Lecture 2 : Decision-making

Introduction
The apex (sommet) of policy making :
→ ‘To choose is to renounce’ ([Link])
→ ‘To govern is to choose’ ([Link]-France) = pres of the council of ministers

Decisions making : Not just the « big decisions »

To decide is to making compromise by negotiating, attenuating but not making a clear response.
Max Weber : According to Dahl, bureaucracies strongly shape how decisions are made as
implemented → the bureaucratic effect.

This means that what we often call “the big decision” (e.g., passing a law) is overrated.

What is underrated is evaluation and the thousands of micro-decisions made every day by lower-
level actors.

→ Street-level bureaucrats (teachers, police officers, migration officers, social

workers) interpret and apply policies in daily life.

→ Their choices accumulate → they can transform or distort the spirit of the original
policy.

Ex : in national education, the government may launch many reforms, but if teachers (street-level
actors) don’t adopt them, the policy will not truly exist.

Why is policymaking so challenging today ?

Because the Nation-State is no longer all-powerful.

Since the 1970s, states have been challenged by :

→ Migration flows (harder to control borders and populations)

→ Environmental crises (global problems that no state can solve alone),
→ Oil shocks (1973) showing economic vulnerability,
→ Global corporations and GAFAM (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft) → new
powerful actors that rival states in influence, data, and resources.
1. The decision: What does it look like ? Is it rational ?

The postulates of rational decision making

Harold Laswell, founder father of ‘policy sciences’ (a naïve perspective)

- Préférences: stable and unambiguous

- Décision maker : aware (conscient) of all alternatives poss
- There is a clear and unanimously agreed criterion of choice
- Decisions are made with no affect, no biases = purely objective reasoning

Answering theses postulates (1/3)

Herbert Simon → “Bounded Rationality”

People are not fully rational → they face limits of information, time, and cognitive capacity.

Decision-making is bounded (bordé) by:

→ Biases (cognitive shortcuts, stereotypes),
→ Cognitive dissonance (gap between what we believe and what we do → e.g., supporting
a politician even if they defend policies we dislike),
→ Emotions and fear,
→ Institutional memory loss (organizations forget past lessons).
Conclusion: decisions are satisficing (good enough), not optimal

Graham Allison → The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)

Theorizes/explains the Kennedy administration’s answer to the Russian deployment of missiles in
Cuba ( or why we avoided a nuclear war). Kennedy didn’t take a rational response (nuclear war),
no because we were rational that we avoid it.

Book : Essence of Decision. Shows that Kennedy’s response was not purely rational.

Rational Actor Model → Decisions explained as if made by a unitary, rational state.

Ex : “Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)” → rational to avoid nuclear war.
But in reality, during Covid (or other crises), priorities kept shifting → rational choice alone doesn’t
explain everything.

Bureaucratic Process Model → Government decisions follow pre-established routines and

bureaucratic procedures.
During the crisis, each agency (Pentagon, Air Force, State Department) promoted its own standard
operating procedures.
Outcome = not a rational “best solution” but the result of bureaucratic inertia.

Governmental Politics Model → Decisions emerge from bargaining (negotitations) among actors
with different interests.
“Where you stand depends on where you sit” → each actor defends its institutional position.
Kennedy himself was influenced by domestic politics (mid-term elections, need to restore
popularity).
Ex. the blockade was chosen partly because it was politically reassuring (public opinion), not
because it was the most effective militarily. LENT mais plus délicat

When government face with crisis, government leaders have not the capacity to look at it on their
own, they break it down, they assign it according to the pre-establish decision line of the all
bureaucracy.
Conclusion: decision-making is collective, slow, interactive, shaped by routines and compromises,
not by one rational leader.
Lindblom → « Stull muddling, not yet through » (on bricole mais pas tout à fait)

Incrementalism is a theory of decision-making (Charles Lindblom, 1959/1979) which argues that

policymakers rarely make radical or optimal choices. Instead, they prefer to make small, gradual
adjustments to existing policies.

It is a process of “muddling through”: half-measures, step-by-step reforms, marginal changes.

→ Half-measures, small stipes, marginal changes… (ex. The budget)

→ A few reason wh decisions-Lakers préfère to amend the existing marginally = fear of be

critiscize, they want to make changes with what we are familiar (more fixing things than
moving foward).

Ex. US federal budgeting system → always small annual adjustments, not big reforms. Jean
Monnet’s “Open Method of Coordination” in Europe → also based on progressive, step-by-step
changes rather than radical shifts.

Conclusion : Policymaking = pragmatic bricolage, not grand rational planning.

II - Who decides ?
Is the decision-making model confiscated by some “Happy Few”/elites ?

Laswell : in the middle of WW2 he was the Forest to denounce the émergence of a military and
bureaucratie power. For him elite is : A shift of class struggle bewteen différent skills groups
evaluated in the modern society.

Elitism & Pluralism: postulates and criticisms - What is it “to have power”?

Elitism = Theory that power is concentrated in the hands of a few people (elites), while the
majority (the masses) follow.

Opposition to Karl Marx : for elitists, the existence of elites is inevitable, a natural part of any
society.

A. Classical elite theories

Main authors : Mosca, Michels, Pareto, Mills.

In practice : society is divided → at the top, those with power (the elites); at the bottom, the
masses.

Robert Michels – The Iron Law of Oligarchy

Even the most democratic organizations (e.g., political parties, unions) become oligarchic.
Why ? :
→ Masses always need leaders for stability and organization,
→ Bureaucracy favors concentration of decision-making,
→ It is comfortable for the masses to rely on a few leaders,
→ Leaders can manipulate their followers to secure their position.
Conclusion: Oligarchy is inevitable, democracy always produces elites.

Harold Lasswell’s typology - Types of elites

Elites are groups of people with specific resources and skills :

→ Violence → police, military forces.
→ Communication / propaganda → spin-doctors (media & political communication experts).
→ Business / commercial elites → powerful businessmen/women.
→ Technocrats → experts with specialized technical knowledge.
→ Bureaucrats → administrative elites with institutional know-how.

= Society is ruled by the combination of these elites.

BUT Threat for democracy → concentration of power could lead to authoritarianism
(cf. Garrison state = a society where military and security elites dominate policymaking, sidelining
democracy).

Wright Mills – The Power Elite (1956)

Coined the expression “military-industrial complex.”

In USA, decision-making was dominated by an alliance of :

→ Military elites
→ Industrial/business elites,
→ Political elites.

These groups form a fusion of interests → they serve themselves rather than the public.

Problem: many of these actors are not elected → democratic deficit.

Conclusion : a “power elite” rules over the middle class and the masses.

B. The pluralist answer : DAHL

• Power is diffused across society.

• There is not one single ruling elite → many groups compete.
• To understand power, we must study interactions between interest groups.

Several pluralist conceptions of the state:

Weathervane (girouette) model

- Government swings from one decision to another, responding to pressures of interest groups.
- State = passive reactor.

Neutral state model

- State is less passive, but acts like a referee.
- Watches the fight between groups without intervening too much.

Broker state model

- State acts as an intermediary (broker).
- Public policy = result of pressure and negotiation between competing groups.
- Power is contingent, not fixed.

Who governs?
- Power = instrumental, it shifts depending on who mobilizes.
- No single center of power, only dominant minorities in each sector.

Theory of New Haven (Dahl’s empirical work)

- In each local domain, a small minority dominates decision-making.
- “Influence” is synonymous with “power.”

Polyarchy = not a perfect democracy, but a system where many groups have access to power.
Competition and plural access prevent monopoly by one elite.
→ Democracy = plural access + contestation.
C. Limitation of the pluraliste theory (Very static view of power + leaves aside ‘the second face
of power’ / Non - decision)

Who really exercises power ? Formal organizations ≠ real influence.

Middle classes overlooked: pluralism assumes equal access, but not all groups are equally
equipped.

Non-decision-making: ignores situations where issues never even reach the agenda (second face
of power, Bachrach & Baratz).

Static view of power → underestimates hidden, structural inequalities.

Power is distributed, they think power is diffused. To understand we have to look after the
interactions.

1. Multiple actors and focus the rôle player by civil servants ?

Before (neocorporatism) : policymaking often negotiated between the state, unions, and
employers.

Since the 1980s: rise of neoliberalism and globalization → weakening of corporatist mechanisms.

New concepts emerged:

Issue networks (Heclo, 1978): wide, informal networks of actors (bureaucrats, experts, NGOs,
businesses, lobbies…) shaping policies.

Governance : the state no longer acts alone, but coordinates with multiple actors.

Role of Top Civil Servants (Bureaucrats)

The relationship between ministers and top civil servants is both cooperative and conflictual.
Ministers : bring political legitimacy.

Civil servants = provide :

→ technical expertise
→ institutional memory
→ drafting capacity (turning political ideas into legal/administrative texts).

Policy Narratives (= storytelling in public policy)

Bureaucrats produce narratives : selective depictions of a problem that justify certain policy
solutions.
A narrative is not necessarily false, but it is framed and oriented.

Narratives = bureaucratic storytelling at the service of ideology, but less formal and more subtle
than political discourse.

Types of Power of Bureaucrats (civil servants)

Policy-shaping power :
→ Producing and promoting ideas, narratives, policy instruments.
Ex : framing unemployment as an “activation” problem.
Ex : R. Lister and the “undeserving poor” → framing poverty in moral terms, justifying more
restrictive welfare policies. (Sick, poor chlidren)

Power of implementation :
→ Civil servants ensure policies actually work in practice. (Discretionary power)
→ Without administration, reforms remain on paper.

Power of brokerage (intermediation) :

→ Acting as intermediaries between politicians, unions, NGOs, and experts. Interest groups
represent the society with expertise and politics doesn’t have acess to that but they have the ability
to dominate bcause they can still politicize administrations or services. So they can impose their
decisions.
→ Building compromises and facilitating negotiations.

Who decide ? = Depending of the policy sector, context

Case Study: Pension Reforms in France & Sweden

Reference: P. Marier, Where Did the Bureaucrats Go?

Thesis: Even in an era of state retrenchment and neoliberal reforms, bureaucrats remain central.

France :
→ Pension reforms are highly politicized and conflictual (strikes, social opposition).
→ Bureaucrats play a mostly technical role, but are often overshadowed by political struggles.

Sweden :
→ Pension reform was more consensual and gradual.
→ Bureaucrats acted as brokers and providers of technical solutions.

Comparison: context matters (conflictual France vs consensual Sweden), but in both cases
bureaucrats remain indispensable actors.

The motives of the decision: the three “I” model (ideas/interests/institutions)

P (Ideas – Interests – Institutions)

→ Developed notably by Peter Hall and enriched by other scholars.

Goal : to explain how and why public decisions are made.

Assumption : no single explanatory factor, but a constant interaction between ideas, interests,
and institutions.

A. Interests
Strategic motivations of actors (individuals or groups), often linked to electoral, material, or power
benefits.
→ Politics as a profession ([Link]é, 2017):
→ Politicians are not purely altruistic ; they aim at being elected, re-elected, or moving up in their
career = as office-seekers / office-keepers

Types of motivations (WEAVER) :

→ Good policy : doing the “right thing” for society, even if it is unpopular (e.g., costly but
necessary health reforms).
→ Credit claiming : gaining recognition for policies adopted, showing voters tangible
results.
→ Blame avoidance : avoiding responsibility for unpopular decisions (by shifting blame
onto other institutions, dispersing responsibility).
Ex. Public choice theory = Views public action as driven by self-interest.
P. Dunleavy, “bureau-shaping model” → civil servants favor policies that strengthen their own
departments rather than serving the public interest.

B. Ideas
Belief (croyance) systems, ideologies, collective representations that shape how actors perceive
reality and define choices.

Ideas as filters: interests are not pursued “objectively”; they are interpreted through ideological
lenses.

[Link] Berman: the role of ideas in social democracy.

Social-democratic reforms are not just strategic, they are grounded (fondé) in a worldview
(equality, welfare state).
Mitterrand (1983) : (more a left president while right politics was before) “austerity turn” shows
how socialist ideas clashed with institutional and economic constraints.

Does ideology still matter ?

→ Some argue parties have become “catch-all parties”, more pragmatic than ideological. (= A
party that seduces all sides beyond social classes and especially the classic divisions between
right and left)
→ Yet, differences remain: left-wing governments spend more on education, health, welfare VS
right-wing governments more on agriculture, military, etc.

Characteristics :
→ Much incrementalism (small policy adjustments rather than radical change).
→ Much clientelism (favoring particular groups of voters).
→ Ideas travel fast internationally, but are always filtered by national contexts.

C. Institution (the stronger of the three)

Formal rules (laws, constitutions) and informal rules (norms, routines) that structure and constrain
actors’ behavior.

Today’s dominant approach : neo-institutionalism. (an analytical approach that studies how political
institutions (rules, norms, routines) shape actors’ behavior, filter their ideas and interests, and
thereby structure public decision-making)

Logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen) :

→ Actors do not only calculate consequences, they also act according to what seems appropriate
within institutional frameworks.

Role of institutions :
→ Stabilize behaviors
→ Filter which ideas can be implemented
→ Organize competition among interests (parliaments, elections, parties, courts)

[Link] parties are institutions that channel competition and organize ideas.
 Interactions between the 3 I’s

The three dimensions are inseparable:

→ Interests are interpreted through ideas.
→ Institutions constrain both interests and ideas.
→ Ideas can reshape institutions (e.g., the welfare
state).

Ex. European monetary policy

Interests : states defended their economic preferences (low inflation for Germany, growth policies
for France, etc.).

Institutions : Maastricht Treaty, voting rules, strong independence of the European Central Bank.

Ideas : dominance of neoliberal ideas and anti-inflation consensus in the 1980s–1990s.