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FMEA Risk Assessment for Contamination

The document outlines a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for various processes in a multi-product facility, identifying potential failure modes, their effects, and existing controls. It emphasizes the importance of mitigation strategies such as validated cleaning procedures, dedicated equipment, and procedural controls to minimize contamination risks. Additionally, it highlights the need for periodic risk reassessment and documentation of high-risk areas for quality assurance.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
32 views5 pages

FMEA Risk Assessment for Contamination

The document outlines a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for various processes in a multi-product facility, identifying potential failure modes, their effects, and existing controls. It emphasizes the importance of mitigation strategies such as validated cleaning procedures, dedicated equipment, and procedural controls to minimize contamination risks. Additionally, it highlights the need for periodic risk reassessment and documentation of high-risk areas for quality assurance.

Uploaded by

anji reddy
Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

S (1– O (1– D (1–

Failure Mode Potential Effect RPN Existing Controls Mitigation / Action


10) 10) 10)
Residue after cleaning of Cross contamination to next Cleaning SOP, PDE-based MACO, swab/rinse testing,
9 4 6 216
reactor batch visual check enhanced cleaning validation
Powder leakage during Spread to adjacent Local exhaust Closed transfer system, dedicated isolator,
8 5 7 280
milling equipment/area system area cleaning
Contamination transfer via Double gowning, training, periodic
Personnel gown breach 7 3 6 126 Gowning SOP
gown/gloves monitoring
Improper HVAC Airborne cross- HVAC alarms, Dedicated AHU for potent API, interlock
9 3 8 216
differential pressure contamination monitoring system
Utensil reuse without SOP for utensil Dedicate utensils or validate cleaning
Residual carryover 8 4 7 224
cleaning cleaning with MACO

Failure Mode Possible Effect S O D RPN Controls / Mitigation


Inadequate cleaning of Residual Sacubitril Valsartan Validated cleaning procedures, swab & rinse limits, visual
9 5 6 270
reactor/dryer contaminates next product inspection, dedicated equipment for potent steps
Airborne API particles spread to Dedicated AHU, differential pressure monitoring, HEPA
HVAC failure (cross-flow) 8 3 5 120
other areas filtration
Material mix-up during Wrong API/Intermediate enters
10 2 3 60 Barcode/QR system, line clearance, double checks
dispensing process
Operator gowning/hygiene
API particles carried on garments 7 3 4 84 Personnel training, gowning procedure, entry/exit air showers
failure
Shared vacuum line
API residues enter common line 8 2 5 80 Dedicated/demountable hoses, validated line cleaning
contamination
Potential Effect (on
Process Step Failure Mode Possible Cause Existing Controls S O D RPN Recommended Action
product/patient)
Vendor Strengthen supplier
Raw material Wrong vendor / Non-qualified Impurity introduction,
qualification, CoA 8 4 4 128 audit, incoming RM
procurement contaminated RM supplier failure in reaction
verification testing
Automation in
Wrong material Human error, Cross-contamination, Barcode system,
Dispensing 9 3 3 81 weighing, double
weighed poor labeling wrong API line clearance
verification
Inadequate Periodic re-
Cross-contamination Other product Cleaning validation,
Reaction cleaning, valve 10 3 3 90 qualification of
in reactor contamination equipment logbook
leak cleaning
Increase cleaning
Residual material in Incomplete Carryover to next Cleaning validation
Filtration/Drying 9 4 4 144 frequency, additional
filter/dryer cleaning product with swab/rinse
rinse
Monitor airborne
Dust generation → Contamination of Closed system,
Milling Poor containment 10 3 2 60 particulate, dedicated
cross-contamination adjacent area HVAC
mill if needed
Ineffective cleaning SOP non- Validated cleaning Periodic cleaning
Contamination of next
Equipment cleaning (carryover of compliance, limits (MACO), 10 3 4 120 verification, operator
product
Sacubitril Valsartan) method limitation swab/rinse retraining
QA check, line Introduce barcode
Packaging/Labeling Wrong label affixed Human error Mix-up of products 9 2 3 54
clearance scanning
Analyst error,
Out of specification Release of Second review, Automation, periodic
QC testing data integrity 10 2 3 60
not detected contaminated batch audit trail data integrity training
issues

Process Flow for Risk Assessment


1. Raw material procurement & storage
o API intermediates, solvents, reagents, packing material.
o Risk: wrong material issue, contamination during storage.
2. Weighing & dispensing
o Shared balance/area → risk of cross-contamination or mix-up.
3. Synthesis / Reaction steps
o Equipment sharing → risk of residues.
o Solvent recovery → cross-contamination.
4. Isolation / Filtration / Drying
o Risk of incomplete cleaning of filters/dryers.
o Dust carryover.
5. Milling / Sieving
o High dust generation → airborne cross-contamination.
6. Packaging & Storage
o Mix-up of labels, wrong batch release.
7. Cleaning of Equipment
o Risk of inadequate cleaning → residue carryover.
8. Final Testing & Release
o Risk of OOS/OOT overlooked, data integrity gaps.

🔹 4. Example FMEA Table (simplified)


Process Step Potential Failure Mode Effect on Other Product S O D RPN Mitigation / Control
Raw material Contamination, wrong API Vendor qualification, QC ID test for all
Wrong material received 9 3 3 81
procurement manufactured materials
Segregated dispensing booths, line clearance,
Weighing/dispensing Material mix-up in balance Cross-contamination 8 4 3 96
barcoding
Residue of Sacubitril Validated cleaning procedure with MACO
Reaction Contamination of next batch 10 4 4 160
Valsartan in reactor calculation
Filtration/Drying Incomplete cleaning of API residue → contamination 9 3 5 135 Dedicated filters where feasible, validated
Process Step Potential Failure Mode Effect on Other Product S O D RPN Mitigation / Control
dryer cleaning SOPs
Closed system milling, HEPA filtration, PPE,
Milling Dust carryover Cross-contamination 10 5 4 200
containment
Label reconciliation, QA checks, barcode
Packaging Label mix-up Wrong product released 10 2 2 40
verification
Inadequate cleaning Cleaning validation (worst-case), swab/rinse
Equipment cleaning Residual API contamination 10 5 5 250
validation test, periodic revalidation
Contaminated product Audit trail review, second-person verification,
Final testing Data integrity failure 9 2 5 90
released QA oversight

🔹 5. Mitigation Controls
 Technical Controls: Closed systems, dedicated equipment (if feasible), HEPA filtration, isolators, validated cleaning (MACO, PDE-
based).
 Procedural Controls: SOPs for line clearance, weighing, segregation, gowning, batch coding.
 Quality Controls: Analytical testing, swab/rinse analysis, changeover verification, environmental monitoring.
 Organizational Controls: Training, periodic risk reassessment, deviation handling, audit trail reviews.

🔹 6. Cleaning Risk Assessment (Critical for Multi-product Facility)


 Perform MACO (Maximum Allowable Carryover) calculation based on PDE (Permitted Daily Exposure) of Sacubitril Valsartan.
 Validate cleaning for worst-case scenario equipment.
 Swab and rinse recovery studies.
 Define acceptance limits (µg/cm²).
 Frequency of revalidation.
🔹 7. Conclusion of Risk Assessment
 List all high-risk areas (RPN > 80/100).
 Document mitigation and re-calculate RPN after controls.
 Residual risk should be acceptable.
 Final approval by QA Head.

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