Motorola Solutions, Inc.

Motorola Solutions, Inc.

AP 71xx Series Wireless Access Points – AP 7131N, AP 7131N‐
GR, AP 7161, AP 7181

FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy

Version: 1.1
Date: December 16, 2013

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CHANGE RECORD

Revision Date Author Description of Change

June 12, Motorola

1.0 Initial release
2013 Solutions

December Motorola
1.1 Updated FW version
16, 2013 Solutions

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Table of Contents
1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 AP 7131 Physical, Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................7
1.2 AP 7161 Physical Representation, Ports and Interfaces ..............................................................9
1.3 AP 7181 Physical Representation, Ports and Interfaces ........................................................... 10
2 Cryptographic Functionality ........................................................................................... 11
2.1 Critical Security Parameters ...................................................................................................... 13
2.2 Public Keys ................................................................................................................................. 14
3 Roles, Authentication and Services ................................................................................ 15
3.1 Roles .......................................................................................................................................... 15
3.2 Authentication Methods ........................................................................................................... 16
3.3 Services ...................................................................................................................................... 17
4 Self‐test ......................................................................................................................... 20
4.1 Power Up Self‐tests ................................................................................................................... 20
4.2 Conditional Self‐tests ................................................................................................................ 21
4.3 Critical Function Tests ............................................................................................................... 21
5 Physical Security Policy .................................................................................................. 22
6 Operational Environment .............................................................................................. 22
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy ................................................................................. 22
8 Security Rules and Guidance .......................................................................................... 22
9 References ..................................................................................................................... 23
10 Acronyms and Definitions .............................................................................................. 23

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List of Tables
Table 1 – Module Configuration Table ......................................................................................................... 5
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements ....................................................................................... 5
Table 3 – AP 7131 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................ 8
Table 4 – AP 7161 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................ 9
Table 5 – AP 7181 Ports and Interfaces ...................................................................................................... 10
Table 6 –Approved Cryptographic Functions.............................................................................................. 11
Table 7 – Non‐Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Functions ................................................................ 12
Table 8 – High Level Protocols and Associated Cryptographic Functionality ............................................. 12
Table 9 – Critical Security Parameters ........................................................................................................ 13
Table 10 – Public Keys ................................................................................................................................. 14
Table 11 – Roles Description ....................................................................................................................... 15
Table 12 – Authentication Methods and Strengths .................................................................................... 16
Table 13 – Unauthenticated Services ......................................................................................................... 17
Table 14 – Authenticated Secure Communications Services...................................................................... 17
Table 15 – Admin Role Services .................................................................................................................. 18
Table 16 – CSP Access Rights within Services ............................................................................................. 19
Table 17 – Power Up Self‐tests ................................................................................................................... 20
Table 18 – Conditional Self‐tests ................................................................................................................ 21
Table 19 – Critical Function Tests ............................................................................................................... 21
Table 20 – References ................................................................................................................................. 23
Table 21 – Acronyms and Definitions ......................................................................................................... 23

List of Figures
Figure 1 – Operational Context ..................................................................................................................... 6
Figure 2 – AP 7131 with plastic shroud and antennas removed .................................................................. 7
Figure 3 – AP 7161 views with antennas removed ....................................................................................... 9
Figure 4 – AP 7181 views ............................................................................................................................ 10

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1 Introduction
This document defines the Security Policy for the Motorola Solutions AP 71xx Series Wireless Access
Points – AP 7131N, AP 7131N‐GR, AP 7161, and AP 7181, hereafter denoted the Module. The Module,
validated to FIPS 140‐2 overall Level 1, is a common platform for multiple access points and wireless
switches in the Motorola Solutions portfolio that satisfies the needs of centrally managed single and
multi‐cell 802.11a/b/g/n wireless deployments. The Module incorporates an integrated router, gateway,
firewall, DHCP and AAA RADIUS server, VPN, and hot‐spot gateway. The dashed line boxes in Figure 1
depict the Module in its operational context.
For the purposes of FIPS 140‐2, the Module is classified as a multi‐chip standalone embodiment, in three
configurations as shown in Table 1..

HW P/N FW Version
AP7131N, AP7131N‐GR [Link]‐050GR
AP7161 [Link]‐050GR
AP7181 [Link]‐050GR
Table 1 – Module Configuration Table
The Module firmware, license and secure installation instructions are delivered as an option for
installation on any of the hardware part numbers listed in Table 1. Once the firmware is installed, the
resulting Module supports only the FIPS‐Approved mode of operation. The FIPS‐Approved mode of
operation is explicitly indicated by the leading characters “[G]” in the shell prompt when using the Login
service, for example “[G]ap7131‐OF1AE6>”. The remaining characters in the prompt indicate
configuration and the last 3 octets of the MAC address.
The cryptographic boundary for each configuration is the enclosure that encloses all hardware and
firmware components not including external antennas. The FIPS 140‐2 security levels for the Module are
as follows:
Security Requirement Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security 1
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self‐Tests 1
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements

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Figure 1 – Operational Context

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1.1 AP 7131 Physical, Ports and Interfaces

Figure 2 depicts the AP 7131N‐GR – antennas are not shown but connect to the 3 antenna ports on each
side of the Module (covered by caps in the figures below). The AP 7131N is the same hardware but
without the tamper evident seals. Table 3 describes the AP 7131 ports and interfaces.

Figure 2 – AP 7131 with plastic shroud and antennas removed

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Port Description Logical Interface Type

PWR 36‐57V DC Power
GE1/POE LAN port (Gigabit Ethernet/Power Over Control in; Status out; Data in; Data out;
Ethernet) Power (optional)
GE2 WAN port (Gigabit Ethernet) Control in; Status out; Data in; Data out.
CONSOLE RJ45 Console Port (serial) Control in; Status out; Data in; Data out.
R1/2‐A/B/C 2‐6 antennas for 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz radios Control in; Data in; Data out; Status out

LEDs Six LEDs (via light tubes) providing status Status out
indicators for:
1) boot/diagnostic mode/normal operation
2) GE1 operation
3) GE2 operation
4) 5 GHz radio operation
5) 2.4 GHz radio operation
6) Unused in this model
Table 3 – AP 7131 Ports and Interfaces
The convention “R1/2‐A/B/C” indicates multiple antenna connections for multiple radios. For example
“R1‐A” is radio one antenna A; “R2‐C” is radio two antenna C.

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1.2 AP 7161 Physical Representation, Ports and Interfaces

Figure 3 depicts the AP7161 without the external antennas. Table 4 describes the AP7161 ports and
interfaces.

Figure 3 – AP 7161 views with antennas removed

Port Description Logical Interface Type

PWR 36‐57V DC Power
GE1/POE LAN port (Gigabit Ethernet/Power Over Control in; Status out; Data in; Data out;
Ethernet) Power (optional)
GE2 WAN port (Gigabit Ethernet) Control in; Status out; Data in; Data out.
CONSOLE RJ 45 Console Port (serial) Control in; Status out; Data in; Data out.
R1/2‐A/B/C/D 2‐8 antennas for 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz radios Control in; Data in; Data out; Status out
LEDs Six LEDs (via light tubes) providing status Status out
indicators for:
1) boot/diagnostic mode/normal operation
2) GE1 operation
3) GE2 operation
4) 5 GHz radio operation
5) 2.4 GHz radio operation
6) Unused in this model
Table 4 – AP 7161 Ports and Interfaces

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1.3 AP 7181 Physical Representation, Ports and Interfaces

Figure 4 depicts the AP7181. Table 5 describes the AP7181 ports and interfaces.

Figure 4 – AP 7181 views

Port Description Logical Interface Type

PWR 100‐240 VAC and 48V DC Power
GE1/POE LAN port (Gigabit Ethernet/Power Over Control in; Status out; Data in; Data out;
Ethernet) Power (optional)
GE2 WAN port (Gigabit Ethernet) Control in; Status out; Data in; Data out.
CONSOLE RJ 45 Console Port Control in; Status out; Data in; Data out.
R1/2‐A/B/C/D 8 internal antennas for 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz Control in; Data in; Data out; Status out
radios
LEDs Six LEDs providing status indicators for: Status out
1) boot/diagnostic mode/normal operation
2) GE1 operation
3) GE2 operation
4) 5 GHz radio operation
5) 2.4 GHz radio operation
6) Unused in this model
Table 5 – AP 7181 Ports and Interfaces

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2 Cryptographic Functionality
The Module implements the FIPS Approved and Non‐Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions
listed in Table 6 and Table 7 below. The notation #n indicates multiple implementations of an algorithm
or protocol; for example, “AES #1” is one implementation of the AES algorithm; “AES #2” is a second
implementation of AES.

Algorithm Description Cert #

AES #1 [FIPS 197, SP 800‐38A] Modes: ECB, CBC; Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits and
CFB 128 mode Key size 128 bits 2377
Encryption and decryption used for RADIUS, SSHv2, SNMP and TLS.
AES #2 [FIPS 197, SP 800‐38A] Modes: CBC; Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits. 1114
Encryption and decryption used for IPsec and MeshConnex functionality. The
ECB mode included in Cert. #1114 is not used by the Module.
AES #3 [FIPS 197, SP 800‐38A] Modes: ECB, Key sizes: 128 bits. 2378
Encryption used for 802.11i wireless communications.
CCM [IG 7.2, SP 800‐38C] Key sizes: 128 bits 861
AES‐CCM generation and verification used for 802.11i wireless
communications.
HMAC [FIPS 198‐1] HMAC‐SHA‐1, HMAC‐SHA‐256 Generation and Verification. 1478
KDF (802.11i) [IG 7.2, IG 7.10, SP 800‐108] 802.11i shared key derivation. 10
TLS KDF [SP 800‐135] TLS key derivation function. 66
SSH KDF [SP 800‐135] SSHv2 key derivation function. 67
IKE KDF [SP 800‐135] IKEv1/IKEv2 key derivation function. 68
SNMP KDF [SP 800‐135] SNMP key derivation function. 69
RNG [ANSI X9.31‐1998] Random number generation. 1180
RSA [FIPS 186‐2, ANSI X9.31‐1998, and PKCS #1 v2.1 (PKCS1.5)] 1231
Key sizes: 1024, 2048 bits
RSA Key Pair Generation, Signature Generation, and Signature Verification
used for IKE, TLS, SSHv2.
SHA #1 [FIPS 180‐3] SHA sizes: SHA‐1, SHA‐256
2048
Secure hashing used for firmware integrity checking, RADIUS, SSHv2 and TLS.
SHA #2 [FIPS 180‐3] SHA sizes: SHA‐1, SHA‐256 1037
Secure hashing used for IKE, MeshConnex.
Triple‐DES [SP 800‐20] Modes: TECB, TCBC; Key sizes: 3‐Key
1487
Encryption and decryption used for TLS, SSHv2.
Table 6 –Approved Cryptographic Functions

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Algorithm Description
Non‐Compliant SP [IG D.2] Diffie‐Hellman (group 2 | 5). Key agreement; key establishment
800‐56A methodology provides 80 bits of encryption strength.
Non‐ Compliant [IG D.2] 2048‐bit RSA Key Transport. Key wrapping; key establishment methodology
SP 800‐56B provides 112 bits of encryption strength.
[Annex C] Hardware Non‐Deterministic RNG; 64 bits per access, used only to seed
NDRNG
the FIPS Approved RNG.
MD5 [IG D.8] Used during TLS handshake.
Table 7 – Non‐Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Functions

Algorithm Description
IKE v1/v2 [IG D.2] IKE v1/v2 and IPsec supported cryptography:
AES‐CBC‐128, AES‐ CBC‐192, AES‐ CBC‐256, SHA1, DH (1024‐1536)
SSHv2 [IG D.2] The SSHv2 Cipher Suites implemented by the Module are:
Cipher: 3des‐cbc, aes128‐cbc, aes256‐cbc
MAC: hmac‐sha1, hmac‐sha2
KEX: diffie‐hellman‐group‐exchange‐sha256,
diffie‐hellman‐group‐exchange‐sha1,
Hostkey‐algorithms: ssh‐rsa
TLS [IG D.2] The TLS Cipher Suites implemented by the Module are:
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
RADIUS EAP‐TLS, EAP‐TTLS, PEAP‐TLS
Table 8 – High Level Protocols and Associated Cryptographic Functionality

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2.1 Critical Security Parameters

All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All usage of these CSPs by the Module is
described in the services detailed in Section 4.

CSP Description / Usage

RNG Seed Material: 128‐bit seed; AES‐256 seed key for the Approved RNG. The Module ensures that the
RNG‐SM
seed and seed key are not equal.
RNG‐STATE The current values of the Approved X9.31 (AES‐256) RNG instance.
Diffie‐Hellman Key Establishment Key: DH Group 2 (1024 bit) or Group 5 (1536 bit) private key for TLS,
DH‐KEK
IKE and SSH key establishment.
DEV‐PRI Device Private key: RSA 1024/2048 private keys used for TLS, SSH, and EAP authentication methods.
IKE‐PSS IKE Pre‐Shared Secret: 64 byte secret value used for IKEv1/IKEv2 authentication.
IPS‐SDEK IPsec Session Data Encryption Key: AES‐128/192/256 key used to encrypt and decrypt IPsec messages.
IPS‐SAK IPsec Session Authentication Key: HMAC‐SHA‐1 (160 bit) key used for IPsec message authentication.
RAD‐SEC Radius Secret: 8 byte minimum, 32 byte maximum secret value used for RADIUS server authentication.
SNMP‐SEC SNMP Secret: 8 byte minimum (no maximum) secret value used for SNMP authentication.
SNMP‐DEK SNMP Data Encryption Key: AES‐128 bit key used to encrypt and decrypt SNMP messages.
SSH‐DEK SSH Encryption Key: AES‐128/256 or 3‐Key Triple‐DES key used to encrypt and decrypt SSH messages.
SSH HMAC Key: HMAC‐SHA‐1 (160 bit) or HMAC‐SHA‐256 (256 bit) key used to protect TLS message
SSH‐HMAC
integrity.
TLS Session Data Encryption Key: AES‐128/256 or 3‐Key Triple‐DES used to encrypt and decrypt TLS
TLS‐SDEK
messages.
TLS Handshake Key Encryption Key: RSA‐2048 private key establishment key, used in the TLS and EAP
TLS‐HKEK
handshakes.
TLS HMAC Key: HMAC‐SHA‐1 (160 bit) or HMAC‐SHA‐256 (256 bit) key used for TLS message
TLS‐HMAC
authentication.
WL‐PSK 64 byte pre‐shared key for use in 802.11i (SP 800‐108) Key Derivation.
WL‐TK 802.11i Temporal Key: AES‐128 key for unicast wireless data encryption/decryption.
WL‐GTK 802.11i Group Temporal Key: AES‐128 key for multicast wireless data encryption/decryption.
WL‐KCK 802.11i Key Confirmation Key: AES‐128 key used for authentication / key confirmation.
WL‐KEK 802.11i Key Encryption Key: AES‐128 key used for sensitive data encryption.
PW 8 byte minimum (no maximum) value used for local user authentication.
MC‐PSK MeshConnex Pre‐shared Key: 8 byte minimum (no maximum) value used for mesh point authentication.
MeshConnex Group Transient Key: AES‐128 session key used to encrypt/decrypt secure multicast routing
MC‐GTK
messages.
MeshConnex Pairwise Transient Key: AES‐128 session key used to encrypt/decrypt secure unicast
MC‐PTK
broadcast routing messages.
MC‐GMK MeshConnex Group Master Key: AES‐128 key used to derive MC‐GTK (SP 800‐108).
MC‐PMK MeshConnex Pairwise Master Key: AES‐128 key used to derive MC‐PTK (SP 800‐108).
Table 9 – Critical Security Parameters

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2.2 Public Keys

Key Description / Usage
CA‐PUB Certificate authority RSA‐1024 or RSA‐2048 public key, used for path validation.
DEV‐PUB Device RSA‐1024 or RSA‐2048 public key, used for SSH or TLS authentication.
PC‐PUB Peer or client RSA‐1024 or RSA‐2048 public key, used for SSH or TLS authentication.
Table 10 – Public Keys
The Module zeroizes all plaintext CSPs by overwriting the storage area three times with three different
patterns. After zeroization, the Module assumes factory default settings on reboot.

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3 Roles, Authentication and Services

3.1 Roles
Table 11 lists all operator roles supported by the module. The Admin and User roles are human operator
roles; the remaining roles are for machine to machine interaction. The Module does not support a
maintenance role, state or interface.

ID Role Description Authentication

Method
An administrative user, inclusive of the following defined groups with
varying levels of access to Module functionality:
Web Admin: Create guest Hot Spot users and printout a voucher with
their credentials.
Monitor: Read only access to statistics and configuration information.
Security Admin: Modify access to WLAN and meshpoint keys. Allows
troubleshooting tasks such as clear statistics, reboot. Passphrase
Admin
Crypto Officer: Manage Layer 2, Layer 3, Wireless, RADIUS Server, DHCP verification
Server, SMART‐RF; and all SEC role services.
System Administrator: Upgrade image, change boot partition, set time,
manage admin access; and all CO role services.
Super User: Full access including halt and delete startup configuration;
and all SYS role services.
This role satisfies the FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Officer role requirement.
Wireless User (FIPS 140‐2 “User” role): Engage the wireless cryptographic
Passphrase
User services provided by the module.
verification
This role satisfies the FIPS 140‐2 User role requirement.
MP Mesh Peer: Connect wirelessly to another AP in a mesh 802.11i Auth
An SNMP Network Management System User, inclusive of the following:
SNMP Manager: Non‐security related configuration, status monitoring.
Passphrase
NMSU SNMP Operator: Read only access and status monitoring
verification
SNMP Trap: Read only access and status monitoring through SNMP trap
messages
TLS Client entity, inclusive of the following: RSA
TLSC https client for Web GUI administration; Air Defense Services Platform
(ADSP) communications. (Uses RSA authentication exclusively)
IPsec Peer (uses IKEv1/v2 and the shared secret authentication method Passphrase
IPSP verification
exclusively)
SSHC SSHv2 Client (Uses RSA authentication exclusively) RSA
WC Wireless Client 802.11i Auth
Table 11 – Roles Description

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The Module enforces the separation of roles using an internal access control and groups for associating
specific operator credentials with operator roles.

3.2 Authentication Methods

The module implements the following authentication methods. Probability of false authentication and
probability of false authentication in a one minute period are shown along with derivation information.

Authentication Probability of false authentication Probability of false authentication

Method (1.0E‐06 required) in a one‐minute period
(1.0E‐05 required)
Passphrase Minimum length: 8 characters Failed authentication imposes 1
verification Character set: ASCII printable (95) second delay (60
attempts/minute).
1/(95^8) = 1.5E‐16
60/(95^8)=9.0E‐15
RSA Client certificates using RSA‐1024 provide 80 Failed authentication imposes 1
bit equivalent strength. second delay (60
1/(2^80) = 8.3E‐25 attempts/minute).
60/(2^80) = 5.0E‐23
802.11i Auth AES‐128 authentication of secrets derived in Failed authentication imposes 1
802.11i handshake. second delay (60
1/(2^128) = 2.9E‐39 attempts/minute).
60/(2^128) = 1.8E‐37
Table 12 – Authentication Methods and Strengths
The Passphrase verification method is a generalization of passwords, SNMP community strings and IKE
shared secrets. This calculation uses the worst case scenario to describe minimum strength: 8 bytes
minimum and a restricted character set.

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3.3 Services
All services implemented by the Module are listed in Table 15, 14 and 15 below.

Service Description
Local Reset Power cycle the Module.
Table 13 – Unauthenticated Services

NMSU
SSHC
TLSC

User
IPSP

WC
MP
Service Description

Establish and use IPsec connection, used for VPN

Connect (IPsec) connection between Motorola devices, RADIUS, X
syslog, NTP server, etc.
Establish and use mesh peer connection, used for
Connect (Mesh) X
wirelessly connecting two Motorola devices.
Establish and use connection with SSH client, used X
Connect (SSH) to connect Motorola device for management and
monitoring purpose.
Establish and use TLS connection, used for Web X
Connect (TLS)
GUI, establishment of captive portal connection.
Connect (Wireless) Establish and use connection with wireless clients. X
Wireless Traffic 802.11 network communications by end User. X
SNMP Traffic SNMP MIB communications. X
Table 14 – Authenticated Secure Communications Services

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Admin
Service Description

Login Authentication via CLI or web GUI for administrative use. X

Configure device parameters, non‐security relevant: routing, quality of
Configure X
service, radio function, etc.
Configure IPsec, TLS, SSH, 802.11, MeshConnex, operator accounts, SNMP
Configure security X
access, and RADIUS.
Monitor View intrusion detection and prevention logs. X
Show status Show status and configuration information. X
Remote reset Trigger a module reset and reboot, inclusive of Power‐On Self‐Test. X
Update firmware Load and manage a new firmware image. X
Destroys the Module’s CSPs and restore the module to factory settings (the
Zeroize X
Restore Factory Setting operation).
Table 15 – Admin Role Services

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Table 16 defines access to CSPs by Module services.

CSPs
RNG‐STATE

SSH‐HMAC
SNMP‐DEK

TLS‐HMAC
SNMP‐SEC

TLS‐HKEK
TLS‐SDEK

MC‐GMK
IPS‐SDEK

MC‐PMK
RAD‐SEC

SSH‐DEK
RNG‐SM

MC‐GTK
DEV‐PRI

WL‐GTK

MC‐PTK
WL‐KCK

MC‐PSK
WL‐KEK
WL‐PSK
IPS‐SAK
DH‐KEK

IKE‐PSS

WL‐TK

PW
Service

Configure ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Configure E E E E E
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ W ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Security W W W W W

Connect G G
‐ W G ‐ E ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
(IPsec) E E

Connect G G G G
‐ W ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ E
(Mesh) E E E E

Connect G
‐ W ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
(SSH) E

Connect G G G G G
‐ W ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
(TLS) E E E E E

Connect G G
‐ W ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ E G G ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
(Wireless) E E

Wireless
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ E E ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Traffic
SNMP G
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ E ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Traffic E

Login ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ E ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Monitor ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Show
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
status
Remote G
Z Z Z ‐ Z Z ‐ ‐ Z Z Z Z Z Z ‐ Z Z Z Z ‐ ‐ Z Z Z Z
reset Z

Update
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
firmware
Zeroize ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z ‐ ‐ Z Z ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ Z Z ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Local G
Z Z Z ‐ Z Z ‐ ‐ Z Z Z Z Z Z ‐ Z Z Z ‐ ‐ ‐ Z Z Z Z
Reset Z

Table 16 – CSP Access Rights within Services

 ‐ = No access to the CSP by the service.
 G = Generate: The Module generates the CSP.
 R = Read: The Module exports the CSP.
 E = Execute: The Module executes using the CSP.
 W = Write: The Module writes the CSP.
 Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the CSP.

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4 Self‐test
4.1 Power Up Self‐tests
Each time the Module is powered up it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and
that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power‐up self–tests are available on demand by power
cycling the module.
On power up or reset, the Module performs the self‐tests described in Table 17 below. All KATs must be
completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. If one of the KATs fails,
the Module enters an error state.

Test Target Description

Firmware Integrity HMAC‐SHA‐256 performed over all code stored in the Module, when the module
is initialized after power‐up or a soft‐reset.
AES #1 Encrypt AES‐128 ECB Encryption KAT
AES #1 Decrypt AES‐128 ECB Decryption KAT
AES #2 Encrypt AES‐128 ECB Encryption KAT
AES #2 Decrypt AES‐128 ECB Decryption KAT
AES #3 Encrypt AES‐128 ECB Encryption KAT
CCM Generate AES‐CCM Generation KAT using AES‐128
CCM Verify AES‐CCM Verification KAT using AES‐128
HMAC HMAC‐SHA‐1 KAT
RNG ANSI X9.31‐1998 RNG KAT with fixed seed, seed key and date/time input.
RSA SigGen RSA 2048‐bit Signature Generation KAT
RSA SigVer RSA 2048‐bit Signature Verification KAT
SHA‐1 #1 SHA‐1 KAT
SHA‐256 #1 SHA‐256 KAT
SHA‐1 #2 SHA‐1 KAT
SHA‐256 #2 SHA‐256 KAT
Triple‐DES Encrypt 3‐Key TEBC Encryption KAT
Triple‐DES Decrypt 3‐Key TEBC Decryption KAT
SP 800‐108 KDF Power‐on KDF self‐test for 802.11i keys.
SP 800‐135 KDF (TLS) Power‐on KDF self‐test for TLS keys.
SP 800‐135 (SSH) Power‐on KDF self‐test for SSH keys.
SP 800‐135 (IKE) Power‐on KDF self‐test for IKE v1/v2 keys.
SP 800‐135 (SNMP) Power‐on KDF self‐test for SNMP keys.
Table 17 – Power Up Self‐tests

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4.2 Conditional Self‐tests

Test Target Description
NDRNG NDRNG Continuous Test in accordance with AS09.42, performed when a random value
is requested from the NDRNG.
RNG RNG Continuous Test in accordance with AS09.42, performed when a random value is
requested from the Approved RNG.
RSA PCT RSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every RSA key pair generation.
Image integrity The Module performs a SHA‐256 test over all data storage.
Firmware Load RSA 2048 signature verification performed when firmware is loaded.
Table 18 – Conditional Self‐tests

4.3 Critical Function Tests

Test Target Description
Kernel space This test includes memory test, DRAM test, data and address bus walk and PCI test.
self‐test
Table 19 – Critical Function Tests

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5 Physical Security Policy

The Module is housed in an industrial quality enclosure.
Motorola Solutions uses production grade components and materials in the manufacture of these
products.

6 Operational Environment
The Module is designated as a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140‐2 definitions. The
Module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within
the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140‐2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded
into this module is out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140‐2 validation.

7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy

The Module does not implement mitigation for any other attacks.

8 Security Rules and Guidance

The following security rules are enforced by the Module:
1. The Module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
2. The Module does not perform any cryptographic functions until an operator (human or proxy)
authenticates to the module, with the exception of cryptographic functions used in the
authentication process.
3. Operators can perform the power up self‐tests by cycling power or resetting the module.
4. Power up self‐tests do not require any operator action.
5. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self‐tests, zeroization, and error states.
6. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the module.
7. The module ensures that the seed and seed key inputs to the Approved RNG are not equal.
8. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
9. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
10. The module does not support manual key entry.
11. The module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
12. The module does not output intermediate key values.

Guidance for first time usage or post factory default reset usage of the Module is provided in the
Module’s Secure Installation Guide, and summarized below:
1. On first use after delivery from the factory, or after zeroization, an authorized administrator shall
access the Module with the default password and create a new password.
2. The Firmware version listed in Table 1 shall be loaded onto the module.

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9 References
The following documents are referenced in this Security Policy.

Acronym Full Specification Name

[FIPS140‐2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[SP800‐131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms
and Key Lengths, January 2011
[RFC3268] Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
[Link]
[RFC2571] SNMPv3
[RFC2574] User‐based Security Model (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMPv3)
Table 20 – References

10 Acronyms and Definitions

Acronym Definition
ADSP Air Defense Services Platform
A web page hosted by the module to authenticate wireless users. An attempt to
Captive portal
access the device for network access redirects the user to the login web page.
CLI Command Line Interface
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
EAPOL EAP over LAN
GE Gigabit Ethernet
GUI Graphical User Interface
IDS Intrusion Detection System
MIB Management Information Base
PCI Peripheral Component Interconnect
POE Power Over Ethernet
TLS Transport Layer Security
TTLS Tunneled TLS
Table 21 – Acronyms and Definitions

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