Yes, I believe there will be another hegemonic war in the future, or at least a hegemonic crisis
that pushes the international system to the brink of major conflict. The core structural pressures
that drive great powers toward war—especially the differential growth in capabilities between a
dominant state and a rising challenger—remain active, creating a profound risk of system-wide
conflict. The most pertinent real-world example is the escalating rivalry between the United
States and China, which aligns precisely with the conditions for systemic change and potential
hegemonic conflict.
1. The Realist Argument: The Inevitability of Power Transition
The probability of hegemonic war is high because the structural conditions outlined by Realist
theory, particularly the power transition model, are currently being met in the US-China
relationship.
The Realist paradigm asserts that the international system is defined by anarchy and power
politics, compelling states to prioritize survival and compete constantly for relative gains.
According to Robert Gilpin's theory, the stability of an international order is determined by the
alignment between the distribution of material power and the hierarchy of prestige. A hegemonic
war becomes likely when a disequilibrium emerges because a dominant state is unable to
consolidate its hegemony against a rising challenger that is dissatisfied with the status quo.
The rivalry between the United States, currently the dominant power, and China, the rapidly
growing challenger, exemplifies this disequilibrium. China has been steadily converting its
enormous economic capabilities into military and diplomatic clout, narrowing the power gap.
The primary danger arises from the possibility of a preventive war. The declining dominant
state (the US) may initiate conflict while it still holds a definitive advantage to prevent the
challenger (China) from becoming stronger in the future. China, a large, rapidly modernizing
state with significant foreign policy ambitions, perceives the US-led system as challenging its
regional influence and global status. As China continues to grow, it will demand a greater role in
setting the rules and conventions of the international system.
Flashpoints like Taiwan and the South China Sea represent direct military and political
conflicts of interest that could trigger this systemic war. The fear of future US or Chinese actions
—driven by the inability of either state to credibly commit to not exploiting their power
advantage later on—creates an immense commitment problem that heightens the risk of
preventive conflict. Therefore, from a Realist perspective, the underlying structural changes in
power make a major hegemonic conflict between the US and China highly probable.
2. The Liberal Argument: Interdependence as Deterrence
Neoliberal Institutionalism acknowledges the structural competition highlighted by Realists but
argues that a hegemonic war is less likely because modern factors—specifically economic
interdependence and international institutions—act as potent deterrents.
The Liberal paradigm focuses on the logic that states prioritize absolute gains (how much they
gain) and can build cooperative frameworks even in an anarchic environment. They contend that
war is costly, meaning that a settlement that both sides prefer over fighting generally exists. The
challenge is overcoming the strategic problems that prevent states from reaching that peaceful
bargain.
In the case of the US-China rivalry, the deep economic interdependence between the two states
raises the expected costs of war to an unprecedented level, thereby enlarging the bargaining
range and encouraging both sides to avoid violent conflict. The US and China are deeply
entwined through trade, finance, and investment (China holds substantial US financial assets),
making economic isolation highly damaging and costly to both economies. This interdependence
ensures that the expected value of war is significantly diminished, which theoretically should
incentivize negotiation over confrontation.
Furthermore, international institutions facilitate cooperation by mitigating the problems of
commitment and information. They heighten the shadow of the future by ensuring that states
consider long-term consequences of defection, making today's aggressive actions more costly.
Through bodies like the WTO, the UN, and regional agreements (like RCEP, which China
promotes), conflicts over scarce resources or policy disputes can be funneled into dispute
resolution mechanisms, helping to prevent escalation.
While acknowledging these strong deterrents, Liberals must concede that the stability provided
by interdependence is conditional. If issues such as the sovereignty of Taiwan are perceived as
indivisible goods (non-negotiable on principle), or if external pressures cause domestic political
forces to prioritize ideology over economic self-interest (e.g., through populist nationalism), the
bargaining process may fail, regardless of the prohibitive costs. However, the strength of their
economic ties creates a powerful disincentive that pushes both states toward restraint,
minimizing the likelihood that the Realist structural shift will actually result in a catastrophic
war.
Conclusion
The prognosis for future stability is highly conditional. The Realist paradigm correctly identifies
the structural conditions for a hegemonic war in the US-China rivalry—the disequilibrium
caused by a rising dissatisfied challenger and the temptation for the dominant state to launch a
preventive war. This underlying power shift guarantees that the two nations will continue to
engage in intense, systemic competition.
However, the Liberal paradigm offers hope, suggesting that the unprecedented depth of
economic interdependence acts as a colossal deterrent, effectively enlarging the bargaining
range by making the mutual costs of war unacceptably high.
The future trajectory of international relations, therefore, hinges not on the existence of
competition (which is certain), but on the ability of the competing powers to successfully avoid
bargaining failure despite the overwhelming incentives that compel them toward conflict.