Programme and Project Management

Introduction

Programme and Project Management are closely related disciplines, but they represent
different perspectives with their way of defining “success”. According to Project Management
Institute (2017), project is “a temporary endeavour undertaken to create a unique product,
service, or result. The temporary nature of projects indicates a beginning and an end to the
project work or a phase of the project work. Projects can stand alone or be part of a program or
portfolio”. While programmes could be described as “a temporary, flexible organisation created
to coordinate, direct and oversee the implementation of a set of related projects and activities in
order to deliver outcomes and benefits related to strategic objectives”. This distinction is widely
recognised in programme management literature, where projects focus on producing outputs,
whereas programmes aim to achieve strategic change through coordinated benefits realisation
(AXELOS, 2011; Pellegrinelli, 2011). Based on this distinction, the Elizabeth Line is best
understood as a programme rather than a single project, because it was conceived to deliver a set
of interrelated benefits that would reshape London’s transport network and wider socio-
economic system. It was delivered under the name of Crossrail, and consisted of multiple major
projects, which included central section tunnelling, rolling stock and depot, surface route
upgrade, etc (Tucker, 2017). These elements formed a highly interdependent structure requiring
strategic oversight rather than isolated project control. The purpose of this report is to critically
evaluate the Elizabeth Line programme through the lens of programme and project management
theory. It will assess the extent to which the programme can be considered a success, not only in
terms of traditional delivery performance, but also in relation to strategic objectives and benefits
realisation. To achieve this, the report first explores theoretical interpretations of success, before
applying them to Crossrail. The report will then analyse key strategic factors that influenced the
programme’s outcome, with particular emphasis on governance, complexity and stakeholder
environment, before drawing out recommendations for future major infrastructure programmes
and summarising the overall implications of the analysis.

Definition of Success in the Context of Crossrail

Table 1 summarises the key differences between project and programme success
perspectives.

Dimension Project Programme Implications for Crossrail

Management Management
 Perspective Perspective
Core objective Deliver a defined Deliver strategic Focus shifts from opening
output outcomes and benefits date to long-term transport
and economic impact
Definition of On time, on Benefits realised and Delays tolerated if benefits
success budget, to scope strategic alignment achieved
Time horizon Short-term Long-term (pre- and Benefits assessed years after
(delivery phase) post-delivery) opening
Performance Cost, schedule, Benefits, outcomes, Traditional KPIs insufficient
metrics quality stakeholder value alone
Governance Control and Strategic alignment Requires adaptive governance
emphasis efficiency and change
management
Relevant PMBOK, MSP, PMI Crossrail aligns more closely
standards PRINCE2 Programme Standard with programme standards
Table 1. Comparison of Project and Programme Success Perspectives

To strengthen this evaluation, it is useful to incorporate multidimensional perspectives on

success. Shenhar and Dvir (2001) argue that project and programme success should be assessed
across four evolving dimensions: project efficiency, impact on the customer, business and
organisational success, and preparation for the future. This model is particularly relevant for
megaprojects whose full benefits materialise years after completion. Under this framework,
delays or cost increases may represent shortcomings in one dimension but do not necessarily
undermine broader programme success.

Figure 1. Multidimensional model of project and programme success (adapted from

Shenhar & Dvir, 2001).

When assessed primarily from a programme perspective rather than a project delivery
viewpoint, the Crossrail programme can be considered a qualified success. This evaluation was
based on acceptance of long-term benefits that aligns with strategic goals of the programme,
overlooking the failures of short-term metrics with operational efficiency that created serious
doubts about Crossrail construction performance. According to William Tucker (2017), who was
one of the senior directors at Crossrail programme, the vision was more than just build a modern
railway network that would increase London’s subway performance and capacity. Both the
mayor and government of London asserted through principles of statement, that the scheme
would stimulate the city’s economic growth, regenerate key areas and London’s status as global
financial hub. This is consistent with MSP and PMI principles which define programme success
in terms of benefits realisation and strategic alignment (AXELOS, 2011; PMI, 2017).

Crossrail was a £14.8 billion pounds railway project connecting Southeast part of
England from Reading to Abbey Wood and Shenfield through central London. It involved
construction of 37 stations and 42 km of tunnel. The operation of new trains was planned to be
involved into the existing network until the full opening of Elizabeth Line in December 2018
(Dodgson et al., 2015). However, it failed to achieve its original delivery schedule and exceeded
allocated budget significantly due to the several reasons that would be discussed in this paper
below. These inefficiencies align with common megaproject challenges identified by Flyvbjerg
(2014), including optimism bias and underestimation of systems-integration risk. From a project
efficiency perspective, these delays and cost overruns indicate underperformance. The 2018
revelation that the programme was not genuinely “95% complete” further damaged perceptions
of delivery success and highlighted weaknesses in governance and readiness reporting.

However, evaluating Crossrail only on these grounds disregards the substantial long-term
benefits realised after opening. Crossrail programme demonstrated a pure success when
compared along with long-term benefits realisation and strategic impact for the overall UK
prosperity. It fully opened in May 2022 and outperformed expectations by enabling more than
100 million journeys in eight months, which is daily passengers’ volume of approximately
650,000 compared with 500,000 daily users’ expectation. It will boost UK economy by
contributing £42 billion, and created 55,000 new job places, ensuring that benefits of this major
infrastructure initiative were distributed across the whole country (Association for Project
Management, 2023). These achievements reflect strong performance across Shenhar and Dvir’s
customer satisfaction and business success dimensions, and demonstrate substantial societal
value, as further supported by the House of Commons (2024) report highlighting regeneration
and employment impacts.

(b) Critically analyse 3–4 factors that contributed to the overall outcome (≈1,280
words)
 Elizabeth Line programme outcome demonstrates a delivery failure recovery benefits
success route which is common in complex infrastructure programmes in which early strategy is
challenged by operational reality. According to programme management theory, the outcomes
are influenced by unique yet interconnected areas: governance/decision rights, delivery
integration capability and the environment of stakeholders/sponsorship (AXELOS, 2011; PMI,
2017).

Success Dimension Description Evidence from Crossrail

Project efficiency Performance against cost and Significant cost overruns and
schedule delayed opening
Impact on customer User satisfaction and service High ridership and improved
quality journey times
Business & Contribution to organisational £42bn economic contribution
organisational success and economic goals and regeneration
Preparation for the Long-term capability and Increased network capacity
future strategic positioning and resilience
Table 2. Application of Shenhar & Dvir’s Success Dimensions to Crossrail

Each factor is analysed independently to avoid overlap and to assess the strength of
programme strategy.

Factor A

The governance structure that contributed to the failure of the early delivery of Crossrail
is the design of governance, which is the lack of decision-rights and the lack of accountability of
various institutions. Its governance under MSP must signal who makes what decisions, that there
is proper assurance and escalation of decisions and that it keeps up with its strategy across the
lifecycle (AXELOS, 2011). Governance in Crossrail was in a joint sponsorship environment
(DfT and TfL) and a complicated delivery ecosystem. According to the institutional theory, when
there are two or more sources of authority, the programmes become polycentric (have
fragmented oversight and divergent actors who act based on different logics (political legitimacy,
engineering performance, cost control) (Biesenthal et al., 2018). It becomes more difficult to
have coherent strategic control and it is more likely that it will misreport, delay decisions and
have misaligned priorities.

These were the features of Crossrail. The public story of preparedness and control
continued in the programme until 2018, when it was realized that the system was not
operationally prepared as much as high levels of reported completion were. According to the
report of London Assembly, the challenge of ineffective governance and weak transparency is
one of the primary factors that led to the discovery of gaps in readiness only at the end (London
Assembly, 2019). The failure was not merely technical in the terms of programme strategy in
that the governance arrangements failed to generate strong incentives and processes of truthful
reporting and timely escalation. This weakness in governance was supported by the ongoing
obsession with a deadline in public view and promoted optimistic reporting and discouraged bad
news, which is also typical of the dynamics of optimism bias in mega-projects (Flyvbjerg, 2014).

The recovery phase helps to conclude that initially the strategy of governance was weak.
Once the control and accountability of decision-making were tightened, the confidence was
restored and more real reporting was placed, the programme came back under control and moved
on to completion (APM, 2023). Thus, Factor A is a strong indicator of weak programme strategy
early (the design of governance is inappropriate when transitioning to operational readiness), and
a strategic correction that resulted in an increase in performance.

Factor B

This part is about how the programme was designed to attain operational readiness,
especially systems integration and commissioning. Programme theory acknowledges the
necessity of complex programmes to have been delivered in stages and highly integrated
management of interdependent projects and suppliers (PMI, 2017). The key delivery issue faced
by Crossrail was to integrate a number of technologies (signalling, rolling stock, stations, control
systems) to create a single safe railway. Complexity research states that failure in tightly coupled
systems occurs at interfaces and propagates via schedules and testing plans (Miller and Lessard,
2001; Nyarirangwe et al., 2019). Figure 2 illustrates how failures at subsystem interfaces can
propagate across a complex system-of-systems, escalating local issues into programme-wide
delays during integration and commissioning.

Figure 2. Illustration of interface-driven risk propagation in complex infrastructure

programmes.
 Although originally developed for system-of-systems risk analysis, this model is directly
applicable to large infrastructure programmes such as Crossrail, where multiple interdependent
subsystems must operate reliably as a single integrated railway.

Crossrail failed to estimate the time and uncertainty of testing and commissioning a
multi-system railway. According to the official and practitioner commentary on Crossrail, it is
clear that construction progress was frequently viewed as operational readiness, despite the fact
that commissioning relies on system reliability, documentation, safety validation and operational
rehearsals. According to the results of the London Assembly, the process of change between
build and test was not adequately monitored, and the readiness tests were excessively positive
(London Assembly, 2019). This aligns with the thesis that most megaprojects do not get the risk
of integration as high as they consider manifested in civil progress (Flyvbjerg, 2014).

The strategy viewpoint weakness was the lack of a conservative and gradual approach to
commissioning early enough. Had the programme strategy handled testing as an integral,
protracted period with defined contingency - as opposed to the last phase after construction - the
scheduled 2018 opening would have been represented more truly to life. This is implicitly
recognized in the later recovery phase: the line opened in phases and with more realistic testing
windows, which is a sign that it is transitioning to a more mature integration strategy (APM,
2023). Factor B is thus a weak early programme strategy of complexity and integration
management which is subsequently superseded by stronger, more realistic delivery strategy.

Factor C

This factor is concerned with external pressure as a source of strategy, rather than
governance mechanisms or technical integration. Sponsors of programmes set standards of
success, risk tolerance and escalation standards. In PMI and MSP, strategic alignment is done by
sponsors, and they facilitate an environment in which risks may be raised or challenged
(AXELOS, 2011; PMI, 2017). Nonetheless, the stakeholder theory implies that programme
behaviour changes to the narrative management instead of risk realism when high-power
stakeholders have pressing political or reputational interests (Mitchell et al., 1997; Freeman,
1984).

Sponsors and political forces of Crossrail were under intense pressure to showcase
improvement and remain positive about a flagship venture. This symbolically raised the
reputational cost of acknowledging delay and made the promised opening date symbolically
significant. The stakeholder salience theory describes why some actors (such as the government,
mayoral leadership, business/public groups with a view of getting benefits) might prevail in the
decision-making process because of their power, legitimacy and urgency (Mitchell et al., 1997).
In these conditions, it is possible to postpone escalation since the recognition of issues may turn
out to be politically expensive. This dynamic aids in understanding the lack of full confrontation
of readiness issues until late 2018, despite alarming symptoms. According to the London
Assembly report, this interpretation is supported by the fact that the situation at the time of the
decision was quite political and that it was not transparent in the early days (London Assembly,
2019).

Simultaneously, pressure of sponsorship and stakeholders also produced eventual

success. The political salience of the same ensured that the funding remained stable over the
years and that it remained strategically committed over the years to be able to sustain itself
through any uncertainty and eventually bring about benefits. The conclusion is based on the fact
that the strategic objectives have been finally met according to the post-opening numbers, such
as high ridership and expanded regeneration benefits (APM, 2023; House of Commons, 2024).
Thus, Factor C is ambivalent: on the one hand, it made the long-term success possible out of the
long-term commitment, on the other hand, it made the short-term failure worthy of attention by
fostering the development of unrealistic expectations and preventing the timely escalation.

(c) Evaluation and Recommendations on the Use of Programme and Project

Management Best Practices
As an example of the impact of the belated implementation of the established best
practices in programme and project management, the Elizabeth Line programme can be used to
explain how the eventual delivery difficulties can occur despite the eventual realisation of long-
term strategic benefits. Although the programme ultimately managed to provide transformational
results, the previous and more stringent application of accepted standards and theories would
have minimised the scope of the schedule slippage, budget surges and image loss. This part
analyses whether, in case the programme management practices, as laid down in the first place,
would have helped prevent or mitigated the issues encountered.
One of the key lessons of Crossrail is related to the use of Managing Successful
Programmes (MSP) principles of governance. MSP also stresses the existence of accountability,
good decision rights and constant alignment of strategic goals and delivery realities of the whole
programme lifecycle (AXELOS, 2011). In Crossrail, governance structures were first typified by
diluted power among multiple sponsoring organisations and absence of effective critique of
delivery optimism. Though there were senior leadership positions, the overall accountability in
the process of making readiness decisions was not concentrated enough, which undermined the
capabilities of the process of escalation and speedy identification of integration risks. The use of
MSP model of governance and especially clarity of empowerment of one responsible owner and
greater independence of assurance could have enhanced transparency and minimized optimism
bias through earlier adoption of the model. The indication that the governance strengthened in
the recovery phase with better reporting and assurance processes is the indication that application
of MSP principles earlier may have helped avoid scale of delay that was experienced.
 Besides the issue of governance, the programme would have been more effectively
applied in terms of benefits realisation management since the very beginning. The MSP and the
Project Management Institute (PMI) state that the benefits should be the motivators of these
programmes, which are actively managed, reviewed and utilised to make strategic decisions
(AXELOS, 2011; PMI, 2017). As much as the strategic benefits of Crossrail were clearly stated,
decisions concerning the delivery process used to be sequence-driven instead of being
operational preparedness-based and long-term value-driven. A more grown-up benefits oriented
strategy would have involved formal ownership of benefits, more defined benefit profiles and
periodic benefits reviews, associated with milestones in delivering the benefits. This may have
justified previous choices of the need to change the opening strategies towards reliability and
safety, as opposed to the need to sustain unrealistic deadlines, and make delivery more in line
with the success criteria of the programme.
Another area where the best practice might have been applied better is risk and
complexity management. Both PMI and ISO 31000 present risk management as a process that is
continuous and organisation-wide, instead of a technical matter that takes place within individual
work streams (ISO, 2018; PMI, 2017). The greatest risks that Crossrail had were experienced
within systems integration and commissioning, but they were not addressed as dominant
strategic risks early enough. The research on megaprojects always indicates that the main causes
of delay in complex infrastructure programmes are integration and interface risks (Flyvbjerg,
2014). The use of systemic risk management methodologies, such as scenario planning,
conservative testing assumptions and explicit contingency in software and systems integration,
should have been implemented earlier to enhance realism in programme schedules and minimise
the disruption at the end of the schedule.
In the same vein, programme strategy is to have commissioning and integration as the
critical delivery stage overtly recognised. The complexity-conscious programme management
theory contends that in highly coupled systems, like urban railways, operational preparedness
must be used to regulate programme pacing instead of civil construction advancement (Miller
and Lessard, 2001; Nyarirangwe et al., 2019). Crossrail was in the habit of perceiving
construction milestones as signs of general progress, although it was not operating as well as it
should. This knowledge can be seen coming out later in the introduction of staged opening and
longer testing times. The incorporation of such an approach more in the earlier stages as a
common practice would have averted unrealistic pledges by the population and the minimal
effect.
Lastly, the role of the stakeholder and sponsor has been enhanced with better ability,
which would have helped in reducing the effect of political pressure on the programme strategy.
The stakeholder theory attracts attention to the role of high power and urgency actors in
perverting decision-making when the success criteria are relatively small and focused on
symbolic milestones (Mitchell et al., 1997). The crossrail project provided instances of political
and reputational pressure that supported a culture of meeting the deadlines instead of increasing
the issues of readiness prematurely. The best practice does not aim at elimination of political
influence, but it aims at containing it with well spelt success measures, open-ended escalation
procedures and mutual interpretation of acceptable risk. Previous consensus between sponsors on
the criteria of success was based on operational preparedness and benefits realisation that would
have minimised incentives to report positively.
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Appendices
Appendix A

Appendix B
Appendix C

Appendix D