CHAPTER

Equality
Ashok Acharya
4
66

CHAPTER OUTLINE
Introduction 59
Evolution of the Concept 60
Why Equalize? 65
Equality of What?
In Conclusion: The Politics of
Equality 72
Points for Discussion
72
 EOUALITY 59

INTRODUCTION

human beings in this world, innumerable inequalities abound. People

Among the billions of different races, religions, sexes
and unequal in many respects. I hey belong to
are diflerent endowments are also dissimilar. People differ
Their physical, genetic and mental
and so on.
and abilities and the ways in
which they lead, and are
to their dispositions
with regard that humanity displays
of inequalities and disparities
to lead, their lives. The range
taught fact.
wide and this is an empirical
is indeed very
that we are essentially equal and possess equal
we believe, and rightly so,
Yet, as humans,
this ideal in social, economic and political
when it comes to realizing
worth especially
of equality when we want to be
counted as
We invoke the concept
structures of our society.
to be treated-as an equal, to be equally
an equal, to
be treated--and aspiring or claiming
as an equal? What sense do
we
But what does it mean to be treated
entitled to social goods. as
that irrespective of our diterences and certain inequalities--whether
make when we say worth?
men or women-we, as humans, possess cqual
Brahmins or Dalits, black or white,
difterence between men
anatomical similarities, save the
We are clearly here not reterring to
tacts of our social existence that we, as humans, possess:
women, and the
common
and
living in societies, and so on. But we are
wit, the use of language, ability reproduce,
to
to
to teel pain or to sufter, capacity to ex-
alike in more fundamental respects. Our capacity
to be able to bear relevant consequences
of the same are
perience affection for others and
As Bernard Williams (1962) highlights, these are
capacities that have a moral resonance.
other characteristics
moral capacitiesthat are universal to humanity. However, there are
other humans in important ways. One of
possess and these
as well that we connect us to
these would be a 'desire for self-respect, which helps us unravel our own goals without
collective
being instruments of others' will. In short, there is something common in our
experience that forms the core of our egalitarian beliels. This makes certain causes worthy
of pursuit and helps realize the significance of some of our struggles against unequal rela-
tionships and social order. Along with other political values such as justice or liberty, equality
offers us a moral framework that we draw upon to make political judgements, and explain,
prescribe or criticize certain political views and forms of political action.
he concept of equality lies at the heart of normative political theory. Ina very general

IS,Cquality is a relationship between two or more persons or groups regarding some

pect of their lives. The idea of equality is not, however, a simple one and hence it is not
aays easy to speak with accuracy what that relationship ought to be and in respect or
wdl. Ihere is no one way in which we may define a relationship between two or moic

PeOns (or groups), determine the goals of the relationship, and give primacy to one aspec
Over another by attaching pre-eminent value to the same. There are multiple waya
8 S0. In other
words, the suggestion here is that the concept of equality can yicl
60 POLINCAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION

various conceptions depending on how we unpack the building-blocks-relationships.

hips,
persons, relevant attributes-and propose an appropriate relationship between them.

EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT

The history of political philosophy is replete with many references to the ideal of equality
Starting from the ancient Greek civilization till the 20th century, notable tor its many
eMNTAr egalitarian experiments,the idea ofequality has evoked some of the strongest human pas-
sions. The content of the
concept has undergone momentous transtormations across cen-
turies shaping, and
being shaped by, the millions of people that have been inspired fight
to
various political battles sometimes against an autocrat, at other times against
conditions, and on other occasions against undemocratic unjust social
regimes policies.
or
Tracing the history of an idea is fraught with difficulties, one of which is the problem of
recovery of an interpretive exercise. Quite a lot has
about interpreting texts and already been said on how we should
go
events, the focus of disagreement
can being
successfully employ contemporary lenses to judge contributions of
on whether or not
we

say we can, and others claim this is past authors. Some

impossible. Those who
interpretation to be authentic, it needs to be deny
in order for the possibility
suggest that
merits on both sides and contextual, not textual. There are
many scholars are
at least concur to
the validity of the same. persuaded to adopt a pluralist approach, or
that either the The one further
issue that remains,
recovery of an idea can
promise progressive revelation however, is
contemporary set of ideals or it may very well be an account culminating in some
a set of of
dangerous trends visible in degeneration concluding in
words, is laden with either contemporary times. The project of
Most exercises of hope despair.
or recovery, in other
at a recovering the history of normative
progressive revival, noting in the concepts in
is
usually helped by drawing on the role process how ideas widen and political theory an
riching the one under study. that other ideas or deepen in scope. Ins
Thus, an account of the values have also
from parallel accounts
of idea of equality played in en
which it feeds and is liberty, justice, rights, cannot be
separateu
inspired by popular sovereignty
In what
follows, we will selectively use some
or
democracy o
and

the Tocqueville) who had decisive roles

thinkers (Aristotle,
shape to the idea Hobbes,
fact that the idea in
we equality also derivesgiving
of Rousseau, Mal.
of [Link]
may well find other its
chapters in this book strengths Irom similar normative consiacS,
we
Alexis de
somethingTocqueville, complementing co
is the author of the present
the classic
irresistible and inevitable
history of humankind. about Democracy in America, exercise.
writes that
The main features ol "The gradual the spread and
fact that the ideal
this
progress, progress of equality is progress of equality 1t the
is daily
he
claims, are its somethir
hing fated? he declares.
man helps it alongng passing universality
beyond human control, and permanen nd the
permanent "begin its(Tocqueville
journey?
1969: 12).How and
did something every humanand every
that is now universal and
 EQUALTTY 61

Aristotle
are well-known facts ot the Greek experiments in popular rule, we are
ln what by now
citizens exercised an equal voice in the governance of their city-states.
l l aware of how
Constitution contains many reterences ot egalitarian
reforms initiated
Aristotle's Athenian
the passage for testing the democratic ideal. At the heart of the
in Athens that prepared of social life in-
that sought to reduce inequalities in many spheres
reforms were attempts
the ending of aristocratic stranglehold over land. power and
cluding, most importantly,
non of democratic rule. A
equality established by law were sine qua
a
honour. Practices of
ancient Athens was isonomia.
c o m m o n usage with demokratia in
word that competed in that secured the
betore and within the law, a form of political equality
meaning equality
ot 'the many poor in the regime
who were
equal participation from the domain
other classes of people who were excluded
Yet, ancient Athens also had documents
slaves and women. Aristotle's Politics, both
of citizenship: metics (foreigners),
evident, was limited to
andjustifies this exclusion. Aristotles conception of equalitý it is the virtue
the class of citizens only The political equality of citizens lay in acknowledging
Chapter 9 of Politics, Aristotle draws
a
In Book llI,
of 'ruling and being ruled in turn. held
straighttorward correlation between justice and equality when he says that justice is
justheld to be and is
not tor all, and inequality is
to beequality, and it is, but tor equals and
is the first classic statement ot jormal equality,
indeed, butlorunequais and not lor allT. This
of like cases al1ke. and unlike
Teiterang the dominant conception ol legal equality treating
cases unlike. However, unlike other conceptions
of formal equality which are generally
shorm of substance, this conception captures Aristotle's defence of natural inequality among
which does nothing in vain, divides
men to rule. Note that in Aristotle's view, nature,
have
people into the ruling and the ruled, where, to belong to the ruling category one must

rational, deliberative and authoritative capacities (true for some men, but not all). This in-

equality between the ruling and the ruled-the unequals-is just.

Hobbes
Aristotle defends natural inequality and then proposes a corresponding political equality
DeWeen some humans (usually nmale citizens), Hobbes, who quarrels with Aristotle the
OSL delends a view of the natural equality between all humans in the state of nature. I

LevIalhan, his most famous work, Hobbes claims that

in the faculties of body, and mind; so that though

r e hath made men so equal,
here be found one man sometimesmanilestlystrongerin body,or of quicker mind
mot
another, yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man h
Consicderable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benett. to
aother may not pretend, as well as he. (Hobbes 1968: 183)
POl l HOR1: AN INTRODUCTION

As 1o the stength of the body, Hobbes proclaims that even the weakest has
STiength to kill the strongest either by secret plot or by conspiring with others. Inaddit nough
as lo the faculties of the mind, Ilobbes argues that prudence, borne out ol experiene ition
, Is
cquallh bestowed upon men. What Hobbes proposes is the equal ability of individuals
n
the state ol naure which gives rise to an equality of hope to achieve our ends. What drit

indivduals 1s an cqual ability to work as well as an equal and irresistible passion for powe
ives
From this condition of equality, beset however by the passions of
wer
sel-glorification an
competition tor more power, emerges the first threat to equality when men try to domina
and
nate
and subjugate others. In this quest for more power, men forgo the need tor security and
ve in a state of depravity. Unless men agree to cede a part of their power to the political a
thornity and accept to lead a civilized but equal existence under the domination of author
ity, they can never be fully secure. In the Hobbesian vocation, it is important to acknowledge
the achievement of natural equality among men freed from all non-political sources of
authority. including the religious.

Rousseau on Inequality
n hisDiscourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality (also called the Second Discourse).
Rousseau speçulates on human psytchology and the history of SOCial institutions.
This is
where he delyesdeep intö the issue of humanr mequality, describing its various types that
existamong human beings and determiningwhich kind of inequality are 'natural and which
ones are 'unnatural Rousseau presents his analysis of society and the origins of
as a historical narrative. The narrative is
inequality
relatively simple but bears a powerful message. For
Rousseau man in his state of nature is essentially an animal like any other, driven two
key motivating principles: pitý'and self-preservation.n the by
state of nature, which is more a
hypothetical idea man neither is a rational creature nor possesses the oi
evil, has few needs, and is essentially happy. The only thing that concepthim good
and

at beasts is separates from the

some sense of unrealized
human
perfectibility. This notion of perfectibility is what allows
beings to change with time, and according to
moment isoláied
Rousseau, it becomes important the
an human being is torced to adapt to his environment and allows
to be
shaped byit. When
natural disasters torce people to move irom one himsel
make contact with place to
another
other people, and torm small
needs are created, and men groups or elementary societies,
begin to new
diflerent. Rousseau writes that as move out of the stat of nature towards somethingvery
individuals have more contact with
one another and
groups begin form, the human mind
to
smal
the develops language, which, in turn,
development of reason Life in the collective contributes to
new, negative motivating principle for human [Link]-preeipitates the devetopment or
a
state

propre, and it drives men to compare themselves Rousseau calis this

to others. This
principle amour
with others is not only rooted in the drive towards
comparison
desire to
drives men to seek domination over their preserve the self and pity others, but it aso
fellow human
their own happincss. beings as way of augmenting
a
 EQUALITY 63

tates that with the development of amour propre and more complex human
Rousseau states
societies, private
erty is invented, and the labour necessary for human survivalis
among diferent individuals to provide for the whole. This division oflabour and
divide

ginning of private property allow the property owners and all those who live of the
labour ofathers
others to dominate and exploit the poor. Rousseau observes that the poor resent

oaflairs andwill naturallyseekwar againsttherich toendtheirunfair domination.

maISSeau's
Ro history when the ncn recognize this, they deceive the poor into joining a
ot
ialsociety that claims to grant them the equality they seek. The universal consent
politica
is needed t
l to justify the institution of private property the rich suggest thatevery
humanity

ne associate
togeth tousetheir common forcestonisecure the weak from oppression, Te-
everyone the possession of what belongs to him'.
and secure tor
The
Tain the ambitious,
ran to meet their chains thinking they secured their freedom,
naive and unsuspecting poor
for although they
had enough reason to feel the advantages of a political establishment, they
to toresee its dangers (Rousseau 1964: 159-60).
Instead of
did not have enough experience unnatural moral
sanctily their oppression and make
an
however, the rich
granting equality,
ol civil society.
inequality a permanent feature
inequality through the dilterent epochs of civilization, Rousseau notes
In the progress ot of social
how the changing nature
of institutionalized inequality transiorms the dymamic
the establishment of law wasthe
first stagesitauthorized
relations. Ifthe right to propertyand and it established
institution ofmagistracy wasthesecondstage
the status of rich and [Link] effected the transformation
between the powerlul and the weak. The last stage
the relations that authorized the
we just discussed above)
into arbitrary power (which
otlegitimate power inequality-continuum, property the owners or
existence of and slaves. In Rousseaus
masters follow:
the metamorphosis would
and become masters. For the poor
the rich anmass power statement but is soon
followed up by Rousseaus
That is a powerful
poorweak >slaves. stretched to their limits,
is possible and things have been
claims that when no more inequality
it closer to its legitimate insti
the govemment altogether bring
or
ewrevolutions dissolve
utions (Rousseau 1964: 172).
that the only natural inequality among
argument in the Second Discourse is sort of
Kousseaus for this is the only
differences in physical strength,
nen is that which results from modern societiesthe
[Link], in
that exists in the state of nature. Ashe
Cuality
has Corrupted naturalmen and
created new forms ofinequality
On otlaws and property unjustitiable,unacceptabe
with natural law. Rousseau calls
these
C nOl in accordance concludes by making
other words, moral inequality, and he
It is, in
Onequality
be contested. From this analysis and
the prescribed
d l L n a t this sort of inequality must Marx
Karl
a straight
road leads to the work of
t new revolutions',
OSIs

Marx
ue of
liberal equality.
as a critique
At one best be described derided his con-
leyel, Marx's Views onequality can
equality,Marx
In
his polemic against the preyalent socialist conception
of ot history. t
was

for the materialistic conception

S 1Or their inability to aCcount
64 POLITICAL. THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION

necessary for Marx to correct popular misconceptions surrounding the ideal whoc
ose uses
were more in the interest of the bourgeois. In The German ldeology, Marx seeks to
the ideological bind that certain concepts have in a historical period, A ruling class unrave
has ts
own ideology to which society subscribes. The parallelbetween kousseau and Marx
is pretty evident. As Rousseau larmeAB how thepoor get duped by the promises mad
by
the rich to securetheconsent ofthe former toinstitute 1egtimate power, Marx als0 shou
how the ruling class produces a legitimating ideology to perpetuatethe system of econ
hows
exploitation. Towards that end, the division of labour in the ruling class of a capitalist e
onomic
t so-
ciety will ensure a division between mental and material labour, and correspondingly
ythe
division between the the thinkers of the class' and the capital ownerS Will emerge. The lo
mer
are the active, conceptive ideologists, who makethe pertecting oftheillusion of the Class
about itselt their chief source of livelihood. All historical epochs provide their own rulin
ideas: during the time the aristocracy was dominant the concepts honour, loyalty, ete
were dominant, during the dominance of the botrgeðisie, the concepts freedom, equality
etc: (Marx 1978: 173). These concepts are abstract and hold sway by taking on the fom
of universality to which even some socialists sometimes fall prey. But they are hollow and
bereft of substance unless accompanied by a communist vision.
What Marx envisions for the final stage of
history-the communist, classless society-
becomes clear only when we understand the impossibility of human emaiktpation under
Conditions of exploitative social relations. The question of human emancipation is linked
to freedom from economic inequalities. The capitalist system intensiies and heightens eco-
nomic inequality. In the transitional socialist stage, emancipation is not complete but equal
access to the means of
production is ensured. In this transitional stage many capitalist prac-
tices, including the necessity of labour and material incentives, do not vanish. The distribu-
tive principle in operation during the stage is guided by the principle of 'to each according to
his work. Socialism, in the transitional
phase, realizes [Link] principle of liberalism.
Here, man is seen only as a worker. In his Critique of the Gotha Programme, however, Marx
declares that in the final phase of communism, society would be able to
inscribe on its banner
From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs! (Marx 1978: 521). Under
communism, man will no longer be regarded simply as
a producer but as a person Wu
needs and desires, which, rather than his contribution of Tabour,
will be the basis tor the as
tribution of [Link] distribution of goods, properly
understood, is the consequence
the distribution ot the conditions of production.
are contingent aspects ot class
Scarcity and contlict of economic intercs
societies. These will
munist sóciety.
disappear with the inauguration ot col

RTocqueville
rentral thrust of Tocquevilles work was to
study
historv His study ol the Amencan democratic revolutionequality as a tendency of
mo
historical transition trom feudalism to democracy in the
was
designed to understand
whole. Hi
Western societya s a
study was not meant to just identity the transitio but to account tor it as well. was
wy
 IOUALITY 65
the triumph of ec ality
inevitable? The project involved
sive elopment ofs
equality. Equality an ideal cxplaining the gradual and progres-
of social
as

itions of servitudeand dependence. Iu makes appeals to people who wish to escape

democratic lile
aistocraCy with democracy,
Tocqueville notes: 'AristoCracy links possible. In comparing
to king,in one long chain. Democracy breaks the chain and freeseverybody,Irom peasant TaH1
ane
n

O508), In denmocracies, men preter each link'

equality to (Tocqueville
and hold liberty, on to it
tenaciously
The charmms ot equality are te the wholetime and are within the reach of all;
spirits appreciate ther the
noblest
em, and the commonest
nminds exult in them. The
ality is theretore both and
passion generated by
equali strong general (Tocqueville 1969: 505). However, Tocqueville
RTTS us ot the dangersot eXCessive
equality. here are times when the passions for equality
mav turn into a delirium. Tocqueville is equivocal'aBout the
consequences of social equality
an Dolitical life. Alhough passions for equality may be found to exist very strongly in
democracies, it is vital, in his view that a single-minded pursuit of equality at the expense
of liberty may prove detrimental to the political health of democracies.

WHY EQUALIZE?
Reduction of inequalities may be considered as the primary objective of equality. But, why

reduce inequalities?objective of inequality-reduction can be [Link] by

The
in an unequal
a commitment to the
ideal of uniformity. One way to bring about uniformity
individuals' abilities, or to
income irrespective of the
world is to fix for everyone equal know
of the size of the fanmily. This we
distribute identical houses irrespective
and
design idea of an equal income militates
resolve. Forinstance, the
raises more problems than helps and efforts. No one
differential talents, skills, occupations
what deserve by way of
we all deserve equal
against we
that irrespective of our social positions
Can make a plausible argument whatever the size. gets
case that every family,
well make a convincing
No one as can that irre-
income. for that matter,
no one would ever argue
two- or three-room
house. Or,
O nave a
student should get the
same grades
examinations, every
performance in the at least the
pective of cannot be the end of equality,
its attractions,
spite of s o m e of must appeal to
Unitormity, in
distributional terms. Equality
latter in
we understand and extend the is a valuable
way caveat is in orcder. Unilormity
However, a
One and better standards.
other here is that, rich or poor,
high or low-
The idea
of fair procedures. in the court oflaw,
a d a r d when we speak of cqual 1 r e a t m e n t , say,
to the unilormity ol justice. The
usetul-
aiKng. ecach o n e
of us is entitled allect the dispensation
should not signilicance in
the dis
social rank
wealth moral
IEre our or
ceases to have a
however,
of uniformity,
Of the yardstick
and its sep-
its moral appeal
tributional sphere. so, augments ends
and, by doing
ends fourdiflerent
achieves certain is valuable for fulfilling
uallty
value. Equality in order De Jan.
to
a u t o n o m o u s

sometimes required to
as an
cquality is unlair
Standing n is
it s u
[Link],
equal,
has an intrinsic other things being t w o equally
c h it distribute, then, des to
If there a benefits o r burdens to marks or grade
to award unequal
e are It is unlair, say,
distribute them unequally.
 e x a m i n a t i n .

pcrlormed
Identically
in their the absene
studenis
who have distribution,
lairness requires equality
lai
alcnied
uncqual neceee
ler an mieasurc
of cquality is
rellec -voneSpea
reasons
sonie
monal bccause
Rd should.
is
desirable
in sociely
bui that not
sopond cquahty positions
helong to dillcien tcels that in
te of the
spite status differ
Poopie ma a person
es that ste
cach other
When
her sell-respect
danger, A fit
is in
thev pencnr
others shc is as good
as none,
hetso tal wa
shares wath acknowledge that the gan
need for sell-respect to
is

understanding the that person is not toni

too
ersons
how others who are
better oll perceive
huge Often
self-magcand
external conditions-by
way ofsforexample
unjust a min
his calls for correctng a bearing on a person's self-image
matenal condition-that have
nust
maily
to show respect to otherS. Ihe ability to possess
Thirt cquahty enjoins a duty
one treats others. Showing equal resrons
respea
but hoW
the only thing that matterS,
nplies
deliberate for themselves and to
s
not
have capacities to
recognizing that all people
atvities and relationships
that are considered intrinsically valuable
Conditions of equality induce sa
inally tqyaliy is necessary to foster fraternity.
ure of solidarity among the inhabitants of a society by way ol removing systematic harra
ers
Most commuters in buses and on trains do not worry about the o
tosocial intercourse.

ot religious afiliation of their fellow passenger. AcrOSs caste and communal divide. people
oin hands to fight various forms of injustice. Thisispossible because webelieveintheida
ofequaity Inequalities are objectionable in part because they place barriers to friendshin
community and love
All the above four justifications for equality are
complementary to each other.
Together
they capture diferent reasons tor a general defence of
equality and each separatelv
highlighis a special aspect as signiicant. The argument to be tair on grounds of distributive
ustice focuses on the equal satisfaction of basic needs. The argument from the
perspectivea
self-respect makes a case for equality of statusby requiring that material
otbe glaring The case for equal respect demands inequalities should
seit-development inally the argument from the
prerequisites of equal opportunities J
oal
equality (Miller 1996) perspective of fraternitv makes a case

EQUALITY OF WHAT?
n contemporary
debate political philosophy, a lot of discussion
Any atlempt Ounds the 'cqualityotwhat
terms with what
the to apply surrounds the cqLk
pinciple ofl equality between
ty has
exactly we must be
concerned to individuals
individuals must first come
must
a
distributional aspect it, we are to cqualize. ln addition, the w
lon, the 'what' of equa
Although the final word
on the
chielly tallking here about dist
distributional quality
eenerally dently ihree metrics of debate ID
above, there
on
equality olof equality what?
what: 1sis yet to be
id, scholas
1s an
aternaive equality. wellare, resources Besides the
cOCeplion of equalitv that and capad
equality and more ol n:al
each one of them below
a
comnplement. This is the idea of
is less a
competn shall examinë

comp equality. We
Complex
 EQUALITY 67

Equality ofWelfare
Utilitarians generally argue that the project of distributional equality amounts to the
distribution of welfare. 'Welfare' here is primarily understood in two ways. According to the
classical utilitarian thinking, as espoused by Jeremy Bentham (also see Chapter 3), welfare
refers to the happiness which is understood as the net balance of pleasure over pain that
the individual experiences. According to this view, in assessing how well-off someone is in
life, we should look at how happy he or she is, that is, at the net balance of pleasure over
pain in his/her life. In more recent writings, however, welfare is identified with desire or
preference-satisfaction; people have more or less wellare, and so have better or worse lives
in a fundamental sense, depending on hOw tar they satisty their desires or their preferences.
In deciding which preterences matter most to a person, the person must be able to form
his/her own judgements independently and with full information without any scope for
errors of reasoning.
A society that believes in distributing welfare equally will not worry much about how
much resources individuals get, but whether or not these resources are instrumental in
securing tor each individual a level of satisfaction or happiness (whether in terms of pleasure
or prelerence-fulfilment) equal to everyone else. Under such a scheme, it is imperative that
we fulfil everyones weltare equally irrespective of the inequality entailed in the distribution
of resources. Someone who has a taste for an expensive car or jewellery is to be treated
at par with someone who is happy riding a bicycle or owning a lantern. There is a moral
issue here, however, that is bound to engage our intuitive notions of fairness. Should our
society subsidize peoples expensive tastes? Why should those who are unhappy without
expensive cars have more of a claim on social resources than those who are content with
bicycles? Or, for that matter, why should a society underwrite a gambler's professional risks
and treat it at par with someone who needs much fewer resources to be trained as a car
mechanic? Demands to treat preferences equally can at times be morally worrisome and un-
sustainable. The ideal of equality of welfare, let us be clear,
certainly does not promote the
cause of fairness,
self-respect, or fraternity. In many ways, the ideal is considered morally
objectionable by most liberals and is held to be unattractive as a yardstick for social
policy.

Equality of Resources
he resourcist view of equality 'resource egalitarianism' is
or
the views
most expressly identified Witn
of John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin and Eric Rakowski.
Equality of resources, Dworkin
naintains, holds that a distributional scheme treats people as equals when it distributes
Or
ransterS that
further transfer would leave their shares of the total resources inoc
SO no

d(Dworkin 1981: 186). But one needs to know when precisely equality of resources
Kely to be achieved. Dworkin suggests a two-stage process: (i) the ambition-sei1sitive
, and (11) the insurance scheme. But let
ke a
ns start with a simpler story, a story-mu
philosopher's fiction-that Dworkin himself uses.
POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION

on a
deserted island. et Iet. us
washed ashore
we are shipwrecked immigrants
this later)
that everyone hs
magine we will quality
for the moment (though abundant resources and n.
further assume with
in an island
Huddled together
the natural talents. the available resources

of equally dividing The

same

we set upon
the task division will followthe
th.
native population, division of resources.

us to effect an equal need to evaer-

in lite may difter,
we
elect one amongst
of the fact that
our goals
procedure. In view that extent, we are eack
auction
and hence bid tor. lo ch
we need
cise our choices on which
resources

r e s o u r c e s in the
island that are up for sal
clamshells to bid for all
the available
given 100
is likely to have
ditterent preBerences and
market. Each one of us
in a perfectly competitive clamshells. Someone who wishes
wish to spend our
will determine on what we
ourpreferences
of the clamshells on agricultural land, and
to engage in farming
will spend a major part And
will bid for the beaches.
a person
those others who wish to spend time near the sea land. In this manner
cattle and some grazing
who wishes to set
up a dairy farm will bid for ambitions and each will
resources in accordance
with one's
each one will bid for difterent
or she would not
wish to trade away with some-
end up with a bundle of resources that he
but equal bundle of re
one elses. The division, so
effected by the purchase of a different
sources in the auction, meets the envy test,
which implies that 'no division of resources is
the division is complete, any immigrant would preter someone
an equal division it, once

else's bundle of resources to bundle' (Dworkin 1981: 285). We could say that if
his own

and difer
the envy test is met, then people have been treated with equal consideration,
resources are a retlection of their dik
ences between them owing to difterent bundles of

ferent ambitions.
We have just met the requirement of choice in the resource egalitarian conception. Howeve
in the real world it is difficult to imagine that everyone would be similarly endowed in natura
assets. We are re-opening an issue that we had assumed to be non-existent earlier. Will tne

envy test succeed if we assumed that people were differently endowed? Suppose some of s

are physically challenged and are borm with natural handicaps, say, without eyesight. Now, m

the auction scheme where all of us enjoy equal ability to bid for equal bundles of resources
no two persons with difierent natural endowments will find themselves under conditions
of equal circumstances. A person who is physically challenged, for instance, will have se
cial needs and the resources that she purchases with her 100 clamshells will leave her les
well-off than others. She shares the burden of unequal circumstances. Where the
fortunate than her make more meaningful choices with their resources, a disproportionat
ale

der
amount of her resources will be spent in meeting her special needs. This is not fair conside

ing that her handicap was involuntarily acquired. How do we then meet the envy test:
One way out would be to ompensate for her natural disadvantage from the Common

w e may be
before we start the auction process. In order to be fair to
pool of r e s o u r c e s her
required to design a distributional plan that offsets her brute luck before giving her a fairgo

atthe auction. The plan is simple:

we tobe both need
endowment-insensitive
ople's fates in
and ambition"

sensitive. This is another way of acknowled as Dworkin suggests, that peoplt

termined by their choices as by their circumsta
mStances

as much
distributional scheme is better
any peoples che
choices,
the auction takes care
ot compensating ple-or,

Hence, although
 IOtUAIIY 69

llsecuring insurance tor against brute luck-is morally required. However, the
them
it mayhrst seem. One cannot simply concede that we compensate
sull

matteT is not as simple as

Some disadvantages cannot just be compensated,
disadvantages of the nlucky.
allnatural not be a cause of great concern. And where compensation is due we
in cases
and some need
circumstances--not wholly-no matter how much we
an only partially
equalize unequal
somewhere between being fair to people's choices
Can

need to strike a balance

Ompensate. We ambition-sensitive auction needs
responsibility tor their disadvantages. An
and taking moral
takes care of natural, undeserved inequalities.
balanced by an insurance scheme that
be 25 or 30 clam-
all of us may be required to put aside, say,
1o

the auction can take place,

Refore
towards the disadvantaged and then
bid for the available
meet the obligations
shells to is to invite us to see the parallels
between
Tesources A
central objective of Dworkin's proposal
to in an ideal setting, and
what the transposed implications are
ourselves
what we commit real world is
real world. A rough parallel of the insurance scheme in the
1o the
non-ideal,
more than the poor
taxation. Taxing the rich proportionately
of progressive
the practice A resourcist conception of equal-
to secure welfare for the disadvantaged.
enables the state
unequal c i r
the centrality of state responsibility towards remedying
on
y

lays emphasis

Cumstances among people.

Equality of Capabilities
that distributional equality should concern

The economist Amartya Sen pioneers the idea on resources or incomes.

instead of emphasizing
tsell with equalizing people's capabilities, the people enjoy such
real freedoms that
as

We should be able to, Sen argues, focus on

able
having self-respect, being politically active, being
Deing able to read, being healthy, The focus should be on what
proper
and so on.
to take the life of the community,
part in
and not on how much
r e s o u r c e is

is on their functions,
people are able be and do, that
to
lead valuable lives
secure for us
what makes us happy.
ted to therm Resources only
considered as means of well-being.
and are therefore, to be understood
Sen the notion of well-being
proposes
Contrast
to the r e s o u r c e approach, vital to leading a valuable life. However, Sen does
a function
ems
of function Reading is Social policy, according to
should be concerned with function
certain sort of
1gue that social policy is the ability to achieve a
capabilities A capability
S20uld instead focus on while reading is a function
In a society where
t o n F o r ezample, literacy is a capability, read, ie literay
should actively promote peoples ability to educauional
r elliterate, a state such as books and
insist that r e s o u r c e s
TeTeas a resourcrCe egalitarian may
the capability
advocate
that are deficient in literacy,
ay be provided for in regions matters is the capability-
of external m e a n s what the
g u e that more than a provision of addressin:
read and write This way
2n to
population
a i i t y - o f the target
oblem of inequ is indeed a novel one
home by Scns
observation

is further hrought diver

of the capability approach fcts of human
ey hand-in-hand with
hata
t

aalysis of inequality
needs to go
characteristics
(stIch as age. penic
sity. We are Sen argues, 'deeply diverse in our internal
70 POLNCAL IEORY: AN INTRODUCTION

general abilities, particular talents, proneness to illnesses and so on) as well

,well as in
cireumstances (such as ownership of assets, social backgrounds, environmenits externa
environmental predi
ments, and so on). (Sen 1993: xi) To take one example ot an internal charactes
der) made worse in the presence of some adverse external factors (discrimineistic gen
erential ]between males and f
patriarchal institutions), Sen points to the mortality differential nination and
(that also accounts for the phenomenon of 'missing women' in countries such Semales
and India), especially among rural families in Asia and Africa (Sen
1993: China 1-
other social characteristics such as identity and sOcial
disadvantage are factored in 122-25).I
understanding inequality deepens.
of Hence, it will be Our
plausible to maintain, for instano.
that beyond the simplistic account of
gender inequality, most Dalit women are worse 1stance,
than other women in terms of aB
high mortality. However, the buck may not stop here
will be a real test to determine further whether Dalit
women of Delhi, for example, fare as
badly as, say, widows from upper-caste rural Rajasthan. Some would
reasons, that the latter-due to
argue, and with god
rigid external constraints-are probably worse off than
former. We need to be sensitive to such the
differences and not be misled by
many characteristics can impinge on appearances. Since
amass as much information as
peoples functioning, it is essential that
policy makers
possible before they design suitable policies to
peoples capabilities. Social policy must be attuned to facts of equalize
minded approach (for human diversity. simple
A
example, of equalizing incomes) towards
of inequality will
simply not do. correcting complex modes

Complex Equality
Michael Walzer gives currency to the idea of
finds himself ill at ease with the
complex equality Walzer is an egalitarian ou
most
intellectual enterprise involved
in identifying the
important metric of equality-welfare, s
resources
is somewhat
misplaced. It is
or
capability. This enterprise, tohim,

single point of access to the misplacedof

due to the
egalitarians' unrelenting insistene on a
plurality distributive arrangements. This needs acking
Often, in our quest to distribute
goods, we harp more on the unpaonand
less on what
meaning we attribute to principles
goods. Walzer argues that
of
distrD and
create goods, which people
they then distribute
among themselves. It is conceiv
attention from distribution to the important that we
goods, which determines their social conception and creation of goods. We give g s to

ferent societies. There is no

value. The same
goods have di
ifferent meaningsI
difte
single set ofl basic edof
and given the same value. Rawls, goods which could be universally
Walzer would argue. g e s t e d

that what mattered was hoW a set ol was oft the mark when he
primary sug
societies. If goods needed to be fairly
distributed acro
one knew how
goods were socially distri agree

ing with Rawls in giving a universalist created, one would have diffhcuy
account of
and

space. AlI .distributions are just and unjust relative to the justice that would apply acros Stake

(Walzer 1983: 9). These meanings change

social meanings of go0 ide
the
across time and
responsibility no longer holds true in sominstance
space. For
that childcare is solely a family
m e s o c i e t i e s unlike
 EQUALITY 71

thers. Every society wilt 8ve vate to goods in a

particular and will be sustained
way,
: a shared understanding among members.
what, however, is typIcal to the understanding of how goods ought to be distributed is

uhen meanings given

that
to
goOds distinct, distributions must be autonomous. Every
are
t of goods constitutes a aistinct ciistributive sphere within which only certain criteria of
distribution are appropriate (Walzer 1983: 10). Economists may be right to impute a cer-
tain measure ot rationanty and acquisitiveness to the behaviour of people in the markets.

Hawever, the same does not hold true in all social domains. Fathers and mothers are
SunDOsed to be loving. trusting, caring and altruistic. Citizens are supposed to be equal,
Pp
imnartial, and motivated by views of the collective good. Resources within families are not
distributed as wages, political offhces in a democracy ought not to be distributed among
relatives. Walzer maintains that there is no reason to expect that the same distributive stand
ards must prevail in different spheres' of social life. Thus, the spheres of the market and
political power, to take two examples, are distinct and separate. The norms for distributing
goods within each are internal to each and ideally should not spill over. Critics, however,
may reason that this is easier said than done. Of course, inequalities from economic life do
spill over into political lite and vice versa. Wealth can buy votes, and elected representatives
can misuse their offices to further the interests of business. This, Walzer would be quick to
point out, is highly undesirable. Nations do indeed erect barriers, with limited success, to
restrict the extent to which wealth leads to political power.
Within each sphere, there might well be inequalities and there is nothing wrong with
that. If the distributional norm in the economic domain lays emphasis on effort and because
of which inequalities emerge between those who work hard and those who do not, the
indolent or the lazy cannot expect to be similarly rewarded as the diligent. This inequality
is acceptable with the caveat that hard work at times goes unrewarded in some societies.
What is not acceptable, however, is when people who enjoy a certain pre-eminence in other
A case in point could well
spheres are disproportionately rewarded in the economic sphere.
be to ask whether reward for work should be related to religious afiliation. In Walzers

Scheme, it is clear it cannot be. But, what if it does? That would lead to tyranny. Tyranny is
tne disregard for the distinctness of spheres and the principles internal to them and in ways
n which it multiplies inequalities. Some groups can monopolize a particular category of

8o0ds and then use achieve unequal distribution of other goods. That
their monopoly to
wOuld lead to dominance. Our effort should be on the reduction of dominance. Equality
Cquires a diversity of distributive criteria that mirrors the diversity of socClal goods.
a set of relationships such
COmplex equality is the opposite of tyranny. 'It establishes
dt domination is impossible. In formal terms, complex equality means that no citizen's
and one sphere or with regard to one social good can be undercut by his standing in

Other sphere, with regard to some other good' (Walzer

1983: 19). The idea ofcomplex
over the metrics of
d t y is a refreshingly different perspective than those struggling
q and personhood that
n contrast to the abstractions of individual responsibility

the three conceptions we discussed above, Walzers approach locuses attention

CZes
on the
social mear of the spheres of justice.
eanings of goods and the plurality
72 POLITICAL

THEORY:
.2. IN CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF EQUALITY
In
As
policy
divide
AN
a was
instrumental in Justiying the it
One of egalitarianism in
One the 20th century
successtul in its heyday, has decinned
he politics
drawing
things. That idea,
theis
is
OI a welare
issues
does
aa
state, among other detail all the causes, but a sha
representative
up
What went wrong?
We cannot the TiSe of rightShon
-Wi
Over the two not
a decades. today are witnes ing
past lashion
teacher
INTRODUCTION
[Link] Many
inhertitance
related
may prospective
de m oc r a t i c societies
headed by Ronald Reagan ing an
checklist
wish
of when governments
This trend started in the 1980s
politics. your
to
to
with
state. The legitimacy of th
Margaret designer
between
unleashed
Thatcher the welfare
among backlash against
work discredited for having given shor
politician
humble
class, and it was largely
called into question
five
who politi
weltare state was and economic efticiency. Right-wing
youcreativity and
them?
shrilt to individual responsibility, needs
with less tax and consequently ve
works
has
children who wish to pay
sustained have
citizens
The by
less tax. In the global political
in recent times is land
right-wing) whowithpromise
to power parties (usually been
with
expensive shilt toward the right. The politics
decisive ideological
following redistribution and the idea (
notices a one
Scape, moreover, the
invitedpractice of
further caused a setback to expensive
diflerent
globalization has tastes.
welfare-state policies. by
ambitions. of identiy
visible: the political struggles
is alsoinformation
political phenomenon the
tastes
Yet another distinct
material too. The 'equality ofwhat
in normative political theory,
concerns

groups. This parallels new

and increasingly shedding their
college
of whom?. Egalitarians are is
debate is being replaced by 'equality surrounding inequality between
to engage in
concerns

and keener
individualist bias are ambitions,
provided
equality by women
for greater
Governing
to non-material tactors. The struggles
more
groups that to the continuing relevane
owe
and others are a pointer
minorities, Dalits, linguistic groups about
how of group
search for new paradigms
of social equality and a corresponding
of the bases Council
the
would
sensitive equality. to
children
a
ais
paren

Points for Discussion

One is blind.

textbooks to your native language

(a) The translation of the most popular English denis

for visually challenged stud

(b) The expansion of Braille resources in the college library
(c) The provision ot wheelchair access to the entire college premises
Would you justiBy any of these policies? Why and how?