Influence

Course Introduction

Cade Massey, Practice Professor of Operations, Information and Decisions

Influence
What is Power?

Cade Massey, Practice Professor of Operations, Information and Decisions

Who is the most
influential?
Observing and Measuring Influence

• How do you know an individual has influence?

• Someone who gets others to take actions they would not otherwise
Understanding Influence

• We can understand these influence questions better by thinking of different

dimensions of influence:

Sources Means Extent Scope

Sources of Influence

• Situation
• Needs of the moment, personalities of those involved, etc.
• Structure
• Placement in an organization, nature of an organization, rules
• Purchasing unit, “gatekeepers”
• Culture
• Organizational values and expectations
• In some places, loud assertive behavior is a sign of weakness not
strength
Sources of Influence

• Relationships
• “Work in organizations is more like football than golf”
• Traits
• Energy, focus, sensitivity, flexibility, conflict tolerance, getting along
• Tactics
• Need facility with a wide range of tools
Means of Influence

• What are the tools available?

• Formal tools
• Laws, rules, incentives, obligations, roles
• Informal tools
• Persuasion, alliances, moral, guilt, kinship, ethnic, etc.
• Guanxi
Extent of Influence

• Effect on the probability of compliance

• How likely is it that your desires will be followed?
• If your request increases the likelihood of something happening
from, say, 20% to 60%, you are pretty powerful
Scope of Influence

• Number of people/organizations affected

• You have influence over many people
• Range of preference which can be satisfied
• You have influence over many substantive areas
Other Dimensions of Influence

• Duration
• Resistance able to overcome
• Immediacy
• Transferability/Delegate-ability
• Reserves (how often can you go to the well?)
• Other?
To understand power, and use it, you must
appreciate its dimensions and nuance.
Influence
Just-World Fallacy

Cade Massey, Practice Professor of Operations, Information and Decisions

Failure to Launch (or worse)

• Noah graduated from a top business school in 2005

• Mechanical engineering background, well liked by classmates – “one of
the smartest kids around”, “great teammate”, “nice guy”
• Took product manager (PM) role with a ~100-person tech startup
• Challenging work environment
• Firm was under great pressure to hit venture capital milestones
• Direct supervisor was inexperienced and over-committed
• Founder/CEO had difficulty making decisions
Failure to Launch (or worse)

• Some successes
• Great rapport with the business-side colleagues –marketing and sales
• Known as a hard worker
• But more challenges
• Argued with the lead engineer about product specifications
• Intimidated by questions from the board, especially those from the lead
VC’s rep
• Repeatedly stymied by management’s reluctance to commit to a course
of action
Failure to Launch (or worse)

• Challenges seemed to multiply in the second half of his first year

• Increased his work hours (and hoped the owner noticed)
• Too busy to attend periodic gathering of portfolio companies
• Eventually lost support from the Marketing team b/c of his inability to
persuade Engineering
• As his 1st anniversary neared, his product missed a second deadline and
he was unceremoniously let go
Some Patterns

• Dealt a difficult hand

• Chance happens. Bad bosses happen.
• Political ability is often as important to merely getting the job done as it
is to promotion
• Tripped over first impressions
• Places a premium on early performance
• Trouble fostering good relationships
• A humbling share of what we do happens through other people
Some Patterns

• Didn’t understand the cost of passivity

• High returns to the willingness and ability to bend circumstances
• Hampered by their belief system
• Expected a “just world” to reward hard work and good intentions
Just-World Hypothesis (Lerner 1982)

• Most people believe that “people get what they deserve; that is, that the
good people are likely to be rewarded and the bad to be punished.”
• Pfeffer:
• Hinders people’s ability to learn from all situations and all people, even
those whom they don’t like or respect
• Anesthetizes people to the need to be proactive in building a power
base
Influence
Case: Sergio de Mello

Cade Massey, Practice Professor of Operations, Information and Decisions

East Timor’s Independence and Destruction

• “Nothing, literally nothing, had been left

intact on the ground except the will of the
Timorese.”
• “Airports and ports had to be opened, clean
water procured, health care provided,
schools resuscitated, a currency created,
relations with Indonesia normalized, a
constitution drafted, an official language
chosen, and tax, customs and banking
systems devised. Policies that normally
evolved over hundreds of years would all
have to be decided within months of arrival.”
Phase 1: Early Efforts

• Put together an “advisory board”

• Included the United Nations, multiple political parties and the Catholic
church
• Recruited and trained entire new judicial system
• “Acutely sensitive to symbolism and to national self-esteem”
• Studied the local language
• Worked 19-hour days and weekends, inspiring staff to do the same
Phase 2: Crisis Worsens

• 80% unemployment
• The UN didn’t have the expertise needed
• Staff was “good at diplomatic cables, not laying electrical cable”
• Multiple missteps with the guerilla army
• UN regulations restrictive and inappropriate
• 500 UN cars and barely 10 for the Timorese leaders
• Spring 2000 – brink of failure
• Physical security was breaking down
• Economy still in ruins
• Timorese began viewing UN as “second occupation”
Phase 3: Address Needs at any Cost

• More emphasis on security

• Revised peacekeepers’ rules of engagement
• Large police and military sweeps to drive out militia
• Gave up repatriation offices in West Timor
• Created a “co-government”
• For the first time on the mission, high-paid foreigners would work under
Timorese
• Forced this on NY HQ, and on local staff
• “These 4 are your new bosses! … I assume full responsibility. You
either obey or you can leave.”
Phase 3: Address Needs at any Cost

• Bent UN rules to increase investment in country

• Able to use some of his budget on road repair using logic that they
damaged UN vehicles
• In January 2001 laid out timeline to full independence
“People remember him. He came here in the worst of times and led them
out of these horrendous times when nothing existed, nothing worked, until
the restoration of independence.” – Ramos-Horta

Soon-to-be President Xanana Gusmao, voting in the first independent election, August 2001.
Influence
Themes from de Mello

Cade Massey, Practice Professor of Operations, Information and Decisions

Themes from de Mello

• What can we learn about power & influence from watching de Mello in East
Timor?
• Entire course, but especially:
• Flexibility
• Intentionality
• Relationships
Takeaway #1: Be Multiple

• Examples throughout
• Muscular with Indonesians, participative with East Timorese
• “Timorization” – Coercive with the UN in order to cede power to local
officials
• Direct pressure (family reparations) vs. working through others
(Australian oil)
• Value of flexibility, or “ruthless pragmatism”
Takeaway #2: Recognize Need for Trade-offs

• Security vs. human rights

• Ramos-Horta: “Human rights? Human rights? That is Alice in
Wonderland. We have to deal with reality here.”
• “[Sergio] started out as a humanitarian, but by 2003 he had become a
diplomat and politician, comfortable weighing lesser evils.”
• Intentionality: You’re not truly committed to a goal if you’re not making
trade-offs
Takeaway #3: Invest in Relationships

• Put symbolism over convenience

• “I’d rather be late than act like a king.”
• Prioritized the dignity of the citizens
• “Local staff members were unaccustomed to being treated with such
respect by foreigners.”
• “Went to the jungle”
• One day after his 24-hour trip to arrive in East Timor, de Mello made a
2-hour trip via steep, unpaved mountain roads to visit guerilla leader,
Xanana Gusmao
Influence
Foundations of Social Power: French & Raven

Cade Massey, Practice Professor of Operations, Information and Decisions

“ Leaders cannot maintain authority…unless
followers are prepared to believe in that
authority. In a sense, leadership is conferred by
followers.”
— JOHN GARDNER
“ Formal authority is a source of power if and
only if we accede to it.”
— JEFF PFEFFER
Power and Authority

• Understanding obedience – the acceptance of authority – is vital to an

understanding of politics
• So why do people “obey”?
The Bases of Social Power

• French & Raven’s classic model

• Reward Power
• Coercive Power
• Expert Power
• Referent Power
• Legitimate Power
Expert Power

• Confidence
• Performance / Reputation
• Functional Status – Someone knows something you don’t
• Important role for accreditation (e.g., doctor, technician)
• “Probably the principle type of authority that operates…in society in
general.” Simon et al.
de Mello & Expert Power

• “Not repeating Cambodia meant aggressively establishing functioning

government structures that made a concrete and lasting difference to
citizens.”
Referent Power

• Identification with, a feeling of one-ness with, or a desire for it

• Identification
• Being part of a group can give credibility or confidence in like-
mindedness
• “In group” identification can make suggestions more attractive
• Often outside the awareness of those influenced
de Mello & Referent Power

• He learned the native language (Tetum)

• “How do you win the sympathy of the people? First you have to learn
the language. Language is the key to a people’s culture, and culture is
the key to a people’s heart. If you force them to speak your language,
you will never win their sympathy.”
Legitimate Power

• “Should”, “ought to”, “has a right to”

• Most people are indoctrinated “to play according to the rules of the
game”
• One of the most important sources of the authority of the hierarchical
superior
• Regardless of confidence, identification or sanctions
• Hierarchical Status – Confidence that a higher up is:
• Reasonably capable else she wouldn’t be there
• Privy to information that makes her better able to make the decision
de Mello & Legitimate Power

• de Mello understood informal power is separate from formal power

• He used participation as a source of legitimacy
• “Timorization” of the interim government
• This underscores the tension in how to manage Gusmao
• “In advance of presidential elections, he would try to walk a fine line,
respecting Gusmao’s de facto authority without formally enshrining it.”
Some of the Subtleties in French & Raven

• Use of power (esp. coercive) can invoke opposing resistance

• Types of power differ in their degree of internalization
• Influence of power does not have to be intentional
• The attempted use of power that is outside that power’s range will
decrease the power of the authority
The Bases of Social Power

• French & Raven’s classic model

• Reward Power
• Coercive Power
• Expert Power
• Referent Power
• Legitimate Power
Influence
What About You?

Cade Massey, Practice Professor of Operations, Information and Decisions

How to be a Star at Work (Kelley, 1998)

• Conventional wisdom: Stars are better in a fundamental sense

• Brain, schmoozer, workaholic
• Empirical observation: Patterns of behavior on the job
• Stars and middle performers identify the same strategies, but:
• Rank their importance differently
• Describe them differently
“ Goal is to convince you that you can actually
acquire power – not by becoming a new
individual but by doing some things more
strategically and differently.”
— J E F F P F E F F E R ( P. 1 7 )
What about you?

• What is one strength of yours, a method by which you effectively influence

others?
• What is one weakness of yours, a method you see others use for influence
that you have trouble with?
• What is one thing you’d like to create, change or accomplish that requires
as much influence as you can muster?
“It isn’t what these stars had in their head that made them
standouts, but how they used what they had.” - Kelley
Influence
Situation Awareness

Cade Massey, Practice Professor of Operations, Information and Decisions

[Link]
Situation Awareness
• There are these two young fish swimming
along, and they happen to meet an older fish
swimming the other way, who nods at them and
says, “Morning, boys, how's the water?"

• The two young fish swim on for a bit, and then

eventually one of them looks over at the other
and goes, "What the hell is water?“

- David Foster Wallace

Leadership is like flying an airplane. You have to
have your head up and you have to have
situational awareness of everything that’s
going on around you.
- Richard Anderson, CEO Delta Air Lines
Situation Awareness

• “The perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time and

space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their
status in the near future.” (Endsley 1995)
• Originally a military concept
• Important in aviation and heavy operations
• We’re extending to organizational navigation
Situation Awareness

• A critical issue is how these elements change over time, especially

regarding…
• Importance
• Risk
• Uncertainty
Situation Awareness

• “We come from cities and learn to

expect things to stay the same. But
they don’t. And it kills us, quickly or
slowly.”
- Survival instructor
• Kennedy, during the Cuban Missile Crisis: “It isn’t the first step that
concerns me, but both sides escalating to the fourth and fifth step – and
we don’t go to the sixth because there is no one around to do so.”
Influence
Case: Cuban Missile Crisis

Cade Massey, Practice Professor of Operations, Information and Decisions

Cuban Missile Crisis Timeline
1962
14-Oct U-2 flew over Cuba, discovering missile sites
16-Oct Kennedy meets with advisors to consider response
17-Oct Intel determines intermediate-range nuclear missiles could reach Wash St.
20-Oct Kennedy meets with Ex-Com to discuss speeches and final decision
21-Oct Kennedy decides on blockade
22-Oct Kennedy makes televised speech about the missile sites
23-Oct Discussion at UN; Kennedy orders low-level mission to inspect sites
24-Oct Soviet ships reach the quarantine line
25-Oct Low-level picture prove missiles in Cuba; DEFCON 2
26-Oct Kruschev sends letter proposing exchange
27-Oct US spy plane flew off course over Russia
27-Oct Kruschev sends 2nd, more bellicose, letter
27-Oct Kennedy responds to Kruschev's 1st letter
28-Oct Kruschev announces removal of all missiles from Cuba
Influence
Allison’s Three Models of Power

Cade Massey, Practice Professor of Operations, Information and Decisions

Competing Explanations for Action

• Model 1:
• Rational analysis

• Model 2:
• Organizational process

• Model 3:
• Bureaucratic politics
Model 1: Rational Policy

• National government is a unitary actor

• The actor is rational
• Each action is part of a strategic objective according to plan
Model 1: Rational Policy

• Cuba case: What are the • Model 1 suggests blockade was

alternatives available to the United the rational choice, best because:
States? • Middle course
• Do nothing • Puts onus back on Kruschev
• Diplomacy • Limits engagement
• Secret approach to Cuba • Demonstrates conventional
• Blockade military advantage
• Surgical air strikes
• Invasion
• Best choice?
Model II: Organizational Process

• Government as “semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations”

• Governmental actions are merely outputs
• Few problems are strictly the domain of a single organization
• “Factored” problems, leading to factionalization
“The best explanation of an organization’s
behavior at t is t-1.”
Model II: Organizational Process

• Cuba case: What organizational routines influenced the outcome?

• Intelligence gathering
• Bits of information are collected but
not seen together (lumber ships riding
high in the water, rantings of Cuban in
a bar, view of missile profile)
• Delay in schedule of surveillance
flights due to inter-agency conflict
• Configuration of Soviet missile bases
Model II: Organizational Process

• Cuba case: What organizational routines influenced the outcome?

• Analysis
• Air-strikes deemed unlikely to succeed because of definition of
mobile missiles
• Implementation
• Naval blockade is set up according to established procedures.
Engagement is handled “by the book.”
Model II: Organizational Process

• Communication
• Routinized activities send “false” signals
• Scheduled U2 flight over Russia
• Nuclear tests carried out in the midst of crisis (JFK: “There’s always
one son-of-a-bitch who doesn’t get the message”)
Model 3: Bureaucratic Politics

• Policy as the outcome of bargaining games

• Participants as players with different positions, interests, ambitions, etc.
• Position and placement influences your decision
“Where you stand depends on where you sit.”
Model III: Bureaucratic Politics

• Cuba case: What are the interests and abilities of key players?
• Political significance for Kennedy
• Previous experience (e.g., Bay of Pigs.)
• Key alliances
• Who held what opinion
• What if Robert Kennedy had been in favor of bombing? What if
McNamara hadn’t been reluctant to employ military?
Model III: Bureaucratic Politics

• Approaching problems with “Model 3” mindset:

• Seeing the politics in the other organization
• (e.g., Ignore the second letter from Kruschev)
Allison’s Models of Organizational Politics

• Model 1: Rational Analysis

• This model explains an outcome as the optimal response, for the
organization as a whole, to a specific set of conditions and objectives
• Model 2: Organizational process
• This model explains an outcome as the result of systemic pressures
and routinized behavior. The key to applying this framework is to think
of an outcome as being the byproduct of activities and imperatives not
specifically intended to produce that outcome.
• Model 3: Bureaucratic politics
• This model explains outcomes as a product of the accumulated
preferences and strategies of people (and/or sub-organizations) making
up an organization
Allison’s Models of Organizational Politics

Decision…
Logic Locus As
Model 1 Rational Organization Choice
Model 2 Routine Division Output
Model 3 Bargaining Individual Outcome
Influence
Implications

Cade Massey, Practice Professor of Operations, Information and Decisions

Allison’s Models: Implications

• Models reveal potential sources for, and constraints on, your own power
• Savvy analysis requires using multiple perspectives
• Many of us have one chronic “conceptual lens”
Tetlock’s Foxes & Hedgehogs

• Eminent Berkeley social scientist

• Multi-year study of the forecasts of a wide
range of experts about major world events
• Evaluated performance and looked for factors
that separated good forecasters from bad
• Rampant overconfidence
• No important factors distinguishing
• The exception: Cognitive Style
• esp. “foxes” vs. “hedgehogs”
Tetlock’s Foxes & Hedgehogs (Isaiah Berlin)

• Hedgehogs: “Thinkers who ‘know one big thing,” aggressively extend the
explanatory reach of that one big thing into new domains, display bristly
impatience with those who ‘do not get it’, and express considerable
confidence that they are already pretty proficient forecasters, at least in the
long-term.”

• Foxes: “Thinkers who know many small things (tricks of their trade), are
skeptical of grand schemes, see explanation and prediction not as
deductive exercises but rather exercises in flexible “ad hocery” that require
stitching together diverse sources of information, and are rather diffident
about their own forecasting abilities.”
Allison’s Models: Implications

• Models reveal potential sources for, and constraints on, your own power
• Savvy analysis requires using multiple perspectives
• Many of us have one chronic “conceptual lens”
• Not all models equally appreciated
• Model 1 long dominant in political analysis
• Attend (obsess?) on Model 3 when thinking of own firm, but often
neglect when thinking of others
• Most under-appreciate Model II altogether!
Model 2: Processes (Student Examples)

• Governmental organizations
• BP Oil Spill – e.g., MMS licensing, BP responses
• Katrina – Governmental responses
• Pre-9/11 (and post?!) intelligence gathering
• Non-governmental
• Hospitals (admissions, medication, surgery, etc.)
• Campus recruiting
• Newspaper publishing
Allison’s Models: Implications

• Models reveal potential sources for, and constraints on, your own power
• Savvy analysis requires using multiple perspectives
• Many of us have one chronic “conceptual lens”
• Not all models equally appreciated
• Model 1 long dominant in political analysis
• Attend (obsess?) on Model 3 when thinking of own firm, but often
neglect when thinking of others
• Most under-appreciate Model II altogether!
• Don’t forget about chance!
Rx: Don’t Forget Chance

• “The distinguishing feature of the ‘owlish’ group [neither hawk nor dove,
which included McNamara, Bundy & Ball…
• … was the weight they assigned to the risks of desperate, irrational Soviet
action or to inadvertent escalation.”
Rx: Don’t Forget Chance

• “I don't think the Cuban missile crisis was unique.

The Bay of Pigs, Berlin in '61, Cuba, later events in
the Middle East, in Libya, and so on – all exhibit
the truth of what I'll call ‘McNamara's Law’:
• It is impossible to predict with a high degree of
confidence what the effects of the use of military
force will be because of the risks of accident,
miscalculation, misperception and inadvertence.
• “In my opinion, this law ought to be inscribed
above all the doorways in the White House and
the Pentagon, and it is the overwhelming lesson of
the Cuban missile crisis.”
Influence
Case: Robert Moses

Cade Massey, Practice Professor of Operations, Information and Decisions

Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authority

• Public authority
• Independent borrowing authority
• Collects tolls on bridges it builds and
manages
• Separate from state agencies, but still
governed by the laws of New York State
Problems Faced by Moses

• Bound by rules regarding personnel

and contracting
• Limited to building bridges and the
roads leading to the bridges
• His bridges made too much money!
• As soon as the debt was paid off,
the Public Authority would go
away
Changing the Rules

• Moses got the law regarding the powers of

Authorities and nature of the bonds changed
• Authority could retire and issue new bonds
• Authority could build projects “not inconsistent”
with the bridges
• Authority was not bound by the civil service rules
that applied to the government agencies
• The contract between Moses’ Authority and debt
holders is protected by the Constitution
Changing the Rules

• Buried deep in the legislation, in a subdivision wholly unrelated to

“Existence”:
• “The authority shall have power from time to time to refund any bonds
by the issuance of new bonds, whether the bonds to be refunded have
or have not matured, and may issue bonds partly to refund bonds then
outstanding and partly for any other corporate purpose.”
La Guardia: “The Mayor
establishes the policy for
the City…and the
Authority bondholders
have absolutely nothing
to say.”

Moses: “I think you had better

read the agreements and
contracts.”
Influence
The Sources of Moses’ Power

Cade Massey, Practice Professor of Operations, Information and Decisions

Where Did Moses’ Power Come From?

• The Bases of Social Power

• French & Raven’s classic model
• Reward Power
• Coercive Power
• Legitimate Power
• Referent Power
• Expert Power
Influence
Themes from Moses

Cade Massey, Practice Professor of Operations, Information and Decisions

A Few Additional Factors…

• Performance
• Organizational process
• Agency
• Ethics
The Critical Role of Performance

• Moses had access to the levers of power only because of a reputation for
performance built over decades
• The “Man Who Got Things Done”
“ You’ve got to understand – every morning when a mayor
comes to work, there are a hundred problems that must be
solved. And a lot of them are so big and complex that they
just don’t seem susceptible to solution. And when he asks guys
for solutions, what happens? Most of them can’t give him any.
And those that do come up with solutions, the solutions are
unrealistic or impractical –or just plain stupid...”
— J U D G E J A C O B L U T S K Y ( S E R V E D 4 M AY O R S )
“ But you give a problem to Moses and overnight he’s back in front of
you – with a solution, all worked out down to the last detail, drafts of
speeches you can give to explain it to the public, drafts of press
releases for the newspapers, drafts of the state laws you’ll need to get
passed, advice as to who should introduce the bills in the Legislature
and what committees they should go to, drafts of any City Council
and Board of Estimate resolutions you’ll need; if there are
constitutional questions involved, a list of the relevant precedents –
and a complete method of financing, are all spelled out. He had
solutions when no one else had solutions.”
— J U D G E J A C O B L U T S K Y ( S E R V E D 4 M AY O R S )
Organizational Process

• “It is often the case that exercising power creates enemies who constitute a
threat to your long-term organizational survival. Thus, in developing and
exercising power it is important to use structural mechanisms that
institutionalize your power and diffuse responsibility for decisions and
actions.”
- Pfeffer (1992)
Organizational Process

• Given the nature of rules & structure, what are the implications for you as a
manager?
• Recognize, ala Allison, they are not always established in the best
interest of the organization
• Private agendas, competing interests, benign neglect, etc.
• Do not accept them as a given
• These are essentially cards that are dealt and re-dealt continuously
• You can (and should!) influence the dealing
The Importance of Agency

• “Rule-breakers” are essential for innovation (Canales)

• Pfeffer: “So, if you have all the power you want or need, by all means not
only follow the rules but encourage everyone else to do so too. But if you
are still traversing your path to power, take all this conventional wisdom
and “rule following” with a big grain of salt.” (p86)
The Importance of Agency

• Definition: To act; to exert control over one’s environment

• A vital characteristic of powerful people is their actively shaping the
situations they face, rather than passively accepting what they find
• This is “stacking the deck” rather than “playing the cards you’re dealt.”
Power & Ethics

• The cultivation and use of power is inextricably linked with ethics

Power & Ethics

• “Robert Moses himself was

certain he held the keys to the
city’s future.”
Power & Ethics

• Aldous Huxley
• “The end cannot justify the means, for the simple and obvious reason
that the means employed determine the nature of the ends.”

• Robert Moses
• “If the end doesn’t justify the means, what does?”
Constraints on the Use of Power

“Power alone cannot protect us, nor does it

entitle us to do as we please. Instead…our
power grows through its prudent
use…emanates from the justness of our cause;
the force of our example; the tempering
qualities of humility and restraint.”
- Barack Obama (1/20/09)
“People often worry about politics as a substitute for
merit. But if manipulating rules and working within
rules are keys to success, …and doing so is considered
politics, perhaps political ability is merit.”

— J O N AT H A N K O P P E L L ( 2 0 0 8 )
Acknowledgments

I am indebted to Jonathan Koppell for the introduction to Graham Allison’s

work and lecture material.