"Responsibility to Protect is predominantly a means to pursue self-interested

interventions." Do you agree? Why, why not? Critically discuss with reference to the

relevant literature and two case studies.

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 Introduction

The R2P principle emerged at the beginning of the twenty-first century as a response

to international community failures in Rwanda in 1994 and in Srebrenica in 1995. The ICISS,

an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, proposed this doctrine in

2001. Later, the principle was endorsed by all the member states at the 2005 World Summit,

where it was defined that R2P signifies an obligation of states to protect the civilian

population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity (United

Nations, 2005).

In the last two decades, during which time the principle has been formally adopted,

the reality of R2P's application has not proven easy. According to numerous researchers, in

some instances, the appeal to the principle has led to effects that appear to serve the strategic

or political interests of the West, rather than pure humanitarian motives. They argue that these

interventions can be more a reflection of power interests than of a need to protect (Thakur

2016; Kuperman 2013).

This essay argues that, even though R2P has as established as a humanitarian norm, it

has been applied in practice to legitimize interventions that advance the strategic interests of

the strongest states. The essay presents this argument by critically examining the literature

and comparing interventions in Libya with the non-intervention in Syria, demonstrating that

the practice of R2P has less to do with humanitarian disasters and more to do with

geopolitical demonstrations.‌

Using a Realist theoretical framework, the research paper critically analyzes the

development, application, and limitations of R2P. The paper first explores the arguments for

the political selectivity of the R2P, the motives of regime change, and the problem of
institutional inequality. Then it looks at two significant cases: the NATO intervention in

Libya (2011) and the current non-intervention in Syria (201110).

R2P's Three Pillars

The three main pillars used in the structure of R2P are as follows: protecting own

people is the duty of every state; the collective responsibility is taken by the international

community, which has to help states in meeting this task; and in the case a state cannot

protect its people, the international community has to take urgent and decisive measures

(Evans, 2009)

Limitations of R2P

R2P, despite its great normative importance, faces several structural and political

constraints that limit its effectiveness. Most importantly, R2P has been blamed for different

kinds of offenses among which is the selective application of it: interventions usually take

place in the states where the powerful actors have the strategic or economic interests, whereas

the crises in the less economically or strategically significant regions that may be still of great

humanitarian concern hardly get any attention (Hehir, 2012; Bellamy, 2014). Such a lack of

consistency robs R2P of the status of a universal humanitarian ‍‌‍‍‌‍‌norm.

Another institutional weakness of R2P is its dependency on United Nations Security

Council authorization. In fact, the veto powers of the five permanent members mean that very

often, political alliances override humanitarian urgency. This is seen to occur in Syria, as the

repeated vetoes by Russia and China prevented the international community's reaction against

the widespread commission of mass atrocities (Bellamy, 2014).

 Other related criticisms by several scholars address what they believe to be R2P's

critical failure to avoid suspicions of Western bias. The 2011 intervention in Libya further

entrenched suspicions that the norm provides a pretext for regime change, not protection of

civilians. As, for instance, Thakur (2016) identifies, these perceptions have diminished faith

in R2P among many states, especially in the Global South.

Finally, prevention is the weak point for R2P. While one of its pillars is indeed

prevention, it is well known that states usually act very late when violence has been far-flung.

The discrepancy between early warning mechanisms and real political commitment still

remains one of the critical factors limiting the norm's preventive potential Evans 2008;

Bellamy 2014.

Realism theory

Realism, to be sure, provides an important optic through which to view the reasons

powerful states shape and impel the implementation of R2P, as it is one theory focused on

power and national interest. For instance, classical and structural realists such as Morgenthau

and Mearsheimer believe that anarchy is the underlying principle of the international system

and that states should prioritize survival and security above all else (Mearsheimer, 2019). In

this way, foreign policy, which may take on humanitarian disguises, is ultimately based on

strategic calculation and not moral obligation. From a realist perspective, interventions

associated with humanitarianism often reflect other interests-those political and strategic,

specifically, with R2P being one possible vehicle or conduit that states pursue such goals.

Realists would, however, logically argue that powerful states, especially the five

permanent members of the UNSC, will only invoke R2P selectively to serve their strategic

and national interests rather than any genuine humanitarian concerns. Indeed, Doukakis

(2018) argues, for example, that in the majority of cases it represents a calculated alignment
of moral rhetoric with political objectives, whereby interventionist states can justify their

actions as necessary protection of civilians while, in fact, serving their respective security or

geopolitical interests. The‍‌‍‍‌‍‌ selective nature of this practice underlines the argument of

inconsistent application of R2P. It resonates with a realist argument that the actions of states

in an anarchic international system are mainly influenced by their quest for power and

survival rather than by moral principles.

Important Discussions and Literature Review

The academic research on R2P has so far been split into two camps, those seeing it as

a real progress and those seeing it only as a geopolitical instrument. The latter division of

opinion gave rise to three main groups of scholars: the proponents of R2P, the ones who

stress its politicization, and a middle-ground that acknowledges both the successes and the

limitations of R2P.

Among them who view R2P as a groundbreaking normative achievement, even

though its implementation has been fragmentary, are Bellamy (2015) and Luck (2018).

Bellamy claims that R2P managed to redefine sovereignty by changing the idea from being

the property of state authority only to one where state is responsible for the protection of its

population.

Consequently, he maintains, it has created the framework for international

expectations of the protection of civilians. Bellamy admits that R2P has been carried out in a

few instances only and for him, these gaps are ultimately a product of unprincipled political

factors.

Luck 2018 stresses the preventive aspect of R2P by arguing that the first two pillars- a

state's obligation to protect its population and international assistance- are the very core of the

Doctrine. He mentions the cases of Kenya 2008 and Côte d'Ivoire 2011, among others, where
preventive diplomacy and international engagement have led to the best practice in the

reduction of mass ‍‌‍‌atrocities.. These demonstrate how R2P could work effectively through

non-military, diplomatic channels when favorable conditions [Link] cases show that,

despite practical difficulties, R2P has developed protective norms for civilians at the

international level.

The critical approach, on the other hand, highlights that R2P can be abused and used

in a highly selective manner by some of the most influential states. In this case, for example,

Kuperman (2013) disapproves of NATO's 2011 intervention in Libya because, according to

him, it was not within the bounds of the UN mandate, and the humanitarian discourse served

as a license to change the regime. Chandler (2019) subsequently refers to R2P as

humanitarian imperialism, since, in reality, this doctrine justified the actions of Western states

and restricted the authority of non-Western [Link] (2013) proposes a Global South

view that the preceding elements of selective application of R2P, combined with neo-colonial

patterns, generate skepticism and distrust among states outside the Western sphere.

Collectively, these criticisms indicate that much of R2P is, in effect, simply a

geopolitical instrument rather than a universal humanitarian necessity. Practical experience is

definitely on the side of such a reading: the intervention in Libya, which cannot be compared

with anywhere in Syria, Yemen, or Myanmar, by the speed of its reaction, speaks volumes in

favor of the fact that strategic considerations prevail in most cases over the pleas of

humanitarian intervention. To the realists, states are cost-benefit calculators in the end: they

take actions when their interests are in harmony with humanitarian aims, and they abstain

when they are not.

The other strand of critique of the review is based on the abuse of R2P as a

justification for regime change or strategic [Link] (2013) indicates that NATO,
in its intervention in Libya, far surpassed the aim of civilian protection and, de facto, sought

the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi. Pattison‍‌‍‍‌(2018) enlarges on how even Western states

that are generally seen as powerful and morally right, might sometimes use the language of

humanitarianism to achieve their strategic goals, like gaining access to resources or influence.

These instances alone are sufficient illustrations of how effortlessly R2P can serve as a

disguise for hiding the political nature of a mission under the guise of being a humanitarian

one. According to Thakur (2016), this kind of misuse weakens the belief in the principle,

thus, Russia, and China, and the like, become skeptical of the perspectives of such

interventions, as it happened in Syria.

The structure of the UNSC adds another layer of the complexity which, although all

five permanent members are worried about the humanitarian situation, still allows them to

veto intervention: the US, UK, France, Russia, and China. Weiss (2020) and Luck (2018)

note that this asymmetry enables states to address humanitarian issues through a strategic-

interest perspective, thereby making the issue of the selectivity of the application of R2P

more and more obvious and, at the same time, limiting its use to political realities.

The third line of scholars admits the R2P triumphs and criticisms. In this sense, R2P

might be considered a debatable norm with its primary purpose and extent mostly regarded as

controversial. Welsh (2013) points out that it is a sign of disagreement about the balance

between state sovereignty and the duty to protect populations.

In a similar vein, Weiss (2020) concedes that the interventions in Libya compromised

the credibility of R2P but he is still supportive of the principle. Weiss claims that, through

reforms and clearer rules, R2P can remain a guide to states on how to protect populations.

Crossley (2016) also supports this opinion from the middle-ground point of view,

noting that R2P has made substantial progress in the establishment of norms concerning state
responsibility, while its implementation is lagging ‍‌‍‌[Link] strengthening of this doctrine

might be achieved through reforms to the UN Security Council, closer regional cooperation,

and greater seriousness about prevention. In this sense, political realities and institutional

obstacles, rather than the principle's inherent weaknesses, are reflected in the different issues

with R2P.

This essay is critical of R2P because it acknowledges that it is, in most cases, applied

for self-interest, as witnessed in Libya and Syria. However, from this point of view, the word

primarily is imperative-it is not an assumption that the prime motive on which R2P is

appealed to is simply a strategy towards geopolitical acquisition or that humanitarian interests

are simply nonexistent. Instead, the element of strategy is more likely to prevail, albeit with

normative impact and preventive achievements, as Bellamy and Luck note, pushing on the

edges of the crises. Although supporters of R2P lionize the norm as providing a mechanism to

weaken absolute sovereignty by inculcating a global expectation of protection against

genocide, war crimes, and other forms of mass atrocities, those who have questioned it have

highlighted that there is a risk of the norm being politicized and used selectively and

manipulatively by the mighty. The‍‌‍‍‌literature taken together present R2P to be functioning in a

dynamic and competitive niche: on the one hand, it has made a number of significant

normative and preventive victories; on the other hand, it still grapples with the strategic,

political, and institutional challenges. Such a position can be acknowledged for recognizing

not only the promise but also the limitations of R2P assessment in current international

politics.

Literature debates and key arguments

From this point of view, the R2P has been a major source of controversy in the

literatures, with scholars equally divided on the question of whether it is a real and substantial
move towards the protection of humanity or a tool of geopolitical ‍‌‍‌[Link] instances

exist in which R2P has helped prevent violence, it is also clear that political and strategic

interests have, in most cases, influenced its use.

1. Selectivity and Political Bias

The criticism is not short of criticism; one of them is that R2P is applied selectively.

Theoretically, it is supposed to defend any population against any mass atrocities, but in

reality, it tends to intervene when there is an advantage to it for the powerful countries.

Bellamy (2015) notes that the world rushed to Libya in 2011 but afterward remained largely

idle regarding Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar. Weiss (2020) supplements this idea by arguing

that such inconsistency creates the impression of R2P as an instrument of the West rather than

a humanitarian international norm. Realist thinkers would say that proves the belief that states

act in their own interests, not because they feel a responsibility to everyone in danger.

2. Regime Change and Misuse of Humanitarian Claims

Another‍‌‍‍‌problem of equal importance is the use of political explanations of R2P just

to facilitate these politics, mainly through the change of the regime. Kuperman (2013) states

that NATO intervention in Libya was beyond the UN mandate and virtually was a mission for

Gaddafi's removal, while at the same time pretending to help people but in fact serving

strategic interests. Moreover, Pattison (2018) argues that Western states frequently resort to

the use of humanitarian rhetoric as a means of Political and economic promotion under the

guise of easy reform access, broader political influence, or regional integration. Thakur

(2016) expresses that the usage of such a weapon results in the disappearing of international

trust in R2P which makes countries like Russia and China reluctant to approve the
interventions, as is the case with Syria. Humanitarian protection is generally sacrificed on the

altar of political demands even if the supposed goal is the safety of the civilians.

3. UNSC Vetoes, Power Politics and Institutional Constraints.

The institutional setup of the UNSC plays a major role in the deepening of power

politics that shape the R2P interventions. It is so due to the fact that five permanent members-

the US, UK, France, Russia and China- who have the privilege of vetoing action against

intervention that they consider threatening their alliances or strategic interests. Weiss (2020)

and Luck (2018) state that this imbalance of power in the institution benefits dominating

states in completely ignoring the plight of the vulnerable in preference of their strategic

interests. Geopolitics has become even more entrenched in the center of R2P practice, such as

crises like Syria, where even in the event of a mass atrocity, timely action is blocked by a

veto.

Success Potential of R2P

R2P has been confronted with numerous obstacles throughout its existence, but some

people think that through the appropriate reforms and the political will of leaders, its

functioning can be improved.

One of the main points is to enhance the decision-making process in the UN Security

Council. The French-Mexican initiative and the Code of Conduct, suggested by ACT, are

good examples of situations where the veto power should be voluntarily restrained, such as

cases involving mass atrocity ‍‌‍‌crimes. The change would shorten the political stalemate and

make the action more predictable.

 The other potential route to success is to enhance early-warning mechanisms and

invest in preventive diplomacy. R2P has been generally successful in Kenya (2007-2008).

After the post-election violence, organized diplomatic pressure accompanied by mediation

was used to bring the atrocity escalation to a stop.

This success also serves as an example of the potential of R2P in the instance of early

action combined with political will.

More open and fair criteria for intervention would also reduce charges of selective

intervention. Standards would also be consistent, and the guiding principle in any crisis

would be humanitarian needs rather than geopolitical interests. Another example of R2P in

action is Cote d'Ivoire (2011): the international effort to protect civilians, led by regional

African organizations, has helped stabilize the situation and address the post-election crisis.

The cases mentioned demonstrate that R2P can be effective when its conditions are

favorable, despite its drawbacks. All these steps indicate that it is still possible to implement

R2P when states are willing to engage in it and ensure their devotion to reforms aimed at

protecting civilians

Libya and Syria as case studies

According to the realist approach, Libya and Syria are two instances of intervention

decisions made on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis of national interests, not on a sense of

duty to humanity. This part focuses on two major crises, Libya (2011) and Syria (2011 to the

present), to illustrate how the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has been used as a humanitarian

ideal and as a political tool. These incidents do imply that political motives, rather than a

rigid adherence to humanitarian principles, have been the primary driving force behind the

intervention decisions.

Libya (2011). Case Study 1

 One could argue that the first specific instance of the third pillar of R2P in operation

was the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011. The UNSC moved quickly to authorize "all

necessary measures" to defend people in response to Gaddafi's threats to launch a "merciless"

attack on Benghazi, enacting Resolution 1973. The UN was openly supporting military action

in accordance with R2P principles to stop mass atrocities, which at the time was regarded as

nearly historic.

Most‍‌‍‍‌of the time, the intervention seemed to be a success that met the requirements of

R2P. As NATO airstrikes prevented Gaddafi's forces from entering Benghazi, they most

probably saved thousands of lives. For quite a few people, this was a perfect example of R2P

protecting the vulnerable populations.

Nevertheless, the reality that is much more complicated is unveiled upon closer

inspection. To illustrate this, the author of the article, Kuperman (2013), specifies the reasons

why he believes the NATO action exceeded the limits set in the mandate very quickly. Instead

of halting the campaign at the point of protecting civilians, the degradation of regime

capabilities was carried out, and support was given to the rebels to facilitate their advances

that finally led to Gaddafi's overthrow. Hence, the intervention turned from the protection of

the humanitarian situation into political transformation.

The intervention, in the view of legal and political analyses, also exceeded its motives

profoundly. Teimouri and Subedi (2018) illustrate that as the use of force was employed for

strategic objectives, the mission drifted from the original R2P focus on civilian protection and

thus the doctrine's legitimacy was questioned from the standpoint of international law.

Where the intervention had consequences, its legacy became more difficult to

understand. In Libya after Gaddafi, among other problems, political unrest, violence, and

human insecurity issues had become more widespread. The initiative, which was first
protective, nevertheless, as Kuperman (2013) explains, it rapidly escalated human suffering,

and there was even the spread of weapons that deepened the regional instability. The case

also affected the R2P as a global standard deeply: a great number of states, especially from

the Global South, considered the R2P sceptically as the humanitarian discourse had been used

as a cover for regime change. The argument regarding Libya as a case of R2P misuse has

been among the reasons for the subsequent vetoes of the UNSC by Russia, China, and other ‍‌‍‌

countries.

The case also had wider consequences for the R2P as an international norm. Many

states, particularly those in the Global South, view R2P with distrust since humanitarian

language has been used to support regime change. The belief that Libya constituted an abuse

of the R2P authority was directly connected to the subsequent vetoes by Russia, China, and

other UNSC members (Thakur, 2016; Bellamy, 2015).

What was primarily a mission to rescue civilians quickly evolved into a political one

to change Libya's regime. In this light, the international community's inability to support

post-intervention reconstruction, together with developments in Libya's civil conflict and

state fragility, might suggest that the protection of civilians was, in many respects, secondary

to strategic interests (Kuperman, 2013; Pattison, 2018).

Overall, the Libyan intervention is a good example of the conflict between the

humanitarian goals of the R2P and the realist forces that influence international politics. The

doctrine was referred to as a way to legitimize the action, with the dismantling of the mission

showing that strategic and political reasons are usually dominant over genuine humanitarian

care for civilians, and that the use of R2P as a doctrine is often instrumental.

Case Study 2: Syria (2011–Present)

 The Syrian conflict, which started shortly after the Libyan one, is a different case that

reveals the selectivity of R2P. What locals did was to protest peacefully, and the government

responded with brutal repression and, later, civil war. The scale of the humanitarian

catastrophe has been absolutely horrifying: the death toll has exceeded 500,000, the number

of refugees is over 6 million, and there have been systematic war crimes such as the use of

chemical weapons, barrel bombing, and torture (UNHCR, 2024; UN Human Rights Council, ‍‌‍‍‌‍‌

2020). Syria clearly met the R2P criteria in ways that far outweighed those of Libya, but it

was to witness international paralysis rather than protection.

Direct‍‌‍‍‌strategic interests are the main reason for this. Russia, for example, keeps its

only naval base in the Mediterranean at Tartus and is the leading supplier of weapons to

Assad, with the trade exceeding $4 billion per year. To Moscow, Syria is the last geopolitical

foothold in the region, and its loss would diminish influence there. Meanwhile, China strictly

opposes any intervention, citing respect for sovereignty and concern that it could set a

precedent that later facilitates intervention into its internal affairs.

Western powers, however, were putting on a show of vehemently condemning the

violence, but in fact, they were not willing to take action when it became clear that there

would be strategic costs. The US, the UK, and France encountered several obstacles that

prevented them from acting, namely the risk of a military conflict with Russia, which came to

aid Syria in 2015, the complexity of a civil war in which an extremist group was involved,

and finally, being tired of war due to the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. Therefore, whenever

the US used military force, it was against ISIS rather than the Assad regime, which caused the

majority of the deaths of the civilian population. Western powers gave some aid to the rebels

and humanitarian help, but they did not take the risk of decisive military action in Libya.
 The question is answered very clearly by the direct contrast with Libya. Syria was a

much more complicated case of a humanitarian crisis with fewer deaths and less obvious

systematic atrocities. R2P criteria were only ambiguously met for a shorter period.

Nevertheless, the intervention took place in Libya, not in Syria. The difference between the

two was not the need for humanitarian aid but strategic considerations. Libya offered an

opportunity for a low-risk intervention and therefore plausible benefits; on the other hand,

Syria was a high-risk environment with significantly fewer potential benefits. This pattern

confirms the argument of Mearsheimer (2019) that states act in accordance with power

calculations rather than moral ‍‌‍‌imperatives.

Syria‍‌‍‍‌also demonstrates how R2P's reliance on the Security Council for its

institutional framework makes it possible for the interests of the great powers to take

precedence over those of the humanitarian ones. Russia could obstruct the action alone,

irrespective of the extent of the humanitarian situation. Bellamy 2015 confesses that Syria

"exposes R2P's incapacity to operate in situations where it is most required".

The lack of reaction to the tragedy in Syria, which was a much more severe

humanitarian crisis than in Libya, shows that the non-intervention was a result of the absence

of strategic incentives and the presence of strategic risks. This selective inconsistency has

been instrumental in directly supporting the claim that states, which are led by interests rather

than by humanitarian principles, are the ones who apply R2P.

Comparative‍‌‍‍‌‍‌Analysis: Discrimination, Power Politics, and the Constraints of R2P

By comparing Libya and Syria, we can see that the pattern that comes out is directly

in line with the essay's thesis: the main function of R2P is to intervene in a self-

interested way rather than being consistently a protection ‍‌‍‌mechanism.

 As a matter of fact, the case of Syria was more obvious and more severe than that of

Libya. In Libya, the situation was relatively clean, with potential atrocities in Benghazi

before the killing was done on a large scale. To the contrary, Syria saw the continuation of the

same systematic atrocities with time: chemical attacks, barrel bombing, siege tactics, and

widespread torture. The particle of comparison is Libya's death toll of 25,000-30,000, against

which that of Syria's was over 500,000. Both cases met R2P criteria, but the catastrophe in

Syria was much larger in both quantity and quality. The truth of the matter is that if

humanitarian need is the main excuse for intervention, Syria should have been intervened in

with the most significant action, or at least with an action equally as significant as in Libya.

However, strategic interests were the main reasons why they acted contrary to such a

humanitarian expectation: the intervention in Libya was in line with the Western agenda by,

among other things, getting rid of an unpredictable leader, securing their access to oil, and

thus demonstrating their continued global leadership, as well as the stability of the post-Arab

Spring period. It was also an operation with little risk, as no great power was seen opposing

it. On the contrary, an intervention in Syria would have resulted in a confrontation with

Russian and Iranian interests, been risky due to the great-power rivalry, and offered limited

benefits for the strategy. Moreover, the stakes were much higher after Russia's 2015 military ‍‌‍‍‌‍‌

deployment. Therefore, it was the presence or absence of great-power opposition, rather than

humanitarian severity, that determined the response.

Timing further illuminates selectivity. The Libya intervention took place at the height

of Arab Spring optimism, before intervention fatigue set in. The Syria crisis reached its peak

well after it became clear that intervention in Libya had gone badly, and when the chaotic

aftermath of that intervention had undermined R2P's credibility with political actors. By the

time of Syria's worst atrocities, all political will for intervention in the Middle East had

evaporated.
 In‍‌‍‍‌‍‌terms of institutional dynamics, the differences were significant. The‍‌‍‍‌resolution on

Libya was approved with Russia and China not voting in favor or against, but abstaining, as

they appeared to be thinking that NATO would follow the limited mandate. Later on, Russia

announced that it was deceived when NATO went beyond the mandate, and therefore it used

this as a reason for its vetoes in Syria. Actually, Russia has vetoed 12 times in Syria, even

blocking those measures that were non-military.

This comparison by itself is a direct and clear response to the essay question, stating

that the implementation of R2P is mostly dependent on self-interest rather than on

humanitarian need. Simply put, the intervention will take place if it serves the strategic

interests of the intervening states. On the other hand, if the strategic costs are too high, then

the doctrine will not be activated, no matter how dire the humanitarian situation is. The

examples of Libya and Syria are the cases of R2P being used as a weapon for the chosen few

rather than a protection principle.

Conclusion

This paper, to put it briefly, tries to clarify whether R2P is mostly a device for self-

interested interventions or a consistent humanitarian norm. The findings indicate that

although R2P is a norm created to prevent mass atrocities, its implementation is largely

influenced by the strategic interests of powerful ‍‌‍‌[Link] are some structural reasons for

this, such as the doctrine's dependence on the UN Security Council and the veto powers of

the P5, as well as a lack of definition and the absence of independent enforcement.

Theoretical arguments also support this conclusion: Realism can account for states'

privileging national interests over moral obligations, thereby explaining R2P's selective

activation. Meanwhile, cosmopolitan and constructivist theories emphasize the humanitarian

goal and the normative aspects of R2P, but they cannot explain the persistent gap between
principles and practice. Consequently, R2P is not a globally applicable protection system but

a debated norm influenced by geopolitics.

The most unambiguous indication of this is seen in the comparative case studies of

Libya and Syria. The intervention in Libya not only went extensively beyond the protection

of civilians but also was in line with the strategic interests of the West. On the contrary, in

Syria, despite the far more terrible humanitarian situation, the international community was

immobilized due to the geopolitical costs and the opposition of the great powers. This‍‌‍‍‌change

of the connection between the seriousness of the crimes and the response of the international

community to the opposite side shows that R2P is a selective one and functions according to

a strategic calculation. In fact, the cases of Kosovo, Côte d'Ivoire, Myanmar, Yemen, and

Darfur also reflect such trends.

In a few instances, R2P has managed to be effective in preventive diplomacy,

particularly in situations where there is an absence of major power interests. However, these

few successes are not sufficient to counterbalance the overall pattern of politically motivated

implementation. To sum up, the above analysis serves as an argument that the R2P has been

mostly instrumentalized for the advancement of strategic and political interests rather than as

a reliable or impartial tool for the protection of ‍‌‍‌humanity.

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