Hegeler Institute

CLASS, FUNCTION, CONCEPT, RELATION

Author(s): Gottlob Frege
Source: The Monist, Vol. 27, No. 1 (JANUARY, 1917), pp. 114-127
Published by: Hegeler Institute
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 CLASS, FUNCTION, CONCEPT, RELATION.1

my GrundlagenderArithmetikof 1884 I have tried

IN to make it seem probable that arithmetic is a branch
of logic and need not borrow any ground of proof what
ever from experience or intuition. The actual demonstra
tion ofmy thesis is carried out inmy Grundgesetze of 1893
and 1903 by the deduction of the simplest laws of numbers
by logical means alone. But tomake this proof convincing,
considerably higher claims must be made for deduction
than is habitually done in arithmetic.2 A set of a few
methods of deduction has to be fixed beforehand, and no
step may be taken which is not in accordance with them.
Consequently, when passing over to a new judgment we
must not be satisfied, as mathematicians seem nearly al
ways to have been hitherto, with saying that the new judg
ment is evidently correct, but we must analyze each step of
ours into the simple logical steps of which it is composed,
?and often there are not a few of these new steps. No
hypothesis can thus remain unnoticed. Every axiom which
is needed must be discovered, and it is just the hypotheses
which are made tacitly and without clear consciousness
that hinder our insight into the epistemological nature of
a law.
In order that such an undertaking be crowned with
success, the concepts which we need must naturally be con
1
[Translated from the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik by Johann Stachel
roth and Philip E. . Jourdain.]
*
Grundlagen, pp. 102-104.

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 CLASS, FUNCTION, CONCEPT, RELATION. II5

ceived distinctly. This is true especially inwhat concerns

the thing that mathematicians denote by the word "ag
gregate" (Menge). It seems that Dedekind, in his book
Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen?* of 1888, uses the
word "system" to denote the same thing. But in spite of
the exposition which appeared four years earlier in my
Grundlagen, a clear insight into the essence of thematter
is not to be found inDedekind's work, though he often gets
somewhat near it. This is the case in the sentence :4"Such
a system S is completely determined if of everything it is
determined whether it is an element of S or not. Hence
the system S is the same as the system (in symbols
S= T) ifevery element of S is also element of and every
element of is also element of S." In other passages, on
the other hand, Dedekind strays from the point. For in
stance :5"It very frequently happens that for some reason
different things a, b, c,... can be considered from a com
mon point of view, can be put together in themind, and we
then say that they form a system S." Here a presentiment
of the correct idea is contained in the words "common
point of view" ; but the "putting together in themind" is
not an objective characteristic. In whose mind, may I
ask? If they are put together in one mind and not in
another do they then form a system? What is to be put
together inmy mind must doubtless be inmy mind. Then
do not things outside myself form systems? Is a system
a subjective formation in each single soul? Is then the
constellation Orion not a system? And what are its ele
ments ? The stars, themolecules, or the atoms ? The fol
lowing sentence8 is remarkable: "For uniformity of ex
pression it is advantageous to admit the special case that a
system S is composed of a single (one and one only) ele
ment a: the thing a is an element of S, but every thing
8
[English translationunder the titleEssays on theTheory ofNumbers,
Chicago and London, 1901. See especially p. 45.]
* 5 ?
[Ibid., p. 45.] [Ibid.] [Ibid.]

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 6 THE MONIST.

different from a is not an element of S." This is after

ward7 understood in such a way that every element ^ of a
system S can be itself regarded as a system. Since in this
case element and system coincide, it is here quite clear that,
according to Dedekind, the elements are the proper con
stituents of a system. Ernst Schr?der in his lectures on
the algebra of logic8goes a step in advance of Dedekind in
drawing attention to the connection of his systems with
concepts, which Dedekind seems to have overlooked. In
deed, what Dedekind really means when he calls a system
a "part" of a system9 is that a concept is subordinated to a
concept or an object falls under a concept. Neither Dede
kind nor Schr?der distinguish between these cases because
of a mistake in point of view which is common to them
both. In fact, Schr?der also, at bottom, considers the ele
ments to be what reallymake up his class. An empty class
should not occur with Schr?der any more than an empty
system with Dedekind. But the need arising from the
nature of the matter makes itself felt in a differentway
with each writer. Dedekind says:10 "On the other hand,
we intend here for certain reasons wholly to exclude the
empty system,which contains no element at all, although
for other investigations it may be convenient to invent
(erdichten) such a system." Thus such an invention is
permitted; it is only desisted from for certain reasons.
Schr?der dares to invent an empty class. Apparently then
both agree with many mathematicians in holding that we
may invent anything we please that does not exist,?even
what is unthinkable; for'if the elements form a system,
then the system is annulled at the same time as the ele
7
[Ibid., p. 46.]
8
Vorlesungen ?ber die Algebra der Logik (exakte Logik), Vol. I, Leipsic,
1890, p. 253. [This reference of Frege seems wrong and it should perhaos
rather be to such a page as p. 100. Cf. also Frege's later critical study : "Kriti
sche Beleuchtung einiger Punkte in E. Schr?ders Vorlesungen ?ber die Al
gebra der Logik/' Archiv f?r systematischePhilosophie, Vol. I, 1895, pp. 433
456.]
9 *>
[Op. cit.,p. 46:] [Ibid., pp. 45-46.]

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 CLASS, FUNCTION, CONCEPT, RELATION. II7

merits. As to where the limits of this license lie and

whether indeed there are any such limits, without any
doubt we will not findmuch clearness and agreement;?
and yet the correctness of a proof may depend on such
questions. I believe I have settled them in a way that is
final for all intelligent persons, inmy Grundlagen11 and in
my lecture "Ueber formale Theorien der Arithmetik."12
Schr?der invents his zero-class and thus gets into diffi
culties.18 We do not find, then, a clear insight into the
matter with either Schr?der or Dedekind ;but still the true
position of affairs is seen whenever a system is to be de
termined. Dedekind then brings forward properties which
a thingmust have in order to belong to a system, i. e., he
defines a concept by its characteristics.14 If now a concept
ismade up of characteristics and not of the objects falling
under the concept, there are no difficulties to be urged
against an empty concept. Of course in this case an ob
ject (Gegenstand) can never also be a concept, and a con
cept under which only one object fallsmust not be confused
with this object. Thus we are finally leftwith the result
that the number datum contains an assertion about a con
cept.15 I have traced back number to the relation of simi
larity16 (Gleichzahligkeit) and similarity to univocal cor
respondence (eindeutige Zuordnung). Of "correspond
ence" much the same holds as of "aggregate" (Menge).
Nowadays both words are often used inmathematics, and
n 104-108.
Pp.
^Sitzungsberichte der Jenaischen Gesellschaft f?rMedicin und Natur
wissenschaft, July 17, 1885.
"Cf. E. G. Husserl, G?ttinger gelehrte Anzeigen, 1891,No. 7, p. 272,?
where, however, the difficulties are not solved.
14On and cf. my Grundlagen,
concept, object, property, characteristics,
pp. 48-50, 60-61, 64-65, and my essay "Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand," Viertel
jahrsschriftf?rwissenschaftlichePhilosophie, Vol. XVI, 1892,pp. 192-205.
15 See
Grundlagen, pp. 59-60.
?
[The same idea and word were used by Dedekind (op. cit.,p. 53) ; and
the same idea but with the name "equivalence" was used by Georg Cantor (cf.
Contributions to theFounding of theTheory of TransfiniteNumbers, Chicago
and London, 1915,pp. 40, 86).]

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 8 THE MONIST.

very often there is lacking an insight intowhat is intended

to be denoted by them. Ifmy opinion is correct that arith
metic is a branch of pure logic, then a purely logical ex
pression has to be chosen for "correspondence." I choose
theword "relation." Concept and relation are the founda
tion stones upon which I erect my structure.
But even when concepts have been grasped quite pre
cisely, itwould be difficult?nearly impossible in fact?to
satisfy the demands we have had tomake of a process of
proof without some special means of help. Now such a
means ismy ideography (Begriffsschrift), the explanation
of which will be my first problem. The following remarks
may be noticed before we proceed farther. It is not pos
sible to define everything, hence itmust be our endeavor
to go back to the logically simple which as such cannot
properly be defined. I must then be satisfiedwith referring
by hints towhat I mean. Before all I have to strive to be
understood, and therefore I will try to develop the subject
gradually and will not attempt at first a full generality
and a final expression. The frequent use made of quota
tionmarks may cause surprise. I use them to distinguish
the cases where I speak about the sign itself from those
where I speak about its denotation. Pedantic as thismay
appear, I think it necessary. It is remarkable how an
inexact mode of speaking or writing which perhaps was
originally employed only for greater convenience or brev
ity and with full consciousness of its inaccuracy, may,
when that consciousness has disappeared, end by confusing
thought. Has itnot happened that number signs have been
mistaken for numbers, names for the things named, the
mere auxiliary means for the real end of arithmetic ? Such
experiences teach us how necessary it is tomake the high
est demands of exactitude inmanner of speech and writing.
And I have taken pains at least to do justice to such de
mands wherever it seemed to be of importance.

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 CLASS, FUNCTION, CONCEPT, RELATION. II9

If17we are asked to give the original meaning of the

word "function" as used in mathematics, we easily fall
into saying that a function of is an expression formed by
means of the notations for sum, product, power, difference,
and so on, of Y and definite numbers. This attempt at a
definition is not successful because a function is here said
to be an expression, a combination of signs, and not what
the combination stands for. Then probably another at
temptwould be made with "denotation {Bedeutung) of an
expression" instead of "expression." But there appears
the letter "x" which indicates a number, not as the sign
"2" does, but indefinitely. For different number-signs
which we put in the place of 'V, we get, ingeneral, differ
ent denotations. Suppose for example, that in the ex
pression "(2 + $.x2)x", instead of "x" we put the num
ber-signs "o", "1", "2", "3", one after the other; we then
get as corresponding denotations the numbers o, 5, 28, 87.
Not one of these denotations can claim to be our function.
The essence of the function is in the correspondence that
it establishes between the numbers whose signs we put for
"x" and the numbers which then appear as denotations
of our expression,?a correspondence which is represented
to intuition by the course of the curve whose equation is,
in rectangular coordinates, "y= (2 + 3.?r2)jr". In gen
eral, then, the essence of the function lies in the part of the
expression which is outside the "#". The expression of
a function needs completion (ist erg?nzungsbed?rftig) and
is not satisfied (unges?ttigt). The letter "#" only serves
to keep places open for a numerical sign which is to com
plete the expression, and thus makes known the special
kind of need for completion that constitutes the peculiar
nature of the function indicated above. In what follows,
1TCf. my lectureFunktion und
Begriff, Jena, 1891, and my essay "Ueber
Begriff und Gegenstand" cited above. My Begriffsschriftof 1879 now no
longer representsmy standpoint,and thus should only be used with caution
to illustratewhat I said here.

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120 THE MONIST.

" "
the Greek letter will be used18 instead of the letter
'V\ This keeping "open is to be understood in this way:
"
All places inwhich stand must always be filled by the
same sign and never by different ones. I call these places
argument-places and that whose sign or name takes these
places in a given case I call argument of the function for
this case. The function is completed by the argument;
I call what itbecomes on completion the value of the func
tion for the argument. We thus get a name of the value
of a function for an argument when we fill the argument
places in the name of the function with the name of the
argument. Thus, for example, "(2 + 3.i2)i" is a name
of the number 5, composed of the function-name "(2 +
"
3? 2) and "1". The argument is not to be reckoned in
with the function,but serves to complete the functionwhich
is unsatisfied by itself. If in the following an expression
like "the ( )" is used, it is always to be observed that
" "
the only service rendered by in the notation of the
function is that itmakes the argument-places recognizable ;
it does not imply that the essence of the function becomes
"
changed when any other sign is substituted for ".
To the fundamental operations of calculation mathe
maticians added, as function-forming, the process of pro
ceeding to the limitas exemplified by infiniteseries, differen
tial quotients and integrals ;and finally theword "function"
was understood in such a general way that the connection
between value of function and argument was in certain
circumstances no longer expressed by signs of mathemat
ical analysis, but could only be denoted by words. Another
extension consisted in admitting complex numbers as argu
ments and consequently also as function-values. In both
directions I have gone still farther. While, indeed, the

18
Nothing, however, is fixed by this for our ideography. The "I" never
appears in the developments of the ideography itself,and I only use it inmy
exposition of it and in illustrations.

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 CLASS, FUNCTION, CONCEPT, RELATION. 121

signs of analysis were hitherto on the one hand not always

sufficient, they were on the other hand not all employed
"
in the formation of function-names. For =2
instance, 4"
"
and > 2" were not allowed to count as names of func
tions; but I do so allow them. But that indicates at the
same time that the domain of function-values cannot re
main limited to numbers ; for if I take as arguments of the
2
function = 4 the numbers , i, 2, 3, in succession, I do
not get numbers. I get: "o2 = 4", "i2 = 4", "22 = 4",
=
"32 4", which are expressions of one true and some false
thoughts. I express this by saying that the value of the
2
function = 4 is either the "truth-value (Wahrheits
werth) of the true or of the false."19 From this it can be
seen that I do not intend to assert anything by merely
writing down an equation, but that I only designate (be
zeichne) a truth-value, just as I do not intend to assert
anything by simply writing down "22" but only designate
a number. I say: "The names "2*= 4" and "3> 2" denote
the same truth-value" which I call for short the true. In
the same manner "3s= 4" and "i>2" denote the same
truth-value, which I call for short the false just as the
name "22" denotes the number 4. Accordingly I say that
the number 4 is the "denotation" of "4" and of "22", and
that the true is the "denotation" of "3 > 2". But I dis
tinguish the "meaning" (Sinn) of a name from its "de
notation" (Bedeutung). The names "22" and "2 + 2"
have not the same meaning, nor have "22= 4" and "2 + 2
=
4". The meaning of the name of a truth-value I call
a "thought'9 (Gedanken). I say further that a name "ex
presses" (ausdr?ckt) its meaning and "denotes" its de
notation. I "designate" (bezeichne) by a name what it
means.
2
The function = 4 can thus have only two values, the
19 I have shown this more in my "Ueber Sinn und Be
exhaustively essay
deutung" in theZeitschrift f?rPhiios. und [Link], Vol. C, 1892,pp. 25-50).

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 122 THE MONIST.

true for the arguments + 2 and?2 and the false for all
other arguments.
the domain of what is admitted as argument must
Also
be extended,?indeed, to objects quite generally. Objects
(Gegenst?nde) stand opposed to functions. I therefore
count as an object everything that is not a function; thus,
examples of objects are numbers, truth-values, and the
ranges (Werthverl?ufe) to be introduced further on. The
names of objects?or proper names?are not therefore

accompanied by argument-places, but are satisfied like the

objects themselves.
I use thewords, "the function ( ) has the same range
as the function ( )", as denoting the same as thewords,
"the functions ( ) and (|) have the same value for the
same argument." This is the case with the functions
= 4 and 2
=
I2 3. 12, at least if numbers are taken as
arguments. But we can also imagine the signs of evolution
and multiplication defined in such a manner that the func
2
tion ( =4) = (3.1=12) has the value of the true for
any argument whatever. Here an expression of logicmay
:
be used "The concept square-root of 4 has the same ex
tension as the concept something of which three times its
square is 12." With those functionswhose value is always
a truth-value we can therefore say "extension of the con

cept" instead of "range of the function," and it seems suit

able to say that a concept (Begriff) is a function of which
the value is always a truth-value.
Hitherto I have only dealt with functions of a single
argument, but we can easily pass over to functions with
two arguments. Such functions are doubly in need of
completion. A function with one argument is obtained
when a completion by means of one argument has been
effected. Only by means of a repeated completion do we
arrive at an object, and this object is then called the "value"
of the function for the pair of arguments. Just as the

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 CLASS, FUNCTION, CONCEPT, RELATION. 12$

" "
letter served with functions of one argument, I use
" " " "
here the letters and in order to indicate the two
fold non-satisfaction of a function
arguments, of two as,
" " "
for example, in "( + )2+ ". By replacing by ",
for example, we satisfy the function in such a way thatwe
have in ( + )2+ a functionwith only one argument.
" " " "
This manner inwhich we use the letters and must
always be in
kept mind when an expression like "the func" "
tion ( , )" occurs.20 I call the places in which
" " "
stands
"
-argument-places", and those inwhich stands
-argument-places". I say that the -argument-places
are "related" (verwandt) to one another, and also the
-argument-places to one another, and I say that a -argu
ment-place is not related to a -argument-place.
The functions with two arguments = and >
have as value always a truth-value?at least if the signs
"==" and ">" are defined in a suitable manner. I shall
call such functions "relations". In the first relation, for
example, stands to I, and ingeneral every object to itself ;
in the second, for example, 2 stands to 1. I say that the
object "stands in the relation ( , ) to" the object ,
if ( , ) is the true. I say that the object "falls
under" the concept ( ), if ( ) is the true. It is pre
sumed, of course, that both the functions ( ) and ( , )
have truth-values as values.21
always
* * *

I have already said above that no assertion is to lie as

20 Cf. note 18.
21Here there is a which may easily obscure the true position of
difficulty
things and thus rouse distrust of the correctness of my view. If we compare
the expression "the truth-value of the circumstance that falls under the con
" "
cept (?)" with ( )", we see that to the ( )" properly corresponds "the
truth-valueof the circumstance that ( ) falls under the concept (?)" and not
"the concept (0". The lastwords do not thereforereally designate a concept
(in my sense of theword), though they have the appearance of doing so in
our [Link] regard to the constrainedposition inwhich language
here finds itself,[Link] essay "Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand" mentioned in
note 14.

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 124 THE MONIST.

=
yet in a mere equation; by "2 + 3 5" only a truth-value
is designated and it is not stated which of the two it is.
= = =
Again, if I write "(2 + 3 5) (2 2)" and presup
pose that we know that 2= 2 is the true, yet I would not
have asserted by that the sum of 2 and 3 is 5, but I would
only have designated the truth-value of the circumstance
that "2 + 3= 5" denotes the same as "2= 2". Thus we
need a special sign to assert that something or other is
true. For this purpose I write what I call a "sign of
assertion" just before the name of the truth-value, so that
if this sign is written just before "2*= 4"," it is asserted
that the square of 2 is 4. I make a distinction between
"judgment" (Urtheil) and "thought" (Gedanken), and
understand by "judgment" the recognition of the truth
of a "thought." I shall call the ideographic representation
of a judgment by means of the sign of assertion an "ideo
graphic theorem" or more shortly a "theorem." I regard
this sign of assertion as composed of a vertical line,which
I call "line of judgment" (Urtheilsstrich), and a short
straight horizontal line proceeding from the middle of
the vertical line and going toward the right, which I will
simply call the "horizontal line" (Wagerechte). In my
Begriffsschrift I called this last line the "line of content"
(Inhaltsstrich) and at that time I expressed by the words
"judicable content" (beurtheilbarer Inhalt) what I have
now arrived at distinguishing into truth-value and
thought.23 The horizontal line most often occurs in com
bination with other signs, as it does here with the line of
judgment, and is thus guarded against confusion with the
minus sign. Wherever it occurs by itself itmust be made
somewhat longer than theminus sign for purposes of dis

221 often use here the notations of sum, product, and power in order
conveniently to form examples and to facilitate understanding by means of
hints, although these signs are not yet defined in this place. But we must keep
inview the fact that nothing is founded on the denotations of these signs.
28Cf.
my essay "Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung" cited above.

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 CLASS, FUNCTION, CONCEPT, RELATION. 12

tinction. I regard it as a name of a function in the way

" "
that preceded by this sign denotes the true if is the
true, and the false if is not the true. Of course the sign
" "
must denote an object; names without denotation
may not occur in our ideography. The above arrangement
ismade so that preceded by a horizontal " line "
denotes
something under all circumstances if only denotes
" "
something. If not, preceded by a horizontal linewould
not denote a concept with sharp boundaries,?and thus
would not denote a concept inmy sense. I here use capital
Greek letters as names denoting something without my
saying what their denotations are. In the actual develop
ments of my ideography theywill not occur any more than
" " "
"1" and ". The above preceded by a horizontal
line denotes a function whose value is always a truth
value or, by what I have said, a concept. Under this con
=
cept falls the true and this only. Thus "2* 4" preceded
=
by a horizontal line denotes the same thing as "2* 4",
namely the true. In order to do away with brackets,
I lay down that all which stands to the right of the
horizontal line is to be regarded as a whole which stands
" "
at the argument-place of the function denoted by pre
ceded by a horizontal line, unless brackets forbid this.
The sign "2*= 5" preceded by a horizontal line denotes
the false and thus the same as "22= 5", whereas "2" pre
ceded by a horizontal line denotes the false, and thus some
" "
thing different from the number 2. If is a truth
value, preceded by a horizontal " "
line is the same truth
" "
value, and thus the equation of to preceded by a
horizontal line denotes the true. But this equation denotes
the false is is not a truth-value; so that we can say that
it denotes the truth-value of the circumstances that is a
truth-value.
"
Thus the function ( )" preceded by a horizontal
"
line, denotes a concept and the function ( , )" pre

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 126 THE MONIST.

ceded by a horizontal line, denotes a relation, whether or

not (|) is a concept and ( , ) is a relation.
Of the two signs out of which the sign of assertion is
composed the line of judgment alone contains the assertion.
We need no sign to declare that a truth-value is the
false, if only we have a sign by which either truth-value
is changed into the other. This sign is also indispensable
on other grounds. I now lay down that the value of the
" "
function denoted by preceded by a horizontal line from
the middle of which hangs a small vertical line directed
downward and called the "line of denial" (Verneinungs
strich), so that thewhole is like a sign of assertion turned
round on its face, is to denote the false for every argu
" "
ment for which the value of the function denoted by
preceded by a horizontal line is the true. For all other
arguments the function under definition is to be the true.
The function thus defined may be called "the negation of
", and thus its value is always a truth-value; it is a con
cept under which all objects fall with the single exception
of the true. From this it follows that horizontal lines,
whether or not they form part of a sign of negation, can
be combined with immediately preceding or following
simple horizontal lines in such a way that the latter, so to
speak, lose their separate existence and melt into the former
(Verschmelzung der Wagerechten).
Thus "the negation of 22= 5" denotes the true; and
thuswe may put the sign of assertion so as to join on to the
left of the sign of negation. We may assert, too, the
negation of 2.
I have already used the sign of equality to form ex
amples, but it is necessary to "lay down " something
more
accurate about it. The sign = is to denote the
true if is the same as , and the false in all other cases.
In order to dispense with brackets as far as possible,
I lay down that all which stands on the left of the sign

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 class, function, concept, relation. 127

of equality as far as the nearest horizontal line is to denote

the -argument of the function = , in so far as brackets
do not forbid this ; and that all which stands on the right
of the sign of equality as far as the next sign of equality is
to denote the -argument of that function in so far as
brackets do not forbid this.
Gottlob Frege.

Jena, Germany.

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