Theories of IR
Week 3: Lecture
Realism
For all realist state is the primary
actor in international system. And
Neo Realism- Structural Realism their security and survival is the
primary objective. To attain that
security system of self-help will
work. There are two types of
realist who gave different models
to ensure the security of state.
Realists believe that power is the currency of international politics.
Great powers, the main actors in the Neo-realists’ account, pay
a/c to neorealist
Offensive Realist: states can
careful attention to how much economic and military power they ensure security by maximizing its
have relative to each other. It is important not only to have a power and reaching to the top in
substantial amount of power, but also to make sure that no other power hierarchy. They are also
state sharply shifts the balance of power in its favor. For realists, known as power maximizers. For
international politics is synonymous with power politics. offensive realist power is the end.
a/c to CRs human nature is to seek power
There are, however, substantial differences among realists. The Defensive Realism: It is not
most basic divide is reflected in the answer to the simple but required to achieve the top
important question: why do states want power? For classical Position in power hierarchy in
realists like Hans Morgenthau (1948), the answer is human nature. order to ensure security, it is just
Virtually everyone is born with a will to power hardwired into ensuring by achieving limited
them, which effectively means that great powers are led by power, who is required to tackle
individuals who are bent on having their state dominate its rivals. security threats according to one’s
Nothing can be done to alter that drive to be all-powerful. position in international system.
Waltz Structural Realism (Theory of International Thus they are known as security
Politics: 1979) maximizers. Power is a mean to
Father of Neo-Realism achieve other ends.
He focused on the structure of the international system rather
than human nature as a driving force of the action of [Link]
restricted
Structure includes that all states are constrained by existing in an Absolute gain and relative gain
international anarchic system and any action they pursue is based We see that states are cooperating
on relative power when measured against other states. on many occasion. In what
conditions they do so?
In simple words structure of international system means
condition and environment of international system and the Absolute gain: when both
structure decide the behavior and actions of states rather than think that they are only
their national interest which is derived from human nature. one getting benefit out of
International structure emerges from interaction of states and it.
then constrained them taking certain action while propelling Relative gain: They
them towards others. Cooperate by knowing the
Due to use of structure in international system, in order to explain fact that both are getting
international Relations; Neo-realism is called Structural realism. the gain.
Nuclear Deterrence: No
War
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Structural Realism:
For structural realists, human nature has little to do with why states want power. Instead, it is the
structure or architecture of the international system that forces states to pursue power. In a system
where there is no higher authority that sits above the great powers, and where there is no guarantee
that one will not attack another, it makes eminently good sense for each state to be powerful enough
to protect itself in the event it is attacked. In essence, great powers are trapped in an iron cage
where they have little choice but to compete with each other for power if they hope to survive.
Structural realist theories ignore cultural differences among states as well as differences in regime
type, mainly because the international system creates the same basic incentives for all great
powers. Whether a state is democratic or autocratic matters relatively little for how it acts towards
other states. Nor does it matter much who is in charge of conducting a state’s foreign policy.
Structural realists treat states as if they were black boxes: they are assumed to be alike, save for
the fact that some states are more or less powerful than others.
There is a significant divide between structural realists, which is reflected in the answer to a second
question that concerns realists: how much power is enough? Defensive realists like Kenneth
Waltz (1979) maintain that it is unwise for states to try to maximize their share of world power,
because the system will punish them if they attempt to gain too much power. The pursuit of
hegemony, they argue, is especially foolhardy. Offensive realists like John Mearshiemer (2001)
take the opposite view; they maintain that it makes good strategic sense for states to gain as much
power as possible and, if the circumstances are right, to pursue hegemony. The argument is not
that conquest or domination is good in itself, but instead that having overwhelming power is the
best way to ensure one’s own survival. For classical realists, power is an end in itself; for structural
realists, power is a means to an end and the ultimate end is survival.
Why Do States Want Power?
There is a simple structural realist explanation for why states compete among themselves for
power. It is based on five straightforward assumptions about the international system. None of
these assumptions alone says that states should attempt to gain power at each other’s expense. But
when they are married together, they depict a world of ceaseless security competition.
Assumption 1
The first assumption is that great powers are the main actors in world politics and they
operate in an anarchic system. This is not to say that the system is characterized by chaos or
disorder. Anarchy is an ordering principle; it simply means that there is no centralized authority or
ultimate arbiter that stands above states. The opposite of anarchy is hierarchy, which is the ordering
principle of domestic politics.
Assumption 2
The second assumption is that all states possess some offensive military capability. Each
state, in other words, has the power to inflict some harm on its neighbor. Of course, that capability
varies among states and for any state it can change over time
Assumption 3
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The third assumption is that states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. States
ultimately want to know whether other states are determined to use force to alter the balance of
power (revisionist states), or whether they are satisfied enough with it that they have no interest
in using force to change it (status quo states). The problem, however, is that it is almost impossible
to discern another state’s intentions with a high degree of certainty. Unlike military capabilities,
intentions cannot be empirically verified. Intentions are in the minds of decision-makers and they
are especially difficult to discern.
One might respond that policy-makers disclose their intentions in speeches and policy documents,
which can be assessed. The problem with that argument is policy-makers sometimes lie about or
conceal their true intentions. But even if one could determine another state’s intentions today, there
is no way to determine its future intentions. It is impossible to know who will be running foreign
policy in any state five or ten years from now, much less whether they will have aggressive
intentions. This is not to say that states can be certain that their neighbors have or will have
revisionist goals. Instead, the argument is that policy-makers can never be certain whether they are
dealing with a revisionist or status quo state.
Assumption 4
The fourth assumption is that the main goal of states is survival. States seek to maintain their
territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order. They can pursue other goals
like prosperity and protecting human rights, but those aims must always take a back seat to
survival, because if a state does not survive, it cannot pursue those other goals.
Assumption 5
The fifth assumption is that states are rational actors, which is to say they are capable of coming
up with sound strategies that maximize their prospects for survival. This is not to deny that they
miscalculate from time to time. Because states operate with imperfect information in a complicated
world, they sometimes make serious mistakes.
Again, none of these assumptions by themselves says that states will or should compete with each
other for power. For sure, the third assumption leaves open the possibility that there is a revisionist
state in the system. By itself, however, it says nothing about why all states pursue power. It is only
when all the assumptions are combined together that circumstances arise where states not only
become preoccupied with the balance of power, but acquire powerful incentives to gain power at
each other’s expense
To begin with, great powers fear each other. There is little trust among them. They worry about
the intentions of other states, in large part because they are so hard to divine. Their greatest fear is
that another state might have the capability as well as the motive to attack them. This danger is
compounded by the fact that states operate in an anarchic system, which means that there is no
night watchman who can rescue them if they are threatened by another country. When a state dials
the emergency services for help, there is nobody in the international system to answer the call.
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The level of fear between states varies from case to case, but it can never be reduced to an
inconsequential level. The stakes are simply too great to allow that to happen. International politics
is a potentially deadly business where there is the ever-present possibility of war, which often
means mass killing on and off the battlefield, and which might even lead to a state’s destruction.
Great powers also understand that they operate in a self-help world. They have to rely on
themselves to ensure their survival, because other states are potential threats and because there is
no higher authority they can turn to if they are attacked. This is not to deny that states can form
alliances, which are often useful for dealing with dangerous adversaries. In the final analysis,
however, states have no choice but to put their own interests ahead of the interests of other states
as well as the so-called international community.
Fearful of other states, and knowing that they operate in a self-help world, states quickly realize
that the best way to survive is to be especially powerful. The reasoning here is straightforward: the
more powerful a state is relative to its competitors, the less likely it is that it will be attacked. No
country in the Western Hemisphere, for example, would dare strike the USA, because it is so
powerful relative to its neighbors. This simple logic drives great powers to look for opportunities
to shift the balance of power in their favor. At the very least, states want to make sure that no other
state gains power at their expense. Of course, each state in the system understands this logic, which
leads to an unremitting competition for power. In essence, the structure of the system forces every
great power – even those that would otherwise be satisfied with the status quo – to think and act
when appropriate like a revisionist state.
One might think that peace must be possible if all of the major powers are content with the status
quo. The problem, however, is that it is impossible for states to be sure about each other’s
intentions, especially future intentions. A neighbor might look and sound like a status quo power,
but in reality is a revisionist state. Or it might be a status quo state today, but change its stripes
tomorrow. In an anarchic system, where there is no ultimate arbiter, states that want to survive
have little choice but to assume the worst about the intentions of other states and to compete for
power with them. This is the tragedy of great power politics
Security Dilemma/ Prisoner Dilemma
The structural imperatives described above are reflected in the famous concept of the security
dilemma (Herz 1950; see also Glaser 1997). The essence of that dilemma is that most steps a great
power takes to enhance its own security decrease the security of other states. For example, any
country that improves its position in the global balance of power does so at the expense of other
gain of one = loss of other
states, which lose relative power. In this zero-sum world, it is difficult for a state to improve its
prospects for survival without threatening the survival of other states. Of course, the threatened
states then do whatever is necessary to ensure their survival, which, in turn, threatens other states,
all of which leads to perpetual security competition.
Security Dilemma can be well understood by the Prisoner’s Dilemma of Game Theory. We use
Prisoners Dilemma in International Relations to determine the behaviors of actors in international
system.
Basic concept of Prisoner D is that actors completely understand the best outcome of their decision
they might actually chose a different course of action.
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They chose an option they know is not best option available to
them.
This gives us some insight of that why in global politics we might
not have climate change agreements signed, we might not have
arms control agreements signed. It seems to benefit everybody so Game Theory:
why states do not go to cooperate for mutual benefits.
Prisoner’s dilemma gives us insight into this question. It is a theory of mathematics which is
related to modeling the behaviors of
Prisoner’s Dilemma is a two persons ‘game. actors, individuals, groups and states.
It describes a situation facing two prisoners. Game theory tells us how decisions
They committed a crime together of e.g. bank robbery and captured of different actors interact with one
by the police. Police have no enough evidence against them. another.
Prisoner B
Stay Silent Confess Prisoners Dilemma is a branch of
Prisoner A Game theory.
Stay Silent (1,1) (10,0)
Confess (0, 10) (5,5)
They are placed in separate cells.
Police required a confession from one of them or from both of
them.
Prisoner’s Dilemma is a condition which force the actors to choose
a course of action that is not necessary a best course of action.
Police investigated both the prisoners in separate cells and give
them some options to choose.
We want you to confess the crime which carries a punishment of
10 years.
if you confess you will be free and your partner
(other prisoner) will get sentence of 10 years for not
confession.
If you remain silent and your partner confess, then
you will get punished for 10 years and the other
person will get free.
If you confess and you partner also confess, then we
will split the punishment into 5,5 years of sentence.
And if you both remain silent then we will charge
you both for only having offensive equipment. 1
year of sentence.
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At this stage the best course of action for both of the prisoners is to remain silent. They will only
decide this best course if they have a strong trust over each other.
o Does Prisoner A Trust Prisoner B enough to stay Silent?
o Does Prisoner B trust prisoner A enough to stay Silent?
There is a lack the trust about the decision of other and they will think about the decision of other
rather focusing on their own decision. There is dilemma that both of them thinking that if I remain
silent and other confess then I will receive a penalty of 10 years.
o The pressure is on the confession because
o If they confess and the other does not, then the other will get 10-year prison.
o And in case other also confess then the prison will get split into 5:5.
Staying silent is the best of course for both of them but the distrust and uncertainty attached with
the decision of staying silent let them decide in the other way.
Prisoner’s Dilemma best illustrate the difficulty of two partners to decide on the same manner
because of distrust about the intentions of other. This distrust about each other restrict them to
cooperate with one another. This situation is same with the states as well.
o Cooperation is best option for states
o Distrust about the intentions of others leads them to choose an option best suited for their
benefit, not for mutual benefit.
How Much Power is Enough?
There is disagreement among structural realists about how much power states should aim to
control.
Offensive realists argue that states should always be looking for opportunities to gain more power
and should do so whenever it seems feasible. States should maximize power, and their ultimate
goal should be hegemony, because that is the best way to guarantee survival.
Defensive realists recognize that the international system creates strong incentives to gain
additional increments of power, they maintain that it is strategically foolish to pursue hegemony.
That would amount to overexpansion of the worst kind. States, by their account, should not
maximize power, but should instead strive for what Kenneth Waltz calls an ‘appropriate amount
of power’ (1979: 40). This restraint is largely the result of three factors.
Defensive realists emphasize that if any state becomes too powerful, balancing will
occur. Specifically, the other great powers will build up their militaries and form a
balancing coalition that will leave the aspiring hegemon at least less secure, and maybe
even destroy it. This is what happened to Napoleonic France (1792–1815), Imperial
Germany (1900–18), and Nazi Germany (1933–45) when they made a run at dominating
Europe. Each aspiring hegemon was decisively defeated by an alliance that included all, or
almost all, of the other great powers. Otto von Bismarck’s genius, according to the
defensive realists, was that he understood that too much power was bad for Germany,
because it would cause its neighbors to balance against it. So, he wisely put the brakes on
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German expansion after winning stunning victories in the Austro-Prussian (1866) and
Franco- Prussian (1870–1) Wars.
Some defensive realists argue that there is an offence–Defence balance, which indicates
how easy or difficult it is to conquer territory or defeat a defender in battle. In other
words, it tells you whether or not offence pays. Defensive realists maintain that the
offence–Defence balance is usually heavily weighted in the defender’s favor, and thus any
state that attempts to gain large amounts of additional power is likely to end up fighting a
series of losing wars. Accordingly, states will recognize the futility of offence and
concentrate instead on maintaining their position in the balance of power. If they do go on
the offensive, their aims will be limited.
Defensive realists further argue that, even when conquest is feasible, it does not pay:
the costs outweigh the benefits. Because of nationalism, it is especially difficult,
sometimes impossible, for the conqueror to subdue the conquered. The ideology of
nationalism, which is pervasive and potent, is all about self-determination, which virtually
guarantees that occupied populations will rise up against the occupier. Moreover, it is
difficult for foreigners to exploit modern industrial economies, mainly because information
technologies require openness and freedom, which are rarely found in occupations.
In sum,
not only is conquest difficult but, even in those rare instances where great powers
conquer another state, they get few benefits and lots of trouble. According to defensive
realism, these basic facts about life in the international system should be apparent to all
states and should limit their appetite for more power. Otherwise, they run the risk of
threatening their own survival. If all states recognize this logic – and they should if they
are rational actors – security competition should not be particularly intense, and there
should be few great power wars and certainly no central wars (conflicts involving all or
almost all the great powers).
Offensive realists do not buy these arguments. They understand that threatened states usually
balance against dangerous foes, but they maintain that balancing is often inefficient, especially
when it comes to forming balancing coalitions, and that this inefficiency provides opportunities
for a clever aggressor to take advantage of its adversaries. Furthermore, threatened states
sometimes opt for buck-passing rather than joining a balancing coalition. In other words, they
attempt to get other states to assume the burden of checking a powerful opponent while they remain
on the sidelines. This kind of behavior, which is commonplace among great powers, also creates
opportunities for aggression.
Offensive realists also take issue with the claim that the defender has a significant advantage over
the attacker, and thus offence hardly ever pays. Indeed, the historical record shows that the side
that initiates war wins more often than not. And while it may be difficult to gain hegemony, the
USA did accomplish this feat in the Western Hemisphere during the nineteenth century. Also,
Imperial Germany came close to achieving hegemony in Europe during the First World War.
Both defensive and offensive realists agree, however, that nuclear weapons have little utility for
offensive purposes, except where only one side in a conflict has them. The reason is simple: if both
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sides have a survivable retaliatory capability, neither gains an advantage from striking first.
Moreover, both camps agree that conventional war between nuclear-armed states is possible but
not likely, because of the danger of escalation to the nuclear level.
Finally, while offensive realists acknowledge that sometimes conquest does not pay, they also
point out that sometimes it does. Conquerors can exploit a vanquished state’s economy for gain,
even in the information age. Indeed, Peter Lieberman argues that information technologies have
an ‘Orwellian’ dimension, which facilitates repression in important ways (1996: 126).While
nationalism surely has the potential to make occupation a nasty undertaking, occupied states are
sometimes relatively easy to govern, as was the case in France under the Nazis (1940–4).Moreover,
a victorious state need not occupy a defeated state to gain an advantage over it. The victor might
annex a slice of the defeated state’s territory,break it into two or more smaller states, or simply
disarm it and prevent it from rearming. For all of these reasons, offensive realists expect great
powers to be constantly looking for opportunities to gain advantage over each other, with the
ultimate prize being hegemony. The security competition in this world will tend to be intense and
there are likely to be great power [Link], the grave danger of central war will arise
whenever there is a potential hegemon on the scene
The past behaviour of the great powers has been more in accordance with the predictions of
offensive rather than defensive realism. During the first half of the twentieth century, there were
two world wars in which three great powers attempted and failed to gain regional hegemony:
Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, and Nazi Germany. The second half of that century was
dominated by the Cold War, in which the USA and the Soviet Union engaged in an intense security
competition that came close to blows in the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962).
Many defensive realists acknowledge that the great powers often behave in ways that contradict
their theory. They maintain, however, that those states were not behaving rationally, and thus it is
not surprising that Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, and Nazi Germany were destroyed in those
wars they foolishly started. States that maximize power, they argue, do not enhance their prospects
for survival; they undermine it.
This is certainly a legitimate line of argument but, once defensive realists acknowledge that states
often act in strategically foolish ways, they need to explain when states act according to the dictates
of their structural realist theory and when they do not. Thus, Waltz famously argues that his theory
of international politics needs to be supplemented by a separate theory of foreign policy that can
explain misguided state behavior. However, that additional theory, which invariably emphasizes
domestic political considerations, is not a structural realist theory.
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