267

Chapter VI

NO-SOUL OR NO-EGO (ANATTA)

Anatta is the pāḷi word consisting of a negative prefix, an meaning is not,

plus atta (Sanskrit ātman), soul and is most literally translated as no-soul. The

word atta, however, has a wide range of meanings and some of those meanings

cross over into the fields of psychology, philosophy and everyday terminology, as

for example, when atta can mean self, being, ego, and personality. There are two

pāḷi forms of the word, namely, attā (attanā) and atta (attena). Neither form seems

to be used in the plural in the Tipiṭaka. In the texts and the commentaries the words

attā and atta are used in several senses: (1) chiefly meaning one-self or one own,

e.g., "attahitāya paṭipanno no parahitāya - acting in one own interest, not in the

interests of others or attanāva katam sādhu - what is done by one own self is

good", (2) meaning one own person, the personality, including both body and

mind, e.g., in attabhāva (life), attapaṭilābha (birth in some form of life) and (3)

self, as a subtle metaphysical entity, soul, e.g., atthi me attā (do I have a soul?),

"sunnam idam attena vā attaniyena vā - this is void of a self or anything to do with

a self" etc. It is with the third meaning that we are here concerned, the entity that is

conceived and sought and made the subject of a certain class of views called in

early Buddhist texts attadiṭṭhi, attānudiṭṭhi (self-views, heresy of self) and

attagāha (misconception regarding self).

Most scholars in the field of religion, when writing about soul or anatta

specifically, use the terms self, ego, being and soul interchangeably while

psychologists define those terms as totally different entities. If we define atta as

including the terms of self, ego, personality and being, we may make the mistake

of claiming that Buddha denied the phenomena of individual differences,

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individual personalities, individual kamma and other features of individuality in

people. But if we say that Buddha denied only the theological entity of a soul,

while leaving intact a psychological entity such as an ego or self, then we are also

mistaken.

In most systems of religion or philosophy the question of the nature of man

and his destiny centers largely in the doctrine of the soul, which has been variously

defined. Some call it the principle of thought and action in man or that which

thinks, wills and feels, knows and sees and, also, that which appropriates and own.

It is that which both acts and initiates action. Generally speaking, it is conceived as

a perdurable entity, the permanent unchanging factor within the concrete

personality, which somehow unites and maintains its successive activities. It is,

also, the subject of conscious spiritual experience. It has, in addition to strong

religious associations and various further implications, such as being independent

of the body, immaterial and eternal.1

What has been said above regarding systems of philosophy holds true about

the history of thought in India also. The Sanskrit word ātaman, of which atta is the

pāḷi counterpart, is found in the earliest Vedic hymns, though its derivation and

meaning are [Link] is sometimes held to have meant breath, but breath in the

sense of life, or what might be called self or soul in modern usage. Thus, the sun is

called the atman of all that moves or stands still and the soma drink is said to be

the ātman of the sacrifice. This atta was something that could leave the body and

return and in that connection man was used as a synonym. Such conceptions,

coming down from the earliest times, were continued in later systems such as those

found in the Upanisads.2

1
Encyclopedia of Buddhism, Vols. I, Op. Cit., P. 567.
2
The Upanishads, F. Manchester & S. Prabhavananda, New York: Mentor, 1957, P. 58.
 269

Very briefly stated that the old Indian religion was a kind of pantheism with

Brahman (eternal, absolute, etc.) as the first cause of the universe. The

manifestation of Brahman was sometimes personified and called Brahmā (God or

the Great self). Every human being had in him a part of Brahman, called atman or

the little self. Brahman and atman were one and the same substance. Salvation

consisted in the little ātman entering into unity with Brahman. The atman was an

eternal substance, exempt from the vicissitude of change and incapable of entering

into combination with anything else except itself.

In process of time, however, various theories grew up regarding the

ātman, many of these are to be found in the Brahmajāla-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya

which is assumed to contain the whole of what is possible to assert concerning the

self (atta) and the universe, treated from every point of view such as positively,

negatively and both. Thus, some doctrines set forth that the self and the universe

are eternal (sassata-vāda). Some hold that the self and the universe are in some

respects eternal and in some not. Some teachers wriggle like eels and refuse to give

a clear answer. Some assert that the self and the universe have arisen without a

cause (adhicca-samuppanna). These are theories concerned mainly with the origin

of the self.

There are others dealing with its future destiny. Some hold that the soul

exists as a conscious entity after death, others that it exists but is unconscious.

Then, there are those who say that the individual ceases to exist after death and is

annihilated (uccheda-vāda). This annihilation is further elaborated by stating that it

may take place: (1) with the death of the body, (2) with the death of the divine

ātaman in the world of sense (kāma-loka), (3) in the world of form (rūpa-loka), (4)

in one of the stages of the formless world (arūpa-loka). Whether all these doctrines

were in actual existence or whether any of them were only possibilities added to
 270

make the net complete is not certain. Some of them can be identified with the

actual teaching of certain schools of philosophy, but not all.

The resolution of this dilemma lays in the fact that we must deal with

two levels of reality simultaneously, the ultimate level and the conventional level.

In the absolute sense, the anatta doctrine denies any and all psychological entities

or agents inside the person. In the absolute sense, all phenomena, including what is

called a person, are composed of elements, forces and a stream of successive

states. The Buddha organized these phenomena into conceptual groups, known as

khandhas (aggregates) and they are: (1) material processes, also known as bodily

form, corporeality or matter, (2) feeling, (3) perception, (4) mental formations and

(5) consciousness. Most importantly, when all mental and physical phenomena are

analyzed into those elements, no residual entity, such as a soul, self, or ego can be

found. In short, there are actions executed by these groups, but no actor. The

workings of these groups of forces and elements appear to us as an ego or

personality, but in reality, the ego or self or agent of the actions has only an

illusory existence.

However, on the conventional level, the working of these forces, elements

and states are organized by causal laws and although they in no way constitute

any extra-phenomenal self or soul, they do produce a human individual, a person,

if we want to call a certain combination of material and mental processes a person.

This complex combination of material and processes especially the continuity

of kamma which is the process of ethical volitions and the results of those

volitions. Thus individual differences are accounted for even though the self or ego

or personality is, in the ultimate sense, denied. An individual may be an angry,

hot-tempered person, for example, because in the past he or she has performed

actions which leave conditions for traits, which are kamma results, to arise in the
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present. But this happens because kamma leaves a potential for those traits of anger

and ill will to arise, not because of any kind of self of the person is continuing.

Actually, the human individual does not remain the same for two consecutive

moments; everything is succession of forces and elements, and there is nothing

substantial. Therefore, on the conventional level, we may say that individual

differences have an illusory existence. Common everyday conceptions, such as

ego, self and personality, seem to be very real, obvious and well-defined by

psychologists and laymen alike, but they are, not the absolute level and in the eyes

of those who have achieved enlightenments, illusory.

The definition of soul (atta), spirit given in the Abingdon Dictionary of

Living Religions is as follows: that which gives life to any animate thing; or the

inner, essential, or non-corporeal part or dimension of any animate thing; or a

non-corporeal but animate substance or entity; or a non-corporeal but individuated

personal being.1

Another definition of soul comes from Richard Kennedy in The

International Dictionary of Religion: many religions teach that man is composed of

a physical body, which does not survive death and an eternal, invisible core which

is the true self or soul.2

Donald Watson, in A Dictionary of Mind and Spirit, writes, in the entry

soul: it goes by many names: Sīva (Jain), ātaman (Hindu), monad, ego, self, higher

self, over self, elusive self, psyche, or even mind.3

In these non-Buddhist definitions of soul, we see many terms interchanged,

such as core, ego and essence. Two Buddhist definitions of atta are here given. The

1
Abingdon Dictionary of Living Religions, Crim, K. (Ed.), Nashville: 1981, P. 699.
2
The International Dictionary of Religion, Kennedy, R. (Ed.), New York, Crossroads, 1984, P. 177.
3
A Dictionary of Mind and Spirit, Watson, D, London: Andre Deutsch, 191, P. 314.
 272

first is from Ñānatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary: anything that in the ultimate sense

could be regarded as a self-existing, real ego-entity, soul or any other abiding

substance.1

In The Truth of anatta, Dr. G.P Malalasekera states that atta is self, as a

subtle metaphysical entity, soul.2 These definitions also cover a wide range of

meanings of the term atta and of the usual translations of atta as soul and self. The

above definitions of atta soul sometimes cross over into the realm of psychology

when the authors define soul as self, ego, psyche or mind. Did the Buddha deny

that such conceptions as ego and self are real when He proclaimed the anatta

doctrine? The answer depends on whether we are speaking of absolute or

conventional reality. But first we have to examine some definitions from

psychology to see what was actually denied both implicitly and explicitly by the

anatta doctrine.

According to the Dictionary of Psychology, self is: (1) the individual as a

conscious being, (2) the ego or I and (3) the personality or organization of traits.3

The definition of ego is the self, particularly the individual conception of himself.4

Personality is defined as the dynamic organization within the individual of those

psychophysical systems that determine his characteristic behavior and thought.5

Another definition of personality is that which permits a prediction of what a

person will do in a given situation.6 These psychological terms correspond to some

of the terms used in Buddhism to deal with the conventional life of sentient beings.

They have a useful purpose as labels, but in the ultimate sense, these labels are, as

we shall see, mere designations which have only an illusory reality.

1
Buddhist Dictionary, Ñānatiloka, Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1980, P. 14.
2
The Truth of Anatta, Malalasekera, G. P, Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1966, P. 2.
3
Dictionary of Psychology, J. P. Chaplin, New York: Dell, 1975, P. 476.
4
Ibid, P. 165.
5
Ibid, PP. 380-381.
6
Ibid, P. 381.
 273

In pāḷi, we have the terms satta, puggala, jīva and atta to describe the

conventional psychology of beings. Satta, according to Ñānatiloka, means living

being.1Puggala means individual, person, as well as the synonyms: personality,

individuality, being (satta), self (atta).2Jīva is life, vital principle and individual

soul.3

Some uses of atta also fall within the realm of psychology. Atta can mean,

according to Dr. Malalasekera, one self or one own, e.g. "attahitāya paṭipanno no

parahitāya - acting in one own interest, not in the interest of others or attanāva

katam sādhu - what is done by one self is good". Atta can also mean one own

person, the personality, including body and mind, e.g. in attabhava (life),

attapatilābha (birth in some form of life).4

Pāḷi has some terms which correspond to the psychological notions of

traits. For example, the concept of nature or character is called carita.5 Using

this term, we can speak of different types of persons. For example, we may

describe a person as rāga-carita (greedy-natured), dosa-carita (hateful-natured),

moha-carita (dull-natured), saddhā-carita (faithful-natured), buddha-carita

(intelligent-natured) and vitakka-carita (ruminating-natured) six types altogether.

Different people are at different stages of development, according to their

kamma.

Buddhism does not deny that such conceptions of individuality have

validity, but they have validity only in the conventional sense. Dr. Malalasekera

writes: Buddhism has no objection to the use of the words atta, or satta, or

puggala to indicate the individual as a whole, or to distinguish one person from

1
Buddhist Dictionary, Op. Cit., P. 196.
2
Ibid, P. 170.
3
Ibid, P. 85.
4
The Truth of Anatta, Op. Cit., P. 1.
5
Buddhist Dictionary, Op. Cit., P. 46
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another, where such distinction is necessary, especially as regards such things as

memory and kamma which are private and personal and where it is necessary to

recognize the existence of separate lines of continuity (santāna). But, even so,

these terms should be treated only as labels, binding-conceptions and conventions

in language, assisting economy in thought and word and nothing more. Even the

Buddha uses them sometimes: these are worldly usages, worldly terms of

communication, worldly descriptions, by which a Tathāgata communicates without

misapprehending them.1

Ñānatiloka adds to this idea when writing about the term satta: this term,

just like atta, puggala, jīva and all other terms denoting ego-entity, is to be

considered as a merely conventional term (vohāra-vacana), not possessing any

reality value.2

All of the various conceptions of psychology and religion regarding a self

or souls of any kind were indeed denied existence in the ultimate sense by the

Buddha. But we may use terms such as self and ego to describe a particular

arrangement of the five khandhas (aggregates) which give illusory appearance of

an individual. As sister Vajirā, an arahant at the time of the Buddha, said: when all

constituent parts are there, the designation cart is used; just so, where the five

groups exist, of living being do we speak.3

Understanding of Anatta
The anatta doctrine is one of the most important teachings of Buddhism. It

is the most distinctive feature of Buddhism, for as many scholars have recognized,

it makes Buddhism different from all other religions. Scholars write that all other

religions accept the existence of some kind of spiritual, metaphysical or

1
The Truth of Anatta, Op. Cit., PP. 24-25.
2
Buddhist Dictionary, Op. Cit., P. 196.
3
Ibid, P. 98.
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psychological entity or agent or being inside and, in some cases, simultaneously

outside of sentient beings. That is, most religions accept the existence of a soul or

self.

But, whatever are the theories enunciated by various scholars or thinkers

regarding the self before the day of Buddha, during His life-time and thereafter, it

would seem correct to say that the Buddhist teaching of anatta or non-self

contradicts them all in an all-embracing sweep. The Buddha made no concessions

at all to the doctrine of self. He denied the view that there is in man a ātman or a

self that is permanent and unchanging, possessed of bliss and autonomous. He

denied equally emphatically that at death man is utterly destroyed. He denied that

man is divine, but he said that man should and could become divine, by good

thoughts, good words and good deeds. Man, in Buddhism, is a concrete, living,

striving creature and his personality is something that changes, evolves and grows,

a composite, existent and changing. It is the concrete man, not the transcendental

self that ultimately achieves perfection by constant effort and creative will.

The Buddhist argument against the doctrine of ātman is two fold. In the

first place the Buddha takes various aspects of the personality and contends that

none of them can be identified with the ātman, since they do not have the

characteristics of the ātman. Thus, the question is asked (e.g., is the body or the

physical personality) permanent or impermanent? The answer is: It is

impermanent. Is what is impermanent sorrowful or happy? It is sorrowful. Of what

is impermanent, sorrowful and liable to change, is it proper to regard it as this is

mine, this I am and this is my soul? It is not.1 That is not self in the sense that it has

no core (sāra).

1
Mijjhima-nikāya-Pāḷi, Yangon: Department of Religious Affairs, 1993, P. 232.
 276

The same argument is repeated for the other aspects of the personality such

as feeling (vedanā), perception (sannā), dispositions or tendencies (sankhāra) and

consciousness (vinnāṇa). A similar procedure is attributed to Pajāpati in the

Chāndogya Upanisad but there is a very great difference in the attitude of the two

questioners. Prajāpati assumes the existence of an ātman and when he fails to

identify it with any of the aspects of the personality, continues to assume that it

must exist within it, somewhere, somehow, in spite of its failure to show up in a

purely empirical investigation. The Buddha, on the other hand, accepts the

definition of the ātman, without assuming its existence or non-existence and when

the empirical investigation fails to reveal any such atman, he concludes that no

such ātman exists because there is no evidence for its existence.1

The second argument of the Buddha is that belief in a permanent self

would negate the usefulness of the moral life. In the first discourse, the

Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, given after His enlightenment, the Buddha set out

the Four Noble Truths. In the second, the Anattakakkhaṇa, He stated the

characteristics of His doctrine of the not-self (anatta). Here He begins by

emphasizing that if there were a self it should be autonomous, but no such thing is

to be found. Matter (rūpa) is not the self. Were matter self, then the body would

not be subject to affliction, one should be able to say to it let my body be thus, let

my body be not thus. But, this is not possible; the body is shifting and ever in

change and, therefore, ever accompanied by misery and affliction. Accordingly, it

cannot be the self. The same is repeated for the other aspects of the personality.

The conclusion is, therefore, reached that all these things, whether past, future or

presently arisen, in oneself or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or

near, are all to be viewed thus: this is not mine, this is not what I am, this is not

1
The Upanishads, Op. Cit., Ch. Viii, P. 12.
 277

myself. Then it is added, when a man realizes that all these things are not the self,

He turns away from them and by the extinction of desire He attains release. Here

we find for the first time indication of the purpose of Buddha in enunciating His

doctrine. All misery, in His view, arises from the delusion of self which causes

man to strive to profit himself and to injure others. The most effective therapeutic

against the folly of seeing to gratify longings is the realization that there is no truth

in the doctrine of a permanent self.1

The Mahānidāna Sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya puts the argument in a different

way. Here, three hypotheses are selected for investigation. The first is that the self

is feeling (vedanā). It is argued that feelings are threefold: pleasant, painful and

neutral. They are impermanent; they are products and certain to pass away. If,

when a pleasant feeling exists, the conclusion is drawn this is myself then, when a

painful feeling supersedes it, one must conclude myself has passed away. To call,

therefore, feeling that self is to regard self as impermanent, blended of happiness

and pain and liable to begin and end. The second hypothesis is that the self is

neither feeling nor is insentient, i.e., the soul and the body are identical. This would

mean that where there is no feeling it is impossible to say I am, for a self without

self-reference has no meaning. Thirdly, the self is regarded as not identical with

feeling, but as possessing feeling. If so, were feeling of every kind to cease

absolutely, then there being no feeling whatever, no one could say I myself am.2

There are many such variations in the presentation of the doctrine. Thus,

what is conditioned by not-self cannot be self. Matter is by not self. The cause and

condition for the arising of matter are not self, so, it is asked, how could matter

which is brought into being by what is not self, be self. Or, again, here someone

1
Encyclopedia of Buddhism, Op. Cit., P. 570.
2
Dīgha-nikāya (The Long Discourse), Vols. II, Yangon: Department of Religious Affairs,
1997, P. 66.
 278

view is this: this is self, this is the world. After death I shall be permanent,

everlasting. Then he hears the true doctrine, for the exhaustion of craving, for

cessation, for extinction (nibbāna or nirvāna). Then he thinks: so, I shall be

annihilated, so, I shall be lost, so, I shall be no more. Then he sorrows and laments.

That is how there is anguish about what is non-existent in oneself.1

Some shrink back in that way from the truth, but some go too far the other

way. Being ashamed and disgusted with being (bhava) they relish the idea of

non-being (vibhava), saying: when this self is annihilated on the dissolution of the

body after death that is peace that is the supreme goal that is reality. But one who

has eyes sees how what is (bhūta) has come to be and by so doing practices the

way to dispassion for it.2

In certain discourses the doctrine is very succinctly stated, thus the eye (ear,

nose, tongue, body and mind and their six external objects) is impermanent; what

is impermanent is fraught with sorrow; what is fraught with sorrow is not self or,

all is not self. And, what is the all that is not self? The eye is not self, etc.; or,

again, all things (dhamma) are not self, it is worth nothing that whereas in the

case of the two characteristics anicca (impermanence) and dukkha (affliction)

it is the sankhāra (all component things) that are so described. In the case of the

third characteristic anatta (not-self) all dhamma, i.e., everything, without

exception, is so descried. This is because even nibbāna, which being asankhata

(uncompounded) is not a sankhāra, is also without self.3

In all the statements attributed to the Buddha regarding the doctrine of not-

self there is complete consistency. When, for instance, he is asked who, in the

absence of a self, it that has feeling or other sensations is, his answer is that there is

1
Mijjhima-nikāya, Vol. I, Op. Cit., P. 133.
2
Ibid, PP. 43-44.
3
Saṁyutta-nikāya, Vols. IV, Op. Cit., P. 28.
 279

no one who feels, but there is feeling, which is a totally different proposition.

Similarly, it is not correct to ask who becomes old, who dies and who is reborn.

There is old age, there is death and rebirth.1 Indeed, if any assertion can be made

about a self, it would be more correct to call the body the self because, whereas the

body may endure as long as a hundred years, the mind in all its forms is in constant

flux, like an ape in a forest which seizes one branch only to let it go and grasp

another.2

The doctrine of not-self is a necessary corollary to the teaching of

impermanence. Since all things are impermanent, they are fraught with sorrow, and

since bliss is the characteristic of the self, they are without self. Thus, there is no

self in things. This is one interpretation of the three characteristic (ti-lakkhaṇa).

Another is that all things being impermanent, they are fraught with suffering

because they are without self, in as much as they are not autonomous. Existence is

nothing but existence depending on a series of conditions; hence their existence is

a conditional one and there is nothing in the universe that is permanent, i.e.,

independent of conditions. All things, matter and mind (nāma and rūpa), have no

abiding self-reality. What appears to be real is a temporary existence, an instant in

a conditional sequence, the effect of two or more conditions combined.

This is rather dramatically expressed in a conversation between Māra (the

Evil One) and the nun Vajirā. By who is the person (satta) produced, asks Māra.

Who is the creator of the person? Where is the person who comes into being?

Where is the person who disappears? The Vajirā points out to him that there is no

such thing as a person but merely a collection of changing aggregates (khandhas)

and she illustrates her meaning by the simile of the chariot which is merely the

1
Saṁyutta-nikāya, Vols. II, Op. Cit., P. 62.
2
Ibid, P. 94.
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name for a collection of various parts.1 In the Milindapanhā, the illustration is

elaborated in great detail and it is pointed out that when a person is indicated by

giving him a name, it does not denote a soul but is merely an appellation for the

five aggregates which constitute the empirical individual.2

Several Scholar's Conceptions of Anatta

According to several conception of anatta from several scholars, Donald

Watson writes: of the world major religions, only Buddhism denies or is agnostic

about the existence of a soul.3 Another scholar, Richard Kennedy writes: according

to others religions, each soul will be judged as at the end of the world. It is the soul

which will determine whether the individual is punished by hell or rewarded by

eternal life in heaven. Buddhism teaches that there is no such thing as a soul or

true, permanent self.4The Encyclopedia Americana writes: in Buddhism there is no

per-during or surviving self, such as the ātman. Meditation leads to the awareness

that the idea of self, or ātman, is mere illusion.5 In A Dictionary of Comparative

Religion, the teaching of the existence of the soul is traced through every major

religion throughout history: primitive animistic, Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Hebrew

Greek religion in Homeric, Orphic, Pythagorean and Platonic versions; Hindu,

Zoroastrian, Chinese, Muslim, Japanese and Christian. But as the writers state,

Buddhism in its classic form rejected the Hindu concept of ātman as the essential

immortal self.6

As we can see, Buddhism is the only major religion that denies the

existence of a metaphysical entity which is usually called a self or soul. Buddhism

1
Saṁyutta-nikāya, Vol. I, Op. Cit., P. 134.
2
The Question of King Milinda, (Tr.) Rhys Davids, London: Pāli Text Society, 1890, P. 25.
3
A Dictionary of Mind and Spirit, Op. Cit., 314.
4
The International Dictionary of Religion, Op. Cit., P. 177.
5
The Encyclopedia Americana, Soul, Vol. 25, Danbury, Connecticut: Grolier, Inc., 1990, P. 236.
6
A Dictionary of Comparative Religion, S. G. F. Brandon, (Ed.), New York: Scribner’s, 1970,
PP. 587-88.
 281

is also divided into two major schools, Theravāda and Mahāyāna, which have, in

some case, major differences. But both schools adhere to the anatta doctrine. H.

Von Glasenapp writes: the negation of an imperishable atman is the common

characteristic of all dogmatic systems of the lesser as well as the great vehicle and,

there is, therefore, no reason to assume the Buddhist tradition which is in complete

agreement on this point has deviated from the original teaching of Buddha.1

Although the anatta doctrine is so important, so distinctive, and supposedly

so universally accepted by Buddhists, it is still the most misunderstood, the most

misinterpreted, and the most distorted of all the teachings of the Buddha. Some

scholars who have written on Buddhism had a great respect for the Buddha, liked

His teachings, revered Him and honored Him, but they could not imagine that such

a profound thinker had actually denied the existence of a soul.

Consequently, they have tried to find apparent loopholes in the teachings

through which they have tried to insert the affirmation of atta by the Buddha.

For example, two modern scholars, Ananda K. Coomaraswanmy and I. [Link],

in their book, The Living Thoughts of Gotama the Buddha, have devoted much of

the book to the idea that Buddha taught a doctrine of two selves, the great self,

spelled with upper case to signify the spiritual self or soul and a small self, the

personal ego, spelled with a lower case. They claim that Buddha denied only this

personal self or ego when He spoke of anatta. These scholars base their ideas on

mistranslations of Pāḷi terms.2

Another scholar, John Blofeld, also claims that Buddha was really teaching

a doctrine of two selves, one true self or soul and one false personal self or ego.

1
Vedanta and Buddhism: The Middle Way, H. von Glasenapp, London: The Buddhist Society,
1957, P. 154.
2
The Living of Thoughts of Gotama the Buddha, A. Coomaraswanmy and I. [Link], London: Cassell,
1984, P. 24.
 282

Notice in the following how he must clarify that the Zen doctrine of self or one

mind is not in reality the ātman of the Brahmins: the doctrine of atman has always

been the center of Buddhist controversy. There is no doubt that Gautama Buddha

made it one of the central points of His teaching, but the interpretations of it are

various. The Theravādins interpret it not only as no-self, but also as no-self,

thereby denying man both an ego and all participation in something of the nature

of universal spirit or the one mind. The Mahāyānists accept the interpretation of

egoless-ness, holding that the real self is none other than that indescribable non-

entity, the one mind; something far less of an entity than the ātman of the

Brahmins.1

The universal spirit, one mind and self which John Blofeld finds within the

anatta doctrine are really an ātman, an atta, of a finer substance, less of an entity,

as he says, but nevertheless an ātman. These ideas of atta are therefore in conflict

with the anattā doctrine of the Buddha. As mentioned before, most Mahāyānists

accept the doctrine of anatta, but late scholars of Mahāyāna, such as the Chinese

Zen of which John Blofeld writes, may have drifted into a soul like theory.2

The controversy over the anatta doctrine seems to be based on a deep fear

of the denial of the existence of a soul. People are often much attached to their

lives, so they like to believe that there exists something everlasting, eternal and

permanent inside them. When someone comes along and tells them that there is

nothing permanent in them, nothing by which they will continue eternally, such as

a soul, they may become frightened. They wonder what will become of them in the

future; they have the fear of extinction. Buddha understood this, as we can see in

1
The Zen Teaching of Huang Po, J. (Ed.), Blofeld, London: The Buddhist Society, 1958, P. 109.
2
Ibid, P. 110.
 283

the story of Vacchagotta, who, like many other people, way frightened and

confused by the anatta doctrine.1

When the Buddha remained silent asking by Vacchagotta, Buddha

explained that He knew that Vacchagotta was very confused in His thinking about

atta and that if He were to respond that there does exist atta, then He would be

expounding the eternalist view, the eternal soul theory, with which He did not

agree. But if He were to say that atta did not exist, then Vacchagotta might think

that He was expounding the annihilationist view, the view that a person is nothing

but a psychophysical organism which will be completely annihilated at death.

Since this later view denies kamma, rebirth and dependent origination,

Buddha did not agree with this. Buddha teaches, in fact, that people are reborn with

paṭisandhi (relinking consciousness) a rebirth consciousness which does not

transmigrate from the previous existence, but which comes into existence by

means of conditions included in the previous existences, conditions such as

kamma. Thus a reborn person is not the same as the one who has died, nor is the

reborn person entirely different from the one who has died. Most importantly, no

metaphysical entity, no soul and no kind of spiritual self-continue from one

existence to another in teaching of Buddha.

But this teaching was too difficult for Vacchagotta, and Buddha wanted to

wait for a time when Vacchagotta would mature in intellect. Buddha was not a

computer who gave automatic answers to every question. He taught according to

the circumstances and temperaments of the people, for their benefit. As it

happened, Vacchagotta advanced spiritually through vipassanā (insight)

meditation, which allowed him to realize the suffering, impermanent, and no-soul

1
Saṁyutta-nikāya, (Tr.) Rhys Davids, Vols. IV, London: Pāḷi Text Society, 1980, P. 400.
 284

nature of all things, and he later became an Arahant. Unfortunately, this story is

used by some scholars to try to prove that Buddha did not really deny the existence

of atta.1

Here examine the ideas contained in the term atta, before Buddha appeared

in this world, Brahmanism, which was later to be called Hinduism, prevailed in

India. Brahmanism teaches the doctrine of the existence of atta or ātman, which is

usually translated as soul or self. When Buddha appeared He claimed that there

is no ātman. This doctrine was so important the Buddha proclaimed it only five

days after His first sermon, the sermon on For Noble Truths. The five disciples

who heard that first sermon became stream winners (sotāpannas) it means persons

who have attained the first stage of enlightenment. Five days later, Buddha

assembled the five disciples and taught them the anatta doctrine. By the end of that

Sutta, all five became Arahants, person who have attained the highest stage of

enlightenment.

What is this atta which the Buddha negated? The word anatta is a

combination of two words (an + atta). 'An' means not or no, and atta is usually has

a wide translated as soul or self. But atta has a wide range of meanings. These

terms are discussed in two famous books of Hindu scripture, the Upanishads2 and

the Bhagavad Gīta3. Many views of atta are also found in the Buddhist

Brahmajāla Sutta4. Atta is the inner core of anything. The inner core of a tree is the

hardest part and thus the core of something can imply permanency. The core may

also imply the best part of something, the part which is the essence, the part which

1
The Truth of anatta, Op. Cit., P. 24.
2
The Upanishads, F. Manchester & S. Prabhavananda, New York: Mentor, 1957.
3
An Anthology of Indian Literature, J. B. Alphonso Karkala, Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971.
4
Dīghanikāya (Long Discourses of the Buddha), Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1999.
 285

is pure, real, beautiful and enduring. The idea of atta as the core of things is found

in the Chandogya and Brihadaranyaka Upanishads.1

Another implication of atta is that if authority. Authority is the ability to

make others follow orders. If anything is to be called atta, it must have the power

to exercise authority over the nature of things, as stated in the Kena Upanishad.2

In addition, atta is not subject to any other authority, it is the highest authority

(sayaṁvasī) one who is his own master. It is like a Lord or owner (sāmī). Atta

is the Lord of ourselves.3 It is distinct from ourselves and abides in ourselves.

It is the dweller (nivāsī) which is not part of the five aggregates. Atta is also the

agent of actions, a doer (kāraka) and it is atta which actually does everything,

good or bad. Atta is that by which we act, that by which we enjoy or suffer. In

ignorance we identify ourselves with the body and ego, forgetting that we are

really atta. When we do something, it is really at the command of atta, but we

ignorantly believe that we as individuals actually control our lives. Atta is thus a

director and an experiencer.4

Another meaning of atta is that of soul, a spiritual entity inside of all

people. The soul, called ātman in Hindu scriptures, is the individual self and it is

identical with the universal self, the Supreme Being, called Brahman. Ātman

resides in everyone and in very living being. Like Brahman, ātman is eternal.

When the body dies, ātman moves to another body and makes the body its new

home. In this way, it moves from one body to another, discarding the worn-out

body and taking a new one. Liberation is, according to Hinduism, the realization

1
The Upanishads, Chaps. IX-X, Ibid.
2
Ibid, Chaps. III.
3
Brihadaranyaka Upanishad , Chap. X.
4
The Mundaka Taittiriya & Svetasvatara Upanishads, Chaps. V, VII & XII.
 286

that ātman is identical with the universal ātman or Brahma, or that the individual

ātman is part of Brahman.1

Buddha denied the ātman theory. According to Buddha, there is nothing we

can call an inner core which is eternal and blissful. There is also nothing we can

call upon to exercise authority over the nature of things. In Buddhism, there is no

doer apart from doing and no experiencer apart from the experiencing. There is

nothing or no one which is omnipotent because everything is at the mercy of the

constant creation and dissolution of conditioned things.

Buddha taught that there are only five aggregates (khandhas): (1)

Corporeality (material process, or form), (2) Feelings, (3) Perceptions, (4) Mental

Formations and (5) Consciousness. Less specifically, we may say that there are

only two groups of phenomena in this existence: mind and matter; nāma and rūpa.

Apart from mind and matter, there exists nothing whatsoever that we can call atta.

The only thing that exists outside of the realm of nāma and rūpa is the

unconditioned (asankhata) nibbāna, absolute truth, but, even nibbāna is anatta.

Buddha taught that, for us, there are only the five aggregates. We are a

compound of five aggregates, when we analyze and observe them one by one with

the deep insight meditation, we will realize that there remains nothing: no soul, no

self, apart from the aggregates. The combination of the five aggregates is what we

call a person, a being, a man or a woman. There is nothing apart from the five

aggregates which are interacting and dependent upon each other. No director, no

doer, no experiencer and no essence can be found. Atta is merely an idea which has

no corresponding reality whatsoever.

1
An Anthology of Indian Literature, Op. Cit., P. 2.
 287

In the Sutta1, a story of a very famous ascetic-scholar named Saccaka. One

day he heard that the Buddha taught the anatta doctrine. Since he was a very sharp

debater he decided that he would go to the Buddha and convince Him that the

anatta doctrine was wrong. He was very confident; he claimed that if we were to

debate with a stone pillar, that pillar would sweat from fear. He claimed that, just

as a strong man takes a goat and flings it around his shoulders, so he would take

hold of Gotama and flings Him around in debate.

Saccaka and his followers went to the Buddha, and there exchanged

greetings. He asked Buddha to explain the doctrines He taught. Buddha replied that

He taught anatta. Saccaka countered, no. there is atta. The five aggregates are atta.

Buddha replied, do you really think that rūpa (corporeality) is atta? As it

happened, Saccaka was very ugly, and if he said that corporeality was atta, then

Buddha could counter, then why do not you make yourself more handsome? Thus

Saccaka was forced to say that rūpa is not atta. Here we can realize Buddha

striking down several characteristics that are attributed to atta. If Saccaka had an

atta, he could call upon it to exercise authority and power in order to change his

appearance. After all, atta is identical to Brahman, the supreme ruler, the infinite,

omnipotent creator and source of all things, as explained in the Bhagavad Gita.2

But according to Buddha, there exist only the five aggregates and these are

not atta because they are subject to the laws of impermanence, suffering, and no-

soul. Rūpa (material form) is not atta, it is not master and ruler of itself and it is

subject to affliction. The other aggregates are also subject to the same laws.

Saccaka was therefore defeated.

1
Mijjhima-nikāya, Op. Cit., Sutta (25).
2
An Anthology of Indian Literature, Op. Cit., PP. 124-140.
 288

Although it may be easy to understand that rūpa (material form) is not atta,

some people may find it difficult to understand why the other aggregates which we

may summarize as simply nāma (mind) do not constitute an entity which can be

called atta. After all, many people believe that mind and soul are identical or

interrelated, and they define mind and soul as that part of a person which gives life

and consciousness to the physical body and they further believe that, as such, it is

the spiritual and psychological center of the person.

But, according to the Buddha, nāma is not atta for the same reasons the

rūpa is not atta: nāma is equally subject to the laws of impermanence, suffering,

and no-soul, as we shall study further when we analyze the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta

in depth. Buddha treats nāma and rūpa equally and they are mutually dependent

upon each other: just as a wooden puppet, though unsubstantial, lifeless and

inactive, may by means of pulling strings be made to move about, stand up and

appear full of life and activity; just so are mind and body, as such, something

empty, lifeless and inactive; but by means of their mutual working together, this

mental and bodily combination may move about, stand up and appear full of life

and activity.1

Furthermore, we have to realize that nāma-rūpa or khandhas are merely

abstract classifications made by the Buddha and, as such, they have no real

existence as groups. That is, there is never the functioning of an entire entity or

group known as corporeality or feeling or perception or mental formation or

consciousness, but only the functioning of individual representatives of these

groups. For example, with one unit consciousness, only one single kind of feeling

can be associated. Two different units of perception cannot arise at the same

moment, and only one kind of consciousness, for example seeing consciousness,

1
Buddhist Dictionary, Op. Cit., P. 122.
 289

can arise at one time. A smaller or larger number of mental formations can arise

with every state of consciousness. The groups never arise as a totality; only

constituents or bits from a certain group can arise depending on conditions. There

are no integrally functioning groups which can be called a self or a mind.

Moreover, the single constituents of these apparent groups are all equally subject to

the laws of impermanence, suffering and no-soul.

Another way to realize the question of why nāma is not atta. Here we can

see that the four aggregates, which can be understood as an abiding mind substance

or as anything that can be called atta. Rather, the aggregates are completely

interdependent, and the constituents of each group condition the arising of the

others. There is no self-existing, abiding entity in any part of the following

definition, but only constituents which mutually condition each other and arise

only when they interact: "what, O monks, is the corporeality group? The four

primary elements and corporeality are depending thereon. What, O monks, it

feeling group? There are six classes of feeling: due to visual impression, to sound

impression, to odor impression, to taste impression, to bodily impression, and to

mind impression. What, O monks, is the perception group? There are six classes of

perception: perception of visual objects, of sound, of odors, of tastes, of bodily

impressions and of mental impressions. What, O monks, is the group of mental

formation? There are six classes of volitional states: with regard to visual objects,

to sounds, to odors, to tastes, to bodily impressions and to mind objects. What, O

monks, is the consciousness group? There are six classes of consciousness: eye,

ear, nose, tongue, body and mind-consciousness".1

Based on the above definitions, it is easy to see that nothing which can be

called atta, can be found in the workings of rūpa or nāma. Still another way in

1
Saṁyutta-nikāya, Op. Cit., P. 56.
 290

which the nature of nāma and rūpa is analyzed is to be found in the Abhidhamma,

which is highly recommended for anyone who wants to understand Buddhism

thoroughly. This is the most comprehensive and analytical study of all phenomena

given by the Buddha. Here Buddha analyzes nāma and rūpa (mind and matter) into

three groups of absolute realities, which are eighty nine types of consciousness

(cittas), fifty two mental states (cetasikas) and twenty eight material properties

(rūpa). Here too, there is no abiding mind substance or atta, but only the

interdependent working of the constituents of these groups.

Buddhist Conception of Anatta

The Buddhist conception of the individual, the person, is a quiet definite

theory, expressed in different ways, but all of them essentially the same. The

individual consists of nāma and rūpa (mind and matter or mind and body). More

usually, he is said to consist of five aggregates. Body corresponds to rūpa and four

other aggregates to nāma, mind. Elsewhere, e.g., in the Sammā-diṭṭhi Sutta, nāma

is said to consist of feeling, perception, volition (cetanā), contact (phassa) and

attention (manasikāra), while rūpa is defined as being made up of the four great

elements (mahā-bhūta) earth, water, wind and fire, which are common both to the

world and to the individual.1 But the distinction between the elements in the world

and those that are part of the complex which constitutes the individual, is clearly

defined in the texts. The latter are described as being Upādinna, appropriated,

taken up and assimilated by the consciousness (viññāṇa), in order to continue the

existence to which it is bound by its earlier activities.

These conceptions are elsewhere found further expanded. Just as the human

being was analyzed into its component parts, so was the external world with which

he entered into relationship. This relationship is one of cognition (viññāṇa) and, in

1
Mijjhima-nikāya, Vol. I, Op. Cit., P. 53.
 291

discussion how this cognition is established, mention is made or cognitive faculties

(indriya) and their objects, these faculties and their objects are called āyatana. The

term means simply place or sphere or entrance and is used to include both sense

and sense-object, the meeting of which two is necessary for cognition. These

factors that together comprise cognition, i.e., the sense-faculty, the sense object

and the resultant consciousness, are classified under the name dhātu. The human

personality, including, the external world with which it enters into relationship, is

thus divided into khandha,1 āyatana (sense-organ) and dhātu (faculty of senses).

The generic name for all three of them is dhamma which, in this context, is

translated as element of existence. Hence, the significance of the formula already

referred to: sabhe dhammā anattā (all existence is not-self or without self).

The universe is made up of saṅkhāras (component things) and since these

are anicca (impermanent), they are regarded as being in a state of ceaseless

movement. And, since they have nothing perdurable or stable in them, they are in a

condition not of static being, but of perpetual becoming (bhava). The phenomenal

world is, therefore, a world of continuous flux or flow (santāna), a congeries of

ever-changing elements in a process of ceaseless movement. All things, without

exception, are nothing but strings or chains of momentary events, instantaneous

bits of existence. In the Buddhist view not only are eternal entities such as God,

Soul, Matter, denied reality, but even the simple stability of empirical objects is

regarded as something constituted by our imagination. The empirical thing is a

thing constructed by the synthesis of our productive imagination, on the basis of

sensation. It is nothing but an imagined mental computation.

How, then, is the illusion produced of a stable, material world and of the

perdurable personalities living in it? It is in order to explain this that the Buddha

1
Khandhan is a sensorial of aggregates which condition the appearance of life in any form.
 292

taught the doctrine of Paṭicca-samuppāda (dependent origination or conditional

causation). According to this doctrine, all things that exist in time as well as in

space are subject to definite laws and the laws of causation. There is nothing

aimless or pre-determined. Every element (dhamma), thought appearing only for a

single instant (khaṇa) is a dependently-origination element, i.e., it depends for its

origin on what had gone before it. Thus, existence become dependent existence

and is expressed by the formula: if there is this, there comes to be that; in the

absence of this, that too is absent (asamiṁ sati, idaṁ hoti, asamiṅna sati, idaṁ na

hoti). The relationship is one of consecution rather than of causation. There is no

destruction of one thing and no creation of another, no influx of one substance into

the other. There is only a constant, uninterrupted, infinitely graduated change.1

Accordingly, the personality, in which other systems of thought imagine

the presence of a permanent spiritual principle, a self or soul (attā), is, from the

point of view of the Buddha, only a bundle of elements or forces (saṅkhāra) and a

stream or a series of successive states (santāna) originating and existing in

dependence on other, previous states. Everything is a succession; there is nothing

substantial or permanent. The human individual does not remain the same for two

consecutive moments. The spiritual part (nāma) of the human being and its

physical frame (rūpa) are linked together by causal laws. The individual is entirely

phenomenal, governed by the law of life, without any extra-phenomenal self or

soul within him. Thus, in place of Upanisad teaching, let no man try to find what

speech is, let him know the speaker; let him not try to find what the seen-thing is,

let him know the one who sees; not what the doing is, but the doer, etc. the Buddha

says, there is no doer, only doing; no seer, only a seeing, etc. The ātmanvādin

(believer in the soul-doctrine) would say that when a patch of color is cognized by

1
Encyclopedia of Buddhism, Op. Cit., P. 572.
 293

someone his soul is the agent, the sense of vision is the instrument and its

procedure would consist in light travelling from the eye to the object, seizing its

form and coming back in order to deliver its impression to the soul. The Buddha

would repudiate the whole of this construction as mere imagery. There are the

senses, he would say, and there are the sensible or objects of senses, then there is a

functional interdependence or relationship between them. There are sensations and

conceptions and there is a co-ordination between them.

The absence in the human being of a soul, an unchanging, undying essence,

does not mean that the Buddha taught the annihilation of body and mind at death.

For, besides all the doctrines mentioned earlier, He also taught the doctrine of

kamma, the doctrine of the transmitted force of the cast, both physical and mental.

The living being is an aggregate-complex, ever changing, but ever determined by

its antecedent actions. The long drawn out line of life is but a fluctuating curve of

inner experience. A man is a compound of body and its organs of sense, of feeling

and perceptions, by which he is in constant contact with the external world, of

dispositions, aptitudes and abilities, and summing them all up, of thought, covering

the whole group of mental activities. When he began this present life he brought as

his inheritance the kamma of his many previous lives. During the course of his

existence in this world he always accumulating fresh kamma, through his actions,

his thoughts and desire, his affections and passions and these affect every moment

of his life, constantly changing its character. At death, when the corporeal bond,

which held him together, falls away, he undergoes only a relatively deeper change.

The unseen potencies of his kamma beget a new person. His new body, determined

by his kamma, becomes one fitted to that sphere in which he is born. When a new

life is thus produced its component elements are present from its very inception

although in an undeveloped condition. The first moment of the new life is called
 294

viññāṇa; in the formula of the Paṭicca-samuppāda (dependent origination or

conditional causation) its antecedents are the saṅkhārā, the pre-natal forces, which

contain latent in them anusaya, the resultant of all the impressions made in that

particular flux of elements (santāna), conventionally called an individual, in the

whole course of its repeated births and deaths, its faring through life (saṁsāra).

The new person, psychologically, if not physically, is continuous with the deceased

and suffers or enjoys what his predecessor had prepared for him by his behavior.

The elements that constitute the empirical individual are constantly changing but

they will never totally disappear till the conditions and causes the hold them

together and impel them to rebirth, the craving (taṇhā) and the grasping (upādāna)

and the desire for separate existence, are finally extinguished.1

The teaching that viññāṇa (consciousness) forms the connecting link

between one life and the next has had various interpretations, though it is clear that

there is no indication at all of an autonomous consciousness persisting unchanged,

but only of a continuity of consciousness. The Buddha was once asked: if there is

no permanent self, then who is affected by the acts which the not-self has

performed? The Buddha reproves the questioner saying: shall one who is under the

dominion of desire, think to go beyond the mind of the master meaning thereby,

perhaps, that the question is wrongly put because there is an assumption in it of a

permanent self.2

The Mahātaṇhāsankhaya Sutta3 relates the story of a monk, Sāti, who went

about saying that, according to the doctrine of Buddha, one consciousness runs on

and continues without break of identity (anañña). It is said that Sāti view was due

to his having hard various characters in the Jātakas (birth stories) identified

1
Buddhist Psychology, Mrs. Rhys Davids, London: Pāḷi Text Society, 1918, P. 244.
2
Saṁyutta-nikāya, Vols. III, Op. Cit., P. 103.
3
Mijjhima-nikāya, Vol. I, Op. Cit., P. 256.
 295

with the Buddha. Sāti colleagues tried to point out his error and when they failed

they brought him before the Buddha who explained to him that, according to his

teaching, consciousness arises only by causation and that, without assignable

conditions consciousness does not come about.

The Mahānidāna Sutta1 contains the assertion that there is a descent of the

consciousness into the womb of the mother preparatory to rebirth. Commentators

have differed in regard to the question whether, in addition to the continuity of

consciousness between the old and the new lives, there is also some sort of

corporeal accompaniment, some kind of subtle matter, for instance. Buddhaghosa

denies that the consciousness is accompanied by any physical form and that it is in

process of constant change. The descent is only an expression to denote the

simultaneity of death and rebirth.

The continuity of consciousness is also the theme of the amusing tales of

Godhika. He made various attempts to win arahantship but disease prevented him

from maintaining his state of trance long enough. In the end he decided to commit

suicide and cut his throat. But, before he died, he put forth a final effort and won

nibbāna. Māra (the evil one),not being fully aware of what had happened, and

seeing only the suicide, assumed the form of a cloud of smoke and went about

searching for the rebirth-consciousness of the sage. When failed to find it he

reported this to the Buddha who explained that his search was in vain because

Godhika had gone beyond sphere of Māra. The question is: Does the story mean

that the rebirth-consciousness is something visible or is the conception of visibility

purely metaphorical? It also asserts the doctrine of the moral responsibility of the

individual for his actions, for it is not only his continuity that is stressed but also

his identity. This idea is emphasized with a wealth of illustration. To give only

1
Dīgha-nikāya, Vols. II, Op. Cit., P. 63.
 296

two, the milk turns into curds, the curds turns into butter and butter into ghee. The

thief of a mango cannot escape punishment because the mango he stole was not the

mango the owner planted.1 The Milindapanhā explicitly raises the question: Is the

infant the same as the man? Is the mother of the child the same as the mother of the

man? And so on. Each succeeding state is neither the same as the one that precedes

nor yet another. The being that is born into a new life is likewise neither the same

nor different from his predecessor. One comes into being and another passes away

and the rebirth is, as it were, simultaneous.2

The statement has been sometimes made that although the Buddha has

denied self as belonging to visible form (rūpa) or to mind (nāma) he has not said

that here is not said that there is no self at all, anywhere, of any kind at all. It is

objected that to infer the absence of self altogether from the denial of self in either

body or mind, is unjustified, because to do so would be to assume that the self, if it

is to be found at all, must be entirely comprised under and within body and mind.

If I pull my typewriter to pieces, so runs the argument, I shall find in it no typist;

would it be correct, therefore, to say that there is no typist at all?

The argument is evidently due to a confusion of thought. In Buddhism it is

not only the typewriter that has been analyzed; the typist has been analyzed as

well, and both man and machine have been discovered to be bundles of aggregates,

the typewriter having only rūpa (matter) in it while they typist has nāma (mind) as

well. From the point of view of Buddhism, typist and machine agree in this, that

they are both anatta, without self of any kind. If it is suggested, however, that there

is an atta, outside and apart from body and mind, which use body and mind for its

expression and manifestation, in the same way as a typist uses a typewriter, it must

1
Saṁyutta-nikāya, Vol. I, Op. Cit., P. 120.
2
The Question of King Milinda, Op. Cit., P. 40.
 297

be asserted that such a supposition finds no support in any of the records of the

Buddha. It has already been stated that the Buddha never recognized the presence

of an atta or any nature or description either in the universe or out of it. If it be true

to say that the Buddha has nowhere explicitly stated, in so many words, that the

being (satta) is composed only of the aggregates, it would be a hundred times truer

to say that nowhere has he said of being that it comprises anything else at all, of

any description whatsoever, apart from the five aggregates. Numerous passages

can be quoted from the Piṭakas which show beyond all possible doubt that, in

Buddhist ontology, when being (satta) is resolved into the five aggregates, there is

no residuum whatever left. It is clearly stated in one passage that all asamanas and

Brāhmanas, who talk about the soul which is variously described by them, talk

about it in reference to the five aggregates or one or other of them.1 Buddhaghosa

says that the five aggregates were selected for this every purpose for examination

to show that there was no residual self.2 So does Vasubandhu in the

Abhidharmakosa where it is stated that anāma n is synonymous with skandha,

āyatana and dhātu.

In any event, it cannot be maintained that the Buddha was incapable of

making a categorical statement on a self if it did really exist and it would certainly

be conceded that if the Buddha had the least lurking belief in a self of any sort, He

would not have hidden it from His own, only son. And, yet, this is what He taught

Rāhulā, now Rāhulā, when a monk by perfect wisdom realizes with regard to the

elements (which comprise the human being) this is not time, this is not I, this is not

my atta, then does he cut himself off from craving, loosen bonds and by

overcoming the vain conceit (of atta) make an end of suffering. As the

1
Saṁyutta-nikāya, Vols. III, Op. Cit., P. 46.
2
The Path of Purification, Ch. XIV, Op. Cit., P. 218.
 298

commentator Kumāralābha asks in desperation: if there was an atta, what on earth

was there to prevent the Buddha from saying so?

In the Vinaya Mahāvagga there is a story of thirty young bloods (elsewhere

called the Buddha-vaggiyas) who went on a picnic with their wives. One of them

who had no wife had brought a courtesan and when they were not noticing her she

made off with their belongings. While seeking her, they came across the Buddha

and asked if He had seen a woman. The Buddha replied, come now, which would

be better for you, that you seek the woman or seek yourself (attānam

gaveseyyatha)? The word attānam has been interpreted as meaning the self, the

God within you, thus giving to it an import which has deeply colored the whole of

the subsequent argument. The use of the singular accusative is quite in accordance

with pāḷi idiom and there is no need to see here anymore than the reflexive sense

each one seeking himself, i.e., learning the truth about himself. In this passage and

in such passages as attā hi attno nātho (one is lord of oneself), attadīpā viharatha

(be refuges unto yourself), the word atta merely refers to the living individual to

whom the statement is made or the advice given.1

To attribute to the Buddha any teaching accepting the existence of a self or

soul would necessitate the supposition that His disciples who came after him had

suppressed His teaching so effectually that no one remembered anything of it.

Although at the time of his death his teaching was preserved in the minds of

thousands of disciples, there is no trace of it even as a heresy among the Buddhists.

Unprejudiced scholars have always been struck reveals itself in the oldest Buddhist

sects whenever the idea of a self or soul is mentioned. All Buddhist schools,

without exception, have rejected the atta-vāda or the doctrine which teaches the

idea of a surviving personality of some sort, a psycho-physical entity. What, in the

1
Manual of Buddhism, Mrs. Rhys Davids, London: Pāḷi Text Society, 1984, P. 147.
 299

view of the disciples of Buddha, He did consider permanent is stated in the

Sarvāstivāda version of the Anatta-lakkhaṇa-sutta, which being, from has the

nature of the destructible and with its cessation in nirvāna which is of

indestructible nature and so on, with each of the five aggregates.1

There is a discourse in the suṁyutta-nikāya called the Burden sutta (Bhāra

Sutta) which speaks of the burden, the taking of the burden, the grasping of the

burden and the laying down of the burden. The five aggregates are the burden. The

grasping of the burden is the craving which tends to re-birth. The laying down of

the burden is the complete cessation of this craving in all its forms. Here the word

bhāra-hāra is used is reference to the individual, the person (puggala) of such and

such a clan. It has sometimes been translated as burden-bearer, thus supporting the

view that the sutta accepts a person, i.e., an attā or self, apart from the five

aggregates. But, the word could equally well and with greater consistency be

translated burden taking. In any case, it is not important because it would be

unjustified to try to prove from a single text that the individual is to be regarded as

a permanent entity.2

It should be added that two Buddhist schools, the Sammitīyas and the

Vajjiputtakas, held the conception of a person (puggala) which for all practical

purposes, may be regarded as an effective self. They taught that the internal

aggregates at a given moment constitute a certain unity which is related to them as

fire is to fuel. This which is called puggala assumes new elements at birth and

casts them off at death. Since it was obviously another name for a self this view

was rejected by orthodox Buddhists and the arguments adduced are given in the

Kathāvatthu. It is significant that the heretics never thought of calling this self

1
Encyclopedia of Buddhism, Op. Cit., P. 574.
2
Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, Keith, A. Berriebale, Oxford: At Clarendon Press, 1923,
P. 82.
 300

ātman but used instead a new term puggala. The Abhidharmakosa devotes a whole

chapter to its refutation.

Buddhism has no objection to the use of the words attā, or satta, or

puggala, to indicate the individual as a whole, or to distinguish, one person from

another, where such distinction is necessary, especially as regards such things as

memory and kamma which are private and personal and where it is necessary to

recognize the existence of separate lines of continuity (santāna). But, even so,

these terms should be treated only as labels, binding-conceptions and conventions

in language, assisting economy in thought and word and nothing more. Even the

Buddha uses them sometimes, these are worldly usages, worldly language, worldly

terms of communication, worldly descriptions, by which a Tathāgata

communicates without misapprehending them.1

The doctrine of anatta, like all other doctrines enunciated by the Buddha,

has moral perfection as its purpose. The analysis of the five aggregates is in order

to find out the conditions and causes of their existence and their functioning, which

are involved in impermanence and suffering, so that the path to their cessation may

be discovered and followed. To do this effectively, according to the Buddha, all

false views and misconceptions should be eliminated. Among the strongest of

these views are the various beliefs about self (atta), particularly those that conceive

it as a permanent entity. The individual being entirely phenomenal, governed by

causal laws, were there to be in him a supernatural self, who transcends these laws,

the ethical life would lose its point. Then the Buddha took up a pinch of dust on the

tip of His nail and said, even if this much rūpa (matter) be permanent, stable,

eternal, by nature unchanging, standing fast, then the living of the holy life, for the

1
Dīgha-nikāya, Vol. I, Op. Cit., P. 195.
 301

utter destruction of suffering, would not be set forth by me. And so on with the

other aggregates.1

The passionate sense of egoism is regarded as the root of unhappiness of

the world. For one thing, it makes the individual blind to the reality of other

persons. When the notion of self disappears, the notion of mine also disappears and

one becomes free from the idea of I and mine (ahaṁ-kāra mamaṁ-kāra) and there

follows a gentler, profounder sympathy with all sentient existence.

The first factor of the Noble Eightfold Path is sammā-diṭṭhi (right view).

When the path is trodden the goal is ultimately reached which is nibbāna, complete

emancipation and supreme bliss. There are four stages to this goal, the first of

which is described as sotāpatti (entering the stream). This is reached when three of

the ten saṁyojanā (fetters) have been cast off. These three are (1) belief in a

permanent individuality (sakkāya-diṭṭhi), (2) doubt (vicikicchā) and (3) belief in

the efficacy of mere morality and rites and ceremonies (sīlabbata-parāmāsa). It is

noteworthy that sakkāya-diṭṭhi is the first of the fetters which hinder the attainment

of that complete insight on which depends the final release from all suffering and

unhappiness. It is said that final deliverance cannot be attained till the subtle

remnant of the conceit, I am conceit, of the desire, I am desire, of the lurking

tendency to think I am, is utterly removed. Acceptance of the doctrine of a self

(attavāda) is one of the four kinds of grasping (upādāna) which attach beings to

continued rebirth. Another term atta-diṭṭhi (the heresy of self) is also sometimes

mentioned and attagāha (misconception of self).2

The individual who has stained nibbāna is described by many names, one

of them being Tathāgata. The question was asked of the Buddha himself, e.g., in

1
Saṁyutta-nikāya, Vols. III, Op. Cit., P. 147.
2
Ibid, P. 131.
 302

the Alagaddūpama-sutta as to what happen to a Tathāgata when he dies. Would it

be true to say that the Tathāgata exists after death? When the question is thus put,

every possible way of asserting or denying it is stated and rejected. It is one of the

undetermined questions (avyākata). Further discussion in this subject will be found

under the topic nibbāna. It is worth nothing, however, that among the statements

denied is the view that a disciple, in whom all the fetters have been destroyed, is

annihilated and destroyed with the dissolution of the body and does not exist after

death. A Tathāgata released from what is called body etc., is profound,

immeasurable, hard to fathom, like the great ocean. It does not fit the case to say

that he is reborn or not reborn or reborn and not reborn or neither reborn nor not

reborn. When dissatisfaction is expressed with this declaration the Buddha

answers, profound is this doctrine, hard to see, hard comprehend, calm, excellent,

beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, intelligible only to the wise.1

The truths anatta, according to Buddhist teaching, is of all truths the most

difficult to realize. Thus Buddhaghosa says that the description of the

characteristics of not-self is the province of none but a Buddha. It is no idle

tradition which states that even the Pañcavaggiyas2 the first disciples of Buddha,

who were very nearly his peers in knowledge and wisdom, how even thy failed to

realize arahantship till He preached to them the Anatta-lakkhaṇa-sutta on the

characteristics of anatta. The belief in the categories of an abiding self with

changing qualities is so deeply rooted in our habits of thought that we are reluctant

to admit the doctrine of pure and complete change.

Even among the Buddhist schools the doctrine did not hold undisputed

sway. The notion of a permanent entity, constituting reality, though officially

1
Mijjhima-nikāya, Vol. I, Op. Cit., P. 487.
2
Pañcavaggiya, a group of five monks, who accompanied Gautama when He became as ascetic, are
called Pañcavaggiya..
 303

banned and repudiated, constantly tended to appear through some back-door

and to haunt the domain of Buddhist philosophy in various guises. These will be

dealt with in their proper place. Nor is this surprising, for it is only with the

attainment of arahantship that the threefold illusion of self, known as the three

conceits (maññanā), is destroyed. Even the anāgāmi who has attained the third

stage of the path is not free from the māna-maññanā, the conceit of I am.1 Till the

fetters of avijjā (ignorance) are completely broken and paññā (wisdom) has been

attained, our attempts to escape from belief in self are like those of the hare in the

old Indian tale who, annoyed with the earth, jumped off it, hopping never to return,

only to find that the higher he jumped the greater was the thud with which

he fell. It is because of our clinging that this is so, says the Buddha: To

the herdsman who has no cows, the cry of wolf, wolf no longer brings any

terror; to him who has no clinging, the realization of anatta spells the highest

liberation.2

Misunderstanding of Anatta
Here the research will analyze some of the attempts to place a doctrine of

attā into Buddhism. Some scholars have tried to, in the words of Dr. Walpola

Rāhulā, smuggle the idea of atta into the teaching of the Buddha.3 Ananda K.

Coomaraswamy and I. B. Horner, already discussed briefly, have mistranslated

certain pāḷi terms to demonstrate the Buddha affirmed the existence of atta. They

argue that the Buddha did indeed claim that the five aggregates are not atta, but

that He never directly denied the existence of atta. The five aggregates are not atta,

but there is something apart from the five aggregates that we can call atta, self or

1
Saṁyutta-nikāya, Vols. III, Op. Cit, P. 128.
2
Ibid, P. 182.
3
What the Buddha aught, Dr. Walpolā Rāhulā, New York: Grove Press, 1959, P. 55.
 304

soul, these scholars claim.1 Whenever they see the word atta, they try to imagine

that it means eternal self or soul.

On the passages they point to is found in Dhammapada:2Attāhi attano

nātho. They translate it as self is the lord of self.3 They say that it means that the

big self is the lord of the little self. Actually, it means, one is one own lord or

refuge or one is one own support. The second line of the verse reads kohi nātho

paro siyā? Or, who else can be the lord or refuge? In pāḷi, the word atta can mean

self, soul, or eternal self, in the Hindu sense or it can simply be a part of a reflexive

pronoun like himself, yourself or myself. Thus when the Buddha says: "attāhi

attano nātho, kohi nātho paro siyā, which mean one is one own Lord or refuge

who else can be the Lord or refuge". It is clear that atta means oneself, not soul.

Buddha urges people to rely on themselves, on their own effort and not to rely on

others in their spiritual practice.

Another passage which is misinterpreted in the book by is from

Mahāparinibbāna-sutta:4"attadīpā viharatha attasaraṇā anannasaraṇā, which

mean dwell having yourself as an island, having yourself as a refuge and not

anyone else as a refuge". Here also they interpret atta to mean soul or eternal self.5

They claim that Buddha was instructing us to make the soul our island or refuge.

But in the next line, Buddha says, "dhamma dīpā viharatha dhamma saraṇā

anannasaraṇā, which means dwell having the dhamma as a refuge, nothing else as

a refuge". Buddha is instructing his followers to rely on their own effort and on the

teachings, especially as He was soon to be gone from this earth. The idea of atta as

soul is completely foreign to this passage. Moreover, Buddha went on to say, how

1
The Living of Thoughts of Gotama the Buddha, Op. Cit, P. 21.
2
The Dhammapada, Op. Cit., V. 160.
3
The Living of Thoughts of Gotama the Buddha, Op. Cit., P. 147.
4
Dīgha-nikāya, Op. Cit., Sutta No. 16.
5
The Living of Thoughts of Gotama the Buddha, Op. Cit., P. 151-2.
 305

is the monk to dwell making himself an island? He then went on to describe the

practice of the four foundations of mindfulness. The Buddha really meant that

one should make satipaṭṭhāna meditation (contemplation of the body,

feelings, mind and dhamma objects) one refuge. There is no mention of soul

whatsoever.

Another passage they point to is the story in which Buddha spoke to some

princes. There were thirty princes who were cousins of King Pasenadi of Kosala.

Twenty-nine of them had wives, but one did not. One day, they went to a park to

amuse themselves, and they hired a woman for the unwed prince. When they were

drunk and having fun, the hired woman took all the valuables and ran away with

them. They looked for her and met the Buddha. They asked Buddha if He had seen

her and He said, what do you think, young men? Which is better for you? To

search after the woman or to search after yourselves (attānam gaveseyyātha), then

they replied that it would be better to search after themselves and so Buddha told

them to sit down and listen to a dhamma talk.

They also interpret the word atta in that passage to mean higher self or

soul, and they want it to mean that Buddha told the princes to search after atta.1

But Buddha is telling the princes to turn away from chasing after worldly pleasures

and to practice the self-discipline of the Noble Path. In that dhamma talk, Buddha

spoke about giving (dāna), moral conduct (sīla), the celestial world (sagga), the

peril, vanity and depravity of sense pleasures (kamānaṁ ādīnavaṁ, etc.) and the

advantages of renunciation (nekkhamme ānisaṁsaṁ). There is no mention

whatsoever of searching for a soul, for atta.

1
Ibid, P. 6.
 306

Another passage mistranslated by them is one found in visuddhimagga:

Buddhattā Buddho.1 They translated it as, Buddha is awakened self.2 But the

correct translation of the pāḷi is, He is the Buddha because He knows or He has

known. The word Buddhattā is not a compound of Buddha and atta, but one word,

Buddha, with the suffix-tta combined with ablative case termination, ā, which

means because of. The word Buddhattā therefore means because of the state of

being one who knows.

It would be better to say that one does not believe in the anatta doctrine and

that Buddha was wrong about it than to try to say that Buddha taught a religion

with atta in it. It is not accurate to say that Buddha did not deny atta. In fact, there

are many places in the pāḷi cannot where atta is denied by Buddha. For example,

Buddha once said, I do not see a soul theory which, if accepted, does not lead to

the arising of grief, lamentation, suffering, distress, and tribulations.3 Buddha also

said, since neither self nor anything pertaining to self can truly be found, is not the

speculative view that the universe is atta wholly and completely foolish? Buddha

teaches that belief in atta is a wrong view (diṭṭhi) or (micchā-diṭṭhi) which will

lead to misery. Wrong views must be rejected because they are a source of wrong

and evil aspirations and conduct.

In Mijjhima-nikāya, Buddha describes the belief in atta as an idea which

leads to selfishness and pride: The Perfect One is free from any theory (diṭṭhigata),

for the Perfect One has seen what corporeality is, and how it arises and passes

away. He has seen what feeling, perception, mental formations, consciousness are

and how they arise and pass away. Therefore, the Perfect One has won complete

deliverance through the extinction, fading away, disappearance, rejection and

1
The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga), Op. Cit., Chaps. VII.
2
The Living of Thoughts of Gotama the Buddha, Op. Cit., P. 27.
3
Mijjhima-nikāya, Op. Cit., Sutta No. 22.
 307

casting out of all imaginings and conjectures, of all inclinations to the vainglory of

I and mine.1

In the famous Brahmajāla-sutta which is recommended for those who want

to study an explanation of wrong views, Buddha describes and classifies all

conceivable wrong views and speculations about reality. One of those wrong views

is the belief that there exists an eternal self. Buddha says of this view: Therein,

Bhikkhus (monks), when those recluses and Brahmins who are eternalists proclaim

on four grounds the self and the world to be eternal that is only the agitation and

vacillation of those who do not know and do not see; that is only the agitation and

vacillation of those who are immersed in craving.2

Coomaraswamy and Horner argue that Buddha denial of atta refers only

to the phenomenal self, and that His denial is really an affirmation of what they

call the great self (mahā-atta).3 They argue that Buddha stated that the five

aggregates are not atta, but that He never categorically stated that there is no atta,

no self.4 They claim that Buddha was only directing us not to see the real self

in the personal ego, a view identical to the Hindu view. They reason that Buddha

denial of certain things being atta indicates that He affirmed a true atta of a

different nature. When Buddha said, this is not atta; these scholars insert the

following argument: But a moment consideration of the logic of the words will

show that they assume the reality of a self that is not any one or all of the things

that are denied of it.5

For the sake of argument, that we have five animal horns here. If we say,

none of these horns is the horn of a rabbit; does it mean that there exists

1
Ibid, Sutta No. 72.
2
The Discourse on the All-Embracing Net of Views, Bhikkhu Bodhi, Kandy: BPS, 1993, P. 84.
3
The Living of Thoughts of Gotama the Buddha, Op. Cit., P. 5.
4
Ibid, P. 27.
5
Ibid, P. 21.
 308

somewhere else or in another form such a thing as a horn of a rabbit? No. a horn of

a rabbit is just a designation, an abstraction, without any corresponding reality.

Similarly, Buddha often said, this is not atta. That is not atta. Nothing here is atta.

Does that indicate that Buddha means that there exists somewhere something that

can be called atta? No.

This section by explaining a very important statement found in

Patisambhidāmagga and in Mijjhima-nikāya1: "Sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā, sabbe

saṅkhārā dukkhā, sabbe dhammā anattā". The first sentence means, all

conditioned things are impermanent, the second means, all conditioned things are

suffering. The third sentence, however, is different. Here, Buddha does not use the

word saṅkhārā, but He uses dhamma instead. Dhamma here means all things

without exception. So the third sentence means, all things, conditioned or

unconditioned, are anatta, are void of self and soul. This means that even nibbāna,

which is asaṅkhata, unconditioned, is not atta or is void of atta. This statement

unequivocally denies atta of any kind, even in ultimate truth and Enlightenment,

even in nibbāna.

Direct Experience of Anatta

The anatta doctrine is extremely difficult to comprehend. One can

speculate or ponder about it that is one kind of knowledge, acquired by listening to

a lecture or by reading. One may also ponder over it more deeply in contemplation.

But one can only really penetrate into it during vipassanā (insight) meditation.

When Yogis (who practice spiritual exercise) practice, they keep themselves aware

of everything. When they see something, there are two things: the mind which sees

and the object seen; apart from these, there is nothing. More specifically, seeing is

a process which depends on four things: the eye, the visible object, light and

1
Mijjhima-nikāya, Vol. I, Op. Cit., P. 228. Sutta No, 35.
 309

attention to the object. If one does not have eyes, no atta can make one see. Only

when all conditions are met does seeing consciousness arise. No agent like atta is a

part of this.1

Likewise, when yogis note themselves thinking during meditation, they

note thinking, thinking, thinking, and they find only thinking and the mind

which notes it, they do not find a self or ego or atta. They do not find that I am

thinking unless they add this idea as an afterthought. They really find that

thinking is occurring. In this process, yogis can see the impermanence of mind and

thought comes and goes and this goes on and on. A new thought comes every

moment, arising and disappearing. They directly see the impermanence of thought.

They can also notice the impermanence of material things, such as physical pain,

by noting the arising and disappearing of the pain in the body. They can see that all

things are oppressed by rise and fall, by arising and disappearing. This oppression

of phenomena by arising and disappearing is the characteristic of suffering.2

Unwisely, we desire for things to be permanent, yet we realize that we have

no power to make impermanent things permanent; we realize that we have no

control or authority over things. No inner core, no atta, can be found in any

observed phenomena. Yogis can discover this anatta nature of things in vipassanā

(insight) meditation, because gradually they bring awareness and concentration to a

high degree and then they have penetrative knowledge into the true nature of mind

and body.

Impermanence (Anicca), Suffering (Dukkha) and No-Soul (Anatta)

The doctrine of anatta is very important to Buddhists. No realization of

truth can occur without the knowledge of the anatta (no-soul) nature of things. To
1
No Inner Core (An Introduction to the Doctrine of Anatta), Sayadaw U Sīlānanda, Penang: Buddha
Dharma Education Association Inc, 1999, P. 42.
2
Ibid, P. 43
 310

realize truth, one must practice meditation and during meditation, the knowledge of

anatta must arise. One needs the knowledge of anicca, dukkha and anatta, that is,

the knowledge of impermanence, of suffering and of the no-soul nature of things.

Until one experiences these characteristics in meditation, not just intellectually, but

directly, one cannot make progress. Vipassanā (insight) meditation deals directly

with these characteristics. These characteristics run through all stages of vipassanā

and vipassanā also conceals the three characteristics from perception during

meditation.

Impermanence is concealed by continuity. If one looks at a candle flame,

one may think that it is the same flame from moment to moment. Actually, the

flame is constantly disappearing and arising again every second. We have the

illusion of one flame because of the idea and appearance of continuity.

The nature of suffering is concealed by changing into different postures.

When we are sitting and feel some pain, we change posture and the pain goes

away. Actually, we are changing postures constantly at every moment of our lives,

but this is not apparent to us. The moment a tiny unpleasant sensation is felt, we

change postures. The characteristic of no-soul is concealed by the perception that

things are compact and solid. We look at things and at ourselves as solid, compact

things. Until we can break through the false perception that we are compact, we

will not see the no-soul nature of things.

That is why there are meditational practices in which the four elements,

earth, water, fire and air are contemplated. Actually, the primary qualities of those

elements are contemplated: Earth is characterized by hardness or softness, water by

fluidity or cohesion, fire by heat and air by extending or supporting. If we can have

the insight into phenomena as being composed of elements and their

 311

characteristics, then the idea of compactness will be weakened. We think that we

are substantial, but if we have insight into our real nature, the nature of being

composed of nāma and rūpa, or more precisely, of elements and forces mutually

dependent and interacting with each other, then the idea of a coherent, abiding,

substantial self is weakened and nothing we can call a self is found.1

The anatta doctrine is of primary importance to a Buddhist. In fact, anatta

can only be understood when there is a Buddha or teaching of a Buddha in the

world. No one but a Buddha can penetrate into the anatta nature of things because

only through vipassanā meditation discovered by Buddha, can insight into anatta

be realized. Even though great and profound thinkers are around, they still cannot

penetrate into anatta and other kinds of meditation, such as samatha (tranquility),

may give us psychic powers or higher states of consciousness, but they cannot lead

us to the insight into anatta.

As this research mentioned earlier, the belief in a soul was described the

Buddha as a major cause of suffering. The belief in atta of any kind, whether belief

in a personal ego or in a spiritual self, is the cause of all sufferings in this round of

rebirths; the belief in atta is the root of greed, hatred and delusion. Atheists may

not believe in a spiritual soul, but they serve the desires of their personal ego and

this may commit deeds of greed, hatred and delusion. The idea of atta is very hard

to conquer, but still we must try because realization of anatta is the way to

deliverance, while the persistence of the idea of atta is a major cause of misery.

One cannot overemphasize the importance anatta, as venerable Ñānatiloka

explains: whosoever has not penetrated this impersonality of all existence and does

not comprehend that in reality there exists only this continually self-consuming

process of arising and passing bodily and mental phenomena, and that there is no

1
The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga), Op. Cit., Chaps. XXI
 312

separate ego-entity within or without this process, he will not be able to understand

Buddhism, i.e., the teaching of the Four Noble Truths, in the right light. He will

think that it is his ego, his personality that performs good and evil actions and will

reborn according to these actions, his personality that will enter nibbāna, his

personality that walks on the Eightfold Path.1

The words of Ñānatiloka bring up a very important point often asked

about nibbāna: In the absence of a soul, who or what is it that enters nibbāna?

This is a difficult subject. From what has been said so far in this research, we can

certainly say that there is no atta or self which realize nibbāna. What realizes

nibbāna is insight-wisdom, vipassanā-pannā. It is not the property of a personal or

universal self, but is rather a power developed through meditative penetration of

phenomena.

Yet another even more difficult question is: What happens to a Tathāgata

(here in the sense of one who has realized nibbāna) after death? Once again,

Buddha gave his answer without recourse to any kind of spiritual entity such as

atta. Buddha essentially replied that no words could possibly describe with

happens to a Tathāgata after death: A Tathāgata released from what is called body

etc., is profound, immeasurable, hard to fathom, like the great ocean. It does not fit

the case to say that he is reborn or not reborn, or reborn and not reborn, or neither

reborn nor not reborn. Then He goes on to say, after being questioned further:

Profound is this doctrine, hard to see, hard to comprehend, calm, excellent, beyond

the sphere of reasoning, subtle intelligible only to the wise.2 Thus Nibbāna is, the

Absolute Noble Truth, the extinction of all continuity and becoming, the Unborn,

Un-originated, Uncreated, Unformed. Reality is affirmed without reference to atta.

1
Buddhist Dictionary, Op. Cit., P. 15.
2
Mijjhima-nikāya, Vol. I, Op. Cit., P. 487.
 313

Likewise, the Arahat who realizes nibbāna does so by means of a flash of insight

which destroys forever all illusions of the existence of atta. Here mentioned words

from Ñānatiloka: One cannot too often and too emphatically stress the fact that not

only for the actual realization of the goal of nibbāna, but also for a theoretical

understanding of it, it is an indispensable preliminary condition to grasp fully the

truth of anatta, the egoless-ness and insubstantiality of all forms of existence.

Without such an understanding, one will necessarily misconceive nibbāna

according to one either materialistic or metaphysical leanings, either as

annihilation of an ego, or self enters or with which it merges. Hence it is said:

Mere suffering exists, no sufferer is found; the deed is, but no doer of the deed is

there; nibbāna is; but not the man who enters it; the Path is, but no traveler on it is

seen.1

The Discourse on the Characteristic of No-Soul (Anatta-lakkhaṇa Sutta)

Here is more detail in the sutta which teaches the doctrine of anatta, known

as the Anatta-lakkhaṇa-sutta, the discourse on the characteristic of no-soul. This

was the second sermon of the Buddha. At the end of the first sermon, the venerable

Koṇdañña became a sotāpanna (a person at the first stage of enlightenment) and

then, according to the commentaries, for example, the commentary on vinaya,

the other four disciples became sotāpannas, one on each of the four following

days.

On the first day after the full-moon day in July, the monk Vappa became a

sotāpanna; on the second day, Bhaddiya; on the third day, Mahānāma and on the

fourth day, Assaji. After they became sotāpannas, they all asked Buddha for

ordination. Buddha ordained each of them by calling to them, come monks. On the

fifth day after the full-moon day, the Buddha assembled them and preached to

1
The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga), Op. Cit., Chaps. XXII
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them this discourse on no-soul. This discourse (sutta)1 is even shorter than the first

sermon on the Four Noble Truths. It was delivered at the Deer Park at Benares

(Vārāṇasī). Buddha called the disciples by saying monks and they replied,

Venerable Sir and then the Buddha started.

This sutta can divide into five sections. In the first section, Buddha says

that the five aggregates are not atta, not self or soul. In the second section, Buddha

asks the monks if the five aggregates are permanent or impermanent, pleasurable

of painful, and then He arrives at the conclusion that the nature of the five

aggregates is anatta. In the third section, Buddha teaches that the five aggregates

should not be taken as a soul or self or belonging to oneself. In fourth section,

Buddha explains briefly the progress of vipassanā (insight) meditation. The last

section records that all five monks had attained the stage of Arahant. By the end of

the sutta, all five monks became Arahants, which is the highest stage of

enlightenment.

Buddha say, Bhikkhus, form is anatta (form is not soul or self). Were form

soul, then this form would not lead to affliction and one could have it of form: Let

my form be thus; let my form be not thus. And since form is not soul, so it leads to

affliction, and none can have it of form: Let my form be thus; let my form be not

thus. Here the pāḷi word rūpa is translated as form. The word form is here used in

the sense of material properties or just matter. We may recall that the first of the

five aggregates is form or corporeality. But form cannot be atta because it is

subject to affliction. Atta (self or soul) must have the meaning which this research

discussed earlier: that of vasavattana, something which has the power and

autonomy to change the nature of things. No one likes pain and affliction in the

1
Mijjhima-nikāya, (Tr), Bhikkhu Bodhi, Bostom: Pāḷi Wisdom Publications, 1998, Chaps. XXII,
P. 59
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body, but it cannot be changed. If form were atta, people could abolish pain,

disease and ugliness by merely wishing. But there is no core or director or soul

inside or outside of people which has the power to accomplish such action.

Buddha considered the second aggregate and says: Feeling is not soul.

Were feeling soul, then this feeling would not lead to affliction, and one could

have it of feeling: Let my feeling be thus; let my feeling be not thus. Then Buddha

takes the third, fourth and fifth aggregates: Perception is not soul, mental

formations are not soul, Consciousness is not soul. Were consciousness soul, then

this consciousness would not lead to affliction and one could have it of

consciousness: Let my consciousness be thus; let my consciousness be not thus.

Consciousness cannot be atta because it is not under our control. Consciousness is

unavoidably subject afflictions, to sorrow, depression and frustration. We cannot

avoid being conscious of ugly sights, sounds and sensations in the world, although

we would like to arrange coming into contact with pleasant sensual objects only.

Likewise, in meditation, we would like to be consciousness only of the

meditation object and we would like to achieve stillness of mind and concentration,

but this is not easy, and we cannot will it. If consciousness were atta, we could will

our consciousness to still and concentrated and then we could proceed to the higher

states of mind, perhaps it would only take one day to advance to the higher stages

of meditation. But in all cases, consciousness arises completely determined by

circumstances and conditions, conditions which are not under our control.

Therefore, consciousness cannot be atta.

In the second section of the sutta, Buddha asks the monks some questions,

which they answer. Buddha says: Bhikkhus, how do you conceive it: Is form

permanent or impermanent? Since they were already sotāpannas, they had already
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seen that the five aggregates are impermanent, suffering and no-soul, so they

answered, impermanent, Venerable Sir. Now Buddha asks is what is impermanent,

painful and subject to change fit to be regarded this: This is mine. This is I. this is

my soul? They answered, no Venerable Sir. Form is impermanent because it

disappears. It comes into being and then vanishes. It has a beginning and an end.

The monks had already realized by means of vipassanā knowledge that form is

impermanent. They had already seen the three marks of impermanent, which are

the three phases of existence: arising, continuation, and dissolution.

Another way to state this process is to call it non-existence after having

been in existence, in Pāḷihutvā abhāvato. Buddha then proceeds to explain that

whatever is impermanent is also painful. The mark of pain (dukkha) is constant

oppression by arise oppression by rise and fall, by arising and dissolution. This can

be seen during meditation, when yogis (one who practices spiritual exercise) take

thoughts as objects and look at them closely. They see that the moment a thought is

observed as an object, it disappears and another thought takes its place. As

meditators observe very closely with concentration, they see all objects in the mind

arising and disappearing constantly and this is seen as a kind of oppression by

arising and disappearing. Phenomena are called oppressed by rise and fall because

nothing is ever at peace; everything is menaced by an endless flux. In this sense,

whatever is impermanent is dukkha. Dukkha means more than just painful. Dukkha

also comes from our desire for permanence. Dukkha means difficult to bear

mentally and physically and thus we call the impermanence of all phenomena

suffering. In the third section of questioning of Buddha, He asks, is that which

impermanent and painful fit to be called mine, I, myself or soul? Buddha is here

leading the monks to the discovery of anatta. Is something that disappearing fit to
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be called atta? No. From anicca (impermanence) to suffering and finally to anatta

(no-soul) the monks are led.

Here is the review again the processes which hide impermanence,

suffering, and no-soul. As unenlightened people, fail to see impermanence because

we do not see the arising and disappearing of things. We are tricked by continuity,

which hides the nature of impermanence. We look at things or at consciousness

and see them as continuous. In order to see impermanence, we must observe

closely the arising and disappearing of phenomena. We must penetrate, by means

of concentration and insight developed in meditation, through the impression of

continuity, which acts as a cover of impermanence. Let us think of a ring of fire.

Someone has a torch and twirls it to create an impression of a circle of fire. But we

know that there is really no ring of fire; it is just the impressions of individual

positions of the fire at different places and at different times. But our mind takes

the impressions as something continuous; rather, our mind connects the

impressions and we deceive ourselves.

If we could take a moving picture of the process and watch it at a slow

speed, we would see the individual parts of the sequence of the apparent ring of

fire. We would only see light at different places and not a circle. If we cannot

pinpoint the components of things in order to see them arising and disappearing,

we will continue to see things as whole entities. Let us not here that impermanence

in this context means momentary impermanence. If we drop a cup which breaks,

we say that it is impermanent. Or if a person dies, we say that the person is

impermanent. These examples of impermanence are easy to see.

But when we use that term in the context of vipassanā meditation, we mean

the constant arising and disappearing of phenomena, and this can only be observed
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during vipassanā meditation. Similarly, by dukkha, we do not mean ordinary pain

or illness. We mean the constant oppression by arising and disappearing and this

can also be seen only in vipassanā meditation, even in phenomena we call

pleasurable. When we recall the dukkha is concealed by postures; more

specifically, there is always dukkha in the body, but we conceal that pain by

changing postures. That is why Buddhism instruct meditators to sit very still while

they are meditating. If yogis avoid changing postures often, they will achieve

mindfulness and concentration and they will observe the nature of dukkha directly.

Anatta, the no-soul nature of all things, is concealed by compactness. We usually

see things as solid and compact. We have to train our minds through vipassanā

meditation to look at and analyze that compactness more closely. Just as a scientist

uses a microscope to look at things in a laboratory, so yogis must use concentration

in vipassanā meditation to penetrate into the unsubstantial, anatta nature of things.

We must try to see through the apparently solid mass of mental and physical

phenomena.

Regarding material things, we try to analyze and observe them as earth,

water, air, and other material properties. Regarding mental phenomena, we try to

see that, for example, one phenomenon is contact, another feeling and another

perception, although these may have been experienced very rapidly as only one

mental event. Both mental and physical phenomena are composed of only elements

and forces, and thus have the nature of being anatta (unsubstantial). That is why

we must try to observe everything very slowly in meditation in order to see that

phenomena are not held together with a core, an atta.

For example, all mental states and material properties have their own

functions. Contact has one function, feeling another and perception still another. If

we see these mental phenomena as one connected whole, we fail to see them as
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parts with specific functions and we fail to see them as void of a central core, atta.

These mental states actually have different ways of taking objects and responding

to them. Lobha (attachment) has one kind of response; dosa (hatred) another. We

must see the individual differences of these mental states. We need to analyze and

observe deeply to see that mind and matter have individual functions and

responses. One superficial observation and analyzes, everything seems to be

compact, whole and substantial. All of us think that a book is very solid, but if we

could look at this book under a microscope, it would appear full of holes, with

empty spaces, like a sieve. Vipassanā is like using a microscope to see that all

things are only elements and force which are not unified by any kind of core, by

any kind of atta.

In the third section of the sutta, Buddha states that: Any kind of form,

whether past, future, or presently arisen; whether in oneself or external; whether

inferior or superior; whether far or near; must with right understanding be regarded

thus: This is not mine; this is not I; this is not myself or soul. There can be different

kinds of form, different kinds of matter, but none of them can be regarded as atta

or as having atta. The same is true for feelings, perceptions, mental formations and

consciousness. Next, Buddha explains to the monks the progress made by a

meditator: When a noble follower who has heard the truth sees thus, he finds

estrangement of form, finds estrangement in feeling, finds estrangement in

perceptions, in mental formations and in consciousness. This means that the

meditator becomes weary of form, dispassionate about matter. The meditator

realizes that the aggregates are impermanent suffering, and no-soul.

When he finds estrangement, passion fades out. Buddha is here describing

stages of vipassanā meditation in a very brief form with many stages left out. The

disciple wants to be free from the five aggregates, so this person makes more
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effort. The meditator then arrives at equanimity about formations. When Buddha

uses the phrase finds estrangement, he is referring to all of the stages of vipassanā

up to the very highest stage. After finding estrangement, passion fades out in one

moment, the moment of enlightenment. That is the moment known as path

consciousness, when some defilements of the mind are eradicated.

Buddha continues, with the fading of passion, he is liberated. This means

that the meditator has reached the two or three moments after path consciousness

known as fruition consciousness. When liberated, there is knowledge that he is

liberated. Here the meditator reflects on the path, on fruition, on nibbāna, on

defilements destroyed and on defilements that are remaining. He understands:

Birth is exhausted. The holy life has been lived out. What need to be done is done.

Of this there is no more beyond. Like Buddha when He became enlightened, the

meditator says similar words.

The discourse ends: This is what the Blessed One said. The bhikkhus

(monks) were glad, and they approved His words. Now during this utterance, the

hearts of the monks of the group of five were liberated from taints, through

clinging on more. This means that they had become Arahats. By understanding the

doctrine of anatta (no-soul), they were now free of all fetters, defilements and

impurities. They had reached the highest state of enlightenment. They had realized

nibbāna and were free from all rebirths. Here is ending of the sixth chapter on

Anatta (No-ego, No-soul) and the researcher is going to sum up the seventh

chapter of conclusion.