Levels of Processing in Lexical Access
Levels of Processing in Lexical Access
The patterns of semantic errors in speaking and writing are used to constrain
claims about the structure of lexical access mechanisms in speech and written
language production. It is argued that it is not necessary to postulate a
modality-neutral level of lexical representation (lemma) that is intermediate
between lexical-semantic representations and modality-specific lexical
representations. A dual-stage access model is proposed in which the first stage
involves the selection of semantically and syntactically specified,
modality-specific lexical forms, and the second stage involves the selection of
specific phonological (orthographic) content for the selected lexemes.
INTRODUCTION
How are words accessed in language production? Theories of speech produc-
tion are in agreement on two fundamental points: (1) semantic, syntactic, and
lexical form information constitute independent levels of representation, and
(2) these levels of representation are probably accessed sequentially in the
course of language production. The dominant view is that lexical access
involves at least two distinct stages of processing. The first stage involves the
selection of a semantically and syntactically specified lexical representation or
lemma; the second stage involves the selection of its corresponding lexical-
phonological representation or lexeme (e.g. Bock, 1982; Bock & Levelt, 1994;
Burke, MacKay, Worthley, & Wade, 1991; Butterworth, 1989; Dell, 1986; Fay
& Cutler, 1977; Fromkin, 1971; Garrett, 1975, 1980; Harley, 1984; Kempen &
Ó 1997 Psychology Press, an imprint of Erlbaum (UK) Taylor & Francis Ltd
178 CARAMAZZA
1
A similar distinction has been made in the neuropsychological literature in order to explain
the dissociation between disorders of lexical-semantic processing and disorders of lexical form
retrieval. Most models of the lexical system assume a two-stage retrieval process in which the
first stage involves accessing a lexical-semantic representation and the second stage involves
accessing modality-specific lexical forms (e.g. Caramazza & Hillis, 1990; Ellis, 1985; Howard &
Franklin, 1988; Humphreys, Riddoch, & Quinlan, 1988). This view should not be confused with
a superficially similar proposal that distinguishes between cognitive and lexical form systems (e.g.
Allport, 1985; Allport & Funnell, 1981). On the latter view, lexical access only involves one stage:
The retrieval of lexical forms from nonlinguistic conceptual information.
2
Although on a much smaller scale, in recent years there have also been a number of attempts
to articulate the structure and content of lexical-orthographic representations (see, for example,
Badecker, Hillis & Caramazza, 1990; Caramazza & Miceli, 1989, 1990; Jonsdottir, Shallice, &
Wise, 1996; Kay & Hanley, 1994; Link & Caramazza, 1994; McCloskey, Badecker, Goodman-
Schulman, & Aliminosa, 1994).
LEXICAL ACCESS 179
the elements that enter in word and sound exchange errors, such as the examples
shown in Table 1, are subject to different distributional constraints: Word
exchanges tend to involve words of the same grammatical class and occur
between phrases, whereas sound exchanges tend to occur in words of different
grammatical classes within a phrase. Furthermore, sound exchanges but not
word exchanges are usually phonologically similar elements and occur in
similar phonological environments. The fact that word exchanges are con-
strained by grammatical features and not by phonological properties, and the
fact that sound exchanges are constrained by phonological and not semantic or
syntactic properties, has been taken to indicate that separate lexical access
stages are involved in speech production: the first stage retrieves a semantically
and syntactically specified representation; the second stage retrieves a
phonologically specified representation. This conclusion, aside from debates
about whether the two stages are independent or interactive (e.g. Dell &
O’Seaghdha, 1991; Levelt et al., 1991), has remained a constant of all models
of speech production.
Other evidence cited in support of the lemma/lexeme distinction includes
the reaction time data in naming and lexical decision experiments (e.g. Jesche-
niak & Levelt, 1994; Kempen & Huijbers, 1983; Levelt & Maassen, 1981;
Levelt et al., 1991; Schriefers, Meyer, & Levelt, 1990) and the pattern of
hesitation phenomena in normal and aphasic speech (Butterworth, 1979, 1980;
Butterworth & Beatty, 1978). Perhaps the most intuitively appealing evidence
for the lemma/lexeme distinction is the tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) phenome-
non—the feeling of knowing a word that is momentarily inaccessible for
production (R. Brown & McNeill, 1966; Burke et al., 1991; Jones & Langford,
1987; Kohn et al., 1987; Koriat & Lieblich, 1974; Perfect & Hanley, 1992;
Rubin, 1975; and see A.S. Brown, 1991, for review). This phenomenon has
been interpreted as reflecting the failure to retrieve a lexeme in the context of
successful retrieval of its lemma. And, of course, there is the evidence from
aphasia, which shows there are word production disorders that can be attributed
to a deficit in lexical-semantic processing (e.g. Gainotti, 1976; Hillis, Rapp,
Romani, & Caramazza, 1990; Warrington, 1975) and production disorders for
which the deficit can clearly be localised at the level of retrieval of lexical forms
TABLE 1
Examples of Word and Sound Exchange Errors
Word exchange errors: They left and forgot it behind (Garrett, 1988)
I left the briefcase in my cigar (Garrett, 1980)
. . . writing a mother to my letter (Dell & Reich, 1981)
Sound exchange errors: She’ s a real rack pat . . . (Garrett, 1988)
It comes down to a choice of stummer sipends . . . (Garrett, 1980)
. . . lorck yibrary . . . (Dell & Reich, 1981)
LEXICAL ACCESS 181
visual
form
FIG. 1. Part of the lexical system showing the relation between lemma and other levels of lexical
representation: The “Syntactic Mediation” hypothesis (see text). The lemma and lexeme levels show
the Italian words for the lexical concepts TIGER, APPLE, TO GO, and TO DRINK. (Adapted from
Bock & Levelt [1994], Jescheniak & Levelt [1994], and Roelofs [1992].)
Roelofs (1992). Dell (1990, pp. 331–332) draws a similar distinction among
semantic, lemma, and lexeme representations: “The lemma node represents the
lexical item as a syntactic/semantic entity. It corresponds to Dell’s (1986) `word
node’ and is assumed to connect directly to conceptual structure and to syntactic
information. Below that, the lexeme node is a single unit representing the
phonological form of the word. This corresponds roughly to the morpheme
node and/or to the set of syllable nodes in Dell (1986) and MacKay (1982). The
lexeme node connects to phonological segments (. . .).” However, this model
differs from that of Levelt and collaborators on at least two crucial points: (1)
in Dell’s model, word meanings are represented in componential form, and (2)
the stages of lexical processing are not discrete but interactive. Nonetheless,
for present purposes, the two models make a common assumption: There is a
level of representation, lemma, that is distinct from lexical-semantic and from
3
lexical-phonological information .
The modality-neutral lemma hypothesis—a hypothesis shared by Roelof’s
discrete stage model and Dell’s interactive model—predicts that retrieval of
syntactic information is necessary for the successful retrieval of lexemes.
However, reviews of experimental results with normal subjects in tasks requir-
ing access to syntactic and word form information and of the performance of
brain-damaged subjects with selective deficits in word production raise con-
siderable difficulties for this hypothesis. I will argue that there are grounds for
rejecting the hypothesis that a modality-neutral lemma node intervenes between
lexical-semantic representations and word forms. However, I will also argue
that there are equally compelling grounds for the autonomy of syntactic
information from semantic and word form representations. These seemingly
conflicting conclusions will be reconciled in a new model of the processing
structure and organisation of lexical knowledge.
3
Parenthetically, it should be noted that it is not obvious that Dell can maintain both that there
are interactions between semantic and phonological levels, which he needs to explain the results
showing that word substitutions are affected by both semantic and phonological similarity (Dell
& Reich, 1981), and that there is a modality-neutral level of representation, lemma, intervening
between lexical-phonological and semantic representations.
184 CARAMAZZA
orally; KSR (Rapp et al., 1995) was selectively impaired in producing nouns
in speaking, but verbs in writing; and PW (Rapp & Caramazza, 1997) has
difficulties producing closed-class words in writing and open-class words in
speaking. The striking commonality in these cases is the remarkable specificity
of the disorder—the deficit involves words of a specific grammatical class in
only one modality of output (or input).
These selective grammatical class deficits, restricted to either oral or written
production, provide the evidence we need to argue that syntactic knowledge is
represented independently of both lexical-semantic and word form information.
We reason as follows: The fact that the deficit is restricted to one modality of
output implies that the lexical-semantic system is intact; furthermore, given that
the lexical-semantic system is intact and given that the impairment in these
subjects is limited to one grammatical class, jointly imply that the deficit must
concern a syntactic level of representation. Thus, we are led to conclude that
lexical-semantic and syntactic information are represented independently.
Evidence for the autonomy of syntactic from word form information is found
in the performance of anomic subjects who are able to provide information
about the syntactic features of words they are unable to produce. Thus, for
example, Henaff Gonon, Bruckert, and Michel (1989) described a French-
speaking anomic patient who could correctly provide the grammatical gender
(13/14 correct) of the nouns he failed to produce in various naming tasks. A
more systematic investigation of this type of dissociation has recently been
reported by Badecker, Miozzo, and Zanuttini (1995). These investigators
described the performance of an anomic subject, Dante, who despite his
inability to produce the names of objects, or even guess the first or last phoneme
in a two-phoneme, forced-choice task, was virtually always able to recall their
gender correctly. In a more recent investigation of the same subject (Miozzo &
Caramazza, in press b), the dissociation between the retrievability of syntactic
and word form information has been extended to verbs. Dante was shown to
be able to provide correctly the auxiliary form of a verb (be or have) he was
unable to retrieve: He correctly recalled the auxiliary of verbs he could not name
in 99% of the trials, but was exactly at chance level in guessing the initial
phoneme of the word. These results clearly show that a word’s syntactic
features are represented independently of its form, thereby permitting their
independent access. However, they leave unanswered the question of how
syntactic features are activated and how they are related to semantic and
phonological information. Thus, for example, do syntactic features mediate
between semantic and phonological information as proposed by the SM hy-
pothesis? Tentative answers to this question are provided by normal subjects’
ability to retrieve gender and phonological information in TOT states.
In a series of experiments (Caramazza & Miozzo, 1997; Miozzo &
Caramazza, in press a), we addressed the question of whether the availability
of syntactic and phonological information are correlated in TOT states. For this
186 CARAMAZZA
4
This conclusion may be too strong. It is entirely possible that there are fundamental
differences in the way in which different grammatical features of a word are represented and
accessed. Thus, for example, we might want to distinguish between what I will call “intrinsic”
and “extrinsic” grammatical features. The former, intrinsic features, refers to those properties that
are inherently associated with a word (e.g. grammatical class and gender); the latter, extrinsic
features, refers to those grammatical properties that are contextually determined (e.g. number and
tense). And within the set of intrinsic features, we may want to distinguish between the more and
the less arbitrary features: “gender” is a purely arbitrary feature; “noun” is not nearly as arbitrary
given the meaning of the word. It may turn out that the accessibility of the different types of
grammatical features for any one word is not uniform.
LEXICAL ACCESS 187
in naming objects. Facilitation in the gender task was only obtained in Experi-
ment 5b. That is, facilitation in the gender decision task was only obtained when
the preceding trials required subjects to retrieve gender information explicitly;
the mere retrieval of a word’s lexeme (Expt. 5a) did not facilitate access to its
gender information. These results suggest that phonological information can
be accessed “independently” of grammatical information, and may even imply,
contrary to the interpretation preferred by Jescheniak and Levelt, that the
selection of a lemma does not lead “automatically” to the activation of its
associated grammatical features.
There is also indirect evidence from the spontaneous speech of brain-
damaged subjects that is consistent with the claim that lexemes can be accessed
without correct access to their gender features . These subjects make syntactic
agreement errors despite their ability to retrieve the phonological form of
words. For example, the Italian speaker, FS (Miceli & Caramazza, 1988)
produced utterances such as the following: “Poi io ascolto il (masculine
singular) televisione (fem. singular)—then I listen [to] the television”; “ . . .
perché il (masc. sing.) giornate (fem. plural) [sono] lungo (masc. sing.)— . . .
because the days are long.” In this example, FS correctly retrieved the lexemes
televisione and giornate but not the gender information needed to select the
correct article (la and le, respectively) and the proper inflection on the adjective
(lunghe, in this case). These examples suggest the possibility that the retrieval
of lexemes may be spared in the face of damage to grammatical features.
A similar case has been described by Cubelli and Perizzi (1996). They report
a patient who produced utterances such as “Il nonno è seduto sul (masc. sing.)
panchino (neologism)”—the grandfather is seated on the bench—instead of “Il
nonno è seduto sulla (fem. sing.) panchina (fem. sing.)”; and “La palla è sotto
il (masc. sing.) sedio (neologism)”—the ball is under the chair—instead of “La
palla è sotto la (fem. sing.) sedia (fem. sing.).” This case, too, clearly demon-
strates that the phonological representation of a word (albeit deformed) can be
accessed despite access of the wrong syntactic features.
The final example I will consider here concerns a subject who made
article/noun agreement errors involving the mass/count distinction (Semenza,
Mondini, & Cappelletti, 1995). This subject produced utterances such as “Nella
cucina c’è sempre una panna”—In the kitchen there’s always one cream;
instead of “Nella cucina c’è sempre della panna”—In the kitchen there’s
always some cream; and “Una farina nel sacco (. . .) ”—one flour in the bag .
. . ; instead of “La farina nel sacco (. . .) ”—The flour in the bag . . . . These
examples demonstrate that the subject could correctly access the phonological
representation of words despite the occasional failure to access (some of) their
syntactic features.
In short, the agreement errors produced by the three cases briefly reviewed
here suggest that access of a word’s syntactic features is not required in order
to activate its lexeme.
188 CARAMAZZA
INTERIM SUMMARY
5
This conclusion does not entail that the relation between the lemma level and the correspond-
ing P-lexeme and O-lexeme levels must be identical. However, it is more parsimonious to begin
with this assumption.
190 CARAMAZZA
FIG. 2. Schematic representation showing the relation between lemma and lexeme representations.
Panel A shows the phonological mediation hypothesis; panel B shows the orthographic autonomy
hypothesis.
prior access of P-lexemes (see also Hanley & McDonnell, this issue; Shelton
& Weinrich, this issue; and Rapp & Caramazza, 1997, for discussion of other
relevant evidence).
One other type of evidence in support of the orthographic autonomy hy-
pothesis is the observation of different oral and written semantic errors in
response to the same object in double, sequential naming tasks. WMA (Miceli,
Benvegnù, Capasso, & Caramazza, this issue) and PW (Rapp, Benzing, &
Caramazza, this issue) produced semantic errors both in speaking and in
writing. Crucially for present purposes, in double naming tasks they produced
inconsistent lexical responses in oral and written naming of the same pic-
ture—for example, they might produce a correct response in writing followed
by a “don’t know” or a semantic error in oral naming—and they occasionally
produced different semantic errors in oral and written naming. For example, in
response to a picture of tweezers, PW orally named it “pliers,” wrote “needle,”
and then orally named it again “pliers.” Similarly, the Italian subject WMA, in
response to a picture of a cook (cuoco) said “pietanza” (dish) but wrote
“forchette” (forks), and in response to a picture of peppers (peperoni) wrote
“tomato” (pomodoro) but said “carciofo” (artichoke). These patterns of per-
formance undermine the phonological mediation hypothesis of written lan-
guage production, and they suggest instead that lemma representations
independently activate their associated O-lexeme and P-lexeme repre-
sentations. Thus, we can safely proceed to interpret the implications of con-
trasting patterns of P-lexeme and O-lexeme selection errors for models of
lexical access and, more specifically, for theories of the structure of lemma-
level representations.
“drugs” and went on to define the stimulus as “He gives you your prescrip-
tions.” Observations such as these, together with the fact that subjects per-
formed virtually flawlessly in various comprehension tasks, confine the deficit
to output processes. More important for present purposes is the observation that
semantic errors were restricted to one modality of output. This implies that
lemma-level representations were correctly activated. That is, since subjects
could consistently select the correct lexemes in one modality of output itfollows
that their associated lemmas must have been correctly accessed, or it would not
have been possible to produce the correct lexemes in the first place. A further
relevant observation is that their semantic errors occurred in the context of
unimpaired post-lexical processes. Thus, for example, HW only occasionally
produced an articulatory error; RGB spoke fluently and without phonological
or articulatory errors; and SJD only rarely made spelling errors. In all three
cases, their errors consisted of fluently produced semantic substitutions. These
facts rule out a post-lexical deficit as a determinant of the contrasting patterns
of performance in oral and written naming. Thus, the locus of damage in these
subjects is at a point between the correctly selected lemma-level representations
and their modality-specific lexeme representations.
Having confined the possible locus of damage in subjects HW, RGB, and
SJD to a point between the lemma and the lexeme levels of representation, we
are confronted with a puzzle: If the correct lemma has been selected, how can
the inaccessibility of a modality-specific lexeme result in a semantic error? It
is not immediately apparent how models that postulate a “contentless” node
between lexical-semantic and lexeme levels of representation can account for
the occurrence of semantic errors in a single modality of output. That is, it is
not clear what happens when a correctly selected lemma node fails to activate
either its P- or O-lexeme. Since the lemma node has a discrete, one-to-one
relationship to its P- and O-lexemes, the expectation ought to be that failure to
activate one of its modality-specific lexemes would result in the absence of a
response and not in the production of a semantic error. Nonetheless, although
it does not flow naturally from its basic architecture, the lemma-as-abstract-
node hypothesis could be made to account for the modality-specific semantic
errors as follows.
It could be argued that damage to the connections between lemma and
lexemes in one modality leads to the reselection of another lemma because of
spreading activation within the conceptual system. The chain of events might
be as follows: the correctly selected lexical concept activates the correct lemma,
leading to its selection; the correctly selected lemma activates its associated P-
and O-lexemes; if one of these lexemes cannot reach threshold because of
damage within that level of representation, a different lexical-concept node is
selected from among the set of nodes that have become activated by the
spreading activation from the originally selected lexical-concept node; the
newly selected lexical-concept node will activate its associated lemma node,
LEXICAL ACCESS 193
and so on. The way in which the abstract lemma hypothesis can motivate the
reselection of another lemma is by proposing that this process is undertaken
whenever the appropriate lexeme node does not reach threshold.
This account is further strained when we consider the performance of
subjects WMA (Miceli et al., this issue) and PW (Rapp et al., this issue), who
make different oral and written semantic errors in naming the same object. Here
the story would take the following form: The reason a semantic error is made
in one modality is, as previously discussed, because the target lexeme in that
modality could not reach threshold and therefore a new cycle of lexical selection
beginning with a related lexical-concept node would have to be undertaken. To
explain the production of a semantic error in the other modality we would have
to argue that in that modality, too, the target lexeme could not reach threshold
and therefore yet another cycle of lexical selection would have to be undertaken
for production in that modality. What has to be explained, however, is why a
different lexical concept is selected the second time. We know that the reason
for this is not because the process of selection of alternative lexical concepts
from one trial to another is random. This is shown by the fact that consecutive
responses in the same modality always resulted in the same response—it was
only across modalities that different lexical responses were produced to the
same stimulus. Thus, the selection of a different semantically related lexeme
must be due to the failure to select successfully the other modality lexeme of
the previously selected lemma. An example should make this clear. Subject PW
produced the following sequence of responses to a picture of tweezers: “pliers,”
“needle,” and “pliers,” in oral, written, and oral production respectively. To
explain this performance we would have to assume that the P-lexeme repre-
sentation /tweezers/ could not reach threshold and consequently the next
lexical-concept node selected was “pliers.” This cycle could be brought to
completion because the P-lexeme /pliers/ could reach threshold and was
selected. We would then have to argue that in trying to write the name of
tweezers, PW again selected the lexical-concept node correctly and proceeded
as before, only to encounter difficulty in selecting the O-lexeme for tweezers.
At this point we would expect that the same alternative lexical-concept node as
the one selected in the previous trial (pliers) would again be selected (as in
within-modality consecutive trials). But since the subject produced a different
semantic error in writing, we must assume that the O-lexeme for “pliers” could
not reach threshold and therefore a completely new cycle of lexical selection
had to be undertaken. In the new cycle the lexical-concept node “needle” was
selected and this time the cycle could be brought to completion.
The two cases considered here do not constitute knock-down arguments
against the abstract lemma hypothesis. And it might even be argued that it has
been shown that the abstract lemma hypothesis is able to account for the
supposedly recalcitrant results. However, the way in which the model has been
forced to account for the results provides the most compelling argument against
194 CARAMAZZA
the hypothesis. The explanation proposed for the contrasting patterns of seman-
tic errors across modalities of output gives absolutely no role to the abstract
lemma node. Had we completely omitted all mention of this node, we would
have produced a formally equivalent argument. That is, the burden of explana-
tion for the existence of contrasting semantic errors in oral and written naming
was completely carried by the “interaction” between lexical-semantic and
lexeme representations. Thus, once again, we find that the notion of an abstract
lemma node may be quite superfluous.
To this point I have presented various results and arguments against the
lemma-as-abstract-node hypothesis. Singly, each observation or argument may
be insufficient to reject this hypothesis since each observation may be chal-
lenged or alternative interpretations offered. However, the combined weight of
all the evidence is not easily dismissed on one pretext or another, and is
sufficient to raise profound scepticism about the explanatory value of the
hypothesis. This scepticism about the validity of the syntactic mediation
hypothesis of lemma-level representation encourages the consideration of
alternative forms of organisation of the lexical system. One such possible
alternative is considered next.
6
The lexical-syntactic network also receives input from outside the lexical system—from
sentence generation mechanisms. However, these inputs will not be considered here.
LEXICAL ACCESS 195
7
We can think of the effect of the activation propagated from the semantic network to the
syntactic feature network as a form of priming of the target features that will eventually be selected
when additional activation is provided by the lexeme node.
8
The fact that the model assumes that syntactic nodes reach threshold before lexeme-level
representations does not mean that subjects should be able to “report” syntactic information more
rapidly than word form information. Whereas the production of word forms is a natural function
of the lexical system, the metalinguistic task of reporting syntactic features may be quite difficult
and slow.
196 CARAMAZZA
PANEL A
FIG. 3A. Panel A (see also Panel B, Fig. 3B, opposite) presents a schematic representation of the
Independent Network model showing the relation among semantic, syntactic, and lexical form repre-
sentations.
FIG. 3B. Panel B (see also Panel A, Fig. 3A, opposite) shows a more detailed representation of the
model. The O-lexeme network is not shown in this figure to avoid excessiv e crowding. The flow of
information is from semantic to lexeme and syntactic networks and then on to segmental information.
N=noun; V=verb; Adj=adjective; M=masculine; F=feminine; CN=count noun; Ms=mass noun. Dotted
lines indicate weak activation. Links within a network are inhibitory.
(Rapp et al., this issue) in conditions where access to the P- and O-lexeme
networks is impaired.
Finally, in order for the IN model to account for the selective deficits for
words of one grammatical class in only one modality of output, we must make
an additional assumption about the organisation of lexical knowledge in the
brain. We must assume either that syntactic information about different gram-
matical classes is represented in different areas of the brain or that lexeme
representations are organised by grammatical class in different parts of the
9
brain . We could, then, explain the patterns of spared and impaired production
of nouns, verbs, and function words as the result of selective damage to either
one of the spatially segregated networks. Some similar assumption is needed
by all models of lexical production.
It would seem that the IN model can readily and naturally account for the
full pattern of results discussed in this paper. However a problem remains to
be addressed. In the IN model, much of the burden for explaining the observed
patterns of semantic errors in brain-damaged subjects is carried by the assump-
tion that meanings are componential—it is because of the componentiality
assumption that a semantic representation activates multiple lexemes. This
assumption has not gone unchallenged over the years (e.g. Fodor, Garrett,
Walker, & Parkes, 1980). Levelt (1989, 1992) has recently raised a further
objection in the form of what he calls the “hyperonym” problem: Why don’t
people speak in hyperonyms (i.e. produce “animal” instead of “dog,” “furni-
ture” instead of “table,” “artefact” instead of “furniture,” and so on) if meanings
are componential? This is a non-trivial problem that must be addressed by
proponents of componential theories of meaning. Indeed, as Levelt (1992) has
correctly noted, a simple, unadorned componential theory of lexical semantics
is fatally flawed. Here I propose a solution to this problem within a parallel
activation, componential theory of meaning.
9
An implication of the latter assumption is that there are independent lexeme representations
for homonyms such as to play/the play (the position that was taken in Caramazza & Hillis, 1991).
200 CARAMAZZA
specificity.” This principle states that given that the activation conditions for
multiple lexemes are satisfied by the selected lexical-semantic representation,
speakers select the most specific lexeme. Thus, speakers intending to say
“table” will select “table” instead of “furniture”; and speakers intending to say
“furniture” will select “furniture” instead of “artefact.” However, as Levelt
notes, it is not obvious how to implement such a principle in current network
models of language production.
The other solution proposed by Levelt is to give up altogether the assumption
of componentiality and adopt a holistic conception of semantics, where word
meanings are represented by lexical-concept nodes and the set of labelled
connections among the concept nodes (e.g. Collins & Quillian, 1969). On this
view, there is a node in conceptual memory corresponding to every lexical entry
in the language. These nodes are directly connected to their corresponding
lemma representation in a one-to-one fashion (as already discussed). Thus, the
conceptual node DOG would be connected to its lemma “dog,” and the
conceptual node ANIMAL would be connected to its lemma “animal.” This
solution to the hyperonym problem may face other problems, however (see
Bierwisch & Schreuder, 1992, for discussion).
There is another solution possible within the IN model that does not require
the implementation of the “principle of specificity.” The solution is quite
simple, and follows naturally from the assumptions of componentiality and
parallel activation that form part of the basic structure of the IN model. All that
needs to be assumed is that the amount of activation passed onto the next level
by any one “feature” is a weighted proportion of the number of selected
features. So, for example, if the meaning of a word is represented by 10 features,
the amount of activation passed on by each feature is (roughly) 1/10th of the
amount of activation propagated from the lexical-semantic network to the
10
lexeme level . A further assumption is that the amount of activation normally
needed by the activated lexemes to reach threshold is the full unit of activation
propagated from the lexical-semantic network. Consequently, the lexeme most
likely to reach threshold (ignoring other factors such as resting state levels of
different lexemes) will be the one that receives activation from all the selected
semantic features —the only one that receives the full complement of activation
propagated from the lexical-semantic level. The hyperonym lexeme will, by
definition, receive activation from only a fraction of the selected features and
therefore not enough to reach threshold (see example in Fig. 4). On this view,
it is not even necessarily the case that the most active alternative lexeme to the
target lexeme will be the hyperonym; a very similar co-hyponym (e.g. dog,
given that cat has been selected at the lexical-semantic level) could reach a
greater level of activation than the hyperonym (animal).
10
I say roughly because the amount of activation propagated by each feature may also be
weighted by its importance to the meaning of the word.
LEXICAL ACCESS 201
FIG. 4. Example of activation levels reached by various P-lexemes in response to the selection of the
semantic representation CAT.
The proposed solution to the hyperonym problem does not solve the inverse
problem also associated with componential theories of meaning—the “hypo-
nym problem.” If people intend to say “animal,” why don’t they sometimes say
“dog” or “elephant” instead? The solution proposed for the hyperonym problem
could lead to hyperonym errors—producing “dog” instead of “animal”—since
the amount of activation reaching the hyponym (dog) would be the same as that
reaching the intended target (animal). So, why don’t people regularly make
hyponym errors? To solve this problem we must make an additional assump-
tion: The maximum amount of activation contributed by a single link to a node
is a direct function of the number of links that feed into the node. Specifically,
we assume that the maximum activation contributed by any one connecting link
to a lexeme node that has N links feeding into it will be 1/Nth the total activation
202 CARAMAZZA
needed for selection of a lexeme node (or some other arbitrary value just greater
than threshold). In this way, the activation reaching the lexeme “dog” when the
semantic representation ANIMAL has been selected will necessarily be smaller
than the activation reaching the lexeme “animal.”
CONCLUSION
In this paper I have been concerned with whether it is necessary to postulate a
modality-neutral level of lexical representation (lemma) that is intermediate
between lexical-semantic representations and modality-specific lexical repre-
sentations. I have argued that there is no compelling reason for postulating such
a level of representation and that, in fact, its postulation has undesirable
empirical consequences. I have also attempted to articulate a hypothesis about
the relations among lexical-semantic, syntactic, and word form representations
that is compatible with the facts of cognitive neuropsychology, normal speech
errors and experimental evidence with normal subjects.
Two facts, in particular, have been stressed in this criticism of the lemma-
as-abstract-node hypothesis: the existence of brain-damaged subjects with
selective grammatical class deficits restricted to either oral or written produc-
tion, and the existence of subjects who make semantic errors only in speaking
or only in writing. The reason for stressing the importance of these facts is
because the peculiar nature of these dissociations allows us to specify relatively
precisely the locus of functional damage in these subjects. Thus, we can be
confident that the locus of damage in subjects who only make semantic errors
in speaking, say, must directly concern the inaccessibility of P-lexeme repre-
sentations. The reason for this conclusion is simple: As the subject can produce
the target response correctly in the other modality of output—writing, in this
example—we must conclude that the lexical-semantic level of representation
is undamaged. Furthermore, since the errors are well-formed lexical substitu-
tions, we must conclude that lexical-phonological knowledge is also undam-
aged. The only remaining possible locus of damage is at the level of the
connections leading to the activation of lexeme representations. And since a
consequence of this damage is the production of semantic errors, we are invited
to infer that the damaged relation concerns a mapping between meaning and
lexical forms—that is, between lexical-semantic representations and P- and
O-lexeme representations. This conclusion is incompatible with the syntactic
mediation hypothesis of lexeme access proposed by Bock and Levelt (1994),
Dell (1990), Jescheniak and Levelt (1994), and Roelofs (1992).
Another important source of evidence for the organisation of the lexical
system concerns the observation that selective grammatical class deficits, such
as difficulties in producing verbs, can be restricted to either oral or written
production. Here again we can rule out damage to the lexical-semantic level
because the subjects could produce verbs correctly in the unaffected output
LEXICAL ACCESS 203
modality. Furthermore, the fact that the modality-specific deficit was restricted
to only one class of words allows us to exclude a post-lexeme deficit as the
cause of the observed impairment. We are thus invited to draw the following
inferences: lexical-semantic and grammatical information are independent
since we can damage one without affecting the other; and syntactic and word
form information are also independent of each other for the same reason.
The two conclusions reached on the basis of the neuropsychological evi-
dence find further support from research with neurologically intact subjects. It
has been found that access to a word’s lexical-semantic representation does not
guarantee access to its syntactic features, and that access to the word’s
phonological features can occur independently of access to its syntactic features
(at least for gender; Caramazza & Miozzo, 1997; Miozzo & Caramazza, in press
a). Also, in a study involving the analysis of priming effects in object naming
and gender decision tasks (Jescheniak & Levelt, 1994), it has been found that
access of a word’s lexeme facilitated a second retrieval of that lexeme but not
access of its syntactic features. Thus, experimental evidence with normal
subjects converges with that from neuropsychological investigations in show-
ing that access of lexeme representations does not depend on the prior selection
of (all) the grammatical features of a word.
The evidence reviewed here finds a plausible account within a model of
lexical access that shares many features with current theories of the lexical
system but differs from them in some important respects. The central assump-
tions of the Independent Network (IN) hypothesis are:
1. The lexical-semantic, syntactic, and modality-specific form repre-
sentations of a word are independently stored in separate networks.
2. P-lexeme and O-lexeme representations are independently activated by
semantic representations.
3. Lexical-semantics is componential and itactivates in parallel the syntactic
nodes and the P- and O-lexemes, but whereas the former nodes only
receive enough activation to be primed, the lexeme nodes can receive
enough activation for independent selection.
4. The selected lexical-semantic representation activates in parallel all the
lexemes of words that share semantic features with the selected lemma.
5. Activation from selected lexeme converges on the grammatical features
already primed by activation from the lexical-semantic network.
The fact that there is a direct link between the lexical-semantic and the lexeme
levels provides a natural explanation for the occurrence of semantic errors only
in writing or in speaking; the fact that syntactic features are represented
autonomously allows a natural explanation for the occurrence of selective
deficits of grammatical classes in only one modality of output.
There are several empirical and theoretical issues that have not been ad-
dressed here. For example, what is the time course of activation of different
204 CARAMAZZA
levels of representation? And, what are the dynamics (discrete vs. continuous;
strictly forward vs. forward and backward propagation) of activation and
selection of representations at different levels of processing? These issues are
currently the focus of concerted experimental and theoretical analysis (e.g. Dell
& O’Seaghdha, 1991; Levelt et al., 1991). It remains to be seen whether closer
scrutiny of the IN hypothesis in light of these other issues will confirm the
optimistic conclusion reached here.
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Neuropsychological studies support the independence of lexical-semantic and syntactic information processing by demonstrating that deficits in processing these types of information can occur independently. For example, some patients may experience selective grammatical class deficits, such as difficulty producing verbs, in only one modality, indicating damage specific to syntactic processing without affecting lexical-semantic access. Additionally, experimental evidence shows that access to a word’s lexical-semantic representation does not guarantee access to its syntactic features, reinforcing the notion of separate, autonomous processing networks for these aspects of language .
The significance of modality-specific semantic errors in understanding Caramazza's lexical access model lies in their challenge to models that postulate a "contentless" node between lexical-semantic and lexeme levels of representation. These errors highlight the direct connection between lemma and lexeme levels, illustrating that semantic errors can occur when activation fails to reach threshold in one modality, leading to reselection of another lemma through spreading activation. This demonstrates that lexical-semantic information is processed independently from syntactic and modality-specific lexeme representations, supporting the idea that semantic errors can manifest in a single modality without general lexical-semantic impairments .
The IN model's structure supports semantic errors limited to specific output modalities by positing separate, independently activated networks for P-lexeme and O-lexeme representations. Semantic errors occur when activation from a selected lexical-semantic representation fails to reach the threshold required for modality-specific lexeme nodes. In such cases, the parallel activation of semantically related lexemes can lead to incorrect lemma reselection, manifesting as semantic errors in the affected output modality. This model accounts for the mistakes in naming tasks that appear in one modality but not the other, illustrating the independent but interconnected nature of lexical-semantic activation and modality-specific processing .
The IN model is unique because it proposes simultaneous and independent activation of lexical-syntactic and word-form networks by lexical-semantic representations. Unlike earlier models, which might suggest a sequential or dependent activation process, the IN model allows for the parallel processing of syntactic and lexical-form features. Furthermore, it rejects a modality-neutral lemma representation and emphasizes the bidirectional, direct links between lexical-semantic representations and modality-specific representations, supporting the notion that phonological and orthographic content can become available separately from grammatical features due to specific conditions like brain damage .
In Caramazza's hypothesis, the lemma node acts as an abstract intermediary between lexical-semantic representations and modality-specific lexeme representations. If damage leads to the correct lemma failing to activate its associated lexeme in one modality, spreading activation may cause reselection of another lemma associated with an activated lexical concept. This mechanism implies that semantic errors specific to a modality occur not due to a lexeme failing but because of subsequent activation of an incorrect lexeme through misdirected lemma selection. This challenges the notion of a "contentless" lemma node and underscores the dynamic nature of lexical retrieval processes .
The IN model accounts for the independence of syntactic and word-form information by positing that these are stored in separate networks and are activated independently. Lexical-semantic representations activate syntactic nodes only to a primed level, whereas lexeme nodes can receive enough activation for independent selection. This structure allows syntactic features to be activated without necessarily reaching the threshold required for lexeme selection. Consequently, access to a word's lexeme does not depend on prior selection of all grammatical features, supporting evidence from studies where subjects show selective grammatical class deficits in one output modality .
Studies on tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) states challenge the assumption of direct syntactic feature access during lexical retrieval by showing that individuals often retrieve partial phonological information without simultaneously accessing syntactic details like grammatical gender. In TOT states, the phonological form of a word can be partially or fully accessed independently of its syntactic features, suggesting that lexical retrieval involves modular and independent processes. This supports the view that phonological and syntactic aspects of words can be separately activated, highlighting the independence and complexity of lexical processing networks, as suggested by models like IN .
The argument against modality-neutral lemma representation is supported by the observation that modality-specific lexeme activation can occur independently. This implies that semantic errors and other lexeme-related phenomena can independently affect either phonological (P-lexeme) or orthographic (O-lexeme) representations without impacting the other. The independence of these pathways suggests that the lemma level serves as a modality-specific activator, rather than an abstract, unified mediator, allowing for detailed and modular processing of language components .
In Caramazza's model, spreading activation explains semantic errors by suggesting that damage to connections between a lemma and its lexemes in one modality leads to the activation of neighboring lexeme nodes through spreading activation. When a lexeme fails to reach a threshold, spreading activation within the conceptual network may cause the selection of a different lexical-concept node, potentially linked to an incorrect lemma and leading to a semantic error. This process underscores the dynamic, interconnected nature of conceptual activation and highlights how errors can arise from misdirected lemma reselection due to lemma-lexeme disconnection .
The evidence of selective grammatical deficits in oral versus written modalities highlights the modular and independent organization of lexical processing. It suggests that lexical-semantic, syntactic, and modality-specific form representations are independently stored and processed within separate networks. This independence is underscored by cases where subjects show deficits specific to one modality, indicating that oral and written grammatical processing can be selectively impaired without affecting the entire lexical-semantic system. Such findings challenge models that assume interdependence of these processes, emphasizing instead the autonomy and specificity of each component within lexical access .