TEAM CODE: TC – 235
INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2026
BEFORE THE HON’BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT, NAGPUR
BENCH
Under section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
IN THE MATTER BETWEEN
MOHAN (Applicant)
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (Respondent)
MEMORANDUM FOR APPELLANT
Table of Abbreviation
AIR All India Reporter
Anr. Another
art. Article
CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure
DRJ Delhi Reported Judgments
Etc. Et Cetera
Hon’ble Honourable
i.e., That is
Ors. Others
¶ Paragraph
PIL Public Interest Litigation
RPA Representation of the People Act
section Section
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SRA Sindhu Rashtra Act, 2025
UOI Union of India
v. Versus
Vol. Volume
BNS Bhartiya Nyay Sanhita, 2023.
BNSS Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023.
3 Memorial of Appellant
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Legislations and Rules –
Bhartiya Nyay Sanhita, 2023.
Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
Materials in public domain
[Link]
provocative-poem-sc-legal-news/
[Link]
feelings-bombay-hc-fir-chargesheet-quashed/
[Link]
crpc-and-incomplete-investigation-288056
[Link]
2025-free-speech-516583
[Link]
supreme-court-lays-down-four-step-test-for-high-courts-to-quash-criminal-cases-303320
4 Memorial of Appellant
Statement of Jurisdiction
The petitioner most humbly submits that this Hon’ble Court has
jurisdiction to try the instant matter under section 528 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
This Hon’ble High Court is vested with inherent powers to pass such orders as may be necessary to prevent
abuse of the process of law and to secure the ends of justice. In exercise of these powers, this Hon’ble Court
may quash an FIR or criminal proceedings where their continuance would result in abuse of process of the
court and injustice.
5 Memorial of Appellant
Statement of Facts
Sr. No. Events Description
1. Decision of Birthday Mohan, 26 year old Engineer and a teetotaller decides to
Party celebrate his birthday at Obad Club, Nagpur on 10 th September
2025 with his friends Madhur and Utkarsh.
2. Wish of breaking They all gathered at 7:00 pm at Mohan’s residence went to the
teetotalism club. Mohan expressed his wish to break his teetotalism
completely unaware about the fact that both of his friends were
fond of alcohol and often get in scuffle after drinking. All of
them drank several beers.
3. Leaving the club All of them began to speak loudly, disturbing other patrons while
premises. leaving the club. Rajesh, along with being waiter at the club had
responsibility to maintain peace and tranquillity inside the club
asked the trio to leave the club immediately.
4. Heated exchange and Mohan and his friends felt insulted by Rajesh’s words and the
physical blows verbal spat quickly escalated in heated exchange and even
physical blows between the parties.
5. Intervention of police Just outside in front of the club gate police patrolling van which
outside the club was passing nearby saw the commotion and apprehended all four
premises and case of Affray, 194 BNS was registered against them.
6. Investigation Two police official and one staff member of club recorded the
statement that all four were fighting and shouting loudly in
public.
7. Filing of chargesheet The chargesheet was filed in front of JMFC naming all four as
before JMFC accused.
8. Petition before Hon’ble Aggrieved Mohan contended that the incident was mere personal
High Court scuffle and the FIR should be quashed as his acts does not
amount to Affray. Hence this petition.
6 Memorial of Appellant
Statement of Issues
Issue 1
Whether the High Court, amidst the stage of the investigation as it presently stands and the nature of the
offence alleged, is entitled to interfere with the investigation and quash the FIR in the present case?
Issue 2
Whether the offence of Affray under Section 194 of the BNS is made out against the Applicant, warranting
sufficient ground for quashing of FIR?
7 Memorial of Appellant
Summary of Arguments
Issue 1
The petitioner humbly submits that the High Court at the nascent stage of investigation in the case of
cognizable offence can quash the FIR to prevent the abuse of the process of court and to secure ends of
justice based on following grounds. Firstly, there is no legal barrier in approaching the High court at the
nascent stage. Secondly, even after the chargesheet is filed before the JMFC the High Court under § 528
BNSS is empowered to quash the FIR. Thirdly, the present case satisfies the test established by the
Honourable Supreme Court under State of Haryana vs Bhajan Lal, 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 and recently in
Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, SCC OnLine SC 1947 for determining the
validity of petition under 528 BNSS invoking the inherent power of High Court.
Issue 2
The petitioner humbly submits that the essential elements of the alleged offence of Affray in the present
case are not fulfilled based on the following grounds. Firstly, the FIR is ambiguous as the contents of the
FIR, as well as statements of witnesses, are not clear enough to state that since when or for how much time
the fighting was going on, acts of accused were voluntary fighting or mere act of self-defense. Secondly, no
conclusive evidence that because of the fight any annoyance has resulted to the public. Thirdly, the
allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value
and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused.
8 Memorial of Appellant
Arguments advanced
.
Issue 1 – The High Court under 528 BNSS is entitled to interfere with the investigation and
quash the FIR in the preset case.
A. No legal Barrier in moving to the High Court at nascent stage under § 528 BNSS to quash the
FIR.
1. “In the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866, the Supreme Court summarized
some categories of cases where inherent power can be exercised to quash the criminal trial
proceedings: (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or
continuance e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or
complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged ;
and (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the
evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.”1
2. The case of Imran Pratapgadhi2 offers valuable clarity on the scope and exercise of the High Court’s
inherent jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings under Section 528 of the BNSS (earlier Section
482 of the CrPC). It reiterates that the power to quash must be exercised with circumspection and in
accordance with well-established principles. The Court emphasised that while examining a plea for
quashing, the High Court is required to assess the case against settled parameters, including whether
the allegations, taken at face value, disclose the commission of any offence and whether continuation
of the proceedings would result in an abuse of the process of law or cause manifest injustice.
3. Thus, it was established that the High Court can nterfare in the nascent stage and quash the FIR by
deciding (i) whether a cognizable offence is disclosed, (ii) the presence of malice and/ or (iii)
whether the proceedings have been initiated for oblique purposes, and (iv) whether the allegations
are so absurd that no rational person acting fairly would accept. If any of these factors exist, the
court must not hesitate to quash the proceedings. Whether the investigation is at a preliminary or
stage is not the relevant consideration.
1
R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866.
2
Imran Paratapgandhi v. State of Gujrat, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 678.
9 Memorial of Appellant
B. Even though chargesheet is filed in cognizable offence the High Court under § 528 BNSS is
empowered to quash FIR
4. “In Shaileshbhai Ranchhodbhai Patel & Another v. State of Gujarat & Ors.. the Supreme Court held
that the High Court under Section 482 Cr. PC. (now, Section 528 BNSS) retains the power to quash
an FIR, even after charge-sheet under Section 173(2) CrPC [now, Section 193(3) BNSS] thereof is
filed, provided a satisfaction is reached, inter alia, that either the FIR and the charge-sheet read
together, even accepted as true and correct without rebuttal, do not disclose the commission of any
offence or that continuation of proceedings arising out of such an FIR would in fact be an abuse of
the process of law as well as of the Court given the peculiar circumstances of each particular case.” 3
5. “Similarly, in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. the matter arose from the quashing plea
of an F.I.R., where the chargesheet was submitted after institution of the petition under Section 482
CrPC (now, Section 528 BNSS). It was opined that even if the charge sheet had been filed, the Court
could still examine if offences alleged to have been committed were prima facie made out or not on
the basis of the F.I.R., chargesheet and other documents.”4
6. “Again, in Mamta Shailesh Chandra v. State of Uttarakhand & Ors. the Supreme Court held that if
the charge sheet is filed against the accused during the pendency of the petition for quashing of the
FIR, the High Court is not restrained from exercising its inherent jurisdiction and could still examine
if offences alleged to have been committed were prima facie made out or not on the basis of the
F.I.R., charge sheet and other documents.”5
7. “The Supreme Court, once more, in Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), [8] held that
there is nothing in the words of the Section 482 CrPC (now, Section 528 BNSS) which restricts the
exercise of the power of the Court to prevent the abuse of process of court or miscarriage of justice
only to the stage of the FIR and that the High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482
CrPC (now, Section 528 BNSS) even when the discharge application is pending with the trial court.
It would be a travesty to hold that proceedings initiated against a person can be interfered with at the
stage of FIR but not if it has advanced and the allegations have materialized into a charge-sheet. On
the contrary it could be stated that the abuse of process caused by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR
3
Shaileshbhai Ranchhodbhai Patel & Another v. State of Gujrat & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 1884 of 2013.
4
Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujrat & Ors., (2011) 7 SCC 59.
5
Mamata Shailesh Chandra v. State of Uttarakhand & Ors., SLP (Cri.) No(s). 7273/2019.
10 Memorial of Appellant
has taken the form of a charge-sheet after investigation. The power is conferred to prevent abuse of
process of power of any court.”6
8. “Further, in Abhishek v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court rejected the contention of the
Respondent that the Appellant's quashing petition against the FIR was liable to be dismissed, in any
event, as the chargesheet in relation thereto was submitted before the Court and taken on file. It was
held that the High Court would continue to have the power to entertain and act upon a petition filed
under Section 482 C.r. P.C. (now, Section 528 BNSS) to quash the FIR even when a chargesheet is
filed by the police during the pendency of such petition.”7
9. “Recently, on September 25, 2024, the Supreme Court in Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel & Ors. v.
State of Maharashtra & Anr. [10] held that there is no prohibition against quashing of the criminal
proceedings even after the charge sheet has been filed.”8
C. The test established by Honourable Supreme Court are satisfied
10. “In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the
exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of
the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases
by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process
of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any
precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and
to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.”9
11. “The test established was as follows:
a. Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused.
b. Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any,
6
Anand Kumar Mohatta v. state of (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 11 SCC 706.
7
Abhishek v. state of Madhya Pradesh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1083.
8
Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel & Ors. V. state of Maharashtra & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 4003/2024.
9
State of Haryana vs Bhajan Lal, 1992 SCC (Cri) 426.
11 Memorial of Appellant
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by
police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within
the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
c. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out
a case against the accused.
d. Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of
a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
e. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable
on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
f. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the
concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
g. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”10
12. In the said case titled Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. the Apex
Court laid down the following steps which should ordinarily determine the veracity of a prayer for
quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of
the Cr.P.C./ Section 528 of BNSS”11
13. “Step One: Whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable,
i.e., the materials is of sterling and impeccable quality? Step Two: Whether the material relied upon
by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused,
i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint,
i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual
basis of the accusations as false. Step Three: Whether the material relied upon by the accused, has
not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be
justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? Step Four: Whether proceeding with the trial
10
State of Haryana vs Bhajan Lal, 1992 SCC (Cri) 426.
11
Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, SCC OnLine SC 1947.
12 Memorial of Appellant
would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?”12
Issue 2 – The essential elements of the alleged offence of Affray as per 194 (1) BNS, especially the
disturbance to public peace are not fulfilled which makes the FIR absurd and needs to be quashed to
secure ends of justice.
A. The FIR is ambiguous in nature as it lacks clarity over the fulfillment of the essential elements
of the alleged offence of Affray.
14. No only this but also the case of Jeya Priston and Othr. V. State through the Inspector of Police 13
2025 SCC OnLine Mad 8248, which was decided on January 3, 2025 by madaras High Court the
issue to be considerd is that whether an offence has been made out by satisfying the ingredient under
section 159 I.P.C. as followed- This Court had an occasion to deal with the scope of Section 159
I.P.C. in Nagarajan v. State [Crl. O.P. (MD) No. 17260 of 2018 dated 27.09.2018], wherein this
Court has held as follows:— “The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the following
judgments in order to substantiate the points raised by him. The first judgment relied upon by the
learned counsel for the petitioners is reported in, AIR 1938 Mad 924 in P. Rami Reddy v. Chintha
Chinna Narasi Reddy. The relevant portions of the judgment is extracted here under: “In my
opinion defines "fighting" for affray (under old Section 160 IPC, akin to Section 194 BNS) as a
mutual contest or struggle for mastery between two or more parties, implying reciprocal violence or
threats.
15. Absence of such bilateral engagement, it constitutes mere one-sided assault or beating, not affray.
The court acquitted petitioners of affray charges, setting aside convictions, as prosecution framed the
case solely on affray despite evidence supporting other offences.”
16. The second judgment that is relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners is reported in,
2007 Cri LJ 4747 in Pushpa v. Ravi 14 The relevant portions of the judgment is extracted here
under, “To constitute an offence under Section 160 IPC, three ingredients must be satisfied: “A
reading of Section 159 IPC would clearly indicate that in order to bring home the guilt of the
accused for an offence of affray, the prosecution should satisfy the three essentials. Firstly, fighting
must be between two or more persons. Secondly, fighting must take place in a public place, and
thirdly, such fighting must also result in disturbance of public peace. In the absence of even one of
12
Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, SCC OnLine SC 1947.
13
Jeya Priston and Othr. V. State through the Inspector of Police, 2025 SCC OnLine Mad 8248.
14
Pushpa v. Ravi, 2007 Cri LJ 4747.
13 Memorial of Appellant
these ingredients, it cannot be stated that there was either an affray or the accused facing the trial,
should be held responsible.”
17. “The contents of the FIR, as well as statements of witnesses, are not clear enough to state that since
when or for how much time the f ighting was going on. If that was for more period, then it would
have certainly caused hurt to any one or all or more than one amongst them. Therefore, the contents
of the FIR, as well as the material in the charge-sheet are not sufficient to attract the ingredients of
Section 159 of the Indian Penal Code and therefore, it cannot be said that there is sufficient evidence
to arrive at a conclusion that the applicants have committed offence punishable under Section 160 of
the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, it would be unjust to direct the applicants to face the trial.” 15
B. The important element of threat to public or public annoyance to constitute offence of Affray
is not fulfilled.
18. In the case of Gadadhar Guru v, state if Odissa16it was held that “An offence of affray in essence
consists of three ingredients, the first being fighting by two or more persons, secondly, the fighting
must take place in a public place and thirdly, such fighting must also result in disturbance of the
public peace. Only if such ingredients are satisfied, an offence of affray can be said to have
occasioned for which the persons causing the same would be responsible. The fight must have
necessarily caused annoyance to the public and hence satisfied the third ingredient of Section 159,
I.P.C. would not be justified. In the first-place annoyance to public, if at all, is not necessarily also
disturbance of public peace which is more pervasive and of wider reach. In a prosecution under
Section 159, I.P.C. there must be positive evidence of public peace having been disturbed which
would mean that by the action of the accused the even tempo of life of the public was disturbed
resulting in affecting the peace and tranquility of the locality. No such evidence has admittedly been
led. It was observed in Podan v. State of Kerala17, that mere causing inconvenience to the public is
not disturbance of public peace the two being entirely different notions.”
19. The fight did not result in a disturbance of the public peace, which is a necessary component of
Section 194 of the BNS. As a result, no offence is proven because there was neither a breach nor a
disturbance of the public peace. “Which also held in the case of C. Subbrayudu v. state of Andhra
PradeshThe accusation against the petitioner and other is to the effect that on 26-6-1992 the accused
of ‘A’ party and ‘B’ party, containing two persons each, were abusing and kicking each other
15
Mahant Kaushalya Das v. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 2.
16
Gadadhar Guru v, state if Odissa, 1989 SCC OnLine Ori 130.
17
Podan v. State of Kerala, 1962 (1) Cri. L.J. 339.
14 Memorial of Appellant
causing breach of peace. The alleged plea of guilty, by the petitioner and accused No. 2 was not
recorded by the Spl. Judl. II Class Magistrate. Under Section 252 Cr. P.C. a Magistrate shall record
the plea of guilty as nearly as possible in the words used by the accused. No such attempt has been
made by the learned Magistrate.
20. This is a mandatory requirement, violation of which renders the conviction illegal. Before convicting
an accused on the basis of plea of guilty, a Magistrate should take the following precautions. He
should ascertain whether all the copies of the documents on which prosecution relies have been
supplied to the accused. Thereafter sufficient time has to be allowed for perusing them. He should
satisfy himself that the. allegations in the accusation do constitute an of-fence. He should question
the accused on all the ingredients of the offence to find out whether the accused understood the
nature of the offence. The plea of guilty should be recorded in the words of the accused. He should
find that the plea of guilty was free and voluntary.” ”18
21. The provisions of the Section are mandatory as held in Mahant Kaushalya Das v. State of Madras
AIR 1966 SC 22; Podan v. State of Kerala 1962 I Cri LJ 339 explains the offence of Affrary as a
fight i.e., a bilateral act in which two parties participate and it will not amount to an affray when the
party who is assaulted submits to the assault without resistance. Again, there must be a definite
disturbance of the public peace due to the fight in the public place to make the offence affray, mere
causing, inconvenience to the public is not sufficient
C. The offence alleged is not made out and thus the FIR should be quashed.
22. To strengthen our second arguments, we are relying upon the case of Bombay high courts recent
19
judgement of 2025 Rajesh and others v. State of Maharashtra in which the honourable court
quashed and set aside the F.I.R.. as the case do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused came to conclusion after analysing the precedent given by the other High
Court and Supreme Court for that matter the honourable court relied upon the “unreported ruling of
the Bombay High Court of Judicature, Bench at Aurangabad, in Nadeem Ajij Pathan v. State of
Maharashtra. In this case, the same issue was decided, and Hon’ble High Court, Bench at
Aurangabad was pleased to quash and set aside the F.I.R., which was registered under Section 160
of I.P.C. The material, which was collected during investigation, goes to show that there was free
fighting between the parties. However, it falls short to attract Section 159 of I.P.C., which defines
affray as under:
“159. Affray.—When two or more persons, by fighting in a public place, disturb the public peace,
18
C. Subbrayudu v. state of Andhra Pradesh, 1995SCC OnLine AP 871.
19
Rajesh and others. V. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 2730.
15 Memorial of Appellant
they are said to “commit an affray”. As per the ingredients of Section 159 of I.P.C., there must be
two or more person, there should be fighting between them in public place and the result of such
fighting should be in disturbance to the public peace. If these three ingredients are satisfied, then
and then only it can be said that the accused has committed an offence of affray. Under Section 160
of I.P.C., punishment of imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which
may extend to one hundred rupees, or with both is provided for committing the offence of affray.
23. Therefore, two ingredients of Section 159 of I.P.C. are satisfied that there were more than two
persons and there was fighting in the public place. However, the third limb of Section 159 of I.P.C.
was absent, as it can be gathered from the material placed before us and, therefore, it cannot be
said that the applicants have committed the offence of affray. It would be useful to refer to the order
dated 04/12/2024 passed in Criminal Application No. 3624 of 2023 by the High Court of Bombay at
Aurangabad Bench, wherein the learned Division Bench by relying on the reported judgment in the
case of Mahant Kaushalya Das v. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 2220 has held thus:
24. ‘Mere causing public inconvenience is not sufficient’. Here there are no statements of persons from
the public to see even prima facie, as to whether the public peace was disturbed. Furthermore, the
use of the word fighting will not be sufficient as in the present case the word used is ‘Maramari’.
The said fighting should be as a result of use of force and further it can be considered that neither in
the F.I.R. nor in the statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or even by the
Investigating Officer, it was tried to extract as to what was the point/reason, on which those persons
were fighting. It also appears that though four persons were taken in custody, they were not taken
for medical examination in order to see as to whether the said fighting has caused any kind of hurt
to any one of them or all of them.”21
25. The law laid down in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 22, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : AIR
1992 SC 604, wherein seven parameters have been laid down, but the present case would fall in one
of the categories i.e. Clause (a) of paragraph 8.1, which reads thus: “(a) where the allegations made
in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused;”
26. The present case is also somewhat identical. The entire record does not show that there was
disturbance to the public peace incident was mere personal scuffle and had not bearing on public
20
Mahant Kaushalya Das v. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 22.
21
Rajesh and other v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 2730.
22
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604.
16 Memorial of Appellant
peace. The contents of the F.I.R. as well as the material in the charge-sheet depict that the material is
not sufficient to attract the ingredients of Section 194 of B.N.S., and therefore, it cannot be said that
the applicants have committed an offence punishable under Section 194 of B.N.S and the FIR needs
to be quashed to secure ends of justice.
17 Memorial of Appellant
TABLE OF
CONTENTS PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of the facts stated, issues raised, authorities cited and arguments advanced, it is most
humbly prayed before the Hon’ble Court, that it may be graciously pleased to held that:
The essential elements of the alleged offence of Affray are not fulfilled and the FIR needs to be
quashed pertaining to the inherent power of Honorable High Court in 528 BNSS preventing abuse of
process of any court and securing ends of justice
AND/OR
Pass any other order it may deem fit, in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.
All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted
S/d__________
Counsel for Appellant
18 Memorial of Appellant