AFF

General Uniq:

The Economist 25 [The Economist, "What Putin wants—and how Europe should thwart him", May 8,
2025, The Economist,
[Link]
Accessed 07/02/2025] | gavnotpoore
Generous payments to soldiers and their families amount to 1.5% of GDP. Mr Putin also uses war as his excuse for ever-harsher repression and isolation
from the West. It is wrong to think that Russia’s forces are spent or incapable. The navy and air force are
largely intact. NATO’s top commander says Mr Putin is restocking men, arms and munitions at an “unprecedented” pace. Russia plans to
have 1.5m active troops, up from 1.3m in September; eventually, it could boost forces and kit on the western
front by 30-50%. Thanks to the war, it has deepened its ties to China, Iran and North Korea. Russian tactics are crude and costly, but a sudden
small incursion into a NATO member would force NATO to choose whether to take back lost ground
and risk nuclear war. If it did not fight, NATO would be broken. In a longer conflict NATO could surely repel a first Russian offensive, but
would it have the resources for a fifth or sixth? Mr Putin might count it a strategic victory e to turn up, even if Russia were pushed back. That is
if Mr Trump d clined

because America’s absence on the battlefield would entrench Russia’s influence over Europe. Defence against Russia begins in Ukraine. The more Mr
Putin is denied success there, the less likely he is to attack NATO. As The Economist has argued, that means supplying
Ukraine with arms, as well as giving it more money to pay for those it can build cheaply itself. Ukraine could produce $35bn-worth of kit a year, but has
orders for less than half as much. Mr Trump should see that financing Ukraine is in America’s interests, if only because China is watching Russia’s
progress. However, backing Ukraineis not enough to make the entire continent safe and Mr Trump is unlikely
to offer much help, so Europe must do more. That means working harder to defend itself, shoring up its unity
and laying the foundations for a post-Putin Russia.

The Economic Times 25, 3-10-2025, "Russia's Vladimir Putin will attack 3 more nations soon,
claims NATO ex-commander," Economic Times,
[Link]
soon-claims-nato-ex-commander/articleshow/[Link]?from=mdr, accessed 6-26-2025 | aarthi

Is Russian President Vladimir Putin just bidding his time before launching a devastating attack across Europe after annihilating Ukraine? With
close aides of Donald Trump, the new US President, clamouring that America quit NATO and as a
consequence leave Europe to face the might of the Russian army on its own, the prospects of Putin
unleashing his forces onto other defenceless countries are real, claims a former top British army General Sir Richard
Shirreff. The officer who also served as NATO’s deputy supreme allied commander in Europe believes that Russian forces will in a
couple of years attack at least three more European nations if an effective deterrence is not created.
Lambasting Trump for dumping Ukraine, the former NATO’s ex-deputy supreme allied commander in Europe in an interview to a UK news outlet
stated that the US President had delivered a “mortal blow” to the formidable military alliance. Trump’s decisions to halt arms supply to Ukraine
as well as stop intelligence sharing is a clear signal to Putin’s commanders to go all out against Kiev and eventually other European nations, he
claimed.
Chevreuil of The Center for Strategic and International Studies 25 finds

CSIS Horschig Critical Questions By Astrid Chevreuil and Doreen Horschig, 3-4-2025, "Can France and the United Kingdom Replace the U.S.
Nuclear Umbrella?" [Link] GZR

Rather than a formal policy shift, official document, or prepared campaign statement, his remarks were a spontaneous response in a town
hall–like setting with the interviewer directly asking him about British and French nuclear sharing. Merz is also known for his impetuous style
that he used in his career as a businessman. This distinction is crucial, as it suggests that Merz’s statement may not have been a deliberate attempt
to pressure the U.S. administration into clarifying its commitment to NATO’s extended nuclear deterrence. Instead, his comments may reflect
preliminary thinking about potential alternatives if needed. Merz’s remarks were framed around the assumption of U.S. disengagement from
In the lead-up to a second Trump administration, European discussions were
European security.
dominated by hypotheticals and fears of abandonment. Now, that fear seems to have evolved into a reality of
abandonment—with the key question being to what extent the United States will withdraw. Considering
this context, Merz underscored the urgency for Europe to become more self-reliant. He warned that “Donald Trump will no longer
unconditionally honor NATO’s mutual defense commitment” and urged that Europe must “now make every effort to at least be able to defend the
European continent on its own.” Merz might also have wanted to show contrast with the previous chancellor, Olaf Scholz, whose stance towards
defense policies has been marked by cautiousness and, at times, a fear of escalation with Russia that created frictions with Paris and London.

Chevreuil goes on to find

Following Merz’s comments in an interview on Saturday, March 1, 2025, French President Emmanuel Macron
said he was
ready to “open the discussion” on European deterrence and recalled that “there has always been a
European dimension to France’s vital interests within its nuclear doctrine.” Nevertheless, he made it clear
that such a sensitive discussion would have to be carefully framed in the current strategic context where the U.S. political commitment might be
questioned. President Macron and Chancellor Merz’s remarks come at a pivotal moment, as U.S. President Donald Trump’s stance on NATO and
his approach to Russia’s war in Ukraine cast doubt on the future of transatlantic defense cooperation. When Trump stated in 2024, “I would
encourage them [Russia] to do whatever the hell they want,” he hinted that Washington may no longer uphold its commitment to defend all
NATO members in the event of an attack—a direct challenge to the alliance’s core principle of collective defense. Officials in the new U.S.
administration have added to these concerns. While Germany has long relied on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, [Indeed] growing
uncertainty over Washington’s commitments has sparked debate over whether France and the United
Kingdom could provide a viable alternative. However, significant strategic, doctrinal, and logistical obstacles make such a shift
difficult.

Schake, head of foreign and defense policy at the American Enterprise Institute, 25 finds
[Link]
/#cookie_message_anchor
Two months ago, I suggested that NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte fake a heart attack and postpone next week’s summit in The Hague. I
genuinely feared that the Trump team’s animus toward the United States’ closest friends had become so intense that it would lead to a disastrous
meeting. The list of evidence, after all, is long: U.S. President Donald Trump
has threatened to abandon any ally that did
not meet defense spending targets; called for the annexation of Canada and Greenland;
humiliated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office; and constricted the provision of intelligence
and weapons to Kyiv. The evidence further includes Vice President J.D. Vance’s nasty Munich speech, his explicit support for
European political extremists, [moreover there is] Washington’s hesitance to appoint a U.S. officer to
command NATO, the administration’s refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and its
parroting of actual Russian talking points. I feared that Trump might use the summit to announce the complete withdrawal of
U.S. troops from Europe, which would be an open invitation for Russia to expand its sphere of influence and possibly attack a NATO ally.

Welch ‘25, Jennifer. [Chief Geoeconomics Analyst at Bloomberg] “A Putin War with NATO Would Cost
the World $1.5 Trillion” Bloomberg. June 24, 2025
[Link]/graphics/2025-russia-war-with-nato-cost-world-trillions/?embedded-checkout=true. //sv

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte suggested that Russia may be in a position to consider such an attack on the alliance within five years,
echoing the assessments of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and several European intelligence agencies. The warnings come as NATO - under
Denmark has said Russia could
pressure from Trump - pushes members to raise defense spending to the highest levels in decades.
engage in a local war with a neighboring country within six months and pose a credible threat to one
of more NATO countries within two years.

Gwadera 25 [Zuzanna Gwadera, "US allies question extended deterrence guarantees, but have few options",
March 20, 2025, International Institute for Strategic Studies,
[Link]
es-but-have-few-options/, Accessed 06/24/2025] | gavnotpoore
The foundation of nuclear deterrence is as much about credibility as it is certainty. The United States has provided this credibility through extended
deterrence to its allies for three-quarters of a century, but this guarantee now faces creeping uncertainty. Only weeks into his second term,
President Donald Trump’s transactional approach to defence and security relations has begun to erode
decades of assurance. NATO has long sheltered under US extended deterrence, while Washington has also provided Australia, Japan and South
Korea with its nuclear umbrella. But any perceived weakening in the strength of the US guarantee could risk long-standing nuclear weapons
non-proliferation norms. Current arrangements The United States’ extended nuclear deterrence policy emerged after the Second World War in response to
the conventional military threat that the Soviet Union posed to Western Europe. The US pledged to protect NATO members with its strategic arsenal and
subsequently forward-deployed nuclear weapons to Europe in 1954. NATO’s nuclear-sharing and forward-deployed nuclear arrangements comprise an
estimated 100 US B61 gravity bombs stored at six bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkiye. Seven NATO members contribute
dual-capable aircraft (DCA), which can deliver B61 bombs; a portion of allies also conduct joint nuclear exercises. Apart from France, all NATO members
participate in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), the Alliance’s senior body on nuclear policy. However, the US has full custody of
weapons at forward-stations in Europe and the US president maintains the sole authority over employing
them. Australia, Japan and South Korea are provided similar cover, though the US does not station nuclear weapons on their soil. In light of growing
threats from China and North Korea, the Biden administration sought to reassure its allies in the Indo-Pacific, including through increased deployments
of strategic bombers and submarines, joint military exercises and greater inter-government engagement, notably through the Nuclear Consultative Group
(NCG) enshrined in the 2023 Washington Declaration between the US and South Korea. A tattered umbrella? The Trump administration has long
criticised European allies for not spending enough on defence. The US has now ramped up that pressure, with Trump calling for NATO members’
minimum defence expenditure to increase to 5% of GDP – a level not even the US meets. He has also publicly mused about refusing to defend allies that,
in his view, ‘don’t pay’. Combined with his push for a quick ceasefire in Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine without security guarantees, and the pause
in US military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine (since resumed), US behaviour has caused some in Europe to question Washington’s commitment
to the continent’s security. Nuclear extended deterrence, while not explicitly addressed by the Trump administration, is to the fore of these concerns.
Allies now doubt whether Trump would ever consider using US nuclear weapons to defend Europe.

Walt ’21 — Stephen; columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international
relations at Harvard University. March 23, 2021; "It’s Time to Fold America’s Nuclear Umbrella"; Foreign
Policy; [Link] //CYang | recut
gavnotpoore

Why is this statement so intriguing? Because it shows the authors of this report recognize that Europe as a whole might be more secure if it
could rely on a locally based deterrent instead of continuing to shelter under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. And if that is true for
the nations of Europe, then it might well be true for others. Although the report’s authors are opposed to new states joining the nuclear club (Britain
and France are already members), their statement clearly implies that deterrence would be strengthened if states facing serious
external threats had a nuclear guarantee that didn’t depend on Uncle Sam.
Clark 25 [Alex Clark, "Armed by America: how Europe’s militaries depend on the US – a visual analysis",
June 24, 2025, The Guardian,
[Link]
lone, Accessed 06/25/2025] | gavnotpoore
That concern is now increasingly mutual. European governments are pursuing an unprecedented push for military
independence, amid fears the US is no longer a reliable ally.

Rasmussen, former NATO secretary-general, 25 explains that

[Link]
/#cookie_message_anchor
As U.S. President Donald Trump seeks to reduce Washington’s role in European security, intelligence
agencies are repeatedly telling us that Russia may be [is] preparing to attack a NATO country by the
end of this decade. Even as it continues to fight in Ukraine, Russia has lately been upgrading its
military bases on the NATO frontier. Last year, Russia spent more on defense than all of Europe combined. Against this
backdrop, Europe’s longstanding intransigence on rearmament and military readiness is no longer just an
embarrassment. It is an emergency.

Cook ‘25, Lorne. [Lorne Cook is a reporter with The Associated Press, an American not-for-profit news agency headquartered in New York

City and founded in 1846.] “EU’s Top Diplomat Warns That Russia Has a Plan for Long-Term Aggression against Europe.” AP News, 18 June 2025,
[Link]/article/europe-eu-russia-sabotage-threat-attack-nato-428d488080c17f6c322c9553a301b6dc. //sv

Russia poses a direct threat to the European Union through acts of sabotage and cyberattacks, but its
massive military spending suggests that President Vladimir Putin also plans to use his armed forces
elsewhere in the future, the EU’s top diplomat warned on Wednesday. “Russia is already a direct threat to the European Union,” EU
foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said. She listed a series of Russian airspace violations, provocative military exercises,
and attacks on energy grids, pipelines and undersea cables. Kallas noted that Russia is already
spending more on defense than the EU’s 27 nations combined, and this year will invest more “on
defense than its own health care, education and social policy combined.” “This is a long-term plan for
a long-term aggression. You don’t spend that much on (the) military, if you do not plan to use it,”
Kallas told EU lawmakers in Strasbourg, France.

The Moscow Times ‘25. “NATO Declares Russia ‘Long-Term Threat’ to Its Security.” The Moscow Times, 26 June 2025,
[Link]/2025/06/25/nato-declares-russia-long-term-threat-to-its-security-a89568. //sv

The NATO military alliance on Wednesday declared Russia a “long-term threat” to its collective
security in a joint summit statement that pledged increased defense spending and reaffirmed “enduring” support for Ukraine. NATO’s 32
member states said they stood “united in the face of profound security threats and challenges, in particular the long-term threat posed by
They committed to spending 5% of GDP annually on defense and security by
Russia to Euro-Atlantic security.”
2035. The alliance argued that the boost is necessary to counter what they described as Russia’s growing
aggression, as well as to help keep U.S. President Donald Trump engaged in NATO, as he has long criticized European nations for spending
too little on defense. Russian President Vladimir Putin last week dismissed NATO’s plans, saying Moscow “will no doubt counter all threats that
Putin has portrayed his full-scale invasion of Ukraine as part of a broader confrontation with the
arise.”
West, demanding written guarantees that NATO will not expand further east. Ukraine has rejected any such concessions and continues to
seek security guarantees from the West.

The Economic Times 25, 3-10-2025, "Russia's Vladimir Putin will attack 3 more nations soon,
claims NATO ex-commander," Economic Times,
[Link]
soon-claims-nato-ex-commander/articleshow/[Link]?from=mdr, accessed 6-26-2025 | aarthi

Is Russian President Vladimir Putin just bidding his time before launching a devastating attack across Europe after annihilating Ukraine? With
close aides of Donald Trump, the new US President, clamouring that America quit NATO and as a
consequence leave Europe to face the might of the Russian army on its own, the prospects of Putin
unleashing his forces onto other defenceless countries are real, claims a former top British army General Sir Richard
Shirreff. The officer who also served as NATO’s deputy supreme allied commander in Europe believes that Russian forces will in a
couple of years attack at least three more European nations if an effective deterrence is not created.
Lambasting Trump for dumping Ukraine, the former NATO’s ex-deputy supreme allied commander in Europe in an interview to a UK news outlet
stated that the US President had delivered a “mortal blow” to the formidable military alliance. Trump’s decisions to halt arms supply to Ukraine
as well as stop intelligence sharing is a clear signal to Putin’s commanders to go all out against Kiev and eventually other European nations, he
claimed.

Deterrence:

Landsbergis, former Lithuanian Foreign Minister, 25 explains

[Link]
Not all that long ago, conventional wisdom held that it would be suicide for Russia to attack NATO. Today, the
Kremlin knows
perfectly well that Europe lacks sufficient air defense, tanks, and artillery to fight a sustained
war—and that it will take many years and substantial funding for Europe to rearm as much as it
needs to. Add in the uncertainty over whether the United States will come to the aid of an ally attacked by Russia, and Europe faces its most
dangerous phase in many decades.

Hoffmann of the Oslo Nuclear Project, 25 explains

[Link]
Europe must therefore prepare for war—precisely to deter Russia from starting one in the first place. For
many decades, NATO’s deterrence has worked, but two critical factors have changed. First, NATO’s military capabilities—particularly those of
Russia is now operating under a fully
the European allies—are not commensurate with the growing threat the bloc faces.
mobilized war economy with a society that seems prepared to bear any costs imposed by its leadership, but Europe’s armed
forces, defense industries, and societies are only beginning to respond. Second, NATO’s cohesion as an alliance has been fraying:
Donald Trump’s verbal attacks on European allies have cast serious doubts about the credibility of U.S. security guarantees, and key Western
European states have repeatedly demonstrated fear and hesitation in confronting Russia over Ukraine. All this pushes the perceived balance of
resolve dangerously in Moscow’s favor.
Brugen 25 explains
[Link]

Ukraine inherited the world's third-largest nuclear arsenal following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Approximately 30,000 nuclear
weapons were spread across Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, with Ukraine possessing nearly 1,900 strategic nuclear warheads and
chose to denuclearize, signing the Budapest Memorandum
thousands of tactical nuclear weapons. However, three years later, Kyiv
and transferring the weapons to Russia. In exchange, [and] Ukraine was promised security assurances
from Russia, the U.S. and the United Kingdom. At the time, Ukraine's decision was widely welcomed, as it helped the country secure
financial assistance from the West. But with Russia having openly violated the Budapest Memorandum—first by
annexing Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, and by launching a full-scale invasion of the country in 2022—some now
question whether Kyiv miscalculated the possible cost of disarmament. In 1993, political scientist John Mearsheimer published commentary titled
"The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," arguing that a nuclear Ukraine was imperative to maintaining peace with its neighbor, Russia.
Three decades on, he stands by that position. "If Ukraine had kept its nuclear weapons, Russia would not have
invaded in 2022," Mearsheimer, the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor in the Political Science Department at the
University of Chicago, told Newsweek. "Nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent." Mearsheimer said it would have
been highly likely that Kyiv would have used its nuclear weapons to defend itself in the event of a Russian invasion, which Ukraine would have
viewed as an "existential threat."

Dodman ‘25
[Link]
mbrella-deter-russia
In the short term, a change in France’s nuclear doctrine, which prohibits the stationing of atomic weapons outside France, could give an extended
French nuclear umbrella greater credibility. Allies could be integrated into French nuclear exercises and training through the provision of air
escorts and by the development of supply and logistical support, aiming to create a degree of interoperability.
France possesses Rafale warplanes capable of carrying nuclear missiles. Their deployment across
Europe “would give concrete form to European strategic autonomy”, adds Grémare, sending a signal
of “European solidarity that would make Moscow’s calculations more difficult”

Dodman 25 [Benjamin Dodman, "As faith in the US wavers, can France’s nuclear umbrella deter Russia?",
June 3, 2025, France 24,
[Link]
russia, Accessed 06/30/2025] | gavnotpoore
“Maintaining a certain vagueness about France’s vital interests is at the heart of the ‘strategic ambiguity’ that underpins
nuclear deterrence,” said Alain De Neve, a researcher at the Royal Higher Institute for Defence in Brussels. The idea, he added, “is to
keep opponents in the dark about the scope of France's nuclear umbrella”. Keep adversaries guessing Nuclear
deterrence involves maintaining ambiguity about which circumstances would lead to the use of nuclear weapons, in order to prevent a potential
aggressor from calculating risks. In this case, it means striking a balance between giving substance to French claims of a vested interest in
Europe’s defence and avoiding detail about how far Paris would go to defend the continent. France “likes to remind people of its
capabilities in order to be credible in its deterrence”, said Emmanuelle Maitre, a senior research fellow at France's Foundation
for Strategic Research. “But there’s also an element of ambiguity, because it’s not a question of telling our
adversary exactly what our red lines are,” she added. “No nuclear power does this.”
René Schlee, Country Director of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung - Office in Kosova (German Think Tank
associated with the Social Democratic Party of Germany), 1-28-20 “Mut zum Wechsel,” Internationale Politik
und Gesellschaft, January 28, 2020,
[Link]
[Translated to english by Ulrich KüHn, Tristan Volpe, Bert Thompson, 3-5-2020, "Tracking the German
Nuclear Debate," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
[Link] | recutgavnotpoore

A withdrawal of Germany from nuclear sharing with the Americans would have further advantages.
Coordinated with other countries of nuclear sharing, such as Belgium or the Netherlands, one could send the important political signal to the Eastern
even a minimal nuclear deterrent under French leadership would satisfy German
European NATO countries that
as well as European security interests. Moreover, it would enable Germany to present itself with new
credibility in matters of nuclear disarmament.

Dikov 20 [Ivan Dikov, "Macron Just Missed the Chance to Extend France’s Nuclear Umbrella over the
Post-Brexit EU", February 27, 2020, European Views,
[Link]
-over-the-post-brexit-eu/, Accessed 07/02/2025] | gavnotpoore
Both of those goals could have been easily achieved by declaring a French nuclear guarantee for the entire EU territory. It is absolutely
essential to realize that the security and stability of the EU is vital not just for its own citizens. It is vital for the entire world,
and for those citizens of the world who are sick and tired of wars, corruption, embezzlement,
dishonesty, and using state power for various kinds of abuses. Given the forward thinking, general goodwill, and concrete
steps and measures of the European Union in favor of promoting peace, providing mass-scale humanitarian assistance, and, what’s more important than
ever, fighting climate change – the EU is an asset for any decent person out there, not just for itself and its own good people. Guaranteeing that the
EU would not be blackmailed, extorted, intimidated, or even shattered to bits and pieces by malicious dictators,
many of them at its very doorstep, is a huge part of allowing the EU the opportunity to make a real difference in
the world of today. It is thus of utmost importance for the EU as a whole and every single one of its member
states to make sure that their Union can be defended successfully against those foreign leader who wish it ill as they are
unable to understand that today’s stakes are much higher for the entire humankind than anything their distorted, atavistic brains could ever imagine.
The EU must be able to stand up for itself if it is going to do anybody any good, and it is inconceivable
that it would be able to do that without being a major international power with the capability to fend off nuclear
blackmail, or, God forbid, to retaliate against a nuclear attack. It’s hard to say which of these three attributes is being lacked
the worst by the EU, the unique supranational power of the present and the future: a nuclear capability, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, or
a full-fledged, medium-sized but fully capable Union military with sufficient power project capabilities. None of those seem to be much in the making,
which is, once again, bad news for everybody because the EU’s potential for spearheading as well as realizing positive change is important for all.
However, at least with respect to the EU’s lack of nuclear capabilities, France could have provided an easy fix,
especially now that it has remained the only EU nuclear power after Britain’s voluntary Brexit downshifting.
(That is, of course, not counting Cold War Era tactical US nukes still stationed in Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands (as well as non-EU state
Turkey) which could theoretically be used by the host country under certain conditions.) Instead of making some banal statements that the EU “cannot
remain spectators” in arms races, and that “the vital interests of France now have a European dimension” (indeed! They seem to have had that for…ever),
Macron should have made a highly convincing declaration that France would be extending its nuclear umbrella over all 27 member states of the post-Brexit
EU. Macron should have stated that the French nuclear arsenal would be used to retaliate against any potential nuclear attack targeting EU soil. Plain and
simple. Why would he even want to consider doing that? First,
to solidify France’s leadership position within the EU,
together with Germany in “Franco-Germany”, and/or on its own – by using one of its top assets, the
French military capabilities. (France does remain one of the three countries in the world, the other two being the United States and the
United Kingdom, with arguably global power projection capabilities.) Second, to guarantee the overall security and stability of the EU vis-à-vis any
potential adversaries with nuclear capabilities or the aspiration to acquire them. Because the EU’s security would to the benefit of the good people of
France, Europe, and the world as a whole. Third, to plug, at least rhetorically, some major loopholes in the security and defense of the entire West
stemming from the NATO – EU discrepancy, i.e. how the memberships of these two entities do not coincide, leaving non-NATO EU members exposed.
The simple act of making the EU a collective member of NATO would largely resolve that but Western leaders
aren’t able to reach a working consensus even on such a simple state. Fourth, to demonstrate some European security
independence from the United States of America. While NATO remains crucial to European and Western security, with perplexing figures such as Trump
getting elected “leader of the free world” and “most powerful man (human) on Earth”, the EU should have taken care of its own defense capabilities a very
long time ago. Last but not least, Macron should have extended the French nuclear umbrella to the entire EU territory immediately after Brexit because,
while such a move would have brought all those benefits mentioned above, it would have cost him or France absolutely nothing – other than some bold
statements. If
France extended its nuclear umbrella over the entire EU, it wouldn’t be surrendering its
nuclear arsenal to Brussels, or anything of the sort. It would just promote itself to a guarantor of EU security existence in the
face of nuclear or WMD threats. France would just declare that it would use its capabilities to strike back on behalf of the EU at any adversary in the
hopefully highly unlikely scenario that such an adversary might make the mistake of launching a nuclear attack against any bit of EU territory. And it
would do that regardless of NATO and/or the United States (which doesn’t mean ignoring or abandoning them, of course). Such a French nuclear
umbrella for the entire EU could be just a bluff. It probably should be just a bluff. That wouldn’t have
mattered as long as it could be just a little convincing – it would still help achieve all those beneficial goals mentioned above. And if push ever came to
shove, say, if somebody actually attacked some part of the EU which is remote from Eiffel Tower and Champs-Elysee, such as Poland, the Baltic States,
Finland, or Cyprus, France wouldn’t be obliged to do anything anyway. There would be no power to force it to do anything. Depending on the
highly hypothetical situation, the respective French leader might decide it is a good idea for it to retaliate on behalf of the EU with its nuclear
arsenal. Or it might decide that it isn’t – and that wouldn’t be the first time a great power wouldn’t live up to a security guarantee. But the highly
hypothetical nature of such scenarios, whose development is impossible to predict, does not negate the
benefits of just making a nuclear umbrella statement.

Bruno Tertrais, Deputy Director of the Paris-based Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, ’19, “Will
Europe Get Its Own Bomb?” Washington Quarterly, 42:2, June 28, 2019,
[Link] | recut gavnotpoore

Would it be credible? Some claim that a France and/or UK-based nuclear deterrent would not have the
necessary credibility.53 But it is widely considered that a smaller arsenal can deter a major power
provided it has the ability to inflict damage seen as unacceptable by the other party. This has always been
the premise of “deterrence of the strong by the weak”—and is not connected with the size of the other party’s
nuclear arsenal as long as deterrence does not rely on a “counterforce” strategy, or on the ability to destroy the
equivalent territory or population of the defender. It is also not connected with the size of the other party’s
conventional military capabilities as long as one does not rely on any war-fighting or nuclear defense
strategy—concepts that even NATO no longer applies. Most importantly, again, deterrence exercised by a
European power might be seen as more credible than when it is exercised by a distant protector; the idea
is that “be ready to die for Helsinki” could be a more credible proposition for a European nuclear power
than for the United States.
Dodman 25 [Benjamin Dodman, "As faith in the US wavers, can France’s nuclear umbrella deter Russia?",
June 3, 2025, F24,
[Link]
russia, Accessed 06/29/2025] | gavnotpoore
France possesses Rafale warplanes capable of carrying nuclear missiles. Their deployment across Europe
“would give concrete form to European strategic autonomy”, adds Grémare, sending a signal of “European
solidarity that would make Moscow’s calculations more difficult”.

Kulesa 18 - (Lukasz Kulesa is Research Director at the European Leadership Network. Previously, he
worked as the Head of the Non-proliferation and Arms Control Project at the Polish Institute of International
Affairs (PISM), and between 2010–2012 as Deputy Director of the Strategic Analyses Department at the
National Security Bureau, a body providing aid and support to the President of the Republic of Poland in
executing security and defence tasks; February 2018, European Leadership Network, "," doa: 1-20-2021) url:
[Link] | recutgavnotpoore

Any NATO-Russia conflict would inevitably have a nuclear dimension. The role of nuclear weapons as a tool for escalation
control for Russia has been thoroughly debated by experts, but when and how Russia might use (and not merely showcase or activate) nuclear weapons in a conflict remains an
open question. Beyond catch phrases such as “escalate to de-escalate” or “escalate to win” there are a wider range of options for Russian nuclear weapon use.
For example, a single nuclear warning shot could be lethal or non-lethal. It could be directed against a purely military target or a military-civilian one. Detonation
could be configured for an EMP effect. A “false flag” attack is also conceivable. These options might be used to signal escalation and could significantly
complicate NATO’s responses. Neither NATO nor its member states have developed a similar theory of victory. Public NATO documents stipulate the general goals for the
Alliance: defend against any armed attack and, as needed, restore the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. It is less clear how far the Alliance would be
willing to escalate the conflict to achieve these goals, and what mechanisms and means it would use while trying to maintain some degree of control over the conflict. The goals
and methods of waging a conflict with Russia would probably have to be limited in order to avoid a massive nuclear exchange. Such limitations would also involve restrictions on
striking back against targets on Russian territory. But too narrow an approach could put too much restraint on NATO’s operations: the Russian regime’s stability may
ultimately need to be threatened in order to force the leadership into terminating the conflict. NATO would thus need to establish what a proportional self-defence response to
Russian actions would involve, and to what extent cyber operations or attacks against military targets in quite different parts of Russia would be useful as tools of escalation to
signal NATO’s resolve. Moreover, individual NATO Allies, especially those directly affected by Russia’s actions, might pursue their individual strategies of escalation. With
regards to the nuclear dimension in NATO escalation plans, given the stakes involved, this element would most likely be handled by the three nuclear-weapon members of the
Alliance, with the US taking the lead. The existence of three independent centres of nuclear decision-making could be exploited to complicate Russian planning and introduce
uncertainty into the Russian strategic calculus, but some degree of “P3” dialogue and coordination would be beneficial. This coordination would not necessarily focus on
nuclear targeting, but rather on designing coordinated operations to demonstrate resolve in order to keep the conflict below the nuclear threshold, or bring it back under the
threshold after first use. Relying on concepts of escalation control and on lessons from the Cold War confrontation might be misleading. The circumstances in which a Russia
-NATO conflict would play out would be radically different from the 20th century screenplay. Moreover, instead of gradual (linear) escalation or salami tactics escalation, it is
possible to imagine surprizing “leap frog” escalation, possibly connected with actions in different domains (e.g. a
cyberattack against critical infrastructure). Flexibility, good intelligence and inventiveness in responding to such developments would be crucial.

EDIB:

Cameron 25 [James Cameron, "Eurodeterrent: A Vision for an Anglo-French Nuclear Force",

03/31/2025, War on the Rocks,
[Link] //MVSG

With their ability to hold several key cities in European Russia at risk, including Moscow and St. Petersburg, even if Russia struck first, the
submarine-launched missiles of the United Kingdom and France would provide a sufficiently credible force to deter large-scale Russian
nuclear-weapons use against Europe. To maintain the long-term viability of this submarine force, the United Kingdom and France would have to
develop joint contingency plans well beyond existing cooperation to cope with any cutoff of U.S. nuclear assistance to London. Further
development of an air-delivered missile capability would be necessary to provide a credible limited-use capability beyond the “final warning” of
current French doctrine and the rumored low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead available to the United Kingdom. Such efforts
would require an increase in warhead numbers, though not on par with U.S. or Russian stockpiles. A new generation of conventional
precision-strike systems should supplement the Anglo-French nuclear forces. Non-nuclear
allies such as Germany, Poland,
the Netherlands, and the Nordic states could provide such systems, possibly through joint production.
This role would draw non-nuclear states deeper into conventional-nuclear operations through exercises
and planning that go beyond non-nuclear NATO members’ current involvement in Conventional Support for Nuclear
Operations. Coordination of these nuclear and non-nuclear efforts should be institutionalized in a European equivalent of
the existing NATO Nuclear Planning Group, in which France does not currently participate. A new Anglo-French deterrence policy would need
clear articulation by London and Paris, either in a single document, or in separate but coordinated statements, similar to the U.S. Nuclear
Posture Review. Neither country currently has such a detailed declaratory policy.

Seldin 22 [Seldin, Jeff. “Europe Warns of Russian Pressure from Africa.” VOANews, 15 July 2022,
[Link]/a/europe-warns-of-russian-pressure-from-africa/[Link]. Accessed 14 Sept.
2022. Jeff Seldin serves as VOA’s National Security Correspondent tracking developments in intelligence,
counterterrorism, and cyber since March 2015, following a stint covering the Pentagon. His current focus
has been on terror groups such as ISIS and al-Qaida, while also covering U.S. election security, as well as
covering developments with Russia, China, North Korea and other global hotspots. \ ncp-faraj ♞]
Washington — Across Europe, there is a growing uneasiness that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is serving to overshadow another critical, even
existential threat that could do severe damage to the West while serving the Kremlin’s interests. Instability and the rise of terrorism across
Africa, according to multiple European and NATO officials, cannot be overlooked no matter how deeply Russian President Vladimir Putin pushes
into Ukraine. And nowhere are concerns growing as fast as they are in the Sahel, the semiarid stretch of land spanning northern and western
Africa from Senegal to Sudan. “By sending a couple of thousand Wagner paramilitaries, the Russians are taking
over there,” Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren told an audience in Washington Thursday. “We cannot accept that.” Ollongren is not
alone in voicing concerns about the Russian threat from Ukraine, in the east, overshadowing the threat from Africa. "One of the worst effects
this will have on the Western side in my view is that it focused attention of the European member states on the eastern front, lowering the
already low level of attention on the south," Lieutenant General Giovanni Manione, the deputy director general of the European Union Military
Staff, warned a forum in Washington last month. "It is a tragic effect. It is a huge mistake," Manione added. "We are keeping resources [in
Europe] just in case something happens, forgetting completely that actions should be taken now in another theater." FILE - Russian President
Vladimir Putin attends a meeting on the sidelines of the Caspian Sea littoral states summit in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, June 29, 2022. FILE -
Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a meeting on the sidelines of the Caspian Sea littoral states summit in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, June
29, 2022. Manione went even further, suggesting that Putin, as much as he may want to conquer Ukraine, is also adroitly using the fight there as
a distraction. "I'm not sure this is the main target of the Russians," Manione said of Ukraine. "The main target of the Russians could be having
people focused on there [Ukraine], forgetting their actions elsewhere." Russian paramilitary groups in Africa Other European countries are also
sounding alarms. An Austrian Federal Intelligence Service report issued late last month warned of a “belt of instability” reaching across Africa,
from the Sahara Desert and the Sahel region all the way to Somalia and the Arabian Sea. “This
instability is exacerbated by the
rise of a grass-roots anti-West movement in the Sahel region and the withdrawal of European armed
forces from Mali,” the report said. “Ostensibly private actors on the ground, such as the Russian Wagner
Group, also play an important role here.” Many Western officials view Wagner, a paramilitary company
run by Russian oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin, is a proxy force for Putin, helping Moscow secure access to
natural resources with no regard for human rights. So far, U.S. military officials have reported the presence of Wagner
mercenaries in more than a dozen African countries over the past several years. With recent deployments to Mali sparking
renewed concerns, especially after Wagner forces were tied to the slaughter of 300 civilians this past March.
FILE - A Malian soldier patrols in Mali, Oct. 20, 2017. SEE ALSO: Malian Forces, Suspected Russian Fighters Killed 300 Civilians, Rights Group Says
Wagner has also been tied to January’s coup in Burkina Faso, though U.S. officials have not confirmed the allegations. FILE - A man holds his
national flag to show support for the military after Burkina Faso President Roch Kabore was detained at a military camp in Ouagadougou,
Burkina Faso, Jan. 24, 2022. SEE ALSO: US Aware of Allegations of Russian Links to Burkinabe Coup Like their European counterparts, U.S.
officials agree Russia’s involvement in Africa, and in the Sahel in particular, is worrisome, warning the payoff for countries turning to Russia, and
to Wagner, often fails to deliver on Moscow’s promises. “We've seen the impact and destabilizing effect that Wagner brings to Africa and
elsewhere, and I think countries that have experienced Wagner Group deployments within their borders found themselves to be a little bit
poorer, a little bit weaker, a little bit less secure,” U.S. Deputy Commanding General for Africa Major General Andrew Rohling told reporters last
month. But U.S. military and intelligence officials, while concerned, question whether Russian forces are capable of threatening Europe from the
south. “There’s not necessarily a concrete and cohesive plan,” one U.S. official told VOA, speaking on the condition of anonymity in order to
discuss intelligence. "They're not a very effective organization, except for extorting money and resources,” the official added, comparing Russia’s
strategy in Africa to “placing a bunch of bets on a roulette table." Indirect threat NATO, in its recently adopted, updated strategic concept, also
sees the threat from Russia in Africa as indirect. “NATO’s southern neighborhood, particularly the Middle East, North Africa and Sahel regions,
faces interconnected security, demographic, economic and political challenges,” the alliance document said, adding it “enables destabilizing and
coercive interference by strategic competitors.” Some experts warn it would a mistake, however, to view Russia’s actions as incoherent. “Russia
is pursuing several strategic objectives on the continent,” Joseph Siegle, director of research at the National Defense University's Africa Center
for Strategic Studies, told U.S. lawmakers Thursday. While much of Moscow’s effort is designed to “displace and discredit Western influence,”
Siegle said that is just the start. “Russia
is trying to gain control over strategic territory in North Africa, most vividly
seen in Libya. This would provide Moscow with an enduring security presence on NATO’s southern
border,” he said. “Combined with port access that Moscow’s trying to gain on the Red Sea, this would
put Russia in a position where it could disrupt maritime traffic through the chokeholds of the Suez
Canal and the Bab el-Mandab through which some 30% of global container traffic passes every year,”
he warned.

Chevreuil 25 [Astrid Chevreuil and Federico Steinberg, "Bolstering European Defense in an Era of US
Retrenchment", 04/09/2025, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs,
[Link]
t-insights-from-the-draghi-report/?utm_source=[Link]] //MVSG

With the ongoing war in Ukraine and a new US administration reassessing its security commitments to Europe, Draghi stresses the need for
Europe to become more self-reliant in defense. While these recommendations challenge entrenched national interests and the existing US-EU
relationship, a stronger European defense would benefit both Europe and the United States by fostering a more balanced and resilient alliance.
This article argues that the European Union must act on these recommendations to enhance its strategic autonomy and strengthen its security
framework for the future. Addressing a Fragmented European Defense Sector Expanding European defense capabilities requires substantial
investment. Draghi’s report calls for a radical transformation of the EU’s government financing model, arguing that insufficient public
and private investment has led to a spending gap of approximately five percent of the EU’s GDP per year—around eight
hundred billion US dollars. This shortfall undermines the production of essential European public goods, including defense.
These funding shortages come at a precarious time. Regardless of the outcome in Ukraine or future US security commitments, European nations
must prepare to counter potential Russian military aggression in neighboring states. Draghi estimates that an
additional five hundred
billion euros is needed to address security threats. While higher economic growth and productivity could facilitate these
investments, excessive austerity following the 2008 financial crisis and the EU’s failure to establish a centralized fiscal capacity have weakened its
economies. Compounding these challenges is the fragmentation of the European Defense Industrial Base
(EDIB), exacerbated by inefficiencies in the single market. Dominant national defense firms like Leonardo, Dassault,
Thales, and Rheinmetall primarily operate in domestic markets, producing relatively small volumes. This prevents
the European Union from achieving economies of scale—critical for reducing production costs and
developing effective supply chains across the continent. As a result, Europe lags behind integrated defense markets such as those in
the United States, China, or Russia. This fragmentation forces Europe to source a significant portion of its defense procurement externally.
Currently, 78 percent of member states’ procurement goes to foreign suppliers, with US defense firms receiving 63 percent of those funds.
Despite efforts to reverse this trend following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Draghi argues
that Europe’s defense industry remains insufficient to meet emerging security threats. To address these shortcomings, Draghi
calls for greater EU integration and political commitment. His report recommends creating a European Defense Industry
Authority to centralize procurement, leverage the EU’s large-scale economy, and allow for specialization across member states—akin to the US
defense model. Such a move would mark a significant structural shift, as defense policy remains predominantly under national control. The
European Defence Fund, established in 2017, has supported joint defense projects, but procurement remains largely decentralized. The newly
appointed Defense Commissioner, Andrius Kubilius, and his team must now define their approach to expanding the EU’s role in defense policy.
Their challenge will be to demonstrate the EU’s capacity to coordinate defense industrial decisions while ensuring that
military planning remains within the purview of member states and NATO. While NATO leads in defense planning and resource allocation, it
does not manage procurement. The European Union, on the other hand, plays an economic role, including coordinating defense spending
across member states. The key challenge will be synchronizing NATO’s strategic planning with the EU’s defense spending decisions, ensuring that
Europe develops a more self-sufficient and competitive defense sector while maintaining transatlantic cohesion.

Wachs 23
Horovitz; Wachs 23 [Liviu Horovitz; Lydia Wachs, "France’s Nuclear Weapons and Europe", 09/03/2023,
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), [Link] //MVSG

As long as France does not relinquish control over its nuclear arsenal, the coun­try’s security promises can be underpinned only by the
establishment of an institu­tional framework that would give its allies some say over or, at least, an insight into French nuclear policy. One
possibility would be an arrangement that resembles the current US nuclear-sharing system. But even that mechanism would lack credibility if
France did not abandon minimum deter­rence and significantly expand its nuclear capabilities. And what is more, even if France were to take
such steps, credibility would still be primarily determined by the country’s political interests. Any form of French nuclear sharing
would require large investments by France and its allies. Above all, the options for limited escalation would have to be
up­graded. While there is no doubt that France’s current arsenal offers the basis for such an expansion – given, for example, the air­borne
component mentioned above – to­day’s stockpile of nuclear warheads for air-launched cruise missiles is likely to be too small for extended
deterrence. Enhancing France’s credibility to respond to limited aggression would likely require the produc­tion of nuclear warheads with lower
yield. For their part, the NATO states participating in this sharing mechanism would have to provide storage
facilities. This would presumably mean a smaller outlay for the five states that are already involved in nuclear sharing and have the necessary
facilities; but new host countries would first have to construct such depots. In addition, participating states would have to provide carrier
aircraft. Using American F-35 fighters for French weapons would not be an option because of possible political dif­ferences and the lack of
technical certification. Thus, new European fighter aircraft would have to be constructed for this task. The Future
Combat Air System could be an option. It is currently being developed by France, Germany and Spain and is not ex­pected to enter into service
until 2040 at the earliest. Finally, questions remain about both the institutional framework, and the command and control of such a sharing
mechanism. Full institutional integration into NATO would be unlikely as long as the United States were part of the alliance. Therefore, a new
institutional structure would be needed. Moreover, the decision-making and consul­tation process between France and the par­ticipating states
would have to be clarified.

Cameron 25 [James Cameron, "Eurodeterrent: A Vision for an Anglo-French Nuclear Force", 03/31/2025,
War on the Rocks,
[Link] //MVSG
With their ability to hold several key cities in European Russia at risk, including Moscow and St. Petersburg, even if Russia struck first, the
submarine-launched missiles of the United Kingdom and France would provide a sufficiently credible force to deter large-scale Russian
nuclear-weapons use against Europe. To maintain the long-term viability of this submarine force, the United Kingdom and France would have to
develop joint contingency plans well beyond existing cooperation to cope with any cutoff of U.S. nuclear assistance to London. Further
development of an air-delivered missile capability would be necessary to provide a credible limited-use capability beyond the “final warning” of
current French doctrine and the rumored low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead available to the United Kingdom. Such efforts
would require an increase in warhead numbers, though not on par with U.S. or Russian stockpiles. A new generation of conventional
precision-strike systems should supplement the Anglo-French nuclear forces. Non-nuclear
allies such as Germany, Poland, the
Netherlands, and the Nordic states could provide such systems, possibly through joint production. This
role would draw non-nuclear states deeper into conventional-nuclear operations through exercises and
planning that go beyond non-nuclear NATO members’ current involvement in Conventional Support for Nuclear Operations.
Coordination of these nuclear and non-nuclear efforts should be institutionalized in a European equivalent of the existing
NATO Nuclear Planning Group, in which France does not currently participate. A new Anglo-French deterrence policy would need clear
articulation by London and Paris, either in a single document, or in separate but coordinated statements, similar to the U.S. Nuclear Posture
Review. Neither country currently has such a detailed declaratory policy. Greater specificity would be necessary to bolster the credibility of an
Anglo-French deterrent in the eyes of Moscow. Such a policy would also provide reassurance to non-nuclear European allies, who would need to
be involved in its formulation in a similar way as with the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. The financial, military, diplomatic, and cultural challenges
facing any Anglo-French deterrent would be formidable and require a “paradigm shift” in Europe’s approach to nuclear deterrence. However,
the Trump administration’s public disregard for U.S. extended deterrence, the growing danger from Russia, and the rising risk of further nuclear
proliferation, means that the settled paradigm of trans-Atlantic deterrence is already shifting in ways that will compel Europe to choose
between these options. The development of an Anglo-French Eurodeterrent — ideally as part of a negotiated transfer of responsibility for
European security from the United States to its NATO allies, could help Europe navigate a path from this old world to a more secure future.

Wolff ‘25, Guntram Wolff Is A Senior Fellow At Bruegel. He Is Also A Professor Of

Economics At The Université Libre De Bruxelles (Ulb)., 4-7-2025, "The governance and
funding of European rearmament", Bruegel | The Brussels-based economic think tank,
[Link]

Europe faces a grave security threat. Gaps in European military equipment are substantial compared to Russia’s military build-up. The European
defence market is fragmented and weakened by home bias in procurement, low order numbers and technological gaps.
These problems reflect the combination of past reliance on the United States and Europe’s nationally-based defence
governance. With the US now retreating from its role of European guardian, greater cooperation is essential to close technological gaps and reduce
rearmament costs. Unless procurement is pooled and fragmentation reduced, additional demand for defence goods will mainly drive up prices.

Better-integrated defence markets would both increase competition and facilitate entry of new
defence technology firms. The combination of integrated markets and scaled-up procurement could lead to a halving of unit costs.

Chevreuil ‘25 [Astrid Chevreuil and Federico Steinberg, "Bolstering European Defense in an
Era of US Retrenchment", 04/09/2025, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs,
[Link]
renchment-insights-from-the-draghi-report/] // PL

With the ongoing war in Ukraine and a new US administration reassessing its security commitments to Europe, Draghi stresses the need for Europe to
become more self-reliant in defense. While these recommendations challenge entrenched national interests and the existing US-EU relationship, a

stronger European defense would benefit both Europe and the United States by fostering a
more balanced and resilient alliance. This article argues that the European Union must act on these recommendations to enhance
its strategic autonomy and strengthen its security framework for the future. Addressing a Fragmented European Defense Sector Expanding European
defense capabilities requires substantial investment. Draghi’s report calls for a radical transformation of the EU’s government financing model, arguing
that insufficient public and private investment has led to a spending gap of approximately five percent of the EU’s GDP per year—around eight hundred
billion US dollars. This shortfallundermines the production of essential European public goods, includingdefense. These funding shortages come at a
precarious time. Regardless of the outcome in Ukraine or future US security commitments, European nations must prepare to counter potential Russian
military aggression in neighboring states. Draghi estimates thatan additional five hundred billion euros is needed to address security threats. While higher
economic growth and productivity could facilitate these investments, excessive austerity following the 2008 financial crisis and the EU’s failure to establish

a centralized fiscal capacity have weakened its economies. Compounding these challenges is the fragmentation of the European
Defense Industrial Base (EDIB), exacerbated by inefficiencies in the single market. Dominant national defense firmslike Leonardo,
Dassault, Thales, and Rheinmetall primarilyoperate in domestic markets, producing relatively small volumes. This prevents the European
Union from achieving economies of scale—critical for reducing production costs and developing effective supply chains across
the continent. As a result, Europe lags behind integrated defense markets such as those in the United States, China, or Russia. This fragmentation forces Europe to source a significant portion of its
defense procurement externally. Currently, 78 percent of member states’ procurement goes to foreign suppliers, with US defense firms receiving 63 percent of those funds. Despite efforts to reverse this trend
following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Draghi argues that Europe’s defense industry remains insufficient to meet emerging security threats. To address
these shortcomings, Draghi calls for greater EU integration and political commitment. His report recommends creating a European Defense Industry Authority to centralize procurement, leverage the EU’s
large-scale economy, and allow for specialization across member states—akin to the US defense model. Such a move would mark a significant structural shift, as defense policy remains predominantly under
national control. The European Defence Fund, established in 2017, has supported joint defense projects, but procurement remains largely decentralized. The newly appointed Defense Commissioner,
Andrius Kubilius, and his team must now define their approach to expanding the EU’s role in defense policy. Their challenge will be to demonstrate the EU’s capacity to coordinate defense industrial
decisions while ensuring that military planning remains within the purview of member states and NATO. While NATO leads in defense planning and resource allocation, it does not manage procurement.
The European Union, on the other hand, plays an economic role, including coordinating defense spending across member states. The key challenge will be synchronizing NATO’s strategic planning with
the EU’s defense spending decisions, ensuring that Europe develops a more self-sufficient and competitive defense sector while maintaining transatlantic cohesion.

Wachs ‘23, [Liviu Horovitz; Lydia Wachs, "France’s Nuclear Weapons and Europe",
09/03/2023, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP),
[Link] // PL

As long as France does not relinquish control over its nuclear arsenal, the country’s security promises can be underpinned only by the establishment of an
institutional framework that would give its allies some say over or, at least, an insight into French nuclear policy. One possibility would be an arrangement
that resembles the current US nuclear-sharing system. But even that mechanism would lack credibility if France did not abandon minimum deterrence and
significantly expand its nuclear capabilities. And what is more, even if France were to take such steps, credibility would still be primarily determined by the

country’s political interests. Any form of French nuclear sharing would require large investments by
France and its allies. Above all, the options for limited escalation would have to be upgraded. While there is no doubt that France’s current
arsenal offers the basis for such an expansion – given, for example, the airborne component mentioned above – today’s stockpile of nuclear warheads for
air-launched cruise missiles is likely to be too small for extended deterrence. Enhancing France’s credibility to respond to limited aggression would likely
require the production of nuclear warheads with lower yield. For their part, the NATO states participating in this sharing mechanism would have to
provide storage facilities. This would presumably mean a smaller outlay for the five states that are already involved in nuclear sharing and have the necessary
facilities; but new host countries would first have to construct such depots. In addition, participating states would have to provide carrier aircraft. Using
American F-35 fighters for French weapons would not be an option because of possible political differences and the lack of technical certification. Thus,
new European fighter aircraft would have to be constructed for this task. The Future Combat Air System could be an option. It is currently being
developed by France, Germany and Spain and is not expected to enter into service until 2040 at the earliest. Finally, questions remain about both the
institutional framework, and the command and control of such a sharing mechanism. Full institutional integration into NATO would be unlikely as long
as the United States were part of the alliance. Therefore, a new institutional structure would be needed. Moreover, the decision-making and consultation
process between France and the participating states would have to be clarified.

Cameron ‘25[James Cameron, "Eurodeterrent: A Vision for an Anglo-French Nuclear Force",

03/31/2025, War on the Rocks,
[Link]
e/]

With their ability to hold several key cities in European Russia at risk, including Moscow and St. Petersburg, even if Russia struck first, the
submarine-launched missiles of the United Kingdom and France would provide a sufficiently credible force to deter large-scale Russian nuclear-weapons
use against Europe. To maintain the long-term viability of this submarine force, the United Kingdom and France would have to develop joint contingency
plans well beyond existing cooperation to cope with any cutoff of U.S. nuclear assistance to London. Further development of an air-delivered missile
capability would be necessary to provide a credible limited-use capability beyond the “final warning” of current French doctrine and the rumored low-yield
submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead available to the United Kingdom. Such efforts would require an increase in warhead numbers, though not on
par with U.S. or Russian stockpiles. A new generation of conventional precision-strike systems should supplement the Anglo-French nuclear forces.

Non-nuclear allies such as Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, and the Nordic states could provide
such systems, possibly through joint production. This role would draw non-nuclear states deeper
into conventional-nuclear operations through exercises and planning that go beyond non-nuclear NATO members
current involvement in Conventional Support for Nuclear Operations. Coordination of these nuclear and non-nuclear efforts should be
institutionalized in a European equivalent of the existing NATO Nuclear Planning Group, in which France does not currently participate. A new
Anglo-French deterrence policy would need clear articulation by London and Paris, either in a single document, or in separate but coordinated statements,
similar to the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. Neither country currently has such a detailed declaratory policy. Greater specificity would be necessary to
bolster the credibility of an Anglo-French deterrent in the eyes of Moscow. Such a policy would also provide reassurance to non-nuclear European allies,
who would need to be involved in its formulation in a similar way as with the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. The financial, military, diplomatic, and
cultural challenges facing any Anglo-French deterrent would be formidable and require a “paradigm shift” in Europe’s approach to nuclear deterrence.
However, the Trump administration’s public disregard for U.S. extended deterrence, the growing danger from Russia, and the rising risk of further nuclear
proliferation, means that the settled paradigm of trans-Atlantic deterrence is already shifting in ways that will compel Europe to choose between these
options. The development of an Anglo-French Eurodeterrent — ideally as part of a negotiated transfer of responsibility for European security from the
United States to its NATO allies, could help Europe navigate a path from this old world to a more secure future.

Cohen ‘25[Jared Cohen (President of Global Affairs and Co-Head, Goldman Sachs Global
Institute), "The Future of European Defense", 06/30/2025, Goldman Sachs,
[Link]

While European leaders diverge on the best course of action to take, they are making reforms in at least three directions: 1) Investments in European-level
security architectures, including those aimed at greater strategic autonomy, 2) the modernization of NATO, and 3) an agenda to boost European
competitiveness and technological innovation. Such courses of action can be pursued simultaneously. But they each involve tradeoffs. Scenario #1: Greater

strategic autonomy European strategic autonomy, championed primarily by France, is the push to
strengthen Europe’s ability to defend itself and reduce dependence on external powers, especially the US, for
security. The EU is already investing in Europe’s defense industrial base to strengthen its capabilities at home. The EU’s
Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument is a €150 billion “loans for arms” program, and part of the European Commission’s ReArm Europe plan.
SAFE creates preferential eligibility requirements for procurement from EU firms that would exclude or limit involvement from US enterprises. Likewise,
the European Defense Fund aims to promote cooperation among EU defense companies, with approximately €5.3 billion of its nearly €7.3 billion
budget allocated for collaborative capability development projects. Additional EU-level economic reforms could boost Europe’s defense sector. The
European Commission is developing a Defense Omnibus Simplification proposal to reduce regulatory barriers, ease access to financing, and facilitate
cross-border collaboration. The Commission is also advocating for capital markets reforms to offer additional financing options and pathways to scale.
Long-term investments to revitalize European defense have yielded some progress. But strategic autonomy and a self-reliant European defense sector are
unlikely in the short and medium term. Such changes would require sustained political commitments and cooperation among the EU’s 27 member states
and their partners at levels we have not yet seen. Regulatory barriers, competition among members, and national commercial interests will likely slow
progress. Meanwhile, Europe’s access to both legacy defense systems and critical and emerging technologies depends in large part on transatlantic
commercial engagement. There is still no substitute for cooperation with the US and its defense ecosystem. Historically Europe has been strongest as a
partner to, not a competitor with, the US. Scenario #2: NATO modernization NATO, despite differences among member states, is in many ways in a
stronger position today than it was a decade ago. At 32 members, it is larger and has greater capabilities. A record 23 members are now spending 2% or
more of their GDP on defense. The primary drivers of NATO defense spending increases are primarily central and Eastern European nations, while
members in Western Europe and the Mediterranean have been slower to boost defense outlays. The Alliance is now focused on increasing defense
investments, and on recognizing what other national assets matter for national security. The announcement of a new defense spending target of 5% by
2035, including 1.5% for defense-related spending, could scale this progress, ensuring that member states have more capable militaries and access to safe
and reliable critical infrastructure, from airports, to rail lines, to cyber networks. Further European investments in NATO could strengthen the historic
alliance and increase its members’ capacity for burden sharing. NATO-first modernization would upgrade the alliance for the challenges of the era of
Russian aggression, great-power competition, and technological disruption. Defense spending targets above the 2% threshold will further strengthen the

alliance’s capabilities. Discipline and coordination in areas like procurement and investments, especially in research
and development (R&D) for critical and emerging technologies, would modernize the alliance’s militaries and provide
qualitative advantages. Early moves in this direction include NATO’s Innovation Fund and NATO’s defense innovation accelerator, DIANA.
Furthermore, NATO is working with global and regional coalitions to further enhance its capabilities and modernize its posture, given the challenges of
global strategic competition. The alliance is collaborating with its Indo-Pacific partners, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, on support for
Ukraine, cyber defense, and AI. The alliance’s capabilities have been boosted by the addition of highly capable members like Finland, which has adopted a
comprehensive security model, a whole-of-society approach that augments its Defense Force of 280,000 active-duty and 900,000 reservists (in a country of
roughly 5.5 million people). Meanwhile, regional groupings like the Joint Expeditionary Force, the United Kingdom-led, 10-nation Northern European
military partnership, are taking on more prominence. NATO remains the foremost security framework for many European countries and will likely
continue to be the continent’s primary security guarantor. Greater regional and global defense cooperation could further boost the scale of Europe’s
defense industries and overcome EU-level barriers to cross-border investment, trade, and capital flows. Modernizing the NATO Alliance for today’s
challenges is critical to the future of European defense. But modernizing the alliance is a generational task that would require overcoming political
divisions, competing priorities and limited resources, and the perennial challenge of burden sharing. Scenario #3: Techno-democratic partnerships
Artificial intelligence, autonomy, and industrial capacity are rapidly reshaping the character of war. But Europe lags behind the US and China in
production and technological innovation, a fact that compounds its economic and security challenges. In the defense realm, key technologies include
autonomous unmanned vehicles, cyber and space systems, and AI-enabled systems. Dual-use capabilities critical to modern defense are often invented,
adopted, adapted, and produced at scale by the private sector.

John C. Johnson, 9-4-2024, "Deterrence Can Only Return With Regaine Economic Might"
National Defense Magazine,
[Link]
h-regained--economic-might // PL

The current constraints on defense funding are the results of policy decisions. For one, wartime supplemental funding in the United States is not available
for indirect or proxy conflicts, and unfortunately, traditional deterrence, a flawed premise for preventing direct conflict, has resulted in the ill-conceived

justification for diverting funds from defense to social endeavors. When deterrence fails, industry will be asked to
respond. Thus, the underlying pinnacle but least-recognized instrument of deterrence is the strength of a nation’s economy and
production capability. Industrial strength as a backstop to deterrence makes negotiations, sanctions and military
status more likely to be effective. But without industrial health, other efforts are hollow expressions unable to prevent the struggles
we are witnessing around the globe. If international negotiations are to be sincere, sanctions to be penetrating and military prowess to be acknowledged,
then we must focus on domestic industrial capability. The U.S. supply chain is now spread out farther overseas than in previous years, which hastens the
decline in industrial capability and production readiness.

Indo-Pacific:
Ross Andersen 25, 7-7-2025, "The Nuclear Club Might Soon Double," Atlantic,
[Link]
3251 /, accessed 7-8-2025 | aarthi

For all the recent focus on Iran, in a cruel irony, East Asia is where the world’s fastest buildups are unfolding, in
China and North Korea. A dangerous proliferation cascade may be about to break out, right in the shadow of Hiroshima. It would likely
start in South Korea, and spread first to Japan. It might not stop there. The decades-long effort to keep
nuclear weapons from spreading across the planet may be about to collapse. One cold, windy morning in
Seoul, a week before I met Ogura, I surrendered my phone at the gates of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, a government brain trust that advises
South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff. Inside the gray brutalist building, the nuclear strategist Heo Tae-keun was waiting for me. Heo had recently served as
South Korea’s deputy defense minister for policy. In that role, he had led the country’s delegations in nuclear talks with the United States. He is a former
brigadier general with a rugby player’s build, a sturdy presence in every sense. And yet, that morning, he seemed deeply troubled. President Donald Trump
had just begun his second term, but already he was showing less restraint than in his first. Almost immediately, he had threatened Denmark with military
force, and he seemed content—delighted, even—to let Russia decide Ukraine’s fate. His disdain for old alliances unsettled Heo. “I am not sure what will
happen in Trump 2.0,” he told me. In Korea, he said, in the cautious way of a diplomat, “he is perceived as more unstable in his decision making” than
previous U.S. presidents. Stability is prized by nuclear strategists, who by dint of their profession have had to envision, with disturbing vividness, what
instability looks like in the nuclear realm. As America’s dependability as an ally comes into question, Heo, like many other South Koreans, is looking
around nervously at the dangerous neighborhood where his country is located. South Korea hangs like an earlobe off the eastern edge of Eurasia. Not even
a tiny moat like the Taiwan Strait separates it from the three nuclear-armed autocracies immediately to its north. The first of them, North Korea, is still
technically at war with South Korea, and Seoul’s 9 million residents are attuned to its closeness. From the city center, where skyscrapers stand alongside old
palaces preserved since the Joseon dynasty, it takes just 40 minutes to reach the thin strip of land-mine-riddled wilderness that separates the two countries.

Pacific Forum 25, 5-8-2025, "Explore Pacific Forum's Insightful Indo-Pacific Analysis,"
[Link]
n-th e-indo-pacific/, accessed 7-8-2025 | aarthi

The global security environment is shifting rapidly, and with it, the challenges facing the United States and its allies. Increasing alignment between

nations like China, Russia, and North Korea is testing the foundations of U.S. extended
deterrence, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. As the geopolitical landscape becomes more complex, the importance of
denying adversaries the opportunity to exploit vulnerabilities is more vital than ever. In the spring
of 2025, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory hosted a strategy colloquium focused on these very
issues. The event brought together a diverse group of national security thinkers to discuss how to strengthen U.S. deterrence posture in the Indo-Pacific.
This article draws on those discussions. It’s written to provide insights for defense and strategic planners, and it represents the author’s viewpoints and
reflections of the workshop. The Indo-Pacific is no longer defined by one or two threats—it’s a region shaped by a convergence of actors, interests, and
strategies. The growing coordination between China and Russia, combined with the continued provocations from North Korea and the destabilizing
behavior of Iran, presents a complex web of challenges. These countries are learning to exploit weak points in the current deterrence system, not just
through direct military action but also through economic coercion, cyber tactics, and ambiguous or “gray zone” activities that test the limits of U.S. and
allied responses. For instance, Russian cyber-attacks like the infamous NotPetya cyber-attack caused significant economic loss. However, because gray zone
actions fall below conventional thresholds of retaliation and don’t fit cleanly into existing laws or doctrines, they make it difficult for the US and its
partners to coordinate a clear and unified response.

FrançOis Diaz-Maurin 24, 2-12-2024, "Even in the face of Russian aggression, a nuclear
'Eurodeterrent' is still a bad idea," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
[Link]
ntis-still-a-bad-idea/, accessed 7-8-2025 | aarthi

Reliance on the US nuclear guarantee has helped to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons not
only in Europe, but also in Asia with respect to South Korea and Japan. If countries now start doubting the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent
and feel immediately threatened by the growing capabilities of hostile neighbors, their leaders and publics might turn to national nuclear forces as a
guarantor against aggression or nuclear coercion. This could be tempting because, based on the historical evidence, even a small number of nuclear
weapons can be deterring to adversaries who might otherwise contemplate a conventional war against a state. If North Korea continues to menace South
Korea with military threats, including nuclear ones, South Korea might reverse its prior disinterest in its own nuclear force. Japan too, if it feels threatened
by a rising China, might reluctantly become more interested in a small but survivable force of sea-based nuclear missiles.

Hal Brands 22, 10-16-2022, "Can the US Take on China, Iran, and Russia All at Once?,"
American Enterprise Institute - AEI,
[Link] accessed
7-8-2025 | aarthi

Tehran’s assistance to Russia underscores something vital: If any of the revisionists were decisively defeated, the others would face an emboldened
superpower that could more aggressively target its remaining foes. China may not want to get involved in Ukraine. Yet if Xi feared that Russia was nearing
a military collapse that could cause a political collapse in Moscow, he might feel pressure to provide economic aid and military supplies despite the threat of
American wrath. Don’t expect Russia, Iran and China to commit suicide for one another, but don’t think they will be indifferent to one another’s fate.
The US government often struggles to handle more than one crisis at a time, because the attention of
top policymakers is finite. What’s more, America presently has less ability to deal with multiple military challenges than at any time since
the Cold War. Significant real-dollar defense cuts in the early 2010s, combined with a worsening threat environment, forced the US to adopt a “one-war”
defense strategy, rather than the two-war standard of the 1990s and 2000s. That shift reflected an overdue realization that a major war with a mighty rival
— especially China — would tax the US military to the utmost. Yet it means that the Pentagon lacks the wherewithal to deal with violent contingencies in
two, let alone three, theaters if they happen in close succession. Strategy textbooks typically say that a country with more commitments than capabilities
should reduce the former or increase the latter. That’s sound long-term advice, but it isn’t as helpful right now. So-called Asia Firsters argue that the US
should de-escalate confrontations and even liquidate commitments in the Middle East and Europe to focus on China. They might get a boost from the
bipartisan fury that the recent Saudi decision to cut oil production has provoked in Washington. But moving to such a China-centric foreign policy would
be unwise. Immediately de-escalating in Ukraine might allow Putin to salvage a messy victory and send a message that conventional aggression, when
backed by nuclear coercion, can pay. Pulling back significantly from the Middle East when Tehran is at the nuclear threshold is a recipe for either Iranian
hegemony or regional anarchy. Retrenchment is hard to get right in ideal conditions, let alone when rivals are advancing.

Eckhard LüBkemeier 21, 3-2-2021, "Standing on Our Own Feet?," Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik (SWP),
[Link]
ks-ofeuropean-self-defence, accessed 7-9-2025 | uzair

Only a Europe that provides for its own defence can be a fully sovereign Europe. As is the case for the
US, Europe would have to be capable of protecting its core security interests without depending on its transatlantic partner. Structural incentives as well as
recent developments militate in favour of establishing such intra-NATO status parity. Structurally, unilateral dependence, even among friends, comes at a
price. This timeless incentive is reinforced by recent developments: the demise of the old West, with or without Trump; China’s twofold challenge; an
emerging Sino-American rivalry; a resurgent Russia; the new world disorder; Macron’s offer to his European partners. European self-defence has to meet
four key requirements: broader and greater European integration, sufficient military capabilities, effective strategy, and political leadership. Defence

autonomy requires an independent nuclear deterrent capability. In the case of the EU, neither primary
deterrence, reserved for a single state, nor extended deterrence, such as that provided by the United States, would be adequate. Instead, Europe would have

to create a novel type of “integrated deterrence”. Underpinned by a solid community of solidarity and trust, this would be based on French
nuclear forces, with the French president maintaining exclusive decision-making authority.

Mark Hannah 24, 7-8-2024, "Opinion: Europe and NATO can't help the U.S. counter China.
Here's why," Los Angeles Times,
[Link]
ssio n, accessed 7-8-2025 | aarthi

Disputes about trade and technology accompany these military and political differences. America’s Inflation Reduction Act and the European Union’s
proposed carbon border tax, for instance, create tensions. Economic disagreements pale before the overriding imperative of deterring Chinese or Russian

aggression against Taiwan or NATO territory, but considering all these factors, the U.S. and Europe should split their
attention. As it concentrates forces in the Pacific, the U.S. should encourage Europe to bolster its defenses closer to home. European allies should
double down on deterring Moscow rather than dilute their efforts in a far-off region where they can make little difference. Over time, a more robust
European defense posture might enable more contributions in the Pacific. But developing the necessary expeditionary capabilities would require drastic

investment in areas such as airlift and sealift that most European militaries have long neglected. If Europe instead concentrates on
securing its own neighborhood, it would relieve the U.S. of its costly burden there and free it up to
focus more on the Indo-Pacific. This approach would also be politically popular, with our surveys finding large pluralities of
Europeans who want to increase their country’s defense spending; about 9 out of 10 Europeans want Europe to be primarily — or wholly — responsible
for its own defense.

Thomas Berger 14, Professor of International Relations at Boston University’s Pardee School
of Global Studies, PhD from MIT, “Re: Richard Samuel's NY Times quote,” 3 Jul 2014,
[Link]

At this point in time, however, it would be premature to base policy on the expectation of inevitable American decline. The military balance continues to
favor the US and its allies, and if they work together they should be able to avoid a too dramatic shift for a considerable time to come. Taiwan is not eager
to reunify with China - data provided by Shelly Rigger and others show large majorities would prefer to remain independant, and while the Koreans feel
they have to work with China, they remain deeply suspicious of China as well. A recent ASAN poll shows that 66% of South Koreans view China as a
threat (down from 73% last year.) See figure 5 in the survey available. And the United States continues to have considerable sources of strength that may
endure over time. Since the end of the Second World war there have been periodic waves of predictions that the United States is in a state of inevitable
decline - the current wave is probably the 4th - and it is far from clear that the current pessimists are more likely to be correct now than they were in the

past.¶ At the same time, it should be remembered that there are real risks to leaving balancing to regional powers.
Japan, for instance, would be forced into taking much more aggressive actions than it is now if it were forced to rely on its
resources. South Korea might be as well. Both countries would have to reopen the nuclear option, as might
Taiwan, Australia and others. Perhaps not a bad thing, if you believe like Kenneth Waltz that the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the prospect of
national incineration makes for more sober decision making - "more nukes less Kooks." China, in response might become more assertive as well, and the
risk would go up of disastrous miscalculations leading to conflicts that inevitably would drag the United States back in. To paraphrase Lenin, the United
States may not be interested in international politics, but international politics is definitely interested in the United States.

Sukin and Dalton, 21 -- Assistant Professor of International Relations, and senior fellow and
co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment, “Why South Korea
Shouldn’t Build Its Own Nuclear Bombs,” War on the Rocks, 10-26-2021,
[Link]
s/, accessed 7-23-2023]

Even if the alliance problems were as profound as some analysts contend — and if South Korean nuclear proliferation did not somehow make them worse
— a South Korean decision to acquire nuclear weapons would not necessarily improve Seoul’s security against North Korea or China, as advocates have
claimed. Indeed, a lot would depend on how North Korea and China would react to South Korean proliferation. South Korean nuclear weapons may not
be especially useful politico-military tools against China. U.S. nuclear threats against China during the Korean War did not dissuade Beijing from
continuing to fight. Nor has China hesitated to leverage its conventional military strength in territorial contests with nuclear-armed India. China’s ongoing
modernization of its nuclear forces — whether by constructing missile silos or testing hypersonics — suggests Beijing may view the survivability and
effectiveness of its arsenal as vital for deterring the United States, especially in the Taiwan Strait. Would South Korean nuclear weapons dissuade Beijing

from undertaking coercive operations against Seoul? It seems unlikely. If anything, South Korean proliferation could plausibly invite
more coercive Chinese economic and military pressures if Beijing interpreted Seoul’s nuclear arsenal as a direct challenge to its regional
aspirations. Vis-à-vis China, then, South Korea could wind up counterintuitively less secure with nuclear weapons than without them. South Korean
nuclear weapons could similarly make the situation with North Korea much more dangerous. Already, joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises, which
Pyongyang calls “exercises for a nuclear war,” have repeatedly prompted North Korea to issue aggressive rhetoric, engage in cross-border provocations, and

conduct missile tests. In the face of a South Korean nuclear weapons program, it would be unreasonable to expect North Korea to take no
countervailing actions. For example, it seems likely that South Korean proliferation could cause North Korea to further augment its nuclear arsenal,
posture its nuclear weapons for first use, or take greater risks to gain the upper hand in an escalating military crisis. After all, even the United States, with its
far superior nuclear arsenal, has had limited success deterring or compelling North Korea Moreover, even if South Korean nuclear weapons likely would

deter large-scale violence by China or North Korea, they could make the threat of low-level conflict escalation greater than it
already is today. This is especially important in the Indo-Pacific context, where the most prevalent threats and sources of crisis escalation — such as China’s
overflights of contested territory or North Korea’s offensive use of cyber capabilities — exist far below the nuclear threshold. The “stability-instability
paradox” of nuclear weapons suggests that, although mutual possession of nuclear weapons may reduce the chances of nuclear war, it may, at the same
time, make conventional wars and militarized crises more likely, as well as incentivize greater risk taking at lower levels. A more moderated version of this
argument suggests that nuclear weapons may not necessarily make low-level conflict more likely, but neither do they prevent it. For instance, a
nuclear-armed South Korea could be emboldened to respond more aggressively to North Korean provocations with proactive deterrence or “quid pro quo
plus” military operations, the inherent escalation risks of which are intended to dissuade North Korea in the first place. Facing perceived “use or lose”
pressures, North Korea may be quicker to cross certain escalation thresholds, such as the use of long-range rocket systems, as it seeks escalation dominance.
The potential for these action-reaction dynamics to spiral into a race up the escalation ladder is clear. To be certain, this potential is already present, but it

seems likely to worsen if South Korea possessed nuclear weapons. Reaction times during moments of crisis would be shorter,
tensions higher; miscommunication and misperception easier, and nuclear use more accessible. South Korean
proliferation could, then, make conflict more likely at worst and fail to deter it at best.

Poland:

Cameron 25 explains that today European powers are facing a tough decision
[Link]
The choice Europe faces is not between U.S. extended deterrence as it existed before Jan. 20, 2025, and other arrangements. Instead, the
choice is between today’s compromised U.S. commitment — which may deteriorate rapidly and
oscillate unpredictably in the future — and the alternatives.

Cameron goes on to find

Any European country that obtained nuclear weapons would be incentivized to pursue a risky
nuclear strategy. If the new nuclear state were small, with key cities near the Russian border, or had relatively weak conventional forces,
then it would be highly motivated to launch a nuclear attack at the outset of a Russian invasion. Knowing that the country’s
forces were on a hair trigger would incentivize Russia to launch a pre-emptive strike against that
state, further increasing the pressure on the target state to pre-empt Russia by launching its
nuclear weapons first. This escalatory spiral would dramatically raise the risk of nuclear war in
Europe. Despite these risks, if “front-line” European NATO allies conclude that they no longer have faith in U.S. extended deterrence, and
absent any viable alternative, it is likely that some would seek their own nuclear arsenals.

Which is why they go on to explain that

At present, the debate in Europe has turned to whether more countries should develop nuclear
weapons. Analysts across the continent have argued that their governments should consider doing so. Tusk has hinted that Warsaw should
consider acquiring its own nuclear deterrent. In Norway, commentators have debated a nuclear force for the Nordic region, though the Norwegian
government has rejected the idea.

Hoffmann 24 (Fabian Hoffmann.) Internationale Politik Quarterly, 01/29/2024, “The Future of the
Zeitenwende: Scenario 5—Poland Becomes a Nuclear Power”
[Link] (Accessed:
06/27/2025) //jjoy
At present, five European NATO countries fall under NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement, and together they station an estimated 100 forward-deployed American
nuclear weapons on their territory. In the case of a warfighting contingency where nuclear use is deemed necessary, these nuclear weapons would be delivered by
NATO dual-capable aircraft operated by the host states. These include Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. To date, NATO
has not
shown any willingness to extend the nuclear sharing arrangement to Poland. If NATO’s restrictive nuclear sharing
policy persists but Poland still desires a nuclear capability stationed on its own territory, then the only option for Poland
would be a nuclear weapons program with the goal of deploying an independent nuclear deterrent.

Nikolov 25 (Boyko Nikolov is a recognized name in defense analysis, with his work featured in outlets
like the South China Morning Post and Der Standard. His insights have been cited by heavyweights such
as the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, The National Interest, MSN, the US-ASEAN Business Council, etc.)
Bulgarian Military, 05/02/2025, “BREAKING: Poland is developing its own nukes to defy Russia”
[Link]
(Accessed: 06/25/2025) //jjoy

Poland has embarked on a bold and unprecedented endeavor to develop its own nuclear warheads, a move aimed at
deterring Russian aggression amid growing regional tensions and uncertainties surrounding NATO’s traditional security
guarantees. This development, articulated by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, signals a dramatic shift in Warsaw’s defense strategy, positioning the nation
as a potential new player in the global nuclear landscape. Announced in the context of deepening ties with France, Tusk’s statement underscores Poland’s
determination to secure its sovereignty against the backdrop of Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and its nuclear saber-rattling. As a frontline NATO member, Poland’s
pursuit of an independent nuclear arsenal raises profound questions about European security, alliance dynamics, and the global non-proliferation regime. The
announcement came as part of broader discussions surrounding a Franco-Polish defense and economic pact, set to be formalized by Tusk and French President
Emmanuel Macron on May 9, 2025, coinciding with the 80th anniversary of World War II’s end. According to a Financial Times report by Raphael Minder and Leila
Abboud, Tusk explicitly stated that Poland is developing its own nuclear warheads to deter Russia, a claim that has
reverberated across international capitals. “Tusk also talked about Poland developing its own nuclear warheads to deter Russia” they wrote. This assertion, while not
accompanied by detailed evidence of an operational program, reflects Poland’s response to escalating threats from Moscow and perceived vulnerabilities in NATO’s
collective defense framework, particularly in light of U.S. President Donald Trump’s wavering commitment to the alliance. Poland’s nuclear aspirations mark a sharp
departure from its historical stance. During the Cold War, Poland served as a staging ground for Soviet nuclear weapons, hosting missiles like the R-11 Scud and Luna
rockets, capable of carrying warheads ranging from 0.5 to 500 kilotons. These deployments, controlled by Moscow, were dismantled after the Soviet Union’s
collapse. Joining NATO in 1999, Poland aligned itself with the alliance’s nuclear umbrella, underpinned by U.S. warheads stationed in Western Europe. As a signatory
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons since 1969, Poland has adhered to its obligation to forgo nuclear weapons development, relying instead
on NATO’s deterrence. Tusk’s declaration that Poland is now developing its own nuclear warheads challenges this longstanding policy, driven by Russia’s deployment
of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and Kaliningrad and the broader erosion of trust in U.S. security guarantees.

RAND, 25 finds that given the current geopolitical landscape

[Link]
Like West Germany in the Cold War, Poland today is the main NATO ally on the Central Front. In the Soviet era, NATO judged that U.S.
nuclear-armed forces in West Germany were vital to deterring and defending against potential aggression. Similar logic is relevant to Poland
Poland and its nuclear-armed allies might choose among [has] three options. It could try to acquire its own
today.
nuclear arms. Poland might join NATO's nuclear sharing program as a basing country. And Warsaw might [or] seek
nuclear protection from France and the United Kingdom.

Ojewska 25 explains
[Link]

Successive Polish governments have staked the country’s security on forging close relations with Washington. Warsaw has spent billions of
dollars on contracts with US defense contractors and picked US-based Westinghouse Electric Co. reactors for its first atomic energy plant. Poland
attempts to lobby the
also succeeded to convince the US to station about 10,000 troops on its soil, a long-sought security goal. But the
previous US administration to get Warsaw involved in its nuclear-sharing program yielded no
results.
Głowacki 25 (Bartosz Głowacki) Breaking Defense, 03/13/2025, “A nuclear Poland? Logistics, political
challenges ahead of potential Warsaw deal”
[Link]
-warsaw-deal/ (Accessed: 06/27/2025) //jjoy

“While pursuing nuclear weapons, Poland would have to contend with the risk of Russia using force to prevent such a program from
being successful,” Kacprzyk added. However, he noted that if Poland sees risk at being abandoned by the US, Warsaw would “be at high risk of Russian
aggression anyway.” Added Wolfsthal, “If NATO’s in shambles and Poland says we need a nuke, wherever they build it, those become instant targets. It

becomes very unstable and very volatile very quickly.” And how Poland’s allies might react is also unclear. In theory, Warsaw could face
sanctions or isolation for violating the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), but realistically, Poland would be taking action in conjunction with
other European nations. By acting jointly in the future, European countries could pool their knowledge, resources, and infrastructure and make it more difficult for
Russia to try to forcibly prevent nuclear weapons programs” Kacprzyk observed. But the political fallout would be wide, said the former Pentagon official, because “a
decision by even one of our democratic allies or partners to actually cross the nuclear weapons threshold is not something the NPT is likely to be able to survive.”

Messmer 25 [Marion Messmer, "France should join NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements to strengthen
European deterrence", March 12, 2025, Chatham House,
[Link]
uropean-deterrence, Accessed 06/26/2025] | gavnotpoore
Developing nuclear weapons in European countries would be destabilizing Late last week, Poland’s prime
minister Donald Tusk also raised alarm across the continent by saying that Poland must consider acquiring nuclear
weapons to address US threats to stop protecting European allies. This would be a highly risky and impractical solution. Developing an
independent nuclear capability for Poland – or any other non-nuclear European country – would significantly destabilize the region. A
European state pursuing nuclear weapons would violate and threaten the credibility of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) and would risk other countries following suit, prompting a dangerous arms race. Breaking the NPT and
proliferating would erode the broader international arms control architecture and potentially weaken other critical treaties and norms, such as those
governing chemical and biological weapons. Rather than enhancing deterrence and security, proliferation
in Europe would undermine
global non-proliferation efforts and increase the risk of regional instability, miscalculation and misunderstanding at a time
when tensions are already high.

Ray Hughes [Ray Hughes is a Research Associate at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
His research focuses on nonproliferation policy and the national security implications of emerging nuclear technologies. He recently earned an
MS in International Security from the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. He also holds a BA in

International Affairs from Kennesaw State University.], 9-16-20 24, "Nuclear power: future energy solution or potential war target?", Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, [Link]

While pursuing nuclear weapons, Poland would have to contend with the risk of Russia using force to prevent
such a program from being successful,” Kacprzyk added. However, he noted that if Poland sees risk at being abandoned by the US, Warsaw
would “be at high risk of Russian aggression anyway.” Added Wolfsthal, “If NATO’s in shambles and Poland says we need a nuke, wherever
they build it, those become instant targets. It becomes very unstable and very volatile very quickly.” And how Poland’s
allies might react is also unclear. In theory, Warsaw could face sanctions or isolation for violating the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), but realistically, Poland would be taking action in conjunction
with other European nations.
Adérito Vicente, PhD researcher in the Department of Political and Social Sciences (SPS) at the European
University Institute (EUI), ’19, “Euro-nukes? A difficult but perhaps necessary debate,” European Leadership
Network, December 7, 2018,
[Link]
/. | recut gavnotpoore
With that being said, if the strategic autonomy of the EU ultimately relies on having a sovereign nuclear
option, how could Euro-nukes come about? I see two possible [Link], the creation of a new,
independent, multilateral nuclear force: A scenario in which European nuclear weapon state(s) share
their arsenal and encourage others to contribute to burden sharing. This would fulfil Europe’s ambition to
gain control over its own security, without increasing the number of nuclear weapon states in Europe.
Such extended nuclear deterrence guarantees (e.g. from France) would not undermine the global NPT
regime.

Marksteiner 17 [Alexandra Marksteiner, "Alternative Futures: Rethinking the European Nuclear

Posture", 2017, RCD,
[Link]
ture/, Accessed 06/24/2025] | gavnotpoore
Some, such as social scientist Maximilian Terhalle, are worried that France’s arsenal, comprising almost 300 warheads, is too small to
deter Russia—and justifiably so. Nonetheless, nuclear deterrence is not a numbers game. Deterrence is psychological
and exists in the mind of the adversary. To be deterred, Russia must believe that a nuclear attack will be
retaliated against and will come at an unacceptable strategic and human cost. Hence, France and the countries under its umbrella should focus on
developing survivable delivery capabilities that can penetrate Russia’s sophisticated anti-access/area denial (A2AD) network, such as air-launched cruise
missiles (ALCMs). Effectiveness, reliability, and readiness should be prioritized. With this arrangement, the destabilizing effects of a sudden loss of
deterrence would be negated while complying with international law. Since ascenario in which France assumes the role of the
nuclear supplier does not have to involve a transfer of command or weapons, the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) would not be violated. Said plan would also disincentivize individual member states from
turning nuclear by calming fears of vulnerability and serving as an insurance policy. Additionally, since the
United States would be removing its weapons from military bases across Europe, the total number of warheads stationed on the
continent would decrease, underlining Europe’s commitment to eventual disarmament.

Artur Kacprzyk 23, Analyst in the International Security Programme at the Polish Institute of
International Affairs, M.A. in International Relations from the University of Warsaw, “Russia Sharpens
Nuclear Signalling Towards NATO,” Polish Institute of International Affairs, 06-30-2023,
[Link]
In military terms, the deployment of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery to Belarus broaden

🧥
Russian options for a nuclear attack on NATO’s Eastern Flank, although it will not fundamentally change
the balance of forces. Russia already has significant capabiliti es to conduct such strikes from the main
part of its territory, the sea, air, and from the Kaliningrad Oblast. The additional Iskander missiles
increase the chances that Russia could penetrate NATO air defences and attack more targets (the
obsolete SU-25s have little combat value). Belarus is likely to receive at least a brigade of these missiles.
This will increase the possibility of strikes on Poland, which is already within range of a Russian Iskander
brigade from Kaliningrad, and allow Iskanders to reach parts of Czechia, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, and
western Ukraine. It should be noted, however, that Russia has a total of 13 Iskander brigades and could
deploy at least some of these launchers and nuclear warheads to Belarus during or before a conflict with
NATO anyway.

Sahel Terror:

Ayesha Rascoe 25, 3-8-2025, "Why Africa's Sahel region has been called the 'epicenter of global
terrorism',"
[Link]
r-of-global-terrorism, accessed 6-27-2025 | aarthi

Over half of all terrorism-related deaths in the world occur in the Sahel. That's according to a new report from the
Institute for Economics and Peace. The vast region in Africa that lies just south of the Sahara Desert and
encompasses 10 countries has also been singled out for a second year in a row as the global, quote,
"epicenter of terrorism." NPR West Africa correspondent Emmanuel Akinwotu is here to tell us more. Good morning. The Sahel is this
semi-arid region just north of where I am in Lagos - in Nigeria - and it covers this belt of countries from Guinea-Bissau - which is along the
Atlantic - to Sudan on the Red Sea. And essentially, this entire region is suffering extreme effects from various crises.
First, a climate crisis, with desertification and flooding, and it's also gripped by political crises with several military coups. And then there's just
extreme levels of violence. It now accounts for 1 in 5 attacks from militant groups around the world and 51% of
deaths, according to the Global Terrorism Index, which is a monitoring system by the Institute for Economics and Peace - or IAP. And this trend
is most severe in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, where they're facing major insurgencies from armed groups. And the main one is a group called
Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin - or JNIM - which is aligned with al-Qaida. RASCOE: These three countries have also been at the center of
Russian influence in Africa. How is that playing into the current situation? AKINWOTU: Yeah, it's a significant factor. These three countries are
former French colonies and Western partners. But, frankly, France was deeply unpopular there for its political meddling and influence. Its
military forces were key parts of the fight against militant groups like JNIM. But despite some gains, insecurity overall continued and worsened,
and that context has clearly been exploited by Russia. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have all strengthened political and
security ties with Russia, and they've cut ties with France, to a lesser extent the U.S., and even countries in the region. There have been major
tensions with the regional bloc ECOWAS, and the three countries have decided to go their own way and form their own bloc, announced by
Burkina Faso military president, Ibrahim Traore, earlier this year in a speech.

Oluwole Ojewale 25, 1-12-2025, "West Africa could soon have a jihadist state – here’s why,"
Conversation,
[Link] accessed
6-27-2025 | aarthi

Among other enablers of jihadist expansion, border porosity remains a critical factor. It aids the circulation of small arms and ammunition. The
illicit supply of weapons empowers the terrorist groups: they are often equipped with sophisticated arms. The recent
military coups in the Sahel have benefited terrorist organisations operating in the area. In Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, these takeovers have
hindered efforts to coordinate counterterrorism initiatives. State authority has declined and there’s an increased
presence of armed groups. This environment of instability provides opportunities for terrorist entities to broaden their activities.
They take advantage of the power vacuums created by weakened governments and the withdrawal of
western military forces. The current counterterrorism efforts of the military governments are widely believed to focus more on regime
protection in the countries’ capital cities, while the terrorists reign in the rural areas. The dense vegetation in some parts of the Sahel makes
surveillance difficult. Forests become hiding places and operational bases for the jihadist groups. These spaces include Sambisa and Kuyambana
in Nigeria, Dida Forest bordering northern Côte d’Ivoire, and W-Arly-Pendjari Complex (WAP Complex) straddling Niger, Burkina Faso and Benin.
For example, the WAP Complex has become a haven for militant Islamist groups since 2018. The last factor is the connection to the global
terrorist groups’ headquarters in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan, and the return of fighters from those countries to the Sahel. These locals
who had gone to fight in the terrorist headquarters often return with sophisticated training to propagate terrorist ideologies, drive recruitment
and manage clandestine operations. More than 5,000 of these terrorist fighters are believed to be fighting in the Sahel. To combat the threats
posed by jihadist groups in the Sahel, the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) can explore diverse strategies with military,
political and socio-economic dimensions. Ecowas has suggested the potential deployment of a regional standby force to reinforce
counter-terrorism operations in west Africa. It will need funding, estimated at US$2.6 billion annually. Ecowas can also initiate programmes that
empower civil society in efforts towards peacebuilding. By fostering resilience within communities, the region can counter jihadist recruitment
efforts. The current military dictators will seek to stay in power. The longer they stay, the more complicated the security
situation will become. Their focus on protecting a small military elite will increase political marginalisation and grievances, which often
bolster recruitment by jihadist groups. Secondly, the UN secretary-general noted in 2022 that “if nothing is done, the effects of
terrorism, violent extremism and organised crime will be felt far beyond the region (Sahel) and the
African continent.” In other words, the region could become the global headquarters of a jihadist state.

Carlota G. Encina 24, 12-4-2024, "Europe, Beyond Its Southern Border," No Publication,
[Link] accessed 6-26-2025 | aarthi

This growing influence and presence of Russia and China fuels the idea that the countries of the
Sahel—along with those in North Africa—are aligning more closely with these two powers, or at least that
they want to reinvigorate their foreign policy autonomy vis-à-vis the West in line with that of other countries of the “Global South.” In both
cases, this is connected to the relative decline of the influence of Western powers in the region. After the coup
d’état in Niger, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, stated in her last State of the Union address to the European
Parliament that the European Union should engage more with African countries. She stated that Europe had to show the same unity of purpose
toward Africa as it has shown toward Ukraine, focusing on cooperation with legitimate governments and regional organizations. The president
further accused Russia of sowing chaos in the Sahel and stated that military coups destabilize the region, making it prone to the risk of
terrorism. The European Union’s concerns about developments beyond the Mediterranean directly
impacting the continent’s security and prosperity are not new. But the results of its actions have been
disappointing, perhaps because of tactical errors in its approach or inadequate attention paid to the
issue. For years, the perceived risks emanating from the Sahel have generally remained low due to the intangible nature of many of them and
the belief that they were somehow under the control of the intervening countries in North Africa. These are countries with which Brussels
cooperates under the European Neighborhood Policy, with programs in a wide range of sectors, such as democratic and economic development,
rule of law, and migration. The Sahel region was therefore perceived by European policymakers as largely a remote desert area prone to drought
and in need of infrastructure and humanitarian aid. Since the fall of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s regime in Libya in 2011 and the ensuing security
crisis in Mali, however, Europe accelerated the process of expanding the borders of its immediate southern neighborhood into the Sahel. It
committed more spending, launched more development and stabilization programs, and intensified its external military presence in Burkina
Faso, Mali, and Niger, which were beginning to be seen as part of the “gateway to Europe”—a source of dangerous population growth,
unwanted migration, and violent extremism, not to mention the favored territory of Russian mercenaries.

Aspasia Fatsiadou 25, 5-8-2025, "Europe in Flux: Militarization, Fragmentation, and the Limits of
Unity," Geopolitical Monitor,
[Link]
y/, accessed 6-26-2025 | aarthi

Trump’s early actions in 2025 – particularly his oscillation between unilateral engagement with Moscow
and temporary disengagement from Kyiv – have further underscored this shift, marking a clear
departure from established alliance-based security commitments. The brief suspension and subsequent conditional
reinstatement of US military aid and intelligence-sharing, confined to a narrow ceasefire framework, exposed the precariousness of Ukraine’s
external dependencies. Europe’s response, spearheaded by a coalition led by France and the United Kingdom and initially joined by Turkey,
reflected the complex web of competing geopolitical interests within this fragile alliance. However, the coalition remains ambiguously defined,
shaped more by national discretion than by cohesive doctrine. More recently, signals from the Trump administration suggest a willingness to
step back from active mediation, citing frustration over stalled diplomatic progress. While a $50 million arms sale was announced – widely seen
as a symbolic signal of continued engagement – Washington’s broader intentions remain undefined. This ambiguity casts
further uncertainty over Europe’s ability to coordinate a coherent response and sustain long-term engagement with Kyiv. Compounding
this external ambiguity are widening strategic divergences within the EU itself. Eastern European states perceive
Russia as an existential threat necessitating maximal deterrence, while Western capitals maintain a more cautious, sometimes ambivalent
approach. Hungary openly defies sanctions; Italy and Slovakia voice growing public fatigue; France
carefully balances robust
deterrence with forward-looking diplomacy, influenced by its strategic concerns in Africa, particularly in
the Sahel, where Russia’s increasing influence directly challenges French interests. Additionally, Italy’s recent
rapprochement with Turkey – including Prime Minister Meloni’s official visit aimed at enhancing defense and economic cooperation –
highlights intra-European divergences. This alignment potentially complicates EU cohesion, especially regarding Greece and
Cyprus, whose geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean could be adversely impacted by a closer Italy-Turkey axis. The resulting
strategic divergences are further compounded by growing domestic unrest, as populist movements exploit inflation, energy insecurity, and
socioeconomic grievances, questioning the rationale and sustainability of prolonged confrontation with Russia. Divergences within the EU may
intensify further as militarization increasingly generates asymmetric benefits, particularly for member states with advanced defense industries,
while other nations absorb substantial costs without equivalent economic returns.

Camille Grand 24, 7-3-2024, "Defending Europe with less America," ECFR,
[Link] accessed 6-26-2025 | aarthi

Beyond Russia, Europe’s broader security environment is also looking increasingly unfavourable, with
multiple other crises in Europe’s neighbourhood from the Sahel to the Middle East, and the development of great
power competition, including with a strong hard power dimension. Europe’s traditional cooperative approach to international affairs appears
unprepared for this environment. Its longstanding excessive reliance on the US for security is an additional weakness.
Trump’s comments in February 2024 that he “would not protect” a NATO ally that is not meeting defence spending guidelines, and “would
encourage [the Russians] to do whatever the hell they want” were a bombshell in Europe, even if he later referred to them as a “form of
negotiation”. But these statements were not just a Trumpian whim. In an effort to transform his instincts into policy, think-tanks associated with
the Trump campaign have developed multiple scenarios, ranging from modest reductions in the US commitment to European security to a
“dormant NATO” – a de factoquasi withdrawal of the US from the European theatre and a halt on further expansion of the alliance. Trump’s
former national security adviser Robert O’Brien recently articulated a Trump foreign policy of “peace through strength”, insisting that
“Washington should make sure that its European allies understand that the continued American defense of Europe is contingent on Europe
doing its part—including in Ukraine.” At a minimum this suggests that US support for Ukraine and the rest of Europe would be more conditional
and uncertain should Trump be re-elected.

Carlota G. Encina 24, 12-4-2024, "Europe, Beyond Its Southern Border," No Publication,
[Link] accessed 6-26-2025 | aarthi
Given the complexity of the current situation—the entire security architecture built over the last decade that was contingent on external
support having collapsed in the last year—a reset in relations between Europe and the Sahel is direly needed. A
new geopolitical
framework is emerging in the region where Europe and the West increasingly seem out of place. This
situation seems to be leading southern European countries, mainly France, Italy, and Spain, to review
their policies toward the region while prioritizing bilateral efforts ahead of multilateral ones. This
approach is a mistake, given the complexity of the challenges emanating from the Sahel. A better solution
would be for these countries to set aside rivalry among themselves and coordinate to address the challenges emanating from the Sahel. France,
Italy, and Spain are well known in the region and can work together to coordinate agendas, particularly as all have the tacit support of the
European Union and NATO. At the same time, both the European Union and NATO could take advantage of the potential coordinated effort of
these three countries to harmonize their strategies toward the region, thus reducing intra-European power struggles and increasing efficiency.
France, Italy, and Spain should also coordinate with the United States, which remains concerned about instability in the Sahel. Given the
mediocre results of EU and NATO efforts in the region, the United States has recently been trying to approach southern European countries
individually to find effective solutions to specific countries and challenges. With the assistance of NATO’s new southern neighborhood
representative, it is time for Paris, Rome, and Madrid to engage in coordinated talks with Washington to try to find new solutions for the Sahel,
again leaving aside the perceived competition between them.

Mölling et al., 20 (Dr. Christian Mölling,Research Director Torben Schütz, Research Fellow, Security
and Defense Program Sophia Becker Research Fellow, Security and Defense Program, “”Deterrence and
Defense in Times of COVID-19 Europe’s Political Choices”, April 2020, German Council on Foreign
Relations, [Link]
In the 2010s, even the USA – which had retained high levels of military spending in the immediate aftermath of the crisis because of ongoing
military engagements – had to recognize the need to balance military spending with increasing national debt. Like in other countries, the
consequences for the US defense budget will depend on the duration and the severity of the economic recession caused by the pandemic. A
severe economic crisis during the presidential race could cause significant electoral pressure to reduce the defense budget and relieve ailing
public finances. The current crisis could thus lead the US to speed up the retrenchment of its global posture. Facing hard economic choices, the
US is likely to focus on China as the single biggest threat and retreat from Europe. This would leave Europeans with even more capability holes
to patch. US commitment to maintaining its nuclear umbrella may strongly depend on Europeans increasing their efforts to ramp up their own
capabilities. Political decisions about European defense spending will need to take this into account. Russia and China won’t lose time to step
into the vacuum. Institutional Coherence and Coordination in European Defense While defense remains a national prerogative, no
European state has the size and resources to be effective on its own. Military power in Europe
depends on multinational formations and coordination. Even when individual governments do operate
nationally, they can only do so because they have allies at their back. Yet the 2008 financial crisis showed up severe
shortcomings in institutional coherence. It was not just the euro which nearly fell victim to isolated national policies. Governments also
decided to cut defense spending nationally, putting what they thought of as “sovereignty” before
military effectiveness. In the current crisis, the institutional challenge will be even greater as Britain, a major military power, has left the
EU. Britain’s membership in NATO continues but cannot fully make up for the many close links between EU member states. Both the British
government and EU countries have expressed the will to continue and possibly even intensify their cooperation in defense matters, but this may
prove very difficult at a time of exploding debt and rising nationalism. For the purpose of this paper, we assume that Britain will continue to be
part of European defense, both as a member of the European caucus of NATO and as a close associate of EU programs like PESCO. This is why
Any scenario
the authors speak of Europe rather than the European Union. At this stage, it is hard to predict specific outcomes.
outcome will be shaped by the four stressors described above: dwindling resources, a changing security
environment, potential US retrenchment, and the issue of EU cohesion. The following four exploratory scenarios10
highlight these four stressors and their consequences for European defense, meaning its armed forces, defense industry, and military
modernization. All four scenarios are built on the expectation that the economic situation will get worse. In this scenario, the financial
burden of the crisis quickly becomes so devastating that virtually all European governments prioritize
short-term socio-economic spending over the medium/longer term responsibilities of the state,
including security considerations. Smaller countries’ forces will become almost completely inoperable,
with air forces collapsing first due to their high maintenance and operational costs – leaving allied air space unguarded at times. Country
after country pulls its contingents out of exercise and training rosters. While governments try to coordinate through
EU and NATO, there is not much left to coordinate. As some governments are forced to declare bankruptcy, the
remaining forces are needed for internal security tasks. The medium-term result is not a scale-down but
a breakdown of the European deterrence and defense posture, leaving Europe vulnerable. The security
situation is tense as Russian analysts assume that the nuclear threshold has been lowered due to the loss
of conventional capabilities. The challenge for burden sharing and solidarity in the EU and in NATO will
be to pick up the remaining pieces and rebuild a minimum credible posture. Some allies will not be
able to contribute for a long time. Industries will not only suffer from the immediate cuts but also from uncertainty over whether
and when defense activities will resume. After the first shock, globally active European defense companies will start to
leave Europe for places that offer more stability. European governments may be willing to let them go – allowing them to
export defense industrial know-how and production facilities – if they promise to supply goods and services for the next two decades at reduced
prices. Uncompetitive companies will become national branches of non-European holders and produce in
license. Another consequence of the economic vulnerability will be that foreign investors, especially from Asia, buy into critical parts of the
European supply chain. US withdrawal from Europe would be the most devastating outcome in both economic and security terms. In this
scenario, the enormous strain that the fight against the pandemic puts on the US economy and the deep rift in US society result in strong
political pressure to bring the troops home and to stop paying for European security. Those views were present among the American electorate
prior to the pandemic11 but are widely held now as the United States is consumed by the fallout of the crisis. As a result, the United States is
pulling out of NATO, leaving Europeans to their own devices. Regardless of the development of European defense budgets, this scenario places
an extreme burden on European governments. The security environment becomes more perilous as the US ends its commitment to European
defense. The loss of the US nuclear umbrella ignites an intra-European debate about nuclear deterrence. Given that Europe includes nuclear
powers as well as countries that have signed and ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, internal cohesion is strained. Both
budget and nuclear debates meet with political resistance in individual states. This paradoxical situation of having to spend more while budgets
are becoming tighter exacerbates political rifts between Europeans. Just as during the last crisis, Europeans have different spending priorities.
Diverging spending patterns impact defense industries differently across Europe. Procurement and modernization efforts become more and
more asynchronous in the mid-term. Those Europeans who spend consistently retain both forces and industry, while others cut back.
Uncoordinated capability retention wastes resources and weakens Europe’s capacity to act even further. This scenario is built on Europe’s
cardinal mistake during the last crisis: national instead of European decisions. European governments react to the financial challenge just as they
did before – with uncoordinated changes to their armed forces. Domestic considerations take priority over the maintenance and generation of
military capabilities and the respective equipment procurement. Instruments like PESCO and EDF are only paid lip service to. As seen over the
last decade, coordination and solidarity are crucial to prevent the loss of critical niche capabilities. National cuts have system-wide
consequences, causing inefficiencies and damaging Europe’s military capacity to act. Only after a first wave of cuts will Europeans return to
attempting some coordination within in EU and NATO. But as they lack a clear picture of who retains which capabilities, coordination becomes
cumbersome. Moreover, as this is the second round of cuts within a decade, there is not much left to pool. Force modernization increasingly
turns into copying US efforts with significantly smaller forces which will be equipped with imported material. Consequently, Europe’s strategic
autonomy decreases while its dependency on the US increases. In this scenario, the United States continues to be committed to European
security and NATO. The presence of US forces on the European continent remains a strategic priority. However, NATO will not be able to function
across the same wide spectrum as before. This could trigger another burden- and risk-sharing debate on the value of deterrence versus
expeditionary operations and put a strain on internal cohesion. European defense industrial capabilities suffer as domestic demand and
investment into research and development (R&D) plummet. Moreover, the industry’s ability to increase efficiency through transnational M&A
and economies of scale is constrained by heightened national sentiments. Companies decide to either aggressively internationalize, which
means massively increasing defense exports, or to abandon production as the armed forces as an otherwise reliable client drop out. In our
best-case scenario, we assume that the overall financial impact on defense budgets is mild and only a few countries will be hit more severely.
Here, early political commitments by larger European countries soften the impact of the financial crisis on defense spending. The economic
fallout of the pandemic has less severe effects on larger economies, enabling them to act early by taking on more national debt in order to
retain their forces. Those forces constitute the anchor to which smaller armed forces, that are driven into more specialization by the crisis, can
attach their capabilities. Available flexibility in the capability development plans is used to integrate countries that fall temporarily behind. Such
an arrangement, similar to NATO’s Framework Nation Concept, allows for a comparatively good balance of financial strain and retention of
military capabilities. In a laudable display of leadership, commitment, and coordination Germany, France, and the UK make this approach work.
In order to protect the heart of European defense and deterrence, larger countries erect firewalls around critical military capabilities such as
air-to-air refueling, electronic warfare, air defense, etc. Smaller militaries are reassured that allies will retain capabilities which they themselves
can no longer afford. Europeans take stock and will identify and retire unnecessary capabilities and outdated equipment. In order to provide
modern equipment to armies that suffer disproportionally, European states introduce new contractual concepts. Larger countries can lease out
equipment they have procured to support their industry. In turn, leading defense industrial companies include local suppliers in smaller states in
their supply chains to make such deals more appealing. As a result, Europe does not increase its dependency on the US. Instead, it incentivizes a
European consolidation of industrial capabilities, supply chains, and procurement programs with larger states as lead nations. Moreover, the
retention of a large part of the initial military capabilities allows Europeans more flexibility in addressing new and existing threats. As the
unprecedented economic fall-out of this crisis is starting to become apparent, it may seem tempting to curtail defense spending. But given the
current volatility in the world, it would be irresponsible to slash investment in risk prevention. There is no automatism that sends European
governments down the same path they took a decade ago. The world is just at the beginning of this crisis, and there is still time to shape the
outcome of the current development. Germany and Europe should embrace six recommendations: EU and NATO should prevent unilateral
action. Uncoordinated defense cuts would not only damage the alliance as a whole but also spread the
narrative about countries free-riding on the back of other nations’ efforts. Without proactive
coordination or at least information-sharing, the capability landscape will get rougher, and
misperception and distrust will grow. Given the size of European nations, there can be no such thing as
a national defense anymore. Moreover, rebuilding capabilities is more costly than retaining them – another painful lesson from 2008.
EU and NATO should immediately convene for emergency meetings. They should try to preempt developments and present
several alternative scenarios and possible joint reactions. They should also show where national reactions can be useful
and where they do harm. The objective at this early stage is to enable allies to understand their roles and responsibilities and to allow for a
collective search for solutions. EU and NATO need to reactivate their cooperation. To enable EU instruments to be used effectively, EU
and
NATO states have to be fully aware of what is discussed and designed in response to the unfolding crisis
on the other side of Brussels.

Max Bergmann 22, 8-18-2022, "Transforming European Defense," No Publication,

[Link] accessed 6-26-2025 | aarthi

Over the last two decades, European militaries have lost 35 percent of their capabilities.13 To take the example of European navies, European countries had almost
200 large surface combatants and 129 submarines in 1990, but only 116 and 66, respectively, in 2021.14 Europe’s combat power at sea is considered to be about half
of what it was during the height of the Cold War.15 Although often justified as favoring high-tech quality over quantity, reduced operational “mass” remains
concerning. For example, the war in Ukraine suggests platforms remain vulnerable in high-intensity warfare. Russia itself might attest to this: according to the
Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Russian military may have lost 1,500 tanks, 3,600 armored vehicles, 750 artillery pieces, and 210 aircraft between the beginning of the
invasion and the end of June.16 Declining military investments have also led to major capability gaps. As witnessed with
military engagements in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and the Sahel, European armed forces are still relying on U.S.
support for critical enablers such as air-to-air refueling, strategic airlift, and reconnaissance and intelligence capacities.17 The chaotic withdrawal from
Afghanistan was a sobering demonstration of these limitations, as European states were incapable of evacuating their own citizens and allies without logistical
support from Washington.18

Frank Holmes 25, 3-7-2025, "European Defense Stocks Go Parabolic as War Spending Surges," USFunds,
[Link] accessed
6-26-2025 | aarthi

Brussels has responded with an unprecedented $840 billion plan to boost military readiness across the continent. This week, the European Commission laid out a
framework to mobilize resources on a scale never seen before. The bulk of this money will reportedly come from direct national spending, as European Union (EU)
leaders have agreed to temporarily lift fiscal rules that limit government deficits. Additional funds will be made available in the form of loans to governments looking
to modernize their defense industries. An analysis by European research firms Bruegel and Kiel estimates that for
Europe to establish a truly
independent military deterrent against Russia, it will require at least 250 billion euros in annual defense
spending. That means deploying tens of thousands of additional soldiers, acquiring thousands of new tanks and
infantry fighting vehicles and ramping up production of long-range drones and other advanced military
technologies.

Turkey:
Newsroom, 9-7-2025, "Turkey warns Greece against moves in Aegean, East Med", No Publication,
[Link]
egean-east-med/ //kayte

Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler said on Wednesday that Ankara would not tolerate any actions by
Greece that infringe on Turkey’s claimed rights and interests in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern
Mediterranean. Responding to a parliamentary question from a lawmaker with the nationalist opposition Good Party regarding “Greece’s
decision to extend its territorial waters in the Aegean to 12 nautical miles,” Guler said the Defense Ministry was closely
monitoring Greek activities in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. “No fait accompli that would violate
our country’s rights, entitlements or interests will be permitted,” he said.

Wolf 25 [Fabrice Wolf, "Why is Greece missing a unique opportunity to guarantee its security against
Turkey?", 4/7/2025, Meta Defensde,
[Link] //kayte
In 2021, Greece and France signed a highly ambitious defense partnership aimed at increasing the interoperability and collective effectiveness of
the two countries' armed forces. For Athens and Paris, this was intended to contain the growing appetites of Erdogan's Turkey, particularly in the
Aegean Sea, following repeated hostile statements and displays of force by the Turkish armed forces and authorities. The two countries then
agreed on extensive cooperation, especially in the industrial field, after Athens acquired 18 Rafale and three FDI frigates. However, since the
, the dynamic between France and Greece seems to have run out of
signing of these two contracts

steam, if not stopped, with the Greek armed forces having, for the most part, turned
to American equipment solutions for modernization over the last three years. While Athens
has just announced the upcoming release ofan investment envelope of $27 billion to modernize its armies, it seems that the historic defense
agreement between the two countries is now ancient history. Indeed, for several months, a case concerning the delivery of Meteor missiles to
, if we look closely,
Turkey, as part of the sale of 40 Eurofighters Typhoon, came to degrade Franco-Greek relations. Yet

Greece's security situation has never been as deteriorating as it is today, and the
country has never been in greater need of a powerful, militarily, and politically reliable
ally to contribute to its security. By persisting on this path, Athens could well miss a
unique opportunity in its history to guarantee its own security, as well as the integrity
of its territory, in the face of a Turkey whose military and economic power will only
widen the gap with it in the years to come… Greece faces the Turkish threat today While in Europe, for several
months, all eyes have been on Russia and the potential disengagement of the United States from the European theater, Greece, for its part, has
Indeed, while the two countries are fundamentally
eyes only for the development of Turkish military means.

allies within NATO, they harbor strong resentments for each other, which originate
from the partitions of Eastern Thrace and the Aegean Sea, following Turkey's defeat in
the First World War. The fact is, the bulk of these two maritime and land areas have
been annexed to Greece, significantly limiting Turkey's exclusive economic zone along
its coasts. Since then, the two countries have been in a state of permanent pre-war for
several decades. Until now, the culmination of this latent confrontation was the conquest of part of the island of Cyprus by the Turkish
army in July 1974. However, since 2000 and the arrival of RT Erdogan to power in Ankara, Turkey has engaged in a very significant effort to
modernize its armies, as well as to equip itself with a defense industry aimed at strategic autonomy. In fact, the Turkish armies, which already
had a very significant numerical advantage over the Hellenic forces, now find themselves on a technological parity with their Greek
counterparts, while the options for economic and technological coercion of Western countries, to hinder the proper functioning of their military
equipment, have been significantly weakened over the years, and with the progress of the Turkish defense industry. This is especially true given
that the GDP gap between the two countries has widened considerably over the past 50 years. While Greece's GDP was $56 billion in 1980,
compared to Turkey's $68 billion, Greece's GDP will now reach only $220 billion in 2023, compared to Turkey's $1,120 trillion, and Turkey's
population of 85 million is eight times larger than Greece's population of 10,5 million. Cooperation between Paris and Athens in the field of
the only alternative for Athens would be to move
defense in recent years Faced with such imbalances

closer to some of its close allies, to dissuade Ankara from pushing its economic and
especially military advantage, in order to regain possession of the Aegean Sea and Eastern Thrace, both subjects having
been clearly identified as strategic objectives by President RT Erdogan, since he came to power in 2000.
ICGS - ‫המרכז לאסטרטגיה רבתי לישראל‬, xx-xx-xxxx, "Israel – Eyes on Ankara: Turkey’s Dependence on
Europe", [Link] //PLS
Given these dynamics, European nations—keen to avoid allocating additional resources to another geopolitical challenge—might choose to
integrate Turkey into a new military alliance outside the EU framework. If so, it will be crucial for Europe to establish clear
red lines for Turkey and any country that might act as a Trojan horse within the alliance. One of NATO’s most significant weaknesses
today is the lack of a mechanism to expel member states. In the event of a new military alliance, European nations must develop
an effective system to deal with rogue actors if necessary. Over the past decade, Turkey has repeatedly caused
headaches for the EU. At the height of the war in Ukraine and even before, Ankara blackmailed NATO by opposing the accession of new
member states—Eastern European countries, Sweden, and Finland. While it eventually backed down, it successfully delayed critical processes
for the alliance. Furthermore, by acquiring Russian S-400 missile systems, Turkey became the only NATO member subjected to U.S. military
sanctions typically reserved for American adversaries.

Kollaros 21 (Panagiotis Kollaros, Department of International and European Studies, University of

Piraeus. 10/2021, "Greece and Nuclear Weapons: An Assessment", HAPSc,
[Link] DOA:
7/9/25) RWC

Turkish aggression since 1973 constitutes a constantly present challenge for Greek strategic thinkers.
However, Turkey’s great nuclear program coupled with the development of limited accuracy medium
range missiles, only suitable for delivering WMD, create the fear of nuclear blackmail to Greece and thus
advance the threat to an even higher level. This development of a Turkey with nuclear capabilities
generates a great opportunity to discuss a possible Greek development of nuclear weapons as a
reaction to Turkey or even as a remedy for the recurring Greek strategic problems. The following paper
tries to answer the question on whether the acquisition of nuclear capabilities will serve the interest of
the Greek state.1 In the first section some general observations on Greek strategic constraints are
formulated; then, in the second section, the subject is approached based on the literature of
international relations, by the examination of the most important incentives and disincentives that
influence a state’s decision to develop nuclear capabilities. In the final section the Greek case is
researched through the method that was presented by Monteiro & Debs (2014). 1. General observations
on Greek strategy and its constraints in correlation with the GrecoTurkish balance of power With Turkish
revisionism unravelling constantly for decades, the Turkish aims to advance in a global power status
through a strategy which contains the use of coercive diplomacy to challenge the status quo in land, air
and sea the Greek state is facing two options of grand strategy: appeasement and balancing. The option
of appeasement is rejected, since Turkey does not have limited aims and will interpret any concessions
as weakness. When these concessions finally stop, war will follow. As a result, balancing is a one-way
street (Platias, 1995). The basic component of this strategy is, as Platias (1995: 49) highlights, the
“adoption of credible deterrence, that makes the cost of possible extension of Turkey against Greece
higher than the expected benefit”. The Turkish aspirations will not be bent overnight and success lies
on the credible demonstration that Greece is capable of surviving a protracted exhaustive competition
until Turkey realizes that the cost of its strategy surpasses the benefit and then cooperation will
follow.

John Psaropoulos, 3-28-2018, "Greece vs. Turkey: Are We Headed for an Intra-NATO War?", Washington
Examiner - Political News and Conservative Analysis About Congress, the President, and the Federal
Government,
[Link]
to-war/ //RWC+kayte

These arsenals, built up over decades and constantly modernized, were not merely a boon to U.S. and German defence contractors. Western
policymakers wanted to believe that loyalty to NATO’s mission of containing the USSR, rather than regional rivalries, motivated this exemplary
level of Greek and Turkish defense spending. After the Soviet Union collapsed, good diplomacy and Turkey’s EU aspirations made it possible,
most of the time, to overlook the downsides of an arms race between uneasy neighbors. Recently, however, the Aegean has become a
dangerously narrow sea. For decades, Turkish military aircraft have regularly violated Greece’s 10-mile airspace around its islands, on the
grounds that Greece’s territorial waters extend only six nautical miles from shore, and that air and sea borders should match. Turkish ships also
ignore the territorial waters around a number of small islands whose Greek ownership Turkey questions. These ships and planes are intercepted
by their Greek counterparts, and mock dogfights result. Occasionally fatal accidents occu Kostas Grivas, who teaches advanced weapons
systems at the Hellenic Army Academy, calls it a “a unique theater of confrontation,” where “land, sea and air forces are simultaneously in use in
a very confined area, and there is an enormous amount of weapons systems and men-at-arms in deployment.” In
the event of war, he
believes, it would be very difficult to maintain command-and-control systems because of the intensity
and speed of activity, meaning heavy fratricidal losses. In such chaos, the outcome might ultimately be
up to local commanders’ ability to take intelligent initiatives. An Aegean war, Grivas says, would
resemble “a mini-nuclear war because there will be so much high-tech ordnance discharged it will
cause a huge amount of damage.” The prospect of such hostilities has been suddenly brought closer
this year, following events that are individually and as a series without parallel in recent decades. Last
autumn, Greek foreign minister Nikos Kotzias expressed concern that Turkey had become an “irritable
power.” What inspired this concern was a record 3,317 airspace and 1,998 territorial water violations
recorded in the Aegean last year—respectively double and quadruple the previous year’s numbers.
“Our job is to behave responsibly,” Kotzias declared, so he invited Recep Tayyip Erdogan to become the first Turkish president in six decades to
visit Greece. Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s December 7 visit was a disaster. On its eve, Erdogan gave an interview calling for revisions of the Lausanne
Treaty of 1923. This is the treaty that defines the borders of the modern Turkish state, while guaranteeing the rights of Greek and Muslim
minorities in the two countries. It has kept Greece and Turkey at peace for a century and forms the bedrock of their détente. No Greek or
Turkish head of state or government had ever publicly called for its revision. Greece’s President Prokopis Pavlopoulos reacted by overstepping
his role as ceremonial head of state to lecture Erdogan. Lausanne, he asserted, was “non-negotiable.” “It has no gaps. It needs neither revision
nor updating. It stands as it is, it covers absolutely the issues that it needs to cover, and stresses that among other things it leaves no leeway for
gray zones or minority issues,” Pavlopoulos said. Erdogan gave as good as he got. Greece had plunged its Muslim minority into poverty, he said,
and is racially prejudiced against it. Erdogan also demanded of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras the extradition of ten Turkish military officers who
fled to Greece after the failed July 2016 coup. The Greek Supreme Court had barred their extradition on the grounds that their lives would be
endangered in Turkey. The government cannot overrule the decision and there is no higher court of appeal, but Erdogan insisted: “What I told
Mr. Tsipras is that these putschists may be returned to Turkey, a country that has abolished the death penalty, a country where torture does not
take place.”

Navy:

NickChilds 17th March 2025

[Link]
c atherinechun
Europe’s leading navies have shrunk dramatically since the end of
the Cold War while retaining small numbers of high-capability
platforms and [Link] so, European NATO navies collectively possess a much
greater number of principal surface combatants than the Russian Navy. But whether they can
deliver a credible deterrence and defence posture without the US is another [Link]’s
inventory of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) frigates would also be
hard-pressed to counter even Russia’s diminished number of
submarines. Making up for a lack of US MPAs would also be a challenge, given Europe’s
limited fleets. The same is true on the submarine front. Europe’s navies have small flotillas of
modern conventionally powered aack submarines, which are capable in their own right for
certain missions. But, again, US Navy SSNs and SSGNs would be sorely missed for their
open-ocean ASW abilities. France and the UK have just ten available SSNs between them. The
French are transitioning from the less capable Rubis class to the new Suren class, while the
Royal Navy has faced significant challenges in maintaining the operational readiness of its
Astute-class SSNs

NTI August 13th 2025’

hps://[Link]/analysis/articles/france-submarine-capabilities/ //Adelina Lee “The

French submarine fleet consists of nuclear-propelled aack (SSNs)

and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). France helped pioneered the
development of air independent propulsion (AIP) technology, which the

state-owned company Naval Group now export along with vessels.

The French Navy’s SSBN force is the nucleus of the country’s strategic
deterrent as it maintains a continuous presence at-sea.” Starting in 1991, all six units from
France’s fleet of Le Redoutable-class SSBNs were gradually decommissioned, with the final
vessel, L’Inflexible decommissioned in 2008.4 The Triomphant class replaced these submarines
starting in 1997. The French navy currently operates a fleet of nine nuclear submarines, which
consist of both nuclear-powered aack submarines (SSNs) and ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs).5 France currently operates five SSNs and four SSBNs.6 The new Barracuda-class aack
submarines have replaced the Rubis class aack submarines and are set to gradually replace the
Améthyste-class vessels. The three Rubis class submarines have already retired. The Saphir
was retired in 2019, followed by the Rubis in 2022, and then the Casabianca in 2023.7 The first
Barracuda class aack submarine, the Suren, was
commissioned on November 6, 2020 and entered into service June 3, 2022. The second
submarine of this class, the Duguray-Trouin, was commissioned into active service on April 4,
2024.9 This submarine is the second submarine of the series of the six Suren-class submarines
that is intended to replace the fleet of Rubis class submarines by 2030.10 In addition to
traditional sea control and sea denial operations, the aack submarines are tasked with Special
Forces deployment; surveillance and intelligence gathering; and missions against piracy,
narcotics, and human traicking.

Piaton 25[Didier Piaton, "The sea as a strategic interest for Europe. A European perspective on the ocean and its
challenges", 06/09/2025, The Robert Schuman Fundation,
hps://[Link]/en/european-issues/794-the-sea-as-a-strategic-interest-for-europe-a-european-perspectiv
e-on-the-ocean-and-its-challenges]//MVSG
The military aspect involves the freedom of action and combat capability of European war fleets. Our fleets work to ensure the
safety of activities at sea and to preserve certain unique skills. They guarantee the continuum of competition, protest and
confrontation[15], a deterrent to a strategic competitor seeking to harm our interests, at sea or elsewhere. By way of illustration,
they help to counter aempts to territorialise maritime areas in the Mediterranean Sea[16] whose resurgence reflects the return of
power relations and the fait accompli. Over a century ago, at a time already marked by major technological and geopolitical
transformations, American Admiral Mahan was the one who best described the role of maritime power in global competition. An
excellent strategist, he also formulated a vision that went beyond simple military naval might, analysing the dynamics of global
power[17]. He did not view maritime power as an independent variable, but rather as the result of a complex combination of
factors: geography, demographics, industrial capacity and political choices. His vision remains surprisingly relevant today. Finally, a

much more recent but highly symbolic aspect of a maritime component directly serving the overall strategy, the oceanic
nuclear deterrentforce does not have as its primary objective to fight at sea but, if necessary, from the sea to its
targets via the trajectory of its ballistic missiles. However, its only real success will be achieved in the realm of
an adversary's perceptions, deterring them from aackingour interests beyond a
threshold unknown to them. Although France has chosen to remain outside NATO's nuclear plans, its recent proposal to discuss the
European nature of its independent nuclear deterrent is an unprecedented and encouraging contribution to this strategic
construction. European leaders cannot therefore ignore the importance of naval power, not only as a guardian of the seas, but above
all as a guarantor of a maritime dimension that is essential to its global security, the construction of its strategic identity and its place
in the world. A new step towards a more strategic Europe The lack of robust military capabilities that could be mobilised collectively,
despite the commitment of the WEU, prevented Europe from compensating for the failures of the UN in the post-Cold War Balkan
crises. This ultimately led to recourse to the Americans and NATO at the height of these crises.

James Andres June 5 2025

hps://[Link]/en/europe/20250306-macron-will-discuss-extending-french-nu
clear-protection-to-europe-with-allies-ukraine-russia-usa // Adelina Lee “French

President EmmanuelMacron said Wednesday he will discuss with

European allies the possibility of using France's nuclear deterrentto
protect the continent from Russian threats, amid concerns over
potential US disengagement.” France is the only nuclear power in the European Union.
Macron, in a televised address ahead of a special European summit Thursday, described Russia as a
“threat to France and Europe", and said he had decided “to open the strategic debate on the protection
of our allies on the European continent by our (nuclear) deterrent".He said the use of France's nuclear
weapons would remain only in the hands of the French president. Macron's move comes in response to a
push by German election winner Friedrich Merz, who recently called for a discussion on “nuclear sharing”
with France. EU leaders are set to address the issue of nuclear deterrence, among other topics, during the
Thursday summit in Brussels focusing on support for Ukraine and European defence. European NATO
allies have for decades counted on the powerful US deterrent.

Bryant 24 [Miranda Bryant, "Undersea ‘hybrid warfare’ threatens security of 1bn, Nato commander warns",
04/01/2024,
the Guardian,
hps://[Link]/world/2024/apr/16/undersea-hybrid-warfare-threatens-security-of-1bn-nato-commander-warns?u
tm_source=[Link]] //MVSG

The security of nearly 1 billion people across Europe and North America is under
threat from Russian attempts to target the extensive vulnerabilities ofunderwater
infrastructure including windfarms, pipelines and power cables, a Nato commander has warned. V Adm Didier
Maleterre, the deputy commander of Nato’s Allied Maritime Command (Marcom), said the network of underwater cables and pipes
on which Europe’s power and communications depend were not built to withstand the “hybrid warfare” being pursued by Moscow and
other Nato adversaries. “We know the Russians have developed a lot of hybrid warfare under the sea to disrupt the European
economy, through cables, internet cables, pipelines. All of our economy under the sea is under threat,” he said. “And, to be very clear,
we know what Russians have developed as far as nuclear submarines to operate under the sea. So we are not naive and we [Nato
countries] are working together.” The comments come after two incidents of suspected sabotage on gas pipelines in the Baltic in the
last 18 months – first on Nord Stream 1 and 2 in September 2022, followed by the Balticconnector in October last year. Despite
extensive investigations by multiple states both remain unsolved, although Finland said in December that “everything indicated” a
Chinese ship had purposely damaged the Balticconnector with its anchor.

Lorne Cook 25 (Senior Reporter and Journalist) 6-10-2025, "EU's top diplomat warns that
Russia has a plan for long-term aggression against Europe," AP News,
[Link]
22c9553a301b6dc, accessed 6-26-2025 | aarthi

Russia poses a direct threat to the European Union through acts of sabotage and cyberattacks, but its massive military spending suggests that
President Vladimir Putin also plans to use his armed forces elsewhere in the future, the EU’s top diplomat warned on Wednesday. “Russia is
already a direct threat to the European Union,” EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said. She listed a
series of Russian airspace violations, provocative military exercises, and attacks on energy grids,
pipelines and undersea cables. Kallas noted that Russia is already spending more on defense than the EU’s 27 nations combined,
and this year will invest more “on defense than its own health care, education and social policy combined.” “This is a long-term plan for
a long-term aggression. You don’t spend that much on (the) military, if you do not plan to use it,” Kallas told EU lawmakers in
Strasbourg, France.
Childs 25 [Nick Childs (Senior Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security), "The defence of Europe
all at sea?", March 17th, 2025, IISS,
[Link]
//MVSG + aarthi

As Europe’s governments scramble to step up on defence, there is sure to be a focus on the deficiencies
in European naval capabilities in the absence of US support. These include offensive lethality, defensive capacities and
the ability – if necessary – to sustain operations. A naval broadside Europe’s leading navies have shrunk dramatically since the end of the Cold
War while retaining small numbers of high-capability platforms and assets. Even so, European NATO navies collectively possess a much greater
number of principal surface combatants than the Russian Navy. But whether they can deliver a credible deterrence and defence posture without
the US is another matter. The US Navy’s forward presence in Europe has also been a shadow of its former self for much of the post-Cold War
period. While it has been boosted in recent times by the revival of regular deployments and surges of carrier strike groups (CSGs) and
amphibious ready groups (ARGs), the US Navy is stretched thin, with no such formations currently in the region. The US Navy presence in and
around European waters is currently limited essentially to a command ship, a handful of forward-deployed destroyers, detachments of P-8
Poseidon maritime-patrol aircraft (MPA) and perhaps most significantly also up to a handful of highly capable nuclear-powered submarines.
Nevertheless, despite its global commitments, its ability to reinforce significantly – particularly from US east coast bases – is critical for NATO.
Military Balance+ Military Balance+ | The online defence database from the IISS, delivering authoritative and searchable defence data and
A key European naval
insights into military capabilities, policy priorities and commercial opportunities in more than 170 countries.
deficiency is in offensive firepower, especially in terms of land-attack capability. Partly, that is linked to
the continent’s limited capacity in terms of aircraft carriers. The closest European equivalent to a US
carrier-strike capability is the French nuclear-powered carrier, Charles de Gaulle. The United Kingdom has two
aircraft carriers, the Royal Navy’s Queen Elizabeth-class ships, but it can muster only one full group at best and probably only for a limited
period. The large-deck aviation platforms of the Italian and Spanish navies are of more limited capability. As such, the US Navy’s carrier-strike
capabilities would be sorely missed. The loss of the US’s destroyers and submarines – not least its modified Ohio-class guided-missile boats
(SSGNs), capable of launching Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles – would also represent a significant setback. In contrast, European
capabilities are limited to the small number of cruise missiles that could be launched from UK and French nuclear-powered attack submarines
(SSNs) and some French surface ships. One area of capability in which European navies have invested is high-end air defence platforms, although
this is still marked by significant deficiencies. No European ships can currently provide the full missile defence capabilities of many US Navy
cruisers and destroyers, and they are also deficient compared to their US counterparts in terms of magazine depth and overall weapon
stockpiles. These are key factors both in protecting major naval formations and contributing to European integrated air and missile defence
overall. At present, Europe’s air defence ships would likely struggle in the face of Russian naval strike capabilities. Shortfalls below the surface
Europe’s inventory of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) frigates would also be hard-pressed to counter even Russia’s diminished number of
submarines. Making up for a lack of US MPAs would also be a challenge, given Europe’s limited fleets. The same is true on the submarine front.
Europe’s navies have small flotillas of modern conventionally powered attack submarines, which are capable in their own right for certain
missions. But, again, US Navy SSNs and SSGNs would be sorely missed for their open-ocean ASW abilities. France and the UK have just ten
available SSNs between them. The French are transitioning from the less capable Rubis class to the new Suffren class, while the Royal Navy has
faced significant challenges in maintaining the operational readiness of its Astute-class SSNs. Europe would also be handicapped without access
to the US network of seabed sensors. It would struggle to provide the full maritime domain-awareness picture that the US can offer as well as
some aspects of at-sea command and control. In addition, while Europe still has some pockets of amphibious or littoral-strike capabilities, they
are nothing in comparison with US ARGs. Likewise, sustainment and afloat support is another area where, currently, Europe’s navies would
struggle. However, there are key niche capability areas – such as coastal defence and patrol, and mine countermeasures – where some of
If Europe does move significantly towards
Europe’s smaller navies actually have capability strengths that they can offer.
re-arming, the likely initial naval focus would be on upgrading and filling the capability gaps in existing
platforms as quickly as possible and on improving their readiness. This would include the recruitment and retention of
personnel. European navies, like others, are also looking to rapidly innovate – including with uninhabited platforms and systems – to
supplement existing capabilities. In the longer term, any
European naval rearmament will also require significant and
sustained additional investments in key high-end platforms and capabilities, as well as an expanded
industrial base to build and support them.
Piaton 25 [Didier Piaton, "The sea as a strategic interest for Europe. A European perspective on the
ocean and its challenges", 06/09/2025, The Robert Schuman Fundation,
[Link]
uropean-perspective-on-the-ocean-and-its-challenges] //MVSG

The military aspect involves the freedom of action and combat capability of European war fleets. Our fleets work to ensure the safety of
activities at sea and to preserve certain unique skills. They guarantee the continuum of competition, protest and confrontation[15], a deterrent
to a strategic competitor seeking to harm our interests, at sea or elsewhere. By way of illustration, they help to counter attempts to
territorialise maritime areas in the Mediterranean Sea[16] whose resurgence reflects the return of power relations and the fait accompli. Over a
century ago, at a time already marked by major technological and geopolitical transformations, American Admiral Mahan was the one who best
described the role of maritime power in global competition. An excellent strategist, he also formulated a vision that went beyond simple military
naval might, analysing the dynamics of global power[17]. He did not view maritime power as an independent variable, but rather as the result of
a complex combination of factors: geography, demographics, industrial capacity and political choices. His vision remains surprisingly relevant
today. Finally, a much more recent but highly symbolic aspect of a maritime component directly serving the overall strategy, the oceanic
nuclear deterrent force does not have as its primary objective to fight at sea but, if necessary, from the sea to its targets via the
trajectory of its ballistic missiles. However, its only real success will be achieved in the realm of an adversary's
perceptions, deterring them from attacking our interests beyond a threshold unknown to them. Although France has chosen
to remain outside NATO's nuclear plans, its recent proposal to discuss the European nature of its independent
nuclear deterrent is an unprecedented and encouraging contribution to this strategic construction.
European leaders cannot therefore ignore the importance of naval power, not only as a guardian of the seas, but
above all as a guarantor of a maritime dimension that is essential to its global security, the construction of its strategic identity
and its place in the world. A new step towards a more strategic Europe The lack of robust military capabilities that could be mobilised
collectively, despite the commitment of the WEU, prevented Europe from compensating for the failures of the UN in the post-Cold War Balkan
crises. This ultimately led to recourse to the Americans and NATO at the height of these crises.

John 25 [Michael John, "Europe Needs Its Own Multilateral Nuclear Force", 03/26/2025, Foreign
Policy, [Link] //MVSG

Ideally, a European MLF would have at its core an Anglo-French component, as both countries currently field continuous at sea deterrents based
on wholly different technologies. Whereas the French deterrent is entirely independent, the British one is not, as it is highly reliant on U.S.
technology. The first step toward a strategic deterrent manifested in a European MLF would be to begin training and
integrating European officers and crew into the existing French and British platforms to develop an
understanding of nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered submarines. This has the additional benefit of reassuring
other European powers as to the Anglo-French commitment to European nuclear deterrence. At the same time, the EU should field
special tenders for the development of a European nuclear submarine fleet. France has extensive
experience with nuclear submarines, and Germany and Sweden are preeminent producers of
conventional submarines. A European consortium with collective funding could develop a new
nuclear-powered attack submarine for Europe—one that might eventually be shared with countries such as Australia.
Another, much quicker option is to expand the current British Dreadnought submarine program to Europe (and Australia). The reliance of these
submarines on U.S. Trident missiles would require at the very least a redesign of the current “common missile compartment” scheme so that
the European boats could perhaps carry French M51 missiles or the design of a new pan-European system so that the European system is
completely independent of the United States. For London, there is a real threat of U.S. pushback against U.K. cooperation with the
continent—but perhaps that alone should be incentive for Britain to make such a move. The second order of business would be for the new
European Nuclear Weapons Agency to create a tactical nuclear capability. The easiest way to do this would be to adapt the Storm
Shadow/SCALP EG and Taurus KEPD 350 cruise missiles to accept a nuclear payload, which would provide Brussels with the necessary
incremental, escalatory capability for a convincing deterrent. For 75 years, nuclear sharing in NATO has provided the United States an ability to
manage proliferation and served as a strong tool of alliance management. But the only thing certain with the Trump administration is
uncertainty, and Europe must plan accordingly. Although U.S. extended deterrence theoretically still covers NATO allies, European countries
would be foolish not to develop a pan-European nuclear alternative.

Tiwari 24 [Sakshi Tiwari, "November 17, 2024", November 17, 2024, The Eurasian Times,
[Link] Accessed 06/30/2025] |
gavnotpoore
Despite all their vulnerabilities, submarines are still the most reliable form of deterrence and attack capability. They have a
tactical advantage that few other military platforms can match because they can obtain intelligence in dangerous areas while staying hidden. They also

provide countries with an assured second-strike capability. While a country’s ground and air-based nuclear forces can be
knocked down with a preemptive strike, submarines hidden deep inside seawater will be nearly impossible to track and destroy.

Impact Ev:
Preventing a nuclear war is key as Helfand 13 quantifies
Ira Helfand, Co-President of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Past President of Physicians for Social Responsibility,
Internist and Emergency Medicine Physician practicing at the Family Care Medical Center in Springfield, Massachusetts, holds degrees from
Harvard College and the Albert Einstein College of Medicine, 2013 (“The Humanitarian Consequences Of Nuclear War,” Arms Control Today,
November 4th, Available Online at [Link] Accessed 06-29-2016)

In April 2012, at the Nobel Peace Laureates Summit in Chicago, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) and its U.S.
affiliate, Physicians for Social Responsibility, released a report, “Nuclear Famine,” examining this potential catastrophe.[8] The report concluded
that more than one billion people might starve as a result of a limited, regional nuclear war.

Bryant 24 [Miranda Bryant, "Undersea ‘hybrid warfare’ threatens security of 1bn, Nato commander
warns", 04/01/2024, the Guardian,
[Link]
nato-commander-warns?utm_source=[Link]] //MVSG

The security of nearly 1 billion people across Europe and North America is under threat from Russian
attempts to target the extensive vulnerabilities of underwater infrastructure including windfarms,
pipelines and power cables, a Nato commander has warned. V Adm Didier Maleterre, the deputy commander of Nato’s Allied
Maritime Command (Marcom), said the network of underwater cables and pipes on which Europe’s power and communications depend were
not built to withstand the “hybrid warfare” being pursued by Moscow and other Nato adversaries. “We know the
Russians have
developed a lot of hybrid warfare under the sea to disrupt the European economy, through cables,
internet cables, pipelines. All of our economy under the sea is under threat,” he said. “And, to be very clear, we know
what Russians have developed as far as nuclear submarines to operate under the sea. So we are not naive and
we [Nato countries] are working together.” The comments come after two incidents of suspected sabotage on gas pipelines in the Baltic in the
last 18 months – first on Nord Stream 1 and 2 in September 2022, followed by the Balticconnector in October last year. Despite extensive
investigations by multiple states both remain unsolved, although Finland said in December that “everything indicated” a Chinese ship had
purposely damaged the Balticconnector with its anchor.
Kulesa 18 - (Lukasz Kulesa is Research Director at the European Leadership Network. Previously, he
worked as the Head of the Non-proliferation and Arms Control Project at the Polish Institute of
International Affairs (PISM), and between 2010–2012 as Deputy Director of the Strategic Analyses
Department at the National Security Bureau, a body providing aid and support to the President of the
Republic of Poland in executing security and defence tasks; February 2018, European Leadership
Network, "," doa: 1-20-2021) url: [Link]

Any NATO-Russia conflict would inevitably have a nuclear dimension. The role of nuclear weapons as a tool for escalation
control for Russia has been thoroughly debated by experts, but when and how Russia might use (and not merely showcase or activate) nuclear weapons in a conflict
remains an open question. Beyond catch phrases such as “escalate to de-escalate” or “escalate to win” there are a wider range of options for Russian

nuclear weapon use. For example, a single nuclear warning shot could be lethal or non-lethal. It could be directed against a purely military
target or a military-civilian one. Detonation could be configured for an EMP effect. A “false flag” attack is also conceivable. These options might be used
to signal escalation and could significantly complicate NATO’s responses. Neither NATO nor its member states have developed a similar theory of victory. Public NATO
documents stipulate the general goals for the Alliance: defend against any armed attack and, as needed, restore the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of
member states. It is less clear how far the Alliance would be willing to escalate the conflict to achieve these goals, and what mechanisms and means it would use
while trying to maintain some degree of control over the conflict. The goals and methods of waging a conflict with Russia would probably have to be limited in order
to avoid a massive nuclear exchange. Such limitations would also involve restrictions on striking back against targets on Russian territory. But too narrow an
approach could put too much restraint on NATO’s operations: the Russian regime’s stability may ultimately need to be threatened in order to force the leadership
into terminating the conflict. NATO would thus need to establish what a proportional self-defence response to Russian actions would involve, and to what extent
cyber operations or attacks against military targets in quite different parts of Russia would be useful as tools of escalation to signal NATO’s resolve. Moreover,
individual NATO Allies, especially those directly affected by Russia’s actions, might pursue their individual strategies of escalation. With regards to the nuclear
dimension in NATO escalation plans, given the stakes involved, this element would most likely be handled by the three nuclear-weapon members of the Alliance,
with the US taking the lead. The existence of three independent centres of nuclear decision-making could be exploited to complicate Russian planning and introduce
uncertainty into the Russian strategic calculus, but some degree of “P3” dialogue and coordination would be beneficial. This coordination would not necessarily
focus on nuclear targeting, but rather on designing coordinated operations to demonstrate resolve in order to keep the conflict below the nuclear threshold, or bring
it back under the threshold after first use. Relying on concepts of escalation control and on lessons from the Cold War confrontation might be misleading. The
circumstances in which a Russia -NATO conflict would play out would be radically different from the 20th century screenplay. Moreover, instead of gradual (linear)
escalation or salami tactics escalation, it is possible to imagine surprizing “leap frog” escalation, possibly connected with actions in
different domains (e.g. a cyberattack against critical infrastructure). Flexibility, good intelligence and inventiveness in responding to such developments
would be crucial.

Starr 15 [Steven Starr, director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program, as
well as a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility. He has worked with the Swiss,
Chilean, and Swedish governments in support of their efforts at the United Nations to eliminate thousands
of high-alert, launch-ready U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, "Steven Starr: Nuclear War: An
Unrecognized Mass Extinction Event Waiting to Happen", February 28, 2015, Ratical,
[Link] Accessed August 12, 2023] RPF
A war fought with 21st century strategic nuclear weapons would be more than just a great
catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war would be a mass extinction event
that ends human history. There is a profound difference between extinction and “an unprecedented disaster,” or even “the end of
civilization,” because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on. But extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality,
and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act. It certainly would be the crime to
end all crimes. The world’s leading climatologists now tell us that nuclear war threatens our continued existence as a species. Their
studies
predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, would create
a post-war environment in which for many years it would be too cold and dark to even grow food.
Their findings make it clear that not only humans, but most large animals and many other forms of
complex life would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness of our own making. The environmental
consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. Radioactive fallout, produced not only by nuclear
bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, would poison the biosphere. Millions of tons of smoke
would act to destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer and block most sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface, creating Ice Age weather conditions
that would last for decades. Yet the political and military leaders who control nuclear weapons strictly avoid any direct public discussion of the
consequences of nuclear war. They do so by arguing that nuclear weapons are not intended to be used, but only to deter. Remarkably, the leaders
of the Nuclear Weapon States have chosen to ignore the authoritative, long-standing scientific research done by the climatologists, research that
predicts virtually
any nuclear war, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed nuclear
arsenals, will leave the Earth essentially uninhabitable.

Alexander 10 [Douglas Alexander 1-27-2010, "The Impact of the Economic Crisis on the World’s Poorest Countries," Wiley Online Library,
[Link]

Yet the impact of falling trade has also reached Africa. Twelve African countries receive over 75 per cent of their export earnings from nonfuel
commodities. Year on year, the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) index of nonfuel commodity prices has fallen by 23 per cent from 2008 to

2009 – with real impact on employment prospects across Africa. The global recession has hit an important form of income for the
poorest families – remittances. Globally worth over $300 billion a year, remittances are significantly larger than global aid flows. Because
80 per cent of remittances to developing countries come from high-income countries, this source of income is vulnerable to economic crises –

and indeed is expected to have fallen by between $25 billion and $66 billion over 2009 (Cali and Dell’Erba, 2009). This collapse in
economic activity – from investment to trade and remittances – has turned the financial crisis into a social
crisis. For the poorest people in the least developed countries, this comes shortly after the rise in food prices in 2008
that is estimated to have pushed between 130 and 155 million people into poverty (World Bank, 2008). The
United Nations has estimated that the worldwide recession has pushed 100 million more people
below the poverty line (UN, 2009). That could set back progress towards meeting the first of the Millennium Development Goals – to
halve extreme poverty – by up to three years (Alexander, 2008). This collapse in economic activity – from investment to trade and remittances –

has turned the financial crisis into a social crisis. Many more families are now being faced with the toughest
decisions of extreme poverty: pulling children out of school to help provide for the family; forgoing
medicines; and even choosing which of their children to feed. Indeed lives are threatened – infant mortality
rates are set to rise by an additional 200,000 to 400,000 deaths each year from now to 2015 if the crisis
continues (UN, 2009). There is, among these worrying predictions, some more positive news. A recent report from the IMF suggests that most
economies across sub-Saharan Africa appear to be responding to this global downturn better than to those of the past (IMF, 2009b). Better
management of African economies resulting in lower inflation, lower fiscal deficits and debt levels at the outset of the crisis has given policy
makers more room for manoeuvre. But while many African countries have greatly improved their prospects through better economic
management, those prospects will still also depend on the actions of policy makes outside the region. Low-income countries and fragile states
will remain dependent on external assistance and private financial inflows, including remittances; these are themselves dependent on the
progress the global economy makes towards sustained recovery. A major concern remains that further delay in improvements in public services
will prevent attainment of the MDGs and have long-lasting effects on poverty for this generation and the next (IMF, 2009b). But while many
African countries have greatly improved their prospects through better economic management, those prospects will still also depend on the
actions of policy makers outside the region.
NEG
General Uniq:
Gray 25 Andrew Gray, "NATO commits to spending hike sought by Trump, and to mutual defence," June 24, 2025 // RKE
[Link]

THE HAGUE, June 25 (Reuters) - NATO leaders on Wednesday backed the big increase in defence spending that U.S. President
Donald Trump had demanded, and restated their commitment to defend each other from attack after a brief summit in the
Netherlands. While Trump got what he wanted at the annual meeting, tailor-made for him, his NATO allies will be relieved that he
committed to the fundamental principle of collective defence after less clear-cut language on Tuesday.

Abboud, L. and Ivanova, P. (2025). [Leila Abboud is the Paris bureau chief for the Financial Times. She joined the Financial Times in
2018 as the consumer industries correspondent, and has more than a decade of experience covering business in Europe. She has also been an
opinion columnist at Bloomberg, and a reporter at Reuters and the Wall Street Journal.; Polina Ivanova is a foreign correspondent for the FT
covering Russia, Ukraine, and Central Asia. Her reporting is focused on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and on developments inside Russia, from the
Kremlin’s crackdown to the effect of sanctions and attempts to evade them. Previously, she covered Russia and Ukraine for Reuters as a Special
Correspondent on the investigative team. She joined the FT in 2021 and was shortlisted for the George Orwell Prize for Political Journalism in
2022.] Emmanuel Macron open to stationing French nuclear weapons in other European nations. [online] @FinancialTimes. Available at:
[Link] [Accessed 27 Jun. 2025].//armaan‌

French President Emmanuel Macron said he was “ready to open a discussion” with European allies about
stationing France’s nuclear weapons on their soil, in an effort to beef up defences against Russia. The
comments made by Macron in an interview with the broadcaster TF1 on Tuesday come as he has been holding talks with
Germany, Poland and other European countries to explore whether and how France’s nuclear
deterrence could be extended on the continent. Such a move is being considered in response to signs that US President
Donald Trump wants to scale back the American military presence in Europe and force European countries to take more responsibility for their
own security. “I will define the framework [for talks about French nuclear weapons] in a very official way in the weeks and months to come, but
we have already begun things with the provisos I mentioned,” Macron said.

Vergun 24 [David Vergun, "NATO's Nuclear Deterrence Posture Seen as Robust", 07/19/2024, U.S.
Department of Defense,
[Link]
e-seen-as-robust/] //sw

NATO has put a lot of effort and resources into its nuclear deterrence mission, said Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy
Vipin Narang, who spoke today at a virtual Center for a New American Security fireside chat on Adapting NATO's Nuclear Posture to Current Threats. Narang said that

overall, he'd give NATO's nuclear posture [is an] a grade of A-plus. He provided some examples: The U.S. and the
Netherlands have fielded the first nuclear-certified F-35A jets. The legacy B-61 nuclear weapons are
being replaced by upgraded ones. NATO has reinvigorated its nuclear consultations and planning. The
transition to the Sentinel ICBM from the Minuteman III will continue. The transition to Sentinel is crucial
to national security, Narang said. NATO has superior conventional forces, as compared with Russia, and
three of its member states, the U.S., the United Kingdom and France, all have nuclear weapons. The United States has an impressive
nuclear triad consisting of intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines and bomber
aircraft, he said, noting that each leg of the triad has its own inherent strengths. The robust nuclear and
conventional forces of NATO are vital to deterring conflict. If nuclear weapons are employed against NATO, it will be necessary to support and sustain
the conventional fight and a potential nuclear response at the same time, he said. "We have to build all that resilience and redundancy into the conventional forces to be able to enable nuclear
operations should it become necessary," he said. In the event that Russia were to employ non-strategic nuclear weapons, Narang said he believes that "you will see coherence and unity in the
NATO alliance" and there would be severe consequences as President Joe Biden has consistently stated.

Trevelyan 24 [Mark Trevelyan, "Putin draws a nuclear red line for the West", 09/27/2024,
Reuters,
[Link] //sw

LONDON, Sept 27 (Reuters) - President Vladimir Putin has drawn a "red line" for the United States and
its allies by signalling thatMoscow will consider responding with nuclear weapons if they allow Ukraine to strike deep
inside Russia with long-range Western missiles.
But some in the West are asking: does he actually mean it?
The question is critical to the course of the war. If Putin is bluffing, as Ukraine and some of its supporters believe, then the West may feel ready to deepen its military support for Kyiv
regardless of Moscow's threats.
If he is serious, there is a risk - repeatedly stated by Moscow and acknowledged by Washington - that the conflict could turn into World War Three.

In the latest in a long series of warning signals,Putin on Wednesday extended the list of scenarios that could lead to Russia
using nuclear weapons.
A rival nuclear power that supported a
It could do this, he said, in response to a major cross-border conventional attack involving aircraft, missiles or drones.

country attacking Russia would be considered a party to that attack.

Both those criteria apply directly to the situation that would arise if the West allows Ukraine to strike deep inside Russian territory with Western long-range missiles such as U.S. ATACMS
and British Storm Shadows, something Putin has said would need Western satellite and targeting support.

"It was a very clear message: 'Don't make a mistake - all these kind of things may mean nuclear
war,'" said Nikolai Sokov, a former Soviet and Russian diplomat.
Bahram Ghiassee, a London-based nuclear analyst at the Henry Jackson Society think-tank, linked the timing of Putin's remarks to Ukraine's lobbying of the West for long-range missiles and
the fact that President Volodymyr Zelenskiy is making his case to U.S. President Joe Biden this week.
"Putin is saying: just stop it right there," Ghiassee said.
<<text condensed, none omitted>>
'NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL' Reaction from Kyiv was swift, with Zelenskiy's chief of staff accusing Putin of "nuclear blackmail".
"In my opinion, this is yet another bluff and demonstration of Putin's weakness. He will not dare to use nuclear weapons because that will make him a complete outcast," Anton Gerashchenko,
a former adviser to Ukraine's internal affairs minister, said on X. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Putin's warning was irresponsible and poorly timed, and that it was not the first time
he had been "rattling the nuclear sabre" Andreas Umland, an analyst at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, accused Putin of playing mind games. "This is a psychological PR
operation, by the Kremlin, without much substance. It is designed to scare leaders & voters of countries supporting Ukraine," he wrote. Fabian Hoffmann, a doctoral research fellow and
defence expert in Oslo, said he did not believe Putin's comments could be ignored, but that it was important not to overreact. "Russian nuclear use is not imminent," he said on X. "Concern is
warranted only
when Russia signals actual preparations." Hoffmann said next steps could be removing warheads from storage and pairing them with delivery vehicles for a tactical strike, before ratcheting
up preparations for large-scale nuclear use by readying silos and putting bombers on alert - all of which U.S. intelligence agencies would detect. And Russia security expert Mark Galeotti
wrote: "Talk is easy and has political impact, but evidence of actual willingness to use nuclear weapons is both absent and something we can detect if it ever happens." <<paragraph breaks
resume>>

LOWER THRESHOLD
Nevertheless, Putin was more specific than in the past about the circumstances that could prompt
nuclear use. His spokesman said on Thursday that his comments were meant as a signal to Western countries that there would be serious consequences if they participated in
attacks on Russia.

At the same time, the announced changes fell short of what some hawkish commentators have been calling for. The best-known of them, Sergei Karaganov, has argued for a limited
nuclear strike in Europe that would "sober up" Russia's enemies and make them take its nuclear deterrent seriously.

Russia's nuclear umbrella to cover neighbouring Belarus, a close ally. They lower
In practical terms, the changes extend

the threshold for nuclear use by stating, for example, that it could happen in response to a conventional strike that
posed a "critical threat to our sovereignty".
Previously, the nuclear doctrine talked about a threat to "the very existence of the state". Item 1 of 2 A Russian Yars intercontinental ballistic missile system drives past an honour guard during
a military parade on Victory Day in central Moscow, Russia May 9, 2022. REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov/File Photo [1/2]A Russian Yars intercontinental ballistic missile system drives past an
honour guard during a military parade on Victory Day in central Moscow, Russia May 9, 2022. Putin made the announcement in a four-minute video in which he was seen addressing the nine
members of a security council that meets twice-yearly to discuss nuclear deterrence. He said nuclear use was an extreme measure and Russia had always approached the issue responsibly.
Ministers and intelligence chiefs listened intently, occasionally fidgeting or shuffling papers. One participant - Alexei Likhachev, head of state nuclear corporation Rosatom - took detailed
notes. But the real addressees of Putin's message were in Kyiv, Washington and London.

Yevgeny Minchenko, a Russian political consultant, said the thrust of the revised doctrine was a blunt message to Ukraine and the West not to escalate the war further into
Russia. "If you try to kill us with your proxy's hands, we will kill both your proxy and you," was the message, he said.

Sergei Markov, a former Kremlin adviser, said the changes opened the door to Russia using tactical nuclear battlefield weapons in certain scenarios, namely against
Ukraine.

"The threshold for the use of nuclear weapons has been lowered. Now it will be easier for Russia to use nuclear weapons," Markov said on
his official blog.

"The reason for changing the nuclear doctrine was the threat of a full escalation by the West.
The West is sure that Russia will not use tactical nuclear weapons first. Russia is now saying it is ready to
do so."

Markov suggested Russia could use tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine, or air bases in Romania or Poland if Ukrainian warplanes flew sorties from there and if Kyiv - backed by U.S.
or British satellite support - used the jets to strike Moscow itself or parts of central Russia.

Schroeder 23 [Schroeder, "The Real Russian Nuclear Threat", 12/20/2023,

[Link]
tm_campaign=article_link&utm_term=article_email&utm_content=20250626] //sw

there is little risk that the war in Ukraine will lead to nuc
To hear U.S. officials tell it, s
lear e calation. “We don’t have any indication that Mr.
Putin has any intention to use weapons of mass destruction—let alone nuclear weapons,” said White House spokesperson John Kirby in January. At za Senate hearing in early May, Director of
National Intelligence Avril Haines stated that Russia was “very unlikely” to use its nuclear arsenal. Yes, CIA Director William Burns said a February speech, the United States must take Putin’s
nuclear saber rattling seriously. But the purpose of such rhetoric, Burns continued, was “to intimidate us, as well as our European allies and Ukraine.” It was not to signal that Russia was
actually thinking about using its weapons. Washington’s incredulity is to some extent understandable. The advent of the war triggered fears of outright nuclear conflict between the West and

Russia. That period of somewhat frenzied speculation has passed. The war has since settled into a grinding—but conventional—stalemate. To
be sure, U.S. officials are still concerned that Russia may use tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield. “I worry about Putin using tactical nuclear weapons,” U.S. President Joe Biden said in
June. The risk, he continued, is “real.” But officials do not appear to believe that the war in Ukraine could lead Russia to use its nuclear arsenal against a NATO state, however furious it is at the

It is actually quite unlikely that Russian President Vladimir

West for supporting Ukraine. That is a mistake. U.S. officials have it backward.

Putin will use a nuclear weapon on the battlefield in Ukraine, but it is very possible that he will move toward
using one against NATO. Unlike the West, Putin may not fear a nuclear standoff: he is well versed in Russia’s nuclear arsenal and the tenets of nuclear deterrence, and
possibly sees himself as uniquely suited to navigating a nuclear crisis. And Putin has been remarkably consistent that Russia is willing

to use nuclear weapons against NATO to defend its interests in Ukraine. Even eight years ago, in a television interview done a year after Russia invaded
Crimea, Putin declared that he had been ready to place Russian nuclear forces on alert to prevent Western forces from interfering in Moscow’s takeover of the peninsula. Russian nuclear

weapons use is not imminent. But if Putin does escalate the war, for instance by attacking NATO with conventional weapons, he will likely move very swiftly, so as not
to give the United States a chance to maneuver away from a crisis. Washington will struggle to deter a Kremlin so emboldened. Ukraine is too central to the Kremlin’s ambitions—and too
secondary to the United States’—for Putin to believe any American threats.

Escalation:
Inadis 24 [INADIS Foundation. (2024, October 29). Reversing the offensive: Ukraine’s invasion of Russia
and the West’s role — INADIS. INADIS.
[Link]
ole]/icw//BE

NATO’s involvement and the

The interplay between offensive and defensive realism in this scenario is complex. On one hand,
testing of Storm Shadow missiles can be interpreted as part of an offensive realist strategy to push
Russian influence out of Eastern Europe and secure NATO dominance. On the other hand, Russia’s
potential response is more accurately described by defensive realism, as it seeks to protect itself from
Western encroachment. This hypothetical scenario also highlights the inherent instability of modern international relations, where
technological advancements in warfare, like the Storm Shadow missile, exacerbate existing tensions.
The more NATO pushes its technological superiority, the more likely it becomes that Russia will feel
threatened, potentially leading to miscalculations that could trigger a global war. Both realism perspectives
converge on the notion that a state’s security is often compromised by the actions of others, leading to unintended escalation. In this context,
Ukraine’s role as a proxy in the conflict between NATO and Russia presents a dangerous precedent. The involvement of the U.S. and U.K., with
their long-standing rivalry with Russia, introduces additional layers of complexity, making the likelihood of a peaceful resolution even slimmer.
The use of advanced military technology in an invasion of Russia may well be the tipping point that transforms this regional conflict into a global
one, potentially leading to World War III. Conclusion The potential for a Ukrainian invasion of Russia, backed by NATO, and the testing of the
NATO’s actions can be
Storm Shadow missile represents a critical juncture in global security. Through the lens of offensive realism,
seen as part of a broader strategy to weaken Russia and maintain Western dominance. Conversely,
defensive realism explains Russia’s likely response as a rational attempt to protect its sovereignty from
perceived Western aggression. The security dilemma that emerges from this interaction underscores the precarious nature of
modern international relations. As this analysis demonstrates, the escalation of the Ukraine-Russia conflict could have
far-reaching consequences, potentially sparking a global war. To prevent such outcomes, policymakers
must recognize the inherent risks of military escalation and seek diplomatic solutions that address the
underlying security concerns of all parties involved.

Reuters, 5-14-2025, "Kremlin criticises Macron remarks on nuclear-armed planes,"

[Link]
05-14/ //EA

MOSCOW, May 14 (Reuters) - The Kremlin on Wednesday criticized comments by French President Emmanuel Macron that Paris is open
to deploying nuclear-armed warplanes in other European countries, saying it would not enhance the continent's security. "The
Americans have the bombs on planes in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Turkey," Macron told France's TF1 television on Tuesday. "We are ready to
open this discussion. I will define the framework in a very specific way in the weeks and months to come," he said. Asked about Macron's
comments, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said: "The proliferation of nuclear weapons on the European continent is something that will not
add security, predictability and stability." "Right now, the entire system of strategic stability and security is in a deplorable state for obvious
reasons," Peskov said. Macron first floated the idea of

extending the protection of France's nuclear arsenal to other European countries in March. The Kremlin said at the time
that this amounted to an assertion by France of "nuclear leadership in Europe", which it said was "very,
very confrontational."

David Ljunggren 23, 3-26-2023, "Putin says Moscow to place nuclear weapons in Belarus, US reacts
cautiously," Reuters,
[Link]
pons-there-tass-2023-03-25/ //EA

March 25 (Reuters) - Russia will station

tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, President Vladimir Putin said on Saturday,
sending a warning to NATO over its military support for Ukraine and escalating a standoff with
the West. Although not unexpected and while Putin said the move would not violate nuclear non-proliferation promises, it is one
of the Russia's most pronounced nuclear signals since the beginning of its invasion of Ukraine 13 months
ago. The United States - the world's other nuclear superpower - has reacted cautiously to Putin's statement, with a senior administration
official saying there were no signs Moscow planned to use its nuclear weapons. Putin likened his plans to the U.S. stationing its weapons in
Europe and said that Russia would not be transferring control to Belarus. But this
could be the first time since the
mid-1990s that Russia were to base such weapons outside the country. "There is nothing unusual here
either: firstly, the United States has been doing this for decades. They have long deployed their tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of their
allied countries," Putin told state television. "We agreed that we will do the same - without violating our obligations, I emphasize, without
violating our international obligations on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons." Tensions have grown over the war in Ukraine after heavy
supplies of Western weaponry to Kyiv and Moscow shifting its rhetoric on its military operation away from "demilitarisation" of its neighbour to
fighting "the collective West" there. Some hawkish Russian politicians and commentators have long speculated about nuclear strikes, saying
Russia has the right to defend itself with nuclear weapons if it is pushed beyond its limits. "Tactical" nuclear weapons refer to those
used for specific gains on a battlefield rather than those with the capacity to wipe out cities. It is unclear how many such weapons Russia has,
given it is an area still shrouded in Cold War secrecy. Experts told Reuters the development was significant, since Russia had until now been
proud that unlike the United States, it did not deploy nuclear weapons outside its borders. The senior U.S. administration official noted that
Russia and Belarus had been speaking about the transfer of nuclear weapons for some time. "We have not seen any reason to adjust our own
strategic nuclear posture nor any indications Russia is preparing to use a nuclear weapon. We remain committed to the collective defence of the
NATO alliance," the official said. NATO'S THRESHOLD Putin did not specify when the weapons would be transferred to Belarus, which has
borders with three NATO members - Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. He said Russia would complete the construction of a storage facility there by
July 1. "This is part of Putin's game to try to intimidate NATO ... because there is no military utility from doing this in Belarus as Russia has so
many of these weapons and forces inside Russia," said Hans Kristensen, director of the nuclear information project at the Federation of
American Scientists. It was also unclear where in Belarus the weapons would be stationed. The transfer would expand Russia's nuclear strike
ability along NATO's eastern border. Although the Kremlin has never publicly confirmed it, the West has long being saying that Russia
keeps nuclear-capable missiles in Kaliningrad, its Baltic coast exclave between NATO and European Union members Poland and Lithuania. The
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons called Putin's announcement an extremely dangerous escalation. "In
the context
of the war in Ukraine, the likelihood of miscalculation or misinterpretation is extremely high.
Sharing nuclear weapons makes the situation much worse and risks catastrophic
humanitarian consequences," it said on Twitter. Putin said that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko had long requested
the deployment. There was no immediate reaction from Lukashenko. While the Belarusian army has not formally fought in Ukraine, Minsk and
Moscow have a close military relationship. Minsk allowed Moscow to use Belarusian territory to send troops into Ukraine last year and the two
nations stepped up joint military training. "We are not handing over (the weapons). And the U.S. does not hand (them) over to its
allies. We're basically doing the same thing they've been doing for a decade," Putin said. "They have allies in certain countries and they train ...
their crews. We are going to do the same thing." Russia has stationed 10 aircraft in Belarus capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons, Putin
said, adding that it had already transferred to Belarus a number of Iskander tactical missile systems that can launch nuclear weapons. "It's a very
significant move," said Nikolai Sokov, a senior fellow at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. "Russia
had always
been very proud that it had no nuclear weapons outside its territory. So, now, yes, they are changing that
and it's a big change."

Kluth 22 Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering European politics, former editor in chief of Handelsblatt Global and writer for the
Economist, Andreas(6-20-22, “Europe Needs a Better Nuclear Deterrent Against Putin”, Washington Post,
[Link]
fbf7194 cd78_story) ZachDiesel

In one scenario, France could extend its nuclear umbrella to the whole European Union (of which the UK is no longer a member).
French President Emmanuel Macron speaks often about achieving European “autonomy,” by which he usually means independence from

the US. So he should in theory be amenable. In practice, the French are neither willing nor able. Since Charles de Gaulle, France has always

insisted on total sovereignty over its arsenal and all decisions pertaining to it. In that sense, visions of a Europeanized “force
de frappe,” as the French call their nukes, suffer from the same problem as ideas about a “European Army.” Without a United States

of Europe, it’s not clear who’d be in command, when and how. Moreover, the French arsenal isn’t suited for the

job. France has a relatively small stash of 290 nukes. In the event of all-out war, an adversary like
Russia, with thousands of warheads, might be tempted — and able — to take out those weapons with
a preemptive first strike. Deterrence only works if retaliation is assured. France’s nukes are also of the
wrong type. They’re “strategic” — that is, bombs capable of causing many Hiroshimas worth of
devastation each, and therefore meant to be used only in a total-war scenario to take out entire cities
in the enemy’s homeland. If Russia were to escalate, however, it would do so with “tactical” nuclear
weapons — smaller warheads deployed at short ranges to cow an enemy into submission or win
specific battles. It’s inconceivable that France (or anybody) would retaliate for an initial and limited
tactical strike by going directly to strategic retaliation and thus Armageddon.

Corker 15 [Corker, "- RUSSIAN AGRESSION IN EASTERN EUROPE: WHERE DOES PUTIN GO NEXT AFTER
UKRAINE, GEORGIA, AND MOLDOVA?", 03/04/2015, US Senate,
[Link]
e=[Link]] //sw

deploying nuclear weapons to the relatively new members in the Baltic States or Central Europe would make the
First,

weapons more vulnerable to a Russian preemptive attack in a crisis. For example, the Iskander ballistic missiles reportedly deployed in
Russia's Kaliningrad can carry conventional or nuclear weapons. From Kaliningrad, Iskander missiles could cover and
rapidly strike targets in two-thirds of Poland and virtually all of Lithuania and Latvia. U.S. nuclear assets are far less vulnerable at their current bases.
Second, deploying nuclear weapons to the new members would violate NATO policy. Many, probably most, allies would oppose such a move. In 1997, the alliance stated that it had ``no
intention, no plan and no reason'' to deploy nuclear arms on the territory of new member states. While some allies have sought to have NATO renounce or alter its policy of not permanently
stationing substantial combat forces on the territory of new members, no ally has seriously raised the idea of changing the existing policy on no deployment of nuclear arms on the territory of

placing U.S. nuclear weapons so close to Russia would be seen in Moscow as an

new member states. Third,

extremely provocative act, on par with the attempt by the Soviet Union in 1962 to place
nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba. It does not make sense to respond to Russian actions with a deployment that would make American nuclear weapons more
vulnerable, cause a major rift within NATO, and unduly provoke Russia.

Tetzlaff-Deas 25 (Benedict Tetzlaff-Deas is a news reporter at the Daily Mirror and previously held
same position at the Daily Star, one of the first two students in Great Britain to complete the NCTJ
Certificate in Foundation Journalism.) Daily Mirror, 06/27/2025, “Russia issues WW3 threat as Estonia
makes promise over UK's nuke-capable jets”
[Link] (Accessed:
06/30/2025) //jjoy

Vladimir Putin's top spokesman has reacted furiously after Estonia said it was open to hosting RAF warplanes with nuclear
capability - one Kremlin mouthpiece said the move would 'end badly'
Russia has issued a new threat to NATO after one of Britain's allies said it was 'ready' to host RAF warplanes capable of carrying tactical nuclear bombs.

In the security defence review unveiled this week by Keir Starmer, it was announced the RAF will be equipped with twelve new F-35A fifth-generation aircraft by
2030, which will be "available to fly NATO’s nuclear mission in a crisis". Estonia's defence minister Hanno Pevkur said today that his country would "naturally" be
prepared to host some of the jets - sparking a furious reaction from Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, who was asked by Russian media if such a move would be perceived
as a threat to Moscow.

Dmitry Peskov, the Kremlin's top press secretary, said: "A direct one. Of course… a direct danger." Estonia is a NATO member and shares a 183-mile land
border with Russia, and around 1,000 British troops are permanently based in the Baltic state.

Peskov added: “The leaders of the Baltic countries express a lot of absurd ideas. One can only express regret, that’s all.”
Russia's extensive propaganda operation has also honed in on the Estonian minister's comments, and even appeared to threaten the country with
invasion. One presenter from Kremlin-linked Tsargrad TV warned: “It’s strange that Tallinn doesn’t grasp the obvious.

“Such moves near Russia’s borders end very badly. And there’s no need to look far for an example — just look at where such
‘games’ have led Ukraine.”

Pro-Kremlin military blogger Aleksei Zhivov warned an F‑35A deployment could trigger war, accusing Estonia and NATO of inciting Putin.

He said: “Given that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are located uncomfortably close to Russia’s most important regions, this
poses an existential threat to our country”
“This should be viewed appropriately — as part of Europe’s preparations for a major war with Russia. At some point, the Baltics’ task will be to provoke Russia into
launching a military operation in the region.”

Peskov was speaking in Belarus, a Russian ally which borders Baltic states Lithuania and Latvia, and also another NATO state Poland. Belarus has been supplied with
nuclear weapons by Putin.

A dozen new RAF F‑35A fighters capable of carrying US B61‑12 nuclear gravity bombs are scheduled to enter service by 2030 at RAF Marham in Norfolk - but there
has been no suggestion that they would be based in Estonia.

Britain's existing F-35 jets have previously been sent on short rotational deployments to Estonia for "NATO enhanced Vigilance Activity", but are not based there
permanently.

Suggesting today that he would be open to hosting newer versions of the planes with enhanced nuclear capability, Estonia's Hanno Pevkur said: “F-35s have already
been in Estonia, and will soon return as part of the rotational mission.

“If some of them, regardless of the country, also have dual-use nuclear weapons capability, this does not
change our position on hosting the F-35. Of course, we are ready to host allies.”

Speck 24 (Dr. Ulrich Speck is a senior visiting fellow at The German Marshall Fund of the United States
in Berlin. His work focuses on German foreign policy, the EU, transatlantic relations, and global order.
From 2015 to 2016, he was a senior fellow at the Transatlantic Academy at GMF in Washington, DC.) The
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 01/18/2024, “A separate nuclear umbrella for Europe? The prospect of a Trump
victory is spurring a new debate over nuclear weapons”
[Link]
ope-ld.1774685 (Accessed: 07/06/2025) //jjoy
Extended nuclear deterrence

Nuclear deterrence in relation to a country's own territory, as practiced by Russia, China, India and Israel, is credible because it is about the country's own continued
existence. Only the U.S. has practiced the extension of such deterrence to other sovereign states. It has done so from the 1950s to the present day, in both Europe
and Asia, as an important building block of the American-led regional and global security order. The Soviet Union did take the Warsaw Pact under its nuclear
umbrella during the Cold War, but the countries in question were not fully sovereign states.

If France and/or the U.K. were to make such a promise for all EU and/or NATO states, this would by no means constitute a
deterrent in itself. Deterrence requires not only the declared intention to deter, it requires above all that the other side actually
feels deterred. The decisive factor in extended deterrence is the credibility of the promise to maintain a nuclear umbrella over others – to treat the foreign
territory to be protected as one's own.
Even in the case of the U.S., this credibility was often questioned, with good reason. But at the same time, nobody dared to put Washington to
the test. This is due to the United States' overall deterrent effect as the world's largest military power, as well as the role it has played for decades in
maintaining global order.

Neither France nor the U.K. can come even close to this impact. Nobody knows this better than the Kremlin. In one
way or another, Russia would immediately test a declared French or British nuclear umbrella over East-Central Europe.
Moscow would assume that Paris and London would not risk a nuclear war with Russia in order to protect Finland, the
Baltic states or Romania.=
Russia is waiting for opportunities

An attempt by France and/or the U.K. to create a nuclear umbrella over East-Central Europe would lead to considerable resistance, even outside these countries. At

the same time, it would probably immediately lead to a nuclear crisis, because Russia would see this as a unique
opportunity to demonstrate that East-Central Europe no longer has any nuclear protection.

The result: Only America can credibly and therefore effectively provide extended deterrence against Russia (and in future
probably also Iran) in Europe. The alternative to the American nuclear umbrella is no nuclear umbrella.
If Europe were to lose the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the most likely scenario would be that states feeling particularly threatened in East-Central Europe would make
every effort to acquire at least a minimal nuclear deterrent capability as quickly as possible, in order to defend themselves against an attack or intimidation by
Russia, and thus maintain their sovereignty.

Welton 22 – US Air Force Research (George O. Welton “RUSSIA INVADES THE BALTIC STATES: HOW AND
WHY NATO MUST LIBERATE THE REGION,
[Link]
ALTICSTATESComplete_Welton.pdf)

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF FAILING TO LIBERATE THE BALTICS If Russia is able to invade, occupy, and hold the Baltics while
fending off a NATO counter-attack, NATO itself could collapse along with the foundations of Western
security for the last 70 years.3 While this effect may seem extreme, it is not completely unrealistic and is a goal of Vladimir Putin. 4 The principle of collective
defense is the bedrock of NATO and is enshrined in the Alliance’s founding treaty as Article V: “…an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all…” which allows members to use “armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic

area.”5 This means that if attacked, the Alliance members are obligated to collectively defend the attacked member and restore its security. Russian forces
occupying the Baltic states is in direct contradiction to the North Atlantic Treaty and their continued
occupation would invalidate NATO’s purpose for existing. If NATO were to collapse, the collective
economic and military strength its members currently enjoy over Russia would be gone leaving a power
vacuum in Europe for Russia to step into other Eastern European countries with little resistance. Even if
NATO did not disintegrate following unsuccessful attempts to liberate the Baltics, its effectiveness at
maintaining European security would be eroded. US and European prosperity would decline due to new worries of NATO’s ability and
willingness to defend its members. The credibility of NATO would be lost and Russia will achieve its goal of disrupting both European
and US security arrangements. In this light, NATO’s ability to garner support from member states to achieve a common security goal will suffer and
decline. Different organizations or even nations could begin competing with NATO, and hence the US, to become the new Western guarantor of security. The
strategic consequences for failing to uphold Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty are disastrous for the US and Europe and a great victory for 3 Russia as well as
opening windows of opportunity for other authoritarian regimes and strategic competitors in the world.
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF SUCCESSFULLY LIBERATING THE BALTICS Successfully liberating the Baltic states from Russian occupation would prove to the world the importance and credibility of NATO, and of the US, in demonstrating resolve to uphold and defend strategic interests. NATO
and the US share the common interest of a stable and peaceful Europe. While the US provides the bulk of NATO security guarantees, the alliance is an important force multiplier for US strategic interests that is able to project unmatched power across the globe. Since the end of the Cold
War and collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO has struggled to define its role and relevance to a 21st Century security environment. Russian aggression over the last decade has been a reminder of NATO’s continued importance for guaranteeing security across Western democracies and free
markets. As victors in this sort of conflict, NATO would have enhanced leverage and advantage over Russia with the ability to garner concessions to improve the security of NATO as well as the continued economic prosperity of its members. The successful liberation of the attacked Baltic
states would lend credibility and legitimacy to the defensive alliance. The ability to bring the economic and/or military power of 30 NATO member states to bear is unmatched in the world and “is a powerful message and powerful commitment.”6 No single country can match the
capabilities NATO as a whole is able to muster. No matter the notoriously slow decision-making process that must be supported by the views of all member states7 , a victory over Russia in liberating NATO members from an invasion would confirm NATO’s importance in securing Western
democracies’ interests. By demonstrating its ability to protect its members using Article V, NATO could potentially receive more applications for 4 membership from countries looking for the security guarantee that collective defense provides (e.g., Finland and Sweden).

HOW TO LIBERATE THE BALTICS FROM RUSSIA The mission to liberate the Baltic states from a Russian invasion is no easy task. The Baltics are NATO’s
most vulnerable territory and the balance of power in the region is heavily tilted towards Russia.8 A Russian invasion into the sovereign territories of
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would be accomplished rapidly leaving the Alliance with a limited response options.9 Two critical issues for NATO’s operation to
liberate the Baltics are: 1) Russia’s geographic advantage in the conflict (proximity to the Baltics, Kaliningrad, Belarus); and 2) The kind of conflict NATO is willing to
fight (length, cost in terms of lives and money, nuclear weapon threat) in order to defend the Baltics. These two issues will form the general framework of how NATO

should design a campaign plan and conduct operations to defend against a Russian attack and liberate the Baltic region from Russian occupation. Russia

possesses a large geographic advantage over NATO forces in regards to conflict in the Baltic region. From the Russian border
to Tallinn is about 200 kilometers (125 miles), to Riga 275 kilometers (170 miles), compared to the shortest land routes from Poland to Riga and Tallinn being 325

kilometers (200 miles) and 600 kilometers (370 miles) respectively.10 This proximity affords Russia a crucial advantage in a
conflict, which combined with NATO’s notoriously slow and deliberative decision process could lead
Russia to significant gains in the region before NATO can agree on an appropriate response.11 Russia is able to
reinforce troops at a much faster rate with a less complicated process than NATO due to the proximity of forces. NATO would be heavily reliant on flying or shipping
in reinforcements to the region.12 5 Another geographic advantage held by Russia in this conflict is its exclave, Kaliningrad (sandwiched between Lithuania and
Poland on the Baltic Sea). Kaliningrad is a great counterbalance for Russia to the military threat posed by NATO.13 Kaliningrad hosts what may be the most effective
Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) in the world.14 The capabilities located in Kaliningrad “can deny NATO access to the Baltic states and slow, if not thwart US and

NATO airpower should either respond to a Russian attack against any of the Baltic states.”15 Kaliningrad is a critical piece of Russia’s
defense against any NATO operation into the Baltic region and essentially provides Russia with initial air superiority over the Baltic
states. The question of what to do about Kaliningrad is important, because if Kaliningrad is left untouched NATO will be unable to provide any kind of meaningful air
power over the Baltics. The IADS from Kaliningrad would be able to stop NATO troop reinforcements by air and even by sea with the anti-ship missile capabilities and
Baltic Fleet located there. According to a wargaming study conducted by Rand in 2016, airpower is required from the beginning of a conflict with Russia to enable
ground operations in the Baltics.16 Knowing this information, operations against Kaliningrad must be part of the effort to liberate the Baltics. The extent of those
operations should at least be to bring down Kaliningrad’s IADS and enable freedom of movement for NATO forces from the rest of Europe to the east. Operations

against Kaliningrad could even extend to annexing the Russian exclave to ensure it is not a threat again for future conflicts in the region. However, annexing

Kaliningrad would likely be viewed as an offensive action rather than a defensive action that NATO claims is
its purpose. Another piece of Russia’s geographic advantage over NATO in a Baltic conflict is Belarus. Belarus and Russia are
close allies based on their shared history and the formal creation of the “Union State” in 1999.17 Currently Russian troops are moving into Belarus to continue the 6

encirclement of Ukraine. In a conflict in the Baltics, Belarus would certainly play host to Russian forces. Belarus borders two
NATO members, Lithuania and Poland, and sits on the east side of the Suwalki Corridor with Kaliningrad
on the west side. The Suwalki Corrider is 65 kilometers (40 miles) wide and connects Poland with Lithuania, effectively becoming the only land link from
central Europe to the Baltics. This is NATO’s “most vulnerable choke point” in a conflict with Russia in the Baltics and provides an
opportunity for Russia to “incapacitate NATO as a security provider for its three Baltic members.” 18 Protecting the Suwalki Corridor and denying its use by Russia to
resupply Kaliningrad must be a key part of any strategy to liberate the Baltics to ensure there are multiple avenues of approach for NATO forces and stop Russia from
being able to concentrate its efforts on just one of those avenues. Aside from its proximity to the Baltics and the key land bridge connecting the Baltics to the rest of

NATO, Belarus has offered to host Russian nuclear weapons.19 The threat of a nuclear strike by Russia in a
regional conflict, such as the Baltics, is real. Russia maintains the option to use nuclear weapons in a
first-strike capacity in order to coerce an adversary to agree to its terms in a strategy of “escalate to
de-escalate.”20 NATO members maintain nuclear forces under the umbrella of NATO that include strategic assets as well as dual-capable aircraft and tactical
nuclear weapons. Both NATO and the US hold the same policy of maintaining nuclear capabilities to impose
costs so great on the adversary that the benefits of the adversary’s use of nuclear weapons would be far
outweighed by NATO’s response.21 Russia’s ability to stage and potentially launch nuclear weapons from Belarus changes the calculus of NATO and
US planners use of nuclear weapons, especially if the deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus materializes and becomes public knowledge. If Russia were to
threaten the use of nuclear 7 weapons to deter a NATO counter-offensive to liberate the Baltics, it would drastically alter the decision calculus of NATO members
who do not want Europe to become the site of nuclear war.

Baltics:
Hoffman 25 (Fabian Hoffmann is a Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the
Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Fabian is a Doctoral Research Fellow at the Oslo Nuclear
Project (ONP) at the University of Oslo. His research focuses on missile technology, nuclear strategy, and
defense policy. His PhD project focuses on the implications of conventional long-range strike weapons on
nuclear strategy.) Missile Matters, 03/09/2025, “From Paris With Love: Extending France's Nuclear
Umbrella Over Europe” [Link]
(Accessed 06/30/2025) //jjoy
Can the French nuclear arsenal replace the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent?

The key question then is if the France can offer a better or at least equally good extended nuclear deterrent “product” to its
European allies. Most likely, this is not the case—at least unless the French nuclear arsenal and doctrine undergo major
changes, and as long as the perceived scope of the nuclear umbrella remains unchanged.

The French nuclear arsenal is insufficient in size and capability to offer meaningful damage limitation in the event of a nuclear conflict. Unlike the
United States, France is essentially only able to retaliate on behalf of its allies, not to take preemptive action.

That might not be an issue for Belgium, Germany, or the Netherlands—countries geographically close to France. If their survival were threatened, France would likely
face an existential threat as well, if not immediately, then in the near future. In such a scenario, large-scale nuclear use on their behalf is at least somewhat credible.

However, this credibility does not extend to states further from France, including the Baltics, the Nordics, Poland, and Romania. Here, the question of whether a
French president would trade “Tallinn for Paris” becomes unavoidable.

In discussions with French officials and in Macron’s statements, I get the impression that the French believe they can bridge this credibility gap through their
long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity—the idea that they will not specify when and how they would resort to nuclear use. Macron’s references to "vital
European interests" without further clarification reflect this approach. However, it is difficult to see how such nuclear guarantees would be taken seriously north and
east of Germany.

France, at present, is also unable to credibly signal to its allies that it could fight and potentially win a nuclear war with Russia at the
sub-strategic level. France lacks both the arsenal depth and the arsenal diversity necessary to compete effectively with Russia in a non-strategic nuclear
warfighting scenario.

This could put France and its European allies in a position where they are forced
to either submit to Russia non-strategic nuclear use or
escalate to the strategic nuclear level, an option that may not be seen as credible by allies.
A key issue here also lies in France’s nuclear doctrine. At present, French doctrine does not acknowledge the existence of a distinct non-strategic nuclear level,
treating all nuclear use as strategic in its consequences. This doctrinal stance effectively prevents France from incorporating moew non-strategic nuclear options into
its nuclear planning. While this was not a problem when French nuclear doctrine was solely focused on protecting French vital interests, it becomes a major issue if

France attempts to extend its nuclear umbrella over other European states.
Finally, with some adaptations, the French nuclear arsenal could be well positioned to support coercive nuclear use as a means to escape conventional defeat,
similar to the role played by the American nuclear arsenal. This would be especially true if French nuclear weapons were forward-deployed to countries facing an
immediate threat of Russian invasion, much like West Germany during the Cold War.

This means that discussions about forward-deploying Rafale aircraft and ASMPA-R nuclear cruise missiles to Germany are somewhat redundant and do little to
enhance the credibility of French extended deterrence. Germany is already relatively well covered by France’s strategic nuclear arsenal, as outlined above.
Instead, the
focus should be on forward-deploying French nuclear capabilities to Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, and Romania—the new frontline states in the confrontation with Russia. If this were to happen, and if French decision-makers could agree
on joint authorization procedures with the leadership of these countries, it could significantly complicate Russian planning and strengthen nuclear deterrence in
Europe amid U.S. withrawal.

Tetzlaff-Deas 25 (Benedict Tetzlaff-Deas is a news reporter at the Daily Mirror and previously held
same position at the Daily Star, one of the first two students in Great Britain to complete the NCTJ
Certificate in Foundation Journalism.) Daily Mirror, 06/27/2025, “Russia issues WW3 threat as Estonia
makes promise over UK's nuke-capable jets”
[Link] (Accessed:
06/30/2025) //jjoy

Estonia said it was open to hosting RAF warplanes with nuclear

Vladimir Putin's top spokesman has reacted furiously after

capability - one Kremlin mouthpiece said the move would 'end badly'
Russia has issued a new threat to NATO after one of Britain's allies said it was 'ready' to host RAF warplanes capable of carrying tactical nuclear bombs.

In the security defence review unveiled this week by Keir Starmer, it was announced the RAF will be equipped with twelve new F-35A fifth-generation aircraft by
2030, which will be "available to fly NATO’s nuclear mission in a crisis". Estonia's defence minister Hanno Pevkur said today that his country would "naturally" be
prepared to host some of the jets - sparking a furious reaction from Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, who was asked by Russian media if such a move would be perceived
as a threat to Moscow.

Dmitry Peskov, the Kremlin's top press secretary, said: "A direct one. Of course… a direct danger." Estonia is a NATO member and shares a 183-mile land
border with Russia, and around 1,000 British troops are permanently based in the Baltic state.

Peskov added: “The leaders of the Baltic countries express a lot of absurd ideas. One can only express regret, that’s all.”

Russia's extensive propaganda operation has also honed in on the Estonian minister's comments, and even appeared to threaten the country with
invasion. One presenter from Kremlin-linked Tsargrad TV warned: “It’s strange that Tallinn doesn’t grasp the obvious.

“Such moves near Russia’s borders end very badly. And there’s no need to look far for an example — just look at where such
‘games’ have led Ukraine.”

Pro-Kremlin military blogger Aleksei Zhivov warned an F‑35A deployment could trigger war, accusing Estonia and NATO of inciting Putin.

He said: “Given that Estonia,

Latvia, and Lithuania are located uncomfortably close to Russia’s most important regions, this
poses an existential threat to our country”
“This should be viewed appropriately — as part of Europe’s preparations for a major war with Russia. At some point, the Baltics’ task will be to provoke Russia into
launching a military operation in the region.”

Peskov was speaking in Belarus, a Russian ally which borders Baltic states Lithuania and Latvia, and also another NATO state Poland. Belarus has been supplied with
nuclear weapons by Putin.

A dozen new RAF F‑35A fighters capable of carrying US B61‑12 nuclear gravity bombs are scheduled to enter service by 2030 at RAF Marham in Norfolk - but there
has been no suggestion that they would be based in Estonia.

Britain's existing F-35 jets have previously been sent on short rotational deployments to Estonia for "NATO enhanced Vigilance Activity", but are not based there
permanently.

Suggesting today that he would be open to hosting newer versions of the planes with enhanced nuclear capability, Estonia's Hanno Pevkur said: “F-35s have already
been in Estonia, and will soon return as part of the rotational mission.

“If
some of them, regardless of the country, also have dual-use nuclear weapons capability, this does not
change our position on hosting the F-35. Of course, we are ready to host allies.”
Russian doctrine necessitates a response
Kimball 24 (Daryl G. Kimball has been Executive Director of the Arms Control Association (ACA) and
publisher and contributor for the organization’s monthly journal, Arms Control Today, since September
2001.) Arms Control Association, xx/12/2024, “Russia Revises Nuclear Use Doctrine”
[Link] (Accessed:
7/1/2025) IZ

The update of Russia’s nuclear doctrine was previewed by Putin in comments delivered on Sept. 25. (See ACT, November 2024.) It was issued just days after it
was reported that U.S. President Joe Biden had decided to authorize Ukraine’s use of U.S.-supplied long-range missiles to strike targets deeper into Russia as a means
revised
of thwarting ongoing Russian attacks on Ukrainian territory. Russia had warned that such a U.S. move would change the nature of the conflict. The

nuclear doctrine includes language asserting that Russia “reserves the right” to use nuclear weapons not only in
response to a nuclear attack, but also to respond to a conventional weapons attack that creates a “critical threat” to
its “sovereignty and territorial integrity” or to that of Russia’s ally, Belarus. The previous version of Russia’s nuclear weapons doctrine, issued in
2020, reserves the right to use nuclear weapons if an attack on Russia threatens “the very existence of the state.” The new document, titled “Fundamentals of the
State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence,” states that Russia considers “nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence, the use of which
is an extreme and necessary measure, and is making all necessary efforts to reduce the nuclear threat and prevent the aggravation of interstate relations that could
provoke military conflicts, including nuclear conflicts.”

Brands 19 – Bloomberg columnist and a professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced
International Studies, Hal, 10-12-19. "Commentary: How Russia could force a nuclear war in the Baltics."
Bulletin,
[Link]
s/article_dbf40df4-[Link]

possibility of nuclear escalation in a conflict

Yet a series of reports by the nonpartisan RAND Corporation shows that the
between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia over the Baltic region is higher than one might imagine. The
best way of averting it? Invest more in the alliance’s conventional defense.

There was a time when it seemed quite normal to risk nuclear war over the sanctity of European frontiers.

After the Cold War ended, the U.S. and its allies had the luxury of thinking less about nuclear deterrence and war-fighting. Yet today, with Russia
rising again as a military threat, the grim logic of nuclear statecraft is returning.

The spike in tensions between Russia and the West over the past half-decade has revealed a basic problem: NATO doesn’t have the capability to
prevent Russian forces from quickly overrunning Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Russian invaders would be at the gates of the Baltic capitals in
two to three days; existing NATO forces in the region would be destroyed or swept aside. NATO could respond by mobilizing for a longer
war to liberate the Baltic countries, but this would
require a bloody, dangerous military campaign. Critically, that campaign would require
striking targets located within Russia itself, as well as suppressing Russian artillery, short-range missiles and other capabilities within
the Kaliningrad enclave, which is situated behind NATO’s front lines.

Moreover, this sort of NATO counteroffensive is precisely the situation Russian nuclear doctrine seems meant to
avert. Russian officials understand that their country would lose a long war against NATO. So the Kremlin has signaled that it might carry out
limited nuclear strikes — perhaps a “demonstration strike” somewhere in the Atlantic, or against NATO forces in the theater — to force the
alliance to make peace on Moscow’s terms. This concept is known as “escalate to de-escalate,” and there is a growing body of evidence that the
Russians are serious about it.

A NATO-Russia war could thus go nuclear if Russia “escalates” to preserve the gains it has won early in the conflict. It could
also go nuclear in a second, if somewhat less likely, way: If the U.S. and NATO initiate their own limited nuclear strikes against Russian
forces to prevent Moscow from overrunning the Baltic allies in the first place. And even the limited use of nuclear weapons raises the question
of further escalation: Would crossing the nuclear threshold lead to a general nuclear war?
So what to do? One option would be for the West to pull back. The logic here is superficially compelling. After all, the U.S. could survive and
thrive in a world where Russia dominated Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, just as it survived and thrived during the Cold War, when those countries
were part of the Soviet Union.

A second option, emphasized by the Pentagon’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, would be to devise new limited nuclear options as a way of
strengthening deterrence. For example, the U.S. might develop low-yield nuclear weapons that could be used, in a relatively limited fashion,
against a Russian invasion force or the units supporting it.

Russia might mistake a limited strike against

The dangers here are, well, obvious and drastic. There is always some possibility that
military targets in the Baltics for part of a larger or more dangerous nuclear strike against Russia itself.

Fragmentation (general):

Ghoshal 25 [Debalina Ghoshal, "Effects of Macron's Nuclear Deterrence Policy for the West", 5/30/2025,
[Link] //sw

Moreover, France’s choice of offering nuclear security guarantees to EU members that are also NATO members
could lead to complexities that are beyond resolve. The US guarantees nuclear security under Article 5
of the Washington Treaty. France would need to establish a distinct legal framework to legitimise its
nuclear security commitments outside the NATO structure and to ensure compliance with its obligations under the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While Paris may seek to justify its position through reference to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty,

doing so could undermine its broader strategic objective of asserting greater autonomy and influence within the European Union’s
security architecture
Although France asserts its nuclear deterrent strategy is independent of NATO command, other NATO members with shared nuclear capabilities

might encounter command-and-control difficulties and be forced to disregard NATO’s structure.

France’s nuclear arsenal is another concern; its size may hinder its ability to provide nuclear protection
to allied nations, particularly those threatened by tactical nuclear weapons. Essentially, France’s nuclear strategy is based on
sea-launched deterrence, specifically aircraft launched from ships. Sea-based delivery systems could severely complicate command-and-control issues in umbrella countries during crisis
situations.
France’s relatively small nuclear arsenal, compared to Russia’s, further complicates its extended nuclear deterrence strategy. Providing credible extended nuclear deterrence to European Union
allies necessitates France expanding its nuclear arsenal to counter potential Russian nuclear blackmail, especially when ensuring the nuclear security of nations such as Poland and Lithuania,
which border Russia.
Conclusion
France’s proposal to extend its nuclear deterrence to EU member states marks a significant shift towards greater European strategic autonomy. However, the initiative is fraught with legal,

Discrepancies in threat assessment between EU and NATO members, compounded by Paris’

operational, and political complexities.

demand for sole command authority, risk undermining cohesion and fostering mistrust. The limited size of France’s nuclear arsenal and its reliance
on sea-based delivery systems raise concerns over the credibility and responsiveness of such a deterrent.

fragmenting existing
Without a clearly defined legal framework outside the NATO structure and broader consensus among European partners, France’s ambitions risk

deterrence arrangements. President Macron’s leadership shows a proactive approach to escalating security anxieties, especially considering Russia’s recent actions;
however, the efficacy of this strategy hinges on the reconciliation of national interests with allied obligations and the establishment of strategic clarity within the European security framework.

Samuel, O. (2025). [Dr Olamide Samuel is a renowned international security expert and Network Specialist at the Open Nuclear Network.
Previously, he served as Special Envoy of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE), established by the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zone Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Pelindaba.] Europe going nuclear would be a catastrophic mistake. [online] Al Jazeera. Available at:
[Link] [Accessed 27 Jun. 2025].//armaan
recut sw

Last week, French President Emmanuel Macron said that in response to Merz, he has decided to “open the strategic debate on the protection of
The proposal for some form of European nuclear
our allies on the European continent through our [nuclear] deterrence”.
sharing arrangement with France and the United Kingdom to protect against threats from Moscow is not new. Versions of it
have been floated around for decades. But today, resurfacing this proposal is not just a geopolitical miscalculation; it
is a strategic dead end. It reflects a misreading of both the nuclear balance of power and the existential
risks of fragmenting Europe’s security architecture further. Rather than bolstering deterrence, this
gambit risks accelerating the very instability it seeks to avert. Amid the growing unpredictability of United
States-Russia relations under the second Trump administration, Europe must pivot from nuclear escapism to a bold
agenda of diplomatic engagement on nuclear disarmament. The fantasy of European nuclear sharing The proposal for
European nuclear sharing founders on arithmetic and strategic reality. Russia’s nuclear arsenal boasts 5,580 warheads, including hypersonic
Avangard glide vehicles and Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). This dwarfs the combined Anglo-French stockpile of 515
warheads. This asymmetry isn’t merely quantitative; it is also doctrinal. Moscow’s “escalate to de-escalate” strategy represents a calculated
approach to conflict escalation designed to coerce adversaries into concessions. It
is a strategy the British and French nuclear
arsenals, optimised for minimal deterrence, cannot counter. Data on defence spending reveals a deeper flaw:
Europeans do not have the funds or the technological capabilities to carry it out while executing their
ambitious rearmament plans. Germany’s 90.6-billion euro ($98bn) military budget remains crippled by inefficiencies, with only 50
percent of army equipment meeting NATO readiness standards. Meanwhile, France and the UK lack the conventional force multipliers – global
surveillance networks, intelligence capabilities, or even complete nuclear triads – that underpin US extended deterrence. Evenif every
euro cent of the European Union’s recently announced 800 billion-euro ($867 billion) defence boost
were spent on nuclear weapons programmes, cold-starting the sort of production complexes required
for a credible deterrent would still take decades. Attempting to replicate NATO’s nuclear-coalition
model at a European level ignores six decades of integrated command structures and fails to address hybrid
threats now defining modern conflict. What is more, replacing one dependency with another solves nothing.
Proponents claim nuclear sharing offers protection, but the reality is that it can lead to strategic
subjugation. Neither France nor the UK is likely to give up control over its nuclear arsenals and transfer
it to the EU. That means that a nuclear-sharing agreement would reduce Germany and other European
countries participating in the arrangement to Franco-British warhead warehouses with no real agency.
This Potemkin deterrence—all ceremony, no substance—would only further irritate Washington.
Trump has already shown that he has no qualms about abandoning allies if he sees no benefit for the
US strategic interest. His recent moves to stop intelligence sharing and military aid for Ukraine and his conditioning mutual defence on
military spending have exposed NATO’s fraying norms – the alliance is witnessing a collapse of shared purpose. As experts note,
Trump’s “MAGA Carta” foreign policy explicitly rejects strategic altruism. A European nuclear caucus
would signal panic, validating Trump’s transactional world view while undermining NATO’s cohesion.
A European nuclear club would deepen fragmentation, emboldening revisionist actors like Russia and
China while diverting resources from critical gaps in AI advancement, sustainable economic output, and energy resilience that define
21st-century power. The economic argument compounds the folly. Pouring billions of euros from Europe’s finite
resources into redundant warheads while neglecting practical gaps in conventional capability isn’t
statecraft—it’s generational malpractice. The EU’s opportunity lies not in nuclear posturing, but in
revitalising arms control and mediation. The collapse of the US-Russia strategic dialogue since the invasion of Ukraine has left critical arms
control frameworks in disarray. The New START treaty, which limits deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550 each for Russia and the US,
remains the last pillar of bilateral arms control. Its expiration in 2026 without a successor would mark the first time since 1972 that the world’s
nuclear superpowers operate without mutually verified limits—a scenario that could trigger a new nuclear arms race. Herein lies Europe’s
opportunity. Rather
than pursuing a European nuclear umbrella, it could lead efforts to revive nuclear
disarmament dialogue. Austria, an EU member, has already played a key role in nuclear talks between the West and Iran as well as the
2020 US-Russia-China trilateral arms control discussions. This positions it as an ideal venue for restarting negotiations on nuclear risk reduction
issues, especially at a time when Washington is open to renewed dialogue with Moscow. Taking a lead on nuclear disarmament would be the
sort of leadership that would reflect a more mature interpretation of security policy, as opposed to seeking an impossible nuclear deterrence.
Some critics maintain that negotiating with Russia rewards aggression. Yet history shows even bitter adversaries can cooperate on arms control
when interests align. The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which eliminated 2,692 missiles, was finalised after years of
heightened tensions between the USSR and the US in the early 1980s.

Mara Karlin 25 , 6-26-2025, "Beyond the NATO summit, key questions remain for European security," Brookings,
[Link] //EA

the dreaded 2025 NATO summit has now passed: President Donald Trump questioned the validity of Article 5 and
made a public display of a fulsome text message sent to him by Mark Rutte, the NATO secretary general, praising his ability to
convince NATO member states to spend 5% of their GDP on defense.

Obsessed to the point of being blinkered with Trump management and the risk of a blowup of the summit, European leaders
missed an opportunity to come up with a real plan to ensure sustainable support to Ukraine in the mid to long run and build up and
expand their own military capabilities.

They can now focus on these two goals.

The first goal requires financial and material commitments. The European Union (EU) and its member states have
already come up with substantial figures to support Ukraine. Europe now spends more than the United States on both financial
and military support, amounting to almost 150 billion euros (about $175.8 billion) spent since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in
February 2022, including 50.8 billion euros ($59.5 billion) in military assistance. European member states have recently reached
an agreement to spend 1.5 billion euros ($1.76 billion) to fund defense investments. The Council of the European Union has
also set up financial schemes to fund defense projects, including Security Action for Europe, or SAFE, through
which the EU will provide up to 150 billion euros ($175.8 billion) in loans that will be disbursed to member states who request them,
on the basis of their own national plans. These aren’t meant to substitute for national spending but to supplement it.

At the Hague Defense Industries Forum, on the sidelines of the NATO summit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy made a
strong plea for European countries to spend 0.25% of their GDP to support Ukraine, beyond the bilateral security
agreements signed last year. France, the U.K., and Germany must now reiterate these commitments and act on the
defense coproduction agreements they have also signed with Ukraine. To maintain the current momentum, European states
now have a responsibility to ensure they can scale production, align supply chains, reduce fragmentation and
competition, and develop new coproduction and procurement models.

The conditions and timeline of Ukraine’s accession to the EU should also be further clarified, which may likely provoke intense
debate inside the European Union. Some estimates indicate Ukraine’s accession to the EU may cost approximately
$186 billion, and affect farming and cohesion funding allocation. Due to the sensitive nature of this debate, clarifying the timeline
and conditions could help address tensions around this issue.

A crucial aspect of the second goal, strengthening Europe’s military capabilities, is air defense; intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance; and missile defense. Here, Europe remains completely dependent on U.S. capabilities; as it
doubles down on strengthening its defense industrial base, these areas must take priority. One way of achieving this would be for
Europe to increase cooperation with NATO’s partners in Asia, who face similar challenges in their region; this would also allow
Europe to emphasize how much the European and Indo-Pacific theaters remain interconnected.

Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Australia—also known as the “Indo-Pacific 4” or IP-4—which had participated in the last
three NATO summits, did not attend the Hague summit due to tensions with the Trump administration. And Secretary of
Defense Pete Hegseth has explicitly pushed back against deeper engagement between European allies and Indo-Pacific
partners, insisting that Europe needed to focus on its own region, leaving the United States in sole charge of Indo-Pacific security.
But with North Korean soldiers fighting in Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific has burst into the European theater, and Europeans need to
update their Indo-Pacific strategy from 2021, before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, Japan is already deeply
committed to supporting Ukraine, not least because of growing Russia-North Korea ties. Japan has already provided
$12 billion in assistance to Ukraine and just pledged an additional $3.3 billion, stemming from Russian frozen assets.
Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal declared that the “funds will be repaid using proceeds generated from frozen Russian
assets.”

After Pyongyang and Moscow signed a security pact last year, South Korea also indicated that it might consider sending arms to
Ukraine; it remains to be seen whether Seoul will follow up now that the domestic political turmoil there is subsiding. Australia
has provided over $1.5 billion in aid to Ukraine and has just placed sanctions on 60 vessels in Russia’s fleet of shadow oil
tankers. Finally, New Zealand has announced an additional $9 million aid package for Ukraine; it includes both military and
humanitarian assistance.

Europeans should not be concerned that sustaining support for Ukraine, developing military capabilities with higher
defense budgets, and increasing cooperation with Washington’s Asian allies would antagonize the U.S.
administration. On the contrary, it would demonstrate Europe’s ability to take on the burden of its own
defense, and thereby comply with the Trump administration’s reiterated demands. And if the United States
wanted to participate in these schemes, it ought to be invited to do so.
In any case, Europeans must understand that they are now responsible for defending Ukraine as well as themselves. Some in
Europe still seem to be expecting some kind of American reversal: an election that returns the transatlantic alliance to its previous
state, or an epiphany in the current administration. But the Trump administration has already made its intentions clear. It may not
be withdrawing from the alliance, but troop withdrawals remain on the agenda, and European and Asian allies will wait for the
global posture review to be released later this year with trepidation. But there can be no doubt that the United States wants
Europeans to take charge of their security, and that this is in their own interest.

LORNE COOK and GEIR MOULSON. [Link] and [Link]

(2024). NATO chief warns against dividing the US and Europe or undermining their joint nuclear deterrent. [online] AP News.
Available at: [Link] [Accessed 26
Jun. 2025].//armaan

BRUSSELS (AP) — The

head of NATO warned member countries on Thursday against allowing a
wedge to be driven between the United States and Europe, as concern grows about Washington’s
commitment to its allies should Donald Trump return to office. Faced with a war in Ukraine that is draining military and financial
resources, and with a U.S. package of support held up by infighting in Congress, European leaders and senior officials have
warned that Europe must invest more in its armies and new technologies and ramp up weapons production. “I welcome that the
European allies are investing more in defense, and NATO has called for that for many, many years,” NATO
Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg told reporters at the alliance’s Brussels headquarters, where he was chairing a meeting of the
organization’s defense ministers. “But that’s not an alternative to NATO. That is actually a way to strength NATO. And we should
not pursue any path that indicates that we are trying to divide Europe from North
America,” he said. Talk has even surfaced in recent weeks about Europe developing a
nuclear umbrella. France and the United Kingdom – a staunch U.S. ally that sees NATO
as the world’s key security organization – are Europe’s only nuclear powers. France has
traditionally seen itself as a counterweight to U.S. influence in NATO. It does not
participate in NATO’s nuclear planning group. “NATOhas a nuclear deterrent, and this has
worked for decades,” Stoltenberg said. “We should not do anything to undermine that. That will
only create more uncertainty and more room for miscalculation and misunderstanding.”
President Emmanuel Macron insists that France must maintain its independence when it comes to the
possible use of nuclear weapons. He said in December, though, that France has a “very special responsibility” as a
nuclear power in Europe and “stands by” its allies and European partners. Talk of a European nuclear umbrella has come from,
among others, German members of the European Parliament. But Chancellor OIaf Scholz and other top security policy officials
believe there is no alternative to NATO’s nuclear umbrella. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius dismissed the debate about
European nuclear weapons, saying that it’s a “complex discussion” that shouldn’t be embarked on because of remarks from an
aspiring candidate who’s in election campaign mode. On Saturday, former President Trump, the front-runner for the Republican
Party’s nomination this year, said he once warned that he would allow Russia to do whatever it wants to NATO members that are
“delinquent” in devoting 2% of GDP to defense. President Joe Biden branded Trump’s remarks “dangerous” and
“un-American,” seizing on the former president’s comments as they fuel doubt among U.S. partners about its future dependability on
the global stage. Stoltenberg said those comments call into question the credibility of NATO’s collective security commitment —
Article 5 of the organization’s founding treaty, which says that an attack on any member country will be met with a response from all
of them. “The nuclear debate is really the last thing we need at the moment,” Pistorius told reporters in
Brussels on Wednesday. “It is an escalation in the discussion that we don’t need.” German Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck also said
that “this big abstract debate won’t lead to success.” Speaking to Germany’s Welt television, he also voiced skepticism about the
idea of making French nuclear weapons part of a European atomic arms strategy. “The last thing the French want is
European co-management over their army,” he said. NATO’s nuclear deterrence relies in part on U.S.
warheads deployed in Europe using local infrastructure. A number of NATO countries contribute aircraft for use in a nuclear role,
along with trained personnel, but Washington retains ultimate control over the use of these weapons. NATO conducts a major
nuclear exercise every year to ensure its readiness and to act as a deterrent to any would-be aggressor, primarily Russia.
Samuel, O. (2025). [Dr Olamide Samuel is a renowned international security expert and Network Specialist at the Open
Nuclear Network. Previously, he served as Special Envoy of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE), established by
the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Pelindaba.] Europe going nuclear would be a
catastrophic mistake. [online] Al Jazeera. Available at:
[Link] [Accessed 27 Jun.
2025].//armaan recut sw

Last week, French President Emmanuel Macron said that in response to Merz, he has decided to “open the strategic debate on the
protection of our allies on the European continent through our [nuclear] deterrence”. The proposal for some form of
European nuclear sharing arrangement with France and the United Kingdom to protect against threats from
Moscow is not new. Versions of it have been floated around for decades. But today, resurfacing this proposal is
not just a geopolitical miscalculation; it is a strategic dead end. It reflects a misreading of
both the nuclear balance of power and the existential risks of fragmenting Europe’s
security architecture further. Rather than bolstering deterrence,this gambit risks
accelerating the very instability it seeks to avert. Amid the growing unpredictability of United States-Russia
relations under the second Trump administration, Europe must pivot from nuclear escapism to a bold
agenda of diplomatic engagement on nuclear disarmament. The fantasy of European nuclear sharing
The proposal for European nuclear sharing founders on arithmetic and strategic reality. Russia’s nuclear arsenal boasts 5,580
warheads, including hypersonic Avangard glide vehicles and Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). This dwarfs the
combined Anglo-French stockpile of 515 warheads. This asymmetry isn’t merely quantitative; it is also doctrinal. Moscow’s “escalate
to de-escalate” strategy represents a calculated approach to conflict escalation designed to coerce adversaries into concessions. It
is a strategy the British and French nuclear arsenals, optimised for minimal deterrence,
cannot counter. Data on defence spending reveals a deeper flaw: Europeans do not have the funds or
the technological capabilities to carry it out while executing their ambitious rearmament
plans. Germany’s 90.6-billion euro ($98bn) military budget remains crippled by inefficiencies, with only 50 percent of army
equipment meeting NATO readiness standards. Meanwhile, France and the UK lack the conventional force multipliers – global
surveillance networks, intelligence capabilities, or even complete nuclear triads – that underpin US extended deterrence. Even
if
every euro cent of the European Union’s recently announced 800 billion-euro ($867
billion) defence boost were spent on nuclear weapons programmes, cold-starting the
sort of production complexes required for a credible deterrent would still take decades.
Attempting to replicate NATO’s nuclear-coalition model at a European level ignores six
decades of integrated command structures and fails to address hybrid threats now defining modern conflict.
What is more, replacing one dependency with another solves nothing. Proponents claim
nuclear sharing offers protection, but the reality is that it can lead to strategic
subjugation. Neither France nor the UK is likely to give up control over its nuclear
arsenals and transfer it to the EU. That means that a nuclear-sharing agreement would reduce
Germany and other European countries participating in the arrangement to
Franco-British warhead warehouses with no real agency. This Potemkin deterrence—all
ceremony, no substance—would only further irritate Washington. Trump has already
shown that he has no qualms about abandoning allies if he sees no benefit for the US
strategic interest. His recent moves to stop intelligence sharing and military aid for Ukraine and his conditioning mutual
defence on military spending have exposed NATO’s fraying norms – the alliance is witnessing a collapse of shared purpose. As
experts note, Trump’s “MAGA Carta” foreign policy explicitly rejects strategic altruism. A
European nuclear caucus would signal panic, validating Trump’s transactional world
view while undermining NATO’s cohesion. A European nuclear club would deepen
fragmentation, emboldening revisionist actors like Russia and China while diverting resources
from critical gaps in AI advancement, sustainable economic output, and energy resilience that define 21st-century power. The
economic argument compounds the [Link] billions of euros from Europe’s finite resources into
redundant warheads while neglecting practical gaps in conventional capability isn’t
statecraft—it’s generational malpractice. The EU’s opportunity lies not in nuclear
posturing, but in revitalising arms control and mediation. The collapse of the US-Russia strategic dialogue since the invasion
of Ukraine has left critical arms control frameworks in disarray. The New START treaty, which limits deployed strategic nuclear
warheads to 1,550 each for Russia and the US, remains the last pillar of bilateral arms control. Its expiration in 2026 without a
successor would mark the first time since 1972 that the world’s nuclear superpowers operate without mutually verified limits—a
scenario that could trigger a new nuclear arms race. Herein lies Europe’s opportunity. Rather
than pursuing a
European nuclear umbrella, it could lead efforts to revive nuclear disarmament dialogue.
Austria, an EU member, has already played a key role in nuclear talks between the West and Iran as well as the 2020
US-Russia-China trilateral arms control discussions. This positions it as an ideal venue for restarting negotiations on nuclear risk
reduction issues, especially at a time when Washington is open to renewed dialogue with Moscow. Taking a lead on nuclear
disarmament would be the sort of leadership that would reflect a more mature interpretation of security policy, as opposed to
seeking an impossible nuclear deterrence. Some critics maintain that negotiating with Russia rewards aggression. Yet history shows
even bitter adversaries can cooperate on arms control when interests align. The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,
which eliminated 2,692 missiles, was finalised after years of heightened tensions between the USSR and the US in the early 1980s.

Hal Brands 25, 6-24-2025, "Global Alliances NATO Crisis: NATO Has Dodged Collapse Before, But Not Like This," Deccan
Herald, [Link] //EA

The US Still Needs Europe For some NATO skeptics, that outcome wouldn't be so bad: They hope that a US departure might force
Europe to get its act together and become an equal partner in defense of the democratic world. In reality, a
Europe that no
longer enjoys US protection wouldn't be as accommodating of US interests, on issues from dollar
dominance to the security of the Western Pacific. And the reason that US officials never walked away from the alliance, is that
doing so could be disastrous for everyone involved. In the near term, a transatlantic split would
rip the guts out of NATO. It would leave European countries, even ones now arming themselves with
urgency, struggling to project power to the edge of the continent and counter the Russian threat. It would deprive
Europe of the patron whose support produces firmness against autocratic pressure — and whose
leadership helps reconcile divergent interests into a coherent transatlantic agenda. The result, most likely, would be a
weaker, more fractured continent that becomes a source of debility for the democratic world.
Indeed, there's a reason that strategic autonomy — the idea that Europe can do without the US — is taken more seriously in the
sheltered western part of the continent than in Poland, Finland and other countries in the imperiled north and east. The European
defense industrial base is feeble and splintered.
The continent can't quickly replace NATO's American-led
command structures. Nor can the French or British take over America's nuclear responsibilities: They lack the big,
flexible arsenals, the extensive forward troop deployments, and the damage-limitation capabilities that have typically been
required to make extended deterrence work. Asia Firsters in Washington might think European weakness doesn't
matter, so long as the US is strong in the Western Pacific. They ought to think again. Europe and the UK account for about 20 per
cent of world gross domestic product: It's hard to believe that cutting the continent loose will somehow make America more
competitive, economically and technologically, against Beijing. And if the US does turn its back on Europe, it may struggle to remain
a successful global power. Europe still represents America's entry point into Western Eurasia, the supercontinent where so much of
the action happens, and its staging point for Africa and the Middle East — where Trump has now become embroiled in exactly the
sort of war he pledged to avoid. With a European foothold, the US is positioned for influence across several important regions.
Without it, America risks being locked into the Western Hemisphere — on one side, at least — and locked out of the struggle for
wide swaths of the world. Then there's the possibility that a post-American Europe could return — not immediately, but eventually —
to the darker patterns of its past. Peace isn't Europe's natural condition: America's presence transformed a tortured continent.
American absence could rip the crucial safeguards away.
After a US departure, political and economic rivalries
might take on menacing undertones. The illiberalism and hypernationalism of earlier eras, never fully buried, could
force their way to the surface. Border disputes and revisionist grievances might intensify. As arms races
resume and nuclear proliferation becomes more common, a conflict-prone Europe could again
export instability and violence to the world. In this scenario, Trump wouldn't have to formally withdraw from NATO. He
would make the alliance a dead letter by destroying its strategic cohesion and trust. Trump may not be
the sole source of NATO's crisis, but he certainly has the power to make it fatal. Fortunately, there's a more constructive scenario,
which isn't out of the question yet. In this scenario, Trump eventually shuts up about annexing Greenland and Canada; he settles for
greater cooperation on Arctic security and his missile shield, Golden Dome, instead. A trade truce soothes the US-EU relationship.
An administration consumed by Middle Eastern crises comes to see the value of the military access and diplomatic support the
European allies provide
Lack of cohesion cascades into vulnerabilities.
Rachel Ellehuus 21, deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., 7/21/2021, “NATO Futures: Three
Trajectories,” [Link]
Trajectory 3 (Negative): Dissolution of NATO

OVERVIEW

NATO becomes defunct due to death by a thousand cuts. The gradual erosion of the cohesion, political
will, credibility, military capability, and relevance of the alliance described in our baseline scenario is
accelerated by several factors. These include an economic downturn, increasing nationalism and
protectionism, the absence of U.S. leadership, divergent interests, and threat perceptions, and a
disregard for common values and interests. Defense budgets in the United States and Europe decrease,
and countries prioritize national defense needs over multilateral solutions. These tensions lead to open
conflict among several Allies, including Greece and Turkey who regularly challenge one another over
their respective activities and rights in the Eastern Mediterranean. They hold hostage NATO defense
plans, training and exercises, and missions. Still, other allies appear willing to do China’s bidding, for
example, by limiting access to key ports and railways. Finally, adversarial actors calculate that NATO
lacks the political resolve and military capability to fulfill its core tasks, testing this with several
incidents. These include a cyberattack that takes out the electric grid in several NATO countries; while
there is intelligence that Russia is behind the attack, not all allies deem it credible, and NATO fails to
respond. In another incident, Russia claims that temporarily breaching Lithuania’s territorial integrity is
necessary to defend Belarus. Though disturbed, most allies overlook the incident to avoid escalation;
NATO fails to invoke Article 5, and a subset of allies respond in Lithuania’s defense outside the alliance’s
framework.

Cyberattacks cause extinction.

Klare ’23 [Michael; February 2023; Senior Visiting Fellow at the Arms Control Association, “Assessing
the Dangers: Emerging Military Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability”,
[Link]
ecut VR
The first and possibly most dangerous path to escalation would arise from the early use of
cyberweapons in a great-power crisis to paralyze the vital command, control, and communications (C3)
capabilities of an adversary, many of which serve both nuclear and conventional forces. Given the heavy
reliance placed by senior officers on reliable and extensive C3 systems to track enemy actions and
oversee countermoves by their own forces, the incapacitation of these networks through cyberattacks at
the very onset of battle would, presumably, convey an enormous advantage to the attacking side. In the
“fog of war” that would naturally ensue from cyberattacks of this sort, the recipient of such an assault
might anticipate more punishing follow-up kinetic attacks, possibly including a preemptive strike on its
nuclear deterrent capabilities. Fearing the possible loss of those capabilities, the nation under assault
might place its nuclear weapons on high alert and, in the worst case, launch them in response to
ambiguous signs of attack. This might occur, for example, in a confrontation between NATO and Russian
forces in eastern Europe or between U.S. and Chinese forces in the Asia-Pacific region.
Speaking, for example, of a possible confrontation in Europe, James N. Miller Jr. and Richard Fontaine of
the Center for a New American Security wrote that “both sides would have overwhelming incentives to
go early with offensive cyber and counter-space capabilities to negate the other side’s military
capabilities or advantages.” If those early attacks succeeded, “it could result in [a] huge military and
coercive advantage for the attacker.” This scenario might induce the recipient of such attacks to back
down, affording its rival a major victory at very low cost. Alternatively, however, the recipient might view
the attacks on its critical C3 infrastructure as the prelude to a full-scale attack aimed at neutralizing its
nuclear capabilities, and so choose to strike first. “It is worth considering,” Miller and Fontaine
concluded, “how even a very limited attack or incident could set both sides on a slippery slope to rapid
escalation.” 123

What makes the insertion of latent malware in an adversary’s NC3 systems so dangerous is that it may
not even need to be activated to increase the risk of nuclear escalation: simply by their presence, they
could sow doubts in the minds of adversary leaders regarding the reliability of their NC3 systems. “The
introduction of a flaw or malicious code into nuclear weapons through the supply chain that
compromises the effectiveness of those weapons could lead to a lack of confidence in the nuclear
deterrent,” thereby undermining strategic stability, Page O. Stoutland and Samantha Pitts-Kiefer wrote in
a 2018 paper for the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Without confidence in the reliability of its nuclear
weapons infrastructure, a nuclear-armed state might misinterpret confusing signals from its
early-warning systems and, fearing the worst, launch its own nuclear weapons rather than lose them to
an enemy’s first strike.124

Compounding these dangers, in the view of many analysts, is the widespread integration of nuclear C3
with conventional command, control, and communications systems. For reasons of convenience and
economy, the major powers have chosen to rely on the same early-warning and communications links to
serve both their nuclear and conventional forces—a phenomenon described by James Acton of CEIP as
“entanglement.” In the event of a great-power conflict, one side or the other might employ its
cyberweapons to confuse or disable its adversary’s conventional C3 in the opening stages of a
nonnuclear assault; but the recipient of such attacks, not knowing whether it is conventional or nuclear
systems that are the intended targets, might fear it is the latter and so prepare for immediate nuclear
operations, again risking early weapons use.125

Yet another pathway to escalation might arise from a cascading series of cyberstrikes and counterstrikes
against vital national infrastructure, rather than on military targets. All major powers, along with Iran
and North Korea, have developed and deployed cyberweapons designed to disrupt and destroy major
elements of an adversary’s key economic systems, such as power grids, financial systems, and
transportation networks. Russia, for example, is believed to have infiltrated the U.S. electrical grid, and
it is widely assumed that the United States has done the same in Russia.126

The danger here is that economic attacks of this sort, if undertaken during a period of tension and crisis,
could lead to an escalating series of tit-for-tat attacks against ever more vital elements of an adversary’s
critical infrastructure, producing widespread harm and eventually leading one side or the other to
initiate kinetic attacks on critical military targets, possibly initiating a spiral of escalation ending in
nuclear conflict. For example, a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. power grid could trigger U.S. attacks on
Russian energy and financial systems, causing widespread disorder in both countries and generating an
impulse for even more devastating attacks. At some point, Miller and Fontaine argue, such attacks “could
lead to major conflict and possibly nuclear war.”127

NPT Break:

Lee 25 [Lee, S. (06/11/2025). The NPT’s role in nuclear nonproliferation.

[Link]
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a landmark international agreement
aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and promoting disarmament. Since its entry into force
in 1970, the NPT has played a crucial role in maintaining international peace and security. In this article, we
will examine the NPT's role in preventing nuclear proliferation and promoting disarmament, including its successes and challenges
The NPT's Successes The NPT has achieved significant successes in preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons and promoting disarmament. Some of the key successes include: The NPT has prevented the
spread of nuclear weapons to many countries. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the number
of countries with nuclear weapons has remained relatively stable since the treaty's entry into force 1. The treaty has promoted
the peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology. The NPT allows states parties to develop and use
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, subject to IAEA safeguards 2. The NPT has contributed to a significant reduction in
nuclear arsenals. The treaty has facilitated the reduction of nuclear warheads and the dismantling of nuclear delivery systems 3.

Sauter-24 (Philipp Sauter, Research Fellow at the Max-Planck-Institute for Comparative Public Law and
International Law in Heidelberg, Germany, 2-19-2024, "European Nuclear Weapons", Verfassungsblog,
[Link]
France’s capacity to share its nuclear weapons is limited by the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT). According to its Article I, France is not allowed to transfer nuclear weapons with any recipient.
The using of the word “recipient” includes not only states but also supranational organizations such as
the EU. The signatories of the NPT are also not allowed to transfer the control of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states (i.e. every
state that is not the US, the UK, France, Russia or China). Nuclear sharing is allowed to a certain limit. Currently, the US has nuclear sharing
agreements with Germany, Turkey, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy. The US military stations a certain number of nuclear weapons in the
respective host country, while the host country provides the required deployment technology, mainly fighter jets that are capable of
transporting and dropping nuclear weapons. In this scheme, the final control remains within the US chain of command. Given the fact that
nuclear sharing agreements preceded the NPT, NATO countries interpret the NPT in a way that the deployment of weapons in non-nuclear
weapon states is compatible with Article I, as long as the final say remains within a nuclear weapon state. This interpretation, however, is the
object of constant criticism by both non-nuclear weapon states (e.g. Mexico) and also nuclear weapon states (China).However, such a
sharing of French nuclear weapons would – in any case – be excluded with state parties to the 2017
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Within the EU, Ireland, Austria, and Malta are
parties to this treaty. Under Article I of the TPNW, any support towards nuclear weapons is prohibited. Member states must not allow
the stationing of nuclear weapons in their territories. Furthermore, the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons, as
well as assisting, encouraging or inducing such behaviour, is also forbidden. There is no scenario where
Ireland, Austria or Malta could share nuclear with France without violating their obligations from the
TPNW. While withdrawal from the treaty is possible, this requires “that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have
jeopardized the supreme interests of its country” and only takes effect after one year according to Article 17. Similarly, those states could not
vote for a financial contribution by the EU for the French nuclear weapons program. While these three countries do not constitute a blocking
minority under Article 16(4) TEU, budgetary questions within the Multiannual Financial Framework require a unanimous decision by the Council
pursuant to Article 312(2) TFEU.

Doreen Horschig, 3-4-2025, "Can France and the United Kingdom Replace the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella?,"
No Publication,
[Link] //EA

The impact of a shift in Europe’s nuclear posture on the nonproliferation architecture will depend on the nature of the
change. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which prohibits new countries from developing nuclear weapons and is
the foundation of the global nuclear order, does not explicitly address NATO nuclear sharing, but the practice remains a point of debate. NATO
members argue that nuclear sharing does not violate the NPT because the weapons remain under U.S. control in peacetime. They also contend
that the practice was established before the treaty’s entry into force in 1970 and was explicitly taken into account and acknowledged during
negotiations. In an extreme scenario, such
as stationing French or British nuclear weapons in Germany, the
limits of the NPT would be stretched. While Germany would not receive direct control over the warheads, critics would
argue that such a move violates the treaty—in spirit or even its articles more explicitly. Indeed, it

would constitute a new nuclear sharing arrangement that was not provided for in the NPT
and it could even be at odds with France and the United Kingdom’s obligations regarding
disarmament if this new configuration required increasing the size of their nuclear arsenals. Russia recently tested these boundaries by
deploying nuclear weapons to Belarus, sparking debate over the implications for the treaty.

Chevreuil & Horschig-25 (Astrid Chevreuil and Doreen Horschig, 3-4-2025, "Can France and the United
Kingdom Replace the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella?", CSIS,
[Link]
In an extreme scenario, such as stationing French or British nuclear weapons in Germany, the limits of the NPT would be stretched.
While Germany would not receive direct control over the warheads, critics would argue that such a
move violates the treaty—in spirit or even its articles more explicitly. Indeed, it would constitute a new
nuclear sharing arrangement that was not provided for in the NPT and it could even be at odds with
France and the United Kingdom’s obligations regarding disarmament if this new configuration required
increasing the size of their nuclear arsenals. Russia recently tested these boundaries by deploying nuclear weapons to Belarus,
sparking debate over the implications for the treaty. Less drastic shifts, such as stationing French nuclear-armed
aircraft in Germany or other European allies who would express their interest, might not directly
challenge the nonproliferation regime but would likely feed criticisms, particularly amongst nonnuclear
weapon States in the Global South, where double standards in the West’s approach to nuclear issues
are prevalent. Moreover, with Russia openly defying international law and China criticizing U.S. nuclear extended deterrence in the
Indo-Pacific, any change in Europe’s nuclear posture could augment strategic risks in an already tense geopolitical environment. Such a move
Other regional powers might see it as justification for strengthening their
could trigger additional ripple effects.
own extended deterrence arrangements—or even pursuing independent nuclear arsenals. Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky has openly suggested that Ukraine could seek nuclear weapons if NATO membership remains out of reach.
Officials in Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Japan have made similar conditional statements about
potential nuclear proliferation. Keeping allies from obtaining nuclear weapons has also long been a U.S. policy objective of extended
deterrence.
Blanc 16 (Emmanuelle Blanc, doctoral candidate in the Department of International Relations at the London School
of Economics. “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime at a Crossroads Part II Whither the International Nuclear
Order?” Institute for National Security Studies.
[Link]
Nuclear_Nonproliferation_Regime_at_a_Crossroads/links/5a4b6d610f7e9ba868b0b4de/The-Nuclear-Nonproliferat
[Link])

The NPT is at a crossroads, facing multiple challenges of different kinds: new threats are appearing and voices of
discontent are on the rise. Indeed, the nonproliferation regime overall is experiencing a serious period of turbulence,
perhaps a profound if not irremediable crisis. Taking this broader perspective, one should ask, what is actually happening to the very edifice
of the nonproliferation regime, with the NPT as its cornerstone? Are the regime’s foundations cracking? Or are these only insignificant
fissures in the exterior facade? Put differently, what are the causes and the nature of the current crisis? This article seeks to characterize the
nuclear order according to the three main mechanisms of state compliance with rules mandated by the international order: coercion,
self-interest, and legitimacy. The strength of these mechanisms, which ensure the stability of the international nuclear order, will be compared
through an examination of two periods: during the Cold War at the time of the ratification of the NPT, and today. This attempt to analyze the
nuclear order through a depiction of its supporting elements suggests that the three main mechanisms of compliance have been relatively
weakened over the years, which explains the current loss of order. Nevertheless, what we are witnessing today is more a “crisis of
efficiency,” i.e., problems that are not adequately managed, than a profound crisis of legitimacy – leaving some hope for improvement in the future. Theoretical Background: The Components of a Stable International (Nuclear) Order In the fundamental and often
anarchical environment in which international relations unfold, a certain degree of order is necessary to ensure stability and a pursuit of basic common goals. Broadly defined, order refers to a certain configuration of the relationship among states that is based primarily on the distribution
of power. However, institutions, in the form of regimes, constitute an additional important element shaping any international order: by enacting clear rules and norms of behavior, regimes help determine what is allowed and what is not permitted in a specific policy area. A specific

international order will be defined as stable if most of the states behave in a way that maintains and preserves it; that is, if they act according to its prescriptions. In other words, the stability of the international order will
depend on the degree of compliance of the states comprising the international system. Several “ordering mechanisms” of the international systems have been identified

in international relations literature. Drawing on Max Weber, Ian Hurd presents three ideal types of mechanisms of social control that are at work in all social settings, including international society: coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy.1 Coercion The first mechanism of compliance relies on coercion and relates directly to realist approaches in international relations theory, whereby
states abide by rules because they are motivated by the fear of punishment from a stronger power. This mechanism, based on power asymmetries among actors, puts the emphasis on threats and actual use of force in generating compliance, at the expense of attention to either the normative content of rules or more complicated calculations of self-interest by actors. Most of the
time, coercion does not provoke voluntary compliance and instead generates resentment. As a result, few social complexes are solely based on coercion, and when they are, they tend not to persist over time.2 Without enforcement, states that can and wish to cheat will do so. This mechanism is reminiscent of the notion of “coercive leadership” and the presence of a hegemon willing
and capable of imposing by force its preferences upon the others.3Self-Interest Another motivation for compliance with rules (or way to explain the stability of a given order) is the belief that compliance promotes one’s own self-interest. This view suggests that actors follow rules as a result of an instrumental and calculated assessment of the net benefits of compliance versus
noncompliance. The task of the governing agent – or the aim of the proposed order – becomes to structure incentives such that community members find compliance the most rationally attractive option. In this perspective, “social interaction is modelled as an exchange and social obligations as contracts: actors’ decisions are calculated to maximise returns, and organizations are
pillars of accumulated principal-agent contract relationships.”4 In such a society where compliance is achieved through self-interested actors, loyalty to its rules is contingent on the system providing a positive stream of benefits. Actors are constantly assessing and recalculating the expected payoff for remaining in the system, and stand ready to abandon it immediately should some
alternative promise greater utility.5 As a result, such a system will remain stable only as long as the payoff structure is in equilibrium. In this framework, the system corresponds mainly to an instrumental attitude toward other actors and rules. Since states do not value the existence of the rules themselves, if interests change, states will depart from the rules.6 According to this
perspective, the international order is maintained because most of the states perceive the system of rules as serving their own interests. The system provides them with sufficient incentives that affect their cost/ benefit assessment in the direction of upholding the order. A parallel could be drawn here again with the notion of “benevolent leadership,” whereby a hegemon bears
disproportionate cost in providing collective public goods.7 Legitimacy The third mechanism for maintaining order corresponds to the concept of legitimacy, understood as the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed. Legitimacy contributes to compliance by providing an internal reason for an actor to follow a rule. When an actor believes a rule (or an
order) is legitimate, compliance is no longer motivated by the simple fear of retribution or by a calculation of self-interest, but rather by an internal sense of moral obligation. Actors accept and support the rules because they perceive them “as desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs anddefinitions.”8 In contrast to the
previous cases, the actor takes for granted the existing structure of relations and institutions and will seek to improve its position within the established system rather than constantly reassessing the cost and benefit of compliance. A few comments are in order regarding the notion of legitimacy. First, two components (or dimensions) of legitimacy are commonly distinguished.
Substantive legitimacy applies to the outcome, content, and product of deliberations, while procedural legitimacy pertains to the process by which agreement was reached. Outcomes and processes are regarded as legitimate if the states involved believe they are right and correct or just and fair.9 This article proposes another way of tackling the notion of legitimacy, by differentiating
between the raison d’être (the ultimate goal) of a regime and its structure (or institutional arrangements) in the context of nonproliferation. Second, legitimacy may translate into different degrees of internalization. At one end of the spectrum, legitimacy involves the complete internalization of the rules of the regime as desirable in their own right. Such a perception profoundly affects
behavior because the rule’s content is internalized by actors and it helps them recalibrate their interests according to the rule.10 Indeed, the internalization of the rule entails a new definition of interests. At the other end of the spectrum, one can find a more superficial form of legitimacy, whereby what is considered as “proper and appropriate” is not always considered “desirable.”11
The ramification of this distinction is that “if an action, a regime or an order is merely appropriate (and not desirable), an actor will tolerate it, but will look for opportunities to reverse it through the appropriate channels.”12 In short, according to this third account, the maintenance of social order depends on the existence of a set of overarching rules of the game that are to a certain
degree internalized, or considered to be legitimate by most actors.13 An underlining assumption is that as unitary actors, states have the capacity to “feel” the pull of a legitimate rule/order.14 Legitimacy is a subjective quality, existing between actor and institution, and defined by the actor’s perception of the institution. In this regard, focusing on narratives of nonproliferation might
provide some useful insights because they explicitly depict the perception of specific actors toward a particular international order. Methodological Note In the following sections, the presence and influence of each of these mechanisms of compliance, essential to the stability of the international (nuclear) order, will be assessed at two points of time: in the 1970s with the ratification

of the NPT, and today, with the nonproliferation regime in the midst of a severe crisis. The comparison across time highlights the variation in strength of each mechanism. A few methodological remarks are in order. First, although each mechanism

of compliance can be analytically separated from the others, in practice rarely are they found in isolation: every system relies on a varying mixture of all three.15 Thus in comparing these two different periods of time, the goal is to estimate roughly whether one mechanism has been more dominant than the others, i.e., to determine the relative importance of each of these factors of
stability. A second methodological challenge is how one determines why a particular rule is followed by actors, i.e., how we can know whether compliance is due to a sense of its legitimacy, fear of repercussions, or coincidence between the rule and the actor’s own self-interest. According to Hurd,16 relying only on the rates of compliance does not provide any indication as to which
mechanism is at play, and he therefore recommends adopting a methodology that goes beyond the simple measurement of compliance and allows grasping the motives for a specific behavior. In this respect, the close examination of the reasons given by policymakers to justify a state’s compliance as well as noncompliance might be particularly insightful. Acknowledging the
importance of discourses, this article focuses on narratives of nonproliferation. The Cold War Period: Stability of the “Nuclear Order” A global nuclear order was founded in the 1960s and 1970s and culminated with the ratification of the NPT. The nuclear nonproliferation regime developed in response to the perceived threat posed by nuclear weapons, and hence its main goal has
been and continues to be to reduce the likelihood of a devastating nuclear war. More precisely, the NPT embodies a “grand bargain” and rests on three pillars: (a) the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons to states not already possessing them by January 1, 1967; (b) promotion of the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and (c) the ultimate elimination of all nuclear
weapons. The challenge was, and still is today, to find the appropriate way to institutionalize restraint and to address thepresence of nuclear weapons in the international arena in a manner that upholds “the existing structure of obligations’’ and that can “translate the transformation of this order into acceptance.’’17 Coercion The international nuclear order enjoyed a fair degree of
stability during the Cold War because of the bipolar configuration that allowed the two great powers to impose their preferences upon others. Indeed, recognizing the destructive power inherent in nuclear capabilities, the two superpowers constituted a united front as they shared the basic understanding that nuclear proliferation was a destabilizing factor, and therefore strove to
prevent this development. This represented a shift in the superpowers’ beliefs: before the creation of the NPT, each superpower saw tactical advantage in some clients’ possession of nuclear weapons, and hence was willing to assist their road toward acquisition of these weapons. After the mid-1960s, the superpowers began to perceive the significant geostrategic risks and political
costs associated with the proliferation of other states. Because of their convergence of interest in limiting proliferation, they could pressure their respective clients to join the NPT, and if it was necessary, even use coercive measures to halt any proliferation attempt.18 A few studies point to the fact that many states joined the NPT because of the persuasive powers of the US and the
USSR.19 Clearly, the two superpowers took the responsibility to manage the risks of the nuclear order they had created, which also entailed the informal duty to punish states that would not abide by the agreed upon rules. Self-Interest Drawing on the second mechanism of compliance, one can argue that the international nuclear order was particularly stable during the Cold War
because it provided attractive incentives for self-interested states to comply with the rules. According to this theory, the majority of the states decided to join the NPT and respect their commitments out of purely instrumental considerations. Even though the three pillars of the NPT were not of high interest for all states, they agreed to accept them because they came to the
conclusion that the nonproliferation treaty and the nonproliferation regime as a whole would best serve their basic interest, namely the reduction of the risks posed by nuclear weapons.20 In addition, if nuclear protection was offered in a credible way, many states would not only benefit from greatersecurity within their own regions, but also gain economically in terms of transaction
costs since the nuclear umbrella would constitute a cheaper option than producing one’s own nuclear devices.21 In the same vein, many researchers argue that the regime merely monitors and ratifies what state interests would have ensured in any case. Joining the NPT had no connection to states’ motivations to acquire or refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. Most of the
members of the NPT lacked the technical and financial capacity to obtain nuclear arms,22 so joining the NPT was to them completely beneficial – a kind of win-win situation, emanating from the collective security system put in place. Their security would be assured by the nuclear weapon states (NWS), and they would preserve their right to develop nuclear materials for peaceful use,
enjoying the benefits of cooperation in this field – without making any real sacrifice. Another line of thought points to a malicious form of adherence to the NPT behind which lies the long term intention to exploit the regime’s loopholes, and eventually develop nuclear weapons.23 This position corresponds to the self-interested pursuit of national security advantages devoid of any
nonproliferation ideals. Legitimacy Profound questions of legitimacy had to be addressed before an effective nuclear order could be instituted. Why would certain states, and only those states, have rights to defend themselves with nuclear weapons and the potential to inflict final destruction? Should any state and any political leader be entrusted with those rights? How could
possession of nuclear weapons by the few be squared with the egalitarian principles enshrined in the UN Charter?24 The difficulty in gaining legitimacy for the nuclear international order was reflected in the refusal of many important states, including China and France, to initially join the NPT, and India’s refusal to join while subsequently becoming a nuclear state outside the
regime.25 However, there was a broad consensus among states that the final goal of the regime – namely, the end of nuclear proliferation and complete disarmament – was desirable and right for its own sake. Even though criticism was voiced as to the procedural legitimacy of the NPT and its discriminatory nature, its essential legitimacy has never been called into question. In
addition, the fact that the NPT rested upon mutual obligation and reciprocity enhanced the legitimacy of the regime significantly: the disarmament pillar dilutedthe discriminatory effects of the nonproliferation pillar and created the expectation that the special rights of the nuclear weapon states would end at some point in the future.26 In return for their renunciation of the right to
develop nuclear weapons, three solemn pledges were made by the nuclear weapon states parties to compensate for the sacrifice of the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS): (a) they would help the NNWS parties acquire nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes; (b) they would not use nuclear weapons to attack or coerce states that renounced them, unless those states attacked
them in alliance with other nuclear powers; and (c) they would work to bring the nuclear arms race to an end and pursue complete nuclear disarmament.27 In sum, the nuclear order legitimacy rested heavily upon the notion that the possession of nuclear weapons by the five acknowledged powers was a temporary trust, and a trust that could be extended to no other nation states.

The political settlement that underpinned the nuclear order implied that only one of its pillars – the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons – possessed true and lasting legitimacy.28 The Current Crisis: Loss of Order, not Complete Disorder Over the
years, the NPT became the “center and the foundation of an interlocking network of international agreements and organizations.” Among the
successes that are commonly attributed to the regime are the institutionalization of the nuclear taboo, the near universal adherence to the
treaty, and the very limited number of states that went nuclear after 1968.29 Since the end of the Cold War, however, an unstable
world has emerged, characterized by an uncertain security environment. In many aspects, the world is fundamentally
different from that in which the NPT-based nuclear nonproliferation regime first appeared. Today’s evolving threat
landscape is much more complex, with blatant cases of non-compliance, growing access to sensitive materials and
technologies, concerns about the activities of nonstate actors, and tensions between reemerging commercial interest in the civil nuclear
fuel cycle and nonproliferation aims. These are all challenges that throw the nuclear nonproliferation regime into
disarray. Against this backdrop, the following sections analyze the three main mechanisms of compliance in this new empirical setting, in order to highlight the main differences. Coercion: Shift in the Geostrategic
Environment Compared to the Cold War years, coercion as a mechanism of compliance seems to have been weakened for several reasons. First, the dramatic change in the distribution of global power has created uncertainty and
instability at the international level. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, with the demise of the Soviet Union, the US was left alone to manage the international order. Even though some researchers have argued in favor of
the “unipolar moment” in terms of stability,30 others emphasize rather the fact that America’s actions in the 1990s and particularly during the Bush administration have called into question the entire nonproliferation order that the
US itself so painstakingly constructed.31 The vehemence of America’s reactions was driven in part by the realization of the vulnerability of American power to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

the US still perceives itself as the custodian of the international nuclear system. Yet
Today, nonproliferation (rather than counter-proliferation) is again on the agenda, and

deep uncertainties over US capacities to deliver protection and enforcement remain. Faced with blatant violations of NPT and
IAEA safeguard commitments by determined proliferators, such as Iran and North Korea, the US has taken coercive measures (including heavy
sanctions and the threat of the use of force), but it has not yet succeeded in efficiently putting an end to this major proliferation
challenge – raising serious concerns as to the effectiveness of the present nuclear order whose centerpiece is the NPT. This
weakness does not go unnoticed by other states, and as a result the perception of a faltering hegemon makes the
fear of punishment by coercion less credible, and hence less relevant. Moreover, today it is widely acknowledged that the world is
entering a new phase with emerging global powers, which give the international order a multipolar character and a more complex nature. In this
new configuration, the simple fact that Russia and China do not hesitate to subordinate nonproliferation matters to economic considerations,32
reflects a weak commitment to the previous international nuclear order, and this inevitably gives some leeway to other states in the system:
they do have alternatives and do not feel the threat of coercion as acutely as before because the great powers no longer constitute a united
front. Self-Interest: A Growing Gap Another factor of instability is that the nonproliferation regime is increasingly
perceived as failing to provide tangible gains for states. Indeed, many states have expressed their general discontent with the
current international nuclear order because they feel that the NPT regime no longer meets their interests. In this regard, the
challenge of non-compliance posed by states that deliberately, overtly, and repeatedly abuse nonproliferation norms is of prime importance
since this undermines the first pillar of the NPT (i.e., the commitment to nonproliferation). The very violation of the rules of the game in the first
place, coupled with the inability of the regime to enforce them, broadly threatens international peace and security. More particularly, it
greatly enhances the sense of danger felt by states in the immediate environment of the proliferators (in the Middle
East and Asia), making the prospect of a renewed arms race both plausible and worrisome. Moreover, the discontent
regarding the effectiveness of the nonproliferation regime is not restricted to the compliance challenge. Indeed, the two other pillars of the
NPT (the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and access to nuclear energy) are also increasingly perceived as failing to
deliver upon their promises. In this context, consider the main claims embedded in the narratives of the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM) states. The first point of contention revolves around the claim of “security erosion”: the majority of states that have abided by their
nonproliferation obligations have seen their security eroded as new states have acquired nuclear weapons while the Cold War powers have
continued to refine and modernize their arsenals, even as some have cut their stockpile numbers. For example, a Brazilian official who reflected
on the issue expressed a clear and growing sense of frustration.33 According to this official, the lack of results of the NPT RevCons in 2000 and
2005, and the long paralysis of multilateral disarmament initiatives, reinforced the conviction held in many circles in Brazil that the nuclear
powers had not lived up to their pledges to promote meaningful negotiations. More broadly, many Brazilians believe that the policy of the
NWS is to impose more constraints and extract further concessions from the NNWS while failing to accomplish – or
even trying to fulfill – what was expected from them when the NPT bargain was struck. In short, many of the developing
countries feel let down by what they view as the failure of the nuclear weapon states to live up to their side of the
bargain.34An additional claim that is frequently voiced by the NNWS is that the West refuses to give the South the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology, referring to the second pillar of the NPT. Such claims, advanced in part by Iran,35 have resonated more widely. In turn,
this perception entails additional risks for the stability of the regime since self-interested actors are unlikely to further comply if the cost/benefit trade-off is not in their favor. It is not just that the “old nuclear threats” have not been reduced, but new security threats specific to a large
number of states have not been properly tackled either. An additional claim voiced by the NAM states is that traditional nonproliferation and arms control approaches fail to address their specific security problems, and that the nonproliferation regime does not ensure them any public
good anymore. Indeed, the threats to which many of the NAM states are confronted today do not rank high on the security agenda of the Western powers36 and consequently the security concerns of developing states are sidelined. Notable among the issues of concern that are relatively
new to the arms control and nonproliferation agenda are the small arms and light weapons (SALW) and the Cluster Munitions Ban. An underlying claim is that the norms of arms control mainly reflect the Western strategic culture, thereby explaining why non-Western states are not
necessarily benefiting from it.37 However, this discontent does not mean that states are constantly recalculating the costs and benefits of any course of action as far as nonproliferation issues are concerned. They continue to share the common interest of ending nuclear proliferation and

they will not accept restraint in their pursuit of other vital interests by the
pursuing disarmament – which is at the very core of the regime – but at the same time,

nuclear states. In the words of the Brazilian representative Marcos Azambuja, “Brazil and Latin America will not develop nuclear weapons
and will remain active and constructive partners in the establishment of a world safe from WMD. But Brazil is equally unlikely to give up its goal
of being a key player in the important nuclear fuel market. In fact, Brazil joined the NPT with the explicit understanding that nuclear activities
allowed under the treaty would be pursued. Many in Brazil assume that sooner or later, Brazil will emerge as a major power and that nothing
should be done that limits or jeopardizes its expectations or hinders its access to that status.’’38 The absence of ongoing reminders of
the benefits that accrue by being a member of the NPT constitutes strong evidence against the propositionthat
states maintain the nuclear order solely for reasons of self-interest. This point leads us to the third mechanism of compliance, namely legitimacy. Legitimacy Broadly speaking, one can say
that today the international nuclear order is still considered legitimate by the majority of states. The near universality of the NPT is often referred to as testimony to the fact that its guiding principles have been embraced by almost all states, and that they are still valid today. Fueling this
argument, one can highlight that the norms of nonproliferation have largely been integrated within states’ security debates. Yet a more nuanced picture emerges when one breaks down the different aspects of legitimacy mentioned above, and ponders the true degree of internalization
that the nonproliferation regime enjoys today. Considering “legitimacy” in broad terms, the close examination of Iran’s nuclear narrative actually provides strong evidence of the legitimacy that the nonproliferation regime has gained over time. Indeed, even Iran, which is a clear challenger
of this nuclear order, understands this fact and strategically adopts the discourse of the NPT to better pursue its interest. As George Perkovich pointed out, whatever the aims of its nuclear program, Iran is determined to convince the international community that it is acting within the
framework of existing laws and rules. Iranian leaders have undoubtedly broken many nuclear rules. But by denying any wrongdoing or claiming to have a different understanding of the rules, they show the importance they ascribe to being perceived as within the law. More precisely, from
2003 onward, following the discovery of Iranian nonproliferation rule violations, the challenge for the Iranian leadership was to persuade the rest of the world to forget its earlier violations and allow it to move forward under existing rules. After 2005, Ahmadinjehad reflected this strategy
in declaring that Iran will exercise without interruption of its “rights’’ to all nuclear technologies and activities under IAEA safeguards.39 The government insisted on being righteous and just.40 Since then, Iran has accelerated its uranium enrichment program and appears to be well on the
way to developing an independent fuel cycle and missile technologies, all the while claiming that its nuclear program is solely for energy and other “peaceful purposes’’ consistent with Article IV of the NPT. The bottom line is that even while breaking the rules, Iran has felt the need to

justify its actions as being within the limits of what is permitted. This clearly reflects the understanding that the NPTand its rules have become the norm – although in this specific case, Iran is blatantly undermining the regime. Likewise, the nuclear narratives of the other NAMs,
which are truly committed to nonproliferation, are replete with references to their “inalienable right” to nuclear energy41 stipulated by the NPT, and most of all, to the “obligations” of the NWS that are not being upheld. This means that they have clearly internalized the rules of the
 have in parallel become increasingly frustrated, and now demand the complete fulfillment of the pledges that
nonproliferation regime, but

were previously made. Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Algerian diplomat and signatory of the Global Zero declaration, summarized the NAM position as follows: “For us in the Non-Aligned Movement, the NPT was a historic bargain whereby the nuclear club
members would progressively get rid of their nuclear arsenals, while the rest of us committed to not acquiring nuclear weapons. For all these years, alarmingly, there was no nuclear disarmament and far too much proliferation. Powerful voices are at long last rising from all corners of the
world to revive and work for such an objective.’’42 Brahimi refers here to the Global Zero movement that calls for the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons by 2030. In order to reach this goal, the NAMs go a step further and attempt to reframe their demand for nuclear
disarmament with references to the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, international law, and international humanitarian law.43 By the same token, they attack core concepts of traditional arms control. For instance, they insist that nuclear deterrence is a
dangerous misguided belief system. By doing so, they try to delegitimize the possession of nuclear weapons by any state. They put greater emphasis on accelerating nuclear disarmament because it is perceived as fundamental to the sustainability of nonproliferation.44 Even the recent
debate on “Global Zero’’ in the US, triggered by former influential US officials, makes the argument in favor of nuclear abolition a legitimate item on the Western security agenda. In any case, the NNWS change of discourse does not intend to call into question the entire nonproliferation

order, whose final goal of nonproliferation and complete disarmament remains highly desired. Rather, it reflects the NAM and NNWS [non-nuclear weapon states] discontent over the institutional
arrangements that have not delivered their promises over time. Therefore it is the time factor that is crucial in the loss of legitimacy of this specific aspect of the
nonproliferation regime. From the very beginning, as an organization dedicated to promotingthe needs of the developing world, the NAM states
have traditionally devoted their energy to ensuring that the inequalities of the international political order are addressed. Yet today, time has
passed and the compromise on which the NPT is based is not satisfying anymore. The inequitable deal is rendered less
and less acceptable to the rest of the international community. As a result, the claims of discrimination and double
standards resonate more widely. The discrimination between the “haves” and the “have nots” in the nuclear realm
has always been a major factor reducing the legitimacy of the treaty, and today, after a few decades, it is becoming
more acute. This type of discrimination is all the more unbearable for the “have nots,” as it cannot be justified as promoting another
important principle, as, for example, the exceptions from Most Favored Nation requirements for developing countries in the WTO. They are the
result of power differentials rather than principle.45 In other words, not enough progress has been made regarding the
disarmament pillar that was supposed to dilute the discriminatory effects of the nonproliferation pillar and strengthen the
legitimacy of the regime. The expectation that the special rights of the nuclear weapon states would end at some
point in the future has not been fulfilled and it provoked a crisis.46 Lastly, the above-mentioned perception that the West
refuses to give the South the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology (the third pillar of the NPT) might further weaken the legitimacy of the
regime. In sum, it can be argued that we are not witnessing the disappearance of the normative value of the treaty and the associated regime.
The norms of nonproliferation and disarmament have been institutionalized and the international community realizes that the nuclear
proliferation threat is an issue of international peace and security and not merely a parochial US interest.47 But the experience with the current
institutional arrangement has been disappointing and is viewed by many states as lacking ongoing credibility. Conclusion: From a
Crisis ofEfficiency to a Crisis ofLegitimacy? The period-based comparison of the three main mechanisms of compliance – coercion, self-interest,
and legitimacy – ensuring the stability of the international nuclear order reveals that each of them has weakened. The new
distribution of global power has made coercion less threatening, the NPT regime is increasingly perceived as failing to meet
state interests particularly in light of serious non-compliance cases, and the high expectations regardingdisarmament that enhanced the
legitimacy of the regime have not been satisfied. For the time being, it seems that the nonproliferation regime is undergoing a “crisis of
efficiency,” but not yet a profound crisis of legitimacy. In fact, even though the structure of incentives on which the regime lies has become less
attractive, the majority of states still perceive nonproliferation and complete disarmament as a desirable goal that should be resolutely pursued.
The final document of the 2000 NPT RevCon can be read as a consensual declaration that the NPT is the only nuclear order in which the bulk of
the nations believe, and in which they were ready to invest. Thus, according to William Walker, although the current order needs to be
strengthened and reformed, the understandings and practices embedded in it should not and cannot be replaced. The only alternative
is a highly conflict-based and destructive “disorder.”48 The key problem to be tackled now concerns mainly the difficulty of
managing the defiant behavior of some determined proliferators, as well as the discriminatory nature of the NPT that has become less
acceptable over time. As the regime is still considered to be legitimate, its total collapse is unlikely, but what may well occur is a
gradual decline, if nothing is done to make the regime more efficient and to compensate for the growing legitimacy
gap. To tackle the crisis of efficiency, efforts must be made in order to triumph over the states challenging the nonproliferation rules and
further discourage the cost-effectiveness of going nuclear for self-interested actors. Indeed, the blatant violations of nonproliferation norms and
the difficulty to cope with them constitute a serious blow to the present nuclear order – which partly fails to deliver on its promises, namely,
providing enhanced international security. As to the legitimacy problem, if the current situation persists, the claims of double
standards formulated by proliferators and others will most likely continue, thereby further undermining the
nonproliferation regime. In fact, the issue of double standards has been advanced in explaining why the NAMs occasionally downplay the
significance of third party noncompliance crises,49 making the maintenance of the order more difficult to ensure. Another empirical illustration
of the detrimental effects that the lack of legitimacy has on the enforcement of the regime could be the case of Brazil, that has displayed serious
reluctance to take more intrusive steps (signing of the Additional Protocol) if no meaningful concessions from the NWS were made.50 These
examples bring additional evidence that there is a strong need to take into account the emerging narratives of nonproliferation, to find
ways of reconciling contending agendas, and to engage seriously in disarmament. Doing so will be critical to managing
this “loss of order” and to avoid the dreaded complete “nuclear disorder.”
Politics:
Goury-Laffont 25 [Victor Goury-Laffont, "French PM Bayrou gets temporary lifeline from far right",
06/25/2025, POLITICO,
[Link]
en-chenu/] //sw
National Rally won’t bring down France’s government — for now.
PARIS — Marine Le Pen’s

Party officials confirmed Wednesday that the French far-right party would not back a motion of

no-confidence against Prime Minister François Bayrou’s minority government, which is expected to be
voted on in the coming days. However, National Rally lawmakers stressed that the centrist prime minister’s days in
office were numbered.
“The time for censure will come in the fall, during budget season,” National Rally Vice-President Sébastien Chenu said in an interview with France Inter. “His time will come.”
The French Socialist Party announced Tuesday that it would seek to bring down Bayrou after talks over pension reform collapsed earlier this week. The center-left party refrained from voting
against the government during four months of negotiations between trade unions and industry representatives over how to improve the unpopular 2023 law which raised the minimum
retirement age for most workers. The Socialists requested that the pensions debate be reopened in parliament after the talks fell apart, which Bayrou refused.
Other left-wing groups announced that they would join the effort to topple the government, but to pass it also needs votes from the far right.

“If we censure François Bayrou in the coming days, the [2023] pensions reform will stay in place,” Chenu explained.

He said that the National Rally would instead try to leverage its position to extract concessions from Bayrou on France’s energy or migration policy when parliament debates next year’s budget
this fall.

The National Rally opted for a similar approach with Bayrou’s predecessor, Michel Barnier, securing a series of policy wins during budget negotiations, though it still decided to eventually pull
the plug on his government over planned tax hikes.

Without the tacit support of the Socialists, Bayrou’s survival now hinges in large part on the National Rally’s next
moves.

Hartmann, T. (2024). [Théophane Hartmann has been a Tech Reporter for Euractiv since May 2023. Working from Brussels, he writes
stories over EU tech policies, including on digital infrastructure, connectivity and other digital topics. He previously worked as an IT Strategy
consultant. He earned a Master's degree in EU politics and policies from the College of Europe and a Master's degree in Consulting and Growth
Strategies at Toulouse Business School.] Macron is under fire for proposing an ‘open debate’ on nuclear deterrence. [online] Euractiv. Available
at: [Link] [Accessed 27
Jun. 2025].//armaan
‌
French politicians slammed President Emmanuel Macron for proposing an open debate on a common European
defence and defending the continent with nuclear weapons. In an interview published by Ebra group media on
Saturday, Macron suggested opening a debate on the idea that France could defend Europe with its nuclear warheads. France can use its
nuclear weapon “when its vital interests are threatened [and] I already said that there is a European dimension to these vital interests,” he said.
Macron then called for "opening the debate" on nuclear weapons "for those who possess them or have US nuclear weapons on their soil". "To
go down this road is not being pro-European, because in fact, [Macron’s proposal] makes no sense," reacted centre-right
candidate for the EU elections François-Xavier Bellamy (Les Républicains, EPP) on Sunday in an interview. According to him, EU countries are
already benefiting from French nuclear deterrence, while Macron’s suggestion to “pool [nuclear] deterrence in its practice” is “of exceptional
gravity” as it touches the very heart of French [Link]-right figurehead Marine Le Pen (Rassemblement National, ID) reacted on X,
commenting that Macron’s agenda was “to dispossess the French people of everything they have built.” In March, Le Pen suggested that
as President, she would not bow to the “EU’s greed” over the French nuclear arsenal and would suggest “that nuclear deterrence be
enshrined in the Constitution as an inalienable element of [French] sovereignty.” Fellow Rassemblement
National MEP Thierry Mariani also commented on X, saying Macron was “becoming a national threat” and
shared fears that after nuclear weapons, France might as well “sell off cheaply” to the EU its
permanent seat at the security council at the United Nations. On the left side of the political
spectrum, Bastien Lachaud, MP and defence specialist of La France Insoumise (LFI, The Left), wrote on X that “nuclear
deterrence is not for sharing.” The National Assembly section of the LFI party then shared their official position,
stating that “there is no need to go further than the solidarity commitments already contained in the EU
treaties.” At the opposite end, the lead EU candidate for the Greens, Marie Toussaint (Ecologists, Greens), who is in favour of a “European
federal lead,” said on France 3 that she favours “sharing the power of French weapons, including nuclear [weapons] as well.”

Cruz 25 [Julian Cruz, "Navigating the Storm: French Bonds and Equities in an Era of Political Uncertainty",
06/24/2025, No Publication,
[Link]
utm_source=[Link]] //sw

France's political landscape has become a minefield of instability, with Prime Minister François Bayrou's
minority coalition clinging to power amid relentless opposition. As the government teeters on the brink of collapse,

investors must confront a stark reality: political gridlock threatens to derail fiscal credibility, delay critical reforms,
and amplify volatility in both bonds and equities. For now, the stakes are clear—underweight French sovereign bonds and prioritize defensive equities while hedging against
rising uncertainty.

The Fragile Coalition and Fiscal Crossroads

Bayrou's government, formed after the collapse of Édouard Philippe's administration, has survived only through tenuous alliances. With 212 seats in a 577-member National Assembly, the
coalition depends on abstentions from Socialist and far-right National Rally (RN) lawmakers to avoid no-confidence votes. This precarious balance has already triggered a downgrade of France's
credit rating by Moody's, citing “political instability and fiscal slippage.”

The immediate risk? A potential government collapse could delay or scrap austerity measures, including €50 billion in tax hikes and spending cuts
aimed at reducing the deficit to 5.4% of GDP—a target now under threat. Without these reforms, France's deficit could remain above 6%, inviting

further rating downgrades and soaring borrowing costs.

Bonds: Bracing for Higher Yields

French government bonds (OATs) face a perfect storm. Investors are already pricing in risk: yields on 10-year OATs have surged by 50 basis points since December 2024 amid speculation over

collapse would likely accelerate this trend, as:​

Bayrou's tenure. A government

1. Fiscal credibility erodes: Without a stable administration to pass austerity measures, France's deficit
reduction timeline becomes a mirage, pushing yields higher.​
2. Credit rating downgrades: A repeat of Moody's actions could trigger a sell-off, with France's debt now
at 110% of GDP—a level that amplifies market sensitivity to political shocks.​
3. Eurozone contagion: A French fiscal crisis risks spillover effects, pressuring bonds across the
eurozone.

Turkey:
Gumrukcu 25 (Tuvan Gumrukcu is a Diplomacy & Defense Correspondent at Reuters in Turkey)
Reuters, 03/13/2025, “Turkey could be a vital partner as Europe, Ukraine seek new security
framework” [Link] (Accessed 07/07/2025)
//jjoy
Turkey has emerged as a key potential partner in restructuring European security, diplomats and analysts say, as Europe scrambles to bolster its
defence and find guarantees for Ukraine under any forthcoming ceasefire deal urged by the United States.

European countries have been unsettled by U.S. President Donald Trump's plan to end the Ukraine war, which has upended Washington's policy,
halted Russia's isolation with possibility of rapprochement, piled pressure on Kyiv after disastrous talks with Ukraine President Volodymyr
Zelenskiy and endangered transatlantic ties.

Analysts say Europeans'

push to maintain Ukraine's military capabilities and agree security guarantees, while
boosting its own defence without Washington, has created a rare opportunity for Turkey to deepen ties
with Europe despite lingering disputes over the rule of law, maritime issues with Greece and Cyprus, and Ankara's long
stalled European Union membership bid.

"European countries that thought they had the luxury of excluding Turkey until today are now seeing that they cannot exclude
Turkey anymore" said Sinan Ulgen, a former Turkish diplomat and director of the Centre for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies
(EDAM).

Speaking after talks with Erdogan in Ankara on Wednesday, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said he brought a "clear proposal for Turkey to
take on the greatest possible co-responsibility" for peace in Ukraine and regional stability.

A senior European diplomat said Turkey had "very important views" on what is needed for peace in Ukraine.

Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan had managed to balance his relationship between Zelenskiy and Russian President Vladimir Putin during the
war, the diplomat said, "so it makes sense to have him on board."

NATO member Turkey has the alliance's second largest army. It has begun producing its own jets, tanks, and naval carriers in recent years, and
sells armed drones globally, including to Ukraine. Its defence industry exports totalled $7.1 billion in 2024.

In a blizzard of talks and decisions since Trump's return in January, several European nations discussed forming a "coalition of the willing" to help
Ukraine. France has offered to consider extending its nuclear umbrella to allies.

Erdogan and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan have said Europe must include Turkey in the restructure of its security
architecture in a "sustainable and deterrent" way.
A Turkish official, who requested anonymity, said there were no clear plans yet on a new European security architecture or Turkey's possible
contributions to it, but certain steps could advance cooperation.

"Instead of including Turkey in projects in an 'a la carte' way, it would be more logical (for Europe) to seek partnerships in a more holistic way.
For example, they can start by including Turkey in the European Peace Facility programme," the official told Reuters, referring to an EU initiative
supporting Ukraine.

Yanarocak 25 (Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak is a research fellow at ICGS and serves as a
Turkey expert and editor of the monthly “Turkeyscope Insights on Turkish Affairs” at the Moshe
Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University. In 2015, he won the Dan David Fellowship in the “Past”
category.) Israel Center for Grand Strategy, 03/21/2025, “Israel - Eyes on Ankara: Turkey’s
Dependence on Europe” [Link] (Accessed:
07/07/2025) //jjoy
A Heavy Historical Burden with Russia

Looking at the bigger picture, it becomes clear that these developments contradict Turkish interests. With the Americans and Russians conducting key diplomatic
moves in Saudi Arabia and Europeans gathering to determine NATO’s future, Ankara is acutely aware of the threats to its position more than ever. As Ankara loses its
role as a mediator while witnessing NATO’s gradual decline, Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan himself admitted, “The genie is out of the bottle.”

Europe is openly discussing NATO’s uncertain future. As a long-standing member, Turkey is part of this conversation. Since the London summit, Erdoğan and his
foreign minister have consistently repeated the same message on every possible platform: “Without Turkey, Europe’s security cannot be achieved.”

despite being a NATO member, Ankara is not part of the European Union. This has
It is important to remember that

led to serious concerns among Turks that the EU might establish a new unified army or an exclusive alliance
open only to EU members. In other words, Turkey could find itself without any protective umbrella against
Russia for the first time since the Cold War.

Despite Erdoğan’s efforts to cultivate closer ties with Russia over the past two decades, Turkey’s collective memory, shaped by historical baggage, cannot ignore its
past defeats at the hands of the Russians. This mindset drove Turkey to do everything possible to join the Western bloc at the start of the Cold War. Back in 1950,
even without being asked, Ankara actively participated in the Korean War and sent troops to the peninsula to prove its loyalty to the U.S. and the Western alliance.
Consequently, in 1952, Turkey was admitted to NATO and received the alliance’s protective umbrella against Soviet threats, which included demands for military
bases in the Turkish Straits and control over two northeastern Turkish provinces. In hindsight, Turkey benefited from its NATO membership, as Western deterrence
worked, and Russia ultimately abandoned its demands from Ankara.

Today, despite extensive cooperation between Ankara and Moscow in various fields—including Russian gas exports via Turkey, the construction of Turkey’s first
nuclear reactor under Moscow’s sponsorship, and mutual tourism and trade ties—Ankara remains deeply concerned about being left exposed, without any security
umbrella against Russia. Thus, despite the political rhetoric in Turkey emphasizing its supposed independence from the West and its ability to pursue its foreign
policy—thanks to successes in local military industry production—the real question remains: does Turkey genuinely want to stand alone?

Threatening to Become “Europe’s Headache”

Statements and reality do not always align. According to senior Turkish officials, Ankara is doing everything possible to become part of the emerging European
military alliance. At this stage, the Turks leverage the momentum to push for EU membership by highlighting their military advantages. In other words, after failing to
integrate into Europe based on shared values, Ankara is now attempting to enter through the back door using its military capabilities and strategic geographical
position.

It remains uncertain whether NATO will dissolve, as Minister Fidan hinted, or if the Europeans will establish a “NATO 2.0” without
the U.S. or a unified European army that excludes Turkey. One thing is clear: Turkey has already declared that if the Europeans choose to exclude it
from the new military alliance they are forming, it intends to become the continent’s latest headache.

During a Ramadan iftar dinner for Turkish ambassadors on March 4, President Erdoğan praised the stability and cooperation between Turkey
and Greece in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, stating that Europe’s security is unimaginable without Turkey. A closer reading of this
statement reveals a direct threat to Europe, particularly to Greece: if Turkey finds itself outside the new European military alliance, the cooperation that Erdoğan

boasts about— including in Cyprus—could end.

Such a scenario could push Turkey to take confrontational steps against Europe and escalate tensions in Cyprus, where Turkey is still considered—at least on
paper—an occupying force on European soil. Turkey invaded northern Cyprus in 1974, and the Republic of Cyprus became an EU member in 2004. While the Turkish
occupation predates Cyprus’ EU membership, the situation remains a severe violation of European sovereignty. If Turkey were to escalate the crisis, it would be
interesting to see how long Brussels could remain silent without taking tangible measures against Ankara.

The Turkish Restraint Has Already Been Lifted

Given these dynamics, European nations—keen to avoid allocating additional resources to another geopolitical challenge—might choose to integrate Turkey into a
new military alliance outside the EU framework. If so, it will be crucial for Europe to establish clear red lines for Turkey and any country that might act as a Trojan
horse within the alliance. One of NATO’s most significant weaknesses today is the lack of a mechanism to expel member states. In the event of a new military
alliance, European nations must develop an effective system to deal with rogue actors if necessary.
Over the past decade, Turkey has repeatedly caused headaches for the EU. At the height of the war in Ukraine and even before, Ankara blackmailed NATO by
opposing the accession of new member states—Eastern European countries, Sweden, and Finland. While it eventually backed down, it successfully delayed critical
processes for the alliance. Furthermore, by acquiring Russian S-400 missile systems, Turkey became the only NATO member subjected to U.S. military sanctions
typically reserved for American adversaries.

If that wasn’t enough, Ankara recently sacrificed NATO’s vital interests in favor of its pro-Hamas foreign policy by blocking Israel’s participation in a NATO military
exercise. This is particularly ironic given that Turkey benefited from Israeli humanitarian aid in the form of an IDF Home Front Command rescue team following the
devastating earthquake on February 6, 2023. Yet today, Ankara is preventing cooperation between NATO and Israel in an exercise focused on “resilience and
emergency preparedness.” This exercise enhances crisis management, cybersecurity, infrastructure protection, and civil-military coordination collaboration.

Conclusion

Turkey now finds itself in an increasingly precarious position regarding its role as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine and its status within NATO. Following the
U.S.-Russia talks in Riyadh rather than Ankara, Turkey’s strategic standing appears to be eroding, and Ankara fears being left out of a new European military alliance.
Consequently, Turkey is unlikely to surrender quickly and will fight for its place on Europe’s geopolitical chessboard.

To secure military backing from Europe, Ankara—aware that it cannot join the EU based on shared values—is instead attempting to entice the bloc with its military
if Turkey is excluded from the new military alliance, there is a real risk that it will take hostile actions
advantages. Accordingly,

against Europe. In such a scenario, Greece and Cyprus could pay the price, and unsurprisingly, such escalation would also
bolster the importance of the Israeli-Hellenic alliance and security ties with the EU.

In this context, like Cyprus and Greece, Israel must also prepare for a new Turkey—as a member of a future European military alliance—and recognize that, in such a
case, unlike today, Erdoğan will no longer be subject to external restraint. It is also essential to acknowledge a harsh reality: given Turkey’s activities in Iraq, Syria,
Cyprus, Libya, Qatar, Somalia, and the Sahel region of Central Africa, it seems that Ankara is already operating without restraint. It would be wise to start preparing
for a future where this situation only worsens.

Lantier 20 (Alex Lantier is a reporter at WSWS and specializes on EU policy. September 2, 2020
“Greek-Turkish standoff escalates war danger in eastern Mediterranean,”
[Link]

The escalating confrontation in the eastern Mediterranean between Turkey and Greece has reached a new and dangerous
stage. Top officials of NATO member states are openly threatening to wage war against one another in conflicts that could set the

Mediterranean and the world ablaze. Last Thursday, Turkish F-16 jets blocked Greek F-16s off Crete from overflying disputed zones of the
eastern Mediterranean where Turkey is drilling for oil and gas. In July, Greek and Turkish naval flotillas steamed directly towards each other, avoiding a clash only at
the last minute when Berlin intervened, calling Ankara and ordering the Turkish ships to change course. Tensions escalated in August, when France dispatched two
warships and Rafale jets to back Greece. The European Union (EU) foreign ministers meeting on Friday in Berlin marked a further shift to a more aggressive stance,
backing Greece against Turkey. After the meeting, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borell said: “We are clear and determined in defending European Union interests and
solidarity with Greece and Cyprus. Turkey has to refrain from unilateral actions.” Borell indicated the EU could adopt economic sanctions to strangle the Turkish
economy later this month. While thanking “the efforts deployed by Germany in this attempt to look for solutions through dialogue between Turkey and Greece and
Cyprus,” he expressed the EU’s “growing frustration” with Turkey and proposed sanctions against Turkish officials. He added that broader “restrictive measures could
be discussed at the European Council on 24-25 September.” In follow-up questions, Borell explained that the EU could target industries “in which the Turkish
Macron issued an extraordinary threat,
economy is more interrelated with the European economy.” The same day, President Emmanuel

comparing French deployments in Greece to the “red line” policy that saw France, Britain and the United States bomb Syria. This 2018 bombing, based
on fraudulent allegations that the Syrian regime had used chemical weapons, led Moscow to accelerate its build-up of Syrian air defences. Macron said his policy is
based on the view that aggressive military action is the only way forward. “When it comes to Mediterranean sovereignty, I must be consistent in deeds and word,” he
said. “I can tell you that the Turks only consider and respect that. If you say words that are not followed by acts ... What France did this summer was important: it’s a
red line policy. I did it in Syria.” Turkish officials responded this weekend by warning that the Greek policy backed by the EU could provoke war. They cited Greek
Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ threats to expand Greece’s exclusive economic zone from six to 12 miles—including around Greek islands directly off the coast of
Turkey—and reports that Greece is strengthening its ground forces on these islands. “This would be grounds for war, a casus belli,” declared Turkish
Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, while Vice President Fuat Oktay said: “If it is not grounds for war, what is it?” Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said, “Their
aim is to imprison our country, which has the longest coastline in the Mediterranean, into a coastal strip from which you can only catch fish with a rod.” Ankara has
already staked out extensive maritime claims, blocking projected gas pipelines from Israel, via Cyprus and Greece, to Italy and the European mainland. The eastern
Mediterranean conflict is the outcome of decades of imperialist wars, particularly the NATO wars in Libya, Syria and Iraq since 2011. These wars plunged Libya into a
decade-long civil war and triggered a devastating proxy war between NATO-backed militias and the Russian-, Chinese- and Iranian-backed regime in Syria. Now
rivalries over undersea oil and gas have lit the fuse in a region that, as when World War I began in 1914, threatens to erupt into a regional
and global war. Both the Turkish and Greek governments, devastated by a decade of EU austerity, are unpopular and seeking to prop themselves up by
inciting war fever. This policy unfolds, however, amid a swirling morass of global conflicts over markets and strategic advantage, similar to the economic rivalries that
plunged Europe into World War I, that are relentlessly fuelling the Mediterranean stand-off. Geopolitically, the region is not only critical to
 the US and Europe to reassert their positions in the Middle East and Africa after their Syrian defeat, but also to Europe’s energy supply,
efforts by

and China’s attempts to build up trade ties to Europe via the Middle East in its Belt and Road Initiative. It is widely acknowledged that the disintegration
of US imperialism’s former hegemonic position is fuelling the conflict. In an editorial board statement, “There’s a New Game of Thrones in the Mediterranean,” the
New York Times pointed to the far-reaching implications of the collapse of US influence. Stating that “only Germany seems to have the sway to mediate a return to
sanity” in a “new and dangerous crisis,” it added: “In an earlier era, the United States would have stepped in to separate feuding NATO partners, as it did when
Greece and Turkey almost went to war in 1996. President Trump did make a call to Mr. Erdogan urging him to negotiate, but that had no effect—the United States
under the Trump administration is not regarded as a viable go-between...” The Libyan war has, moreover, divided both Middle Eastern and European countries
between backers of the Islamist regime in Tripoli, including Turkey, and those of warlord Khalifa Haftar in eastern Libya along the Egyptian border. In its article “How
Europe is getting entangled in the big Middle East conflict,” the Turkish website Ahval notes: “On the one hand, there is the ‘revolutionary alliance’ of Turkey, Qatar,
the Muslim Brothers, a regional movement, and Iran. On the other hand, we see the ‘status-quo entente’ of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and
Israel. … France, Greece, and Cyprus support the status-quo entente, while Spain and Malta seem more ready to support the revolutionary alliance, while Italy is
jaywalking between the two, depending on the file.” Riven by insoluble conflicts, the EU is apparently trying to unify itself around the most aggressive policy against
Turkey. This weekend, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian invited his German counterpart, Heiko Maas, to address a meeting of French ambassadors held to
prepare France’s EU presidency, which starts in 2022. Le Drian stated that France’s plans “would obviously be formulated to continue and complement the German
presidency.” Maas made clear that the critical question for the EU is to develop an aggressive, independent global policy amid the US war drive against China. “The
United States looks at the rest of the world ever more directly through the lens of its rivalry with China,” he said. “In parallel, since Trump’s election, American
readiness to play the role of a global power ensuring stability has fallen. We also know China is forcibly pressing its way into the geopolitical vacuum this has left
behind, making facts on the ground and using methods that cannot be ours.” On Turkey, Maas added, the EU foreign ministers meeting “made very clear that its
destabilizing policy in Libya and the eastern Mediterranean cannot be further tolerated. European sovereignty protects the sovereignty of all member states,
including Greece and Cyprus.” Those arguing that German or European imperialism will peacefully adjudicate the Mediterranean conflicts are, however, placing
heavy bets against history. Amid growing strikes and protests around the world against imperialist wars and official mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic, the
critical question is the unification of the working class in a socialist, anti-war movement.

Gregory KULACKI 16. Senior Analyst, UCS’ China Project; PhD in Political Theory and IR,
University of Maryland; and a Graduate Certificate in Chinese History and Politics, Fudan
University. “The Risk of Nuclear War with China.” Union of Concerned Scientists. May. 8-9.
[Link]

As long as both sides remain committed to pursuing technical solutions to their unique strategic
problems, they are condemned to continue competing indefinitely. But stalemate is not a stable
outcome; rather, it is a perpetual high-wire act. Twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year, the
governments of the United States and China are a few poor decisions away from starting a war
that could escalate rapidly and end in a nuclear exchange.¶ Lack of mutual trust and a growing
sense that their differences may be irreconcilable incline both governments to continue looking
for military solutions—for new means of coercion that help them feel more secure. Establishing
the trust needed to have confidence in diplomatic resolutions to the disagreements,
animosities, and suspicions that have troubled leaders of the United States and the PRC for
almost 70 years is extremely difficult when both governments take every new effort to up the
technological ante as an act of bad faith.¶ The bilateral dialogues on strategic stability aim to
manage the military competition, but they do not seek to end it. Although the two governments
work very hard at avoiding conflict, they have yet to find a way out of what Graham Allison
called their “Thucydides trap”—the risk of conflict between a rising power and an established
power invested in the status quo (Allison 2015). Allison’s warning not to minimize the risks of
war is sage advice, even if he does not say how the United States and China can escape the trap
he describes.¶ PRC leaders believe it is possible to prosecute a major war without risking a U.S.
nuclear attack. The leaders of the United States believe stopping the PRC from prosecuting such
a war may depend, in certain contingencies, on a credible threat to use nuclear weapons—a
threat U.S. leaders state they are prepared to execute. These mismatched perceptions increase
both the possibility of war and the likelihood it will result in the use of nuclear weapons.
Germany Fragmentation:
[Link]
vide
As a result of strategic cacophony, the EU has, in fact, struggled mightily to create even the most minimal C2 structure. As Luis Simón
underscores, “It has taken nearly 20 years of allegedly signiªcant steps for the European Union to establish a ‘Military Planning and Conduct
Capability’ composed of up to 25 staffers, devoted to assisting with the planning and conduct of so-called non-executive (i.e., training and
assistance) missions,” with an advisory role only.119 Ultimately, given
Europe’s deep-seated divergences, there is no
basis for optimism that Europeans will be able to agree being under the permanent command of
another European country for deterrence and defense or to consistently undertake effective institutionalized military
cooperation without the enabling role played by the United States within NATO.

They continue on to find

Idiosyncratic historical legacies, geography, and distinctive local security environments have
thus profoundly shaped the threat assessments of the three major European powers. To be sure, these
differences existed during the Cold War, too, but they were muted by the overwhelming, common Soviet threat.137 By contrast, in light of the
diversification of the post–Cold War threat environment, if the United States withdrew from the continent, the threat perceptions of
these major powers would be unlikely to converge around Russia.138 In such a scenario, the UK and Germany
would be prone to exhibit heightened threat perceptions vis-à-vis Russia. Given their historical reliance upon NATO as their ultimate security
guarantee, if the United States were to remove its conventional and nuclear forces, the credibility of NATO’s deterrent vis-à-vis Russia would
founder in the eyes of British and German policymakers. As a result, there is every reason to expect they would raise the significance of Russia
and of territorial defense in their defense planning.

They conclude

In sum, in the case of a complete U.S. pullback from the continent, London and Berlin would likely move rightward into the second column from the right in table 1 (Russia is a higher threat, but
other threats are also signiªcant), while France would not shift from its current position. Given their differing threat prioritizations, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France would be very
unlikely to reach agreement on a common position vis-à-vis Russia. Germany and the UK might lean more toward balancing and expand bilateral defense cooperation to that end. However,
unlike countries that view Russia as the dominant threat by far (i.e., the Baltic states and Poland), they would face important trade-offs in their allocation of resources—between territorial defense

and power projection capabilities, between Europe’s eastern and southern periphery, and so on—given that they would continue to grapple with other signiªcant threats. For its part,

because France would likely continue to prioritize threats on Europe’s southern periphery, it
would be unlikely to provide a substantial (if any) contribution to a balancing coalition. In fact, it
might opt for accommodation with Russia to develop a sphere of influence in Western/ Southern
Europe or, potentially, even see some strategic advantages to bandwagoning with Russia

[Link]
If Germany were to officially benefit from French nuclear protection as well, it seems highly
improbable that Paris would not expect quid-pro-quos. In fact, this expectation is all the more likely given that, in
recent years, French policies intended to secure support for endeavors in the South have become very
openly about quid-pro-quos. For example, the presence of French troops in Estonia Within the
framework of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence is often linked with the expectation that Estonia supports
Barkhane with a detachment of 50 soldiers.

they go onto find

If one of two European key players—Germany—were essentially dependent on the other one—France—for its
survival, this would also imply consequences for general Western European security dynamics. The issue may not matter tremen-dously
under present circumstances, where military threats to survival are hardly on the agenda. Yet, as this article has argued so far, should scenarios
strategic incompatibilities
materialize in which survival is effectively at stake, implications may be far-reaching because
between France and Germany would potentially be fully revealed, thus paralyzing
decision-making and joint actions. Pointing To the improbabilities of such scenarios materializing is not a valid argument in this
context: why, then, think about a nuclear deterrent in the first place? One way of seeing Franco-German relations is to describe them as a clash of
superiority complexes. Germany’s view of France is indeed characterized by a well-hidden sense of
German superiority. The Same applies vice-versa. The reason these clashing superiority complexes do not result in open
competition is that these complexes have different sources on opposite sides of the Rhine: the French sense of superiority
stems from the country’s status on the international scene (of which the nuclear bomb is a key
element, the permanent seat on the UN Secur-ity Council another). Germans, in turn, derive their superiority from
economic success. Intimes when survival is not at stake, this clash of superiority complexes may be more of a folkloristic element rather
than a serious problem, but that may change under less benign circumstances. With security in that case coming to the fore,
the balance between Paris and Berlin may be disrupted

[Link]
nion/

In addition to disagreements over strategic vision,the two are at odds over a host of granular issues ranging from
military aid to Ukraine and air defense to battle tanks and weapons exports. Those conflicts won’t end
anytime soon, as they’ll need to agree on whether they want Brussels to play a bigger role on defense. As Paris pushes for joint
borrowing to finance a proper defense industrial ramp-up, Berlin’s approval will be essential to
make it happen.

they go onto find

1. Military aid to Ukraine. This is one where Berlin is poking Paris — to the outrage of France. According to the Kiel Institute’s numbers, Paris
has pledged only about 3 percent of the €17.1 billion in arms promised by Berlin. The French reply that, unlike Germany, they’re delivering
weapons that are “game-changers” on the battlefield, such as long-range Scalp cruise missiles. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, on the other
hand, still refuses to send Taurus cruise missiles to Kyiv. Paris has been cagey about releasing its own numbers, while insisting that the Kiel
Institute is undercounting what it gives.“There is a French policy that is not very well understood in Berlin: The fact of not wanting to publish the
figures,” Nils Schmid, foreign affairs spokesperson for Scholz’s Social Democrats in the Bundestag, told reporters in Paris earlier this month. The
bad blood over the issue was on full display during a late January visit of French lawmakers to the Bundestag, with one of the French
participants describing the closed-door exchanges [over Ukraine] as “acid.”
[Link]
It’s possible that three years of fighting between Russia and Ukraine could end — at least temporarily— in a matter of
weeks. It’s more likely it could continue for months or even years. US and allied intelligence agencies have
concluded Russia is probably not serious about making peace, which means the war would continue. If that happens,
who will supply Ukraine with weapons? Possibly the United States. But after the events of the past few weeks, Ukraine and its
European allies certainly can’t assume American aid will continue.

[Link]
Nuclear proliferation. It is not clear whether Ukraine could have controlled the Soviet nuclear weapons left on its territory when it gained its
independence, and turned them into a deterrent of its own. But in any case, it was persuaded to give them up. In return, in the Budapest
Memorandum of 1994, it got security assurances from Russia, the UK and the US that they would respect its independence, sovereignty and
existing borders. The UK and US did very little to help Ukraine when Russia violated its commitments in 2014, but in 2022 they and the rest of
If Ukraine is defeated, and Western promises prove to be empty, there is a
the West pledged to help Ukraine.
clear message to other countries in vulnerable positions: develop nuclear weapons. The examples of
India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea suggest that it is better to have nuclear weapons and
allies, but if you cannot have both, it is better to have nuclear weapons.