FOSTER V AGTANG

PER CURIAM:

This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board or Governors (BOG). Integrated Bar of the Philippines (!BP),
dated March 23, 2014, affirming with modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, who
recommended the suspension of respondent Atty. Jaime V. Agtang (respondent)from the practice of law
for one (1) year for ethical impropriety and ordered the payment of his unpaid obligations to complainant.

From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),received a
complaint2, dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster (complainant) against respondent for "unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful"3 acts as a lawyer.

In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his Answer within 15 days from receipt
of the order. Respondent failed to do so and complainant sent a query as to the status of her complaint.
On October 10, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner issued the Order 5 setting the case for mandatory
conference/hearing on November 16, 2011. It was only on November 11, 2011, or five (5) days before the
scheduled conference when respondent filed his verified Answer.6

During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband appeared. She submitted a set of
documents contained in a folder, copies of which were furnished the respondent. The Investigating
Commissioner7 indicated that the said documents would be reviewed and the parties would be informed if
there was a need for clarificatory questioning; otherwise, the case would be submitted for resolution
based on the documents on file. The Minutes8 of the mandatory conference showed that respondent
arrived at 11:10 o’clock in the morning or after the proceeding was terminated.

On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Answer.

On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24, 2012 Decisions 9 of the Municipal Trial
Court in Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079, ordering respondent [defendant therein] to
pay complainant and her husband the sum of ₱100,000.00 and ₱22,000.00, respectively, with interest at
the rate of 12% per annum from December 8, 2011 until fully paid, plus cost of suit.10

Complainant’s Position

From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in connection with her legal
problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty, which respondent had
notarized. After their discussion, complainant agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of the
appropriate case in court, for which they signed a contract. Complainant paid respondent ₱20,000.00 as
acceptance fee and ₱5,000.00 for incidental expenses.11

On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation to the legal
problem referred by complainant. He then visited the latter in her home and asked for a loan of
₱100,000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for the repair of his car. Complainant, having trust and
confidence on respondent being her lawyer, agreed to lend the amount without interest. A promissory
note13 evidenced the loan.

In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to its name a
lot she had previously purchased. She referred the matter to respondent who recommended the
immediate filing of a case for reformation of contract with damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent
requested and thereafter received from complainant the amount of ₱150,000.00, as filing fee. 14 When
asked about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited the high value of the land and the sheriffs’ travel
expenses and accommodations in Manila, for the service of the summons to the defendant corporation.
Later, complainant confirmed that the fees paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65, entitled Erlinda
Foster v. Tierra Realty and Development Corporation, only amounted to ₱22,410.00 per trial court
records.15

During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that respondent was the
one who notarized the document being questioned in the civil case she filed. When asked about this,
respondent merely replied that he would takea collaborating counsel to handle complainant’s case. Upon
reading a copy of the complaint filed by respondent with the trial court, complainant noticed that: 1] the
major differences in the documents issued by Tierra Realty were not alleged; 2] the contract to buy and
sell and the deed of conditional sale were not attached thereto; 3] the complaint discussed the method of
payment which was not the point of contention in the case;and 4] the very anomalies she complained of
were not mentioned. Respondent, however, assured her that those matters could be brought up during
the hearings.

On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter extend to him the amount of
₱70,000.00 or ₱50,000.00 "in the moment of urgency or emergency." 16 Complainant obliged the request
and gave respondent the sum of ₱22,000.00.

On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainant’s house and demanded the sum of ₱50,000.00,
purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling. Complainant expressed her
misgivings on this proposition but she eventually gave the amount of ₱25,000.00 which was covered by a
receipt,17 stating that "it is understood that the balance of ₱25,000.00 shall be paid later after favorable
judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster." On November 2, 2010, respondent insisted that the remaining
amount be given by complainant prior to the next hearing of the case, because the judge was allegedly
asking for the balance. Yet again, complainant handed to respondent the amount of ₱25,000.00.18

On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was dismissed. Not having been notified by respondent,
complainant learned of the dismissal on December 14, 2010, when she personally checked the status of
the case with the court. She went to the office of respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the
office staff gave her a copy of the order of dismissal.
On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the motion for
reconsideration. On January 15, 2011, complainant went to see respondent and requested him to prepare
a reply to the comment filed by Tierra Realty on the motion for reconsideration; to include additional facts
because the Land Registration Authority would not accept the documents unless these were amended;
and to make the additional averment that the defendant was using false documents.

On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver delivered to complainant a copy of the reply with a message
from him that the matters she requested to be included were mentioned [Link] reading the same,
however, complainant discovered that these matters were not so included. On the same occasion, the
driver also asked for ₱2,500.00 on respondent’s directive for the reimbursement of the value of a bottle of
wine given to the judge as a present. Complainant was also told that oral arguments on the case had
been set the following month.19

On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her counsel and
wrote him a letter of termination,20 after her friend gave her copies of documents showing that respondent
had been acquainted with Tierra Realty since December 2007. Subsequently, complainant wrote to
respondent, requesting him to pay her the amounts he received from her less the contract fee and the
actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent never replied.

Respondent’s Position

In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been engaged in the practice of law
since March 1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from 1998 to 1999. He admitted the
fact that he notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale subject of complainant’s case, but he qualified that he
was not paid his notarial fees therefor. He likewise admitted acting as counsel for complainant for which
he claimed to have received ₱10,000.00 as acceptance fee and ₱5,000.00 for incidental fees. Anent the
loan of ₱100,000.00, respondent averred that it was complainant, at the behest of her husband, who
willingly offered the amount to him for his patience in visiting them at home and for his services. The
transaction was declared as "no loan" and he was told not to worry about its payment. As regards the
amount of ₱150,000.00 he received for filing fees, respondent claimed that the said amount was
suggested by the complainant herself who was persistent in covering the incidental expenses in the
handling of the case. He denied having said that the sheriffs of the court would need the money for their
hotel accommodations. Complainant’s husband approved of the amount. In the same vein, respondent
denied having asked for a loan of ₱50,000.00 and having received ₱22,000.00 from complainant. He also
denied having told her that the case would be discussed with the judge who would rule in their favor at the
very next hearing. Instead, it was complainant who was bothered by the possibility that the other party
would befriend the judge. He never said that he would personally present a bottle of wine to the judge.

Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s comment as to his representation of Tierra Realty in the past.
Respondent saw nothing wrong in this situation since complainant was fully aware that another counsel
was assisting him in the handling of cases. Having been fully informed of the nature of her cause of action
and the consequences of the suit, complainant was aware of the applicable law on reformation of
contracts. Finally, by way of counterclaim, respondent demanded just compensation for the services he
had rendered in other cases for the complainant.

Reply of Complainant

In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered respondent’s defenses by making reference to the receipts
inher possession, all evidencing that respondent accepted the amounts mentioned in the complaint.
Complainant also emphasized that respondent and Tierra Realty had relations long before she met him.
While respondent was employed as Provincial Legal Officer of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte,
he was involved in the preparation of several documents involving Flying V, an oil company owned by
Ernest Villavicencio, who likewise owned Tierra Realty. Complainant insisted that the amount of
₱100,000.00 she extended to respondent was never considered as "no loan."

On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies of the Resolution, dated
June 20, 2012, issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City, finding probable cause against
respondent for estafa.23

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation,24 the Investigating Commissioner found respondent
guilty of ethical impropriety and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
year.

In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with modification the
recommendation of suspension by the Investigating Commissioner and ordered respondent to return to
complainant: 1) his loan of ₱122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the filing fee amounting to
₱127,590.00.

Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16, 2014 to which he filed a motion for
reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition thereto, informing the IBP-BOG that an information
charging respondent for estafa had already been filed in court and that a corresponding order for his
arrest had been issued.26

In its March 23, 2014 Resolution,the IBP-BOG denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration but
modified the penalty of his suspension from the practice of law by reducing it from one (1) year to three
(3) months. Respondent was likewise ordered to return the balance of the filing fee received from
complainant amounting to ₱127,590.00.

No petition for review was filed with the Court.

The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).

The Court’s Ruling

The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with respect to
respondent’s violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR. The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his
alleged violation of Rule 15, on representing conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the penalty.

Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct." It is well established that a lawyer’s conduct is "not confined to the performance of
his professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or
private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court."27

In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional
and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her
case were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high
value of the land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other words, he
resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the amount
of ₱150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the same amounted only to ₱22,410.00. His defense that it
was complainant who suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is highly
improbable that complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would propose such
amount that would further burden her financial resources. Assuming that the complainant was more than
willing to shell out an exorbitant amount just to initiate her complaint withthe trial court, still, respondent
should not have accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be
knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to disclose to his client the actual
amount due, consistent with the values of honesty and good faith expected of all members of the legal
profession.

Moreover, the "fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client."28 Money
entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately returned.
A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by
his client. Such act isa gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs
public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.29

It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received various amounts from
complainant but he could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the
receipts presented by complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return the excess money from the alleged
filing fees and other expenses. His possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated
it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client. 30 When a
lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the
lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money
to the client.31 Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and unwarranted amounts from his
client, respondent displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for the amount of ₱50,000.00 as
"representation expenses" allegedly for the benefit of the judge handling the case, in exchange for a
favorable decision. Respondent himself signed a receipt showing that he initially took the amount of P
25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently demanded and received the other half of the amount at the time
the case had already been dismissed. Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross misconduct that
necessarily warrants the supreme penalty of disbarment. The act of demanding a sum of money from his
client, purportedly to be used as a bribe to ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of
his client’strust but an overt act of undermining the trust and faith of the public inthe legal profession and
the entire Judiciary. This is the height of indecency. As officers of the court, lawyers owe their utmost
fidelity to public service and the administration of justice. In no way should a lawyer indulge in any act that
would damage the image of judges, lest the public’s perception of the dispensation of justice be
overshadowed by iniquitous doubts. The denial of respondent and his claim that the amount was given
gratuitously would not excuse him from any liability. The absence of proof that the said amount was
indeed used as a bribe is of no moment. To tolerate respondent’s actuations would seriously erode the
public’s trust in the courts.

As it turned out, complainant’s case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010.1âwphi1 At this
juncture, respondent proved himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed to inform his client of the
status of the case, and left the client to personally inquire with the court. Surely, respondent was not only
guilty of misconduct but was also remiss in his duty to his client.

Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records reveal that he
likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that "[a] lawyer shall not borrow money
from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client." In his private capacity, he
requested from his client, not just one, but two loans of considerable amounts. The first time, he visited
his client in her home and borrowed ₱100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and the next time, he implored
her to extend to him a loan of ₱70,000.00 or ₱50,000.00 "in the moment of urgency or emergency" but
was only given ₱22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions were evidenced by promissory notes and
receipts, the authenticity of which was never questioned by respondent. These acts were committed by
respondent in his private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with complainant, but were
indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and confidence reposed in him as a lawyer.
Nowhere in the records, particularly in the defenses raised by respondent, was it implied that these loans
fell within the exceptions provided by the rules. The loans of ₱100,000.00 and ₱22,000.00 were surely not
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Respondent’s assertion that the amounts
were given to him out of the liberality of complainant and were, thus, considered as "no loan,"does not
justify his inappropriate behavior. The acts of requesting and receiving money as loans from his client and
thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative of his lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing. Up to the
present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations to complainant.

Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing
so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times,
faithfully perform their duties tosociety, to the bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt
payment of financial obligations.32 Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of "conduct" or
"misconduct," the reference is not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the
performance of the lawyer’s professional duties, but also covers any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to
the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law vest him with. Unfortunately, respondent must be found guilty of
misconduct on both scores.

With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court finds it proper to
modify the findings of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded that complainant presented
insufficient evidence of respondent’s "lawyering" for the opposing party, Tierra Realty. Rule 15.03, Canon
15 of the CPR, provides that "[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts." The relationship between a lawyer and his/her
client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of
confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to
his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can
only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost
secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing
conflicting interests."33 Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer
must decline professional employment if the same would trigger the violation of the prohibition against
conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the rules is a written consent from all the parties after
full disclosure.
The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for
representing conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant against Tierra Realty, a corporation
to which he had rendered services in the past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that respondent admitted
to having notarized the deed of sale, which was the very document being questioned in complainant’s
case. While the Investigating Commissioner found that the complaint inCivil Case No. 14791-65 did not
question the validity of the said contract, and that only the intentions of the parties as to some provisions
thereof were challenged, the Court still finds that the purpose for which the proscription was made exists.
The Court cannot brush aside the dissatisfied observations of the complainant as to the allegations
lacking in the complaint against Tierra Realty and the clear admission of respondent that he was the one
who notarized the assailed document. Regardless of whether it was the validity of the entire document or
the intention of the parties as to some of its provisions raised, respondent fell short of prudence in action
when he accepted complainant’s case, knowing fully that he was involved in the execution of the very
transaction under question. Neither his unpaid notarial fees nor the participation of a collaborating counsel
would excuse him from such indiscretion. It is apparent that respondent was retained by clients who had
close dealings with each other. More significantly, there is no record of any written consent from any of
the parties involved.

The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited "not only because the relation of attorney and
client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles of public
policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and
represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused or violated the entire profession
suffers."34

Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for
violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the
CPR.35 For the practice of law is "a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is
entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character."36 The appropriate penalty
for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.37

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office;
(3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the
lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as
an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether
in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a wanton
betrayal of the trust of his client and, in general, the public. Accordingly, the Court finds that the
suspension for three (3) months recommended by the IBP-BOG is not sufficient punishment for the
unacceptable acts and omissions of respondent. The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and
gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his
client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him as a
member of the Bar.

For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging in dishonest and
deceitful conduct, for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for undermining the trust and faith of the
public in the legal profession and the entire judiciary, and for representing conflicting interests, respondent
deserves no less thanthe penalty of disbarment.38

Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from complainant in his
private capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return money
to complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in administrative cases have
no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer’s professional engagement. In
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be
allowed to continue as a memberof the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the determination of
respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings have no material bearing on other judicial actions which
the parties may choose against each other.

To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases are
filed directly with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from
the quantum of evidence required in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is
required. Preponderance of evidence is "a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the
truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto."40 In administrative cases, only substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence,
which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable.41 Furthermore, the
Court has to consider the prescriptive period applicable to civil cases in contrast to administrative cases
which are, as a rule, imprescriptible.42

Thus, the IBP-BOG was co ITect in ordering respondent to return the amount of ₱127,590.00
representing the balance of the filing fees he received from complainant, as this was intimately related to
the lawyerclient relationship between them. Similar to this is the amount of ₱50,000.00 which respondent
received from complainant, as representation expenses for the handling of the civil case and for the
purported purchase of a bottle of wine for the judge. These were connected to his professional
relationship with the complainant. While respondent's deplorable act of requesting the said amount for the
benefit of the judge is stained with mendacity, respondent should be ordered to return the same as it was
borne out of their professional relationship. As to his other obligations, respondent was already adjudged
as liable for the personal loans he contracted with complainant, per the small claims cases filed against
him.

All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, "the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession."43 The Court likewise aims to ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by
"purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an attorney."44

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby DISBARS him from the practice of
law and ORDERS him to pay the complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of ₱127,590.00,
₱50,000.00 and ₱2,500.00. Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Con fidanl, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to ail courts.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 3745 October 2, 1995

CYNTHIA B. ROSACIA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. BENJAMIN B. BULALACAO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:

Complainant Cynthia B. Rosacia, president of Tacma, Phils., Inc., a duly registered corporation, filed a
complaint for disbarment dated October 25, 1991, against herein respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao.
Acting on the complaint, the Court in a resolution dated February 24, 1992, resolved to refer the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Commissioner
Victor C. Fernandez, the IBP investigating commissioner, found that respondent breached his oath of
office and accordingly recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3)
months.1 In a resolution dated July 30, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve
the commissioner's report and recommendation.2

As found by the IBP, the undisputed facts are as follows:

On June 1, 1990, by virtue of a written Agreement (Exh. "3-a"), respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao
was hired as retained counsel of a corporation by the name of Tacma Phils., Inc.

On October 31, 1990, the lawyer-client relationship between the respondent and Tacma Phils., Inc. was
severed as shown by another agreement of even date (Exh. "3-b").

On July, 1991, or after almost nine (9) months from the date respondent's retainer agreement with Tacma,
Phils., Inc. was terminated, several employees of the corporation consulted the respondent for the
purpose of filing an action for illegal dismissal. Thereafter, he agreed to handle the case for the said
employees as against Tacma, Phils., Inc. by filing a complaint before the National Labor Relations
Commission, and appearing in their behalf.3

The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not respondent breached his oath of office for representing
the employees of his former client, Tacma, Phils., Inc., after the termination of their attorney-client
relationship. We agree with the findings of the IBP that respondent breached his oath of office.
Respondent does not now dispute this. In fact, in his motion for reconsideration, respondent admitted that
he "did commit an act bordering on grave misconduct, if not outright violation of his attorney's
oath".4 However, respondent is pleading for the Court's compassion and leniency to reduce the IBP
recommended three months suspension to either fine or admonition with the following proffered grounds:
that he is relatively new in the profession having been admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990 at
the age of 46 when the complained conduct was committed on August 1991; that he is of humble
beginnings and his suspension will deprive his family of its only source of livelihood he being the sole
bread winner in the family; that he has fully realized his mistake and the gravity of his offense for which he
is fully repentant; that he has severed his attorney-client relationship with the employees of Tacma, Phils.,
Inc. by inhibiting himself and withdrawing his appearance as counsel in the labor case against Tacma,
Phils., Inc.; and that he pledges not to commit the same mistake and to henceforth strictly adhere to the
professional standards set forth by the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Court reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has
represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated as it is not good practice
to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other person against his former client under the
pretext that the case is distinct from, and independent of the former case. 5 It behooves respondent not
only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.6 The relation of attorney and client is one of
confidence and trust in the highest degree.7 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he ought
to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. 8 An attorney not only becomes familiar with all
the facts connected with his client's cause, but also learns from his client the weak and strong points of
the case. No opportunity must be given attorneys to take advantage of the secrets of clients obtained
while the confidential relation of attorney and client exists. Otherwise, the legal profession will suffer by
the loss of the confidence of the people.9

Respondent's plea for leniency cannot be granted. We note that respondent is new in the profession as
he was just admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990, when the breach of his oath of office
occurred more than a year after. Having just hurdled the bar examinations which included an examination
in legal ethics, surely the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility to keep inviolate the client's
trust and confidence even after the attorney-client relation is terminated 10 must have been still fresh in his
mind. A lawyer starting to establish his stature in the legal profession must start right and dutifully abide by
the norms of conduct of the profession. This will ineluctably redound to his benefit and to the upliftment of
the legal profession as well.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three months. Let this
resolution be attached to respondent's record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof
furnished to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

SECOND DIVISION

[ A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013 ]

JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA, MANUEL L. OROLA, MARY ANGELYN OROLA-

BELARGA, MARJORIE MELBA OROLA-CALIP, AND KAREN OROLA, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY.
JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court’s resolution is a disbarment complaint [1] filed against respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos
(respondent) for his violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 (Rule 15.03) of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code) and Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court (Rules).

The Facts

Complainants Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, (all surnamed Orola), Mary Angelyn Orola-Belarga (Mary
Angelyn), and Marjorie Melba Orola-Calip (Marjorie) are the children of the late Trinidad Laserna-Orola
(Trinidad), married to Emilio Q. Orola (Emilio).[2]

Meanwhile, complainant Karen Orola (Karen) is the daughter of Maricar Alba-Orola (Maricar) and Antonio
L. Orola (Antonio), the deceased brother of the above-named complainants and the son of Emilio. [3]

In the settlement of Trinidad’s estate, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 18
(RTC) and docketed as Special Proceeding No. V-3639, the parties were represented by the following: (a)
Atty. Roy M. Villa (Atty. Villa) as counsel for and in behalf of Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, Mary Angelyn,
and Marjorie (Heirs of Trinidad); (b) Atty. Ely F. Azarraga, Jr. (Atty. Azarraga) as counsel for and in behalf
of Maricar, Karen, and the other heirs[4] of the late Antonio (Heirs of Antonio), with respondent as
collaborating counsel; and (c) Atty. Aquiliana Brotarlo as counsel for and in behalf of Emilio, the initially
appointed administrator of Trinidad’s estate. In the course of the proceedings, the Heirs of Trinidad and
the Heirs of Antonio moved for the removal of Emilio as administrator and, in his stead, sought the
appointment of the latter’s son, Manuel Orola, which the RTC granted in an Order [5] dated September 20,
2007 (RTC Order). Subsequently, or on October 10, 2007, respondent filed an Entry of Appearance as
collaborating counsel for Emilio in the same case and moved for the reconsideration of the RTC Order. [6]

Due to the respondent’s new engagement, complainants filed the instant disbarment complaint before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), claiming that he violated: (a) Rule 15.03 of the Code, as he
undertook to represent conflicting interests in the subject case; [7] and (b) Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the
Rules, as he breached the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his clients, the Heirs of Antonio.
[8]
Complainants further claimed that while Maricar, the surviving spouse of Antonio and the mother of
Karen, consented to the withdrawal of respondent’s appearance, the same was obtained only on October
18, 2007, or after he had already entered his appearance for Emilio on October 10, 2007.[9] In this accord,
respondent failed to disclose such fact to all the affected heirs and, as such, was not able to obtain their
written consent as required under the Rules.[10]

For his part, respondent refuted the abovementioned charges, contending that he never appeared as
counsel for the Heirs of Trinidad or for the Heirs of Antonio. He pointed out that the records of the case
readily show that the Heirs of Trinidad were represented by Atty. Villa, while the Heirs of Antonio were
exclusively represented by Atty. Azarraga.[11] He averred that he only accommodated Maricar's request to
temporarily appear on her behalf as their counsel of record could not attend the scheduled June 16 and
July 14, 2006 hearings and that his appearances thereat were free of charge.[12] In fact, he obtained
Maricar’s permission for him to withdraw from the case as no further communications transpired after
these two hearings. Likewise, he consulted Maricar before he undertook to represent Emilio in the same
case.[13] He added that he had no knowledge of the fact that the late Antonio had other heirs and, in this
vein, asserted that no information was disclosed to him by Maricar or their counsel of record at any
instance.[14] Finally, he clarified that his representation for Emilio in the subject case was more of a
mediator, rather than a litigator,[15] and that since no settlement was forged between the parties, he
formally withdrew his appearance on December 6, 2007. [16] In support of his assertions, respondent
submitted the affidavits of Maricar[17] and Atty. Azarraga[18] relative to his limited appearance and his
consultation with Maricar prior to his engagement as counsel for Emilio.

The Recommendation and Action of the IBP

In the Report and Recommendation[19] dated September 15, 2008 submitted by IBP Investigating
Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner), respondent was found guilty of
representing conflicting interests only with respect to Karen as the records of the case show that he never
acted as counsel for the other complainants. The Investigating Commissioner observed that while
respondent's withdrawal of appearance was with the express conformity of Maricar, respondent
nonetheless failed to obtain the consent of Karen, who was already of age and one of the Heirs of
Antonio, as mandated under Rule 15.03 of the Code.[20]

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner held that there was no violation of Section 20, Rule
138 of the Rules as complainants themselves admitted that respondent “did not acquire confidential
information from his former client nor did he use against the latter any knowledge obtained in the course
of his previous employment.”[21] Considering that it was respondent's first offense, the Investigating
Commissioner found the imposition of disbarment too harsh a penalty and, instead, recommended that he
be severely reprimanded for his act with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be
dealt with more severely.[22]

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the aforementioned report in its
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641[23] dated December 11, 2008 (Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641), finding the
same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules but imposed
against respondent the penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law.

Respondent's motion for reconsideration[24] was denied in IBP Resolution No. XX-2013-17[25] dated
January 3, 2013.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests in
violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court concurs with the IBP’s finding that respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code, but reduced the
recommended period of suspension to three (3) months.

Rule 15.03 of the Code reads:

 CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose
interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether they are parties in the same action or on
totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. [26] It
behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. [27] In Hornilla v.
Salunat[28] (Hornilla), the Court explained the concept of conflict of interest, to wit:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is “whether in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument
will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.” This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether
the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.[29] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

It must, however, be noted that a lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions
that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the
lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former
client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.[30]

Applying the above-stated principles, the Court agrees with the IBP’s finding that respondent represented
conflicting interests and, perforce, must be held administratively liable therefor.

Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating counsel not only for Maricar as claimed by him, but
for all the Heirs of Antonio in Special Proceeding No. V-3639. In the course thereof, the Heirs of Trinidad
and the Heirs of Antonio succeeded in removing Emilio as administrator for having committed acts
prejudicial to their interests. Hence, when respondent proceeded to represent Emilio for the purpose of
 seeking his reinstatement as administrator in the same case, he clearly worked against the very interest
of the Heirs of Antonio – particularly, Karen – in violation of the above-stated rule.

Respondent's justification that no confidential information was relayed to him cannot fully exculpate him
for the charges against him since the rule on conflict of interests, as enunciated in Hornilla, provides an
absolute prohibition from representation with respect to opposing parties in the same case. In other
words, a lawyer cannot change his representation from one party to the latter’s opponent in the same
case. That respondent’s previous appearances for and in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio was only a
friendly accommodation cannot equally be given any credence since the aforesaid rule holds even if the
inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no
intention to represent conflicting interests.[31]

Neither can respondent's asseveration that his engagement by Emilio was more of a mediator than a
litigator and for the purpose of forging a settlement among the family members render the rule
inoperative. In fact, even on that assertion, his conduct is likewise improper since Rule 15.04,[32] Canon 15
of the Code similarly requires the lawyer to obtain the written consent of all concerned before he may act
as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes. Irrefragably, respondent failed in this respect as
the records show that respondent was remiss in his duty to make a full disclosure of his impending
engagement as Emilio’s counsel to all the Heirs of Antonio – particularly, Karen – and equally secure their
express written consent before consummating the same. Besides, it must be pointed out that a lawyer
who acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent any of the parties to it.[33] Accordingly, for
respondent’s violation of the aforestated rules, disciplinary sanction is warranted.

In this case, the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner was increased from severe
reprimand to a suspension of six (6) months by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVIII-
2008-641. However, the Court observes that the said resolution is bereft of any explanation showing the
bases of the IBP Board of Governors’ modification; as such, it contravened Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of
the Rules which specifically mandates that “[t]he decision of the Board upon such review shall be in
writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based.”[34] Verily, the
Court looks with disfavor the change in the recommended penalty without any ample justification therefor.
To this end, the Court is wont to remind the IBP Board of Governors of the importance of the requirement
to announce in plain terms its legal reasoning, since the requirement that its decision in disciplinary
proceedings must state the facts and the reasons on which the same is based is akin to what is required
of courts in promulgating their decisions. The reasons for handing down a penalty occupy no lesser
station than any other portion of the ratio.[35]

In the foregoing light, the Court finds the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of
three (3) months to be more appropriate taking into consideration the following factors: first, respondent
is a first time offender; second, it is undisputed that respondent merely accommodated Maricar’s request
out of gratis to temporarily represent her only during the June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings due to her
lawyer’s unavailability; third, it is likewise undisputed that respondent had no knowledge that the late
Antonio had any other heirs aside from Maricar whose consent he actually acquired (albeit shortly after
his first appearance as counsel for and in behalf of Emilio), hence, it can be said that he acted in good
faith; and fourth, complainants admit that respondent did not acquire confidential information from the
Heirs of Antonio nor did he use against them any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous
employment, hence, the said heirs were not in any manner prejudiced by his subsequent engagement
with Emilio. Notably, in Ilusorio-Bildner v. Lokin, Jr.,[36] the Court similarly imposed the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months to the counsel therein who represented
parties whose interests are hostile to his other clients in another case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos is hereby held GUILTY of representing conflicting
interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months, with WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 10662
[Formerly CBD Case No. 10-2654]

JUN B. LUNA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DWIGHT M. GALARRITA, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Before us is a disbarment Complaint against Atty. Dwight M. Galarrita for his failure to deliver to his client,
complainant Jun B. Luna, the P100,000.00 settlement proceeds he received after entering into a
Compromise Agreement in the foreclosure case without his client’s consent.

On April 7, 2010, Jun B. Luna (Luna) filed an Affidavit-Complaint 1 against his lawyer, Atty. Dwight M.
Galarrita (Atty. Galarrita), before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Luna alleged that he retained Atty. Galarrita’s legal services in filing a foreclosure Complaint 2 on October
14, 2002 before the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon.3 The Complaint against one Jose Calvario
(Calvario) alleged that Calvario borrowed P100,000.00 from Luna. This loan was secured by a Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage4 over a parcel of land in Quezon Province. 5 Due to non-payment of the loan, Luna
filed the Complaint praying for payment of the obligation with interest, and issuance of a foreclosure
decree upon Calvario’s failure to fully pay within the period.6

The parties tried to amicably settle the case during pre-trial, followed by Luna’s presentation and offer of
evidence.7
Atty. Galarrita opted to enter into a settlement with the other party after his formal offer of evidence. 8 They
submitted the Kasunduan9 (Compromise Agreement) before the trial court on February 14, 2006.10 It
provided that Calvario would pay Luna P105,000.00 as payment for his mortgaged land and, in turn, Luna
would cause the removal of the encumbrance annotation on the land title. 11 The trial court approved12 the
Compromise Agreement in its February 20, 2006 Decision. 13 Luna alleged that Atty. Galarrita never
informed him of this Compromise Agreement, and did not deliver to him the P100,000.00 settlement
proceeds Atty. Galarrita had received.14

Luna’s Complaint attached a copy of the Counsel’s Report15 dated August 12, 2003 where Atty. Galarrita
proposed and provided justifications for settlement, and waived any compensation for his services in the
case:16

Please take note that Mr. Jose Calvario is willing, able and ready to pay you IN CASH the full amount of
One Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (Php110,000.00), no more no less. While we are aware that it’s your
desire to fight this case to its ultimate legal conclusion, allow us nonetheless, to present the pros and
cons of having this case be amicably settled.

Point One: He has in his possession the original copy of the checks you issued showing that upon
signing of the Contract Of Real Estate Mortgage, he received from you Eighty Eight Thousand
Pesos (Php88,000.00) only. Meaning, he has already paid in advance his interest of 12% or the
equivalent of Twelve Thousand Pesos (Php12,000.00) when the contract was signed. Consequently, it is
useless for us to argue before the court that his principal indebtedness amounted to One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00). Hence, if you accept the compromise settlement of One Hundred Ten
Thousand Pesos (Php110,000.00), you stand to gain Twenty Two Thousand Pesos (Php22,000.00).

....

Rest assured, your undersigned counsel leaves it to your better judgment as to whether he deserves to
be paid for his legal services regarding this case against Mr. Jose Calvario.

Repeat, I will no longer ask from you any compensation for my services regarding this case. 17 (Emphasis
in the original)

Atty. Galarrita wrote Luna the following: Counsel’s Reports, Requests for Funding, and Statements of
Accounts in relation to case developments, retainer’s fees, and reimbursement for expenses incurred.18

After learning of the settlement, Luna wrote Atty. Galarrita: "I was so surprised when you went into plea
agreement for Compromise Agreement without my knowledge [a]nd beyond to [sic] what we had
discussed."19 Atty. Galarrita replied through the Letter20 dated January 27, 2006, stating in part:

I entered into an amicable settlement with Mr. Jose Calvario because I am certain that in this kind of case,
a compromise is better than WINNING it.
Everything is transparent. You even told me that you are not interested to acquire the land that’s why you
signaled your approval of a compromise.

I was hoping that you already understood my situation. As I have told you, I can’t waste my time going to
Gumaca every now and then. Traveling time is too precious for my cases here in Metro Manila.

The point is: I did not receive any appearance fee for the numerous hearings conducted there despite
sending several statements of accounts (SOA) to your office.

If that’s the case, why prolong the agony?

Why bother after all to pursue this case when indeed, you are not interested to acquire the land and you
are not bent in spending the right remuneration for your undersigned counsel?

I have nothing to hide. The money will be deposited in my savings account because I just could not
handle that amount of cash in my pocket.21

In his Letter22 dated February 27, 2006, Luna wrote:

Yes I’m not interested with that lot in Quezon, [and this is] the reason why I’m the one who propose to
them [that] [w]e settle this case on our own without any lawyer, they are the one[s] who insist to go to
Court. . . . This is what we come out to [p]ropose to them, with the right amount to cover all those only
been spent including Acceptance fee. You even waive[d] your fee on this, for every hearing which I
couldn’t understand, [y]et we end up that we still going [sic] to pursue this case, it was discussed during
my trip there. [This is] [t]he reason I’m too surprised with your plea Agreement without my knowledge.23

Luna mentioned that the delay in retainer’s fee payments was due to Atty. Galarrita’s negligence in
handling the case.24

In his Letter25 of the same date, Atty. Galarrita explained: "The reason this case was archived [was]
because I could not attend several hearings for lack of meal and transport allowance going to Gumaca,
Quezon. . . . that’s moot and academic because this case was not dismissed by the court, at all." 26 Atty.
Galarrita then stated that "[f]or all my shortcomings as a lawyer, I now ask forgiveness. . . . But let it not be
said that I betrayed you and your cases."27

In August 2009, Luna received a letter from one of the heirs of Jose Calvario, Emma C. Tayag, seeking
delivery of the land title since they paid the P100,000.00 settlement amount. 28 Another heir, Lutchiare
Calvario, wrote Luna in September 2009 again demanding delivery of title.29

Luna alleged in his Affidavit-Complaint that Atty. Galarrita has not remitted the P100,000.00 to date. 30 He
prays for Atty. Galarrita’s disbarment.31

In his Verified Answer,32 Atty. Galarrita prays for the dismissal of the disbarment Complaint.33 He argues
that he entered the Compromise Agreement by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney 34 that includes this
purpose.35 He regularly submitted reports to Luna on developments and possible settlement before he
entered the Compromise Agreement.36 He submits that Luna "‘slept’ on his rights."37

Atty. Galarrita adds that under their General Retainership

Agreement,38 Luna shall pay him _4,000.00 monthly.39 Luna should have paid P48,000.00 as of
November 17, 2006, and after four years with no revocation, termination, or nullification, Luna’s unpaid
obligation amounted to P208,000.00.40 He listed other unpaid amounts for his legal services. 41 Atty.
Galarrita, thus, argues for an application of the rule on retaining lien. 42 Atty. Galarrita also raises the two-
year prescription under Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline. 43 More than four years elapsed since their last communication
in 2006 when the Compromise Agreement became final.44

In his December 4, 2010 Report and Recommendation,45 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Investigating Commissioner46 found that Atty. Galarrita violated Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended "his suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year[.]"47

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, in its April 15, 2013 Resolution No. XX-2013-
441,48 adopted and approved with modification the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation in that Atty. Galarrita is recommended to be "suspended from the practice of law for six
(6) months and [o]rdered to [r]eturn the amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos to
complainant without prejudice to the filing of a collection case for retainer’s fee against
complainant."49 The Board of Governors denied reconsideration in its May 3, 2014 Resolution No. XXI-
2014-270.50

The Office of the Bar Confidant reported that "no motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed
as of November 17, 2014."51 In any case, it is this court that has the authority to discipline members of the
bar.52

The issue for resolution is whether respondent Atty. Galarrita should be held administratively liable for
entering into a Compromise Agreement without his client complainant Luna’s consent, then refusing to
turn over the settlement proceeds received.

This court acknowledges the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors, with modification increasing the period of suspension from the practice of law to two (2) years.

Those in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty and integrity in all their
dealings.53
Lawyers should maintain, at all times, "a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and
fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their
clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code [of Professional Responsibility]."54

Members of the bar took their oath to conduct themselves "according to the best of [their] knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [their] clients[,]" 55 and to "delay no man for
money or malice[.]"56

These mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients considering the highly fiduciary
nature of their relationship.57 Clients entrust their causes—life, liberty, and property—to their lawyers,
certain that this confidence would not be abused.

Complainant Luna entrusted respondent Atty. Galarrita with handling the civil case involving a mortgaged
land in Quezon Province. However, without complainant Luna’s consent, respondent Atty. Galarrita settled
this case with the other party.

Article 1878 of the Civil Code provides that "[s]pecial powers of attorney are necessary in the following
cases: . . . (3) To compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the right to appeal from a
judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a prescription already acquired[.]"

The Rules of Court thus requires lawyers to secure special authority from their clients when entering into
a compromise agreement that dispenses with litigation:

SEC. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. – Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case
by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary
judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client’s litigation, or
receive anything in discharge of a client’s claim but the full amount in cash.58 (Emphasis supplied)

Atty. Galarrita contends that he holds a Special Power of Attorney to enter into compromise agreements,
but as found by the Investigating Commissioner:

There seems to be a compelling reason to believe that Complainant had not given any authority
for the Complainant [sic] to enter into Compromise Agreement at that precise stage of the
trial. Firstly, the Complainant was not made a party to the Compromise Agreement despite the fact that
he was not abroad when the agreement was executed. Secondly, there was no indication that he had
agreed to the amount of P100,000.00 in exchange for his withdrawal of the complaint. Thirdly, he was not
seasonably informed of the execution of the Compromise Agreement/payment of the P100,000.00 and
came to know of the same only much later.

Respondent argued that Complainant had previously executed a Special Power of Attorney wherein he
authorized the former to "enter into possible amicable settlement or submit any matter to arbitration and
alternative modes of dispute resolution, simplification of the issues, the necessity of amendment to the
pleadings, the possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid
unnecessary proof, the limitation of the number of witnesses, the advisability of preliminary reference of
issues to a commissioner, the propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or
of dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist, the advisability of suspending
the proceedings, offer matters that may properly be considered under Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure." It would seem, however, that despite the authority given to Respondent, the same SPA
cannot justify Respondent’s representation in the Compromise Agreement on February 14, 2006. To
dissect, the SPA was executed on September 16, 2002 or a month before the filing of the
Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage. Thus, the conclusion seems to be that the authority given
therein to Respondent to enter into a possible settlement referred only to a possible settlement
that could be secured or firmed up during the preliminary conference or pre-trial of the case. In
fact, the tenor of the SPA indicates that the SPA was precisely executed in order to constitute Respondent
as Complainant’s representative during the preliminary conference or pre-trial.

Assuming it can be inferred that the SPA and the authority given to Respondent can be liberally
interpreted and allowed to extend up to the time the Compromise had been executed, still the
Respondent may not have faithfully performed his sworn duty to his client. During the mandatory
conference, it was established that at the time the compromise was executed the Complainant was not
abroad and, therefore, given the current information technology it would have been easy or convenient for
Respondent to have informed his client about it. Admittedly, his failure in this regard had only given
Complainant the reason to cast doubt on his real intention in agreeing to the compromise agreement for
and in his behalf.

It would seem, however, that by Complainant’s act of demanding the amount from Respondent, the
former may have already ignored the issue on the lack of authority on his part thus curing the defect on
the latter’s authority to enter into the same.59 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."60 Members of the bar must always conduct themselves in a way
that promotes "public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession." 61 Even though complainant Luna
effectively abandoned the issue on respondent Atty. Galarrita’s lack of authority to compromise the civil
case when he demanded the payment of the settlement proceeds, this does not erase his acts of abusing
the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant Luna.

II

Worse, respondent Atty. Galarrita not only failed to promptly inform complainant Luna of the former’s
receipt of the P100,000.00 settlement proceeds but also refused to turn over the amount to complainant
Luna. This court has held that "any money collected for the client or other trust property coming into the
lawyer’s possession should promptly be reported by him [or her]." 62 Rule 16.03 under Canon 6 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:

CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.

....

Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to
satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also
have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided
for in the Rules of Court.

In several cases, we have disciplined lawyers who failed or refused to remit amounts received for and on
behalf of their clients. "The penalty for violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
usually ranges from suspension for six months, to suspension for one year, or two years, and even
disbarment[,]"63 depending on the circumstances of each case.

In Villanueva v. Atty. Ishiwata,64 respondent received four checks totalling P225,000.00 from his client’s
employer after signing a Quitclaim and Release pursuant to their compromise agreement.65 Despite full
payment of settlement award, respondent only remitted P45,000.00 to his client and refused to deliver the
balance.66 Respondent explained that he delivered P90,000.00 to his client’s wife, but his secretary
misplaced the signed receipts, and he deducted his 25% attorney’s fees of P56,250.00 from the award.67
The balance left was only P750.00.68 This court found Atty. Ishiwata guilty of violating Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year, and ordered
him to restitute to complainant the amount of P154,500.00 representing the balance after P45,000.00 and
the 10% attorney’s fees had been deducted from the settlement award.69

In Aldovino v. Atty. Pujalte, Jr.,70 respondent received P1,001,332.26 from the Branch Clerk of Court
corresponding to the six shares of his clients in the estate of their deceased mother, but respondent only
delivered P751,332.26 to his clients.71 Respondent explained that he deducted P250,000.00 as his
attorney’s fees, while complainants countered that respondent could only retain P14,000.00 as they
already paid him P86,000.00 for his services.72 This court found Atty. Pujalte, Jr. guilty of violating Canon
16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year,
and ordered him to return to complainants the amount of P236,000.00.73

In Almendarez, Jr. v. Atty. Langit,74 respondent received P255,000.00 from the Officer-in-Charge Clerk of
Court representing the monthly rentals deposited by the other party in the ejectment case respondent
handled for his client.75 Respondent did not inform his client of this transaction and failed to reply to the
final demand letter for accounting.76 Respondent did not file an Answer to the administrative Complaint
despite notice, and failed to appear at the mandatory conference.77 This court found Atty. Langit guilty of
violating Canons 1, 11, 16, and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, suspended him from the
practice of law for two (2) years, and ordered him to restitute to complainant the amount of _255,000.00
with 12% interest per annum.78

In Bayonla v. Reyes,79 respondent should have delivered to her clients the amount of P123,582.67—the
net amount of Bayonla’s share in the expropriation compensation after deducting respondent’s 40% share
as attorney’s fees—but respondent only delivered P79,000.00 and refused to remit the P44,582.67
shortage.80 This court found Atty. Reyes guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, suspended her from the practice of law for two (2) years, ordered her to pay
complainants the amount of P44,582.67 with 12% interest per annum, and render accounting and
inventory.81

In Jinon v. Jiz,82 respondent received P45,000.00 from his client for transfer of title expenses.83 His client
later learned that respondent had been collecting the rentals from the property amounting to P12,000.00,
yet respondent only turned over P7,000.00.84 Complainant terminated respondent’s legal services and
demanded the return of the amounts.85 Respondent countered that his legal services covered negotiation
and sale of the property for a fee of P75,000.00.86 This court found Atty. Jiz guilty of violating Rules 16.01,
16.03, and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, suspended him from the practice of law for
two (2) years, and ordered him to pay complainant the amount of P45,000.00 with 6% legal interest per
annum from date of demand until finality of Decision, then 12% until fully paid.87

In this case, respondent Atty. Galarrita entered into the Compromise Agreement involving complainant
Luna’s property without informing him. Even though complainant Luna forewent the lack of authority
issue, respondent Atty. Galarrita still continued to act in bad faith by refusing to turn over the P100,000.00
settlement amount received. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Investigating Commissioner found that:

On another point, there seems no cogent proof, too, that Respondent had been advised of Complainant’s
supposed agreement to Mr. Calvario’s payment of P100,000.00. Despite R[es]pondent’s allegations that
he had informed Complainant about his so-called counsel’s report, it remains undisputed that the
Complainant did not give him any express approval of the same.

There is to the undersigned enough indicia to conclude that Respondent had committed bad faith in
entering into the Compromise Agreement. From February 2006 to November 2010, or a period of four (4)
years, Respondent failed to turn-over the P100,000.00 he had collected from Mr. Calvario to Complainant.
Worse, he failed to seasonably inform Complainant about the same. He kept the money and claimed he
had the right to retain the same invoking the counsel’s right to a retaining line [sic]. He pointed out that
Complainant had incurred accrued attorney’s fees which he is bound to pay under the general retainer
agreement. Thus, it is not amiss to state that he entered into the said agreement with the odious
motivation to hold on to it and pave the way for the payment of his attorney’s fees. In so doing, he violated
the trust reposed in him by his client and violated Rule 16.03 of the Code of [P]rofessional Responsibility.

As to Respondent’s invocation of the lawyer’s retaining lien and his retention of the money, the
undersigned deems the same unlawful. True, the Code of Professional Responsibility allows the lawyer to
apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to his client." But this provision assumes that the client agrees with the lawyer as to
the amount of attorney’s fees and as to the application of the client’s fund to pay his lawful fees and
disbursements, in which case he may deduct what is due him and remit the balance to his client, with full
disclosure on every detail. Without the client’s consent, the lawyer has no authority to apply the
client’s money for his fees, but he should instead return the money to his client, without prejudice
to his filing a case to recover his unsatisfied fees.

....

On Respondent’s argument that prescription has already set in against Complainant, suffice it to state
that the rules have already been supplanted by a new set of rules which do not anymore carry the
same.88 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Administrative proceedings require only substantial evidence.89 This court accepts and adopts the findings
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, but with modification increasing the period of
suspension from the practice of law to two (2) years considering that respondent Atty. Galarrita not only
compromised litigation without complainant Luna’s consent, but also refused to turn over the settlement
proceeds to date.

III

This court sustains the order for respondent Atty. Galarrita to return the amount of P100,000.00 to
complainant Luna.

In Ronquillo v. Atty. Cezar,90 the parties entered a Deed of Assignment after which respondent received
P937,500.00 from complainant as partial payment for the townhouse and lot. 91 However, respondent did
not turn over this amount to developer Crown Asia, and no copy of the Contract to Sell was given to
complainant.92 This court suspended Atty. Cezar from the practice of law for three (3) years, but did not
grant complainant’s prayer for the return of the P937,500.00.93

Ronquillo held that "[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but
rather investigations by the court into the conduct of one of its officers." 94 Thus, disciplinary proceedings
are limited to a determination of "whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar."95
Later jurisprudence clarified that this rule excluding civil liability determination from disciplinary
proceedings "remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature — for instance,
when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and
distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement."96

This court has thus ordered in administrative proceedings the return of amounts representing legal fees.
This court has also ordered restitution as concomitant relief in administrative proceedings when
respondent’s civil liability was already established:

Although the Court renders this decision in an administrative proceeding primarily to exact the ethical
responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Court’s silence about the respondent lawyer’s legal
obligation to restitute the complainant will be both unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical
misconduct concerning the client’s funds or property should be required to still litigate in another
proceeding what the administrative proceeding has already established as the respondent’s
liability. That has been the reason why the Court has required restitution of the amount involved as a
concomitant relief in the cited cases of Mortera v. Pagatpatan, supra, Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, supra,
Small v. Banares, supra.97 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent Atty. Galarrita does not deny his receipt of the P100,000.00 but justifies his refusal to turn
over the amount by invoking jurisprudence on retaining lien.98 The Rules of Court provides for attorney’s
retaining lien as follows:

SEC. 37. Attorney’s liens. – An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his
client which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a
lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance
of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall
have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering
such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to
his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and
executions as his client would have enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and
disbursements.99

First, "lawyer[s] [are] not entitled to unilaterally appropriate [their] clients[’] money for [themselves] by the
mere fact that the client[s] [owe] [them] attorney’s fees."100 They must give prompt notice to their clients of
any receipt of funds for or on behalf of their clients.101

Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for a lawyer’s duty to "account for all
money or property collected or received for or from the client."
Respondent Atty. Galarrita refused to comply with these duties, warranting his suspension from the
practice of law.

Second, the elements required for full recognition of attorney’s lien are: "(1) lawyer-client relationship; (2)
lawful possession of the client’s funds, documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney’s
fees."102

Respondent Atty. Galarrita must prove the existence of all these elements. However, this is not the main
issue in this disbarment case against him, and the validity of his retaining lien defense was not
established. Counter evidence even exists such as respondent Atty. Galarrita's Letter dated August 12,
2003 waiving any compensation for his services in the foreclosure case.103 Complainant Luna also raises
respondent Atty. Galarrita's negligence in handling the case, and lack of supporting receipts for the
incurred expenses respondent Atty. Galarrita seeks to reimburse.104

Nevertheless, we maintain that the disposition of this case is without prejudice to the filing of a collection
case for retainer's fee against complainant Luna.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Dwight M. Galarrita is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2)
years, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
He is ORDERED to return to complainant Jun B. Luna the amount of Pl00,000.00, with legal interest of
6% per annum from February 2006105 until fully paid, without prejudice to the filing of a collection case for
retainer's fee against complainant Luna.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into respondent
Atty. Galarrita's records as attorney. Copies shall likewise be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.
N BANC

[ A.C. No. 1526, January 31, 2005 ]

NAZARIA S. HERNANDEZ (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY LUCIANO S. HERNANDEZ, JR.,

COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JOSE C. GO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For our resolution is the verified letter-complaint[1] for disbarment against Atty. Jose C. Go dated June 23,
1975 filed by Nazaria S. Hernandez (now deceased). Both parties are from Zamboanga City.

The allegations in the letter-complaint are:

Sometime in 1961, complainant’s husband abandoned her and her son, Luciano S. Hernandez, Jr.
Shortly thereafter, her husband’s numerous creditors demanded payments of his loans. Fearful that the
various mortgage contracts involving her properties will be foreclosed and aware of impending suits for
sums of money against her, complainant engaged the legal services of Atty. Jose C. Go, herein
respondent.
 Respondent instilled in complainant a feeling of helplessness, fear, embarrassment, and social
humiliation. He advised her to give him her land titles covering Lots 848-A, 849-Q, and 849-P at
Zamboanga City so he could sell them to enable her to pay her creditors. He then persuaded her to
execute deeds of sale in his favor without any monetary or valuable consideration. Complainant agreed
on condition that he would sell the lots and from the proceeds pay her creditors.

Complainant also owned Lots 2118, 2139, and 1141-A, likewise located in Zamboanga City, which were
mortgaged to her creditors. When the mortgages fell due, respondent redeemed the lots. Again, he
convinced her to execute deeds of sale involving those lots in his favor. As a result, respondent became
the registered owner of all the lots belonging to complainant.

Sometime in 1974, complainant came to know that respondent did not sell her lots as agreed upon.
Instead, he paid her creditors with his own funds and had her land titles registered in his name, depriving
her of her real properties worth millions.

In our Resolution dated September 24, 1975, respondent was required to file his comment on the
complaint.

Instead of filing his comment, respondent submitted a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
is premature since there is pending before the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City Civil
[2]
Case No. 1781 for recovery of ownership and declaration of nullity of deeds of sale filed by complainant
against him involving the subject lots.

On November 14, 1975, we issued a Resolution denying respondent’s motion and requiring him to submit
his answer.

In his answer dated December 19, 1975, respondent denied the allegations in the instant complaint. He
averred that he sold, in good faith, complainant’s lots to various buyers, including himself, for valuable
consideration. On several occasions, he extended financial assistance to complainant and even invited
her to live with his family. His children used to call her “Lola” due to her frequent visits to his residence.
He prayed that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

On January 17, 1977, we referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation,
report, and recommendation.

It was only on March 13, 1990 or after 13 years, 1 month and 26 days that the OSG filed a motion to refer
 the instant case to the IBP for the retaking of the testimonies of complainant’s witnesses and the
submission of its report and recommendation.

On April 4, 1990, we issued a Resolution referring the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation.

The Report and Recommendation dated June 15, 2004 of Atty. Lydia A. Navarro, Commissioner of the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, is quoted as follows:

“A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted by the parties showed that all the
properties of the complainant are presently owned by the respondent by virtue of several deeds of sale
executed by the complainant in favor of the respondent without monetary consideration except Lot 849-D
situated in Tomas Claudio which was returned by the respondent to the complainant on September 5,
1974.

It is evident from the records that respondent was the one who notarized the documents involving the said
properties redeemed or repurchased by the complainant from her creditors which ended up in
respondent’s name like in the deed of sale executed by Victoriano Dejerano in favor of Nazaria
Hernandez over Lots 1141-A-3-A and 1141-A-3-B; deed of sale executed by Antonio Masrahon on
September 3, 1961regarding Lot No. 1141-A; deed of absolute sale executed by Francisco Esperat over
the Curuan properties on November 9, 1971 and the cancellation of the mortgage executed by Alfonso
Enriquez on July 18, 1964 over the Tomas Claudio properties.

The foregoing legal activities and operations of the respondent in addition to his having discussed,
advised and gave solutions to complainant’s legal problems and liabilities to her creditors and even
requested her creditors for extension of time to pay complainant’s accounts constitute practice of law as
legal counsel for consultation aside from representing complainant in other cases; a mute proof of a
lawyer-client relations between them, a fact also admitted by the respondent.

It is incumbent upon the respondent to have rendered a detailed report to the complainant on how he paid
complainant’s creditors without selling her properties. Instead of selling to buyers at higher price, he paid
them out of his own funds; then later on admitted that he was one of the purchasers of complainant’s
properties in utter disregard of their agreement and no evidence was submitted by the respondent
concerning the value of the said sale of complainant’s properties.

As such, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his obligation and duty as complainant’s
legal adviser and counsel when he took advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the
complainant in ultimately putting complainant’s properties in his name and possession in violation
 of Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommends that respondent Atty.
Jose C. Go be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months from receipt hereof and
the IBP Chapter where he is a registered member be furnished a copy of the same for implementation
hereof, subject to the approval of the Honorable Members of the Board of Governors.”

On July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-39 adopting and
approving the Report of Commissioner Navarro with modification in the sense that the recommended
penalty of suspension from the practice of law was increased from six (6) months to three (3) years.

We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding that respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility. However, we have to modify its recommended penalty.

Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the principal source of ethical rules for lawyers in
this jurisdiction, provides:

“A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.”

Respondent breached this Canon. His acts of acquiring for himself complainant’s lots entrusted to him
are, by any standard, acts constituting gross misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction
in duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. [3] Such conduct
on the part of respondent degrades not only himself but also the name and honor of the legal profession.
He violated this Court’s mandate that lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their
dealing with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.
[4]

Canon 17 of the same Code states:

“A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.”

The records show that complainant reposed such high degree of trust and confidence in herein
respondent, that when she engaged his services, she entrusted to him her land titles and allowed him to
sell her lots, believing that the proceeds thereof would be used to pay her creditors. Respondent,
however, abused her trust and confidence when he did not sell her properties to others but to himself and
spent his own money to pay her obligations. As correctly observed by Investigating IBP Commissioner
Lydia Navarro, respondent is duty-bound to render a detailed report to the complainant on how much he
sold the latter’s lots and the amounts paid to her creditors. Obviously, had he sold the lots to other
 buyers, complainant could have earned more. Records show that she did not receive any amount from
respondent. Clearly, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his duty as complainant’s
counsel.

Undoubtedly, respondent’s conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession. He has
definitely fallen below the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly
immoral acts. We have been exacting in our demand for integrity and good moral character of members
of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession[5] and
refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the
fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.[6] Membership in the legal profession is a privilege.
[7]
And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of
his clients and the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him
one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.
[8]
Respondent, by his conduct, blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also the legal
profession.

Public interest requires that an attorney should exert his best efforts and ability to protect the interests of
his clients. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects his client’s cause;
he also serves the ends of justice and does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession.

It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the legal profession.[9]

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct
in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of
the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.[10]

In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos,[11] we ordered the disbarment of lawyer when he deceived his 85-year old
aunt into entrusting him with all her money and later refused to return the same despite demand.
In Navarro vs. Meneses III,[12] we disbarred a member of the Bar for his refusal or failure to account for
the P50,000.00 he received from a client to settle a case. In Docena vs. Limson,[13] we expelled from the
brotherhood of lawyers, an attorney who extorted money from his client through deceit and
misrepresentation. In Busiños vs. Ricafort,[14] an attorney was stripped of his license to practice law for
misappropriating his client’s money.
Considering the depravity of respondent’s offense, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP too light.
It bears reiterating that a lawyer who takes advantage of his client’s financial plight to acquire the latter’s
properties for his own benefit is destructive of the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of the legal profession. Thus, for violation of Canon 16 and Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which constitutes gross misconduct, and consistent with the need to maintain
the high standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent
deserves the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.

WHEREFORE, respondent JOSE S. GO is found guilty of gross misconduct and is DISBARRED from the
practice of law. His name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.