational losses for a particular line in
future, the Board of Director of DMRC would consider

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Report No. 11 of 2021

Name of corridor Date of Length Scheduled Actual date of Relevant clause regarding bearing operation loss as
sanction (in km) date of Completion and per sanction letter.
letter completion commercial
operation date
the issue with specific inputs from the chief Secretary,
GNCTD and Chief Secretary, Uttar Pradesh.

Faridabad- 27-03-2017 3.21 31-12-18 19-11-2018. Clause 6 (i) of sanction letter stated that DMRC will work
Ballabhgarh out what sort of mechanism is feasible for operational
profit/losses for a particular line in future. If there is a case
of operational losses for a particular line in future, the
Board of Director of DMRC would consider the issue with
specific inputs from the chief Secretary, GNCTD and chief
Secretary, Haryana.

Kalindi Kunj- 20-12-2017 3.96 31-12-17 25-12-2017. Clause 6 (h) of sanction letter stated that GoI would not not
Botanical Garden finance cash loses and capital expenditure during the
operational phase and its requirements would be financed
by SPV and/or the State Government from its own
resources.

Noida City Centre to 15-06-2018 6.675 30-09-18 09-03-2019. Clause 6 (h) of sanction letter stated that GoI would not not
Noida Sector-62 finance cash loses and capital expenditure during the
operational phase and its requirements would be financed
by SPV and/or the State Government from its own
resources.

Dilshad garden to 14-02-2019 9.41 09-03-2019. Clause 6 (h) of sanction letter stated that GoI would not
New Bus Adda 31-01-19 not finance cash loses and capital expenditure during the
(Ghaziabad) operational phase and its requirements would be financed
by SPV and/or the State Government from its own
resources.

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

Name of corridor Date of Length Scheduled Actual date of Relevant clause regarding bearing operation loss as
sanction (in km) date of Completion and per sanction letter.
letter completion commercial
operation date

Mundka- 11-09-2012 11.182 25-06-2018 Clause 7 (f) of sanction letter stated that DMRC will work
Bahdurgarh out what sort of mechanism is feasible for operational
profit/losses for a particular line in future. If there is a case
of operational losses for a particular line in future, the
Board of Director of DMRC would consider the issue with
specific inputs from the chief Secretary, GNCTD and
chief Secretary, Haryana.

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Report No. 11 of 2021

Annexure-VIII (Reference: Para 5.2.2)

Year-wise ridership, annual growth and ridership per km of entire DMRC
network from 2011-12 to 2019-20

Year Average Yearly Route Maximum Section/corridor Passenger/ridership

Daily growth length (in Ridership opened during per km {daily
Ridership (in per km) in a single the year (in km) ridership/length in
(in lakh) cent) excluding day (in km}
Airport lakh)
line
2011-12 16.60 -- 167.33 20.84 -- 9,921
(12.08.11)
2012-13 19.26 15.68 167.33 23.05 -- 11,510
(11.02.13)
2013-14 21.91 13.75 167.33 26.51 -- 13,094
(19.08.13)
2014-15 23.86 8.9 170.36 28.87 3.03 14,006
(08.09.14)
2015-16 25.94 8.73 189.50 31.72 19.14 13,689
(28.08.15)
2016-17 27.61 6.95 189.50 33.69 -- 14,570
(17.08.16)
2017-18 25.37 -8.11 228.98 31.13 39.48 11,080
(08.08.17)
2018-19 25.21 -0.63 320.79 91.81 7,859
2019-20 27.79 10.23 325.29 4.5 8,543

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

Annexure-IX (Reference: Para 5.2.4)

Operational Performance (` in crore)
Year Income Operating Operating Operati Depreci Interes Operating Operati
from Expenses Profit ng ratio ation t Cost expenses onal
traffic (2) (3) = (1)- (4) (5) (6) (including Loss
operations (2) = (2)/(1) Depreciation (8) = (7)-
(1) and interest (1)
cost) (7) =
(2) +(5) +(6)
2011-12 1,281.57 627.85 653.72 48.99 800.87 200.58 1,629.3 347.73
2012-13 1,523.74 857.16 666.58 56.25 819.22 216.56 1,892.94 369.2
2013-14 1,645.40 988.17 657.23 60.06 900.78 222.04 2,110.99 465.59
2014-15 1,820.32 1,223.56 596.76 67.22 1,288.55 226.81 2,738.92 918.6
2015-16 2,037.43 1,412.95 624.48 69.35 1,480.80 264.07 3,157.82 1,120.39
2016-17 2,179.00 1,602.68 576.32 73.55 1,541.12 240.13 3,383.93 1,204.93
2017-18 3,027.26 2,088.34 938.92 68.98 1,718.19 262.50 4,069.03 1,041.77
2018-19 3,582.80 2,558.56 1,024.24 71.41 2,415.39 311.68 5,285.63 1,702.83
2019-20 3,897.29 3,139.28 758.01 80.55 2,382.85 451.89 5974.02 2076.73

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Report No. 11 of 2021

Annexure-X (Reference: Para 5.4.1)

Statement showing Non-Fare Box Revenue (Property Development & Advertisement) as per
DPRs
` in crore)
(`
Name of section/corridor 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20
Phase III Corridors 199.37 418.75 460.05 483
including Shiv Vihar
Extension -
November, 2011
Badarpur-Faridabad 13.78 14.33 15.46 15.46
Dilshad Garden - Ghaziabad 1.27 1.33 1.54 1.62
October 2014
Faridabad- Ballabhgarh 0 0 2 2
December 2014
Kalindi Kunj to Botanical 0 3 5 7
Garden -
October 2014
Mundka-Bahadurgarh 5 6 7 8
Dwarka- Najafgarh 2009 38.75 46.88 54.23 48.31
Najafgarh-Dhansa Bus stand 0 6 6 8
2014
Noida City Center -Noida 0 7 7 8
Electronic City 2012
Advertisement from 3.6 3.97 4.17 4.38
Platform Screen Doors as
per decision of BoD meeting
Total 261.77 507.26 562.45 585.87

Grand total ` 1917.25 crore

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 Report No. 11 of 2021

Annexure-XI (Reference: Para 5.4.2)

Statement showing delays in awarding of the co-branding contracts
Sl. Name of the Date on Date of Delay in Date of Delay in Actual Scheduled Actual Delay in Rate quoted Per day Loss of
No. Station Tender start of days/prior award the award of Date of date of Date of start of by successful revenue revenue
(A) floated commer- to start of Co- contract Handing start of start of license fee bidder (in `) (in `)
(B) cial commer- Branding F (E- over of License License date due to (Annually) L (K/365) M (J x L)
operation cial Contract C) station (G ) Fee (H) Fee (I) delay (in `)
(C) operation (E ) awarding (K )
D(B-C) of contract
J (I-H)
1. Vasant Vihar 25-07-18 28-05-18 58 16-01-19 233 21-02-19 25-09-18 21-06-19 269 55,00,000 15,068 40,53,292
2. Durgabai 25-07-18 06-08-18 -12 11-01-19 158 06-08-18 04-12-18 31-03-20 483 2,69,95,555 73,960 3,57,22,680
Deshmukh
South Campus
3. Nehru Enclave 25-07-18 28-05-18 58 17-01-19 234 21-02-19 25-09-18 21-06-19 269 1,83,00,000 50,137 1,34,86,853
4. ITO 28-04-16 08-06-15 325 05-08-16 424 19-08-16 06-10-15 17-12-16 438 75,50,000 20,685 90,60,030
5. Badkal Mor 23-06-15 06-09-15 -75 27-09-16 387 23-05-16 04-01-16 19-09-16 259 61,20,000 16,767 43,59,420
6. Delhi Gate 23-06-15 28-05-17 -705 19-12-17 205 10-01-18 25-09-17 10-05-18 227 1,50,00,000 41,096 93,28,792
7. Hauz Khas 25-07-18 28-05-18 58 07-08-18 71 10-09-18 25-09-18 08-01-19 105 75,00,000 20,548 21,57,540
8. Ajronda 23-06-15 06-05-15 48 27-04-16 357 22-06-16 04-01-16 20-10-18 1020 51,00,000 13,973 1,42,52,460

9. Janpath 23-06-15 28-06-14 360 19-12-17 1270 08-02-18 26-10-14 08-06-18 1321 62,00,000 16,986 2,24,38,506
10. Mewla 23-06-15 06-09-15 -75 29-12-17 845 31-01-18 04-01-16 31-05-18 878 46,00,000 12,603 1,10,65,434
Maharajpur
11. Bata Chowk Negotiation 06-09-15 - 06-07-18 1034 14-08-18 04-01-16 12-12-18 1073 45,00,000 12,329 1,32,29,017
basis
12. NHPC Chowk 23-06-15 06-09-15 -75 27-04-16 234 23-04-18 04-01-16 21-08-18 960 61,30,000 16,795 1,61,23,200
13. Sarai 23-06-15 06-09-15 -75 19-12-17 835 23-01-18 04-01-16 23-05-18 870 36,00,000 9,863 85,80,810
14. Escorts Negotiatio 06-09-15 - 08-02-17 521 15-02-17 04-01-16 15-06-17 528 18,00,000 4,932 26,04,096
Mujesar n basis
Total Revenue Loss due to delay in award of Co- Branding contracts `15,79,80,519

131