Official Language and Legal Maxims Essay
Official Language and Legal Maxims Essay
TOPIC:
ESSAY – OFFICIAL LANGUAGE
LEGAL MAXIMS – EX NUDO PACTO NON ORITUR ACTION & LIS
PENDENS
LANDMARK CASE –
Professor In-Charge
Ms. Inez Lazar
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AKNOWLEDGEMENT
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INDEX
5. Conclusion
6. References
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1. OFFICIAL LANGUAGE
The concept of an official language is a significant aspect of national identity and
governance, particularly in linguistically diverse nations. An official language is
defined by the Cambridge English Dictionary as, "the language or one of the
languages that is accepted by a country's government, is taught in schools, used
in the courts of law, etc.” Depending on the decree, establishment of an official
language might also place restrictions on the use of other languages. Designated
rights of an official language can be created in written form or by historic usage.
An official language is recognized by 178 countries, of which 101 recognize more
than one. The government of Italy made Italian their official language in 1999,
and some nations (such as Mexico and Australia) have never declared de jure
official languages at the national level. Other nations have declared non-
indigenous official languages. Many of the world's constitutions mention one or
more official or national languages. Some countries use the official language
designation to empower indigenous groups by giving them access to the
government in their native languages. In countries that do not formally designate
an official language, a de facto national language usually evolves. English is the
most common official or co-official language, with recognized status in 52
countries. Arabic, French, and Spanish are official or co-official languages in
several countries.
India is home to multicultural and linguistic values and diversity that recognises
and accommodates respect for different practices, customs, traditions, and
languages. Linguistic diversity is widespread and unique in each part of the
country. There is a saying that depicts the importance of language which goes
like, “when people are enslaved, as long as they hold fast to their language it is
as if they had the key to their prison”.
India was a colony of Britain that ruled for a sufficiently long period of time
simply for its own economic benefits. That is why Dr. Shashi Tharoor called India
Britain’s biggest cash cow at the Oxford Union debate.
When Britain came to rule in India, it made laws for its own benefit, played divide
and rule, and even subjected the people to mass famine. It could, however, not
rule on the mother tongue of the Indians. Indians decided to hold onto their local
languages because that was the only way they could feel independent.
In India, the Constitution provides elaborate provisions for official language,
reflecting the country's complex linguistic landscape. The Constitution designates
Hindi, written in Devanagari script, as the official language of the Union.
However, the framers of the Constitution recognized the need for a transitional
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period, allowing English to continue for official purposes for fifteen years from
the commencement of the Constitution.
English, Urdu, and later Hindi were the official languages of British India, with
English being used at the government level. Official Hindi dates back to 1900,
when MacDonnell issued an order allowing the “permissive — but not exclusive
— use” of Devanagari for Hindustani in the North-Western Provinces’ courts.
The Indian constitution, which was established in 1950, stated that English would
be phased out in favour of Hindi over a fifteen-year period, but that Parliament
would have the ability to provision for the use of English even after that. Plans to
make Hindi the Republic’s single official language were met with opposition in
several sections of the country. English and Hindi are still used today, along with
other official languages (at the federal level and in some states).
In 1950, the Indian constitution designated Hindi in Devanagari script as the
official language of the country. The use of English for official purposes was to
end 15 years after the constitution took effect, on January 26, 1965, unless
Parliament voted otherwise. However, non-Hindi-speaking portions of India,
particularly Dravidian-speaking states whose languages are unrelated to Hindi,
were alarmed by the potential of the switchover. As a result, Parliament passed
the Official Languages Act of 1963, which allowed English and Hindi to be used
for official purposes even after 1965.
An attempt was made in late 1964 to specifically prohibit the use of English, but
states including Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, West Bengal, Karnataka,
Puducherry, Nagaland, Mizoram, and Andhra Pradesh objected. Some of these
demonstrations became violent. As a result, the proposal was dropped, and the
Act was amended in 1967 to provide that the use of English would not be
discontinued until a resolution was passed by the legislatures of all states that had
not adopted Hindi as their official language, as well as by each house of the Indian
Parliament.
As a result, the Union government continues to use English as a “subsidiary
official language” in addition to Hindi for official purposes, but it is also required
to plan and implement a programme to gradually enhance its use of Hindi. The
Constitution, the Official Languages Act, 1963, the Official Languages Rules,
1976, and legislative instruments issued by the Department of Official Language
under these laws regulate the amount and areas in which the Union government
employs Hindi and English, respectively.
A national language of a nation is restricted to accommodate various identities
and their differences. This is often associated with the ‘one nation, one language’
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goal of the country. It is different from official languages. In India, there might
be confusion over the difference between national and official language since the
common perception of people is that Hindi is the national language of India.
Hindi is one of our regional languages under the Eighth Schedule of the
Constitution. It is not a national language because India does not have a national
language. In 2010, the Gujarat High Court in Suresh Bhai v. Union (2010)
observed that ‘since the majority of the people have accepted Hindi as a national
language and many people speak Hindi and write in Devanagari, yet there is no
official record to suggest that any provision has been made to consider it as the
national language of the country.’
The Preamble of the Indian Constitution reiterates the secular features of the
Indian Constitution which happen to be a part of the Basic Structure Doctrine
found in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1962). The word secular was
added by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment in 1976. But that does not mean
that the Indian Constitution was not secular before. It has been secular in spirit
and in the letter from the very beginning.
Secularism was later described as a part of the basic structure in S.R. Bommai v.
UOI (1994). The only reason why it is not added at the first instance by the
Drafting Committee was that the constitutional farmers were apprehensive of the
fact that the word may be misused to deny the history of the Indian nationalism.
Part XVII of the Constitution deals with official language under which Article
343 specifies that the official language of the Union shall be Hindi in Devanagari
script along with the international form of the Indian numerals. But,
notwithstanding this, English will continue to be used for all official purposes of
the Union for a period of fifteen years from the commencement of the
Constitution, that is till 25th January 1965.
Further, the President has the power to authorise the use of the Hindi language in
addition to the English language for the official purposes of the Union. Provided
that the Parliament may by law provide for the continuing use of the English
language after the period of fifteen years, which was added through an
amendment in 1967, for the purposes specified by law.
A private Bill was introduced in the Parliament through the Constitution
(Amendment) Bill, 2019 that sought to add the 22 scheduled languages of the
Eighth Schedule to Article 343 of the Constitution. This means that the 22
scheduled languages were to get a status of official languages in addition to Hindi.
The draft Constitution did not have any provision to deal with language initially.
But a proposal was moved by Shri N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, a member of the
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Constituent Assembly, to add language provisions on 12th September 1948. In
the Draft Article 301A, the debate between the members of the Constituent
Assembly surrounded the differences in recognising Hindi as the official
language as the people in South India were not as well versed and fluent with the
language as those in North India.
Ayyangar proposed continuing English as the official language of the Union for
some time, after the commencement of the Constitution. This proposal was
further discussed by K.M. Munshi, a member of the Constituent Assembly, and
the language provision was collectively known as the ‘Munshi–Ayyangar
formula’.
Further, the Assembly debated over replacing Hindi with Hindustani as some of
the members were impressed by the flexibility and integrity the language offered.
There were heated arguments on the acceptance of international numerals, which
some sides proposed, that the inclusion of it will offer universality, while others
wanted that national numerals must be placed before the world so that it gets
global acceptance. At the same time, another school of thought proposed Sanskrit
as the official language as it predominates in the literary forms of Hindi but at the
same time, it is not a language of common people.
It was finally decided by the house to keep Hindi as the official language with
Devanagari script and not downright reject the use of English for the official
purposes of the Union and thus, an interim period of fifteen years have been added
to replace English with that of Hindi. This objective is also backed by Article 351
which obligates the Union to promote the spread of the Hindi language to develop
it as to serve as a medium of expression for cultural assimilation.
Further, Article 346 of the Constitution allows for the use of Hindi language for
communication between the states, provided that if two or more states agree for
the same. Generally, the language of communication between states and the
Union and states would be the one authorised for use in the Union for official
purposes.
Within the state, the Legislature can adopt any one or more of the languages or
Hindi for its official purposes, provided that the English language shall continue
to be used for the official purposes unless otherwise provided by law under Article
345. But this shall not preclude the President to direct the use of other languages
substantially spoken by the proportion of the population as per Article 347.
Article 344 and the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution gives adequate
representation and recognition to the linguistic diversity in India. The Eighth
Schedule recognises 23 languages, namely: (1) Assamese, (2) Bengali, (3)
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Gujarati, (4) Hindi, (5) Kannada, (6) Kashmiri, (7) Konkani, (8) Malayalam, (9)
Manipuri, (10) Marathi, (11) Nepali, (12) Oriya, (13) Punjabi, (14) Sanskrit, (15)
Sindhi, (16) Tamil, (17) Telugu, (18) Urdu, (19) Bodo, (20) Santhali, (21)
Maithili, (22) Dogri and (23) English. These languages are added in accordance
with the linguistic grounds. Others have been excluded based on the same ground.
Under Article 344 of the Constitution, the President shall, after five years from
the commencement of the Constitution and ten years from such commencement,
by order constitute a Commission which shall consist of a Chairman and such
other members representing the different languages specified in the Eighth
Schedule.
The Commission is bestowed with the duty to make recommendations to the
President for the progressive use of the Hindi language for the official purposes
of the Union, restrictions on the use of English language for all or any of the
official purposes of the Union, or in respect of matters related to the use of official
language for the purpose of communication between states, and Union and states
to name a few. Provided that the recommendations must also consider the claims
of the non-Hindi speaking population and due regard must be given to industrial,
cultural, and scientific advancement in India.
It is pertinent to understand that the Eighth Schedule does not mention English as
one of its languages. The idea of the constitutional framers was to include it to
continue with the official work of the Union before the commencement of the
Constitution was pursued in English, the language of the coloniser. But this was
not the only reason because the English language at the time of the drafting of the
Constitution was widely known in other parts of the world too.
The Munshi-Ayyangar formula was a sort of compromise that the Constituent
Assembly agreed on because, first, it was necessary as against the demand of the
various groups to recognise their language. Second, this compromise offered
stability as the country had just become independent from the rule of Britain and
it needed to find its own voice and stand that they long lost because of
colonialism. This meant that rather than instant recognition of various regional
languages, the idea was to agree on one language that was spoken and understood
by the majority and at the same time, it was not possible to disown the language
of the coloniser suddenly as India needed to find its place at the global front too.
Since in many parts of the country the population is recognised through their
unique linguistic identity, it is imperative to give them the recognition they
deserve. India has a population of over 121 crores, and due to the existence of a
variety of languages and mother tongue, there could be a conflict between the
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communities over the non-recognition of their language. It is pertinent to
understand that accommodation of cultural and linguistic values go a long way in
creating stability in the country which was also the goal envisaged by the
constitutional framers.
Further, India adopted the three-language formula to accommodate the flexibility
that arises in recognising Hindi, English, and a modern Indian language in a Hindi
speaking state and replacing it with the Indian language in addition to Hindi and
English in a non-Hindi speaking state. This was added through the national
education policy, 1968.
One of the most apparent issues in regards to language in India is the disparity in
terms of socio-economic disadvantages between those who can speak and write
English versus those who cannot. It is a preconceived notion attached to English
which is considered as the language of the rich and the marker of status. While
the recognition of English is consistent throughout the world, in India it is
associated with upper-class status and privileged education. I say privileged
because not all classes in India have access to standard education, least we expect
them to know English or be fluent in English.
The three-language formula has also been recommended to continue in the
National Education Policy 2020. But since language is a state subject, Tamil Nadu
has refused to accept this formula. The Tamil Nadu government has been
following a two-language formula which is English and Tamil as two languages
of the state. Most of the states have not accepted this formula which could have
been seen as a way to maintain inter-state communications.
There are other issues with the recognition of scheduled languages which is that
there are no standard criteria that are followed to include a particular language
within the framework of the constitutional protection. Since this is still the case,
it becomes discriminatory as against the demand of recognising other languages
such as Bhojpuri, Gujjar, English, and Rajasthani to name a few. These are also
the languages spoken by people in India irrespective of whether the number of
speakers is in minority or majority since the Indian Constitution does not promote
majoritarianism.
Further, since the Constituent Assembly decided on certain aspects that were not
meant to be changed because it could disrupt the delicate balance attained through
the Munshi-Ayyangar formula, the same has now been changed. One such aspect
was to recognise the international form of numerals. Though the government has
not removed the use of international numerals, they have used the Devanagari
script in the new banknotes. This has created tensions amongst the community
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because for a long time India has avoided giving special recognition to a
particular language, but this move shows the contrary to what was envisioned by
the framers of the Constitution. This new move is a sign of cultural imperialism.
India is a land known for accommodating unique linguistic identities and cultures.
Till now, the delicate balance of accommodating all and offending none has been
maintained. But recent decisions of including Devanagari numerals in the new
notes seems to be politically motivated. The issue is not with using the
Devanagari numerals. The issue is that the use of it reflects preferential treatment,
which has long been avoided because of the Munshi-Ayyangar formula. The
constitutional frameworks envisaged the idea of India, that is Bharat, as
homogenous because that was the only reasonable way to maintain diversity. It is
also suggested that the government should establish criteria for selecting a
particular language as a part of the Eighth Schedule because it will offer
objectivity and uniformity. This will also help subdue the demands of groups that
want constitutional recognition of their language because they will have to fulfil
the criteria for the same. As for now, it is reasonably expected from the
government to not disrupt the balance that has been long maintained in the
Constitution.
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2. LEGAL MAXIM – EX NUDO PACTO NON ORBITUR ACTION
2.1Meaning
“Ex nudo pacto non oritur actio” is a Latin maxim that translates to “a bare
promise without consideration cannot be enforced. “Ex nudo pacto non oritur
actio means that a contract without consideration, i.e., something of value
promised in exchange for something else, is not valid and cannot be enforced by
law.
In simpler terms, if one party promises to do something for another party without
receiving anything in return, that promise is not legally binding, and no legal
action can arise from it. The concept of consideration is essential in contract law,
and this maxim reflects that principle.
The Latin maxim “Ex nudo pacto non oritur actio” serves as an essential principle
in contract law. It signifies that a contract without consideration is not enforceable
in law, as it lacks the essential element of mutual benefit. The maxim has been
interpreted by courts worldwide and has stood the test of time. It highlights the
significance of consideration in a contract and prevents the exploitation of parties
in a contractual relationship.
The Indian Contract Act, 1872, defines consideration as an act or abstinence from
an act done at the desire of the promisor. The promisee or any other person must
have done or abstained from doing something or promised to do or abstain from
doing something. This act or abstinence is called a consideration for the promise.
It must be beneficial to the promisor or detrimental to the promisee or any other
person.
The concept of consideration is essential for a valid contract, and the absence of
consideration makes the contract null and void. However, there are exceptions to
this rule, and a contract without consideration can be valid and enforceable in
certain circumstances. Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, provides for
these exceptions.
The concept of consideration is essential for a valid contract, and the Latin maxim
“Ex nudo pacto non oritur actio” emphasizes its importance. A contract without
consideration is not enforceable by law, and the absence of consideration renders
the contract null and void.
2.2 Illustrative Case Examples
S. Parameswari v. Balasubramanian
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The court referenced the well-known Latin maxim “Ex nudo pacto non oritur
actio,” which means that a contract without consideration cannot give rise to
legal action.
Mrs. Suseela & Others v. P.M. Veeraragavan & Ors
The Madras High Court interpreted the maxim as meaning that no legal liability
can arise from a promise that lacks consideration and is not made with
particular solemnity.
White v. Bluett
Bluett was sued by the executors of his father for an outstanding debt, but
claimed that his father had promised to discharge him from it in exchange for
him to stop complaining about property distribution. The court held that the
cessation of complaints had no economic value and therefore did not constitute
consideration for the promise, making the debt enforceable at law.
2.3 Application in Indian Law
The maxim ex nudo pacto non oritur actio, meaning no action arises from a bare
promise, plays a significant role in Indian contract law. It is used to emphasize
that a mere promise, unsupported by consideration, does not give rise to a legal
obligation.
In India, this principle is embodied in the Indian Contract Act, 1872,
particularly through Section 25, which declares that agreements made without
consideration are void. Indian courts apply this maxim to determine the
enforceability of agreements, ensuring that only those promises which are
legally binding can be enforced.
The maxim is also used to distinguish moral or social promises from legal
contracts, thereby preventing claims based on gratuitous or informal assurances.
It helps courts maintain certainty and discipline in contractual relations by
discouraging frivolous litigation.
However, the application of this principle in Indian law is not absolute. The
Indian Contract Act provides specific exceptions—such as promises made out
of natural love and affection, promises to compensate for past voluntary
services, and promises to pay time-barred debts—where an action may arise
even without consideration.
Thus, while Indian law generally follows the maxim ex nudo pacto non oritur
actio, its use is qualified by statutory exceptions to ensure fairness and justice.
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3. LEGAL MAXIM – LIS PENDENS
3.1Meaning
A lis pendens is an official notice to the public that a lawsuit involving a claim on
a property has been filed. Lis pendens is connected to the concept that a property
buyer must assume any litigation that exists pertaining to the property.
If a bank is suing the owner of a lot and a new buyer purchases it, the new owner
inherits the responsibility of the lawsuit; the sale of the property does not prevent
the plaintiff from seeking redress via litigation. It can represent a contingent
liability.
Lis pendens is a notice that a property has a claim against it backed by a pending
lawsuit. The notice must be filed with the Clerk of Court for the county you live
in and is recorded in the county real estate records.
A lawsuit must be pending before the notice can be filed and served. A lis pendens
can be drafted and filed by anyone with an interest in a property, but because the
language must be specific and it is a complex document, it is best to hire a real
estate attorney in your area to prepare it for you.
3.2 Illustrative Case Examples
Shingara Singh vs Daljit Singh (2023)
Decided by the Supreme Court of India on October 14, 2024, with the judgment
delivered by a two-judge bench comprising Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and
Justice Hrishikesh Roy.
The case centered on the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer
of Property Act, 1882, which prohibits the transfer of immovable property during
the pendency of a suit that directly and specifically involves a right to that
property.
Simla Banking Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Firm Luddar Mal
Significant judicial precedent in Indian law, particularly concerning the doctrine
of lis pendens. This doctrine holds that any person who purchases property while
a lawsuit is pending is bound by the judgment rendered against the person from
whom they derived their title, provided the property in question is directly and
specifically at issue in the suit.
The rule ensures that courts maintain complete control over alienations involving
property that is the subject of litigation, making judgments binding on subsequent
purchasers even if they were not parties to the litigation or were unaware of its
pendency.
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3.3 Application in Indian Law
Lis pendens is literally translated from Latin as "suit pending." This condition can
adversely affect the sale price or the possibility of a sale since any pending
litigations are typically unfavourable for the owner. The term is commonly
abbreviated "lis pend."
Lis pendens provides constructive notice, or a warning, to prospective
homebuyers that the ownership of a property is in dispute and litigation is
pending. Lis pendens can only be filed if a claim is related specifically to the
property. By filing a lis pendens, an individual or entity is protecting its claim to
the title pending the lawsuit's outcome.
Lis pendens can be used anytime there is a dispute over real property, but most of
the time, it is used in three situations.
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4 LANDMARK CASE STUDY – SHAYARA BANO V. UNION OF INDIA
(2017)
4.1 Facts of the Case
The case was a landmark case of 2017, that challenged the constitutional validity
of triple talaq (talaq-e-biddat), a practice allowing Muslim men to instantaneously
divorce their wives by pronouncing "talaq" three times in succession. The
petitioner Shayara Bano, was divorced by her husband, Rizwan Ahmed, through
this practice in October 2015 after a 15-year marriage. She filed a writ petition in
the Supreme Court in February 2016, arguing that triple talaq violated her
fundamental rights under Articles 14 (equality before law), 15 (prohibition of
discrimination), 21 (protection of life and personal liberty), and 25 (freedom of
religion) of the Indian Constitution.
The key issue in the Shayara Bano v. Union of India case of 2017 was whether
the practice of instant triple talaq (talaq-e-biddat), a form of divorce in Muslim
personal law where a husband can unilaterally divorce his wife by uttering "talaq"
three times, was constitutional and violated fundamental rights guaranteed under
Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Indian Constitution. The petitioners argued that the
practice was arbitrary, discriminatory, and not an essential religious practice,
thereby infringing upon the rights to equality, non-discrimination, and life and
personal liberty. The Supreme Court had to determine whether triple talaq, which
allowed Muslim men to divorce their wives without legal recourse or
reconciliation, constituted an essential religious practice protected under Article
25 of the Constitution or whether it could be struck down as violative of
constitutional principles.
The main issues raised in the Shayara Bano v. Union of India case of 2017 centred
on the constitutional validity of triple talaq (talaq-e-biddat), a practice under
Muslim personal law that allows a man to unilaterally divorce his wife by uttering
"talaq" three times. The petitioner, Shayara Bano, challenged the practice on the
grounds that it violated fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 (equality
before law), 15 (non-discrimination on grounds of sex), and 21 (right to life and
personal liberty) of the Indian Constitution. A key legal question was whether
triple talaq constituted an essential religious practice under Article 25, which
protects the freedom of religion, and thus fell beyond constitutional scrutiny. The
case also questioned whether the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act,
1937, which recognized triple talaq, was valid in light of constitutional
provisions, particularly Article 13(1), which declares laws inconsistent with
fundamental rights as void.
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4.2 Issues Raised
The main legal issues raised in the Shayara Bano v. Union of India case of 2017
centered on the constitutional validity of the practice of triple talaq (talaq-e-
biddat) under Indian law. The primary questions before the Supreme Court were
whether triple talaq violated fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 15,
and 21 of the Indian Constitution, which protect equality, non-discrimination, and
the right to life and personal liberty. The petitioners argued that the practice was
arbitrary, discriminatory against Muslim women, and deprived them of dignity
and legal recourse, thereby violating these constitutional rights.
Another key issue was whether triple talaq constituted an essential religious
practice under Islamic law and thus fell under the protection of Article 25 of the
Constitution, which guarantees freedom of religion. The petitioners contended
that triple talaq lacked sanction in the Quran, contradicted Islamic principles of
reconciliation, and was not an essential part of Islam, thereby not deserving
constitutional protection under religious freedom. The Court was also tasked with
determining whether personal laws, including Muslim personal law, were
immune from constitutional scrutiny under Part III of the Constitution, or whether
they could be reviewed if they conflicted with fundamental rights. Additionally,
the case questioned whether the Muslim Personal (Shariat) Application Act, 1937,
which recognized and enforced triple talaq, could be considered a "law in force"
under Article 13(1) of the Constitution, making it subject to judicial review and
potentially void if it violated fundamental rights. The Court ultimately held that
triple talaq was not an essential religious practice and was manifestly arbitrary,
leading to its declaration as unconstitutional by a 3:2 majority.
4.3 Judgement
On 22nd August 2017, the Supreme Court of India delivered a landmark judgment
in the Shayara Bano v. Union of India case, declaring the practice of triple talaq
(talaq-e-biddat) unconstitutional by a 3:2 majority. The court held that the practice
violated fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Indian
Constitution, as it was arbitrary, discriminatory, and lacked rational basis. The
majority further ruled that triple talaq was not an essential religious practice under
Islamic law and therefore not protected under Article 25 of the Constitution.
The judgment was delivered by a five-judge bench comprising Chief Justice
Jagadish Singh Khehar, Justice Abdul Nazeer, Justice Rohinton Nariman, Justice
U.U. Lalit, and Justice Kurian Joseph. The majority opinion, authored by Justices
Nariman, Lalit, and Joseph, emphasized that triple talaq was not sanctioned by
the Quran, was contrary to the principles of Shariat, and allowed for unilateral
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divorce without reconciliation attempts. Justice Kurian Joseph stated that “what
is bad in Quran cannot be good in Shariat, and what is bad in theology is bad in
law as well”. The court concluded that the practice of triple talaq was manifestly
arbitrary, as it allowed a Muslim man to dissolve a marriage capriciously without
any attempt at reconciliation, thereby violating the right to equality and dignity.
The judgment declared the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937,
to the extent it recognized and enforced triple talaq, as void under Article 13(1)
of the Constitution. The court directed the government to consider legislative
measures to regulate divorce among Muslims, paving the way for the eventual
passage of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 2019. A
minority view was expressed by Chief Justice Khehar and Justice Nazeer, who
argued that uncodified personal laws like triple talaq were beyond judicial review
and should be addressed by Parliament.
4.4 Impact and the Aftermath
The immediate impact of the judgment was the invalidation of a practice that
allowed Muslim men to unilaterally divorce their wives by uttering "talaq" three
times in one sitting, leaving women without due process, economic security, or
opportunity for reconciliation. This decision was hailed as a significant step
toward gender equality and was described by UN Women as a "milestone for
women’s rights" in India, reinforcing constitutional values and international
obligations.
In the aftermath, the judgment catalysed legislative action. The Indian Parliament
passed the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, which
criminalized triple talaq, making it punishable with up to three years of
imprisonment and a fine. This legislative response underscored the judiciary’s
role in prompting social reform and demonstrated the interplay between judicial
activism and legislative action in addressing personal law reforms. The case also
sparked broader societal and political discourse. It reignited debates on the need
for a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) and prompted re-evaluation of other gender-
discriminatory practices within personal laws, such as polygamy and nikah
halala. While the judgment empowered Muslim women and increased legal
awareness—evidenced by a reported 36% rise in women seeking legal recourse
for marital disputes post-ban—it also faced criticism for not fully addressing
entrenched patriarchal structures, with only 25% of respondents indicating
significant improvements in their social standing. Moreover, the judgment has
been interpreted by some as a turning point in the Indian State’s approach to
Muslim personal law, shifting from non-intervention to active judicial scrutiny of
religious practices in light of constitutional rights. However, concerns have been
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raised about the potential misuse of women’s rights discourse for political
purposes, particularly by Hindu nationalist forces, with critics arguing that the
legislative response may have been influenced by such agendas.
Despite these challenges, the Shayara Bano case remains a landmark precedent,
affirming that constitutional rights supersede discriminatory religious practices
and setting a foundation for future reforms in personal law across religious
communities.
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5 CONCLUSION
Firstly, the essay on Official Language, the concept of an official language plays
a crucial role in ensuring effective governance, uniform communication, and
national integration in a diverse country. While it facilitates administrative
efficiency and legal clarity, it must also respect and accommodate linguistic
plurality to preserve cultural identity and social harmony. A balanced approach
that promotes the official language for official purposes while safeguarding
regional and minority languages strengthens unity without undermining diversity,
thereby reflecting the true democratic and inclusive spirit of the nation.
Secondly, the legal maxim “Ex nudo pacto non oritur actio”, a bare promise
without consideration cannot be enforced.” Ex nudo pacto non oritur actio means
that a contract without consideration, i.e., something of value promised in
exchange for something else, is not valid and cannot be enforced by law. While
Lis Pendens, litigation pending’ or ‘pending suit’ and is drawn from the concept
based on the maxim “Pendente lite nihil innovature” which means that nothing
new must be introduced while a litigation or suit is [Link] Doctrine states
that the Transfer of property shall be restricted when there is a litigation pending
on the title or any rights that arise directly thereof involving an immovable
property.
And lastly, the Shayara Bano case, stands as a landmark judgment that reaffirmed
the supremacy of constitutional morality over personal laws that violate
fundamental rights. By declaring the practice of instant triple talaq (talaq-e-
biddat) unconstitutional, the Supreme Court upheld the principles of equality,
dignity, and gender justice enshrined in Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution.
The decision marked a significant step toward protecting Muslim women from
arbitrary divorce practices and emphasized that religious freedom under Article
25 cannot override individual rights. Overall, the judgment strengthened the
constitutional commitment to social reform and reinforced the role of the
judiciary in advancing justice and equality in a pluralistic society.
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6 REFERENCES
Bibliography:
Tripathi, S. C. - Legal Language, Legal Writing & General English
B. M. Gandhi - Legal Language, Legal Writing & General English
Book CSEET – Reference Reading Material I
M. P. Tandon - Legal Language & Legal Drafting with General English
Khan, Shah Bano. Shah Bano Case: Law and Society. Universal Law
Publishing, 2017.
Webliography:
Shayara Bano Case: Overview and Analysis.” LiveLaw,
[Link]
“Official Language.” Legal Service India,
[Link]
“ex nudo pacto non orbitur action and lis pendens Explained.” Indian Law
Portal, [Link]
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