Received: 14 April 2020 Revised: 4 July 2020 Accepted: 23 July 2020

DOI: 10.1002/wene.388

OPINION

Climate change: What we know and what is to be done

Mark D. Levine1 | Robert V. Steele2

1
Senior Advisor to International Energy
Studies Department, Lawrence Berkeley Abstract
National Laboratory, Berkeley, California Our goal in this article is to explain briefly what we believe to be the scientifi-
2
Independent Consultant, Redwood City, cally confirmed findings of climate change and what actions in our judgment
California
are needed to forestall the worst impacts of a changing climate. Climate
Correspondence change is well documented by data and scientific observation. The global aver-
Mark D. Levine, Senior Advisor to age temperature has already increased by more than 1 C (1.8 F) above
International Energy Studies Department,
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory,
preindustrial levels, and the impacts already felt are significant and encompass
Berkeley, CA 94720. the entire globe. A 1 C increase in global temperature has resulted in increased
Email: mdlevine@[Link] melting of glaciers and the Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets; higher fre-
quency of more severe hurricanes; greater severity of droughts and forest fires;
and extinction of selected species on land and in the sea, among other impacts.
These are due largely to the extreme temperatures that accompany the higher
mean temperature. There exist policies and cost-effective technologies today
that can achieve large reductions in carbon emissions. There is significant
experience with all of the policies and technologies. R&D needs to be carried
out on key new zero-carbon technologies. Foremost among these technologies
are electricity storage for large-scale application in wind and solar power
plants, batteries for electric vehicles, and zero-carbon fuels for vehicles. Other
than the (in our view limited but worthwhile) progress achieved through the
Conference of the Parties meetings, especially the Paris Agreement, the world
has not yet begun addressing climate change sufficiently to avoid very signifi-
cant impacts. One early sign that the world has become serious about climate
change will occur when oil and gas companies reduce and ultimately cease
exploring for new resources.

This article is categorized under:

Energy and Climate > Climate and Environment

KEYWORDS
1˚C, climate change, mitigation of climate change, Paris Agreement, zero-carbon technologies

1 | INTRODUCTION

Our goal in this article is to explain briefly what we believe to be the scientifically confirmed findings of climate change
and what actions in our judgment are needed to forestall the worst impacts of a changing climate. The paper makes
clear the unambiguous increase in global temperature and the surprisingly large number and magnitude of the impacts
of this temperature increase. Many of these impacts are due to the extreme temperatures that accompany the increase

WIREs Energy Environ. 2020;e388. [Link]/energy © 2020 Wiley Periodicals LLC. 1 of 12

[Link]
2 of 12 LEVINE AND STEELE

in the global mean temperatures. Most industrialized countries have some experience with many of the policies and
actions needed to reduce emissions; however, implementation across nations is not nearly sufficient to achieve accept-
able levels of global temperature change, defined by the Intergovernmental Panel and many other bodies as an increase
of 1.5–2 C (2.7–3.6 F).
The paper includes sections on (a) the evolution of the understanding of climate change in the past five decades;
(b) the important uncertainties about climate change; (c) what we know about climate change; (d) the ubiquity and
severity of observed impacts; (e) the large effects of small changes in global average temperature; (f) the most important
actions needed; and (g) the magnitude of the challenge.

2 | EVOLUTION OF UNDERSTANDING OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE

PAST FIVE D ECAD E S

Our understanding of the science of climate change has evolved enormously since one of us (Levine) first began worry-
ing about climate change (then generally called global warming) in the early 1970s with the publication of several vol-
umes of edited papers on the topic by the MIT Press (MIT, 1970, 1971a, 1971b). It has been apparent since 1970 that the
evolution in understanding climate change has been largely in one direction: the problem is more serious than we
thought 50 years ago.
In 1970, we did not know how much if any of the increase in global temperature was due to human activity. The
MIT reports were clear about uncertainties in the quantitative understanding of processes affecting climate. At that
time little was known about some of the major factors that influence the pace of climate change: clouds, oceans, melt-
ing of snow, ice, and glaciers, sinks and sources of greenhouse gases (mostly CO2 and methane), changes in surface
albedo (reflectivity), and the many feedback loops among these key factors. This resulted in a large uncertainty about
temperature changes that would result from increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. As the
models of the global climate system have improved—much better representation of clouds, oceans, the terrestrial car-
bon cycle, and various important feedback effects—uncertainty in model results has been reduced. The actual model
results (e.g., estimated change in temperature with a doubling of CO2eq) have changed little over time. This is the result
of generally counterbalancing factors in the analysis.

3 | IMPORTAN T U N CE R T AI N TI E S

Foremost among the uncertainties is the lack of knowledge of the point at which major irreversible changes will occur
that will greatly affect global climate over the very long term. At what temperature will the major glaciers have melted
so much that they affect the availability of water for human use (e.g., in the Himalayan regions feeding South and East
Asia)? At what point will the melting of the ice masses in Antarctica and Greenland be irreversible? To what extent is
the balance of sinks and sources of greenhouse gases in the biosphere out of balance and where are the “missing”
sources and/or sinks hiding? As the earth warms and there is increased moisture in the atmosphere, how will changes
in the composition of clouds affect global and local climate? Will it be possible to modify major crops so that they prop-
erly mature and produce high yields in increasingly hot and either more humid or drier climates? What will be the
quantitative effects of a changing climate on the frequency and magnitude of devastating hurricanes; of large-scale
droughts; of large fires? What actions will governments, corporations, and individuals take to reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases and when?
If we are not able to effectively control greenhouse gas emissions, one of the greatest uncertainties with regard to
the impacts of climate disruption is how our institutions will be able to deal with the potentially devastating effects of
climate change—the insufferable temperatures affecting large landmasses; the devastation wrought by powerful hurri-
canes; and the declining availability of water in many regions of the world due to droughts, high evaporation, and con-
tinuing groundwater depletion. How will governments, businesses, and individuals cope with increased disease vectors
in hot, humid climates that cover an increasing portion of the globe, with radical changes in weather new to many
regions (e.g., heating of the arctic)? How will governments and other institutions cope with or adapt to the mass migra-
tions, famine, pandemics, and likely wars that will ultimately take place if climate change advances far beyond the pre-
sent (e.g., before 2100 in a high emissions growth scenario)?
LEVINE AND STEELE 3 of 12

Some have used these uncertainties to argue that there is no firm basis for taking any significant action to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. In our view, this is very counter-productive, and it is generally motivated by an economic
interest that is served by discounting the severity of climate change, thus deflecting efforts to pursue related policy
actions. The fossil fuel industry is most threatened by actions to mitigate climate change, since its products are the pre-
dominant source of greenhouse gas emissions. This industry has funded many organizations and consulting firms that
have gone on to create journals that appear to be academically respectable (they are not) that published papers that for
many years supported denial of climate change. Micheals (2020) in a book entitled The Triumph of Doubt: Dark Money
and the Science of Deception devotes a chapter to the actions of the fossil fuel industry in sowing confusion of climate
change and provides full documentation to his statements. In recent years, papers stressing uncertainty in climate
modeling results have become more in vogue and papers espousing climate change denial have declined in number.
But we have not yet seen any changes in governmental policy that might result from this shift. The objective of these
papers has been and continues to be to minimize the perceived impacts and maximize the perceived uncertainty of cli-
mate change to delay or stop policies favoring carbon-neutral energy sources, as described in Micheals (2020).

4 | W HAT WE KNOW ABOUT C LIM ATE C HANG E

Despite the need for better understanding of climate change, there is much that we already know well. In our view,
and that of most scientists familiar with climate change, the most credible source of knowledge is the assessment
reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2014).
IPCC is able to produce its major assessment reports only every 5–7 years. This means that they lag research by sev-
eral years. To overcome this problem, IPCC publishes reports on specific topics in between the release of its assessment
reports. Recent examples of such reports (termed special reports to distinguish them from the assessment reports)
include The Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (IPCC, 2019a); Climate Change and Land, (IPCC, 2019b); and
Global Warming of 1.5 C (IPCC, 2018). The special reports are necessarily less authoritative than the assessment
reports, as they are put together by a small subset of IPCC science contributors and are not subject to reviews that are
as massive and extensive as those of the assessment reports.
The latest IPCC assessment report (AR5) is from 2014 and the most succinct statements of its findings are contained
in the Summary for Policymakers (IPCC, 2014b). These statements are based on knowledge as of 2014 when the report
was released. If the past is any indication, AR6 findings, which will be released in the last quarter of 2021, will be simi-
lar to those of AR5 but will contain stronger statements reflecting greater certainty as well as additional findings based
on new research.1
The following is a summary of the major findings of the Fifth Assessment Report (shortened and somewhat modi-
fied for clarity from the Summary for Policy Makers):

• Human influence on the climate system is clear. The effects of recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases,2
highest in history, are extremely likely3 to have been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th
century. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, and sea level has
risen. These and other recent climate changes have had widespread impacts on human and natural systems, effects
felt in all continents and across the oceans.
• Changes in many extreme weather and climate events have been observed since about 1950. The changes that have
been linked to human influences include a decrease in cold temperature extremes, an increase in warm temperature
extremes, an increase in extreme high sea levels and an increase in the number of heavy precipitation events in a
number of regions.
• Continued emission of greenhouse gases will increase the likelihood of severe, pervasive, and irreversible impacts for
people and ecosystems. It is very likely under all assessed emission scenarios that heat waves will occur more often
and last longer, and that extreme precipitation events will become more intense and frequent in many regions. The
ocean will continue to warm and acidify, and global mean sea level will rise.
• Climate change risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities
in countries at all levels of development. The risks of abrupt or irreversible changes increase as the magnitude of the
warming increases. Without additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and even with adaptation,
warming by the end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, wide-spread, and irreversible
impacts globally (high confidence).
4 of 12 LEVINE AND STEELE

• There are multiple mitigation pathways that are likely to limit warming to below 2 C (3.6 F) relative to pre-industrial
levels. These pathways would require substantial emissions reductions over the next few decades and near-zero emis-
sions of CO2 and other long-lived greenhouse gases by the end of the century. Implementing such reductions poses
substantial technological, economic, social, and institutional challenges, which increase with delays in additional
mitigation and if key technologies are not available.

5 | UBIQUITY AND S EVERITY OF O BSERVED I MPACTS

Adverse impacts of climate change are widespread and there is already documented evidence of very significant dam-
age. Such impacts include extreme temperatures in many regions of the world for days or longer; increasing frequency
of more severe hurricanes; melting of glaciers and ice sheets in Greenland and the Antarctic; reduction in the extent of
Arctic sea ice; devastating droughts in many locations and regions of the world, causing millions of climate refugees
attempting to migrate from the droughts; increasing frequency and severity of forest fires; acidification of oceans (up to
50% more acidic) with concomitant impacts on some sea-life, especially coral reefs, turtles in some locations, and some
species of fish (with more adverse impacts to come).4
All of the impacts above have been observed years or decades before most scientists expected them to occur. In fact,
until the last 5–10 years, most climate analysts and scientists believed that a pernicious problem in taking timely action
to address climate change is that the major impacts would not be apparent until many decades hence, at which time it
would be too late to mitigate them. This had long been our view until we began systematically to gather information on
observed impacts and discovered their ubiquity. What appeared to be problematic because of the expected delay in
observed impacts has turned into a clear forewarning of climate crises in the coming few years and decades. As a con-
tributor to and participant in three IPCC assessment reports, one of us (Levine) has been in a position to observe the
slow change in recognition of climate change impacts—from an uncertain future to a more certain and highly
troubling one.
To cite one example of the recent impact of climate change, the global reinsurance company Munich Re has col-
lected data on what it terms “worldwide extreme weather catastrophes” from 1980 through 20182 (Munich Re, 2019).
These events include extreme temperatures, fires and droughts; floods and mudslides; and storms. Over the 39 years
period, the number of such events increased from 222 to 798 per year, a factor of 3.6. Figure 1 illustrates the timing of
these events.
Extreme effects are well illustrated by events in specific locations (Gore, 2019):

• The frequency of severe hurricanes has increased greatly in recent decades. This is illustrated in the United States by
hurricanes such as:
 Katrina (August 2005), which inundated 80% of New Orleans and caused devastation (~$160 B) in that city and in
locations in the southeastern United States;
 Harvey (August 2017), which caused severe damage (~$125 B) in parts of the southern United States; and
 Sandy (October 2012), which caused particularly severe damage in New Jersey and New York but affected a total
of 24 states including the entire eastern seaboard ($70 B).

F I G U R E 1 Worldwide extreme weather

catastrophes—extreme temperatures, droughts and fires,
floods and mudslides, and storms (Munich Re, 2019)
LEVINE AND STEELE 5 of 12

• Houston has been hit by nine major flood events between 2015 and 2019, including three 1-in-500-year floods and
two 1-in-1,000-year extreme downpours.
• Drought in the years 2006–2010 converted 60% of Syria's fertile land into desert, causing a migration of 1.5 million
people into cities. Ninety-seven percent of Iran has experienced a prolonged drought since 2018. Many other regions
of the world have experienced severe droughts in the past decade (e.g., the Amazon in 2015 and 2016; India's state of
Tamil Nadu, the worst in 140 years; many other locations including north China, Zimbabwe, Po River, Italy, dis-
placement camps in Somalia)
• Severe food shortages caused by droughts in Somalia, Sudan, South Africa, Zimbabwe and other parts of Africa have
affected tens of millions of people
• Increases in the magnitude and frequency of wildfires are best illustrated by the three most costly wildfires in world
history (Camp, Tubbs, and Woolsey) that occurred in 2017 and 2018 in California.5 The fire season in the U.S. West
is now 220 days—more than 80 days longer than it was in 1970 (Westerling, 2016).

Nine of the highest mean annual global temperatures in the instrument record have occurred in the last decade
([Link] The past three decades contain the hottest years on earth in
the last 100,000 years (Gore, 2019). However, it is extreme temperatures (see the following section on temperature dis-
tributions) that are most dangerous to human life. Some examples of record extreme temperatures in Africa and Asia
include: 51.1 C (124 F) in Algeria (July 5, 2018); 51.7 C (125 F) in the United Arab Republic (June 16, 2017; and
53.9 C (129 F) in Pakistan (May 28, 2017). The most severe extended period of dangerously high temperatures in
Europe occurred in July and August 2003 during which time an estimated 35,000 to 70,000 people died from this
heatwave in Spain, France, and Italy (Gore, 2019). Figure 2 illustrates this heatwave as well as extremes of temperatures
in future decades projected under high emission scenarios.
Temperatures in the arctic have risen dramatically faster than the global mean. One measure of this effect is the
ongoing decrease in arctic sea ice. Data from the National Snow and Ice Data Center (2019) show that from 1979 to
2019 the extent of September arctic sea ice (the annual minimum) decreased an average of 12.9% per decade, resulting
in a decrease of more than 60% by 2019. The reduced albedo from the loss of arctic sea ice has a significant effect on the
global climate.
While the loss of arctic sea ice does not contribute to sea level rise, the loss of mass from ice sheets in Greenland
and the Antarctic does, and data in recent years from those regions show alarming trends. A recent study (The IMBIE
Team, 2020) shows that melting of Greenland's ice mass has increased from 25 billion tons per year in the 1990s to a
current average of 234 billion tons per year. In other words, Greenland's ice is melting on average more than nine times
faster today than it did in the 1990s.

F I G U R E 2 History of temperature anomalies and

projection of future temperatures in southwestern
Europe under a high emissions scenario (Stott, Stone, &
Allen, 2004)
6 of 12 LEVINE AND STEELE

Although the Antarctic has not warmed to the same extent as the Arctic, its ice mass is far larger and thus the
potential for sea level rise as a result of melting of its ice sheet is far larger. A study undertaken by University of Califor-
nia scientists tracked Antarctic ice mass over a four-decade period (Rignot et al., 2019). Their data show mass loss of
40 Gt/year from 1979 to 1990, 50 Gt/year from 1989 to 2000, 166 Gt/year from 1999 to 2009 and finally 252 Gt/year from
2009 to 2017, a trend which mirrors that of the Greenland study.
A final example of the impact of global warming is the increase in heat retention in the oceans and the consequent
temperature rise. Over 90% of the excess heat absorbed by the atmosphere due to the increased concentration of green-
house gases ends up in the oceans. Durack et al. (2018) analyzed historical ocean heat content measurements at multi-
ple depth ranges to show that 49% of the increase in ocean heat content since 1860 has taken place since 1999. This
increase in ocean heat content generates an increase in ocean temperatures that has resulted in the increased frequency
of coral reef bleaching events observed in the Great Barrier Reef in Australia and elsewhere around the globe.

6 | LARGE EFFE CT S O F SMALL GL O B A L A V E R A GE T E M P E R A T UR E

CHANGE

To date, global observations of temperature indicate the world has warmed an average of more than 1 C (1.8 F) relative
to pre-industrial levels (Bennett, 2016; NAS (U.S. National Academy of Sciences) and The Royal Society, 2014). How
can a mere 1 C increase in global temperature cause the widespread impacts discussed above? A large part of the
answer to this question is provided by observing that a 1 C increase involves not just the mean temperature but also
shifts the entire distribution of temperatures. Figure 3 depicts the effect of moving the entire distribution, showing an
increase in the probability of extreme high temperatures. Hansen has shown that the region of extremely high tempera-
tures on the right-hand side of the temperature distribution (shown as a dark blue triangle) increases dramatically for a
1 C increase in mean temperature (Hansen et al., 2013). Using his data and methodology, one can estimate that the
world's land areas subject to extremely high temperatures (those with more than three standard deviations from the
mean) increase almost 100-fold from 0.1% to about 10% of total land area with just a 1 C mean temperature increase!
The impacts of climate change that are being observed are largely due to periods of extremely high temperatures in
these land areas.
In our view, too much of the analysis and communication of impacts of climate change has focused on mean tem-
peratures rather than the extremes. This means, for example, that experiments with growing crops that are carried out
to reflect mean temperatures of 1, 2, or 3 C above normal may be misleading. Instead, it is important to subject the
crops to the whole range of temperatures in the distribution. The very high temperatures in the tail of the distribution
would kill most crops, even if they could flourish or at least survive at the mean temperature.
The same consideration likely applies to other impacts, such as the magnitude of hurricanes, forest fires, and species
extinctions, among others. It is important to broaden our perspective when considering temperature effects from a focus
on change in mean temperature to change in extreme temperatures and the frequency of these extremes. When one
does this, the seriousness of climate change now and in the coming decades becomes evident. We do not have to wait
three or four decades to see the most serious effects of climate change; they are already here and many more are waiting
just around the corner.

F I G U R E 3 Increase in the probability of extremely high temperatures associated with an increase in average temperature (derived
from Hansen, Sato, & Ruedy, 2013)
LEVINE AND STEELE 7 of 12

Although we have already seen major impacts, changes in climate and resulting impacts will be progressively more
serious over time. Our greatest concern for the future is that we may be well on the road to the irreversible melting of
the ice masses in Greenland and Antarctica (Romm, 2018). Such melting will lead to substantial ocean level rise (vari-
ously estimated to be between 0.3 and 1 m by 2100, depending on the magnitude of emissions),6 inundating the coastal
areas of the world with associated impacts on the nearly 1 billion people who live in these areas and the concentration
of economic activity found in proximity to coastlands (Romm, 2018). We have other concerns about catastrophic
impacts that could happen in a matter of decades if we continue on our present pace of greenhouse gas emissions: melt-
ing of large portions of the permafrost with the release of methane, a much more potent greenhouse gas than carbon
dioxide (the major culprit hitherto) in the short term.7 A major concern is that the earth's climate will change so rapidly
that large portions of the ecosystem will not be able to adapt, resulting in the decimation of a substantial fraction of spe-
cies of animals and plants (IPCC, 2014c).
In addition to these specific concerns, we are worried about the effect that a variety of impacts will have more gener-
ally: the shortages of water in some regions; the effects of extremely high temperatures in those and other regions; the
devastation of ecosystems throughout the globe; the increased incidence of diseases, epidemics, and pandemics and
other impacts resulting in mass starvation in developing nations; wars over water in Asia and the Middle East; and gen-
eral destabilization of governments and civil society. Considering that human conflict including wars was responsible
for killing about 100 million of our own species in the 20th century in a world with a stable climate, the 21st century
with an unstable climate could be far worse.

7 | THE MOS T I MPORTAN T AC T I O NS TO AV O I D T HE W O R ST E F F E C T S O F

CLIMATE CHANGE

These potential long-term impacts (and others that could be equally devastating) are likely to play out if we do not rap-
idly reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.8 This leads to the most important issues we face: how can we best imple-
ment solutions; how much time do we have to do this; and how likely is it that we will be able to keep average global
temperature increase to 1.5–2 C (2.7–3.6 F) to avoid the most serious impacts of climate change.
Simplifying somewhat, we would say that the solution primarily consists of three major elements: (a) policy actions
by national governments (all those represented at the meetings of the Conference of the Parties that agree on emission
targets); (b) aggressively implementing low- or no-carbon technologies as well as policies for reducing non-CO2 emis-
sions such as methane, nitrous oxide, fluorocarbons, and other forcing agents9 with continued and expanded R&D, and
the early retirement (at times at high cost) of technologies that are high emitters of greenhouse gases (e.g., coal-fired
power plants); and (c) the transfer of technology and know-how to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from developed to
developing countries, as well as assistance to these countries’ institutions to design and implement mitigation policies
and employ low- and no-carbon technologies to substitute for existing (high-carbon) technologies. The assistance would
also be directed at reducing emissions in addition to proper maintenance of forested and agricultural land.
Looking into these actions in greater depth, we believe there are nine important categories of policy actions that are
needed10:

1. Taxing or levying a fee on fuels and electricity based on carbon content, including options such as carbon fee and
dividend programs11 [starting now and with built-in tax or fee increases over time].12
2. Energy efficiency policies (standards and incentives) for buildings, industry13 and transportation [starting now and
with a recognition that cost-effective energy efficiency is the most effective near-term option].
3. Promotion of the use of renewable energy sources (especially solar and wind) and electricity storage for power pro-
duction14 [Starting now for the roughly half of solar and wind installations that are cost-effective in many countries;
within 5–10 years using lower-cost storage for wind and solar; and within two to four decades to replace the
remaining portion of the electric power supply system supplied by fossil fuel].
4. Electrifying end-use equipment in buildings and industry and producing vehicles that use electricity or other zero-
carbon fuels [starting now for new buildings, equipment in industry, and electric vehicles; becoming dominant in
coming decades as electricity is increasingly produced from zero-carbon sources].
5. Applying best practice to protect existing forested land and developing and applying new techniques to create forests
and agriculture that sequesters carbon, producing “negative” emissions [starting now and accelerating over the com-
ing decades as new techniques are developed, tested, and put into practice].
8 of 12 LEVINE AND STEELE

6. Enhancing R&D on advanced carbon-neutral or carbon-negative technologies [starting now. Some examples are
genetically engineered plants from which zero-carbon fuels can be produced on a massive scale at low cost; reduced
cost carbon capture, storage and/or use; low-cost hydrolysis to produce hydrogen from water].
7. Policies that would ease the transition away from all fossil fuels, including measures that support the transition of
the fossil fuel industries to zero-carbon industries [now and progressively stronger over time].
8. Transfer of no- and low-carbon technologies and knowledge to developing countries, along with significant support
for creating and/or promoting institutions that are capable of designing and implementing these technologies
(as discussed above).
9. Policies that address specific non-CO2 greenhouse gases (important but beyond the scope of this article).

In addition to these policies, broader efforts to modify a host of legal and institutional aspects of society will be needed
to fully achieve a very low-emissions world. One example of such changes includes education and empowerment to
women in developing countries that would be expected to substantially reduce population growth in these countries.
This last point deserves emphasis as its importance is not widely recognized, even among people knowledgeable
about climate change policy. The first seven policy actions described above can in principle be implemented by devel-
oped countries using their own resources. China also has resources to carry out all steps to achieve a very low carbon
future. India, while behind China, may need some outside assistance but has much of the technical expertise and
resources to move toward a low carbon future. This leaves as much as half of the world's inhabitants living in countries
that need substantial input from the developed world (and China and later India) to achieve low-carbon futures. Over
time, if the developed world were to drastically cut emissions, then in the absence of a “Marshall Plan” to support the
developing world (excluding China and India) in reducing emissions these emissions will become much larger than
those of the more affluent countries, and will become the dominant source of CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions
(C-ROADS, 2020).

8 | M A G N I T U D E OF TH E C H A LL E N G E

Figures 4 and 5a,b taken together illustrate the magnitude of the change in emissions needed to stabilize global temper-
atures. Figure 4 shows the ineluctable increase in CO2 emissions from pre-industrial times, including the five-fold
increase since about 1955. Ninety-five percent of these emission increases are from energy production and conversion.15
Because the impacts (and consequent damages) are proportional to cumulative emissions, simply lowering emissions is
not sufficient to reduce the growth in the concentration of greenhouse gases. Emissions need to be reduced to zero to
stop the growth of concentration in the atmosphere.
Figure 5a illustrates multiple pathways that could achieve a 1.5 C (2.7 F) increase in global temperature since pre-
industrial times. Observations from this Figure are

• The longer we wait until beginning large reductions in CO2 emissions, the steeper the slope of emissions reductions
needs to be

F I G U R E 4 History of the growth

in CO2 emissions since the mid-1800s,
expressed in metric tons of carbon
(Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory, 2020)
LEVINE AND STEELE 9 of 12

F I G U R E 5 Emission reduction
trajectories associated with
(a) warming below 1.5 C and
(b) limiting warming below 2 C
(Andrews, 2020)

• Because we are already in 2020, the only pathways that could achieve a 1.5 C increase in global temperature involve
a precipitous decline in emissions (that are, in our judgment, highly unlikely if not inconceivable)

Figure 5b illustrates pathways to achieve at 2.0 C (3.6 F) increase in global temperature since pre-industrial times.
Here we see a clear illustration that starting the decline in emissions sooner greatly increases the potential for achieving
the 2.0 C increase in global temperature. However, considering the past history of emissions in Figure 4, it is clear that
any of the pathways shown in Figure 5b will require very dramatic changes in policies, individual behaviors, and the
choice and application of technologies. Achieving a temperature increase of 2 C represents one of the greatest and most
difficult challenges that mankind has ever faced.
As suggested above, different stakeholders in society will experience vastly different costs in achieving the transition
to zero-carbon fuels. These large differences in cost will serve to erect daunting barriers to achieving a very low-carbon
future even in developed countries that otherwise have the means to achieve the transition. Probably the most signifi-
cantly impacted party is the fossil fuel industry as the demand for fossil fuels such as oil, gas, and coal would need to
decline dramatically in the coming decades and reach zero before the end of this century. This would necessitate early
10 of 12 LEVINE AND STEELE

retirement of fossil-fueled power plants creating stranded assets over the coming decades for all electric utilities having
such power plants (virtually all utilities in the world). More importantly, such actions would reduce the value of most
oil, gas, and coal reserves in the ground making them valuable primarily for use in producing materials such as plastics.
These costs may be borne privately or publicly depending on societal decisions reflected in government policymaking.
These costs have generally been assumed to be so large that they could hardly be borne by governments and the private
sector, even if they are less than the benefits of avoiding the worst impacts of climate change. The recent experience of
the United States government allocating trillions of dollars to address the economy in the face of the COVID-19 crisis
makes such magnitudes of expenditures to avert the depredations of climate change imaginable.
The political side of the transition to a zero-carbon economy necessary to stabilize CO2 concentrations in the atmo-
sphere may be even more difficult than the economic issues. Because the oil and gas industry is arguably the most polit-
ically powerful of all industries, it is difficult to imagine countries being able to adopt a set of policies that would cause
existential challenges to this industry.16 Similar observations can be made about the electric utility industry, an industry
that also has very considerable political power.
Governments will likely be under great pressure to create a strategy supporting the existing energy industries, and
especially the oil and gas industries, in an evolution to zero-carbon energy suppliers. This will be no easy task. At a
minimum, these industries would seek very large subsidies, an action not likely to be politically popular in most coun-
tries. In short, the politics are powerfully against policies that would sunset the existing fossil fuel industry (powerful
opposition by that industry) or that would provide the large subsidies that repay those industries for lost assets (power-
ful popular opposition).
A transition to a zero-carbon world will be expensive in both economic and political costs that should be compared
to the undoubtedly much greater benefits of avoiding future impacts of climate change. The costs will be borne by one
party (the energy industry); the benefits will be enjoyed by another (all inhabitants in the world adversely affected by
climate change). Under these circumstances, the oil and gas industry would be an extremely powerful opponent of poli-
cies and actions to move aggressively toward a zero-carbon society. This suggests that governments must pay serious
attention to devising feasible policies for the existing energy industry to navigate a pathway to an entirely new energy
industry. Even though this transition would occur over many decades, it needs to be initiated at scale now (Figure 4b).
When the world begins to seriously move to a zero-carbon future there will be no reason for oil and gas companies
to continue exploring for new fossil energy resources. Stated differently, the continuation of oil and gas exploration
means that the world has not yet embarked on a path to move away from fossil fuels. Only when oil and gas companies
recognize that additional sources of oil do not justify the cost of their exploration and development will it be clear that
the path to a zero-carbon energy future has begun in earnest. The magnitude of investment in oil and gas exploration
may be an extremely good indicator of early-stage progress toward a zero-carbon future.

9 | F IN A L O B S E R V A T I O N S

Climate change is real, the global average temperature has already increased by more than 1 C above preindustrial
levels, and the impacts already felt are significant and encompass the entire globe (NASA, 2019). A 1 C increase in
global temperature has had serious effects on the melting of glaciers and the Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets, on the
frequency of more severe hurricanes, on the severity of droughts and forest fires, and on the survival of selected species
on land and in the sea, among other impacts. This is due largely to the extreme temperatures that accompany higher
mean temperatures.
There are policies and cost-effective technologies that can begin a serious process to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions. There is significant experience with all of the policies and technologies that could be implemented now and in
the coming decades (IPCC, 2018). R&D needs to be carried out on key new technologies that will be commercially
ready for widespread use in the future and especially after one to two decades. Foremost among these technologies is
electricity storage for large-scale applications in wind and solar power plants and batteries and zero-carbon fuels for
vehicles.
Other than the (in our view limited but worthwhile) progress achieved through the Conference of the Parties meet-
ings, especially the Paris Agreement, the world has not yet begun seriously addressing climate change. One sign that
the world has become serious about climate change will occur when oil companies cease exploring for new resources
and utilities and customers are no longer willing to purchase power from coal-fired generation.
LEVINE AND STEELE 11 of 12

There is a Chinese proverb that states: “The best time to plant a tree is 20 years ago. The second-best time is now”.
While the increasingly dire warnings from scientists over the past 40+ years regarding climate change should have been
enough to cause the implementation of effective policies, governments in most countries failed to act. But there is no
excuse for not implementing those policies now.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The authors have declared no conflicts of interest for this article.

A U T H O R C ON T R I B U T I O NS
Mark Levine: Conceptualization; data curation; formal analysis; investigation; methodology; project administration;
writing-original draft; writing-review and editing. Robert Steele: Conceptualization; data curation; formal analysis;
investigation; methodology; project administration.

ORCID
Mark D. Levine [Link]

E N D N O T ES
1
New research on two topics will likely be of great interest in AR6: the timing of massive or irreversible melting of the
Antarctic ice sheets and the sensitivity of climate model results to doubling of CO2 eq. In both cases, recent work
seems to suggest that the timing or impacts have been underestimated in past work.
2
The most important greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide.
3
IPCC (2014c) expresses the level of confidence of its findings in terms of five qualifiers: “virtually certain 99–100%
probability; very likely 90–100%; likely 66–100%; about as likely as not 33–66%; unlikely 0–33%; very unlikely 0–10%;
exceptionally unlikely 0–1%.”
4
All of these and other impacts that have already been observed are described vividly in presentations by Al Gore for
the annual Climate Reality training sessions [Link]
5
For more information about fires in the Western United States, see [Link]
know-about-fire-season-in-the-western-us/.
6
If all the ice covering Antarctica, Greenland, and in mountain glaciers around the world were to melt, sea level would
rise about 70 m (230 ft)!
7
Methane stays in the atmosphere approximately 9 years, so that its effects are primarily felt in the immediate years
after it is released.
8
Although not discussed in this article, the destruction of forested areas reduces absorption of CO2, thus increasing
CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere and contributing to impacts.
9
In the discussion in the text, we confine our attention to CO2 emissions because they have a high forcing and remain
in the atmosphere for very long periods of time. In the short term, the non-CO2 gases mentioned here can have a very
significant impact.
10
Drawdown, a book edited by Hawken (2017), is an excellent source of information about policies and programs to
reduce CO2 emissions.
11
Carbon fee and dividend programs involve a return to the taxpayer of all fees collected from production and/or use of
carbon-based fuels. Such programs are often seen as preferable to taxes, especially by people who do not want the
increase of size of government that could result from greater tax revenues.
12
This policy is of particular importance as it provides a strong economic incentive for actions 2 through 7.
13
For industry, this also requires reduction of GHG emissions from industrial processes such as CO2 emissions from
heating calcium carbonate to produce cement.
14
Policy for nuclear energy and hydropower is also relevant. Retention of existing nuclear power plants can reduce
emissions for many years. New nuclear power plants can play and important role for those countries that have or can
create a viable nuclear energy industry (e.g., France and Germany) or can serve as exporters of nuclear power plants
to other countries. Hydro resources can be developed in many countries especially in South and East Asia.
15
The remaining 5% are from concrete production which releases carbon dioxide from heating calcium carbonate.
12 of 12 LEVINE AND STEELE

16
On the other hand, it appears that BP is moving to a transition from oil to other industrial activities (probably zero
carbon energy) based on recent comments by it CEO, Bernard Lowry (Storrow, 2020).

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How to cite this article: Levine MD, Steele RV. Climate change: What we know and what is to be done. WIREs
Energy Environ. 2020;e388. [Link]