STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
7th Assignment
Chapter X Amendment Revision, Codification and Repeal
Cases:
1. Imperial vs Collector of Internal Revenue GR No. 7924, September 30, 1955
2. Rillaroza vs Arciaga GR No. 23848 October 31, 1967
3. Baking vs Director of Prison GR No. 30364, July 28, 1969
4. Bengzon vs Inciong GR No. 48706 June 29, 1979
5. City of Davao City vs RTC GR No. 127383, August 18, 2005
6. Ramirez vs CA GR No. 23587, June 10, 1976
7. Jalandoni vs Endaya GR No. 23894, January 24, 1974
CHAPTER X Amendment Revision, Codification and Repeal
(SHORT VERSION)
1.
Case DOMINGO IMPERIAL, plaintiff and appellee, vs. THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Title defendant and appellant.
Citation [No. L-7924. September 30, 1955]
Facts This was an appeal from a judgment that ordered the Collector of Internal Revenue to refund the
plaintiff-appellee P637.50 (real estate dealer's tax) plus P50 as a compromise. The tax was imposed
for the period from the fourth quarter of 1946 to the third quarter of 1950. During this period, the
appellee owned a nine-door camarin in Tobaco, Albay, and leased it to three merchants, receiving
monthly rentals totaling P6,240.00 a year. Crucially, during the same period (1946 to 1950), the
plaintiff was a Senator-at-large and later a Minister in a foreign country, holding offices that required
"the greater part of his time and his absence from the Philippines".
Issue Whether the plaintiff was "engaged in leasing real estate" as a "real estate dealer," given that the
property leased (the camarin) was the only property for lease and the annual rental income derived
from it was much less than the annual income received from his full-time government positions.
Ruling The court affirmed the judgment ordering the refund. The court held that there was "no weight in
the argument" that the plaintiff was engaged in leasing real estate, especially when considering that
the camarin was his only leased property and the annual rental was "much less than the annual
income he received from the offices which he had been holding".
Doctrine Statutory Interpretation: Defining "To Engage." The doctrine establishes that the definition of the
statutory term "To engage" (in business or leasing) is "to embark in a business or to employ
oneself therein". To determine if a taxpayer is a "real estate dealer," the court must assess whether
the leasing activity constitutes a primary business or occupation, especially when contrasted with
the taxpayer’s official employment and the disparity in income sources.
2.
Title PORFIRIO RILLORAZA, petitioner-appellee, vs. JUDGE PEDRO ARCIAGA, ETC., ET AL.,
respondents. EULALIA BANAYAT, respondent-appellant.
Citation G.R. No. L-23848, October 31, 1967.
Facts A criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of San Fernando, La Union, on June
18, 1963, for direct assault. Under the law then prevailing (RA 2613), the court had
jurisdiction. On June 22, 1963, Republic Act 3828 took effect, amending the Judiciary Act
by limiting jurisdiction of municipal courts in capitals to offenses committed "within
their respective jurisdictions". Rilloraza moved to quash, arguing that RA 3828 divested
the court of jurisdiction.
Issue (Whether) Whether a subsequent statute (RA 3828) redefining jurisdictional limits retroactively
applied to a criminal case already filed and partially heard, thereby divesting the court of
jurisdiction acquired under the prior statute (RA 2613).
Ruling No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling. Jurisdiction is determined by
the law in force at the time the action is instituted (June 18, 1963, RA 2613). Once
jurisdiction is acquired, it remains until final determination. A subsequent statute
removing jurisdiction "will not operate to oust jurisdiction already attached" unless it
uses express prohibitory words. RA 3828 merely delineates court jurisdiction and is not
a penal statute, thus it cannot be given retroactive effect.
Doctrine Non-Retroactivity of Jurisdictional Laws: Jurisdiction is governed by the law existing
(Statutory when the action is instituted and, once acquired, is preserved. Subsequent statutes
Construction: changing jurisdiction generally do not impair jurisdiction already attached unless they
Amendment and contain express prohibitory words.
Jurisdiction)
3.
Title ANGEL C. BAKING and SIMEON G. RODRIGUEZ, petitioners, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF
PRISONS, respondent. (L-30364) and IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR A
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, JOSE LAVA, ET AL., petitioners. (L-30603)
Citation G.R. No. L-30364 & L-30603, July 28, 1969.
Facts Petitioners, detained for 18 years, were convicted of rebellion and sentenced to 10 years.
They sought immediate release, arguing that their combined credit for preventive
imprisonment (Art. 29, RPC) plus Good Conduct Time Allowances (GCTA) under Article
97 of the RPC, applied retroactively to their entire period of detention, exceeded their
sentence. The Director of Prisons argued that Article 97 (GCTA) was inapplicable to
detention prisoners.
Issue (Whether) Whether Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code, which grants time allowance for good
conduct to "any prisoner," is applicable to prisoners while they are still undergoing
preventive detention.
Ruling No. Article 97 applies only to a prisoner who is serving sentence. Since the RPC was
originally enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text governs, and the term "any prisoner"
corresponds to "el penado," meaning a convict sentenced by final judgment. This
interpretation is required by harmonizing Article 97 with Article 94, which restricts GCTA
to the culprit "while he is serving his sentence". Additionally, Section 5 of Act 1533 (the
old GCTA law) requires detention prisoners to voluntarily offer in writing to perform
labor to earn credit, and this section still subsists as the RPC only partially repealed Act
1533.
Doctrine Interpretation of Codes: A code must be construed as a whole, requiring harmonization
(Statutory of its various provisions. Where a statute (RPC) contains a repealing clause (Art. 367) that
Construction: expressly abrogates specific sections of a prior law (Act 1533), the remaining sections
Codification and not mentioned are deemed to subsist and remain operative.
Partial Repeal)
4.
Title LOURDES E. BENGZON, petitioner, vs. THE HON. DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR AMADO G.
INCIONG, and STA. INES-MELALE VENEER & PLYWOOD CORPORATION, respondents.
Citation G.R. Nos. L-48706-07, June 29, 1979.
Facts Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal in 1975. The Labor Arbiter and NLRC awarded
her backwages, separation pay, and damages in 1977-1978, under the then-existing broad
jurisdiction of Article 217 of the Labor Code. While the case was pending appeal before the
Minister of Labor, Presidential Decree No. 1367 was promulgated (May 1, 1978), which
amended Article 217 to prohibit Labor Arbiters from entertaining claims for moral or other
forms of damages. The Deputy Minister set aside the damages award, citing PD 1367 as
divesting jurisdiction.
Issue Whether Presidential Decree No. 1367, which amended the Labor Code to remove jurisdiction
(Whether) over damages, retroactively applied to set aside an award granted in a case already filed and
decided prior to the Decree's effectivity.
Ruling No. The Supreme Court directed the Deputy Minister to decide the appeal on the damages
question. Jurisdiction to hear and decide the controversy was acquired by the Labor Court
when the case was filed and decided, under the previous version of Article 217. A statute
changing jurisdiction generally does not affect cases already pending prior to its enactment
unless it is specifically given retroactive effect. Applying PD 1367 retroactively would "sanction
split jurisdiction".
Doctrine Non-Retroactivity Rule: Jurisdiction already obtained and exercised over a controversy is
(Statutory preserved until the case is finally determined. Subsequent legislation changing jurisdiction
Construction: does not operate to affect pending actions unless the statute expressly provides for such
Amendment retroactive application.
of
Jurisdiction)
5.
Title THE CITY OF DAVAO, CITY TREASURER AND THE CITY ASSESSOR OF DAVAO CITY,
Petitioners, vs. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XII, DAVAO CITY AND THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Respondent.
Citation G.R. No. 127383, August 18, 2005.
Facts Davao City sought to levy realty taxes (1992–1994) on GSIS properties. GSIS claimed
exemption under Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended by P.D. No. 1981, which required
two conditions for its repeal: (1) express and categorical repeal by law, and (2) enactment of a
provision to substitute the tax exemption policy as an essential factor for GSIS solvency. Davao
City argued that the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1992 (R.A. 7160), specifically Sections
193 and 234, generally and effectively withdrew all tax exemptions granted to government-
owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) upon its effectivity.
Issue Whether the legislature's attempt, through a previous statute (P.D. No. 1146, as amended), to
(Whether) impose specific conditions on the mode of future repeal legally constrained the subsequent,
general repeal of tax exemptions under the Local Government Code (LGC).
Ruling No. The Supreme Court ruled that the GSIS tax exemptions were withdrawn by the LGC (R.A.
7160) for the years 1992–1994. The second paragraph of Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146/1981,
which attempted to impose restrictions or conditions on future repeal, was declared flawed
because it constituted an undue restraint on the plenary power of the legislature. The
express withdrawal of exemptions in Sections 193 and 234 of the LGC applies without
impediment.
Doctrine Prohibition on Irrepealable Laws: It is a basic precept and an implied limitation on legislative
(Statutory power that a legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws. A legislature cannot bind a future
Construction: legislature to a particular mode of repeal or declare in advance the intent of subsequent
Legislative legislation. Comprehensive general statutes, such as the Local Government Code, can
Power and implicitly or explicitly withdraw specific exemptions granted by prior special laws.
Repeal)
6.
Title LUCAS RAMIREZ and ENCARNACION FAJARDO RAMIREZ, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Citation G.R. No. L-23587-88, June 10, 1976.
Facts Petitioners were convicted in the lower courts for falsification of commercial documents (Art.
172, RPC) committed in 1953-1954. The falsification stemmed from submitting untrue
documents to the Central Bank (CB) to obtain dollar allocations, a requirement imposed by CB
Circular No. 20 (1949). While the case was pending appeal, CB issued Circular No. 133 (1962),
which lifted foreign exchange controls, thereby abolishing the requirement of prior specific
licensing and the submission of supporting documents mandated by Circular No. 20.
Issue Whether the absolute repeal of the Central Bank regulation (Circular No. 20), which created
(Whether) the necessity for the allegedly falsified documents, extinguished the criminal liability for
falsification committed while the regulation was in force.
Ruling Yes (by operation of Section 3, Rule 125, due to lack of required majority for conviction). The
majority opinion held that Circular 133 repealed Circular 20 because they were diametrically
opposed. Since the repeal "wiped away the legal obligation of the applicants for foreign
exchange to disclose the truth" in the required papers, the "root cause of the falsification" was
removed, and the offense based on the violation of the circular ceased to have legal
foundation.
Doctrine Supervening Law on Appeal: An appellate court must dispose of a question according to the
(Statutory law prevailing at the time of the disposition. Extinguishment of Liability by Repeal: Where a
Construction: criminal offense is predicated upon the violation or existence of a requirement in a specific
Repeal and regulation, the absolute repeal of that underlying regulation, even if the general penal code
Criminal provision remains, may extinguish the criminal liability related to the repealed requirement.
Liability)
7.
Title JANUARIO JALANDONI, petitioner, vs. HON. VICTORIANO H. ENDAYA, in his capacity as
Municipal Judge of the Municipal Court of Batangas, Province of Batangas, and SERAFIN
D. CRUZ, respondents.
Citation G.R. No. L-23894, January 24, 1974.
Facts Petitioner filed a criminal complaint for libel in the Municipal Court of Batangas. The Municipal
Judge asserted jurisdiction based on Republic Act No. 3828 (amending the Judiciary Act),
which granted municipal courts in provincial capitals general concurrent jurisdiction over
offenses punishable by prision correccional or less. The Judge argued that this general law
impliedly repealed Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which specifically grants exclusive
jurisdiction over libel to the Court of First Instance (CFI).
Issue Whether a subsequent statute granting general concurrent jurisdiction to municipal courts
(Whether) (RA 3828) impliedly repealed the specific provision in the Revised Penal Code (Article 360) that
mandates exclusive jurisdiction for libel cases in the CFI.
Ruling No. The Supreme Court ruled that the specific provision (Article 360) controls. A general
statute (RA 3828) is not construed as repealing a special or specific enactment (Art. 360)
unless the intent to repeal is manifest, as repeals by implication are not favored. Article 360’s
exclusive jurisdiction over libel was reiterated by the legislature in a subsequent amendment
(RA 4363, approved 1965).
Doctrine Implied Repeal/Generalibus Specialibus Non Derogant: Repeals by implication are not
(Statutory favored and require clear and convincing repugnancy. Where a conflict exists between a
Construction: subsequent general statute and a prior specific statute, the specific statute controls, even if
Specific vs. the general law’s terms are comprehensive enough to include the matter (Generalia
General Law) specialibus non derogant).
CHAPTER X Amendment Revision, Codification and Repeal
1.
Case DOMINGO IMPERIAL, plaintiff and appellee, vs. THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Title defendant and appellant.
Citation [No. L-7924. September 30, 1955]
Facts This case was an appeal regarding a judgment that ordered the Collector of Internal Revenue to
refund the plaintiff-appellee the sum of P637.50 (real estate dealer's tax) plus P50 as a compromise.
This tax was collected for the period corresponding to the fourth quarter of 1946 to the third quarter
of 1950. During this period, the appellee, Domingo Imperial, owned a nine-door camarin
(commercial building) in Tobaco, Albay, which was leased to three merchants, yielding P6,240.00 a
year in rentals. However, during the same period (1946 to 1950), Imperial was a Senator-at-large and
later a Minister in a foreign country. The exercise of the duties of these offices required the greater
part of his time and his absence from the Philippines.
Issue Whether the plaintiff, whose principal occupation was high-level government service and whose
rental income was significantly less than his official salary from his only leased property, was
"engaged in leasing real estate" as defined by law, making him liable for the real estate dealer’s tax.
Ruling The court affirmed the judgment ordering the refund. The court held there was "no weight in the
argument" that the plaintiff was "engaged in leasing real estate". This conclusion was based on the
facts that the camarin was his only property for lease, and the annual rental received therefrom was
"much less than the annual income he received from the offices which he had been holding".
Doctrine Statutory Interpretation: Scope and Definition of "To Engage." The judicial definition of the term
"To engage" in a business (or leasing real estate) is "to embark in a business or to employ oneself
therein". If the activity (like leasing property) is minimal, incidental, involves only one property, and
provides income that is drastically less than the taxpayer's primary, full-time occupation, the
taxpayer does not meet the statutory criteria of being "engaged" in that business for the purpose of
taxation.
2.
Title PORFIRIO RILLORAZA, petitioner-appellee, vs. JUDGE PEDRO ARCIAGA, ETC., ET AL.,
respondents. EULALIA BANAYAT, respondent-appellant.
Citation G.R. No. L-23848, October 31, 1967.
Facts A criminal complaint for direct assault was filed against petitioner Rilloraza in the Municipal
Court of San Fernando, La Union, on June 18, 1963. At that time, jurisdiction was governed by
Republic Act (RA) 2613, which amended Section 37(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948. Under RA
2613, the Municipal Court had original jurisdiction to try the case, as the penalty for direct
assault did not exceed prision correccional or P3,000 fine. Hearing on the merits commenced.
Four days later, on June 22, 1963, Republic Act 3828 took effect, further amending the same
provision of the Judiciary Act by limiting jurisdiction to offenses committed "within their
respective jurisdictions". Rilloraza moved to quash, and later sought certiorari and prohibition in
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of La Union, arguing that RA 3828 divested the Municipal Court
of jurisdiction. The CFI agreed, declaring the proceedings null and void.
Issue Whether the subsequent enactment of Republic Act 3828, which redefined the jurisdiction of
(Whether) municipal courts, operated to divest the Municipal Court of San Fernando, La Union, of
jurisdiction over a criminal case already instituted and partially tried under the preceding law
(RA 2613).
Ruling No. The Supreme Court reversed the CFI's order. Jurisdiction to try a criminal case is
determined by the law in force at the time the action is instituted (June 18, 1963, when RA
2613 was in force). Once jurisdiction is acquired, it remains with the court until the case is
finally determined. A subsequent statute removing jurisdiction "will not operate to oust
jurisdiction already attached," especially since RA 3828 did not employ express prohibitory
words. Furthermore, RA 3828, which merely delineated the jurisdiction of courts, is not a penal
statute (it does not define crimes or penalties), and therefore cannot be given retroactive effect.
Doctrine Jurisdiction, once acquired, is generally preserved, regardless of subsequent statutory
(Amendment amendments. Jurisdiction of a court to try a case is governed by the law existing when the
and action is instituted. A subsequent statute removing jurisdiction will not overturn or impair
Jurisdiction) jurisdiction duly acquired under an existing statute unless that subsequent law uses express
prohibitory words. Statutes that merely delineate court jurisdiction are not penal statutes and
therefore do not provide for retroactive effectivity.
3.
Title ANGEL C. BAKING and SIMEON G. RODRIGUEZ, petitioners, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF
PRISONS, respondent. (L-30364) and IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS, JOSE LAVA, ET AL., petitioners. (L-30603)
Citation G.R. No. L-30364 & L-30603, July 28, 1969.
Facts Petitioners were detained for over eighteen (18) years pending trial. On May 16, 1969, the
Supreme Court convicted them of rebellion and sentenced them to ten (10) years'
imprisonment. The decision became final. Petitioners sought release via habeas corpus,
arguing that they had already served their ten-year sentence by combining the credit for one-
half of their preventive imprisonment (Art. 29, RPC) with Good Conduct Time Allowances
(GCTA) under Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), applied retroactively to the entire
period of their detention. The Director of Prisons opposed applying GCTA (Art. 97) to detention
prisoners.
Issue Whether Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides for time allowance for good
(Whether) conduct, is applicable to prisoners while they are still undergoing preventive detention
(detention prisoners).
Ruling No. The petitions were denied. The Court ruled that Article 97 applies only to a prisoner who is
serving sentence. The Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code governs, and the term "any
prisoner" in the English version of Article 97 corresponds to "el penado" in Spanish, meaning a
"convict" or one sentenced by final judgment. This interpretation is confirmed by harmonizing
Article 97 with Article 94 of the same Code, which states that good conduct allowances are
earned by the culprit "while he is serving his sentence" ("mientras este extinguiendo
sentencia"). Furthermore, the specific rule for detention prisoners is found in Section 5 of Act
1533 (the old GCTA law), which was not repealed by the RPC. Section 5 requires detention
prisoners to voluntarily offer in writing to perform labor to earn credit. Since petitioners did not
show they complied with this condition, they could not avail themselves of good conduct
benefits during detention.
Doctrine The principle of harmonization requires construing a code, enacted as a single
(Codification, comprehensive statute, as a whole, rather than as a series of disconnected articles. When
interpreting the Revised Penal Code, which was originally enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text
governs. Provisions must be read in pari materia (e.g., Article 97 must be read alongside Article
Revision, and 94) to ensure the proper meaning is derived from the legislative intent. Effect of Partial Repeal:
Repeal) If a codifying act (like the RPC, Article 367) expressly abrogates only certain sections of a prior
law (like Act 1533), the remaining sections of the prior law are deemed to subsist and form part
of the current law. Courts cannot change the law under the guise of interpretation; that function
belongs to Congress.
4.
Title LOURDES E. BENGZON, petitioner, vs. THE HON. DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR AMADO G.
INCIONG, and STA. INES-MELALE VENEER & PLYWOOD CORPORATION, respondents.
Citation G.R. Nos. L-48706-07, June 29, 1979.
Facts Petitioner Bengzon filed a complaint for illegal dismissal in 1975. The Labor Arbiter and the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) subsequently decided the case (in 1977 and
February 1978, respectively), awarding her backwages, separation pay, and P300,000.00 in
moral and exemplary damages. While the case was pending appeal before the Minister of
Labor, Presidential Decree No. 1367 was promulgated on May 1, 1978. PD 1367 amended
Article 217 of the Labor Code, withdrawing the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters over claims for
moral or other forms of damages. Citing PD 1367, the Deputy Minister of Labor affirmed the
award of backwages but set aside the award for damages due to lack of jurisdiction.
Issue Whether Presidential Decree No. 1367, which divested Labor Arbiters and the NLRC of
(Whether) jurisdiction over claims for moral damages, applies retroactively to set aside an award of
damages in a case already decided by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC prior to the Decree's
enactment.
Ruling No. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and directed the Deputy Minister of Labor to decide
the appeal on the question of moral and exemplary damages. The Court held that the Labor
Court had jurisdiction over the case at the time it was filed, heard, and decided, pursuant to
Article 217 of the Labor Code prior to its amendment. The rule is that jurisdiction already
obtained and exercised over a controversy is generally not affected by new legislation
placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. Since PD 1367 did not expressly
provide for retroactive effect concerning pending actions, it could not be applied to oust the
jurisdiction already attached and exercised by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
Doctrine Non-Retroactivity of Jurisdictional Statutes: Once a court or tribunal has acquired and is
(Statutory exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction is preserved until final determination.
Construction: A statute changing the jurisdiction of a court will not operate to affect cases that were pending
Amendment prior to its enactment unless the statute expressly provides or is construed to the effect that it
and is intended to operate retroactively on pending actions. To apply a subsequent jurisdictional
Jurisdiction) law to a pending case would "sanction split jurisdiction, which is prejudicial to the orderly
administration of justice".
5.
Title THE CITY OF DAVAO, CITY TREASURER AND THE CITY ASSESSOR OF DAVAO CITY,
Petitioners, vs. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XII, DAVAO CITY AND THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Respondent.
Citation G.R. No. 127383, August 18, 2005.
Facts The City of Davao issued Warrants of Levy and Notices of Public Auction for GSIS properties
due to non-payment of realty taxes for the years 1992 to 1994. The GSIS filed suit, claiming
exemption based on Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146 (Revised GSIS Act of 1977), as amended by
P.D. No. 1981. This provision stipulated that the GSIS tax exemption could only be withdrawn if
(1) Section 33 was expressly and categorically repealed by law, and (2) a provision was
enacted to substitute the declared policy of exemption as an essential factor for the fund's
solvency. The RTC upheld the GSIS exemption, concluding that the Local Government Code
(LGC) of 1992 (R.A. No. 7160) did not meet these two conditions. The City argued that the LGC,
particularly Sections 193 and 234, effectively withdrew all tax exemptions granted to
government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs), including GSIS.
Issue Whether the specific conditions imposed by Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended,
(Whether) restricting the mode of its future repeal, legally prevented the general withdrawal of tax
exemptions under the subsequent Local Government Code (R.A. 7160) from applying to the
GSIS.
Ruling No. The Supreme Court ruled that the GSIS tax exemptions were withdrawn by the Local
Government Code (LGC) during the contested period (1992–1994). The Court held that the
second paragraph of Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, which attempted to impose restrictions on
future repeal, was flawed because it placed an undue restraint on the plenary power of the
legislature. The legislature cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws.
Consequently, the express and unequivocal withdrawal of all tax exemptions for GOCCs, as
stated in Sections 193 and 234 of the LGC, applies without impediment to the GSIS, regardless
of the restrictions previously set in P.D. 1146.
Doctrine Prohibition on Irrepealable Laws: It is a basic precept and an implied substantive limitation
(Statutory on legislative powers that a legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws. Restraint on Future
Construction: Legislatures: A legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It
Legislative cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent
Power and legislation upon existing statutes. Codification and Withdrawal of Exemptions:
Repeal) Comprehensive statutes, like the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1992, which implement a
fundamental constitutional policy (local autonomy), can withdraw prior statutory exemptions
granted even by special laws (like P.D. 1146) through explicit general provisions (Sections 193
and 234). Tax Exemption Construction: Any tax exemption, incentive, or relief shall be
construed strictly against the person claiming it.
6.
Title LUCAS RAMIREZ and ENCARNACION FAJARDO RAMIREZ, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Citation G.R. No. L-23587-88, June 10, 1976.
Facts On December 9, 1949, the Central Bank (CB), pursuant to the Central Bank Act (RA 265),
issued Circular No. 20, subjecting all foreign exchange transactions to prior licensing to
protect the international reserve. Subsequently, Circular No. 44 (effective July 1, 1953) required
new importers to submit certified documents (Balance Sheets, P&L Statements, etc.). Between
late 1953 and May 1954, petitioners, the Ramirez spouses, allegedly conspired to submit
falsified documents on behalf of illiterate "importers" (Salustia Lasin and Natalia Caparaz) to
secure dollar allocations. The spouses were charged and convicted by the CFI and CA for
falsification of public, official and/or commercial documents under Section 172, paragraph
1, of the Revised Penal Code. While the case was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals, the
CB issued Circular No. 133 on January 21, 1962, which lifted and abolished the foreign
exchange controls, dispensing with the need for prior specific licensing for the sale of foreign
exchange.
Issue Whether the subsequent repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 20 by Circular No. 133, which
(Whether) abolished the requirement of specific licensing and the submission of supporting documents,
extinguished the petitioners' criminal liability for the crime of falsification of those documents
committed prior to the repeal.
Ruling Yes. The Supreme Court acquitted the petitioners (reversing the conviction due to failure to
achieve the required majority vote for conviction under the Rules of Court, specifically Rule
125, Section 3). The majority opinion held that Circular 133 repealed Circular 20 because they
were diametrically opposed (restriction vs. free market). Although the Revised Penal Code on
falsification (Art. 172) was not repealed, the repeal of Circular 20 wiped away the legal
obligation of applicants to disclose the truth in the required papers. Since the "root cause" of
the falsification (the legal requirement imposed by Circular 20) was removed, the offense
arising out of the violation of that circular "has no more leg to stand on". An appellate court
must dispose of a question according to the law prevailing at the time of the disposition, and a
judgment dependent on a repealed statute must be set aside.
Doctrine Effect of Repeal on Underlying Requirement: Where a criminal offense (like falsification) is
(Statutory predicated upon the violation of, or derived from the existence of a legal requirement imposed
Construction: by, a subsequent administrative regulation or special law, the absolute repeal of that
Repeal and underlying regulation or law may extinguish the criminal liability for the offense, even if the
Criminal primary statute (like the Revised Penal Code) remains in force. Appellate Review based on
Liability) Supervening Law: When a judgment is suspended by appeal, the appellate court must be
governed by the existing law when its decision is rendered. If a statute or regulation necessary
to support the judgment of the lower court has been withdrawn by absolute repeal, the
judgment must be reversed.
7.
Title JANUARIO JALANDONI, petitioner, vs. HON. VICTORIANO H. ENDAYA, in his capacity as
Municipal Judge of the Municipal Court of Batangas, Province of Batangas, and SERAFIN D.
CRUZ, respondents.
Citation G.R. No. L-23894, January 24, 1974.
Facts Petitioner Jalandoni filed a criminal complaint for libel in the Municipal Court of Batangas. After
the preliminary examination, the respondent Municipal Judge insisted on setting the case for
trial on the merits. Petitioner argued that under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
jurisdiction over written defamation cases belongs exclusively to the Court of First Instance
(CFI). The respondent Judge argued that he had concurrent jurisdiction because the
subsequent law, Republic Act No. 3828 (an amendment to the Judiciary Act, Section 87),
conferred concurrent jurisdiction on municipal judges in provincial capitals for offenses
punishable by prision correccional or less (which libel falls under), thereby impliedly repealing
Article 360 of the RPC.
Issue Whether the general provision in Republic Act No. 3828 (amending the Judiciary Act, granting
(Whether) concurrent jurisdiction to municipal judges in capital towns) impliedly repealed the specific
provision of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which vests exclusive jurisdiction over libel
cases in the Court of First Instance.
Ruling No. The Supreme Court granted the writ of prohibition, holding that the Municipal Court lacked
jurisdiction. Article 360 of the RPC is a specific provision granting exclusive jurisdiction over
libel to the CFI, which leaves no room for interpretation. The general grant of concurrent
jurisdiction under RA 3828 does not impliedly repeal the specific jurisdictional requirements of
Article 360. Furthermore, the legislature reiterated the specific rule for libel jurisdiction in the
subsequent amendment (RA 4363, approved in 1965).
Doctrine Repeals by Implication are Not Favored: Repeals by implication will not be declared unless it
(Statutory is manifest that the legislature so intended, requiring a showing of "repugnancy clear and
Construction: convincing in character". Generalibus Specialibus Non Derogant (General does not derogate
Repeal by from the specific): A subsequent statute that is general in character (like RA 3828 conferring
Implication general concurrent jurisdiction) is not construed as repealing a special or specific enactment
and Specific (like Article 360 governing jurisdiction solely for libel) unless the legislative intent to repeal is
vs. General manifest. In cases of irreconcilable conflict, the specific provision controls.
Law)