ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT

NO . 115 SEPTEMBER 2003

INSIDE
CHEN JIAN
Uneasy Allies: Fifty Years
Limits of the ‘Lips and
Teeth’ Alliance: An
of China-North Korea Relations
Historical Review of
Chinese-North Korean ABSTRACT: This Special Report examines the long uneasy China-North Korea relationship,
Relations
and in doing so also illumines the current nuclear crisis on the [Link] experts, repre-
page 4 senting different academic disciplines—Chen Jian of the University of Virginia, Samuel S. Kim
of Columbia University, and Hazel Smith of the University of Warwick—agree that China is
SAMUEL S. KIM
poised to play an important role in resolving this crisis. The authors also concur that the rela-
China and North Korea tionship is far more complex and contentious than once thought. China’s motivations for seek-
in a Changing World ing an end to the crisis are equally [Link] China wields some influence in Pyongyang,
the authors contend that convincing North Korea to abandon its nuclear program and come
page 11
out from its isolation will not be easy. By analyzing the genesis of the relationship, its more recent
HAZEL SMITH history, and the socioeconomic dynamics of the China–North Korea border regions, these essays
help to better understand the current crisis, making this Special Report important and timely.
Asymmetric Nuisance
Value: The Border in
China-DPRK Relations
Introduction diplomatic process. In August, Beijing hosted six-
page 18 Timothy Hildebrandt party talks designed to jumpstart substantive
negotiations, particularly between Washington

S
unday, July 27, 2003, marked the 50th and Pyongyang. North Korea has not necessarily
anniversary of the armistice agreement welcomed this new Chinese role of “honest bro-
that ended the Korean War. With the ker” and Beijing’s conversations with Pyongyang
unsurprising exception of a lavish parade in have not always been easy. Of late, Beijing has
Pyongyang, commemorations of the anniver- been more forceful in its opposition to North
sary were quite muted across Asia and in the Korea’s nuclear aspirations.
United States. Given recent events, there is lit- As a sign of the dire state of affairs on the
tle reason to celebrate; the fragile peace on the peninsula, countries traditionally wary of an
Korean peninsula is in greater jeopardy today increased role for China in regional politics—
than at any other time in the past half century. including the United States—have welcomed
Although all countries with an interest in the Beijing’s efforts to maintain stability and assure
region have expressed concern for preserving a peaceful resolution to the most recent
peace in Northeast Asia, perhaps no relation- nuclear [Link] China’s task is made all the
ship will be more critical in achieving this goal more difficult by a strained relationship with
than that between North Korea (formally North Korea. Though for several decades an
known as the Democratic People’s Republic appropriate description, the “closer than lips
of Korea, or DPRK) and its only remaining and teeth” adage once used in propaganda to
ASIA PROGRAM ally in the region: China. tout China and North Korea’s relationship no
In recent months, China has markedly longer rings true.
increased its involvement in Northeast Asia. At The PRC-DPRK relationship started off
times mimicking the role played by the United on the right foot: North Korean communists
States in the Middle East, Chinese envoys have provided support and a strategic base for the
shuttled between Seoul, Pyongyang and Chinese communists in 1949. China recipro-
Washington, in attempts to initiate a meaningful cated with massive military intervention saving

Timothy Hildebrandt is program assistant at the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program.
 ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT

Kim Il Sung’s regime from collapse following his relationship of “big brother” China and “little broth-
invasion of the South. Yet the honeymoon was er” North Korea came to resemble something akin
short-lived, and tensions arose that last even until to bitter sibling rivalry. Beijing lost much of its influ-
today. While both countries still occasionally offer ence over Pyongyang as China abandoned its revo-
rhetorical statements of solidarity, Beijing and lutionary agenda in favor of economic develop-
Pyongyang clearly no longer share similar objec- ment, while North Korea chose to languish in the
tives. In practice, China has shown far more interest past.
in cultivating its important economic relations with Therefore, in today’s crisis, Chen suggests that
South Korea than in rejuvenating its ideological Beijing no longer has ideological leverage and can
partnership with North Korea. Beijing’s interaction rely only on its economic influence. Chen’s essay
with Seoul has not gone unnoticed by Pyongyang; includes previously unpublished details of the 1956
official DPRK histories have now all but erased crisis, as well as new inside information on Beijing’s
mention of past Chinese assistance. refusal to support Kim’s plans to invade the South in
2 This Asia Program Special Report offers three 1975.
essays that analyze what has long been an uneasy Samuel S. Kim agrees that the relationship
alliance. These essays look back to historical between the two countries has long been uneasy. In
instances of conflict and cooperation, examine more the second essay of this Report, he notes that the
recent political events, and survey the relatively current nuclear crisis occurs at the same time as an
unexplored border relations between China and unprecedented crisis of alliance preservation
North Korea, in an effort to better understand the between China and North Korea. Both China and
nature of the current crisis. South Korea are drifting away from traditional allies:
In the first essay, Chen Jian offers an historical Beijing is moving closer to Seoul than Pyongyang,
review of China and North Korea’s fifty-year rela- while Seoul appears more comfortable with Beijing
tionship. He argues that history is littered with than Washington. One of Beijing’s greatest chal-
instances of tension and stress in the relationship. As lenges is balancing economic and security concerns
early as the Korean War, Kim Il Sung angered China within this new triangular relationship. China
when he was closemouthed on his plans for war, and knows that conflict on the peninsula could well put
did not share his offensive plans with Beijing until an end to its economic growth, and wants desper-
three days after the war began. Even after the war ately to maintain stability in North Korea. It has
ended, tensions between the two allies continued. A thus adopted a proactive foreign policy that aims to
1956 argument over North Korean political dissi- avoid conflict escalation, collapse, or an influx of
dents seeking refuge in China exploded into a crisis refugees, and to keep Pyongyang nuclear-free. It is
that has implications even today. What began as a worth considering, however, whether all Beijing’s
hopes for the peninsula are compatible. That is to
THE ASIA PROGRAM say, if the situation continues to deteriorate, would
China reluctantly accept an armed conflict if that
The Wilson Center’s Asia Program is dedicated to the proposi-
were the only way to keep nuclear weapons out of
tion that only those with a sound scholarly grounding can begin
to understand contemporary events. One of the Center’s oldest Pyongyang’s hands?
regional programs, the Asia Program seeks to bring historical Because China remains an important North
and cultural sensitivity to the discussion of Asia in the nation’s Korean ally, observers speculate that Beijing has
capital. In seminars, workshops, briefings, and conferences, great leverage over Pyongyang, making these goals
prominent scholars of Asia interact with one another and with
policy practitioners to further understanding of the peoples, tra-
more easily obtainable. Kim contends, however, that
ditions, and behaviors of the world’s most populous continent. this leverage is very modest compared to the power
that the United States wields in the region.
Asia Program Staff: Additionally, it is difficult for China to convince
Robert M. Hathaway, Director
North Korea to stay off the nuclear path in light of
Gang Lin, Program Associate
Amy McCreedy, Program Associate its own nuclear weapons program. China’s econom-
Wilson Lee, Program Assistant ic leverage is also very much constrained. Though
Timothy R. Hildebrandt, Program Assistant cutting off massive Chinese aid could be used as a
 UNEASY ALLIES: FIFTY YEARS OF CHINA-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS

disincentive, the strategy could also backfire and peninsula cannot, therefore, be explained as a means
provoke Pyongyang into a military confrontation. to protect itself from a humanitarian disaster in its
Kim further theorizes that while China does not northeastern provinces. China should not, however,
have much leverage, it will make every effort to pre- ignore the economic and humanitarian crises in
serve the little influence that still exists, “to prevent North Korea. Smith suggests that China can use its
tomorrow’s China from becoming today’s Soviet geographic proximity to bring more foreign invest-
Union.” ment and transparency to the northern provinces of
The issue of refugees and immigration along the the DPRK. Such action might help China achieve
China–North Korea border is an important element its desires for economic and security stability in the
in the discussion of instability on the peninsula. Many region.
analysts believe that China’s motivation to keep Though new developments in the current crisis
North Korea from collapse rises from the fear of a on the Korean peninsula crop up daily, one constant
flood of refugees into the country. Hazel Smith does exist in Northeast Asia: the relationships of the
maintains in the third essay, however, that the issue of significant players in the region—including those 3
cross-border relations is not so easily [Link] between China and the two Koreas—were from the
nearly 1,000-mile border is surprisingly permeable, beginning, and are still today, exceedingly compli-
lacking the military fortification of North Korea’s cated. China’s relationship with North Korea, once
southern perimeter. Nonetheless, the threat and exis- seemingly a logical union of like-minded commu-
tence of immigration is not relevant to the whole of nists, has turned more acrimonious over the [Link]
the border. Profiling each of the North Korean bor- China has moved closer to South Korea, leaders in
der provinces, Smith notes that in areas with more Pyongyang have come to view Beijing as a friend
economic stability and those near non-Korean speak- turned bad. Nonetheless, a bad friend is still a friend,
ing Chinese provinces, emigration is not strikingly and China is better situated to help bring peace to
high. Smith also contends that previous attention paid the peninsula than any other country, except of
to the issue of refugees has relied on inaccurate and course, North Korea itself. Indeed, the level of com-
often misleading information. Notably, estimates of plexity in this strained friendship demands study
the number of North Korean refugees in Chinese from many angles. This Special Report attempts to
border regions are rather inflated. do just that. By analyzing the genesis of the relation-
The issue of refugees, Smith concludes, is not as ship, its more recent history, and the socioeconomic
crucial to the current geopolitical situation as was dynamics of the China–North Korea border
once thought—it is less an issue of conflict and regions, these essays help us to better understand the
more a subject of irritation for China. Beijing’s current crisis, making this Special Report particu-
motivation to put an end to the current crisis on the larly important and timely.
 ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT

Limits of the ‘Lips and Teeth’ Alliance:

An Historical Review of
Chinese-North Korean Relations
CHEN JIAN

F
ifty years ago, on 27 July 1953, the Korean
War ended with the signing of an armistice
agreement. Peace, however, has never been
firmly established on the Korean peninsula and the
prospect for another “Korean War” seems never so
4 close as it is now. On the one hand, the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is making
noise that it intends to acquire nuclear weapons and,
on the other, the United States is threatening to use
all means to stop this from happening. Whether or
not the Korean crisis will grow out of control
depends upon many conditions, and a key factor is
the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Indeed, the
PRC was the DPRK’s main ally throughout the
Cold War period—in October 1950, it was massive
Chinese military intervention that saved the North
Korean Communist regime from an imminent col-
lapse. Since the end of the Cold War and the disinte- EARLY CONTACTS
gration of the Soviet Union, the PRC has become
the sole big power from which the DPRK may Historically, the Korean Communists had intimate
receive substantial material support. Therefore, how ties with the Chinese Communists. During the
the crisis situation on the Korean peninsula will 1930s, Kim Il Sung, who later became the leader of
develop, be controlled and, with any hope, resolved, Communist North Korea, waged an anti-Japanese
is closely related to what Beijing will and can do. guerrilla struggle in Manchuria. In the late 1930s
Despite the fact that the PRC has been the and early 1940s, a group of Korean Communists
DPRK’s key ally in the past half century, Beijing’s (including Pak Il Yu, who would later become
relations with Pyongyang are by no means without North Korea’s vice prime minister and a head of the
[Link] the ties between them seem to have “Yan’an faction” within the Korean Workers’ Party
been dominated by a discourse of “lips and teeth” [KWP]) traveled to Yan’an, the “Red Capital” of the
solidarity, there were times that substantial differ- Chinese Communist Party (CCP), to join China’s
ences in perception and practice existed between “War of Resistance” against Japan. During the
the two communist allies. In a sense, the legacies of Chinese civil war between the CCP and the
the uneasy history of Chinese–North Korean rela- Nationalists in the late 1940s, while Communist
tions are mirrored in the complexity of the PRC- North Korea served as a strategic supporting base
DPRK relationship today, revealing the limits to for the CCP in Manchuria, around 100,000 ethnic
which Beijing may influence the orientation of Korean residents in China joined the Chinese
Pyongyang’s attitudes and [Link], an his- Communist forces. The 156th, 164th and 166th
torical review of Chinese–North Korean relations divisions, three of the best combat units of the
will shed useful light upon some of the crucial Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), were
aspects of the Korean crisis at the present time. mainly composed of ethnic Korean soldiers.

Chen Jian is [Link] Professor of Chinese–American Relations at the Miller Center of Public Affairs and profes-
sor of history at the University of Virginia.
 UNEASY ALLIES: FIFTY YEARS OF CHINA-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS

PRIOR TO AND DURING THE KOREAN WAR endeavored to resume Pyongyang’s direct control of
the railway system. Fourth, in June and July 1953,
In 1949, when the Chinese Communist revolution after South Korean leader Syngman Rhee ordered
achieved nationwide victory and Kim Il Sung was the release of more than 25,000 anti-communist
planning to unify the entire Korean peninsula North Korean prisoners, the Chinese believed it
through a revolutionary war, the Korean necessary to give the enemy “another bitter strike”
Communists hoped that their Chinese comrades before reaching an armistice. But Kim opposed the
would return the favor. From summer 1949 to plan and argued that it was better for military oper-
spring 1950, top Chinese and Korean Communist ations on the battlefield to stop immediately.
leaders had a series of discussions, resulting in the These differences can be regarded simply as dis-
CCP sending 50,000 to 70,000 ethnic Korean sol- crepancies in strategies and tactics that usually
diers in the PLA—with their weapons—back to emerge in any alliance relationship. More serious,
Korea. These troops, forming a core part of the however, was Kim Il Sung’s purge of several promi-
Korean People’s Army’s offensive capacity, would nent members (including Pak Il Yu and Mu Chong, 5
later play a crucial role in North Korea’s invasion of the highest ranked PLA commander in the Korean
the South. By doing so, the CCP virtually provided People’s Army) of the Yan’an faction within the
Kim with a green light to attack the South. KWP. Indeed, Kim demonstrated an extraordinary
But even at this early stage of the China–North ability to manipulate this issue under the circum-
Korea relationship, significant problems existed stances that his own regime’s very survival was at the
between Chinese and Korean Communists. Kim Il mercy of 1.35 million Chinese troops who were
Sung, in planning the war to invade the South, did fighting a war in Korea on his behalf. Ostensibly
not visit Beijing to consult with Mao Zedong and Kim was able to use Mao Zedong’s promise that
the CCP leadership about his ideas until mid-May Chinese troops in Korea would under no circum-
1950, only one month prior to the war’s beginning. stances interfere with Korea’s internal affairs to keep
Furthermore, he failed to inform Beijing of the the Chinese out of these inner-Party purges. In
exact schedule of the invasion. During the war essence, however, this epitomized a more general
years, especially after Chinese troops entered the war pattern in Beijing’s mentality—one that had been
to rescue Kim’s regime in October 1950, China’s profoundly penetrated by the “Central Kingdom’s”
relations with the North Korean Communists sense of moral superiority in dealing with its subor-
became extremely close, but problems continued dinate neighbors (such as Korea and Vietnam)—in
between the two sides. According to Chinese perceiving and handling relations with Kim and
sources available in the past decade, China and North Korea. For Mao, to send Chinese troops to
North Korea experienced four major disputes dur- Korea was not for such an “inferior” purpose of pur-
ing the Korean War years: First, in January 1951, suing China’s direct political and economic control
when Chinese troops had pushed the battle line in Korea, but was for, among other aims, achieving
from areas close to the Yalu River to areas south of the Korean Communists’ inner acceptance of
the 38th parallel, PLA commanders believed that China’s morally superior position. This was why, in
their troops were not in a position to continue the late September 1950, Mao refused to help opposi-
offensive, but Kim insisted upon bringing the war tion factions within the KWP get rid of Kim when
further to the South. Second, in spring 1951, when Chinese troops were to enter Korea; and this was
U.S. forces had begun a counteroffensive on the bat- why Beijing established a self-imposed principle on
tle field, the Chinese commanders carried out a not interfering with North Korea’s internal affairs
strategy of “positive defense” to win time and space throughout the war years.
to reorganize their troops. But Kim again pushed
the Chinese to use a counteroffensive of their own THE 1956 CRISIS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
to cope with the American [Link], after the
armistice talks began in July 1951, the Chinese Yet Kim, a Korean nationalist in soul and increasing-
found it necessary to continue to control North ly a dictator in practice, neither tolerated the contin-
Korea’s railway transportation system, but Kim uous existence of any remaining pro-foreign faction
 ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT

within his Party nor felt comfortable with having to decided to restore Choi Chang Ik and Pak Chang
live under the shadow of a morally superior China. Ok to the Central Committee and to reinstate Yun
All of this formed one of the most important condi- Kong Hum, So Hwi, and Yi Pil Gyu as Party mem-
tions under which Kim introduced in 1955 the bers.
“Juche” ideology, emphasizing that the Korean revo- But this was the last time that Beijing (and
lution must be carried out in an indigenous Korean Moscow) was able to force Kim to change his
way and must achieve “self reliance” in all spheres. course of action, and, as it soon turned out, Kim’s
It was against these backdrops that a serious crisis concessions were only temporary. A few months
erupted between Pyongyang and Beijing in late later, he not only waged massive purges of the
[Link] an August 30-31 KWP Central Committee “August factionists” but also, through carrying out a
plenary session that was officially designated for “concentrated guidance” campaign, established a
Kim to give a speech on his recent visit to the Soviet more monolithic political structure with himself as
Union and East Europe, several prominent Party North Korea’s undisputable paramount leader.
6 leaders who belonged to the Yan’an and pro-Soviet Consequently, a face-to-face dispute reportedly
factions stood up to criticize Kim’s personality cult occurred between Mao and Kim. In November
and challenge his economic policies. Kim, informed 1957, when both Mao and Kim were attending a
of the attack in advance, organized effective rebut- meeting by leaders of Communist and Workers’
tals. This resulted in four top Party cadres—Yun Parties from socialist countries in Moscow, the
Kong Hum (Minister of Commerce), So Hwi North Korean leader suggested to Mao that Beijing
(Chairman of Trade Unions),Yi Pil Guy (Minister of should hand the Korean “traitors” taking refugee in
Construction Materials), and Kim Kang—fleeing to China back to Pyongyang. Mao refused, advising
China, and several other Party cadres (including Yi Kim that he should not treat comrades with differ-
Sang Jo, DPRK’s ambassador to Moscow and a ent opinions as “reactionaries” but should learn from
member of the Yan’an faction) seeking asylum in the the CCP’s practice of “while no one would be exe-
Soviet Union. Kim responded by expanding the cuted the majority would not be arrested” in han-
purge. In addition to expelling these cadres from the dling inner-Party struggle. In doing so, Mao was
Party, two top Party leaders, Choi Chang Ik (head of expressing strong disagreement with Kim’s bloody
the Yan’an faction after Pak Il Yu’s purge) and Pak purge within the KWP. Kim, reportedly, felt quite
Chang Ok (head of the pro-Soviet faction) were offended and in turn complained about Chinese
both expulsed from the Party and arrested. troops’ continuous presence in North Korea, imply-
In response, those KWP cadres who had fled to ing that this was a violation of the DPRK’s sover-
Beijing and Moscow presented their cases to the eignty and an interference of its internal affairs. Mao
Chinese and Soviet parties. Regarding the recent immediately said that all Chinese troops would
crisis within the KWP leadership as caused by dif- withdraw from Korea. In February 1958, Chinese
ferences in policies and opinions rather than, as Kim premier Zhou Enlai visited Pyongyang to work out
had claimed, “reactionary attacks on the Party,” the details of the withdrawal. By the end of 1958, all
Beijing and Moscow decided to step in to investi- Chinese troops indeed had left North Korea.
gate and provide mediation. On September 19, in The 1956 crisis and the ensuing troop withdraw-
the middle of the CCP’s own Eighth National al from Korea significantly transformed the founda-
Congress, two Chinese marshals, Peng Dehuai (who tion of Beijing’s relations with Pyongyang while, at
had been the commander of Chinese troops to the same time, changing North Korea’s position in
Korea) and Nie Rongzhen, together with the Soviet the international communist movement. Up to that
Union’s first deputy prime minister and Party polit- point, North Korea had been a “little brother” under
buro member Anastas Mikoyan, flew to Pyongyang Moscow and Beijing, and Kim Il Sung, in spite of
to meet with Kim Il Sung. After intensive discus- his consistent efforts to maintain autonomy in
sions lasting four days, Kim finally agreed to make Pyongyang’s own decision-making, would have to
some concessions. On the same day that Peng, Nie consult with the two Communist “big brothers” on
and Mikoyan left Pyongyang, September 23, anoth- many important occasions. As a consequence of the
er plenary session of the KWP Central Committee 1956 crisis, Kim achieved greater independence and
 UNEASY ALLIES: FIFTY YEARS OF CHINA-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS

a more equal status in dealing with Beijing and China’s Party, state and society into great chaos,
Moscow. In the DPRK’s official propaganda, causing the PRC’s external relations in general—
accompanying the discourse of “solidarity with and its relations with the DPRK in particular—to
other socialist countries” was a highlighted emphasis be severely derailed. Consequently, Chinese–North
upon “opposing flunkeyism” as a fundamental prin- Korean relations reached low ebb from 1967-1969,
ciple that the Party should follow in its external when the Cultural Revolution was experiencing its
[Link] a result, when Kim further consolidated most hectic [Link] Red Guards in China widely
his absolute control over North Korea’s Party and made Kim Il Sung a target of criticism, proclaiming
state through a series of massive purges at home, he that North Korea, like the Soviet Union, had degen-
also dramatically enhanced Pyongyang’s capacity in erated into a “revisionist country.” And the Beijing
resisting influences from Beijing and Moscow. In leadership, which was by itself in constant disorder,
July 1961, when the PRC and the DPRK signed a did little to stop these activities. At some points it
treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assis- even seemed that the PRC-DPRK alliance was
tance, it symbolized that the Chinese–North Korean going to be undermined. 7
relationship, by its essence, was now one between When both Beijing and Pyongyang strongly felt
two “equal partners.” the negative impact caused by the deterioration of
their relationship, they started to take action to
THE UPS AND DOWNS OF THE 1960S improve relations. In January 1968, when a serious
crisis erupted between the DPRK and the United
In the early 1960s, Pyongyang further gained lever- States after the U.S. intelligence vessel Pueblo and its
age in its dealings with Beijing when a great crew were captured by the North Koreans, the PRC
polemic debate concerning the nature of true com- government issued a statement on January 29, 1968
munism emerged and intensified between China to provide “firm support” to the [Link] a dra-
and the Soviet Union. In appearance, the North matic turn in Chinese–North Korean relations
Koreans maintained neutrality toward Beijing and occurred on September 30, 1969, the eve of the
Moscow, but in reality they were more sympathetic 20th anniversary of the PRC’s establishment.
to Beijing (this was largely due to Kim’s resentment Although Beijing had decided in principle that no
of Nikita Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign foreign delegation would be invited to attend the
and criticism of Stalin’s personality cult). When the celebrations for the anniversary, at 3:20 p.m. on
CCP was increasingly isolated in the international September 30, “for the purpose of improving
communist movement with the deepening of the Chinese-Korean relations,” Beijing issued an invita-
Sino-Soviet split, sympathetic support from tion for a top North Korean leader to visit Beijing.
Pyongyang became more and more important to At 6:25 p.m., Pyongyang replied that Choi Yong
Beijing. In a 1964 conversation with Choi Yong Kun would travel to China, and Choi arrived in
Kun, North Korea’s second in command, Mao even Beijing at 11:30 that evening. The next day, Mao
asked him to comment on whether or not the met with him atop the Gate of Heavenly Peace,
Soviet Union would attack the PRC from the telling him that “the relations between our two
north, trying to win firmer support from countries are special and our aims are identical, so
Pyongyang. During this period, although Beijing’s we should improve our relations.”
influence upon Pyongyang was further reduced,
Chinese–North Korean relations—now based upon THE LIMITED RECONSOLIDATION
a foundation that was quite different from that of OF THE 1970S
the early and mid-1950s—were very close.
The situation, however, changed in the mid- Mao issued these statements at a time when China
1960s. On the one hand, after Khrushchev’s down- was not only engaged in a two-decade-long con-
fall in October 1964, the new Soviet leadership frontation with the United States but also, and
started providing more material support to the worse, faced serious security threat from the Soviet
DPRK; on the other, the eruption of the “Great Union—indeed, reportedly Moscow even consid-
Proletarian Cultural Revolution” in 1966 sunk ered conducting preemptive strikes on China’s
 ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT

nuclear facilities. It would have been unwise if Reportedly, in Kim’s meeting with Mao, the CCP
Beijing had failed to take action to improve relations chairman referred him to Deng Xiaoping for dis-
with the DPRK as a neighbor and a Communist cussions of “issues related to Korea.” Deng, on his
ally. But this also meant that Beijing’s leverage upon part, emphasized that China was facing the great
Pyongyang became even more limited than before. challenge of promoting socialist economic recon-
When both Beijing and Pyongyang again empha- struction at home, and therefore would not be in a
sized the solidarity between them in the early 1970s, position to commit itself to Kim’s “revolutionary
the alliance, along with a shared belief in communist war” plans.
ideology, was supported by a series of shrewd securi-
ty agreements. One important element was that WIDENING THE GAP IN THE 1980S
Beijing, by standing together with North Korea in AND AFTER THE COLD WAR
the “armistice regime” on the peninsula, naturally
occupied a crucial position to prop up the security As it turned out, the discrepancy demonstrated in
8 of the DPRK, whereas North Korea served as a the 1975 Deng-Kim meeting was with a meaning
security buffer on China’s northeast border. Mutual much deeper and broader than the issues under dis-
political support, such as Beijing contending that the cussion. It indicated that Beijing, after persistently
DPRK legally represented the entire Korea and pursuing a Korea policy aimed at bringing about
Pyongyang firmly supporting the notion that the revolutionary changes on the peninsula, was willing
PRC was China’s sole legal government, formed to live with the status quo. This new tendency in
another important aspect of the alliance. Chinese policy became more evident after Mao’s
Furthermore, the personal ties between top leaders death in September 1976. With Deng Xiaoping
of the two sides—who by then had known each ascending in the late 1970s to become China’s para-
other for over a quarter-century—played another mount leader, a profound derevolutionization
key role to make the relationship stable. process swept across China. When Deng placed on
One of the most important turning points during top of his agenda modernizing China’s industry,
the Cold War was the Sino-American rapproche- agriculture, national defense, and science, the
ment in the early 1970s. Compared with the resent- unfolding of a new era of “Reform and Opening to
ment from Albania and North Vietnam, two of the Outside” also made China depart from the path
China’s other Communist allies, Pyongyang demon- as a “revolutionary country” in international poli-
strated a willingness to understand and support tics. Consequently, Beijing, even before the end of
Beijing on this issue, to which Chinese leaders were the global Cold War, began to consider the feasibili-
grateful. However, this did not mean that Beijing ty of normalizing relations with South Korea, fur-
would be willing to stand on Pyongyang’s side on ther revealing that its Korea policy as a whole was
any matter that was important to the North increasingly taking the maintenance of the status
Koreans. The limitedness of the Chinese–North quo as a basic aim.
Korean alliance was most clearly revealed in April The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of
1975, when Kim Il Sung traveled to Beijing to try to the Cold War completely changed the context of
gain China’s backing for his renewed interest in East Asian international politics. It also brought
using a “revolutionary war” to unify the Korean about new and important differences to the PRC
peninsula. Kim’s visit occurred against the back- and the [Link] most outstanding among them
ground of impending Communist victories in has been the different ways in which Beijing and
Vietnam and Cambodia and the U.S. withdrawal Pyongyang have coped with their respective legiti-
from Indochina. Kim delivered a highly belligerent macy crises . Beijing chose to enhance the “Reform
speech after arriving in Beijing, contending that Asia and Opening” process by establishing a Chinese-
was approaching “a new era of revolution” and that style “socialist market economy” so that China
if a revolutionary war were to break out in Korea would be incorporated into the international com-
“we will only lose the Military Demarcation Line munit;, whereas Pyongyang opted to remain closed
and will gain the country’s reunification.” But, to the outside world and stick to its own codes of
Beijing showed little interest in Kim’s ideas. behavior in every [Link] emerged a new funda-
 UNEASY ALLIES: FIFTY YEARS OF CHINA-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS

mental difference between Beijing and Pyongyang Throughout the 1990s, the trade relationship
that had not existed during most of the Cold War: between the PRC and the ROK maintained a two-
While the PRC has gradually changed into an digit annual rate of increase, which made Pyongyang
international actor within the existing international feel genuinely offended. The difficulty of handling
system, demonstrating a general willingness to be the relationship was further augmented, as personal
bound by the rules and regulations widely accepted ties among top leaders in Beijing and Pyongyang
by other actors, the DPRK has persistently stayed were no longer operative following the deaths of
outside the existing international system, refusing to Kim Il Sung and Deng Xiaoping. Beijing’s leaders,
act in accordance with the widely accepted rules like concerned policymakers in other parts of the
and regulations. In addition to all the reasons that world, at times seemed unable to understand the
had contributed to China’s limited influence over new North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s behavior.
North Korea in the past, this new difference makes Despite these numerous problems, Beijing’s lead-
it even more difficult for Beijing to affect the orien- ers endeavored to maintain the “traditional friend-
tation of Pyongyang’s attitudes and policies in the ship” with [Link] had reasons to do so. In 9
post–Cold War age. addition to the strategic consideration that North
Korea would serve as a buffer for China, they also
THE DIFFICULT CHALLENGES OF THE 1990S understood that the DPRK’s political and econom-
ic collapse would result in a geopolitical earthquake
Not surprisingly, during most of the 1990s—espe- in northeast Asia, thus bringing about detrimental
cially after the PRC normalized diplomatic relations impact upon China’s own plans for economic mod-
with the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1992 and ernization. Even with the dramatic decrease in over-
Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994—China–North Korea all trade with North Korea, China remained the
relations sunk into another cold period. In almost DPRK’s largest outside supplier for food and oil. In
seven years (1992-1999), top leaders from the two the mid-1990s, Beijing’s emergency food aid to
countries did not visit the other. In response to the Pyongyang probably had saved the North Korean
PRC-ROK normalization, Pyongyang intentionally society from a disastrous collapse. In the meantime,
demonstrated an interest in developing economic Beijing had tried to play a constructive role in inter-
and cultural ties with Taiwan. It has been widely national diplomacy about issues related to the
speculated that in 1993 the North Korean member Korean peninsula (such as participating in the Four
of the International Olympic Committee did not Party Talks process beginning in 1997), while, at the
cast a supporting vote for Beijing in its unsuccessful same time, trying every channel to advise Kim Jong
bid for 2000 Olympic Games. In February 1997, Il that for North Korea’s own sake it should pursue
when Beijing allowed Hwang Chang Yop—a KWP its own path of “reform and opening to the outside
secretary and, as widely perceived, a main architect world.”
of the Juche ideology—to defect to the South
through seeking refuge at the ROK embassy in THE SHORT-LIVED “ROSY HOPES”
Beijing, tension became further intensified between OF 2000-2001
the PRC and the DPRK. This was only to be fol-
lowed by the disastrous consequences of the North Finally, a turning point came in 1999. In June, Kim
Korean food crisis in the mid-1990s, which caused Yong Nam, then a KWP politburo member and
flows of refugees to enter Manchuria. chairman of the DPRK’s Supreme People’s
Accompanying all these tensions was a steady Assembly, visited Beijing. In October, Chinese for-
decrease in the volume of PRC-DPRK trade. After eign minister Tang Jiaxuan visited Pyongyang. The
the two abolished their barter system for bilateral next year, Kim Jong Il shocked the world by agree-
trade in 1992, the value of Chinese–North Korean ing to attend the North-South summit. Right
trade reduced continuously in the following seven before the meeting, he visited China in May 2000.
years, from $899 million in 1993 to $370 million in Seven months later, in January 2001, he traveled to
1999. In the meantime, Beijing’s relations with China again—this time to Shanghai, China’s model
Seoul developed rapidly and comprehensively. case for reform and opening polices. Beginning in
 ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT

2000, Chinese–North Korean trade started increas- Beijing’s relationship with Pyongyang in the past half
ing. At the moment it seemed as if Kim Jong Il was century, though close in a general sense, has not been
willing to develop a reform strategy of his own ver- harmonious. And Beijing’s ability to influence the
sion. Meanwhile, high-level talks were waged orientation of Pyongyang’s attitudes and policies has
between Pyongyang and Washington, revealing the been quite limited. Even during the Korean War
possibility that the 1994 Geneva Agreement years, when large numbers of Chinese troops were
Framework, together with the result of the North- present on Korean territory, Beijing failed to stop
South summit, could be transformed into a new Kim Il Sung from purging outstanding members of
peace structure that would replace the unstable the Yan’an faction within the KWP. Kim Il Sung’s
“armistice regime” that had existed on the Korean shrewd handling of the 1956 crisis further demon-
peninsula for almost half century. strated that he was capable of sticking to his own
But this period of rosy hopes was short-lived. course of action in face of pressures from Beijing.
While Kim Jong Il failed to demonstrate a willing- Since then, Pyongyang has developed a policymaking
10 ness and ability to stick to the course of reconcilia- structure, as well as a rationality associated with it, that
tion initiated by the June 2000 North-South sum- is highly independent (epitomized by the Juche ideol-
mit,Washington’s inclusion of Pyongyang as part of ogy). In the post–Cold War age, Beijing and
the “axis of evil” further interrupted the process Pyongyang have been further driven apart by their
designed by Seoul, Beijing and Washington during different attitudes toward the existing international
previous years to engage North Korea. When the system and as a result of the passing away of the old
atmosphere of confrontation had replaced that of generation of leaders who communicated with each
reconciliation on the Korea peninsula, a crisis situa- other through special “personal ties.” In these senses,
tion emerged. Now, as is well known, the crisis is still Beijing has not occupied a more privileged position
developing, demonstrating the potential of another than others in dealing with Pyongyang’s leaders.
“Korean War.” Indeed, given that Korea historically had been
China’s sphere of influence and both Chinese and
CONCLUSION North Korean leaders have been extremely sensitive
toward the impact of that tradition, Beijing’s leaders
What will Beijing do to control this crisis? There is will have to show real caution in trying to advise, let
no simple answer. Beijing has plenty of reasons not alone applying pressure on, Pyongyang.
to allow the crisis to grow out of control. Since the Beijing’s real leverage on Pyongyang is North
mid-1970s and certainly during the post-Cold War Korea’s economic dependence upon China. But this
era, a fundamental feature of Beijing’s policy toward certainly does not mean that Beijing’s leaders are in
the Korean peninsula has been the maintenance of a position to impose certain policy decisions upon
the status quo. If any transformation in the region North Korea at will. In actuality, Beijing’s leaders are
were to happen, Beijing would prefer it to happen facing a major dilemma in this regard: if they do not
through negotiations between the two Koreas and apply the economic means, it is likely that their
through international diplomacy involving Beijing voice will go unheard by Pyongyang’s ears; but if
as a main East Asian power. Beijing’s leaders need they do use economic means—such as cutting off
North Korea to continuously serve as China’s strate- China’s aid to North Korea—this might backfire
gic buffer on its northeastern border, and need a sta- and, in the worst case scenario, might even cause
ble and peaceful environment in East Asia that will North Korea’s economic and societal collapse and
help promote Chin’s plans of economic moderniza- thus result in a huge blow to China’s own interests.
tion. Therefore, Beijing certainly has a strong desire Therefore, Beijing will have to act cautiously in
to help resolve the Korean nuclear crisis. designing and implementing its policies toward
However, the real problem is not what Beijing is Pyongyang. It seems that Beijing is yet to develop a
willing to do, but what it is in a position to do. satisfactory strategy to cope with this dilemma.
 UNEASY ALLIES: FIFTY YEARS OF CHINA-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS

China and North Korea

in a Changing World
SAMUEL S. KIM
THE EMERGING DOUBLE PARADOX

A
t the locus of the “last glacier of the Cold
War,” there is a double paradox at work on
the Korean peninsula, as it is structured
and symbolized by two competing alliances: PRC-
DPRK (1961) and ROK-U.S. (1954).The peninsu-
la is experiencing an unprecedented crisis of alliance 11
maintenance, and even survival. For better or worse,
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK), or North Korea, is the only country with
which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) main-
tains its 1961 Cold War alliance pact. Yet, amidst
Chinese worries that the U.S.-DPRK nuclear con-
frontation may spiral out of control, and an indicator
of this crisis, in March 2003 Beijing established a
Leading Group on the North Korean Crisis
(LGNKC). Headed by President Hu Jintao, the Beijing Area Study’s feeling thermometer (0-100
Group intends to improve assessment of the intelli- degrees), the mean degree of positive feeling toward
gence “black hole” over Pyongyang’s nuclear capa- South Korea was 58 degrees, in contrast to 47
bilities and intentions, as well as to construct a cost- degrees for the United States and 35 degrees for
effective conflict management strategy. Japan.
There is no mistaking that the half-century-old Against the backdrop of rising anti-
U.S.–Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance has also Americanism—more accurately anti-Bushism—in
recently been mired in unprecedented disarray, recent years there has also been a “China vogue”
especially since the coming of the hard-line Bush (Hanfeng) underway in South Korea, just as there is
administration in 2001. Even more tellingly, Sino- an “ROK wave” (Hanliu) in China. In the context of
ROK relations in political, economic, cultural, and the unfolding nuclear crisis on the Korean
perceptual terms have grown by leaps and bounds Peninsula, Beijing is moving closer to Seoul than to
over the past decade. According to a major public Pyongyang or Washington, just as Seoul is moving
opinion survey conducted by the ROK Ministry of closer to Beijing than to its superpower ally in
Information in 1996, 47.1 percent of South Koreans Washington or even Pyongyang. To some Chinese
chose China as Korea’s “closest partner for the year analysts, Seoul’s stand is rational and sensible, consti-
2006,” in striking contrast to only 24.8 percent tuting one of the biggest safeguards that have pre-
selecting the United States. In a major multinational vented the U.S.-DPRK nuclear confrontation from
citizens’ opinion survey jointly sponsored by Tong-a escalating into war.
Ilbo (Seoul) and Asahi Shinbun (Tokyo) and con-
ducted in the fall of 2000, 52.6 percent of South MANAGING ASYMMETRIC
Korean citizen-respondents predicted China to be SECURITY INTERDEPENDENCE
the most influential Asian power in ten years, com-
pared to only 23.3 percent for Japan and 8.1 percent A brief review of the creation of the complex and
for the United States. Similarly, according to the evolving Beijing-Pyongyang-Seoul triangle recog-

Samuel S. Kim is adjunct professor of political science and associate director of the Center for Korean Research at
Columbia University.
 ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT

nizes the ineluctable truth that the shift from a one- reform and opening, while North Korea remains an
Korea to a two-Koreas policy is one of the most insecure hermit kingdom, a country with seemingly
momentous changes in China’s post-Cold War poli- fatal contradictions on the verge of explosion or
cy. In contrast with China’s 1950 decision to inter- implosion.
vene in the Korean War, the Joint Communiqué of What then explains the paradox of North Korea’s
1992 that normalized China-South Korea relations survival as it continues to muddle through with
lacked all the hallmarks of a foreign policy crisis. By China as its only formal ally, even while Beijing
fits and starts, Beijing’s Korea policy in the long finds Pyongyang increasingly difficult to deal with?
Deng decade evolved through several phases—from Indeed, the single greatest challenge confronting
the familiar one-Korea (pro-Pyongyang) policy to a Beijing is the weakness, not the strength, of
one-Korea de jure/two-Koreas de facto policy and post–Kim Il Sung North Korea.
finally to a policy of two-Koreas de facto and de
jure. The normalization decision was the culmina- STABILITY VERSUS SURVIVAL
12 tion of a process of balancing and adjusting post-
Mao foreign policy to the logic of changing domes- Faced with asymmetrical interdependence realities
tic, regional, and global situations. on the ground, Beijing seeks to achieve multiple,
For China, the greatest challenge to smooth mutually competing goals on several fronts. These
management of the new Beijing-Pyongyang-Seoul goals include maintaining peace and stability on the
relationship has remained Pyongyang’s security Korean peninsula, promoting economic exchange
behavior, which has varied from nuclear brinkman- and cooperation with South Korea, helping North
ship to missile-coercive diplomacy. The North Korea’s regime survive, halting the flow of North
Korean security predicament, along with the ques- Korean refugees into Jilin Province, stopping the rise
tion of how to manage it in a cost-effective way, has of ethnonationalism among ethnic Chinese-
remained one of the most important challenges Koreans, and enhancing China’s influence in Korean
confronting China’s foreign relations in the affairs. Put simply, China’s foreign-policy wish list
post–Cold War world. An unstable North Korea with respect to its northeast neighbor includes at
with inordinate potential to destabilize Northeast least five “no’s”: no instability, no collapse, no nukes,
Asia with the threat of its conventional and non- no refugees or defectors, and no conflict escalation.
conventional military capabilities has extraordinary Nonetheless, China’s geopolitical calculus must
refractory ramifications for China’s foreign policy in also be understood in a larger context of grand
general and its two-Koreas policy in particular. strategic goals and practical means of international
Whether Beijing likes it or not, Pyongyang’s conduct that Chinese leaders have [Link]
brinkmanship has already become an important in this light, China’s foreign policy forms a double
security issue in regional and global politics, espe- triangulation: domestic, regional, and global levels
cially in America’s East Asian policy and Sino- interact in the pursuit of three overarching demands
American relations. and goals. The first is economic development, with
Although Beijing’s relations with North Korea an eye to enhancing domestic stability and legitima-
began to be renormalized in recent years (1999- [Link] second is promotion of a peaceful and secure
2001), due in no small part to shared threat percep- external environment free of threats to China’s sov-
tions emanating from the America-led Kosovo war, ereignty and territorial integrity in Asia. And the
there remains just beneath the surface a highly third overarching goal is cultivation of its status as a
asymmetrical interdependence in all political, mili- responsible great power in global politics. In order
tary, and economic issue areas. This is still a fragile to compensate for growing domestic security and
relationship of strategic convenience fraught with legitimacy deficits, Beijing’s foreign policy faces
the underlying tensions and asymmetries of mutual intense demand to accelerate economic develop-
expectations and interests. Thanks to growing ment and restore China’s great-power status in the
enmeshment in the global community, China’s con- world. China’s fourth-generation leadership now
cept and practice of “security” has experienced con- officially proclaims the maintenance of domestic sta-
siderable modification in the post-Mao era of bility, or the successful establishment of a “well-off
 UNEASY ALLIES: FIFTY YEARS OF CHINA-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS

society” (xiaokang shehui) as the single greatest chal- er if barter transactions and aid are factored into
lenge in the years ahead. these figures. In contrast, South Korea’s trade with
For the DPRK, however, the most daunting chal- China in 2002 amounted to $44 billion—60 times
lenge is how to survive as it seeks more aid as an greater than that of North Korea—with a huge
external life–support system, without triggering a annual trade surplus of $6 to $10 billion. For the first
cataclysmic system collapse. According to the ROK time since the collapse of Sinocentric order in East
Ministry of Unification, over 20 percent of food and Asia in the late 19th century, in 2002 China reassert-
over 50 percent of fuel in North Korea comes from ed its historic role as the largest trade partner of the
foreign [Link] end of the Cold War, the demise of Korean peninsula as a whole.
the Soviet Union, and the end of Sino-Soviet rival- The third notable characteristic of PRC-DPRK
ry have transformed both the context and the con- economic relations is that North Korea’s aid
dition for maintaining the traditional “lips-to-teeth” dependency has grown unabated. Although the
strategic ties. Still, North Korea has earned a reputa- exact amount of China’s aid remains unknown, sup-
tion as “the power of the weak,” creating and using port for North Korea is generally estimated at one- 13
crises to extract concessions to compensate for quarter to one-third of China’s overall foreign aid.
growing domestic failings. With continuing asym- By mid 1994, China accounted for about three-
metries of needs and expectations, Beijing’s foreign quarters of North Korea’s oil and food imports.
policy objectives coalesce, clash, or compete with More recently, China is reported to be providing 70
those of Pyongyang in situation-specific ways. to 90 percent of North Korea’s oil and a third of its
imports and food aid. With the cessation of
MANAGING ASYMMETRIC America’s heavy-fuel oil delivery in December
SOCIO-ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 2002, China’s oil aid and exports may now be in
excess of 90 percent of North Korea’s energy aid.
From the perspective of post-Mao reform, the Whether intentionally or not, Beijing has become
South Korean economy has represented opportuni- more deeply involved, playing a crucial role year to
ties to be more fully exploited, whereas North year in the politics of regime survival by providing
Korea’s economic troubles have posed a burden to more aid in a wider variety of forms: direct govern-
be lessened without damaging geopolitical ties or ment-to-government aid, subsidized cross-border
causing system collapse. In the wake of the 1990 trade, and private barter transactions.
Soviet-ROK normalization, China’s status as North Paradoxically, Pyongyang’s growing dependence
Korea’s biggest trading partner and principal eco- on Beijing for economic and political survival has
nomic patron has become a mixed blessing. In the led to mutual distrust and resentment. Just as Mao
process of the geopolitical and geoeconomic trans- demanded and resented Soviet aid for China’s
formations of the early post–Cold War years, a high- nuclear development, first Kim Il Sung and now
ly asymmetric Beijing-Pyongyang-Seoul triangular Kim Jong Il have demanded but also resented
economic relationship has emerged. Chinese aid. Indeed, Pyongyang’s seeming inability
China’s economic relations with the DPRK over to rework its national identity in the face of a
the years is notable in several respects. First, Sino- changing geopolitical context has engendered
DPRK trade seems closely keyed to and determined intense behind-the-scenes bargaining amidst an
by turbulent political trajectories. Second, North atmosphere of mutual suspicion. In every high-level
Korea’s trade deficits with China have been chronic meeting between the two governments, the North
and substantial, amounting to a cumulative total of Korean request for economic aid dominates the
$4.45 billion between 1990 and 2002—$6.1 billion agenda. Nonetheless, Beijing continues to provide
imported from China and only $1.7 billion export- minimal necessary survival aid in order to lessen the
ed to China. While China remained North Korea’s flow of refugees into China, to delay a potential
largest trade partner in the 1990s in terms of total North Korean collapse, and to enhance China’s own
value, Beijing has allowed Pyongyang to run average leverage in Pyongyang and Seoul. However, since
annual deficits of approximately $358 million since North Koreans realize that China’s aid is given for
1995. China’s role in the DPRK’s trade is even larg- Beijing’s own self-interest, it has not actually
 ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT

increased China’s leverage with Pyongyang, much to Washington. For the first time, Beijing successfully
Beijing’s growing chagrin and frustration. initiated and hosted a round of trilateral talks involv-
The rapid growth of Sino-Korean interactions at ing the United States, the DPRK, and China in
all levels involving political, economic, educational, Beijing (April 23-25). Despite, or perhaps because,
religious, and humanitarian actors has also created a of the inconclusive ending of the Beijing talks,
mixture of emerging challenges for identity politics China’s sudden burst of conflict-management activ-
in the complex web of asymmetrical interdepend- ity in the form of jet-setting preventive diplomacy
ence. There has already emerged a Pyongyang- accelerated. In July 2003, Beijing dispatched its top
Beijing-Seoul triangle of human movements, troubleshooter—Deputy Foreign Minister Dai
involving flows of some 200,000 to 300,000 Bingquo—to Moscow, Pyongyang, and Washington
refugees from North Korea to northeast China, to seek ways of “finding common ground while
more than 400,000 Chinese middle-class tourists preserving differences” (qiutong cunyi).
and about 135,000 Chinese-Korean (chosonjok) ille- Despite the recurring and somewhat nebulous
14 gal migrant workers from China to South Korea, reassurance that China seeks a denuclearized Korean
and almost a million South Korean tourists to China peninsula and that the crisis must be solved peace-
in 2000, reaching 1.72 million visitors in 2002. In fully, it is becoming increasingly obvious that
2001, there were for the first time more Chinese China’s status-quo seeking diplomacy is no longer
visitors (some 444,000) to South Korea than tenable because the status quo on the ground is
[Link] this backdrop, the North Korean changing rapidly in dangerous directions. One small
refugee question, hitherto a much ignored potential but still inconclusive example of China’s changing
time bomb for both Koreas, has brought into sharp geostrategic calculus on the Korean peninsula is that
relief Beijing’s abiding concerns about a North in the spring of 2003 some Chinese analysts were
Korean collapse leading to Korean reunification by openly beginning to question the strategic value of
Southern absorption. the Sino-DPRK alliance with American interlocu-
tors, while others were espousing the need for a new
AVOIDING THE NUCLEAR APOCALYPSE thinking, a new strategy, and a new preventive diplo-
macy.
Beijing’s uncharacteristically proactive conflict- Nonetheless, the major catalyst for Beijing’s
management role in the latest U.S.-DPRK nuclear hands-on preventive diplomacy is growing security
standoff suggests China’s changing strategic calculus concerns about possible U.S. recklessness in trying
and reprioritization of the many competing interests to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis through
and goals. At least until the end of 2002, China military means. Some Chinese analysts argue that
maintained a “who me?” posture, trying hard to the Bush administration is more interested in resolv-
keep out of harm’s way with a strategy of calculated ing the North Korean nuclear crisis with smart
ambiguity and [Link] a way of maximizing weapons than with dialogue and negotiations.
its influence over Korean affairs, China often sought Indeed, the conventional wisdom that the second
to be all things to all parties—which raises questions U.S.-DPRK nuclear crisis began in October 2002,
about their true intentions. In short, Beijing fol- when Pyongyang admitted the existence of a secret
lowed Deng’s foreign policy axiom of “hiding its highly-enriched-uranium (HEU) program, is only
light under a bushel” by not placing itself on the partly right. In fact, this crisis was long in the mak-
front lines of the Korean conflict as either a media- ing. In June 2000, the Clinton administration
tor or peacemaker for fear it might get burned if announced its decision to expunge the term “rogue
something went wrong. state” from the U.S. foreign policy lexicon, explain-
All of this has changed in the heat of the second ing that the category had already outlived its useful-
nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, in several [Link] candidate Bush continued to use the term
dramatic and unprecedented ways. In the first quar- “rogue state” to refer to North Korea, Iran, and Iraq.
ter of 2003, Beijing was busy at long-distance tele- Then came the “axis of evil” state of the union
phone diplomacy, reportedly having passed over fifty speech in January 2002, which upgraded the rogue-
messages back and forth between Pyongyang and state strategy to the evil-state strategy. It became
 UNEASY ALLIES: FIFTY YEARS OF CHINA-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS

increasingly evident that this was more than rhetor- Charybdis of allied entrapment, with the continuing
ical posturing, as shown by a series of radical shifts in danger of being caught in conflict escalation not of
America’s military doctrine (e.g., the Quadrennial its own making.
Defense Review that called for a paradigm shift
from threat-based to capability-based models, the CHINA’S CONFLICT MANAGEMENT ROLE
Nuclear Posture Review lowering the threshold of
use of tactical nukes, and the Bush doctrine of pre- The U.S.-DPRK nuclear standoff has triggered an
emption). agonizing reappraisal of the strategic value of the
From Beijing’s perspective, the perverse and self- Sino-DPRK allied relationship. Some Chinese
defeating consequences of the evil-state strategy are scholars have begun to discuss, for the first time,
seen as aiding and abetting hard-liners in Pyongyang whether Pyongyang is an asset or liability in China’s
and fueling the compensatory brinkmanship/break- grand strategic calculus, in comparison to the costs
down/breakthrough (BBB) behavior of the first and benefits of enhanced cooperation with
U.S.-DPRK nuclear standoff in 1994. Faced with Washington. While both Pyongyang and 15
such a clear and present danger, along with the U.S. Washington, according to Shi Yinhong of Renmin
decision to stop sending the monthly heavy fuel University, are to blame for the current terrible and
supplies that were part of the 1994 U.S.-DPRK dangerous situation on the Korean peninsula, the
Agreed Framework, Pyongyang did what most former holds more direct responsibility than the lat-
countries under similar circumstances would do. ter. Shi sees three worst-case scenarios looming over
What particularly unnerved Chinese leaders was the the North Korean issue: (1) North Korean nuclear
news on April 2003 that Defense Secretary Donald blackmail directed at China; (2) Japan going nuclear;
Rumsfeld had circulated a memorandum proposing and (3) a U.S.-DPRK war. China must therefore
that the United States ally itself with China to iso- move away from tactical maneuvering to grand
late and bring about a collapse of the North Korean strategic restructuring and reprioritization, breaking
regime. Thus, China’s “cooperative behavior”—to free from moral constraints to seek and supplement
go along with America’s regime change strategy— diplomatic mediation efforts with economic sanc-
became the litmus test for enhanced Sino-American tions.
cooperation. Beijing’s proactive preventive diploma- The question for Chinese leaders and policy ana-
cy seems designed to preempt America’s evil-state lysts is still whether the costs of a dramatic change—
coercive strategy. After all, “evil” is something to be refugees, possible war on the peninsula, and the loss
destroyed, not something to negotiate with. Indeed, of a strategic buffer, among others—sufficiently out-
the Bush administration has boxed itself—and weigh the benefits of regime change in the North.
North Korea—into a corner. To date, China’s official position remains the same: it
The Chinese leadership, faced with the harsh is opposed to any coercive sanctions measures since
realities on the ground, is giving the crisis the high- they only lead to more provocative and potentially
est priority. As Pyongyang continues to command destabilizing countermeasures. China is more com-
what former Commander of United States Forces in mitted to the immediate challenge of maintaining
Korea Gen. John H. Tilelli, Jr., called “tyranny of stability than it is to pursuing its long-term objective
proximity,” in early 2003 President Bush shifted of nuclear disarmament on the Korean peninsula.
gears toward non sequitur diplomacy—he is willing Apart from maximizing its leverage as a balancer, the
to talk but never negotiate. Meanwhile, Pentagon greatest danger is from two alternative possibilities:
hawks are working overtime concocting all kinds of conflict or collapse. China’s junior socialist ally in
strangulation strategies, such as Rumsfeld’s the strategic buffer zone could feel so cornered that
Operations Plan 5030 and the eleven-nation it fights back, triggering a full-blown armed confla-
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to establish an gration. Alternatively, economic sanctions could
air and naval blockade/sanctions regime. China’s work so well as to produce another collapsing
challenge, therefore, is to navigate between the socialist regime on China’s borders, with huge polit-
Scylla of allied abandonment, with the potential for ical, economic, and social consequences for Chinese
instability and/or collapse in North Korea, and the domestic politics. Beijing’s realpolitik logic here
 ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT

seems clear enough: to abandon or rebuke very modest to virtually [Link] China generating
Pyongyang publicly, especially during a crisis situa- a trade surplus of over $103 billion in 2002 (by U.S.
tion, would be to follow the Soviet fallacy of prema- calculations), the United States is the one country
ture allied abandonment, losing whatever leverage it that can help or hinder China’s march to great pow-
may still have in the politics of divided Korea. erdom. However, the Bush administration’s relent-
Moreover, Beijing believes, as do many North less pressure on China to exercise its leverage, main-
Korea experts, that Pyongyang’s HEU program may ly through economic sanctions, may well exceed the
have started as a hedge or a strategic “ace in the price that Beijing is willing or able to pay in pushing
hole” but was accelerated in response to the per- Pyongyang in potentially dangerous directions.
ceived ratcheting-up of hostile attitude by the Bush Third is the often-overlooked question of nuclear
administration. The logic of Beijing’s proactive pre- fairness and justice. If nuclear weapons are necessary
ventive diplomacy is to avert the crystallization of for China’s security, or if Israel, India, and Pakistan
conditions under which Pyongyang could calculate can get away with building a weapons program by
16 that lashing out—to preempt America’s preventive dint of not signing the Nuclear Non-proliferation
strike, as it were—is a rational course of action, even Treaty, why is the same not true for North Korea?
if victory were impossible. Pyongyang asserted as much in its repeated state-
China’s preferred solution is now advanced in the ments that if missile development is permissible for
form of a comprehensive package deal stressing sev- the United States, China, Russia, and Japan, then it is
eral key elements: (1) restarting diplomatic dialogue surely permissible for the DPRK. In short, as the
and negotiations in an bi-multilateral framework world’s third largest nuclear power, Beijing cannot
(trilateral talks with bilateral talks on the sidelines); capture the high moral ground in pushing too vig-
(2) avoiding any hostile or provocative rhetoric and orously for unilateral nuclear disarmament of an
actions; and (3) specifying security assurances and insecure hermit kingdom in its strategic buffer zone.
economic aid in exchange for dismantling the
nuclear program, thus reviving and revising the 1994 CONCLUSION
Agreed Framework.
Yet such a comprehensive but flexible proposal is The interplay of a rising China and a declining
easier proposed than accepted. Certainly, Beijing is North Korea in the post–Cold War world is com-
better situated than any other regional power to plex and often confusing, with paradoxical expecta-
help both Pyongyang and Washington think outside tions and consequences. On the one hand, contrary
the box of their mutual making. Nonetheless, there to conventional realist wisdom, China usually
are least three major constraints on China’s leverage behaves as a largely conservative status quo power,
in the resolution of the U.S.-DPRK nuclear con- more satisfied with its born-again national status and
frontation. security than at any time since the founding of the
First, China does not have as much influence People’s Republic in 1949. On the other hand,
over North Korea’s security behavior as Washington North Korea at first glance seems like a textbook
believes. China’s primary leverage is food and oil case of how most Chinese dynasties collapsed under
aid, but this is a double-edge sword, so Beijing is the twin blows of neiluan and waihuan (internal dis-
cautious to a fault for fear of provoking and/or caus- order and external calamity). Yet the DPRK has
ing collapse in the North, with all the social, eco- defied all collapsist scenarios and predictions, as well
nomic, and political destabilizing consequences. as the classical realist axiom that the strong do what
Paradoxically, China’s leverage is also its vulnerabili- they have the power to do and the weak accept
ty. Strategically located at the vortex of Northeast what they have to accept. For its own geopolitical
Asian security—indeed, the most important strate- interests and domestic and regional stability, Beijing
gic nexus of the Asia-Pacific region—Pyongyang has played a generally positive role in Korean affairs,
could potentially entrap China and/or all other not only providing necessary economic support to
regional powers in a spiral of conflict escalation. the DPRK, but also making it clear to Seoul,
Second, China’s leverage in reshaping the Bush Washington, and Tokyo that it is now in the com-
administration’s rogue-state strategy ranges from mon interest of all to promote the peaceful coexis-
 UNEASY ALLIES: FIFTY YEARS OF CHINA-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS

tence of the two Korean states on the peninsula healthy society as the top priority. There is every
rather than having to cope with the turmoil, chaos, indication that Chinese leaders are determined not
and probable massive exodus of refugees that would to repeat the Soviet strategic blunder of placing an
follow in the wake of system collapse in the North. unbearable defense burden on its economy by
In the early 1950s it was common to hear the ral- spending too much on its military forces.
lying cry that China needed to start a tidal wave of China is arguably a more influential player in the
learning from the Soviet Union so as to make today’s reshaping of the future of the Korean peninsula than
Soviet Union tomorrow’s China. Half a century at any time since the Korean War and than any other
later, perhaps the greatest challenge to China’s lead- peripheral power. And yet its capacity to initiate or
ership in the uncertain years ahead is how to prevent implement consistent policies toward the two
tomorrow’s China from becoming yesterday’s Soviet Koreas is increasingly constrained by the norms and
Union. Many Chinese leaders and scholars have practices of important domestic groups, and north-
come to recognize the ineluctable Toynbeean truth east Asian regional and global regimes, as well as the
that the degeneration of a large country or empire— United States. When all is said and done, the future 17
such as the former Soviet Union and many Chinese of North Korea is not for China to make. China can
dynasties—starts from the internal roots of ethnona- help or hinder North Korea in taking one system-
tional separatism, economic stagnation, or political rescuing approach instead of another, but in the end
and social chaos, and they see the need to respond to no external power can determine North Korea’s
the challenge of establishing a stable, orderly, and future.
 ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT

Asymmetric Nuisance Value:

The Border in China-DPRK Relations
HAZEL SMITH

C
hinese-Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (DPRK, more commonly known as
North Korea) international relations are con-
ventionally understood as if both countries were
monolithic actors, controlling and directing all inter-
country activities through the medium of a small
number of elite government and military officials.
18 This picture provides only a partial representation of
the truth. North Koreans and Chinese engage in sub-
stantial interaction along the China-DPRK border—
to varying degrees of intensity and with the involve-
ment of diverse actors. Border interactions have not
provided a major source of conflict although some
official and non-official DPRK activities have provid-
ed asymmetric nuisance value for [Link] border
for the DPRK is a source of access to food, goods and
income. China remains willing to permit North
Koreans to engage in cross-border activities but has The complexity of Chinese-DPRK relations is
reacted forcefully to secure its own interests when perhaps best illustrated through a study of political,
these were threatened by DPRK border activity. economic and social dynamics along the long, open,
The interaction of North Korean and Chinese geographically and demographically diverse land
elites is limited geographically and functionally. border between the two countries. Given that even
North Korean and Chinese elites normally only the most informed audience with empirical data has
visit each other’s capitals whilst interaction is formal paid scarce attention to the border, the first purpose
and restricted to matters of high politics. While of this essay is to demonstrate the diversity of back-
Chinese officials and senior academics have privi- ground conditions along the border that serve to
leged access to Pyongyang they are not permitted to enable or constrain cooperation and conflict. The
move around the country or engage in independent second purpose of the essay is to inform policy
activities. Apart from official elites, however, other debates of all those involved in seeking stability and
North Korean and Chinese actors engage in regular peace on the Korean peninsula such as to provide
interaction of varying degrees of intensity. These ideas for improved and more nuanced policy inter-
include Chinese and North Korean businesses, local ventions, both on border issues and in the context of
governments on both sides of the border, humani- broader China-DPRK relations. Certainly, China-
tarian organisations and churches (in China), aca- DPRK border relations are not as politically impor-
demics and Chinese and North Korean individuals tant or as sensitive as the major security dynamics
who are engaged in regular border crossings, of both with which China is currently involved as interme-
a legal and illegal nature. If Chinese-DPRK interac- diary between the DPRK and the United States.
tion is only understood as what happens between However, a study of border relations allows some
elites, the extent of Chinese interaction with the insight into the various dynamics of the DPRK’s
DPRK state and society and, conversely, DPRK international relations with its contiguous neigh-
interaction with Chinese state and society, is under- bour such as to indicate that the DPRK state and
estimated and therefore poorly understood. society is neither monolithic nor homogeneous and

Hazel Smith is director of the masters program in international relations at the University of Warwick.
 UNEASY ALLIES: FIFTY YEARS OF CHINA-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS

can be understood using conventional tools of social Geographical, topographical and climactic condi-
science analysis. tions, combined with economic parameters, help to
This essay uses DPRK provincial boundaries, shape the social limits of transborder contacts.
providing geographical and administrative differen- Populations of the southern part of the DPRK are
tiation, to supply the analytical focus for comparing not drawn to the northern border [Link] climate
sources and dynamics of conflict and cooperation. is too extreme, the mountainous and forested terrain
Given this essay is concerned with border relations, for the most part precludes extensive agricultural
the focus is on the four northern border provinces development—compared to the southern region’s
of the DPRK. The far western province is North relatively better agricultural capacity, and the jour-
Pyongan, to its east is Chagang, east of which is ney to the north, especially the northeast, is too
Ryanggang and the most northeasterly North physically difficult to attract ‘southern’ migration.
Korean province is North Hamgyong. Likewise, non-northeastern Chinese citizens find
little to take them to the China/DPRK border
DIVERSE DYNAMICS area—especially in the further eastern stretches. 19
ON ALONG AND POROUS BORDER Chinese citizens are attracted to the economically
developing cities of Beijing and Shanghai—not to
The thousand mile long border between North the poor farming and mining areas and severe win-
Korea and China is mountainous, forested and ter climates of the remote northeastern provinces of
sparsely populated. It is enormously long when con- Jilin and Heilongang. The major exception along
sidered against the entire length of the Korean the China/DPRK border is Liaoning, the Chinese
peninsula (North and South combined) at 621 miles border province with northwest DPRK, which
and compared to the widest point of the peninsula contains the economically important port city of
1
at 150 miles. The border follows the length of the Dalian, and provides a pole of substantial economic
Yalu and Tumen rivers—separating the two coun- attraction for non-northeast China citizens. On the
tries by a continuous stretch of water but allowing whole, however, border interaction between China
for relatively easy interaction, especially in winter and North Korean citizens takes place between
when sub-Siberian temperatures cause the rivers to Chinese and Koreans border peoples (broadly
freeze over and North Koreans and Chinese can defined), most of whom will have had long-lasting
simply walk across the narrower river [Link] historical ties to the region.
China-DPRK border is largely devoid of an overt There are historical ties binding Chinese and
security presence with few guard posts or man- North Korean border inhabitants. North Koreans
made barriers like fences, barbed wire emplace- fighting the Japanese in the first half of the twentieth
ments or surveillance position, that might inhibit century based themselves in Manchuria in China as
transborder [Link] most visible security is at well as in the Russian border provinces. North
the major border crossing between Sinuiju (DPRK) Koreans fought in Mao’s armies—resulting in victo-
and Dandong (China) but other crossings at Hyesan ry against the nationalists in 1949, while the Chinese
(Ryanggang province, DPRK), Tumen and contribution to the Korean War of 1950-53 is well
Namyang (North Hamgyong province, DPRK) known. United States forces bombed Chinese bor-
possess only a desultory military presence. The der towns during the Korean War—local Chinese
absence of electricity on the North Korean side of populations are still highly skeptical of U.S. forces
the border also makes transborder activities difficult claims that these were accidental bombings. General
to police. On the other hand, inadequate road net- MacArthur’s stated intention to drop an atomic
works (improving on the China side, disastrous and bomb on the Yalu, which would have killed and
decrepit on the North Korean side), an abundance maimed Koreans and Chinese citizens alike, eventu-
of tough mountain ranges on both sides of the bor- ally vetoed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, may not have
der, and severe winter temperatures provide a prohi- been fully communicated to Chinese citizens, but
bition of their own to easy physical human and eco- the legacy of U.S. bombing, still visible in burned
nomic interchange. out border bridges also leaves a heritage of sympathy
 ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT

for the DPRK in its conflict with the United instance, may visit Musan (a border mining county
2
States. in North Hamgyong) but may not travel to
Culturally, there are variegated relationships Pyongyang on that special visa. There are also
across the border. To the west, the DPRK borders restrictions in that a Chinese person living in North
Chinese-speaking communities, while to the east Hamgyong, married to a North Korean, may rela-
the DPRK shares its border with the Korean-speak- tively easily obtain a visa and DPRK permission to
ing part of China, Yanbian, and at the outermost visit China, but it is much more difficult to gain
eastern part, the DPRK joins together with both DPRK authorization to visit China accompanied
Russia and China. The closest transborder cultural by their spouse.
links are, naturally enough, with Korean speaking
communities in the Korean Autonomous Prefecture GEOGRAPHICAL DIFFERENTIATION AS A
of Yanbian, in Jilin province and the neighbouring LOCUS OF CONFLICT/COOPERATION ANALYSIS
DPRK provinces of Ryanggang and North
20 [Link] is the only Korean autonomous Common to all four DPRK border provinces is the
region in China, although its population is tiny—at pull of an economically prosperous China with
an estimated 2.2 million in 2003. Of this total pop- food, goods, sometimes jobs and relative freedom.
ulation, less than half—fewer than 900,000—are Common to all four also is the push factor—an eco-
[Link] largest concentration of ethnic nomically devastated and food insecure country,
Koreans of Chinese citizenship is in Yanji City, the lacking basic goods even had the population the
capital of Yanbian and the largest human settlement wherewithal to purchase, a decimated public infra-
in the prefecture. But even here the ethnic Korean structure, with freedoms circumscribed or denied.
population stands only at around 210,000, compared Not all these conditions hold to the same extent for
to a population of 350,000 for the entire city. The every member of the population. In some areas,
Korean dialect in Yanji City, the capital of Yanbian, is food is more readily available than in others; in some
close to the North Korean dialect, containing areas the diminution of state security capacity in the
vocabulary and verbal usages common to both sides wake of the deterioration of the economy means
of the border, and uncommon in South [Link] there is increased freedom of movement and deci-
continuation of cultural linkages is assisted by the sion-making capacity for some. In any case, these
range of opportunities provided for licit and illicit common factors might indicate a common border
border crossings in this area—where the river nar- problem in terms of the potential for North Korean
rows in a number of places. illegal emigration to China. Illegal emigration is not,
in fact, an issue in cross-border relations for the
Recognizing the special nature entire border region and therefore does not consti-
of transborder ties tute a general factor of conflict (or cooperation)
The Chinese and DPRK governments recognise between the two states. Instead, each of the four
the special nature of transborder social ties, particu- North Korean border provinces has distinctive eco-
larly between the DPRK and Yanbian. A Chinese nomic and demographic dynamics, such that there
consulate is located in Chongjin, a major port city are consequential differences in respect to con-
in North Hamgyong, the most northeasterly flict/cooperation relations depending on geographic
province of the DPRK, to service the Chinese location.
traders, business representatives and family members
that visit the northeast of the country by way of the North Pyongan—China’s dominance
northern border. Special visa arrangements are also North Pyongan contains the important border town
in place between the DPRK and China whereby of Sinuiju and forms the northern most point of the
nationals of Yanbian, and nationals of DPRK coun- Nampo/Pyongyang/Sinuiju (NPS) economic cor-
ties bordering Yanbian may relatively easily visit each ridor and, comparatively speaking, the economically
other—although these visas do not qualify either dynamic part of the DPRK. North Pyongan, South
nationals to visit other parts of the respective coun- Pyongan, and Pyongyang—the three provinces that
tries. A Chinese businessperson from Yanbian, for enclose the NPS economic corridor, each contain
 UNEASY ALLIES: FIFTY YEARS OF CHINA-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS

12 to 13 percent of the country’s population— brought in all goods that did not arrive by sea, pri-
between two and three million people in each marily through Dandong. Chinese trading firms,
3
province. The only province with a larger popula- based in Dandong, acted as intermediaries for inter-
tion is South Hamgyong, situated on the country’s national organizations, based in the DPRK, and also
east coast. North Pyongan is heavily populated with traded directly with the North Korean government.
2.6 million people, according to 2001 figures. North Transborder economic activity brought jobs, goods,
Pyongan contains a mix of economic sectors but it income and hard currency to the Sinuiju area—not
was, in 2001, a food surplus province in that it could enough to obviate widespread grinding poverty but
just about feed all its people with a reported food enough to provide more economic opportunities
availability per capita of 234 kg (for comparison, the for local populations than in many other parts of the
Food and Agriculture Organisation set 167 kg per DPRK. Local governments on both sides of the
capita as the average minimum food requirement). border had every incentive to maintain economic
Food deficits did not therefore provide as much of intercourse.
an impetus for emigration to China as in food Sources of potential and actual conflict also exist- 21
deficit provinces. ed. DPRK central government relations with
The wide river mouth maintains a physical dis- Chinese central government were strained by
tance between local North Korean and Chinese Pyongyang’s unilateral attempt in September 2002
populations but the simple sight of abundant elec- to install a free trade zone in Sinuiju, headed up by a
tricity at night in China compared to the darkness Dutch-Chinese citizen,Yang Bin. The Sinuiju free
of the North Korean side gives enough evidence to trade zone would have been absent all DPRK
both populations of the economic disparities domestic economic regulation—giving potentially
between the two countries. The relatively heavily free rein to a transborder overspill to the ‘grey’ mar-
policed Sinuiju area—compared to other border ket activities that are already developing in the
crossings—may be testimony to a DPRK fear of DPRK—ranging from customs evasion on petty
North Korean emigration to China and Chinese trade to corruption and alleged narcotics trafficking.
apprehension of such a development. An inhibitory The absence of a settled rule of law in the DPRK to
factor on North Korean emigration efforts, howev- oversee an economy that has been transformed from
er, is the language barrier. Dandong is a Chinese a state run command operation to one that, since
speaking area and poor North Koreans, unable to 1995 at least was marketised but not liberalised,
speak Chinese and unfamiliar with the territory and meant that even without malice aforethought,
customs, would not fare well without legal docu- Sinuiju could have become a magnet for east Asian
mentation and financial support. Mass North transnational organised crime including the proxi-
Korean emigration is feared by both DPRK and mate Chinese snakeheads (people smugglers),
Chinese authorities and, given the absence of an Russian criminals based in Vladivostok and Japanese
empathetic Korean-Chinese community in yakuzas (gangsters)—not to mention homegrown
4
Dandong and surrounding areas compared to the North (and South) Korean criminal elements. This
existence of such a community further East along was especially so given that Sinuiju borders
the border, there remains shared interests between Liaoning, an economically dynamic Chinese
both local and central governments to preventing province—whose major port of Dalian is home to a
such a development. Versace outlet and five star hotels. China had already
Sources of transborder cooperation existed by shown its anxiety to clean up the local economy in a
way of the possibilities for dynamic economic inter- recent crackdown on corrupt government officials
change between the two border towns. Dandong, in Liaoning, in an attempt to make the province
the China border town, stands in a similar relation- more attractive for foreign investment.
ship to Sinuiju as San Diego does to Tijuana, China’s response to the announcement of the
Mexico, benefiting from its position as the most free trade zone in Sinuiju was swift and publicly
important Chinese border crossing for trade with humiliating for the [Link] Chinese authorities
the DPRK. Major humanitarian agencies, in sup- arrested Yang Bin on charges of bribery, forging
port of the largest food aid operation in the world, documents, illegal use of land and fraudulent con-
 ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT

tracts, with the Liaoning People’s court sentencing extent of regularly reaching below minus 20 centi-
5
him to 18 years imprisonment in July 2003. This grade—roads are often impassible and there are
was more than a broad hint to Pyongyang that enormous logistical difficulties in transporting basic
China would not tolerate potentially harmful devel- supplies to the population. The government has,
opments on its border as a result of DPRK actions. however, poured enormous investment into agricul-
China also demonstrated that it would not always be ture in Ryanggang, helped by the Swiss govern-
careful to save its neighbour’s face if it felt its inter- ment, and focused on expanding potato production.
ests were directly threatened. The county of Taehongdan, with its flat uplands, has
been the recipient of most of this investment. As a
Chagang—An absence of information result, in 2000 Taehongdan boasted the second high-
Chagang has a population of 1.2 million and est figure of grain production per capita in the entire
although the province is geographically large, the country. Families from other parts of the country
land is 98 percent mountainous and therefore con- were resettled in Ryanggang to take advantage of
22 tains many very sparsely populated counties. these investments in agriculture and demobilized
Consequently, about 75 percent of the population military personnel have also been encouraged to
6
is located in urban areas. Food production is well migrate to the province to contribute to the drive to
below that required to feed the population at the increase potato production. The grain production
most basic level—at 113 kg per capita per annum figures per capita in 2001 showed that the province
7
in 2001. Of all the provinces, Chagang is least could just about feed the population at 215 kg basic
known to the outside world because only seven of grain per capita. But the figures belied the real food
its eighteen counties are open to humanitarian insecurity of the population as the extreme weather
organisations. The DPRK cites reasons of national allowed for little additional production of food
security for its closure of these counties to the aid other than potatoes—to the extent that three-quar-
agencies and points to the fact that Kanggye, the ters of basic grain consumption was provided by this
province capital, is an important center for the [Link] average diet lacked basic nutrients, includ-
8
country’s munitions industries. Given the priority ing vitamins, minerals and protein.
of the ‘army first’ policy of Kim Jong Il, it is very The provincial capital, Hyesan, is just across a
likely that bilateral food assistance, from China for bridge from China where regular cross-border eco-
instance, is directed towards this province such as nomic and social interaction takes place. The
to feed the [Link] may also be a reason why Chinese-Korean prefecture of Yanbian lies to the
few North Koreans interviewed in China by for- North of Hyesan, making Ryanggang’s communica-
eign organizations emanate from Chagang. Either tion with Yanbian’s Korean speaking inhabitants rel-
food is adequate or the crossing to China is too atively straightforward. Similarly to Chagang, inter-
arduous—because of the difficult topography, views with Koreans that have moved to China do
absence of usable roads especially in winter and not show an exodus from Ryanggang. Ryanggang-
lack of transport or because local communities are China relations focus on trade, with lumber from
more tightly policed than in other parts of the Ryanggang forests sold legally and illegally in
DPRK’s northern provinces. Neither emigration Chinese markets. Potato starch is also sold in China,
nor other factors, therefore, have caused either providing a source of cash income to the state farm
conflict in the transborder relationship along this in Taehongdan. Unlike the cooperative farms that
part of the border. are the dominant form of rural land ownership in
the DPRK in which cash income is the property of
Ryanggang—Sparsley populated, but targeted the cooperative, the cash income of the state farm
for agricultural investment belongs directly to the government. Given the large
At just under 700,000 people, Ryanggang contains investments in the Taehongdan state farm, however,
only 3 percent of the country’s population, who are it is unlikely that this cash income generates much
spread out over twelve rural, mountainous, remote of an overall profit for the government.
9
counties. Even when food is available—during the The government’s focus on investment in this
October to May winter which is severe to the province, its resettlement of military families pre-
 UNEASY ALLIES: FIFTY YEARS OF CHINA-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS

sumably loyal to the regime and the ability of most North Hamgyong industrial infrastructure in the
of Ryanggang isolated population to separate them- party’s development model.
selves from state surveillance, along with coping The majority of residents in North Hamgyong
solutions provided by access to petty trade along the lived in dense urban neighbourhoods, which had
unguarded border, provide coping mechanisms and facilitated the effective implementation of surveil-
opportunities for the northern Ryanggang popula- lance of the population through the neigbourhood
tion. The chance to engage in trade with China is reporting [Link] roots of this nationally-organ-
much less possible for the population of the south- ised system of community-based social control lay
ern part of the province, for whom the journey into in colonial methods instituted by Japan during their
China is almost physically impossible, and who are occupation of Korea in the first half of the twentieth
likely facing higher rates of malnutrition than the century that were adapted by the DPRK for use
10
northern Ryanggang population. from everything from preventative health care to
In terms of overall border relations, Ryanggang’s local policing. Given the urban nature of the North
relations with China are of normal economic inter- Hamgyong population—compared to, for instance, 23
action. It is likely that customs evasion takes pace on their neighbours in Ryanggang—it was much more
both sides of the border, particularly in the buying likely that the residents would have regular contact
and selling of lumber, but the scale of economic with the repressive arm of the state and, therefore,
activity is so low that it has not yet caused either much more reason for discontent.
irritation or conflict in DPRK-China relations. Given also the spread of hunger and famine in
the 1990s, combined with the punitive mentality of
North Hamgyong—Migration a source of security forces, it would not be surprising if there
irritation but not conflict were more incentive to emigrate to China from this
North Hamgyong is the fifth largest province in the province than from others. At the same time those
country with a population of 2.2 million—10 per- same factors—the extent of the security apparatus
11
cent of the DPRK’s population. Like Chagang to combined with the extent of hunger, which partic-
the east, most of the population, about 80 percent, is ularly affected the urban populations—meant that
located in the large urban and industrial conurba- many members of both the security apparatus and
tions, which housed the country’s chemicals, fertilis- the party also suffered. In this context, it was also not
er and steel industries before these were decimated surprising that those willing to take the risk could
after the economic breakdown of the 1990s. Mining bribe their way into China or benefit from a break-
is another local industry. Unlike heavy industry, the down of the law and order apparatus that had func-
mines continue to operate albeit with few health or tioned so effectively when the state had been in a
safety facilities, making the work highly dangerous; position to reward its functionaries.
payment is generally only in food or the almost The poor mining counties of Musan and Undok,
worthless [Link] province has little arable land and classed as two of the most vulnerable counties in the
its own production is nowhere near sufficient to country by the UN World Food Programme, pro-
feed its population—making available just 111kg per vide a major source of unauthorized migration to
person in [Link] pressures to emigrate to China, China. The most serious research carried out on
either legally or illegally, are thus considerable. North Korean migration, by researchers associated
Access is straightforward—over the [Link], with Johns Hopkins, indicated that ‘migrations into
across the other side of the river, is Korean speaking China can be characterized typically as short-term
and its residents have generally been sympathetic to movements by a single member of a household
12
the poverty and hunger of their Korean neighbours. whose other members remained in North Korea’.
North Hamgyong’s influence in the structures A more recent, albeit non-random or scientific sur-
and decision-making of the National Korean vey, undertaken by the nongovernmental organiza-
Workers’ Party had historically been disproportion- tion (NGO), Refugees International, in 2003, came
ate—partly because of the heritage of the North to similar conclusions: ‘Many North Koreans who
Hamgyong party leadership in the anti-Japanese make the perilous border crossing, however, have no
struggle and partly because of the importance of the intention of staying in China. Their hope is to
 ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT

receive immediate financial or humanitarian assis- any dynamic foreigner interchange with the DPRK
tance from relatives or local support networks and apart from the tiny length of frontier with Russia, is
13
then return.’ of marginal political significance compared to the
North Korean migration into China did not pro- broader international relations of both the DPRK
vide a major source of conflict with central state and China.
authorities because both governments agreed on the An investigation of border dynamics does, how-
same objective—return North Koreans to the ever, indicate that some nuanced investigations can
14
DPRK. Local authorities in Yanbian and local be made in respect to DPRK society and DPRK
NGOs have been less sanguine about this policy, relations with its neighbour such as help inform
often assisting North Koreans to stay in [Link] external policy analysis. Policy interventions
Chinese government had only intermittently designed to support humanitarian assistance, human
enforced its agreement to return North Koreans to rights advocacy and political change need to take
the DPRK and had tolerated local authority assis- into account the facts on the ground rather than
24 tance to destitute North Koreans until the high pro- assume an undifferentiated social and economic
file foreigner organised invasions of embassies start- landscape within the DPRK. For instance, foreign
ed to take place in 2002. In the wake of these activ- investment in North Hamgyong’s mining counties
ities, the Chinese government employed the nation- in Musan and Undok, channeled through an Asian
al security apparatus, as opposed to leaving law Development Bank or Word Bank loan, provided
enforcement to local police forces. It continued in a the investment was organised in a transparent and
vigorous campaign of enforcement—its activities publicly accountable manner and insisted on good
leading to North Koreans being sent back to the labour practices, would not only bring economic
DPRK or being forced into ever more precarious assistance by providing jobs and income but would
living arrangements in China—also acting as a also help bring more openness to the society and
deterrent factor to those North Koreans considering therefore help bring about the possibility of
crossing the border for short or long term residence improved human rights and political reform. Rather
than the moralistic posturing that sometimes substi-
MORE COOPERATION THAN CONFLICT tutes for serious foreign policy, such concrete steps,
as part of a political strategy designed to bring
Chinese authorities have, on the whole, found change through dialogue and diplomacy, can pro-
North Korean border dynamics non-threatening to vide instruments to help bring about much-needed
their [Link] major exception was the DPRK political and economic improvements in the lives of
government’s attempt to establish an unregulated North Koreans.
zone of capitalism in Sinuiju, bordering the Chinese
province of Liaoning, a region of strategic impor-
tance to the Chinese [Link] Chinese gov-
ernment, to be sure, has been irritated by the
DPRK’s refusal to embrace change, and local gov- ENDNOTES
ernment authorities in particular have understood 1. ‘Land, climate, people’ On-line. Available at:
and been sympathetic to the political and economic [Link]
reasons for North Korean emigration to China. [Link].
Conversely, North Koreans have felt secure enough 2. For MacArthur’s views see William Stueck, The
in their political relationship with China not to Korean War: An International History (Princeton:
view Korean migration to China as a threat to Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 62. For a direct
Chinese-Korean relations. Nor were they willing to quote from MacArthur recommending the dropping
jeopardise Chinese political and economic support of the atomic bomb on the border see Jon Halliday and
by protesting at the arrest and imprisonment of Yang Bruce Cumings, Korea:The Unknown War (New York:
Bin, the putative governor of the Sinuiju free trade Pantheon, 1988), p. 90.
zone. In the end, therefore, this long but remote 3. Data from Flood Damage Rehabilitation
border area, although providing the only space for Commission, DPRK, supplied to UN World Food
 UNEASY ALLIES: FIFTY YEARS OF CHINA-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS

Programme and reproduced in WFP, provincial pro- border. For nutrition survey see Central Bureau of
files, mimeo, 2003. Statistics, DPRK, ‘Report on the DPRK Nutrition
4. The analysis of socio-economic change in the Assessment, 2002’, mimeo, Pyongyang, 20 November
DPRK in Hazel Smith, Hungry for Peace: International 20 2002, Juche 91.
Security, Humanitarian Assistance and Social Change in 11. Data from Flood Damage Rehabilitation
North Korea (forthcoming, 2004). Commission, DPRK, supplied to UN World Food
5. ‘China through a lens’ On-line. Available at: Programme and reproduced in WFP, provincial pro-
[Link] files, mimeo, [Link] from Kim Sung Un, Panorama
6. Kim Sung Un, Panorama of Korea Seventh edition of Korea Seventh edition (Pyongyang: Foreign
(Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, Languages Publishing House, 1999), pp. 147-162.
1999), p. 203; Flood Damage Rehabilitation 12. W. Courtland Robinson, Myung Ken Lee,
Commission, DPRK, supplied to UN World Food Kenneth Hill, Gilbert M. Burnham,‘Mortality in North
Programme and reproduced in WFP, provincial pro- Korean Migrant Households: A Retrospective Study’,
files, mimeo, 2003. The Lancet Vol. 354 No. 9175, 24 July 1999, p. 293.
25
7. UN World Food Programme and reproduced in 13. Refugees International, ‘Surviving day by day:
WFP, provincial profiles, mimeo, 2003 North Koreans in China’, press release, Washington
8. Federation of American Scientists, On-line. DC, 24 July 2003.
Available at: [Link] 14. For detailed discussion on North Koreans in
facility/[Link]. China see Hazel Smith, ‘North Koreans in China’, in
9. Data on population and nutrition from UN Tsuneo Akaha (ed) with Anna Vassilieva and Shizu
World Food Programme and reproduced in WFP, Naruse, Human flows across national borders in Northeast
provincial profiles, mimeo, 2003. Asia Seminar proceedings United Nations University,
10. The independently audited nutrition survey Tokyo, November 2002 (Monterey: Center for East
published in 2003 showed a high level of malnutrition Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International
for Ryanggang overall. Although the analysis of the Studies, January 2003). See also Human Rights Watch,
county level data was not completed at time of writing The Invisible Exodus: North Koreans in the People’s
my interviews with UNICEF officials indicate there Republic of China (New York: Human Rights Watch,
may be higher malnutrition rates in the more remote 2002), On-line. Available at: [Link]
counties of Ryanggang that are further from the China reports/2002/northkorea/#P164_32652.
 ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT

RECENT ASIA PROGRAM PUBLICATIONS

Special Report No. 114 - The Evolution of a Taiwanese National Identity

June Teufel Dreyer, Thomas B. Gold, Shelley Rigger, August 2003

Special Report No. 113 - The U.S.-Japan-China Triangle: Who’s the Odd Man Out?
Ezra F. Vogel, Gilbert Rozman, Ming Wan, July 2003

Special Report No. 112 - Fighting Terrorism on the Southeast Asian Front
David Wright-Neville, Angel M. Rabasa, Sheldon W. Simon, Larry A. Niksch, Carolina G. Hernandez, June 2003

Special Report No. 111 - China’s Economy: Will the Bubble Burse?
Charles Wolf Jr., Thomas G. Rawski, Deborah S. Davis, June 2003
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Special Report No. 110 - Piety and Pragmatism: Trends in Indonesian Islamic Politics
R. William Liddle, Mohamad Ihsan Alief, Hidayat Nurwahid and Zulkieflimansyah, April 2003

Special Report No. 109 - Durable Democracy: building the Japanese State
John W. Dower, Donald L. Robinson, Franziska Seraphim, March 2003

Special Report No. 108 - Crisis in the Hinterland: Rural Discontent in China
Jean C. Oi, Xiaobo Lu, Yawei Liu, February 2003

Special Report No. 107 - The Demographic Dilemma: Japan’s Aging Society
Paul S. Hewitt, John Creighton Campbell, Chikako Usui, January 2003

Special Report No. 106 - Toward Oil and Gas Cooperation in Northeast Asia: New Opportunities for
Reducing Dependence on the Middle East
Selig S. Harrison, December 2002

Special Report No. 105 - The 16th CCP Congress and Leadership Transition in China
S. Shirk, H. Lyman Miller, G. Lin, L. Dittmer, C. Li, D. Shambaugh, R. Baum, September 2002

Special Report No. 104 - China’s Credibility Gap: Public Opinion and Instability in China
Martin King Whyte, Jie Chen, Edward Friedman, Yongming Zhou, August 2002

Special Report No. 103 - China Enters the WTO: The Death Knell for State-Owned Enterprises?
Dorothy J. Solinger, Lawrence C. Reardon, June 2002

Special Report No. 102 - Scholars under Siege? Academic and Media Freedom in China
Perry Link, Richard Madsen, Chin-Chuan Lee, Yongming Zhou, April 2002

Special Report No. 101 - Undercurrents in Japanese Politics

Ellis S. Krauss, Patricia L. Maclachlan, Aiji Tanaka, Steven R. Reed, Ofer Feldman, Ikuko Toyonaga, February 2002

An electronic copy of any publication can be obtained by visiting the Asia Program’s Web site at [Link]
[Link]/asia.

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 UNEASY ALLIES: FIFTY YEARS OF CHINA-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS

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