STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

8th Assignment

Chapter XI Constitutional Construction

Cases:

1. Legaspi vs Ministry of Finance GR. No. 58289, July 24,1982

2. Lopez vs De los Reyes GR No. L-34361, Novemb er 5, 1930

3. J.M Tuason & Co., Inc., vs Land Tenure Administration GR No. L-21064 February 18, 1970

4. CIR vs Guerrero GR No. 20812, September 22, 1967

5. Ordillo vs COMELEC GR No. 93054, December 4, 1990

6. Philippine Constitution Assn., Inc vs Mathay GR No. L-25554 October 4, 1966

7. ACORD vs Zamora GR No. 144256 June 8, 2005

8. Sarmiento vs Mison GR No. 79974, December 17, 1987

9. Francisco Jr. vs House of Representatives GR No. 160261, November 10, 2003

10. La Bugal-B Laan Tribal Association vs Ramos GR No. 127882, January 27, 2004
 CHAPTER XI Constitutional Construction

(SHORT VERSION)

1.

Name of J. M. TUASON & CO., INC. vs. THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION
the Title

Citation G.R. No. L-21064 June 30, 1970

Facts J. M. Tuason & Co. challenged the constitutionality of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3453, which
prohibited the institution or continuation of ejectment proceedings against occupants of the
Tatalon Estate even when expropriation proceedings had not yet been initiated. The landowner
argued this deprived them of property rights without due process or compensation.

Issue Whether Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3453, prohibiting ejectment against occupants of an estate
in the absence of expropriation proceedings, is constitutional.

Ruling No. The provision was reaffirmed as unconstitutional and unenforceable. A statute that
prohibits ejectment in the absence of commenced expropriation proceedings places the
landowner in the position of losing dominical rights without due process or compensation,
thus offending the Constitution. The motion for reconsideration was denied.

Doctrine Statutes concerning social welfare or expropriation must still adhere strictly to the constitutional
mandates of due process and just compensation. A legislative act that infringes upon dominical
rights without initiating the required constitutional process (eminent domain) is void.

2.

Name of CANDIDO B. LOPEZ vs. JOSE DE LOS REYES

the Title

Citation G.R. No. 34361 November 5, 1930

Facts Lopez assaulted a Representative on October 23, 1929, preventing him from attending sessions.
The House, in its second session, found Lopez guilty of contempt and ordered his 24-hour
confinement. The session adjourned on November 8, 1929, without the warrant being served.
During the next session (the third), the House issued a new warrant, leading to Lopez's arrest.

Issue Whether the legislative power to punish by imprisonment for contempt extends beyond the
adjournment of the session in which the contempt occurred.

Ruling No. The power to punish by imprisonment for contempt terminates with the adjournment of the
session of the body in which the contempt occurred. Since the original session adjourned
without the order being enforced, the House lacked the legal right to proceed with the arrest during
the next session. The judgment was reversed, and the petitioner was discharged.

Doctrine The implied power of a legislative body to punish for contempt is limited to the least possible
power adequate to the end proposed (self-preservation). Imprisonment for contempt cannot
extend beyond the adjournment of the current session. The word "session" must be used in the
constitutional sense, not subjected to a strained grammatical construction.

3.

Name of VALENTINO L. LEGASPI vs. THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF FINANCE

the Title

Citation G.R. No. L-58289 July 24, 1982

Facts Petitioner, an interim Batasang Pambansa member, challenged P.D. 1840 (tax amnesty), arguing
the President lacked legislative power under Amendment No. 6. He contended that the 1981
amendments, which separated the offices of President and Prime Minister, implicitly repealed
Amendment No. 6, rendering the phrase "President (Prime Minister)" inoperable.
 Issue Whether Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, granting concurrent legislative power to the
President (Prime Minister), was repealed or rendered inoperable by the 1981 constitutional
amendments.

Ruling No. The petition was dismissed. Amendment No. 6 has not been altered, modified, much less
repealed. The power was intended to be a permanent feature of the constitutional system,
designed for national survival and to avoid resorting to martial law. The reference to "President
(Prime Minister)" was merely descriptive of the official holding the totality of the executive power.

Doctrine Constitutional Construction (Historical/Purposive): Interpretation must be rooted in the

historical background and the ultimate purpose (ration d'tre) of the provision. Repeal by
Implication is Disfavored: Amendment or repeal of constitutional provisions by implication is
generally not favored, especially regarding transcendental matters. The power conferred by
Amendment No. 6 is an indigenous measure for national survival.

4.

Name of COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. A. D. GUERRERO

the Title

Citation G.R. No. L-20942 September 22, 1967

Facts The administrator of Paul I. Gunn, an American national who operated an air transportation
business, claimed a 50% tax refund on aviation oil based on the National Internal Revenue Code
and the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The Ordinance granted US citizens the privilege
to operate public utilities "in the same manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed
upon, citizens of the Philippines". The Commissioner denied the refund, viewing it as a tax
exemption not covered by the Ordinance.

Issue Whether the privilege granted to U.S. citizens under the Ordinance to operate public utilities "in
the same manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines"
includes the right to claim a tax refund or exemption.

Ruling No. The Court reversed the Court of Tax Appeals, sustaining the Commissioner. The Ordinance's
terms are clear and provide no express or implied warrant for a tax exemption. Tax exemption is not
favored and must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. The Ordinance, being limited and
transitory, should not be given an interpretation that would "trench further" on the permanent
constitutional mandate reserving public utilities primarily to Filipinos.

Doctrine Tax Exemption Strictissimi Juris (Strict Construction): Exemption from taxation is not favored
and is never presumed; if granted, it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer and
declared in words that admit of no doubt. Constitutional Construction (Historical/Purposive):
What is transitory (the Ordinance) should not be interpreted in a way that is "at war with the plain
and explicit command" of the Constitution, which is intended to be permanent and emphasizes
nationalism.

5.

Name of Cordillera Regional Assembly Member ALEXANDER P. ORDILLO, et al., vs. THE COMMISSION
the Title ON ELECTIONS, et al.

Citation G.R. No. 93054. December 4, 1990

Facts A plebiscite was held for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR). Only the
province of Ifugao approved the Organic Act (R.A. No. 6766). The COMELEC and the Secretary of
Justice concluded that Ifugao, being the only province that voted favorably, could alone legally and
validly constitute the CAR. Petitioners challenged this, arguing a region must consist of more than
one constituent unit.

Issue Whether the sole province of Ifugao can validly and legally constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region under the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling No. The petition was GRANTED, and the resolution and related administrative orders/laws
upholding the creation of a one-province autonomous region were declared null and void. Article
X, Section 15 of the Constitution states that autonomous regions shall consist of "provinces,
 cities, municipalities and geographical areas," connoting that a "region" must be made up of
more than one constituent unit. Allowing only Ifugao to constitute the CAR would result in the
absurd situation of having two sets of officials (provincial and regional) exercising powers over the
same small area, violating the intent of R.A. No. 6766.

Doctrine Constitutional Construction (Ordinary Meaning Rule): The language of the Constitution should
be understood in the sense it has in common use; the term "region," in its ordinary sense, means
two or more provinces. Statutory Construction (Construction to Avoid Absurdity): Statutes (and
constitutional provisions) must be construed to avoid absurd or illogical situations, such as having
redundant legislative bodies (Cordillera Assembly and Sangguniang Panlalawigan) governing the
same small area.

6.

Name of PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. ISMAEL MATHAY and JOSE VELASCO
the Title

Citation G.R. No. L-25554 October 4, 1966

Facts Republic Act No. 4134 increased the salaries of Senators and Representatives. The 1965-1966
Appropriation Act implemented the increase for members of the House starting December 30,
1965. Petitioners (taxpayers) sought to enjoin this payment, arguing it violated Article VI, Section
14 of the Constitution, which mandates that "No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives approving such increase". Since some Senators who approved the
Act had terms expiring only on December 30, 1969, the payment was challenged.

Issue Whether the compensation increase for members of the House of Representatives can take effect
upon the expiration of their term, regardless of the fact that the full term of all the Senators who
approved the increase has not yet expired.

Ruling No. The writ of prohibition was GRANTED, and the appropriation items authorizing disbursement
prior to December 30, 1969, were declared null and void. The constitutional phrase refers to "all
the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives" as a single unit, emphasizing the
use of the singular word "term" and the conjunction "and". To allow the House members to receive
the increase earlier than the Senators would produce a disparity and nullify the deterrent purpose
of the restriction. The effective date is December 30, 1969, the date the term of the last approving
Senator expires.

Doctrine Constitutional Construction (Literal/Unitary): The use of the conjunction "and" denotes a
joinder or union, meaning the expiration of the full term of all members of the Senate is
inseparable from the expiration of the full term of all members of the House. Purpose of the Law
(Ratio Legis): The intent of the restriction is to place a "legal bar to the legislators yielding to the
natural temptation to increase their salaries," requiring the expiration of the full term of all
members of the entire legislative body. Literal meaning must prevail unless it leads to perversion of
plain intention.

7.

Name of ALTERNATIVE CENTER FOR ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENT, INC. (ACORD)
the Title vs. HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, et al.

Citation G.R. No. 144256 June 8, 2005

Facts The General Appropriations Act (GAA) for Year 2000 placed ₱10 Billion of the mandated Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA) under an "Unprogrammed Fund," conditioned on exceeding original
revenue targets, subject to assessment by legislative and executive committees. Petitioners
argued this violated the constitutional mandate that the IRA "shall be automatically released" to
local government units (LGUs).

Issue Whether the GAA provision making the release of a portion of the IRA conditional violates the
constitutional mandate in Article X, Section 6 that the LGU's share shall be automatically
released.
 Ruling Yes. The GAA provisions setting apart the ₱10 Billion IRA as an Unprogrammed Fund and making its
release conditional were declared unconstitutional. The term "automatic" connotes something
mechanical, spontaneous, and perfunctory. Subjecting the release to external conditions or
assessment is not automatic. This constitutional mandate binds both the legislative and
executive branches. The Constitution is not amendable by statute.

Doctrine Constitutional Construction (Literal Meaning and Mandatory Command): Where the language
of the Constitution (e.g., "automatically released") is clear and uses the mandatory word "shall," it
must be given effect. Constitutional Supremacy: The Legislature may not hinder or impede a
constitutional mandate directed at the Executive, as this would absurdly suggest the Constitution
is amendable by statute.

8.

Name of ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III vs. SALVADOR MISON

the Title

Citation G.R. No. L-79974 December 17, 1987

Facts Respondent Mison was appointed Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) by the
President without confirmation from the Commission on Appointments (CA). Petitioners argued
that, like the rule under the 1935 Constitution, bureau heads required CA consent. The case
required interpretation of Article VII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution regarding confirmation
requirements.

Issue Whether the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, as a head of a bureau,
requires the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments under the 1987
Constitution.

Ruling No. The petition was DISMISSED. The position of Commissioner of Customs is not among the
enumerated officers in the first sentence of Article VII, Section 16, requiring CA consent. The
framers of the 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded "heads of bureaus" from the confirmation
requirement, marking a departure from the 1935 Charter and adopting a "middle ground". The
President is expressly authorized by law to appoint him, and this appointment no longer needs CA
confirmation.

Doctrine Constitutional Construction (Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius): The explicit enumeration
of officers whose appointments require CA consent excludes those not listed. Constitutional
Construction (Historical and Purposive): The scope of the CA's confirmation power was
consciously limited by the framers of the 1987 Constitution (by removing the reference to
"bureaus") to avoid the political malpractices associated with the 1935 system. Limitations on the
executive power to appoint are strictly construed and must be clearly stated.

9.

Name of ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al. (Consolidated
the Title Cases)

Citation G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

Facts A first impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice Davide on June 2, 2003, and referred
to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003. A second complaint, accompanied by a
resolution signed by over one-third of the House Members, was filed on October 23, 2003.
Petitioners argued that the second complaint violated the one-year bar rule: "No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year" (Article XI, Section 3(5)). The House Rules defined "initiation" as commencing later than the
filing.

Issue Whether the filing and referral of the first impeachment complaint satisfied the constitutional
definition of "initiated" under Article XI, Section 3(5), thereby barring the second complaint filed
within the one-year period.

Ruling Yes, the second impeachment complaint was barred. Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules, which defined initiation as commencing later than filing and referral, were
declared unconstitutional. The constitutional term "initiate" refers to the entire process
 beginning with the filing of the verified complaint and its referral to the proper Committee on
Justice for action. This interpretation aligns with the intent of the framers (ConCom records) who
deleted language suggesting initiation started later.

Doctrine Constitutional Construction (Verba Legis and Ratio Legis est Anima): Words must be given
their ordinary meaning ("initiate" means to begin/file) unless technical terms are used. The intent
of the framers (ConCom records) must be sought, especially when previous texts are modified, to
ensure the law reflects its purpose. Judicial Review: The Supreme Court has the duty to determine
whether a branch of government has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction (expanded certiorari). Rules promulgated by Congress on impeachment
must not ignore constitutional restraints.

10.

Name of LA BUGAL-B'LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. VICTOR O. RAMOS, SECRETARY, DENR, et
the Title al.

Citation G.R. No. 127882 January 27, 2004

Facts Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 (PHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF
1995) and the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMC (Philippines), Inc.
(WMCP), a fully foreign-owned corporation. Petitioners argued that the FTAA was effectively a
"service contract" allowing foreign management and control over mining operations, which goes
beyond the constitutional limit of "either technical or financial assistance" under Article XII,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue Whether R.A. No. 7942 and the FTAA, by allowing a foreign-owned corporation to manage and
control mining activities and provide "management and personnel," violate the constitutional
limitation that foreign agreements must involve "either technical or financial assistance".

Ruling Yes. The petition was GRANTED, and R.A. No. 7942 provisions authorizing service contracts and
the WMCP FTAA were declared unconstitutional and void. The 1987 Constitution deliberately
deleted the phrase "management or other forms of assistance" (found in the 1973
Constitution) to prohibit foreign control and beneficial ownership over natural resources. The
Court found that R.A. No. 7942 and the FTAA, by granting the foreign contractor management,
operational control, and disposal rights, conveyed beneficial ownership over mineral resources
to foreigners, which is abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. However, the Court rejected the literal
interpretation of "either/or" (technical or financial) as this would lead to absurd consequences
(e.g., requiring two separate contracts for technical and financial aid).

Doctrine Constitutional Construction (Verba Legis and Ratio Legis est Anima): Constitutional
interpretation must give effect to the intent of the people and framers. The deletion of specific
language (e.g., "management or other forms of assistance") from a previous constitution indicates
a difference in purpose and a deliberate exclusion (Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius).
Strict Construction of Exceptions: Agreements allowing foreign participation (FTAA) are
exceptions to the nationalization rule and must be construed strictly against non-Filipinos.
Construction to Avoid Absurdity: Literal interpretation of constitutional language must be
rejected if it leads to absurd, unreasonable, or impracticable consequences (such as forcing the
state to contract separately for technical and financial assistance).
 CHAPTER XI Constitutional Construction

1.

Name of VALENTINO L. LEGASPI, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF FINANCE and THE
the Title HONORABLE COMMISSIONER and/or THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents

Citation G.R. No. L-58289 July 24, 1982

Facts Petitioner Valentino L. Legaspi, an incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa,
challenged the constitutionality of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1840 (granting tax amnesty), arguing
that it was issued illegally. The decree was issued by the President under the legislative powers
granted by Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Petitioner contended that Amendment No.
6 was repealed by omission or rendered inoperable by the 1981 amendments, which separated the
previously combined offices of the President and Prime Minister. He also argued that amnesty
grants require the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa (Article VII, Sec. 11).

Issue Whether Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, granting concurrent legislative power to the
President (Prime Minister), was repealed or rendered inoperable by the constitutional
amendments of April 7, 1981. Whether the President, acting under Amendment No. 6, must
secure the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa to grant amnesty.

Ruling The petition is dismissed. Amendment No. 6 has not been altered, modified, much less
repealed by the constitutional amendments of 1981. Constitutional Construction dictates that
the meaning of the Charter must be rooted in its historical background and ration d'tre.
Amendment No. 6 was designed to provide the Executive with a specific concurrent legislative
power to meet grave emergencies and urgency, making the proclamation of martial law
unnecessary, and thus was intended to be a permanent feature of the constitutional system. The
reference to "President (Prime Minister)" was merely descriptive of the official holding the totality
of the executive power, regardless of the physical separation of the offices. Furthermore, when the
President acts as a legislator under Amendment No. 6, he exercises concurrent authority and
does not require Batasan concurrence, as the restriction in Article VII, Sec. 11 applies only when
exercising the power of executive clemency.

Doctrine Constitutional Construction (Historical/Purposive): The application of constitutional provisions

must go beyond mere literal wording and must portray the influence of historical background,
environment, and the ultimate purpose (ration d'tre) at the time of adoption. Amendment or repeal
of constitutional provisions by implication is generally not favored, especially regarding
transcendental matters. The inherent power conferred by Amendment No. 6 is an indigenous
constitutional measure intended for national survival, allowing the government to cope with crises
effectively without resorting to the extreme measure of martial law.

2.

Name of CANDIDO B. LOPEZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. JOSE DE LOS REYES, in his capacity as Peace
the Title Officer and Assistant Chief of the Constabulary, respondent-appellee

Citation G.R. No. 34361 November 5, 1930

Facts Candido Lopez assaulted Representative Jose D. Dimayuga on October 23, 1929, while the latter
was going to the House of Representatives to attend sessions, preventing the Representative from
attending sessions for three days. The House adopted a resolution on November 6, 1929, finding
Lopez guilty of contempt and ordering his confinement in Bilibid Prison for twenty-four hours. The
legislative session (the second) adjourned at midnight on November 8, 1929, without the order
being served. During the next session (the third), on September 16, 1930, the House passed a
confirmatory resolution and issued a new warrant. Lopez was arrested and filed an application for
habeas corpus, arguing that the House lacked jurisdiction to punish him and that its jurisdiction
over the offense ceased upon the adjournment of the session in which the contempt occurred.

Issue Whether the Philippine House of Representatives possesses the inherent power to punish a non-
member for contempt. Whether the power of the House to impose punishment by imprisonment
for contempt extends beyond the session during which the contempt occurred.
 Ruling Yes, a limited power to punish persons not members for contempt resides in the House of
Representatives of the Philippine Legislature. This power is essential to permit the Houses to
perform their duties without impediment, resting upon the right of self-preservation. No, the power
to punish by imprisonment for contempt is limited to imprisonment that terminates with the
adjournment of the session of the body in which the contempt occurred. Since the original
session (the second session) adjourned without the order of arrest being enforced, the House was
without the legal right to proceed with the arrest based on that offense in the next session (the
third). The trial court’s judgment was reversed, and the petitioner was ordered discharged from
custody.

Doctrine The implied power of a legislative body to punish for contempt is justified only by the right of self-
preservation. This power is the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.
Imprisonment imposed by a legislative body for contempt cannot be extended beyond the
adjournment of the session of the body in which the contempt occurred. When applying
analogous jurisprudence (such as rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court on legislative power), terms
like "session" or "adjournment" must be used in the constitutional sense, not subjected to a
strained grammatical construction.

3.

Name of J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., petitioner-appellee, vs. THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, THE
the Title SOLICITOR GENERAL and THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondents-appellants

Citation G.R. No. L-21064 June 30, 1970

Facts J. M. Tuason & Co. filed a motion for reconsideration against a Supreme Court decision that upheld
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2616 (directing the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate),
despite arguments that the Act violated due process and equal protection guarantees. Specifically
contested was Section 4 of R.A. No. 2616, as amended by R.A. No. 3453, which prohibited the
institution or continuation of ejectment proceedings against present occupants of the estate even
in the absence of expropriation proceedings.

Issue Whether Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3453, prohibiting ejectment proceedings against
occupants of the Tatalon Estate when expropriation proceedings have not yet been initiated, is
constitutional and valid. Whether an apparent inaccuracy in the statute regarding the true
ownership of the estate invalidates the legislative act.

Ruling The motion for reconsideration was denied. The Court reaffirmed its previous holding that Section
4 of Republic Act No. 3453 is unconstitutional and unenforceable. A statutory provision that
prohibits the filing or continuance of ejectment proceedings in the absence of expropriation
proceedings offends the Constitution, as it places the landowner in the situation of losing
dominical rights without due process or compensation. The inaccuracy noted in Section 1 of R.A.
No. 2616 regarding ownership does not invalidate the statute. The government is required to pay
just compensation only to the actual owner.

Doctrine Constitutional interpretation, guided by the intent of the framers, requires that statutes concerning
social justice provisions, like the expropriation of landed estates, must still fully protect the
owner's constitutional rights to due process and just compensation. A legislative act that
infringes upon dominical rights without ensuring that the underlying constitutional requirements
for eminent domain (initiation of expropriation and compensation) are met is unconstitutional.

4.

Name of COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. A. D. GUERRERO, Special

the Title Administrator, in substitution of NATHANIEL I. GUNN, as Administrator of the Estate of the
late PAUL I. GUNN, respondent.

Citation G.R. No. L-20942 September 22, 1967

Facts Paul I. Gunn, an American national, operated an air transportation business and paid specific
taxes on aviation oil. His administrator claimed a 50% refund of the specific tax paid, citing Section
142 of the National Internal Revenue Code, arguing that the estate was entitled to the same rights
and privileges, including taxation privileges, as Filipino citizens operating public utilities under the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The Ordinance provides that citizens of the United
 States may operate public utilities "in the same manner as to, and under the same conditions
imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines". The Commissioner of Internal Revenue denied the
refund, holding that the partial exemption was not included under the terms of the Ordinance and
required a showing of reciprocity, which was lacking. The Court of Tax Appeals reversed the
Commissioner, granting the refund.

Issue Whether the privilege granted to U.S. citizens to operate public utilities "in the same manner as to,
and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines" under the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution includes the right to claim a tax refund or exemption.

Ruling No, the claim for refund, which is treated as a tax exemption, is not supported by the language of
the Ordinance, whether expressly or impliedly. The Court sustained the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and reversed the Court of Tax Appeals. The Ordinance's terms are clear and provide no
warrant for the claim made. While the rights granted to Americans to operate public utilities must
be respected, granting anything further, like a tax exemption, would not be warranted. The power
conferred by the Ordinance is of a limited duration and should not be interpreted to violate the
plain constitutional mandate reserving the operation of public utilities primarily to Filipinos. The
administrator was given the opportunity to prove if the estate could claim the benefits of Section
142 based on the principle of reciprocity (granting refunds if the foreign country grants equivalent
exemptions to Filipinos).

Doctrine Tax Exemption Strictissimi Juris (Strict Construction): Exemption from taxation is not favored
and is never presumed; if granted, it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in
favor of the taxing authority. An exempting provision must be declared in words that admit of no
doubt. Constitutional Construction (Historical and Purposive): A constitutional provision (or an
appended ordinance) must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in light of prior and
existing laws. What is transitory in character (like the Ordinance) should not be given an
interpretation that would "trench further" on the explicit command of the fundamental law (the
Constitution), which is intended to be permanent and emphasizes nationalism.

5.

Name of Cordillera Regional Assembly Member ALEXANDER P. ORDILLO, et al., petitioners, vs. THE
the Title COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., respondents.

Citation G.R. No. 93054. December 4, 1990

Facts A plebiscite was held on January 30, 1990, for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region
(CAR) under Republic Act No. 6766. The plebiscite covered the provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, Abra, and Kalinga-Apayao, and Baguio City. The results showed that only the
province of Ifugao approved the Organic Act by a majority vote. The COMELEC and the Secretary of
Justice concluded that Ifugao, being the only province that voted favorably, could alone legally and
validly constitute the CAR. Petitioners challenged this interpretation, arguing that a region must
consist of more than one constituent unit.

Issue Whether the sole province of Ifugao can validly and legally constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region under the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766.

Ruling No, the sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Article
X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution states that the autonomous regions shall consist of
"provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas," indicating that a "region" must be made
up of more than one constituent unit. This reading is supported by the provisions of R.A. No.
6766, which establishes regional bodies (like the Cordillera Assembly and the Regional
Commission on Appointments) whose composition requires members from various provinces and
cities. Allowing a single province (like Ifugao) to constitute the CAR would lead to the absurd
situation of having two sets of officials (provincial and regional) exercising executive and
legislative powers over exactly the same small area. The COMELEC resolution upholding the
creation of the autonomous region, and subsequent related administrative orders and laws, were
declared null and void.

Doctrine Constitutional Construction (Ordinary Meaning Rule): The language of the Constitution should
be understood in its common use, and words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their
ordinary meaning. The term "region," in its ordinary sense, means two or more provinces.
 Statutory Construction (Construction to Avoid Absurdity): Statutes (and constitutional
provisions) should be construed in a way that avoids absurd or illogical situations. A construction
that would result in redundant legislative and executive bodies governing the same small area
must fail.

6.

Name of PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. ISMAEL MATHAY and JOSE
the Title VELASCO, respondents.

Citation G.R. No. L-25554 October 4, 1966

Facts Republic Act No. 4134, approved on June 10, 1964, increased the salaries of the Speaker and
members of the House and Senate. The 1965-1966 Appropriation Act (R.A. No. 4642) implemented
the salary increase for the Speaker and members of the House starting December 30, 1965.
Petitioners (taxpayers) sought to enjoin the payment, arguing that the implementation violated
Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. Article VI, Section 14 provides that no increase in
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Since the term of the eight
Senators who participated in the approval of R.A. 4134 would not expire until December 30, 1969,
the increase should not yet be effective. Respondents contended that the expiration of the term of
the members of the House alone (which occurred in December 1965) was sufficient for the
increase to take effect for them.

Issue Whether the phrase "the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives approving such increase" in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution
means that the increased salary can only take effect after the term of the members of both houses
has fully expired.

Ruling Yes, the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until
December 30, 1969. The constitutional provision refers to "all the members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives" as a single unit. The use of the singular word "term" reinforces the
intent to consider both houses as indivisible components of one single Legislature for the purpose
of the restriction. The employment of the conjunction "and" means that the expiration of the full
term of the members of the Senate is inseparable from the expiration of the full term of all the
members of the House of Representatives. The items in the Appropriation Act (R.A. 4642)
authorizing disbursement prior to December 30, 1969, were declared null and void.

Doctrine Constitutional Construction (Literal, Unitary, and Purposive): The intent of the constitutional
restriction (Article VI, Section 14) is to require the expiration of the full term of all members of the
entire legislative body (Senate and House combined) that approved the increase, thereby creating
a deterrent factor against self-interest. The use of the conjunction "and" mandates a combined,
not separated, condition, indicating a joinder or union. To allow the House members to receive the
increase earlier than the Senators would produce a disparity and nullify the salutary precaution
intended by the framers.

7.

Name of ALTERNATIVE CENTER FOR ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENT, INC. (ACORD),
the Title et al., vs. HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, et al.

Citation G.R. No. 144256 June 8, 2005

Facts The President submitted the National Expenditures Program for FY 2000, proposing a
P121,778,000,000 Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) based on the Local Government Code (LGC)
formula (40% share). However, the General Appropriations Act (GAA) for 2000 appropriated only
P111,778,000,000 as Programmed Fund IRA, and placed the remaining P10,000,000,000 under the
Unprogrammed Fund. This P10 Billion was conditioned to be released only if the original revenue
targets submitted by the President to Congress could be realized, based on a quarterly
assessment by certain legislative and executive committees. Petitioners (NGOs, POs, and local
officials) argued that this GAA provision violated Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, which
mandates that the local government units' (LGUs) just share in national taxes shall be
automatically released. Respondents argued that the automatic release mandate was addressed
 only to the executive branch, and the legislature was not precluded from imposing conditions,
especially to ensure prudent fiscal management.

Issue Whether the provisions of the Year 2000 General Appropriations Act (GAA) placing P10 Billion of
the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) under an "Unprogrammed Fund" and making its release
conditional violate the constitutional mandate in Article X, Section 6 that the LGU's just share shall
be automatically released.

Ruling Yes. The petition was GRANTED, and the GAA provisions setting apart P10 Billion of the IRA as part
of the Unprogrammed Fund were declared unconstitutional. The constitutional mandate that the
IRA shall be automatically released enjoins both the legislative and executive branches of
government. The term "automatic" connotes something mechanical, spontaneous, and
perfunctory. Making the release contingent upon a future event, or subjecting it to
assessment/guidelines, is not an automatic release and constitutes a flagrant violation of the
constitutional mandate. The Constitution only qualifies the determination of the just share ("as
determined by law"), not the release thereof, which must be automatic. To rule that the executive
branch may disregard constitutional provisions if backed by statute would make the Constitution
amendable by statute, which is absurd.

Doctrine Constitutional Construction (Literal/Unitary/Purposive): When the language of the Constitution

(e.g., "automatically released") is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it
says, and courts must ensure the mandate is obeyed. Constitutional provisions must be
interpreted as a whole; one section is not allowed to defeat another. The restriction on the
release of the IRA applies to the Legislature as much as to the Executive. Attempting to amend
the Constitution through statute or through a General Appropriations Act is patently absurd.

8.

Name of ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners, vs. SALVADOR MISON, in
the Title his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE,
in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.

Citation G.R. No. L-79974 December 17, 1987

Facts Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by the
President without being confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (CA). Petitioners
challenged the appointment, arguing that confirmation by the CA was constitutionally required.
Respondents maintained that under the 1987 Constitution, the Commissioner of Customs (a
bureau head) was no longer among the officials whose appointments required CA confirmation.
Under the 1935 Constitution, heads of bureaus required confirmation. The 1987 Constitution,
Article VII, Section 16, provides a specific list of officers requiring CA consent (First Group) but
treats "all other officers" (Second and Third Groups) differently.

Issue Whether the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, a head of a bureau,
requires the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments under Article VII, Section
16 of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling No. The petition was DISMISSED. The President acted within her constitutional authority in
appointing Mison without CA confirmation. The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs is not listed in the first sentence of Article VII, Section 16, which enumerates the offices
requiring CA consent. The framers of the 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the
appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement of CA confirmation, marking a
departure from the 1935 Constitution where such confirmation was required. This conscious
exclusion of bureau heads signifies the intention to limit the CA's power, reflecting a "middle
ground" between the 1935 and 1973 constitutional schemes.

Doctrine Constitutional Construction (Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius): The explicit enumeration
of officers whose appointments require confirmation (First Group) excludes others not
enumerated. Constitutional Construction (Historical and Purposive): Constitutional provisions
must be construed in light of historical background, existing laws, and the intent of the framers.
The framers intended to limit the power of confirmation enjoyed by the CA under the 1935
 Constitution. The power to appoint is fundamentally executive, and limitations on this power
must be strictly construed and clearly stated.

9.

Name of ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., et al., vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al.
the Title (Consolidated Cases)

Citation G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

Facts The first impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. was filed on June 2,
2003, and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003. The Committee later
voted to dismiss it for insufficient substance. On October 23, 2003 (less than one year later), a
second impeachment complaint was filed, accompanied by a resolution signed by at least one-
third of the House Members. Petitioners challenged the second complaint, arguing it violated
Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution: "No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year". The controversy turned on
the definition of "initiated." The House Rules deemed initiation to occur only upon a vote of
sufficiency in substance by the Committee, or when the House affirms/overturns the Committee's
finding.

Issue Whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide on October
23, 2003, was barred by the one-year limitation rule set forth in Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution. Whether Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, which
define when impeachment proceedings are "deemed initiated," are constitutional.

Ruling Yes, the second impeachment complaint was barred. The petition was GRANTED, and Sections
16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules were declared unconstitutional.
Constitutional Construction mandates that "initiation" of impeachment proceedings begins with
the filing of the verified complaint and the referral of the complaint to the Committee on
Justice for action. This interpretation is confirmed by the legislative intent and records of the
Constitutional Commission (ConCom). The House's power to promulgate its own rules on
impeachment is limited by the Constitution, meaning those rules cannot contravene the
fundamental law, particularly the purpose of the one-year bar. Since the first complaint was filed
and referred on June 2/August 5, 2003, the second complaint filed on October 23, 2003, fell within
the one-year constitutional period.

Doctrine Constitutional Construction (Verba Legis and Ratio Legis est Anima): Where possible, the
words of the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning ("initiate" means to begin/file).
Where ambiguity exists, the words should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the
framers (ConCom records). Judicial Review (Expanded Certiorari): Judicial power includes the
duty to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. This
expanded jurisdiction means courts cannot evade their duty by claiming a matter is a non-
justiciable political question if constitutionally imposed limits exist on the power conferred upon
political bodies. Supremacy of the Constitution: Rules promulgated by Congress, including those
on impeachment, must not ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights.

10.

Name of LA BUGAL-B'LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Chairman F'LONG MIGUEL
the Title M. LUMAYONG, et al., petitioners, vs. VICTOR O. RAMOS, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), et al., respondents.

Citation G.R. No. 127882 January 27, 2004

Facts Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 (PHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF
1995), its implementing rules (DAO 96-40), and the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA) between the Philippine Government and WMC (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP). WMCP was a
fully foreign-owned corporation. Petitioners argued that the FTAA and R.A. No. 7942 violated
Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 4 of the 1987 Constitution, which mandates that the President
may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving "either technical or
financial assistance" for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals. The
FTAA granted WMCP "exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilise[,] process and dispose of all
 Minerals products" and required WMCP to provide all "financing, technology, management and
personnel necessary for the Mining Operations".

Issue Whether Republic Act No. 7942 and the FTAA are unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned
corporations to exercise management and control over mining activities, going beyond the
constitutional limit of "technical or financial assistance". Whether the literal use of the phrase
"either technical or financial assistance" prohibits a single foreign corporation from providing both
types of assistance.

Ruling Yes, the petition was GRANTED. The Court declared R.A. No. 7942 provisions authorizing service
contracts, DAO 96-40 (insofar as it conforms to R.A. 7942), and the WMCP FTAA unconstitutional
and void. The 1987 Constitution, by omitting "management or other forms of assistance" (present
in the 1973 Constitution), intentionally restricted foreign participation to prevent foreign control
and beneficial ownership over natural resources. The provisions of R.A. No. 7942 that allow foreign
contractors to manage or operate all aspects of mining effectively convey beneficial ownership to
them, violating the constitutional mandate that natural resources belong to the State. However,
the Court rejected the literal interpretation of "either/or," ruling that requiring the State to contract
with two separate corporations (one for technical, one for financial) would lead to absurd
consequences.

Doctrine Constitutional Construction (Verba Legis and Ratio Legis est Anima): Constitutional
interpretation requires giving effect to the intention of the people who adopted it, and comparing
revised constitutional language with its predecessor is key to discerning purpose. The deletion of
the phrase "management or other forms of assistance" (present in the 1973 Charter) in the
1987 Constitution was deliberate, meant to eliminate the service contract system which was used
to circumvent the constitutional nationalization policy. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius: A
person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. Strict Construction of Exceptions: Constitutional provisions allowing foreign
participation are exceptions to the nationalization rule and must be construed strictly against non-
Filipinos. Construction to Avoid Absurdity: Literal interpretation of the Constitution must be
rejected if it leads to absurd, unreasonable, or impracticable consequences, such as forcing
separate contracts for technical and financial aid when one entity can provide both.